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WINSTON CHURCHILL FALLS FROM POLITICAL POWER IN " 1922 ROBYN KELLER v e n s Communicated by: Dr. Roy Schreiber Department ofHistory . ABSTRACT y t. Two factors led to Winston Churchill's political downfall in 1922. First, Churchill was seen as a key figure t. y promoting force in Chanak, Turkey. Secondly, the Coalition government in power was losing the popularity n that it needed to remain in place. is re ly ie ie The political consequences of Chanak were substantial. The crisis had been played out in public and the Df to the brink of a totally unexpected and unnecessary war caused him to lose support from all parties. In addition at 1e newspapers were well informed of processes going on in the Cabinet. Churchill's part in propelling the Cabinet to this already shaky foundation, the Coalition was weakening and had been acquiring disapproval before the m crisis in Turkey. The pattern of these two events occurring simultaneously was enough to cause the downfall VO of the Liberal Coalition in October 1922. in, JP of ed en he 1ry rm Had Ministers Austen Chamberlain and F .E. Smith accepted advice to abandon Lloyd George and form a center party with Winston Churchill, who would have been the leading Liberal left to receive Unionist support, Churchill may have survived the turmoil in 1922. Instead they publicly supported George which forced Churchill to fight for his Parliamentary seat in Dundee, Scotland as a Liberal and Free Trader. This meant that the Liberal vote would be split three ways. The public view that portrayed Churchill as a warmonger, due to the reports of his handling the situation in ,f 10. 1lla 1 11 ~ Turkey, and the already faltering Coalition government caused Winston Churchill to be forced out of political power for the second time in his career in the public arena. On November 15, 1922, fifteen days before his forty-eighth birthday, Winston Churchill was to fall from political power for the second time in eight years. This date marks his defeat at Dundee, Scotland, a seat in Parliament he had held for fourteen years. Churchill went down to overwhelming defeat. His previous majority at Dundee in 1918 had been fifteen thousand votes; in 1922 he was rejected by more than 10,000 (Gilbert 456). The fickle nature of politics had been dramatically demonstrated. Two main factors led to Churchill's political downfall in 1922. He was seen as a key figure promoting force in Chanak, a town on the Wes tern Shore of Turkey and the Coalition government was losing the popularity it had previously held and was on the verge of collapse.' A strange coincidence made the town of Chanak, on the Eastern Shore of the Dardanelles, the waterway that separates Turkey in Europe and Asia (Asia Minor), the 1 The English Government has a prime minister. The prime minister is the leader of the majority party in the House of Commons. Assuming there is no majority party, a prime minister would have a majority coalition or at least a coalition that was not rejected by the majority. 52 R. Keller ··-·-· ·--··- -.....-.-., "'""" 3 -~·\.•ii~ ~1~:~~~~ .. ;· 01~.JmJAf!Jait' ; S5b""'1 ~· TURKEY· IN· •• EUROPE MiliT11p11 JJ,... '3'4}1Ht' : GALLIPOLI Churchill went to Lloyd George with a warning of what he felt would happen if the Greeks went on the offensive against the Turks to gain pieces of Asia Minor; "If the Greeks go off on another half-cocked offensive, the last card will have been played and lost, and we shall neither have a Turkish peace nor a Greek army" (James 156). • PENINSULA ASIA Ml NOR __.,... AJl;er;hvarshlpS. l~ ~c:h 19t5 • t..n<Mgl>e...,..,2!/...,.,1.. 5 •••• Mi:H.<t"fQ~e1-.2tiAo!'ifHi~5- ~ Moslem world, and so relieving ourselves of the disastrous realization both military and financial to which our anti-Turk policy has exposed us in the Middle East and in India... I am convinced that the restoration of Turkish sovereignty or suzerainty over the Smyrna Province is an indispensable step to the specification of the Middle East. (Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda, Cabinet 23/31) a,....,"....~ 3(}Ap.> t9>5 Figure I: On the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, the town of Chanak A neutral zone had been imposed here under the Treaty of Sovres in 1920, In 1922, the Turkish Army advanced on the Greeks towards Chanak (Source: Gilbert, Martin, Churchill A life, New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc,, 1991) indirect cause of political disaster for Winston Churchill for the second time in eight years. In 1915, he had been thrown into a political wilderness by allegations of mishandling the Dardanelles campaign. He had been relieved of First Lord of the Admiralty due to accusations of mismanagement. Churchill had been blamed for the "loss of three cruisers and the faulty disposition which led to the action off Coronel" (Gilbert 319). A serious accusation was that he interfered with naval experts and their recommendations. Churchill's observations seemed to be coming true. On September 10, 1922 Mustaphe Kemal, a powerful Gallipoli commander, had driven out the Greek forces in Turkey (Gilbert 821). The Greeks reached the port of Smyrna in confusion, followed by the Kemalist army. The victorious Kemalist army turned north and advanced upon the neutral zone of the Dardanelles created by the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 (Gilbert 821). The arrival of the Kemalist forces at Chanak presented a difficult situation for Churchill. Although Churchill had previously been opposed