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Dr. Rolf Frankenberger Eberhard Karls University Tübingen. Dept. of Political Science rolf.frankenberger@uni‐tuebingen.de The same, but different! Regime types from a post‐poststructuralist perspective. Paper presented the IPSA‐ECPR Joint Conference, Sao Paulo February 19, 2011 Introduction In comparative politics there are different strategies and approaches to map regime types. One main strategy way is to suggest a continuum of political regimes with two ideal types as the extreme poles: democracy (Dahl 1971) and totalitarianism (Friedrich/Brzezinski 1965), or Authoritarianism (Linz 2000) and all real political systems to be located somewhere in between according to their gradual differences, including diminished and classical subtypes and hybrids. The main focus of analysis and categorization then is on the (non‐)existence of democratic formal institutions. This can cause problems in several ways: methodological, empirical, and normative: methodological, as categorizations become “fuzzy”, or, as Sartori put it, they are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive; empirical, as measuring gradual differences and defining thresholds is difficult; normative, as this strategy is prone to a biased vies, namely the so called “democracy bias” (for a discussion of related argumentations, see Schlumberger Albrecht/Frankenberger2010, Köhler/Warkotsch 2010; Sartori 1979, 1991, 1993). In the following sections of the paper I will outline some theoretical reflections that might be suitable for a new approach to map regime types. In order to avoid teleological and normative biases and to give a new impulse to a rather deadlocked discussion, I propose to combine a structural‐functionalist perspective on macro‐level configurations of formal and informal institutions with a poststructuralist perspective on the micro‐ and macro level configurations of power. Using Talcott Parsons’ approach of systems analysis (Parsons 1951, 1960, 1963, 1964) and Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality (Foucault 1982, 1988), I argue that a framework of assessing political regime types will have to focus not only on internal functions, mechanisms and institutions but also has to take into account the broader perspective of social, cultural and economic environments these political regimes are embedded in. Using the term political systems instead of regimes reflects the importance of this integrative systemic perspective. Following Parsons, there are some features all political systems have in common: the embeddedness of political systems into a societal environment, a fundamental interdependence of social subsystems, and the need for performing some functions in order to maintain and perpetuate a social system. Following Foucault, the main feature of all societies is the exertion of power as the action upon the action of others. This perspective adds a second complemetary layer of what all political systems have in common: power as the basis of social action, a general tendency of power relations to be institutionalized and stabilized and transformed into states of domination, the differentiation of four technologies of government and a continuous struggle of individuals and groups for gathering control over discourses. Taken together, these perspectives allow for a distinct mapping of regime types: First, according to the AGIL‐Paradigm (Parsons) political systems (regimes) are functional subsystems of social systems concerned with “goal attainment” – all political systems (regimes) are same in this way. And they are interrelated with the other functional 2 subsystems – they are same in this way, too. But political systems differ 1) with respect to their interchange relations with other subsystems (and environments); 2) in the way they are composed of functional equivalents performing the relevant tasks to reproduce themselves and contribute to the reproduction of society; 3) in the way people are governed and govern themselves, i.e. in the kind of governmentality of the respective systems; in the way technologies of government are developed and used over time. Thus, in a first step I will discuss the basic assumptions of Parsons “theory of action” and the AGIl‐Paradigm, and then present the basic patterns of an “Analysis of Power” according to Foucault. Bringing together both perspectives in a last step, I will try to outline a research agenda to map regime types in a poststructuralist perspective. Systems Theory and the AGIL‐paradigm In the following section, I will shortly outline the basic assumptions of systems analysis, as derived from Talcott Parsons’ Model of “societal interchange” within the AGIL‐Scheme (Parsons 1963, also: Parsons 1960, 1964, Parsons and Smelser 1956). Parsons defines a social system as a “mode of organization of action elements relative to the persistence or ordered processes of change of the interactive patterns of a plurality of individual actors” (Parsons 1951:24). Thus for Parsons, social systems are systems of action that can be analyzed in terms of four structural constraints: i) situational constraints, ii) material or immaterial resources, iii) norms as situational and individual limitations to action, and iv) subjective goals of acting individuals or groups. Within the context of social systems, all action does have an inherent function that can be interpreted as the contributions of social phenomena to the reproduction of the system. The use the concept of functions that have to be performed by the system or respectively parts of