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 Peloponnesian War: Sparta Model United Nations at Chapel Hill (MUNCH) 2014 – Carolina International Relations Association Carolina International Relations Association MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Welcome from the Committee Directors Dear Delegates, Hello and welcome to MUNCH 2014! My name is Cole Wilhelmi, and I am thrilled to be chairing the Spartan committee for the Peloponnesian War JCC. I am currently a Sophomore majoring in Biology and Political Science, with two years of competitive Model United Nations experience. My goal for the conference is to combine history and debate into an engaging crisis committee as we simulate the epic battles and political intrigue of ancient Greece, and we look forward to having you join us. Following the final triumph of the Greeks against the Persians in 479 BCE, Sparta and Athens stood as the foremost powers on the Aegean peninsula. A tenuous peace has been established, but now, the two greatest nations in Greece are in a race to economic and military superiority. We, Sparta, must use our military strength and alliance network to counter Athenian influence and place ourselves as the region’s dominant power. Delegates in this committee will be representing the most powerful leaders in Sparta in the 5th century BCE, and must use all the resources as their disposal to guide the economic, political, and military fate of the nation. We hope that this committee will be challenging, fun, and dynamic, as we relive and try to reshape the events of Ancient Greece, hopefully in Sparta’s favor. Sincerely, Cole Wilhelmi-­‐ Chair MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Background Guide Historical Background The Greek Civilization The people who would eventually become the Greeks began migrating from the Balkans into the Achaean peninsula (“mainland” Greece) around 2,000 BC1 They came in three different ethnic groups, each speaking a unique dialect of Greek: first the Ionians, who would later found Athens, then the Achaeans, and finally the Dorians, who would later found Sparta. As the first arrivals settled into towns around the peninsula, they developed what is known as the Mycenaean civilization, best remembered for their destruction of Troy in Homer’s epic Illiad. Yet they also weakened themselves through constant warfare, allowing the Dorians, the latest ethnic group to enter Greece, to sweep in and overrun the Mycenaean cities around the twelfth century BC. The next three hundred years would be labeled by historians as the Dark Age of Greece: cities were abandoned, trade networks collapsed, and art and literacy vanished.2 Yet also during this time, many Greeks migrated from mainland Greece to the west coast of Asia Minor in modern-­‐day Turkey, thus beginning Greek colonization. The pace of colonization advanced when Greek civilization began to recover around 800 BC. The period of 800-­‐500 BC, known as the Archaic Age of Greece, saw the establishment of colonies throughout the Mediterranean and Black Seas by the cities in mainland Greece.3 Colonization was especially prolific on the west coast of Asia Minor and in southern Italy and Sicily, but included colonies as far afield as Saguntum on the east coast of modern Spain, Trapezus in eastern Asia Minor, and Tanais at the mouth of the Don River in modern Ukraine. 1
John Chadwick, The Mycenean World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). Pg. 2. Robin Waterfield, Athens: A History (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004). Pp. 37-­‐39. 3
Ibid, 40-­‐41. 2
MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Greek Colonies, 600 BC4 coursesa.matrix.msu.edu
During the Archaic Age, a fundamental social, political, and military revolution also transformed Greece and its colonies. Whereas the cities of Mycenaean Greece had effectively been little kingdoms, ruled by a king and his nobility, in the resurgence of Greek civilization the larger citizenry increasingly came to dominate political affairs. The result was the development of the polis, or city-­‐state, ruled to some degree by an assembly of all citizens (typically defined as property-­‐owning males).5 Implicit in the polis was the development of the phalanx military formation. The military specifics of the phalanx will be discussed later, but as the formation requires a large core of citizen-­‐soldiers rather than a small aristocratic elite, the citizens’ importance in war translated into greater political power in the assembly. The citizen assembly dominated politics to different extents in different cities—typically more so in 4
The territories labeled as Phoenician colonies are, at the time of this committee, the Carthaginian Empire. Kurt Raaflaub, “Archaic and Classical Greece,” in War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, ed. Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein (Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, Trustees for Harvard University, 1999): 129-­‐148. 5
MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Athens, and less so in Sparta—and aristocratic or monarchical elites remained in some city-­‐states, such as Sparta, but in almost all Greek cities, the citizenry became regarded as the core of political authority. As a result, magistrates and bodies entrusted with the actual execution of government—including these war councils—cannot perpetually ignore the will of the people. The Persian Wars and the Development of the Alliances As the poleis continued to develop and Greek civilization entered its Classical Age in the mid-­‐
sixth century BC, the greatest empire the world had yet seen emerged far to the East. Under the leadership of Cyrus the Great, the Persian Empire conquered lands from the Himalayas to Europe, including the Greek colonies on the shores of Asia Minor. 6 Cyrus’ grandson Darius also forced Macedon, a kingdom directly north of the Greek mainland, to submit as a vassal state. The Persians divided their empire into 26 Satrapies, each ruled by a Satrap who usually exercised a wide degree of autonomy. Satrapies of the Persian Empire, 500 BC 6
