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The International Causes of Civil and Global War in Korea
By
Henry Lung (10097465)
HIST383
Dr. Dawn Miller
March 20th, 2014
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The International Causes of Civil and Global War in Korea
On the 25th of June in 1950, the Korean War began in earnest with North and South Korean
armed forces clashing along the geographical 38th Parallel that had separated the young nations.
The deadly conflict would encompass the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the Koreas and
their respective allies in the Korean peninsula. The outbreak of the war was a direct result of
multifaceted circumstances. Despite the goal of the United Nations and the Korean people to
form a unified nation, war in the Peninsula was inevitable. The situation in the region became
complex as the two similarly authoritarian leaders Syngman Rhee and Kim il-Sung contested for
control over the North Korean peninsula based on their ideological differences. In addition, the
strategic goals of the Soviet Union and United States respectively in the immediate aftermath of
the Second World War had bolstered the political significance of the region. These immediate
tensions in the Korean peninsula, in addition to the heightened strategic importance of the region
would be propelled into the international struggle that defined the progression of the three year
hot war. This political context would be vital to the eruption of the global Korean War as they
forced and exasperated immediate tensions in the peninsula that preceded the war. It would be
the concurrent emergence of a more active foreign policy in containment and deterrence on the
part of both the United States and Soviet Union that would spur the war into an international
conflict. Effectively, this key political shift would supplement the atmosphere to facilitate the
outbreak of warfare.
These political circumstances directly resulted in the initial fighting between North and South
Korea. The initial outbreak of fighting on the Korean Peninsula began directly with the partisan
maneuverings of the opposing Korean leaders Kim il-Sung and Syngman Rhee in the North and
South respectively. It is vital to understand the motivations of these leaders to accurately reflect
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the historical narrative of why local tensions were created and inflamed. The Allied occupied and
post Japanese ruled Korea had given rise to these enormously different men with equal tenacity
in their cause in the aftermath of the Second World War. Divided along the 38th Parallel, Rhee
headed the Republic of South Korea as a staunch conservative nationalist. Rhee’s character was
defined by tenacious agitation and resistance against authorities which he deemed not in the best
interests of the Korean nation. His early political career consisted of frequent and stubborn
clashes with monarchist authorities leading six years of imprisonment which ended as Japan
began to tighten its control on Korea in 1905 by naming the region as a protectorate.1 His
succeeding years of displacement in the United States would prompt him to westernize his birth
name from Yi Sung-nam to Syngman Rhee while zealously heading his “self-styled Korean
government-in-exile” to protest Japanese occupation in Korea.2 His North Korean counterpart
Kim-Il Sung possessed many of the same attributes that defined Rhee’s political career. Born
Kim Sung Chu following the Japanese complete annexation of Korea as a colony, he similarly
adopted a new name to better suit his nationalistic ideals by adopting the name of an antiJapanese military hero.3 Kim would be more actively engaged in resisting Japanese authorities as
a guerilla leader in Manchuria. He had notably joined the Chinese Communist Party before
Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and actively fought a stubborn but futile resistance that
resulted in his exile to the Soviet Union after a decade of fighting.4
At the conclusion of the Second World War, Kim would assume the status of liberator in the
Soviet occupied Korea. This was directly as a result of the Soviets handing over Japanese
administration to communist Koreans making the Democratic Republic People’s Republic of
Lee Hong Yung review of, ”Syngman Rhee: The Prison Years of a Young Radical” by Chong Sik Lee in The
Journal of Asian Studies 61:3 (2002) 1075.
2
Michael Hickey, The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism (London: John Murray Publishers Ltd 1999),
7.
3
Young Hoon Kong, “North Korea’s mysterious Kim Il sung,” in Communist Affairs 2:2 (1964) 21.
4
Kong, “North Korea’s mysterious Kim Il sung,” 22.
