Download WINSTON CHURCHILL FALLS FROM POLITICAL POWER IN 1922

WINSTON CHURCHILL FALLS FROM
POLITICAL POWER IN
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1922
ROBYN KELLER
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Communicated by: Dr. Roy Schreiber
Department ofHistory
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ABSTRACT
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Two factors led to Winston Churchill's political downfall in 1922. First, Churchill was seen as a key figure
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promoting force in Chanak, Turkey. Secondly, the Coalition government in power was losing the popularity
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that it needed to remain in place.
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The political consequences of Chanak were substantial. The crisis had been played out in public and the
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to the brink of a totally unexpected and unnecessary war caused him to lose support from all parties. In addition
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newspapers were well informed of processes going on in the Cabinet. Churchill's part in propelling the Cabinet
to this already shaky foundation, the Coalition was weakening and had been acquiring disapproval before the
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crisis in Turkey. The pattern of these two events occurring simultaneously was enough to cause the downfall
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of the Liberal Coalition in October 1922.
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Had Ministers Austen Chamberlain and F .E. Smith accepted advice to abandon Lloyd George and form a
center party with Winston Churchill, who would have been the leading Liberal left to receive Unionist support,
Churchill may have survived the turmoil in 1922. Instead they publicly supported George which forced
Churchill to fight for his Parliamentary seat in Dundee, Scotland as a Liberal and Free Trader. This meant that
the Liberal vote would be split three ways.
The public view that portrayed Churchill as a warmonger, due to the reports of his handling the situation in
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Turkey, and the already faltering Coalition government caused Winston Churchill to be forced out of political
power for the second time in his career in the public arena.
On November 15, 1922, fifteen days before his forty-eighth
birthday, Winston Churchill was to fall from political power
for the second time in eight years. This date marks his defeat
at Dundee, Scotland, a seat in Parliament he had held for
fourteen years. Churchill went down to overwhelming defeat.
His previous majority at Dundee in 1918 had been fifteen
thousand votes; in 1922 he was rejected by more than 10,000
(Gilbert 456). The fickle nature of politics had been
dramatically demonstrated.
Two main factors led to Churchill's political downfall in
1922. He was seen as a key figure promoting force in Chanak,
a town on the Wes tern Shore of Turkey and the Coalition
government was losing the popularity it had previously held
and was on the verge of collapse.'
A strange coincidence made the town of Chanak, on the
Eastern Shore of the Dardanelles, the waterway that
separates Turkey in Europe and Asia (Asia Minor), the
1
The English Government has a prime minister. The prime
minister is the leader of the majority party in the House of Commons.
Assuming there is no majority party, a prime minister would have a
majority coalition or at least a coalition that was not rejected by the
majority.
52
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Churchill went to Lloyd George with a warning of what he felt
would happen if the Greeks went on the offensive against the
Turks to gain pieces of Asia Minor; "If the Greeks go off on
another half-cocked offensive, the last card will have been
played and lost, and we shall neither have a Turkish peace nor
a Greek army" (James 156).
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Moslem world, and so relieving ourselves of the
disastrous realization both military and financial to
which our anti-Turk policy has exposed us in the
Middle East and in India... I am convinced that
the restoration of Turkish sovereignty or suzerainty
over the Smyrna Province is an indispensable step
to the specification of the Middle East. (Cabinet
Minutes and Memoranda, Cabinet 23/31)
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Figure I: On the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, the town of Chanak A
neutral zone had been imposed here under the Treaty of Sovres in 1920, In
1922, the Turkish Army advanced on the Greeks towards Chanak (Source:
Gilbert, Martin, Churchill A life, New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc,,
1991)
indirect cause of political disaster for Winston Churchill for
the second time in eight years.
In 1915, he had been thrown into a political wilderness by
allegations of mishandling the Dardanelles campaign. He had
been relieved of First Lord of the Admiralty due to
accusations of mismanagement. Churchill had been blamed
for the "loss of three cruisers and the faulty disposition which
led to the action off Coronel" (Gilbert 319). A serious
accusation was that he interfered with naval experts and their
recommendations.