Waterfield, 63. MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta The Persian conquest of the Greek colonies of Asia Minor, which were mainly incorporated into the Satrapy of Ionia, brought the new empire into conflict with the Greek mainland cities. In 499, Athens send a small fleet and army to assist a revolt of Greek cities against the Persian Empire, which was defeated but aroused the wrath of the Emperor Darius.7 Darius assembled a large invasion force to burn Athens to the ground, but it was defeated by the heavily outnumbered Athenian army at the Battle of Marathon, when the heavy Greek phalanx proved superior to the lightly-­‐armed Persians in close quarters.8 After Darius’ death, his son Xerxes carried on his father’s quest for revenge, and in 481, he led an army of 300,000 men overland from north into Greece, supplied by a fleet of 1,000 ships.9 While many Greek cities defected to the Persians or maintained their neutrality, thirty-­‐one states formed an alliance to resist the invaders, nominating the Spartans to lead the alliance. Although the Persian army reached Athens and razed it to the ground, the Athenian populace was withdrawn to the island of Salamis, where Athens’ outnumbered fleet defeated the Persian fleet, forcing the Persian army to withdraw for lack of supplies. Yet after the defeat of the Persians, the Greek coalition broke into two factions: one led by Athens, and one led by Sparta. 10 After the Persians were expelled and their supply base at Byzantium was captured, the Spartans and their allies—almost all from mainland Greece—desired to return home to their cities. 11 The remaining states, including many of the newly liberated colonies, then nominated the Athenians to lead the alliance and continued to prosecute the war, leading a new revolt of the Greek cities within the Persian Empire. In 477, meeting at the island of Delos, the Athenians and their new partners formed a new alliance—the Delian League—with the purpose of freeing the remaining Greeks 7
Waterfield, 64. Waterfield, 66. 9
Waterfield, 68. 10
Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, ed. Richard Livingstone (London: Oxford University Press, 1981). 1.18. 11
Thucydidies, 1.89. 8
MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta under Persian rule. 12 The members of the League were required to contribute either money or warships to the League to fund the continuing expeditions against Persia. As most chose to contribute money, Athens was left with almost a monopoly on naval power within the League, and began using this dominance to coerce other cities join the League, and to prevent current members from leaving. When a city “rebelled” by attempting to leave the League or refusing to make payments, Athens used its superior force to besiege the rebels, often razing the city and selling the inhabitants into slavery upon victory, and at the very least forcing the city to tear down its walls to obviate future resistance. Yet usually, the threat of a trade embargo, enforced by the Athenian Navy, was enough to bend minor cities towards Athens’ will. Meanwhile, the ostensibly “League” treasury was transferred to Athens itself, and used partly to rebuild the city and its walls. The Delian League had evolved from an alliance of equal partners into an Athenian Empire. On the other hand, while Sparta’s alliance—known as the Peloponnesian League—had existed before the Persian Wars, it did not consist of a single, formal body like the Delian League, but rather a loose coalition of states held together by individual alliances with Sparta. 13 Neither were the Spartans’ allies required to make payments to Sparta; rather, the Peloponnesian League was a more strictly military and foreign policy alliance. Decisions on the making of war, peace, treaties and foreign policy belonged to the alliance’s assembly, which was only convened when called by the Spartans. Sparta thus used this authority, and its vastly superior army, to maintain its leadership of the alliance. The “First” Peloponnesian War and the Thirty Years Peace Conflict first broke out between the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues in 460 BC, in what became known as the First Peloponnesian War but was really a series of minor wars.14 It began when 12
Waterfield, 76-­‐77. Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Penguin, 2003). Pg. 4. 14
Kagan, 16. 13
MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta two allies of Sparta, Corinth and Megara, went to war over their boundary, and Megara, facing defeat, abandoned the Peloponnesian League and joined the Delian League. Sparta was not directly involved at first, until Megara defected from Athens and returned to the Peloponnesian League, and a Spartan army led by King Pleistoanax marched into Attica, the region of Athens. When the Spartan army returned home without engaging the Athenians in battle, the Spartans believed Pleistoanax had been bribed by the Athenians and subsequently exiled him. Nonetheless, Sparta and Athens concluded a treaty, the Thirty Years’ Peace, within a few months, in 445. The Thirty Years’ Peace formally established a balance of power between the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues. Both Athens and Sparta—on behalf of their allies—recognized the legitimacy of the other’s alliance, and members of both alliances were forbidden to switch sides, as Megara had done.15 Yet neutral cities could still join either alliance, and thus Athens and Sparta continued to compete in recruiting new members. Breakdown of the Peace The chain of events that would launch the Peloponnesian War began at the Greek colony of Epidamnus, far from the Greek mainland in the Adriatic Sea. A civil conflict between rival democratic and oligarchic factions had broken out in Epidamnus in 436, and the democrats had requested support from both the island city of Corcyra, a neutral city, and Corinth, still a member of the Peloponnesian League.16 The Corcyraeans refused the offer, but when the Corinthians offered their support, the Corcyraeans in turn offered to support the oligarchic faction, and sent a fleet to assist in the defeat of the democrats and the expulsion of the Corinthian advisors. They furthermore defeated the Corinthian fleet and army sent to relieve Epidamnus. Corinth responded by taking two years to rebuild its own 15