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Korea to be the first new postwar nation to have diplomatic ties to the Soviet Union in 1948.5
Kim’s political cunning allowed him to unite and lead several fractured communist factions
while purging domestic dissidents with Soviet support.6 His successes in building international
relations allowed him to build upon his own Juche ideology which effectively was a variant of
Marxism-Leninism that included Kim’s personal principles of “self-generated, autonomous,
independent action.”7 The Soviet Union would continue support for North Korea and respect
Kim’s personal ideological divergences to suit their overall strategic purposes of assisting a new
political ally. The aftermath of the Second World War also granted Rhee the opportunity to
ascend to power. The Allied nations had vaguely decided on the future of the Korean peninsula
in a series of wartime conferences where other strategic focuses took greater precedent. At the
Yalta Conference in 1945, Franklin Roosevelt of the United States and Josef Stalin had agreed
on a vague multi-nation trusteeship in peninsula, but Japan’s unanticipated swift defeat
demonstrated the weaknesses of addressing the finer details of partitioning Korea.8 Having had
the advantage of seizing power in North Korea with Soviet support early in the confusion
regarding the Korean trusteeship, Kim’s position in the geopolitics of the region was assured.
The United States reacted parallel as they too intended to resolve the vague terms of the
agreement at Yalta. In 1947, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was founded
“prodded by the United States” to terminate allied military occupation and assist in establishing
civilian rule in Korea both north and south of the 38th Parallel.9 Despite this American led
attempt at influencing geo-political guidance in the entirety of Korea, Kim’s early political
Jon Halliday “The North Korean Model: Gaps and Questions” in World Development 9:9 (1981) 890.
Kong, “North Korea’s mysterious Kim Il sung,” 24.
7
Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War 2 vols. (Yuksabipyungsa: Princeton University Press 2002), 2:
295.
8
James I. Matray, “Civil War of a Sort: The International Origins of the Korean Conflict” in The Korean War in
Restrospect, ed. Daniel J. Meador (Boston: University Press of America, 1998) 9.
9
Graeme S. Mount and Andre Laferriere, The Diplomacy of War: The Case of the Korean War, (Montreal: Black
Rose Books, 2004) 4.
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maneuverings had effectively allowed him to establish defacto control in the north. This forced
the focus of the United States shifted to Korea south of the 38th parallel which effectively divided
up the Koreas in terms of international allegiance and ideological autonomy. In 1948 with the
absence of Soviet influence, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea voted
narrowly in favour of holding United Nations sponsored elections only in South Korea.10 Rhee
would win the elections and assume power in the newly formed with implicit backing by the
United States which had spearheaded the decisions of the United Nations Temporary
Commission on Korea. Despite Rhee’s extended residency and political actions in the United
States, he remained steadfastly focused on his native Korea and provided very little compromise
for political opponents. The United States remained unmoved as he fuelled political violence in
the months leading up to his election directed towards the leftist Chonp’yong labour unions by
right wing Noch’ong labour union and police who had financial backing and implicit leadership
from Rhee.11 Rhee was also confident enough in his international reputation. He even
remarkably claimed to be the “President of Korea” in the United States prior to his election
victory and relatively minimal influence as a lobbyist.12 The pragmatism of Rhee and Kim
ultimately set the stage for the outbreak of fighting on the peninsula in the summer of 1950 as
both leaders sought to unite Korea under a different ideological banner. Conflict between these
two equally stalwart nationalists with sternly different ideological fundamentals and international
affiliations clearly brewed the initial conflict in the Korean Peninsula. However, Rhee and Kim’s
authority had been propped up by Western and Eastern blocs and their influence in allowing
these leaders to rise to power should not be understated. In addition, their role in allowing these
10
Mount and Laferriere, The Diplomacy of War: The Case of the Korean War, 13.
Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War 2 vols. 2: 203-204.
12
Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War 2 vols. 2: 64.
11
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men to rise to positions of power, they inadvertently allowed their defacto protectorates to
declare war through misunderstandings based upon a policy of mutual deterrence.