the system is an integral part of the theory, because “if such a system is to constitute a persistent order or to undergo an orderly process of developmental change, certain functional prerequisites must be met” (Parsons 1951: 26‐27).1 According to Almond and Parsons, these functional prerequisits are “adaptation, goal gratification, integration, and latent pattern maintenance” (Almond 1965:185; Parsons 1963). In order to perform these functions, social systems have to differentiate subsystems, each of which specializes on performing one of these functions. According to Niklas Luhmann’s concept of functional equivalents as outlined by Niklas Luhmann social systems can (and will) develop alternative functionally differentiated solutions to the problem of survival (Luhmann 1984: 83‐91)., In other words, one function can be performed by different agencies or structure, depending on the systemic context. 1
This does not mean that there is any kind of “master plan” designed by some governing agency within the system. Instead this concept addresses to conditions of persistence of systems. Or to put it in other words, “a particular system (…) has to behave in particular ways, perform a set of tasks, in order to be the particular [system]” (Almond 1965:184) 3 Social Systems often are analysed under the perspective of persistence, equilibrium or stability. In the context of systems theory this does not imply to a crystalline or sclerotic status. Instead it refers to a kind of flux balance that is characterized by the performance (or adaptation of performance) of functions within the system: “when a function is performed in such a way as to maintain the equilibrium of the system, the performance of the function by the agency or structure is referred to as ‘functional’ (…) [and] when the performance upsets the equilibrium, then it is referred to as ‘dysfunctional’” (Almond 1965:185). Social systems are characterized by interdependence. This means that “when the properties of one component in a system change, all the others, and the system as a whole, are affected. (…) when one variable in the system changes in its magnitude or quality, the others are subjected to strains and are transformed, and the system changes its pattern of performance; or the dysfunctional component is disciplined by regulatory mechanisms, and the equilibrium of the system is re‐established” (Almond 1965:185). As a result of the latter two premises, the long‐time survival of a system depends on performance, adaptability and the capacities of detection, control and regulation. With the AGIL‐Paradigm, Parsons develops a model of how societal interchange between socias systems is organized in order to perform the four functions of adaptation, goal attainment, integration and latent pattern maintenance. For Parsons a system initially is simply an integral interrelation that separates itself and is analytically separable from its environment. To delineate from the environment, systems build up structures that are independent from short‐time variations of the system‐environment relations. Thus, a system is a complex of more or less constant patterns that are nevertheless open to adaptation. “Since a social system is a system of processes of interaction between actors, it is the structure of the relations between the actors as involved in the interactive process which is essentially the structure of the social system” (Parsons 1951:25). Each social system then can be analyzed in terms of role expectations anchored in the whole society through institutionalization and/or communicative bargaining that are generated by communication and interaction. On the basis of communication and interaction that are predetermined only by the boundary conditions of what Parsons calls the basic norms, values and cognition patterns that form the cultural complex, organized and structured interactions emerge. These can be differed into roles (rights, duties, role expectations), and institutions (regulatory systems that determine the relations between roles). For the development of such action systems the four basic functions of social systems known as the AGIL‐Scheme of social action are crucial: adaptation, goal attainment, integration and latent pattern maintenance. Parsons distinguishes a spatial dimension with internal and external functions and a temporal dimension with instrumental and consummatory functions. The spatial dimension differentiates processes and patterns of interaction within the system and those belonging to its environment. In addition it decides whether these are internal or external input‐output relations. The temporal dimension discriminates processes and interactions 4 refer to present or future. The combination of the two dimensions and the four basic functions produces the well known matrix in figure 1 (Parsons 1959:7). Figure 1: AGIL‐Scheme According to Parsons (Parsons 1953, 1959, 1960; Parsons/Bales/Shils 1953) the four functions can be defined as follows: Adaptation refers to the mediation of interests between the system and its environment, i.e. the adaptation “to objects in the situation outside the system” (Parsons 1953:625). Goal attainment regulates and formulates the relational goals between the whole system and its environment, i.e. it establishes “consummatory relations to situational objects by instrumental processes” (Parsons 1953:625). Integration addresses the production of the unity of the system and provides for both, the internal differentiation of subsystems and the reciprocal adjustment of the subsystems. In other words, the