Kagan, 18. Kagan, 25. 16
MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta fleet to be superior to Corcyra’s, which prompted Corcyra to seek an alliance with Athens against Corinth. In September 433, ambassadors from Corcyra spoke to the Athenian assembly to encourage them to accept their offer of alliance, while ambassadors from Corinth spoke to dissuade the Athenians from the Corcyraeans’ proposal.17 The Corcyraeans’ arguments prevailed, not because Athens had extensive benefits to gain from the alliance, but because they feared the possibility of Corinthian victory leading to the capture of the Corcyraean fleet, which could have threatened Athenian naval hegemony. Thus, Athens agreed to send a small force of ten ships to assist Corcyra, hoping merely to deter further Corinthian involvement. The Corinthians nonetheless defeated the Corcyraean fleet, and their new Athenian allies, at the Battle of Sybota that same month. The Corinthian fleet prepared to finish off the enemy fleet and invade Corcyra, but returned to Corinth when thirty additional Athenian ships arrived, fearing fighting alone against Athens and Corcyra. That winter, in response to the threat posed by Corinth, Athens moved to secure its hold over the Corinthian colony of Potidaea, a member of the Delian League, on the north coast of the Aegean near Macedon.18 The Athenians ordered the Potidaeans to tear down their walls, dismiss the Corinthian magistrates in the city, and send hostages to Athens to guarantee their good behavior. The Potidaeans objected and attempted to delay Athenian action through negotiation, while using their Corinthian advisors to secretly petition the Spartans for aid. Before long, however, the Athenians grew impatient and ordered a force they had deployed near Macedon to besiege Potidaea to enforce their demands. The Corinthians did not respond with open force, but rather organized an army of volunteers from the Peloponnesian cities, under the command of a Corinthian general.19 17
Kagan, 30. Kagan, 37. 19
Kagan, 41. 18
MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta That same winter, a final provocation towards war occurred when the Athens issued a decree placing a trade embargo on Megara, the city that had caused the First Peloponnesian War (the Megarian Decree).20 The Athenians claimed the decree was in retaliation to the Megarians’ illegal cultivation of Athenian lands, but the true intention was more likely either defiance of the Peloponnesian League or diplomatic pressure to punish Megara for its support of Corinth in the Corcyra War. Decisions Facing the Committees In July 432, the Spartan assembly was called to deliberate on the question of whether the Athenians’ actions merited war.21 The Corinthians, Megarians, and their supporters warned the Spartans that while the Athenians were actively expanding their power and had become “adventurous beyond their power,” the Spartans only sought to keep what they have.22 If the Spartans did not act, they would be unable to maintain the balance of power with the Athenians’ alliance. The implication of this argument was that if the Spartans did not actively defend the interests of their allies, Corinth and other states would take matters into their own hands, defecting from the Peloponnesian League or potentially usurping Sparta’s leadership of the League.23 The Athenian spokesperson admitted to the growth of Athens’ power, but insisted that this was inspired not by a need for dominance, but by quite rational “fear, honor, and interest,” and that moreover Athens would not use its power to interfere with the affairs of the Peloponnesians.24 They suggested that the Spartans submit their complaints to arbitration by the oracle at Delphi, as is provided for by the Thirty Years Peace. Nonetheless, the Athenians warned that if Sparta did not contain the aggressions of its allies such as Corinth, Athens would take its own action against these cities. 20
Kagan, 39. Kagan, 41-­‐42. 22
Thucydides, 1.70 23
Thucydides, 1.71.4 24
Thucydides, 1.76 21
MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta The Spartans, if they are to maintain the leadership of the Peloponnesian League, must either lead their allies in war against Athens, or find a way to broker an agreement between Corinth, Megara, and its other aggrieved allies with the Athenians. The Athenians must likewise maintain control over the Delian League, by deterring further rebellions such as those at Potidaea, and adopting some form of response against the aggressions of Corinth. If the Spartans do not agree to arbitration, the Athenians have the options of launching a war against Corinth alone, or against the entire Peloponnesian League if they believe war is inevitable. Additionally, both Athens and Sparta have the option of looking to allies beyond their respective Leagues. The Persian Empire remains the superpower of the classical world, and while its present relationship with Athens is extremely sour, they may be willing to help either power if they believe it will enhance their influence in the Greek world or help defeat a potential competitor. The kingdoms of Macedon and Thrace, north of the Greek mainland, also present potential allies, and at the present Macedon has agreed to let Athenian troops pass through its territory to suppress the revolt at Potidaea. Greek colonies outside of either Spartan or Athenian control also dot the Mediterranean world, especially in Sicily and southern Italy, and many of these cities have powerful armies and navies and strong trade connections in their own right, and could be crucial allies. MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta The Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues, 431 BC undevicesimus.deviantart.com MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Background of Classical Sparta Social Structure and Government Classical Spartan society is heavily centered around military dominance and oligarchical control. Spartan social structure has its roots in the Dorian invasion of the 10th and 9th centuries BCE. Upon conquering the people of Messinea and Lakonia, Sparta subjugated the population, turning them into state-­‐owned serfs, who had more rights than slaves, but were still bound to their land to serve the Spartan government. These peasants came to be known as helots. Helots in ancient Sparta actually had many more rights than the chattel slaves in other Greek city states. They were allowed to marry freely, and could not be bought and sold like common slaves. As long as production quotas were met, the helots could sell surplus agricultural goods on the market for profit, and could acquire wealth. Despite enjoying a high degree of freedom, the helots were still considered the lowest class, and were looked upon with suspicion by Spartan elites. Brutal treatment of helots was common, and possible helot uprisings pose a significant threat to Sparta’s stability. A helot uprising in fact occurred in 465 BC, and was only suppressed with the aid of troops sent from throughout the Peloponnesian League. Many of those defeated helots were later settled at the Athenian colony of Naupactus on the Corinthian Gulf, which has the potential to pose a threat to Sparta’s control of the helots. Above the helots were the Perioikoi. The Perioikoi were not citizens, but they had many fewer restrictions than the helots and lived relatively free lives. They formed the brunt of the Spartan middle-­‐
class, occupying jobs as merchants, craftsmen, and weapon manufacturers. They were obligated to provide military assistance and soldiers during wartime, but otherwise enjoyed a large measure of self-­‐
sufficiency. The elite class were the Spartiates, or “men of equal status”, who were the descendants of the original inhabitants of Sparta. Spartiates were the only caste in Spartan society who could become MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta citizens. They were exempt from labor, had access to education, and from a young age, were trained to serve in the military and public service. Spartan government was shaped around the Spartiate elite class. Sparta has a complex system of government that is simultaneously an oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, with kings and elected officials alike. The state was led by a monarchy of two hereditary kings. The Agiad king and the Eurypontid king, both said to be descended from Heracles, ruled simultaneously so that one may not gain a disproportionate amount of power. The power of the kings was checked in peacetime by the Gerousia, or 28-­‐man council of elders. The Gerousia was the highest court of Sparta and was tasked with proposing laws and leading the Ekklesia (citizen’s assembly). Despite the oligarchic nature of the government, the Ekklesia continued to have much say in government policy. The Gerousia was filled by prominent Spartan citizens over the age of 60, primarily representing the interests of the most powerful aristocratic families. Serving alongside the two kings was an executive council of five Ephors. The Ephors were elected from the Spartiate class at the citizen’s assembly, and were limited to a one-­‐year term. They had significant powers in executing the law, trying important court cases, and eventually gained the right to declare war. All decisions were made by majority vote. The Ephors also had the ceremonial power to declare war on the helot class each autumn, authorizing young Spartan citizens the chance to kill a helot without blood guilt or fear of punishment (a tradition known as Krypteia). At the age of seven, all young males of the Spartiate class entered the agoge, or formal, state-­‐
run education system. There, the boys began their training as Spartan soldiers, learning military tactics, discipline, and cooperation with other students. They also learned traditional Spartan culture including poetry, music, and literature. Spartan soldiers are expected to serve in the military from age 20 to age 60 after their education is complete. Sparta also has some of the most progressive policies regarding MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta women in the ancient world. Female infants and children were given the same level of care as males, female citizens were still given an education, and had significant control over family estates and wealth. Before the Peloponnesian War Spartan politics were relatively stable, with a limited number of controversial issues. Most of the problems revolved around the aforementioned uprisings and social status of the Helots in the region, as they felt disenfranchised and marginalized in comparison to the Spartan citizens. Competing factions seemed to be more among the different groups of citizens and non-­‐
citizens than among political parties, although there is somewhat of a divide within the government between those who favor maintaining a highly monarchical/oligarchic structure, and those who favor democratic reforms that devolve more power to the assembly. Other political issues during this time were Sparta’s foreign alliances, and whether these allies would help in case of conflict or war. Continued animosity with Athens, which has prior history, was also a big source of contention among Spartan political officials. Currently, the biggest divide in Spartan politics is between supporters of peace with Athens and diplomatic resolutions to conflicts, and those who believe war is necessary to halt Athenian imperialism. MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Economics Unlike the Athenian economy, which is centered around trade, the Spartan economy is founded on agriculture. Following the Lycurgan Reforms of the 8th century BCE, agricultural