to George's support of Greece, he now reversed his position. He viewed the line of water separating Asia from Europe as imperative to the Empire and thought that line must be kept secure at all costs (Gilbert 820). Churchill felt that if they did not fight for the piece of land where Chanak sits on the shores of the Dardanelles, then all the lives lost in the Balkan War would have been for nothing. The Chiefs of Staff were concerned for the safety of the small British forces off Chanak. Due to the safety of the men at Chanak, the Cabinet was ready to concede to many ofKemals' requirements for a peaceful settlement. However, several of the Ministers, Churchill being one of the most prominent, balked at being forced to negotiations under pressure by Kemal. At a cabinet meeting in September 1922, questions facing Chanak spurred ministers into resolute judgment (James 157). Some ministers had now concluded, (perhaps swayed by Churchill's enthusiastic and persuasive speeches) that "Chanak had now become a point of great moral significance to the prestige of the Empire" (James 157). The foundations ofChurchill 's renewed political power began to crack in December 1920 with his view of the Middle East. He had consistently opposed Prime Minister Lloyd Georges' pro-Greek policies and opposed the open support given to the Greeks in their quest for pieces of Asia Minor. On December 11, 1920, Churchill stated his opinion in a memorandum: Churchill and Lloyd George continued their struggle against the Kemalists and disapproved of any proposal to bargain with the Kemalists over the safety of the Greek army, which would "in any way compromise our European policy" (Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda, Cabinet 23/31 ). Churchill stated in the same meeting: We should make a definite change in our policy in direction of procuring a real peace with the The Asiatic arrangement should be kept separate. The line of deep water-separating Asia from Winston Churchill Falls from Political Power in 1922 Europe was a line of great significance, and we must niake that secure by every means within our power. If the Turks take the Gallipoli Peninsula and Constantinople, we shall have lost the whole fruits of our victory and another Balkan War would be inevitable. (Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda, Cabinet 23/31) lt ie m :n or )n )li ey m us ral in l a 1ad he ter 1nd 0). md all ng. tall tat ils' l of :nt, by :ing 57). by that nee .inst .vith mld 1inet :din The Prime Minister's statement about the dilemnia was as strongly stated as Churchill's stance: In no circumstance could we allow the Gall.ipoli Peninsula to be held by the Turks. It was the most important strategic position in the world, and the closing of the straits has prolonged the war by two years. It was inconceivable that we should allow the Turks to gain possession of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and we should fight to prevent their doing so. (Public Records Office, Cabinet 23/31) As a whole, the cabinet resolved "any attempt by the Kenialist to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula shall be resisted by force" (James 157). The Cabinet discussed the stand and strategy they would take on the fifteenth of September. It was beginning to look as if Britain might be heading to war. Churchill stated that it was "vital to have real forces to meet the Turkish challenge" and that he was "wholly opposed to attempt to carry a bluff without force" (James 158). He went on to say that the Empire needed to preserve Gallipoli and inferred that it might be willing to do so without the cooperation of France. The cabinet arranged for an early conference where they instructed Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon to contact the Serbian and Runianian governnients to get "their active and immediate military support in dealing with the present menace to the freedom of the Straits" (James 159). Lord Curzon was also to ask the Greeks for help, and inform the French governnient that the British would send a division to Constantinople if the French did the same. Churchill was asked to draft a telegram to the Dominion Prime Ministers asking for their support. Churchill was also asked to issue a communique for the press stating what they were asking of Dominion Ministers. An unfortunate error in timing resulted in trouble for the Cabinet. Many of the Dominion Ministers read of the appeal in the newspaper before they had received their official copy (Taylor 93 ). As a result, the Dominion Ministers reacted to the appeal from Britain's Cabinet Ministers coldly. The only favorable response came from New Zealand and Newfoundland. Another serious problem facing the Ministers was the indignation of the French governnient at being implicated, along with the Italians, in supporting the defiant British stance. The effect of this combined string of errors was that 53 the British Governnient had already angered its allies and isolated itself from them. The Governnient also had to face the grim reality that they were not going to receive support from Britain's people. There had been virtually no indication that a military situation was looming and the British people were not in favor of entering another war. The very factors mentioned above that had gotten the ministers into trouble, the communique Churchill had issued to the press, the anger of the Dominion Ministers and the French Governnient at reading of their proposed stance in the paper, and the uproar of the British people who were just