integrational system regulates the implementation and adjustment of individual and collective interests and thus manages “the maintenance of a state of internal harmony or absence of conflict among the units of the system” (Parsons 1953:625). The Latent pattern maintenance system constitutes the boundaries of the system and is necessary for the preservation of system continuity and developmental patterns over time as it maintains both “the structure of the internalized‐institutionalized normative or cultural patterns, and motivation to conformity with their requirements” (Parsons 1953:625). Usually these are long lasting cultural systems of rules and symbols generating meaning. These four functions are performed by four subsystems, each of which again has to perform these four functions through one or another structure or agency in order to persist. This again underlines the relevance of functional equivalents. Whereas the cultural system as the locus of cultural and motivational commitments and the integrative system of norms, values and social control indeed seem to be common to all kinds of social systems, Parsons has in mind some examples derived from the analysis of pluralist and capitalist societies when he associates the goal attainment subsystem with the 5 polity as institutionalized structures and agencies and the adaptational subsystem with the economy. He describes a social system that is clearly biased, but even though it will not fit one by one to Autocracies, it is a very important example of how such a societal interchange system can work in a functionally differentiated society of one special kind. Based upon these four primary functions, Parsons (1960, 1963, 1964, Parsons and Smelser 1956) develops a concept of double circulation of generalized media between each of the four functional subsystems: “(…)every such unit is involved in plural interchange relations with other units with respect to most of its functional requirements from its situation – i.e. for factor inputs – and the conditions of making its contributions to other units in the “division of labor” – i.e. disposal of “product” outputs. This order of differentiation requires double interchanges between all the structural components belonging to each category‐pair (…). The double interchange situation precludes mediation of processes in terms either of ascriptive expectations or barter arrangements, or a combination of the two. It necessitates the development of generalized symbolic media”. (Parsons 1963:259). These six interchange systems are the A‐G‐Interchange or “resource mobilization system”, The G‐I‐Interchange or “support system”, The L‐G‐Interchange or “legitimation system”, the A‐L‐Interchange or “consumption system”, the A‐I‐Interchange or “allocative standard system” and the L‐I‐
Interchange or “commitment system”. According to Parsons (1963:262) each functional subsystem consists of generalized media, value principles, and coordination standards. Through the interchange systems the functional subsystems extract factors from the other systems and produce and send products to the other systems. These interdependences and interchanges of factors and products constitute one of the major parts of the social system in request. The Latent Pattern Maintenance Subsystem (L) works with the medium commitments, the value principle Integrity, the coordination standard pattern‐consistency, controls the factors wages extracted from the (economic) Adaptive system and justification of loyalties extracted from the integrative System; Controls the products Consumers demands destined to the (economic) adaptive system and Claims to loyalties destined to the integrative system. It works with negative intentional sanctions and the effects of activation of commitments. The Integrative system (I) circulates the medium influence, has the value principle Solidarity and the coordination standard consensus. It controls the factors Commitments to value associations derived from the Latent pattern maintenance system and policy decisions derived from the (polity) goal attainment system. It controls the products commitment to common values destined to L and political support destined to G. It works with positive‐ intentional sanctions and the effects of Persuasion. The Goal Attainment System (G) works with the medium power, the value principle effectiveness and the coordination standard success. It controls the factors Interest‐
demands extracted from I and Control of productivity extracted from A. It controls the 6 products Leadership responsibility destined to I and Control of fluid resources destined to A. Its sanctions are negative‐situational with the effects of securing compliance The Adaptation System (A) circulates the medium money and has the value‐principe Utility with the coordination standard solvency. It controls the factors capital derived from G (that guarantees private property) and labor derived from L. It also controls the products Commitment of services destined to G and expectation of goods destined to L. Its sanctions are positive‐situational and the effect is inducement. Figure 2: Interchange Systems Governmentality and the “Analytics of Power” The above said implies that there has to be a two level analysis: first on the societal level with structural composition and interchange processes between its functionally differentiated subsystems (as named political system, economic system, integrative system and cultural system), and second on the sub‐societal level with the structural composition and interchange processes within the subsystems. The following perspective on power and domination adds a third level, that focuses on action of persons and groups as well as on the level of concrete mechanisms of power exertion and domination within social systems. 