lands were divided into 9000 separate lots, owned by Spartan citizens. Helots worked on each plot and were expected to give up ½ of their agricultural yield to the state. While helots supplied Sparta’s food, other facets of the economy were controlled by the Perioikoi. Spartan citizens were forbidden from engaging in labor or trade, since they were supposed to be devoted solely to military service. Therefore, the Perioikoi have a virtual monopoly on skilled craftsmanship, arm production, trade, and commerce. The stability of the Perioikoi class is essential to both economic growth and to the assurance of adequate supplies and weapons in times of war. The lands in and around Sparta in the South Peloponnese are rich in natural resources. Copper and tin are abundant, and several natural ports assure access to the Ionian and Aegean Seas. The valleys of Laconia and Messenia are incredibly productive, allowing Sparta to achieve a high degree of autonomy and surplus when it comes to agricultural production. This enables the Spartiate class to serve as full-­‐time solider-­‐citizens, rather than also regularly working as farmers and tradesmen like most Athenian citizens. Foreign Relations Despite Sparta’s renown as a military juggernaut, Sparta relied more and more on diplomacy and alliance-­‐building with its neighbors, rather than force. In the late 8th and 7th centuries BCE, Sparta fought a long war with the Messenian city-­‐states. It ended in victory for Sparta and the subjugation of the local people, but Sparta still remained fearful of popular revolts and weakening regional control. In the mid-­‐6th century BCE, Sparta entered into conflict with the city-­‐state of Tegea in the central Peloponnesus. They were eventually able to defeat the Tegeate army, but were not strong enough to MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta attempt a complete takeover of the city state. Therefore, in 560 BCE, Sparta entered into an alliance with Tegea, in which Tegea was Sparta’s subject ally, but was never brought under complete subjugation. This peace alliance provided the basis for the Peloponnesian League, an alliance network between Sparta and other Greek city-­‐states. During the remainder of the 6th century BCE, Sparta gained a reputation as a defender of democracy, removing tyrants in Athens and many other city states. Plutarch claims, for example, that Sparta was instrumental in deposing the Cypselids in Corinth, Lygdamis of Naxos, Aeschines of Sicyon, Symmachus of Thasos, Aules of Phocis, Aristogenes of Miletus, and Aristomedes of Thessaly. A combination of Spartan diplomacy and military power attracted more and more regions to join the Peloponnesian League, including the powerful states of Corinth and Elis. The Peloponnesian League met when a Congress of Allies was called by Sparta. Sparta was the only member that could call a meeting, and was not required to follow any resolution the Congress passed. However, unlike the Athenian Delian League, the Peloponnesian League was a true alliance system, not a de facto Spartan Empire. Sparta did have a central role, as the most powerful city state, but each member, including Sparta, got only one vote on the council. None of the members were required to pay tribune unless Sparta asked for 1/3 of member states’ armies in times of conflict. The Peloponnesian League provided Sparta with a strong system of military support and interstate cooperation and loyalty. Therefore, Sparta was able to rally Greek city-­‐states and place itself at the head of the resistance against the Persians during the Greco-­‐Persian Wars (499 BCE-­‐ 449 BCE). Although Sparta and Athens had fought alongside each other against the Persians, postwar relations between the two started to decay. In 478 BCE, Athens formed the Delian League, which countered the strength of Sparta’s Peloponnesian League and now threatens to shrink Sparta’s sphere of influence. Athens is also beginning to dominate their Delian League “allies” with an increasingly heavy hand, introducing the threat of a budding Athenian empire. MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Military The cornerstone of Spartan society is their military. All Spartan citizens are required to enter a strict education programme and serve for 40 years in the military. The ultimate objective of the agoge education system is to produce morally and physically superior men who would be dedicated to serving the state. Sparta has the ability to field an army of 5,000 to 8,000 fully trained Spartiate hoplites. The Perioikoi and helot classes filled light infantry and auxiliary positions, bolstering the total number of troops 20,000 to 30,000. In terms of size, the Athenian and Spartan armies were relatively similar, but thanks to superior training and organization, Sparta’s army is generally regarded as far superior. During the Persian War, Sparta held a navy of about 20 triremes, but always preferred to focus on land dominance rather than naval supremacy. Although the Spartan navy has since been expanded, at the present Sparta remains far weaker than Athens in terms of sea power, and relies heavily on its ally Corinth for naval support. MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Military Strategy and Tactics Ground Warfare The centerpiece of Classical Greek armies were the hoplites, who formed a formation known as the phalanx. Hoplites were heavy infantry fitted with shields and armor (the term “hoplite” translates roughly to mean “armored man”), typically free citizens who could afford their own armor and weapons.25 Hoplites were armed with a “dory,” or a spear about 7-­‐9 feet long. This spear would also have a spike attached to the end that could be used as a secondary weapon in case the main shaft snapped, and the hoplites also often carried short swords to use in closer quarters. The evolution of hoplite armor also reflected the need to balance mobility with protection. As the Classical age progressed, the need for more mobility saw more hoplites turning towards corselets in place of heavy