Churchill's observations seemed to be coming true. On
September 10, 1922 Mustaphe Kemal, a powerful Gallipoli
commander, had driven out the Greek forces in Turkey
(Gilbert 821). The Greeks reached the port of Smyrna in
confusion, followed by the Kemalist army. The victorious
Kemalist army turned north and advanced upon the neutral
zone of the Dardanelles created by the Treaty of Sevres in
1920 (Gilbert 821).
The arrival of the Kemalist forces at Chanak presented a
difficult situation for Churchill. Although Churchill had
previously been opposed to George's support of Greece, he
now reversed his position. He viewed the line of water
separating Asia from Europe as imperative to the Empire and
thought that line must be kept secure at all costs (Gilbert 820).
Churchill felt that if they did not fight for the piece of land
where Chanak sits on the shores of the Dardanelles, then all
the lives lost in the Balkan War would have been for nothing.
The Chiefs of Staff were concerned for the safety of the small
British forces off Chanak. Due to the safety of the men at
Chanak, the Cabinet was ready to concede to many ofKemals'
requirements for a peaceful settlement. However, several of
the Ministers, Churchill being one of the most prominent,
balked at being forced to negotiations under pressure by
Kemal.
At a cabinet meeting in September 1922, questions facing
Chanak spurred ministers into resolute judgment (James 157).
Some ministers had now concluded, (perhaps swayed by
Churchill's enthusiastic and persuasive speeches) that
"Chanak had now become a point of great moral significance
to the prestige of the Empire" (James 157).
The foundations ofChurchill 's renewed political power began
to crack in December 1920 with his view of the Middle East.
He had consistently opposed Prime Minister Lloyd Georges'
pro-Greek policies and opposed the open support given to the
Greeks in their quest for pieces of Asia Minor. On December
11, 1920, Churchill stated his opinion in a memorandum:
Churchill and Lloyd George continued their struggle against
the Kemalists and disapproved of any proposal to bargain with
the Kemalists over the safety of the Greek army, which would
"in any way compromise our European policy" (Cabinet
Minutes and Memoranda, Cabinet 23/31 ). Churchill stated in
the same meeting:
We should make a definite change in our policy in
direction of procuring a real peace with the
The Asiatic arrangement should be kept separate.
The line of deep water-separating Asia from
Winston Churchill Falls from Political Power in 1922
Europe was a line of great significance, and we
must niake that secure by every means within our
power. If the Turks take the Gallipoli Peninsula
and Constantinople, we shall have lost the whole
fruits of our victory and another Balkan War would
be inevitable. (Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda,
Cabinet 23/31)
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The Prime Minister's statement about the dilemnia was as
strongly stated as Churchill's stance:
In no circumstance could we allow the Gall.ipoli
Peninsula to be held by the Turks. It was the most
important strategic position in the world, and the
closing of the straits has prolonged the war by two
years. It was inconceivable that we should allow
the Turks to gain possession of the Gallipoli
Peninsula, and we should fight to prevent their
doing so. (Public Records Office, Cabinet 23/31)
As a whole, the cabinet resolved "any attempt by the Kenialist
to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula shall be resisted by force"
(James 157).
The Cabinet discussed the stand and strategy they would take
on the fifteenth of September. It was beginning to look as if
Britain might be heading to war. Churchill stated that it was
"vital to have real forces to meet the Turkish challenge" and
that he was "wholly opposed to attempt to carry a bluff
without force" (James 158). He went on to say that the Empire
needed to preserve Gallipoli and inferred that it might be
willing to do so without the cooperation of France.
The cabinet arranged for an early conference where they
instructed Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon to contact the
Serbian and Runianian governnients to get "their active and
immediate military support in dealing with the present menace
to the freedom of the Straits" (James 159). Lord Curzon was
also to ask the Greeks for help, and inform the French
governnient that the British would send a division to
Constantinople if the French did the same.
Churchill was asked to draft a telegram to the Dominion Prime
Ministers asking for their support. Churchill was also asked
to issue a communique for the press stating what they were
asking of Dominion Ministers.