7 In the perspective of Foucault, Power and Domination can be considered as the basic and constitutive elements of social interaction and society2. Depending on the configuration of elements and means of power exertion and domination, different types of societal power relations emerge, that unfold their potential upon individuals, groups and structures within a society. To grasp these patterns, we need an analytical tool that 1) can gather social phenomena outside and beyond the political system or political regime, 2) reflects the historical process of power formation (i.e. transformation and transition as well as less visible variations of adaptation), and 3) integrates a macro‐ and micro perspective in a historio‐genetic and procedural analysis of power. The approach of “governmentality” proposed by Michel Foucault in several of his writings, does meet these criteria, even though it is criticized due to several reasons (for a discussion see Lemke 1997; Honneth/Saar 2003; Burchell/Gordon/Miller 1991)3. But these critiques are more than counterbalanced by the innovative power of his thought, or as Brass puts it: “Foucault’s discussions and analyses of power and government are so original, so striking in their import not only for the way we do political science, but for our lives, thought, and practices as scholars, that his work ought by now to have become a focal point for the resurrection of these topics and their restoration to centrality in the discipline” (Brass 2000:305)4. As it is hardly applied in comparative politics, my task is to outline the main conceptual lines of thought as well as a more precise definition of what can be used as an “Analytics of Power” in order to map regime types5. Foucault first uses the term governmentality in his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 to indicate his theoretical re‐conceptualization of an analytics of power. He defines it along three dimensions: First, he defines governmentality as the “The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the 2
This perspective highlights a difference between Foucaut and Parsons, as Foucault insists that social interaction always is based on power, whereas Parsons argues that different subsystems of society do have different communicative media, that imply a distinct logic of action within each of the subsystems. At a first glance, this seems to be contradictory, but if we take into account that each and every action is an action upon the action of others, then it becomes more plausible that people always act powerful in order to reach their goals: defend their norms and values, maximize monetary revenue and persuade others t buy their products, become friends, force or persuade others to follow their views and interests 3
There are four main lines of argumentation against Foucault’s approach: 1) the one‐sidedness and arbitrariness of his “Zeitdiagnose” that was denounced as “subjectivism” by Habermas (1985:324), 2) the suspension of normative questions or “normative neutralization” (Lemke 1997:15) of his analyses that was raised by Fraser (1981, 1985), Walzer (1986) and Taylor (1984) with a focus on the neutrality of Foucault regarding different systems of power exertion, 3) conceptual contradictions and stretching especially of his concept of power (Habermas 1985), and 4) a missing preciseness of terms and definitions, which on the one hand reflects the dynamics of Foucault’s Thinking but on the other hand leads to misunderstandings and urges for immediate clarifications when using the terminology developed by Foucault. 4
A systematic discussion of theoretical and research‐relevant perspectives of Foucault’s seminal work is offered by Brass 2000. 5
I will not be concerned with the first critique, as this is rather a conceptual task than a “Zeitdiagnose”. The second critique is rather an advantage than a problem: Foucault’s approach offers a solution to the so called “democracy bias” in transitology and regime typologization (cf. Albrecht/Frankenberger 2010), as it regards all systems of power from a neutral point of view without preferring one of them implicitly or explicitly. Thus the main task remaining is to clarify the “order of the things”, i.e. to sort terms and definitions and to propose a framework for analyzing political regimes. 8 exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault 1991:102). This includes a systematic Analysis of present power relations, which shows the “entirety” of power exertion over and through a society. In terms of comparative politics, this implies the analysis of formal and informal rules and norms as well as action by relevant persons and groups. Second, he refers to “the tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre‐eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of saviors” (Foucault 1991:102). This includes structural and functional analysis of technologies of governing as well as institutions. Third, Foucault means historical transitional processes and their results, “through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes 'governmentalized'.” (Foucault 1991:103). This implies the analysis of path‐dependence of political systems. Based on these three dimensions of governmentality, Foucault develops a concept of power that is different from most other concepts (e.g. Weber, Marx, Arendt, Luhmann). He neither interprets power as