bronze breastplates. For shielding, a hoplite carried a hoplon, a large, heavy circular shield a little over 3 feet in diameter. This equipment was uniquely designed to function within the phalanx formation. A single phalanx was a rectangular mass of hoplites, typically over twenty men wide and eight men deep. The hoplites formed an interlocking shield wall, with the spears of several lines protruding in front. This formation yielded great success for the Greeks during the Persian Wars, allowing relatively smaller Spartan armies to inflict crushing defeats on their numerically superior but lightly armed Persian counterparts. Despite their many strengths, however, hoplite phalanxes had their weaknesses. In battles between the phalanxes of the various Greek city-­‐states, combat tended to get bogged down as two opposing phalanxes clashed head-­‐to-­‐head until one managed to break through the other, not necessarily a quick process. Furthermore, phalanxes could be vulnerable to attacks from the flank and rear, and light, flexible supporting units such as cavalry and skirmishers could severely hamper phalanxes operating without similar supporting units. If a phalanx formation broke in battle and its men 25
Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). pp. 295–298. MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta fled, the individual hoplites were vulnerable to these supporting units, and it was during this period flight after the battle had been decided when most casualties occurred. Non-­‐hoplite supporting troops comprised a relatively small part of classical Greek armies. Cavalry were armed either with spears for charging the enemy, or javelins to throw against the enemy while they avoided contact. In either case, they were primarily used for making flanking attacks or pursuing defeated enemies; they did not possess the heavy armor to charge headlong into heavy infantry formations. Light troops typically consisted of the poorer members of society, who could not afford the full hoplite “panoply.” They might include light infantry with spears and shields, javelinmen, slingers, or archers. Cavalry and light troops were rarely decisive in Greek battles, the exception being if the enemy’s phalanx formation was broken by battle or difficult terrain. The tactics of Greek armies in battle, therefore, were usually focused on the central clash of the phalanxes. Individual phalanxes were typically drawn up as a single line in the center of the army, while cavalry and light troops were placed on the flanks or in the rear to skirmish, or hunt down the hoplites if they broke and ran.26 Meanwhile, the opposing phalanxes would advance and meet in the middle of the battlefield. Commanders could use the depth of their phalanxes to try to defeat the enemy’s phalanxes head to head, punching holes into the enemy’s line, or attempt to use the length of their line to flank the enemy and attack his phalanxes from the side. Terrain also played an important role in tactics, as a phalanx formation that held the high ground, or was less encumbered by obstacles such as hills or rivers and therefore had more room to maneuver, held the advantage. If all else was equal, battles were decided by which army’s hoplites had more experience and motivation, and were able to hold the phalanx formation for longer. 26
Raaflaub. MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Naval Warfare The combat vessels within a Greek navy consisted mainly of trireme: long, slim galleys rowed by three banks of oarsmen (hence “trireme”) and fitted with a metal ram protruding from the bow. A true technological feat for the time, Greek triremes were constructed to fit a balance between superb speed, durability, and flexibility. Most tactics of ancient naval warfare revolved around boarding and ramming enemy ships.27 Due to the maneuverability and speed of triremes, Greek navies became experts at ramming. However, triremes did have their drawbacks. They could actually become waterlogged if kept out at sea for too long, and thus had to be beached when not in use. Constant upkeep was required to keep the vessel operational; ropes, sails, and oars would sometimes have to be replaced mid-­‐
campaign.28 Maintaining a navy was thus a highly expensive undertaking for a Greek city, requiring continuous maintenance and professional expertise. They also consumed a considerable amount of manpower; a fully staffed vessel used for combat would typically consist of around 200 crewmembers, in addition to 10-­‐20 “marines” that were used for boarding actions. These marines were typically hoplites, with some arches mixed in.29 Committee Members 27
John Coates, "The Naval Architecture and Oar Systems of Ancient Galleys" in The Age of the Galley, Hanson (2006) p. 260; Fields (2007), p. 10 29
Plutarch, Parallel Lives Themistocles XIV 28
MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Archidamus II The current Eurypontid King of Sparta, Archidamus is certainly the senior member of the dual monarchy, as his partner Pleistoanax remains tainted by his association with Athens. As an experienced military commander, he is aware of Athens’ powers of resistance and supports a peaceful resolution to the current conflict, although he is also aware that he may need to cater to the aggressive supporters of war in the Spartan elite and military in order to maintain his authority. He is a skilled diplomat who helped negotiate the peace that ended the First Peloponnesian War, and hopes to use negotiations with Athens and Sparta’s allies (particularly Corinth) to stop the escalation of the conflict. His personal relations with Athenian leaders such as Pericles will help in this goal. Agis The son of King Archidamus II of Sparta, Agis is currently the next in line to become Eurypontid King of Sparta. His political views are oligarchic and monarchic, as were his father’s. Unlike his father, Agis is strongly in favor of war with Athens, which he views as weak and tyrannical. As son of the king, he has some control over the placement of troops