An unfortunate error in timing resulted in trouble for the
Cabinet. Many of the Dominion Ministers read of the appeal
in the newspaper before they had received their official copy
(Taylor 93 ). As a result, the Dominion Ministers reacted to the
appeal from Britain's Cabinet Ministers coldly. The only
favorable response came from New Zealand and
Newfoundland.
Another serious problem facing the Ministers was the
indignation of the French governnient at being implicated,
along with the Italians, in supporting the defiant British
stance. The effect of this combined string of errors was that
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the British Governnient had already angered its allies and
isolated itself from them.
The Governnient also had to face the grim reality that they
were not going to receive support from Britain's people.
There had been virtually no indication that a military situation
was looming and the British people were not in favor of
entering another war.
The very factors mentioned above that had gotten the
ministers into trouble, the communique Churchill had issued
to the press, the anger of the Dominion Ministers and the
French Governnient at reading of their proposed stance in the
paper, and the uproar of the British people who were just
informed that they were on the brink of war, ironically niade
the ministers even more determined not to compromise their
position.
The situation escalated on September 18. The Cabinet
decided that any Soviet subniarines, subniarine chasers, and
mine-layers arriving in the Straits should be attacked; that
"any such craft approaching the Straits on the surface from the
Black Sea under the Russian flag should be warned off; and
that, in the event of risk to any Allied ship from the approach
of any such craft encountered in the Black Sea or Straits, it
should be sunk. It was not deemed expedient to warn the
Soviet Governnient at present of these intentions" (Cabinet
Minutes and Memoranda, Cabinet 23/31 ).
The explanation for this potential offense against Russia was
that it was believed that the Bolsheviks were helping the
Kenialists, so they were subject to British wrath by proxy.
The ministers sent the subniarine attack instructions to the
Admiral who was the Naval Comniander-in-Chief in the
Mediterranean.
On September 23, the Cabinet was stressing the importance of
publicity of the Governnient's policy regarding the situation
in the Near East. They had realized that the public needed to
be niade aware of the potentialities of war. They had also
decided to refer the niatter to the League of Nations in the
event that Lord Curzon could not convince the French
Governnient to support the initiative.
Churchill and other Ministers had been aware that the Cabinet
might take this view and pointed out to Lloyd George that the
League might insist upon British withdrawal from Chanak.
Lloyd George overruled the decision of the Cabinet to refer
the niatter to the League in the event that Lord Curzon was
unable to convince the French for support.
The situation in Chanak seemed to be easing when, on
September 26, Kenial agreed to listen to Allied peace
proposals. Churchill viewed this as a success of the hard line
he and other Ministers were advocating. Disregarding
peaceful negotiations, the Cabinet ordered the Turkish
comniander to vacate Chanak. General Charles Harrington,
Comniander of the forces in Chanak, was to designate a time
for this.
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A telegram was sent to General Harrington that stated the
Cabinet's view on Kemalist troops in Chanak. It read:
Bonar Law from retirement now provided a leader in a
successful political revolt.
If his forces are not withdrawn by an hour to be
settled by you, at which our combined forces will
be in place, all the forces at our disposal- naval,
military, and air- will open fire... The time limit
should be short and it should not be overlooked
that we have received warning regarding the date
September 301h for Turkish operations against the
neutral zone from our intelligence. (James 160)
The Coalition had been acquiring disapproval before the crisis
and their reputation was already tarnished. The Government
of Lloyd George was coming apart. One critic said that it had
"produced at the center an atmosphere more like an oriental
court at which favorites struggled unceasingly for position
than anything seen in Britain for a century or more"
(winstonchurchill.org/actsrl922.htrn). Arnold Bennet noted
after a weekend with Ministers, Austen Chamberlain, Lloyd
George, and F .E. Smith, at Cherkley, "I never heard principles
or the welfare of the country mentioned" (James 154).
The orders given to Harrington had left some latitude in his
hands. The members of the Cabinet waited anxiously for word
of what was going on, and were stunned when Harrington
reported on October 1 that the immediate crisis appeared to be
over and he was to meet Kemal (James 160). Harrington had
chosen not to deliver the ultimatum. In the British press,
Harrington was viewed as a hero when headlines extolled the
military brilliance and tact Harrington had used. The Cabinet
Ministers criticized Harrington of "mixing himself up in
political problems" and "misleading Ministers about the
military situation" (Charmley 187).