a manifestation of asymmetric goal attainment through coercive means, nor does he think that power is a manifestation of symmetric goal attainment based on cooperation or consent. Instead, he focuses on three main aspects: First, power can be understood as a relational network or complex strategic situation within a society consisting of the ensemble of actions intended to constrain possible other action. As a consequence power only exists as being exerted by one individual on another (Foucault 1982: 786). Second power is plural, as different and heterogeneous phenotypes of power exist. According to Foucault there is no central power, from which other powers could be derived (Foucault 1982:788ff). Thus, Power and processes of power exertion are not identical with political power and not limited to the political system. And power is not exclusively vertical, but also horizontal and transversal. As a consequence, political institutions and the state are just one intensive (and historically contingent) manifestation of power relations that are developed out of distinct regions of power. Third, power is primarily productive, and not repressive or reproductive, as the work according to the principle of general enhancement of efficiency and abilities (Foucault 1982:799ff). According to Foucault power relations either refer to strategic games between liberties or action upon action. Foucault specifies his rather vague definitions of power by using the terms “technologies”, “techniques” or “rationalities” of governing. To govern refers to diverse kinds of actions and fields in order to lead individuals and collectives rather than political structures, territories or states. Foucault insists that people have to be analysed and governed in their relation to their human, natural and institutional environment as well as in their relation to values, norms, forms of action and thinking and potential disasters 9 (Foucault 1991) Thus, all spheres of human being fall under the necessity to be governed and become political. In this perspective government is the hinge of several perspectives: First, government interlinks power relations and states of domination and illustrates how the first can be transferred into the latter and how states of domination can be stabilized. In other words, government refers to the technologies of transforming and consolidating power. Second, government relates power and subject to each others, which allows for analyzing linkages between techniques of domination and techniques of the self. This addresses the question how individuals can be brought to demand for the things a state of domination needs to stabilize itself respectively how through the entanglement of techniques of the self and of domination power relations can be transformed into states of domination. Third, the relation of power and knowledge can be assessed by analyzing government. For Foucault the main interest lies in the ways of circulation and functions of knowledge in the formation of power relations. This includes the control over the production of knowledge, which he outlines in “The order of the discourse” as well as the ways how power and knowledge interpenetrate each others. For Foucault, discourse is more than language and includes the production of a complex interrelation between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioral patterns, norms and belief systems, techniques, systems of classification and typologization (Foucault 1997:68). Discourse thus refers to regularities of social action (symbolic action) that are related to past and/or future action. According to Foucault the production of the discourse is controlled, regulated and rooted through diverse procedures of exclusion, prohibition, and control of access. The one controlling the rules of discourse production is also controlling the power over the production of and access to knowledge as a whole. As knowledge, power, domination and government determine each others, the level of distinctiveness of penetrating and influencing contingencies is depending on the level of efficiency and efficacy of the instruments or technologies of regulation and can be enhanced through technological development and the sophistication of knowledge. Technologies of government thus constitute more or less systematized, regulated and reflected forms of power exertion (Lemke 2001a:117). According to Foucault, “we must understand that there are four major types of these „technologies, each a matrix of practical reason” (Foucault 1988:18): 1. ”technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things” (Foucault 1988:18). This clearly points at the dimension of economic production and the way in which transformation of things into goods is organized and the way how the material needs of a given society are met. 2. “technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification” (Foucault 1988:18). In other words, these techniques gather the formation of social discourses o power. They refer to their content as well as the definition of their rules. In a more political sense, the technologies of the sign system 10 point at ideologies, programmes, belief systems, norms and values and who has the power to define and control them. 3. techniques of domination or “technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject” (Foucault 1988:18). These techniques refer to mechanisms that are in a stricter sense political, as they ask for mechanisms of governing and dominating individuals in order to make them perform in a certain way, usually the way that stabilizes the existing power relations. This can include mechanisms of indoctrination and education, communication, coercion and persuasion, systems of rewards and punishments. This dimension can be assessed via institutional arrangement as well as political processes (bargaining, corruption, neopatrimonialism, competition and so on). 