informed that they were on the brink of war, ironically niade the ministers even more determined not to compromise their position. The situation escalated on September 18. The Cabinet decided that any Soviet subniarines, subniarine chasers, and mine-layers arriving in the Straits should be attacked; that "any such craft approaching the Straits on the surface from the Black Sea under the Russian flag should be warned off; and that, in the event of risk to any Allied ship from the approach of any such craft encountered in the Black Sea or Straits, it should be sunk. It was not deemed expedient to warn the Soviet Governnient at present of these intentions" (Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda, Cabinet 23/31 ). The explanation for this potential offense against Russia was that it was believed that the Bolsheviks were helping the Kenialists, so they were subject to British wrath by proxy. The ministers sent the subniarine attack instructions to the Admiral who was the Naval Comniander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. On September 23, the Cabinet was stressing the importance of publicity of the Governnient's policy regarding the situation in the Near East. They had realized that the public needed to be niade aware of the potentialities of war. They had also decided to refer the niatter to the League of Nations in the event that Lord Curzon could not convince the French Governnient to support the initiative. Churchill and other Ministers had been aware that the Cabinet might take this view and pointed out to Lloyd George that the League might insist upon British withdrawal from Chanak. Lloyd George overruled the decision of the Cabinet to refer the niatter to the League in the event that Lord Curzon was unable to convince the French for support. The situation in Chanak seemed to be easing when, on September 26, Kenial agreed to listen to Allied peace proposals. Churchill viewed this as a success of the hard line he and other Ministers were advocating. Disregarding peaceful negotiations, the Cabinet ordered the Turkish comniander to vacate Chanak. General Charles Harrington, Comniander of the forces in Chanak, was to designate a time for this. 54 R. Keller A telegram was sent to General Harrington that stated the Cabinet's view on Kemalist troops in Chanak. It read: Bonar Law from retirement now provided a leader in a successful political revolt. If his forces are not withdrawn by an hour to be settled by you, at which our combined forces will be in place, all the forces at our disposal- naval, military, and air- will open fire... The time limit should be short and it should not be overlooked that we have received warning regarding the date September 301h for Turkish operations against the neutral zone from our intelligence. (James 160) The Coalition had been acquiring disapproval before the crisis and their reputation was already tarnished. The Government of Lloyd George was coming apart. One critic said that it had "produced at the center an atmosphere more like an oriental court at which favorites struggled unceasingly for position than anything seen in Britain for a century or more" (winstonchurchill.org/actsrl922.htrn). Arnold Bennet noted after a weekend with Ministers, Austen Chamberlain, Lloyd George, and F .E. Smith, at Cherkley, "I never heard principles or the welfare of the country mentioned" (James 154). The orders given to Harrington had left some latitude in his hands. The members of the Cabinet waited anxiously for word of what was going on, and were stunned when Harrington reported on October 1 that the immediate crisis appeared to be over and he was to meet Kemal (James 160). Harrington had chosen not to deliver the ultimatum. In the British press, Harrington was viewed as a hero when headlines extolled the military brilliance and tact Harrington had used. The Cabinet Ministers criticized Harrington of "mixing himself up in political problems" and "misleading Ministers about the military situation" (Charmley 187). On October 3, a conference was to be held between the Turkish and Allied generals at Mudania (Gilbert 854 ). Few of the Cabinet Ministers believed anything would come of the conference, Churchill being one of the most ardent with this view. He was wrong. War had been averted and public opinion was that of relief, tinged with a little alarm. The political consequences of the Chanak Incident were substantial. Much of the crisis had been played out in public, and the national newspapers were surprisingly well informed of many of the processes within Cabinet itself. In The Times and The Daily Express, Bonar Law, who had recently retired but who nonetheless posed a serious threat of alternative leadership of the Government, had a letter published, expressing his concern at the unilateral action of the Government (James 161 ). His opinion most likely represented what a majority of the Conservative Party within the Coalition were thinking. Churchill's part in propelling the Cabinet to the brink of a totally unexpected and unnecessary war was not likely to win any friends on the Conservative side. By itself, the Chanak incident probably would not have been the decisive event in the history of the Coalition. It is possible that it might have survived the initial stand of September 15, and that Kemal's message of the twenty-sixth would have been attributed to the stand the Cabinet had taken. The Coalition's probable downfall was the ultimatum of the twenty-ninth, which had received substantial press. The Times had printed on October 