On October 3, a conference was to be held between the
Turkish and Allied generals at Mudania (Gilbert 854 ). Few of
the Cabinet Ministers believed anything would come of the
conference, Churchill being one of the most ardent with this
view. He was wrong. War had been averted and public
opinion was that of relief, tinged with a little alarm.
The political consequences of the Chanak Incident were
substantial. Much of the crisis had been played out in public,
and the national newspapers were surprisingly well informed
of many of the processes within Cabinet itself. In The Times
and The Daily Express, Bonar Law, who had recently retired
but who nonetheless posed a serious threat of alternative
leadership of the Government, had a letter published,
expressing his concern at the unilateral action of the
Government (James 161 ). His opinion most likely represented
what a majority of the Conservative Party within the Coalition
were thinking. Churchill's part in propelling the Cabinet to
the brink of a totally unexpected and unnecessary war was not
likely to win any friends on the Conservative side.
By itself, the Chanak incident probably would not have been
the decisive event in the history of the Coalition. It is possible
that it might have survived the initial stand of September 15,
and that Kemal's message of the twenty-sixth would have
been attributed to the stand the Cabinet had taken. The
Coalition's probable downfall was the ultimatum of the
twenty-ninth, which had received substantial press. The Times
had printed on October 2 that "an immediate conflict between
British and Kemalist troops has been averted mainly by the
tact and wisdom of Sir Charles Harrington" (James 161 ).
Chanak may fairly be regarded as the event that finally drew
together Conservatives who were divided on continued
support of Lloyd George and the Coalition. The emergence of
As the revolt against Lloyd George gathered momentum, the
leaders of the Coalition conceived a plan of their own. The
Coalition decided to hold the election before the
Conservatives held their annual conference in November. It
was to be determined at the Carlton Club on Thursday,
October 19, whether the Conservatives entered the election
with the Coalition or as a separate party (James 154 ).
As in the case ofChanak, the Coalition gave an ultimatum that
backfired. The purpose was, as Chamberlain put it, "tell the
Conservatives bluntly that they must either follow our advice
or do without us, in which case they must find their own
Chief, and form a Government at once. They would be in a
damned fix" (Charmley 188). Only Members of Parliament
would be permitted to attend and vote. The meeting was
deliberately timed to take place on October 23, immediately
after the result of a by-election at Newport was declared. It
was expected that an Independent Conservative candidate
would be at the bottom of the poll and thereby prove to the
Conservatives they needed to remain in the Coalition (Gilbert
455).
The plan went terribly wrong for the Coalition. Bonar Law
emerged as the alternative leader for the Coalition and was
scheduled to speak against the Coalition at the Carlton Club.
Law's speech made it clear that there was an alternative
Unionist Prime Minister.
The Newport results arrived just as members were going into
the meeting. The results were to seal the fate of the Coalition.
The Independent Conservative had won easily and the
Coalition's Lloyd George came in third. The meeting voted
against George's Coalition, 185 votes to 88 (James 163).
Lloyd George resigned that afternoon. The Coalition had
collapsed.
At the moment of the Coalition's downfall, Churchill was
recovering from an emergency appendectomy. When he
awoke the following morning, he learned that he was out of a
job. This was only the beginning of the struggle Churchill was
to face to remain in the political arena. Churchill wrote upon
hearing the results, "In the twinkling of an eye, I found myself
without office, without a seat, without a party, and even
without an appendix" (James 165).
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Winston Churchill Falls from Political Power in 1922
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Most Unionists were still in favor of some sort of Coalition
after the election; few thought that they could win a majority
of the new democratic electorate (Kinnear 130). Bonar Law
formed a government of sorts, and promptly called a general
election. This election has been described as one of the most
confused of modem times, "with a whole variety of Liberals
standing under various prefixes, or none, some owing
allegiance to Lloyd George, others to Herbert Henry Asquith,
another former Prime Minister, and some to no one"
(Charmley 189).