4. ”technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault 1988:18). These technologies of the self thus comprise complex forms o self‐regulation that are determined by the more general framework of power und are internalized by the individual in order to stabilize the power system. The phenotypes of this self‐regulation can best be measured by capturing expression of values, norms and orientations towards self‐efficacy, self‐esteem and the role of the self within a society. But keep in mind that these are only manifestations and not the processes themselves, as these only can be approached through analyzing education, self‐
formation and other processes of social learning. Following this perspective, government is the ensemble or network of these four technologies constituting a system of regulated rational opening or closure of scopes of action that can be institutionalized by the state. Foucault differentiates power and domination in order to focus on the processes of power and establishes the intermediate level of technologies of government. According to Foucault, power is conceived as “strategic games between liberties”, whereas domination must be thought as something more static, as a state, or as crystallized strategic games (Foucault 1985:26). Strategic relations or games – action intended to influence action of others ‐ are main characteristics of social interaction that are fluid, indefinite, and multiple. States of domination, in turn, are a kind of crystallized strategic relations. This historical institutionalization can either be military, political or economic. The main difference thus is the structural basis: strategic games are reversible and structurally amorphous, whereas states of domination are comparably hieratic, as a group or individual was able to install durable and asymmetric power relations by using the technologies of government. 11 Figure 3: Assessing power This quite sophisticated concept of analysing power offers a laborious basis for a new approach to comparative politics and the task of mapping regime types. It could help to clarify and exemplify functional as well as structural logics of political systems in their social environment, as political systems and regimes always are embedded in multiple interchange relations with the economic, social and cultural systems. It would also offer insight into the problem of concept travelling, as the transfer of polities and polices can hardly be successful in functionally different environments (that is one reason why state building and democracy promotion produce more failure than success stories!) Foucault moves the focus of analysis away from states and state institutions and towards social interaction. As a result, political institutions and political regimes can be analyzed in terms of historio‐genetic processes of crystallizing strategic relations in specific ways. This perspective opens social relations much more for political analysis that other approaches do. Processes of social change (might it be caused by political, economic, social or cultural change) become genuinely political and can be analyzed as complex of politically relevant interactions in terms of government, power relations and technologies. 12 Conclusions and Perspectives It is nice to reduce complexity. This didn’t seem to have been the main objective of both Foucault and Parsons while conceptualizing power and social systems. So what can be the benefit of bringing together these two approaches in order to draw a map of regime types? First, we can identify patterns of sameness. According to Parsons, political systems are functional subsystems of broader social systems and within this framework they perform the function of goal attainment. Political systems then are characterized by their interdependence with the other subsystems. This implies that “when the properties of one component in a system change, all the others, and the system as a whole, are affected. (…) when one variable in the system changes in its magnitude or quality, the others are subjected to strains and are transformed, and the system changes its pattern of performance; or the dysfunctional component is disciplined by regulatory mechanisms, and the equilibrium of the system is re‐established” (Almond 1965:185). As a result, the long‐
time survival of any system depends on performance, adaptability and the capacities of detection, control and regulation. Following Foucault, each and every social interaction is based on power and in all societies technologies of government will be historically developed over a longer time‐period. Foucault describes power as relations between actors, be they collective or individual. Power is neither a structure nor a modus of action or a medium of communication, even though these concepts could be integrated. Even though power is structurally heterogeneous, more or less fluid and discrete in historical periods, rather stable states of domination and governmentalities will emerge in all social systems. This implies that there also will be struggles, discontinuities and transformations in all social systems. As a result, it is not only politically defined interdependencies, but rather social relations and interaction that are at the core of governmentality: the way in which behavior of individuals can be regulated. Second, and even more important, political systems differ 1) with respect to their interchange relations with other subsystems (and environments) and in the way they are composed of functional equivalents performing the relevant tasks to reproduce themselves and contribute to the reproduction of society. With the AGIL Scheme and the six societal interchange systems, as described above, Parsons provides us with a framework that opens up a perspective on “the most important general structural‐functional distinction in classifying political systems” (Almond/Powell/Mundt 1996:66)6. Thus, it is a promising strategy to take the assumptions of systems analysis serious and to ask for functional equivalents and interchange systems. In fact this cries for an approach to political 6
Even though promised, this distinction has not yet been delivered. For example, the probably most popular definition of authoritarian regimes illustrates this shortcoming, as it neither does ask for functions nor for interchange or interrelations, but rather asks for what these regimes are or have not: Juan Linz (1964:297) defines Autocracies as characterized by „limited, not responsible, political pluralism: without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive or extensive political mobilization (except some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill‐defined limits but actually quite predictable ones“ (Linz 1964: 297). 13 regimes/systems that inherently tends to be interdisciplinary, as it refers to the interdependence and interchange between social subsystems as culture, society, economy and polity as well as the internal differentiation of each of these subsystems. The above said implies that there has to be a two level analysis: first on the societal level with structural composition and interchange processes between its functionally differentiated subsystems (as named political system, economic system, integrative system and cultural system), and second on the sub‐societal level with the structural composition and interchange processes within the subsystems. Both the societal and the sub‐societal level can be starting points for an analysis, but neither of the perspectives will come to satisfying results without taking into account the far side. On the general level of analysis, the societal level, a first analytical step will be to identify whether the society under consideration is “sufficiently differentiated” and has clear boundaries, i.e. in the one or the other way the extension of the social system can be determined7. So it has to be asked whether social subsystems exist and how they “extract resources from the environment, regulate behavior, distribute values, display and transmit symbols, and respond to demands” (Almond 1965:203). In other words, how do these subsystems differentiate themselves in order to perform the AGIL functions, what are the interchange systems between them like, and how are they concretely composed? For all of those the question of concrete content arises. Questions for example are, what are the forms of social control in a specific system and the compliance of which values and norms do they control? What are the foundations of basic commitments to the collectivity? Are they religious, rational, traditional or utilitarian? The more differentiated level is the one of the subsystems and their internal differentiation. There the political system becomes the focus of interest. On this level, we can ask the classical questions of comparative politics: Who makes decisions? How are decisions made? What impact does the political system have and what does it do in its domestic and international environments? What impact do the society and the international environment have on the political system? To classify or typologize systems thus means to look at the specific patterns of functional subsystems and the related interchange systems. This might have the by‐effect not to be able to produce another prestigious index or typology because of a great variance of patterns, but in turn it opens ways deeper understanding of the respective political regimes. As Systems differ in terms of functional equivalents and societal interchange, assessing regime types means to analyze the functional equivalents developed within social systems, their subsystems and their interchange relations8. Different combinations result in different solutions to the problems 7
This points at the problem of stateness, failing or failed states, but also leaves open the possibility of social systems without stateness, e.g. tribally organized collecitivities without clearly defined territories in a sense of boarders recognized by the UN. 8