and military strategy, although he still requires consultation with other generals. He also has power over domestic affairs and the development of alliances. Epitadas Epitadas is a skilled general in the Spartan military. He currently commands a division of 450 highly trained Spartiate hoplites. He is a wealthy member of the elite class, but is also a skilled fighter, and commands tremendous loyalty and respect from his men. His political views are considered democratic, as he is an advocate of expanding citizenship rights to more people in order to increase the size of the Spartan army. He is also pressuring the government to confront Athenian aggression. Pleistolas Pleistolas is a popular statesman and politician. He currently holds an elected position on the Council of Ephors, giving him strong influence on declarations of war and the execution of state laws and decrees. He is an outspoken proponent of alliance building with neighboring city-­‐states, and he wishes to find a diplomatic middle ground between Athens and Sparta to prevent war. Pleistolas is somewhat in favor of a more democratic system of government with more power to elected positions such as the Ephors, although he is hardly a “democrat” and continues to favor relatively oligarchic power for elected positions. Acanthus Acanthus is a veteran politician, statesman, and one of 28 members on the Gerousia, or Council of Elders. His age has commanded him a lot of respect among the elite class and the military. He is a MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta member of one of Sparta’s most aristocratic families, and he supports the existing oligarchic power structure. He also favors peaceful relations with Sparta’s neighbors in order to maintain the status quo. Daithus Daithus is a career statesman and member of the Gerousia. Like Acanthus, he has earned his place as a respected politician and supporter of oligarchical interests. He believes that peace is necessary to maintain control over the helot class, and wants to strengthen the Peloponnesian League to prevent helot revolts. He is also a strong advocate of maintaining Sparta’s diplomatic connections with Athens and other foreign powers. Chionis As a Spartan general and active member of the war party, Chionis was known for his hatred of King Archidamus. Only his expertise in military matters has kept him in the party and in the king’s good graces. A clever and cunning man, Chionis has been countlessly accused of underhandedly accepting bribes from Athenian forces, but these claims have never been proven. The military remains highly loyal to Chionis and considers him one of their most effective generals. Ischagoras A strong advocate for peace, Ischagoras was known to publicly support any decision King Archidamus would make, although he privately worked with allies and enemies of Archidamus. A staunch ally of the kings and a man ostensibly only concerned with Sparta’s prosperity, rather than his own success, he also gained many allies in the war party as well as among the king’s supporters. This was due to how well respected he became through showing his support for Sparta with logic and common sense, using his formidable oratorical skills. Gylippus Gylippus is a newly-­‐appointed Spartan general; he was the son of Cleandridas, who had been expelled from Sparta for accepting Athenian bribes and fled to Thurii. His mother was a helot, which meant he was a mothax, a man of inferior status, not a true Spartan. Despite this, he was trained for war in the traditional Spartan fashion because he was sponsored by a wealthy Spartan citizen. Upon finishing his training, Gylippus was appointed commander of a division of 500 hoplites. He wants to go to war with Athens to prove his worth as a true Spartan soldier, and win honor for himself and his family. Pleistoanax MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta The son of the former regent Pausanias, Pleistoanax now serves Sparta as the Agiad King of Sparta. Like the previous king Archidamus II, he believes in working to maintain peace with the Delian League. He was continually blamed for disasters in Sparta due to the fact that he was previously convicted of accepting a bribe from the Athenians. Overall, he is not well respected and is continually treated with suspicion, even as king. Nonetheless, he continues to have enormous influence on domestic and foreign policy and military decisions. He hopes that his leadership and knowledge of the Athenian government and military will help restore his reputation with the Spartan government and the people. Thrasymelidas Thrasymelidas is a leading admiral of the Spartan navy. His political loyalties lie with the war party. He was cordial with the kings; however, he is believed to be in private discussions with leading members of the war party about how to remove the kings from their positions. He is a strong advocate of a more powerful navy, and believes Athens must be aggressively confronted at sea as well as on land. Lysander Lysander, son of Aristocleitus, was a member of the Spartan Heracleidae; his family claimed descent from Heracles. However, Lysander was considered a mothax or inferior citizen: his family was poor and he was not a member of the Spartiate class. He was able to get sponsorship from a wealthy patron to train as a Spartan soldier, and showed promise as a leader. After completing his education, Lysander was given command as an admiral of the fledgling Spartan navy. He understands that a strong Spartan navy could be key to Spartan dominance, and wants to prove himself as a worthy admiral, and therefore supports the pro-­‐war movement. Brasidas Brasidas is undoubtedly one of the most important leaders in Sparta during this time period. A brilliant tactician, Brasidas is arguably Sparta’s most skilled general. He has also just been elected as one of the five Ephors, giving him strong executive power, and is perhaps the most aggressive supporter of war. His popularity with the Spartan citizens—particularly the men who serve as soldiers—makes