The contemporary observer during the Korean War and Soviet expert George F. Keenan
notably contested that the outbreak of conflict was regional and had been the direct result of
these different but equally headstrong men clashing for power in civil war.13 However, the roots
of the conflict are significantly more international in scale than merely influencing the rise of
Rhee and Kim in the Korean peninsula. Japan’s involvement and capitulation at the end of the
Second World War following decades of imperial rule in Korea made an Allied occupation
inevitable. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour which signaled the American entry into the war
had assured that allied occupation of Korea and made “postwar isolation” unrealistic for
peninsula.14 Both Rhee and Kim had risen to power as both the Western and Eastern blocs drove
their political influence into the Korean peninsula. This effectively set the stage for the
increasing strategic significance of the region for the international community where a local war
was already inevitable. The United States had heavily pursued a policy of attempting to contain
the growth of Communism international as the Soviets had dismantled the American monopoly
on nuclear weapons by testing their first atomic bomb in September of 1949. This loss of a
significant advance, along with the emergent efforts at “accelerating” insurrection in nonCommunist countries in Asia which had been ceded to independent authorities after the Second
World War directly prompted a re-evaluation of America’s strategic position and the creation of
National Security Council Report 68.15 This document effectively increased military spending
and pursued more aggressive practices in the containment of Communism internationally. This
Matray, “Civil War of a Sort: The International Origins of the Korean Conflict” 3
Matray, “Civil War of a Sort: The International Origins of the Korean Conflict” 5.
15
Walt W. Rostow, “The Korean War: A Case of Failed Deterrence?” ” in The Korean War in Retrospect, ed.
Daniel J. Meador (Boston: University Press of America, 1998) 49-50.
13
14
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was bolstered by pre-existing attitudes based on conclusions set out by the Long Telegram sent
by Keenan to Washington in 1946 after researching the Soviet Union. The telegram utilized
“alarmist language” in expressing that the Soviet Union was radically different from the United
States and in suggested that in an effort to keep internal American harmony, cautious and
objective efforts would have to be made containing Soviet political expansion.16 Americans who
sought approaches more cautious than interventionist containment such as isolationist pursuits
were quickly attacked by a growing internationalist faction. The isolationists were frequently
attacked by American propagandists such as John Flynn who stated that gradualist socialists
were preaching isolationism to threaten the American “way of life”.17 Despite a protectionist
form of interventionism in nature, there were evident themes of rabid and aggressive antiCommunism due to popular perceptions taking root as Soviet political expansion played out in
regions such as North Korea.
American strategic and political maneuverings in Korea as a result of would greatly concern
the Soviet Union, interpreting it as aggression rather than fierce protectionism. For the Soviet
aligned factions, their movements at expanding geo-political influence inadvertently became
provocation in the view of the United States. Indeed, they viewed the advantageous addition of
emergence of Communist China forming a defacto political union with Communist regimes
internationally and the loss of the American atomic monopoly as opportunities to thrive in the
early Cold War. They too would view the American strategic thought as offensive tactical
provocations rather than strategically defensive investments. The Soviet strategic focus would
shift to Asia also a result of the emergence of guerilla warfare throughout Southeast Asia earning
the respective Malay, Filipino, Indonesian, and Indochinese Communists praise from Soviet
Efstathios T. Fakiolas, “Kennan’s Long Telegram and NSC68: A Comparative Theoretical Analysis” in Eastern
European Quarterly 31: 4 (1998), 419.
17
Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War 2 vols. 2: 93.
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Second Secretary Andrei Zhdanov.18 Their support of these factions was to also contain the
influence of anti-Communist groups in the geo-politics of Asia and create formidable alliances
with new Communist regimes such as China. This was evidently a welcome change of pace
following the initial phases of the Cold War with the Soviets being disadvantaged due to the
failure of the Berlin Blockade and the American nuclear monopoly.19 The reality of their
assistance and support for these regimes was ultimately far more limited than what the United
States would have anticipated. North Korean rhetoric under Kim had boasted of Soviet liberators
and supporting North Korea20 in addition to the increasingly notable strategic maneuverings in
Asia. Korea became the focal point of the escalating wariness of the United States and the Soviet
Union based on their policies opposing strategic goals. The last American reports from the
Central Intelligence Agency prior to the outbreak of war claimed that was a rigidly controlled
satellite of the Soviet Union lacking independence and completely reliant on the support of the
Soviet Union for political and military survival.21 This presented the Soviet Union and a
boisterous empire with a complete disregard for international stability and the balance of power,
in keeping with conclusions of the Long Telegram. The inadvertent self-vilification of the Soviet
Union however would be perpetrated in large part due to Kim’s tactful respect for Soviet
assistance. Much like the United States, their strategic interests were very protectionist as
highlighted by their ultimately limited military support of Korea. Notably, Soviet military
equipment delivered to North Korea was generally obsolete and with an exception to air power
in the form of the advanced MIG-23 fighter airplanes.22 This was hardly the Soviet satellite
powerhouse that the United States had feared, and the outbreak of war prompted the swift
Rostow, “The Korean War: A Case of Failed Deterrence?” 54-55.