2 that "an immediate conflict between British and Kemalist troops has been averted mainly by the tact and wisdom of Sir Charles Harrington" (James 161 ). Chanak may fairly be regarded as the event that finally drew together Conservatives who were divided on continued support of Lloyd George and the Coalition. The emergence of As the revolt against Lloyd George gathered momentum, the leaders of the Coalition conceived a plan of their own. The Coalition decided to hold the election before the Conservatives held their annual conference in November. It was to be determined at the Carlton Club on Thursday, October 19, whether the Conservatives entered the election with the Coalition or as a separate party (James 154 ). As in the case ofChanak, the Coalition gave an ultimatum that backfired. The purpose was, as Chamberlain put it, "tell the Conservatives bluntly that they must either follow our advice or do without us, in which case they must find their own Chief, and form a Government at once. They would be in a damned fix" (Charmley 188). Only Members of Parliament would be permitted to attend and vote. The meeting was deliberately timed to take place on October 23, immediately after the result of a by-election at Newport was declared. It was expected that an Independent Conservative candidate would be at the bottom of the poll and thereby prove to the Conservatives they needed to remain in the Coalition (Gilbert 455). The plan went terribly wrong for the Coalition. Bonar Law emerged as the alternative leader for the Coalition and was scheduled to speak against the Coalition at the Carlton Club. Law's speech made it clear that there was an alternative Unionist Prime Minister. The Newport results arrived just as members were going into the meeting. The results were to seal the fate of the Coalition. The Independent Conservative had won easily and the Coalition's Lloyd George came in third. The meeting voted against George's Coalition, 185 votes to 88 (James 163). Lloyd George resigned that afternoon. The Coalition had collapsed. At the moment of the Coalition's downfall, Churchill was recovering from an emergency appendectomy. When he awoke the following morning, he learned that he was out of a job. This was only the beginning of the struggle Churchill was to face to remain in the political arena. Churchill wrote upon hearing the results, "In the twinkling of an eye, I found myself without office, without a seat, without a party, and even without an appendix" (James 165). r Winston Churchill Falls from Political Power in 1922 a Most Unionists were still in favor of some sort of Coalition after the election; few thought that they could win a majority of the new democratic electorate (Kinnear 130). Bonar Law formed a government of sorts, and promptly called a general election. This election has been described as one of the most confused of modem times, "with a whole variety of Liberals standing under various prefixes, or none, some owing allegiance to Lloyd George, others to Herbert Henry Asquith, another former Prime Minister, and some to no one" (Charmley 189). s nt d al m e" ed yd es he he he It 1y, on 1at :he ice wn ri a ~nt iaS ely . It ate the 1ert aw vas ub. ive nto on. the 1ted 53). had was he ofa was pon self ven The election results established that Bonar Law was now in charge and he emphasized the differences between himself and Lloyd George, promising, "the minimum of interference at home and of disturbance abroad, stem economies, and the reduction of the personal power of the Prime Minister" (James 164). The Conservatives had won 45 seats, Labor 142, Asquithian Liberal 60, with 57 going to Lloyd George Liberal (Gilbert 457). The sarcastic comment pertaining to the election results by newsman Philip Guedalla stated: Mr. Bonar Law ... became Prime Minister of England for the simple and satisfying reason that he was not Mr. Lloyd George. At an open competition in the somewhat negative exercise of not being Mr. Lloyd George that was held in November 1922, Mr. Law was found to be more indubitably not Mr. Lloyd George than any of the other competitors; and, in consequence, by the mysterious operation of the British Constitution, he reigned in his stead. (James 164) These developments, which were out of Churchill's hands, had profound significance on his political career. Had Austen Chamberlain and F.E. Smith, two major figures in the Coalition government, accepted the advice they were getting from many quarters to abandon Lloyd George, the Coalition would have remained intact. Churchill, as the leading Liberal left in, would have been in the position to receive Unionist support when Bonar Law called an election. As it was, Chamberlain and Smith had issued a public statement declaring their continued adherence to Lloyd George and refused to form a 'centre party' with Churchill (James 164). Churchill would have to fight the election to come as a Liberal and Free Trader (Gilbert 455). As soon as he could, Churchill wrote his Dundee constituency saying he would stand as a Liberal and asked for their support against the Labor and Communist candidates, hoping that the Conservatives would stay with him. Churchill's campaign put emphasis on the dangers of Socialism and the need for national unity. This campaign strategy put him in the circle with moderate Unionists with whom he was willing to unite, but his attempt to rally the electors of Dundee for the fifth time was limited by his own fragile health and Liberal divisions. The Unionists agreed not to oppose him, but the presence of