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cipfa.org.uk CIPFA London Division Delivering the Spending Review 7th March 2011 cipfa.org.uk Welcome & introductions Peter Gilmour Chairman CIPFA London Division cipfa.org.uk \Agenda Now Chief Executive’s perspective of the spending review realities – Kevin Crompton 10:30am CIPFA London Division AGM Business 10:35am Tax, Inflate, Confiscate - Andrew Cole 11:00am The finance officer’s role in managing finance and change - Chris Bilsland 11:30am Panel Debate 12:00pm Buffet Lunch cipfa.org.uk Chief Executive’s perspective of the spending review realities Kevin Crompton Chief Executive LB of Haringey cipfa.org.uk \Agenda Now CIPFA London Division AGM Business 10:35am Tax, Inflate, Confiscate - Andrew Cole 11:00am The finance officer’s role in managing finance and change - Chris Bilsland 11:30am Panel Debate 12:00pm Buffet Lunch cipfa.org.uk CIPFA London Annual General Meeting Peter Gilmour Chair CIPFA London division cipfa.org.uk \Agenda Now Tax, Inflate, Confiscate - Andrew Cole 11:00am The finance officer’s role in managing finance and change - Chris Bilsland 11:30am Panel Debate 12:00pm Buffet Lunch cipfa.org.uk Tax, Inflate, Confiscate Andrew Cole Lead manager of the Barings Multi Asset Fund Barings Asset Management Not just in the UK A G7 Challenge Our forecast Every G7 sovereign will pursue Fiscal Austerity (Tax) Every G7 sovereign will Print (Inflate) Every G7 sovereign will Default (Confiscate) Every G7 Government struggling with the same issues. Source: Barings, as at 2nd November 2010 9 The issues? Which way out of a debt crisis? 120 Sovereign Debt to GDP for G7 nations 1950 - 2009 Debt/ GDP (%) 100 80 60 40 20 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Sovereign Debt to GDP in the G7 Source: Fathom and OECD, June 2010 10 What causes these crises? Excessive debt Excessive interest payments Measured by debt to GDP or to revenue or to exports Measured by debt service to GDP or to tax revenue Excessive reliance on foreign capital Measure by debt to exports or net international investment position 11 What causes these crises? Economic weakness Low growth Low returns on private sector investment Political weakness Excessive expenditure and insufficient taxation are politically determined Irrational exuberance Investors keep forgetting to learn from history 12 In theory, 4 ways out A higher growth rate of GDP Fiscal pain, meaning an increase in taxes and/or a cut in public spending Increased Seigniorage, the increased printing of money by the central bank leading to inflation. Default, including every form of non-compliance with the original terms of the debt contract, including repudiation, standstill, moratorium, restructuring, rescheduling of interest or principal repayment etc. Source: Barings 2010 13 Actually, only 3 ways out A higher growth rate of GDP Fiscal pain, meaning an increase in taxes and/or a cut in public spending Increased recourse to seigniorage (printing money) by the central bank Default, including every form of non-compliance with the original terms of the debt contract, including repudiation, standstill, moratorium, restructuring, rescheduling of interest or principal repayment etc. Tax, Inflate, Confiscate Source: Buiter (2010) 14 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #1: Fiscal Pain Government Primary Balances 1970 – 2009 (%GDP) Govt Primary Balances to Stabilise Debt/GDP by 2020 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 -5 -5 -10 -10 -15 1970 1980 UK 1990 Japan 2000 US 2010 2020 Germany -15 15yr Av to ‘07 UK 2010 US 60% Target Japan Source: OECD and Barings, June 2010. Primary surplus targets to stabilize government debt/ GDP ratios assume Barings trend real growth rates of 1% in Japan, 2.3% in US, 2.2% in UK, and 1.5% in Germany. It is assumed that real interest rates are 1%. The projections take IMF assessments of current government debt. Net debt has been used for Japan, gross debt for others. 