his opinion especially influential. Callicratidas Callicratidas is a popular statesman and admiral. He is too young to be appointed to the Council of Elders, although he commands a great deal of influence on many of the sitting members. Although he understands that his first goal is service to the state, Callicratidas is a strong member of the peace group, and opposes forming foreign alliances. His opinions make him popular as a politician among the standing oligarchical elites, but some pro-­‐war Spartan generals view him with suspicion. MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Clearidas Clearidas is an ambitious and fiery statesman, and one of the strongest supporters of war in the Spartan camp. In 443 BCE, Clearidas finished his military training, and his capabilities landed him a role as Brasidas’s number two officer. Clearidas is one of Sparta’s most outspoken representatives for expanding Spartan influence into the whole of Greece, making him disliked among the elite class and peace advocates. His fame was generated talk that he might make a run to become an Ephor, although these rumors are unsubstantiated. Zeuxadis Zeuxadis is Sparta’s state-­‐sponsored professional artist. Born in Heraclea in 464 BC, Zeuxadis began his studies in painting at a young age, and quickly became known across Greece for his incredible realism and dramatic depictions of Greek mythology and war scences. Zeuxadis was recently sponsored by several wealthy Spartan elites to live in Sparta and create art for public buildings. Zeuxadis, although he is not strongly involved in politics, he is well-­‐respected by the people for his international renown, and both war and anti-­‐war politicians understand that his art can become a powerful tool of propaganda. Damagetus Damagetus is a revered Spartiate and senior member of the Council of Elders. He is the oldest member on the Council as well as an elected Ephor, and by virtue of seniority, has a large amount of influence on the Council’s opinion. Like many members on the Council, Damategus has the existing power structure in mind when making decisions, and wants to preserve the oligarchy as Sparta’s leading institution. He is an advocate for peace, but his son, is a respected pro-­‐war Spartan general. As a result, he is one of the more pragmatic and ideologically neutral members of the Council, and his official stance toward the Athenian threat has not yet been revealed. Cnemus Cnemus is a Spartan admiral, who has yet to command a fleet but has displayed tactical skill as a trireme commander. He has little political experience, but he is an advocate of a strong stance against Athenian aggression, particularly at sea where he believes a war might ultimately be decided. He is also an advocate of naval power as a diplomatic tool, as he believes that Sparta must maintain communication channels with foreign powers to seek alliances against Athens. Cnemus is a member of a traditional, elite Spartan family, and believes Athenian democracy is a dangerous influence in Greece and that Sparta should be active in spreading oligarchic forms of government. MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Tellis Tellis was the father of the commander Brasidas and has a long history of service as a Spartan general. He currently serves as one of the five elected Ephors, with powers over the implementation of state policy. Although he is not as publicly flamboyant or politically active as his son, he nonetheless inspires loyalty in his troops, and his opinions on military matters are well respected in the committee. He also has experience in peace negotiations, and has the potential to serve the committee in a diplomatic context. He has yet to stake out clear support for either the peace or the war parties. Metagenes Metagenes is an experienced politician from one of Sparta’s most elite families, ostensibly descended from Heracles and certainly descended in part from King Leonidas, and a strong supporter of the traditional oligarchic elite. He is also currently serving his fourth term as an Ephor, where he has developed a reputation for building consensus amongst the aggressive supporters of war and the conservative advocates of peace within the Gerousia. His own positions on the war are not entirely clear, but he is certainly concerned with Athens’ support of democratic movements throughout Greece and their potential destabilizing effects in Sparta. He believes a combination of military and diplomatic efforts will be necessary to secure Sparta’s leadership of the Peloponnesian League and contain Athenian aggression. Works Cited Chadwick, John. The Mycenaean World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta Gat, Azar. War in Human Civilization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Jones, A. H. M. “The Economic Basis of the Athenian Democracy.” Past and Present 1 (Feb. 1952): 13-­‐31. Kagan, Donald. The Peloponnesian War. New York: Penguin, 2003. Raaflaub, Kurt. “Archaic and Classical Greece,” in War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds. Edited by Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein. Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, Trustees for Harvard University, 1999. pp. 129-­‐148. Thucydides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Edited by Richard Livingstone. London: Oxford University Press, 1981. Waterfield, Robin. Athens: A History. New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004. Useful Websites for Research •
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http://www.livius.org/so-­‐st/sparta/peloponnesian_league.html http://www.pbs.org/empires/thegreeks/background/8a.html http://www.ancient.eu.com/sparta/ http://anonemuss.hubpages.com/hub/Sparta-­‐and-­‐Athens http://www.historyteacher.net/EuroCiv/Resources/reading-­‐AncientSparta.pdf http://www.sparta.markoulakispublications.org.uk/index.php?id=119 http://www.sikyon.com/sparta/history_eg.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peloponnesian_War MUNCH 2013: Peloponnesian War: Sparta