For example, Venezuela under Chávez developed a rather authoritarian regime, but has a participative integration system at the same time. In old terms it is a hybrid. Using systems theory and given that it will stay in this equilibrium, it can be referred to as a unique type. The Singapore political system is extremely restrictive, but on the other hand there is a flourishing economy, especially in the financial and service sectors. India has a well developed market economy in the urban centers, a democratic politic system and at the same time there exists a cultural caste system that is rooted in a religious pattern system. Russia has a formally 14 of survival in an international environment (with different levels of success) and thus, the strategy of systems theory allows for more sophisticated analysis of stability and change as well as their input/output‐relations9. Third, there is another way how political systems differ: in the way people are governed and govern themselves, i.e. in the kind of governmentality of the respective systems and the way technologies of government are developed and used over time. Foucault himself offers more or less concrete perspectives of analysis, as he distinguishes five factors that are central for assessing power along the three levels ‐ strategic games, technologies of government and states of domination ‐ outlined above: 1. “The system of differentiations which permits one to act upon the actions of others: differentiations determined by the law or by traditions of status and privilege; economic differences in the appropriation of riches and goods, shifts in the processes of production, linguistic or cultural differences, differences in knowhow and competence, and so forth. Every relationship of power puts into operation differentiations which are at the same time its conditions and its results” (Foucault 1982: 792). 2. “The types of objectives pursued by those who act upon the actions of others: the maintenance of privileges, the accumulation of profits, the bringing into operation of statutary authority, the exercise of a function or of a trade” (Foucault 1982: 792). 3. “The means of bringing power relations into being: according to whether power is exercised by the threat of arms, by the effects of the word, by means of economic disparities, by more or less complex means of control, by systems of surveillance, with or without archives, according to rules which are or are not explicit, fixed or modifiable, with or without the technological means to put all these things into action” (Foucault 1982: 792). These instrumental modalities refer to means of power exertion as well as the formality or informality, stability or flexibility of rules and norms of power exertion. 4. “Forms of institutionalization: these may mix traditional pre‐dispositions, legal structures, phenomena relating to custom or to fashion (such as one sees in the institution of the family); they can also take the form of an apparatus closed in upon itself, with its specific loci, its own regulations, its hierarchical structures which are democratic political system, a state capitalist economy and a culture that can be called “subject culture” in terms of Almond and Verba. 9
Almond exemplifies these advantages for the comparative analysis of political systems: “When we compare classes of political systems with each other, or individual political systems with each other, we need to make these comparisons in terms of capabilities, conversion functions, and system‐maintenance and adaptation functions, and the interrelations among these three kinds of functions (…)The theory of political change deals with those transactions between the political system and its environment that affect changes in general system performance, or capabilities that in turn are associated with changes in the performance of the system‐
adaption functions and the conversion function” (Almond 1965:190‐191). 15 carefully defined, a relative autonomy in its functioning (such as scholastic or military institutions); they can also form very complex systems endowed with multiple apparatuses, as in the case of the state, whose function is the taking of everything under its wing, the bringing into being of general surveillance, the principle of regulation, and, to a certain extent also, the distribution of all power relations in a given social ensemble” (Foucault 1982: 792) Institutionalization thus can be formal or informal, closed or open, general or specific, traditional or rational, complex or simple. Depending on the level of closure and relative functional autonomy of institutions, they represent more or less crystallized states of domination. 5. “The degrees of rationalization: the bringing into play of power relations as action in a field of possibilities may be more or less elaborate in relation to the effectiveness of the instruments and the certainty of the results (greater or lesser technological refinements employed in the exercise of power) or again in proportion to the possible cost (be it the economic cost of the means brought into operation or the cost in terms of reaction constituted by the resistance which is encountered). The exercise of power is not a naked fact, an institutional right, nor is it a structure which holds out or is smashed: it is elaborated, transformed, organized; it endows itself” (Foucault 1982: 792). From a methodical perspective, such kind of approaches might have a preference for qualitative case‐study methods, indeed. Foucault himself offers the methods of genealogy and archeology to assess the historio‐genetic processes through which technologies of government are developed and through which strategic games are stabilized and transferred into states of domination. (For a discussion of genealogy as method see. Kearins / Hooper 2002; Saar 2002; Mukerji 2007; Shiner1982; Owen 1995). A more conventional, but also qualitative case‐study method that could illuminate some of the causal mechanisms and path‐dependencies within the formation of political systems is the method of process tracing (George/Bennett 2005; Bennett / George 1997). Taking into account the comparative perspective, it might be charming to find proxy variables for what Parsons and Foucault would consider necessary to be measured and to process a multi‐level quantitative analysis using the insights of case studies. 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