80% Target Germany 15 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #1: Fiscal Pain GDP Growth vs Previous Trend Real Growth by Deleveraging Strategy 7 6 105 5 GDP Growth (%) 100 95 90 85 4 3 2 1 - -1 80 -2 75 -3 -4 70 t=0 t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 t+12 t+14 Belt tightening 10yr pre 1-2 yrs 2-3 yrs 4-5 yrs Trend +10yr Belt tightening Source: McKinsey & Matt King - Citigroup, Arresting the Sovereign Avalanche?, June 2010. 16 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #1: Fiscal Pain 6 2.1 5.5 1.9 5 1.7 4.5 1.5 4 1.3 3.5 1.1 3 0.9 2.5 0.7 2 Jun 07 Japan YTM (%) Yield to Maturity (YTM) (%) Ten Year Government Bond Yields June 2007 – December 2010 0.5 Dec 07 Jun 08 10yr Treasury Dec 08 10yr Germany Jun 09 Dec 09 10yr UK Gilt Jun 10 Dec 10 10yr Japan (RHS) Source: Bloomberg, as at 31st December 2010 17 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #2: Print Central Bank Total Balance Sheet as % of Annual Nominal GDP APF Federal Reserve 25 Phase II Lehman Euro System 20 Bank of England (a) 15 10 5 0 Jun 2006 Oct Feb Jun Oct 2007 Feb Jun Oct Feb Jun 2008 Oct 2009 Source: Bank of England, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech413.pdf , 2nd December 2009. (a) Excludes loans and associated deposits in course of settlement. 18 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #2: Print China Real M1 Growth (yoy) & Chinese Producer Price Inflation (yoy) lagged by 9 mths 40 45 35 30 20 25 10 20 15 0 10 5 -10 0 -20 -5 Sep 98 Sep 99 Sep 00 Sep 01 Sep 02 Sep 03 PPI (9 month lag) Sep 04 Sep 05 Sep 06 Sep 07 Sep 08 Sep 09 Sep 10 China Real M1 Source: Barings as at 31st December 2010 19 Real M1 YoY Producer Price Inflation (%) 40 30 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #2: Print 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 -5 -5 -10 -10 Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 US PPI UK PPI Correlation of PPI annual changes 2000 – 2010 China PPI yoy % chg YoY % Change YoY Change in PPIs for China, US, EU & UK 1999 – 2010 CH US EU UK CH US 0.82 EU 0.82 0.81 UK 0.57 0.67 0.53 China PPI (RHS) Eurostat PPI Eurozone China inflates the World Source: Bloomberg and Barings, 31st December 2010 20 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #2: Print 4.5 1 Breakeven Inflation Rate (%) 4 0 3.5 3 -1 2.5 2 -2 1.5 -3 1 0.5 -4 0 -0.5 Jun 07 Japanese Breakeven Inflation Rate (%) Breakeven Inflation Rates 30th June 2007 – 31st December 2010 -5 Dec 07 Jun 08 Dec 08 Jun 09 Dec 09 Jun 10 Dec 10 US 10yr Breakeven Inflation UK 10yr Breakeven Inflation Italy 10yr Breakeven Inflation Japan 8yr Breakeven Inflation (RHS) Source: Bloomberg and Barings, as at 31st December 2010 21 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #2: Fiscal Pain GDP Growth vs Previous Trend Real Growth by Deleveraging Strategy 7 6 105 5 GDP Growth (%) 100 95 90 85 4 3 2 1 - -1 80 -2 75 -3 -4 70 t=0 t+2 t+4 t+6 Belt tightening t+8 t+10 t+12 t+14 Inflation 10yr pre 1-2 yrs 2-3 yrs Belt tightening 4-5 yrs Inflation Source: McKinsey & Matt King - Citigroup, Arresting the Sovereign Avalanche?, June 2010. 22 Trend +10yr Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #3: Default 5yr Credit Default Swap Spreads – Eurozone Periphery 5 year CDS Spread (bps) 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 Jun 07 Dec 07 Jun 08 Greece Dec 08 Portugal Jun 09 Ireland Dec 09 Spain Jun 10 Dec 10 Italy Source: Bloomberg, as at 31st December 2010 23 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #3: Default 5yr Credit Default Swap Spreads – G5 5 year CDS Spread (bps) 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Jun 07 Dec 07 Jun 08 France Dec 08 Germany Jun 09 UK Dec 09 US Jun 10 Dec 10 Japan Source: Bloomberg, as at 31st December 2010 24 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #3: Default Market Value of Over The Counter Derivatives Outstanding 1999 – 2009 35,000 