Rostow, “The Korean War: A Case of Failed Deterrence?” 54.
20
Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War 2 vols. 2: 444.
21
Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War 2 vols. 2: 443.
22
Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War 2 vols. 2: 447.
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involvement of the international community, with each respective faction having feared the
apparent aggression of their similar strategic visions. Stalin would support Kim in the outbreak
of war for reasons unclear, but likely due to an attempt at containing Western influence in Japan
and bolstering the strength of the new Sino-Soviet alliance. 23 For very similar reasons of selfpreservation, both Eastern and Western factions saw fit to enter into the war in a strong but
cautious capacity.
The mutually deterrence and containment policies practiced by both factions bolstered the
political significance of the steeping conflict in Korea. It would ultimately be Kim-Il Sung with
the blessing of his communist counterparts Mao in China and Stalin of the Soviet Union that
invaded the Republic of South Korea in the summer of 1950. The joint Allied forces of the
United Nations led by the United States would assist the South Koreans, while the Sino-Soviet
alliance would assist the North Koreans. The battle lines of the war had been inadvertently drawn
years before the first shots were fired. Regional tensions were created in the aftermath of the
Second World War with the Soviet and American support of the Kim and Rhee regimes
respectively. The concurrent political rhetoric and the wider political strategies of both factions
led to interpretations of the aggression in partisan activities taken to contain and deter each other.
Effectively, global forces created the regional conflict by inadvertently pitting Rhee and Kim
against each other, and thrust the war into an international conflict due to their interpretations of
the political significance of Korea and respective strategic motivations. Ultimately, the Korean
War was unavoidable in the context of the early Cold War as the international community both
caused and escalated the regional conflict to a vicious global war.
Alan J. Levine, Stalin’s Last War: Korea and the Approach to World War III (Jefferson: McFarland and Company
Inc. Publishers 2005), 40.
23
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Bibliography
Secondary Sources
Print
1. Lee Hong Yung review of, ”Syngman Rhee: The Prison Years of a Young Radical” by
Chong Sik Lee in The Journal of Asian Studies 61:3 (2002) 1075
2. Michael Hickey, The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism (London: John
Murray Publishers Ltd 1999),
3. Young Hoon Kong, “North Korea’s mysterious Kim Il sung,” in Communist Affairs 2:2
(1964) 21-22, 24.
4. Jon Halliday “The North Korean Model: Gaps and Questions” in World Development 9:9
(1981) 890.
5. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War 2 vols. (Yuksabipyungsa: Princeton
University Press 2002), 2: 295, 203-204, 64, 93, 443-444, 447.
6. James I. Matray, “Civil War of a Sort: The International Origins of the Korean Conflict”
in The Korean War in Restrospect, ed. Daniel J. Meador (Boston: University Press of
America, 1998) 9, 3, 5.
7. Graeme S. Mount and Andre Laferriere, The Diplomacy of War: The Case of the Korean
War, (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2004) 4, 13, 54-55.
8. Walt W. Rostow, “The Korean War: A Case of Failed Deterrence?” ” in The Korean War
in Retrospect, ed. Daniel J. Meador (Boston: University Press of America, 1998) 49-50.
9. Efstathios T. Fakiolas, “Kennan’s Long Telegram and NSC68: A Comparative
Theoretical Analysis” in Eastern European Quarterly 31: 4 (1998), 419.
10. Alan J. Levine, Stalin’s Last War: Korea and the Approach to World War III (Jefferson:
McFarland and Company Inc. Publishers 2005), 40.
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