another National Liberal and an Asquithian Liberal meant that, 55 even though Dundee was a two-member constituency, the Liberal vote was being split three ways. The three-way battle was between Churchill, E.D. Morel, a leading Labour Party figure, and Edwin Scrymgeour, who was standing as an Independent with Labour sympathies. As the campaign developed, its tone became notably sharper. The Daily Express accused the Lloyd George Liberals of being warmongers. Churchill was still down from having his appendix removed, but fought the accusations from bed in a statement, describing the Law Ministry as "the Government of the Second Eleven," declaring that he would "never stifle myselfin such a moral and intellectual sepulcher"(J ames 163 ). Others came to the front to fight for Churchill while he was convalescing. Clementine, who was still recovering from the birth of their seven-week-old daughter Mary, went to the Dundee constituency to represent her husband. She spoke at six meetings and graciously faced hostile crowds. So umeceptive were the crowds that sneezing powder was released by someone to break up a meeting that Clementine was speaking at. F.E. Smith also came up to speak for his friend, but Clementine told Churchill "he was no use at all, he was drunk" (Gilbert 880). Churchill did not arrive in Dundee, Scotland until three days before polling. He was still pale and weak from his operation. On the first night, before a crowd of some four thousand in Caird Hall, he defended the Chanak policy and the record of the Coalition. His second meeting at Drill Hall did not go well. Churchill stated, "I was struck by the looks of passionate hatred on the faces of some of the younger men and women. Indeed, but for my helpless condition, I am sure they would have attacked me" (James 164). Even drunk, Smith was probably a charismatic speaker, but neither he, nor a last minute personal appearance by Churchill, could avert the damage done by the Liberal split and the Labor attacks on Churchill's past record that often seemed to advocate war. The cry 'What about the Dardanelles?' still haunted Churchill. Even though it may have been unfair, it worked against him when any argument of substance was lacking. The split would work to the advantage of E.D. Morel and Edwin Scrymgeour, who were elected. Churchill received less than fourteen percent of the total vote. He was out of Parliament for the first time in twenty-two years. He later told the King that "he had always held Dundee by speeches and argument, which required three weeks campaigning. He could not do it in three days" (winstonchurchill.org/actsrl922.htrn). The pattern of events in 1922 that occurred together brought about Churchill's fall from power. The Chanak Incident propelled him and the Coalition leaders into action that were not supported by key elements they needed. They had ignored important factors that would lead to their downfall. They ignored the necessity ofjoint action of the French and Italians, who were also guarantors of the Treaty of Sevres. Also 56 R. Keller ignored were the arguments of Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary who was against military action in Chanak because he believed a peaceful solution could be met with negotiations. The advice of General Sir Charles Harrington was being misinterpreted and largely disregarded. All elements for a rational solution to the Chanak crisis were ignored (James 158). These factors working against him at the same time secured his political downfall in 1922. However, the story of a man such as Winston Churchill had many pages left before the end. The political rollercoaster he rode made him prone to much upheaval from which he would continually rise, making him the quintessential phoenix rising time and again from political ashes. REFERENCES Figure 2: Winston Churchill had been elected to his seat in Parliament four times from the constituency of Dundee, Scotland. In 1922, he would lose his seat, receiving only fourteen percent of the electorate. (Source: Gilbert, Martin. Churchill A Life. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1991) Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda, 1900-1939. London: Public Records Office. Charmley, John. Churchill: The End of Glory. Great Britain: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1993. Gilbert, Martin. Churchill: A Life. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1991. Gilbert, Martin. Winston S. Churchill, The Stricken World, Volume IV, 1916-1922. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975. James, Robert Rhodes. Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900-1939. Ohio: The World Publishing Company, 1970 Kinnear, Michael. The Fall of Lloyd George: The Political Crisis of 1922. New York: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1967. Taylor, A.J.P., et al. Churchill Revised A Critical Assessment. New York: The Dial Press, Inc, 1969. The Winston Churchill Home Page. Washington D.C. http://www.winstonchurchill.org/actsrl 922.htm. Accessed April 6, 2000. ROBYN KELLER graduated in May 2001 with a degree in Social Studies Education and certification in U.S. History, World History, and Psychology. She became interested in the subject of Winston Churchill's political career in the spring of 2000 for 1495, Letters from Churchill, with Dr. Roy Schreiber. "Professor Schreiber has a way of studying history that makes you feel as if you were there. It was in his classes that I decided to switch majors and become a History teacher. Thanks, Professor Scheiber."