US$ Billion 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 Jun 98 Jun 00 Jun 02 Credit Default Swaps Jun 04 Commodity Contracts Foreign Exchange Contracts Jun 06 Jun 08 Equity-Linked Contracts Interest Rate Contracts Source: Bank of International Settlements & Barings, as at 30th June 2010 25 Debt Crisis, ways out. Option #3: Fiscal Pain GDP Growth vs Previous Trend Real Growth by Deleveraging Strategy 7 6 105 5 GDP Growth (%) 100 95 90 85 4 3 2 1 - -1 80 -2 75 -3 -4 70 t=0 t+2 t+4 Belt tightening t+6 t+8 t+10 Inflation t+12 t+14 Default 10yr pre 1-2 yrs Belt tightening 2-3 yrs 4-5 yrs Inflation Trend +10yr Default Source: McKinsey & Matt King - Citigroup, Arresting the Sovereign Avalanche?, June 2010. 26 Which way? Example: UK Taxation: Inflation: Emergency Budget of June 2010 sees government departments cutting spending by 25%, and personal taxes have risen. Bank of England & HM Treasury have swapped traditional roles, with BoE underpinning nominal GDP growth Confiscation: Default on non-tradable contractual obligations: public sector pension defaults; public sector contract ‘renegotiations’ to come. It’s here and now Source: Barings, as at 2nd November 2010 27 Summary and Conclusion There is no easy way to deleverage Although markets are busy deciding which will be the route of choice, governments will commit the all three sovereign sins: Taxation Inflation Confiscation For Investors and Savers, the outcomes have quite different portfolio implications (often represented by the inflation/deflation debate) Markets will likely swing from one extreme to the other as evidence emerges supporting each route Understanding the risk premium on different assets will be an increasingly important discipline. Source: Barings, as at 2nd November 2010 28 Biography Andrew Cole Member of the Multi-Asset Team Location: London Investment Experience: 32 Years Andrew is a member of the Multi Asset Team responsible for the management of multi asset portfolios. He is lead manager on a number of segregated portfolios. Andrew was appointed to the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), the company’s global macro research and asset allocation team in 2005. He is chair of the SPG Risk Sub Group and is a member of the Economic Group. Both groups provide key inputs to the debate of the monthly SPG meetings. Andrew joined the Fixed Income department at Baring Asset Management in 1986. He was appointed a Director in 1994 and joined the Multi Asset portfolio team in 1995. 29 Important Information For Professional Investors/Advisers only. 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Version 03/2009 Compliance (London) 4th November 2010 30 cipfa.org.uk \Agenda Now The finance officer’s role in managing finance and change - Chris Bilsland 11:30am Panel Debate 12:00pm Buffet Lunch cipfa.org.uk The finance officers role in managing Finance and Change Chris Bilsland Chamberlain City of London Corporation The 3 Key Tasks Balance the Budget Manage the Budget Deliver the Change Agenda Balancing the Budget Its not just the numbers…… ….But the forecast risks and assumptions • Credibility of savings proposals • Adequacy of reserves and balances • Interest rates, pay awards, price inflation • Resource Review (LAs) • Council Tax Yield (LAs) Managing the Budget Savings Come First Active Management – savings plan Intervention not monitoring Dynamic reporting on risk areas Delivering the Change Agenda Shared services plan Investment in new technology Ways of working, productivity and buildings Dynamic reporting on risk areas Procurement Income management Communication Concluding Thought Scenario Planning Lets start at 2015 and work backwards This is not the time to think we can simply roll today’s plans forward 4 years cipfa.org.uk \Agenda Now Panel Debate 12:00pm Buffet Lunch cipfa.org.uk Panel Debate cipfa.org.uk CIPFA London Division www.CIPFALondonDivision.org.uk Thank you for attending