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The election results established that Bonar Law was now in
charge and he emphasized the differences between himself
and Lloyd George, promising, "the minimum of interference
at home and of disturbance abroad, stem economies, and the
reduction of the personal power of the Prime Minister" (James
164). The Conservatives had won 45 seats, Labor 142,
Asquithian Liberal 60, with 57 going to Lloyd George Liberal
(Gilbert 457). The sarcastic comment pertaining to the
election results by newsman Philip Guedalla stated:
Mr. Bonar Law ... became Prime Minister of
England for the simple and satisfying reason that
he was not Mr. Lloyd George. At an open
competition in the somewhat negative exercise of
not being Mr. Lloyd George that was held in
November 1922, Mr. Law was found to be more
indubitably not Mr. Lloyd George than any of the
other competitors; and, in consequence, by the
mysterious operation of the British Constitution, he
reigned in his stead. (James 164)
These developments, which were out of Churchill's hands,
had profound significance on his political career. Had Austen
Chamberlain and F.E. Smith, two major figures in the
Coalition government, accepted the advice they were getting
from many quarters to abandon Lloyd George, the Coalition
would have remained intact. Churchill, as the leading Liberal
left in, would have been in the position to receive Unionist
support when Bonar Law called an election. As it was,
Chamberlain and Smith had issued a public statement
declaring their continued adherence to Lloyd George and
refused to form a 'centre party' with Churchill (James 164).
Churchill would have to fight the election to come as a Liberal
and Free Trader (Gilbert 455).
As soon as he could, Churchill wrote his Dundee constituency
saying he would stand as a Liberal and asked for their support
against the Labor and Communist candidates, hoping that the
Conservatives would stay with him. Churchill's campaign put
emphasis on the dangers of Socialism and the need for
national unity. This campaign strategy put him in the circle
with moderate Unionists with whom he was willing to unite,
but his attempt to rally the electors of Dundee for the fifth
time was limited by his own fragile health and Liberal
divisions.
The Unionists agreed not to oppose him, but the presence of
another National Liberal and an Asquithian Liberal meant that,
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even though Dundee was a two-member constituency, the
Liberal vote was being split three ways. The three-way battle
was between Churchill, E.D. Morel, a leading Labour Party
figure, and Edwin Scrymgeour, who was standing as an
Independent with Labour sympathies.
As the campaign developed, its tone became notably sharper.
The Daily Express accused the Lloyd George Liberals of
being warmongers. Churchill was still down from having his
appendix removed, but fought the accusations from bed in a
statement, describing the Law Ministry as "the Government of
the Second Eleven," declaring that he would "never stifle
myselfin such a moral and intellectual sepulcher"(J ames 163 ).
Others came to the front to fight for Churchill while he was
convalescing. Clementine, who was still recovering from the
birth of their seven-week-old daughter Mary, went to the
Dundee constituency to represent her husband. She spoke at
six meetings and graciously faced hostile crowds. So
umeceptive were the crowds that sneezing powder was
released by someone to break up a meeting that Clementine
was speaking at. F.E. Smith also came up to speak for his
friend, but Clementine told Churchill "he was no use at all, he
was drunk" (Gilbert 880).
Churchill did not arrive in Dundee, Scotland until three days
before polling. He was still pale and weak from his operation.
On the first night, before a crowd of some four thousand in
Caird Hall, he defended the Chanak policy and the record of
the Coalition. His second meeting at Drill Hall did not go
well. Churchill stated, "I was struck by the looks of
passionate hatred on the faces of some of the younger men and
women. Indeed, but for my helpless condition, I am sure they
would have attacked me" (James 164).
Even drunk, Smith was probably a charismatic speaker, but
neither he, nor a last minute personal appearance by Churchill,
could avert the damage done by the Liberal split and the Labor
attacks on Churchill's past record that often seemed to
advocate war. The cry 'What about the Dardanelles?' still
haunted Churchill. Even though it may have been unfair, it
worked against him when any argument of substance was
lacking.
The split would work to the advantage of E.D. Morel and
Edwin Scrymgeour, who were elected. Churchill received less
than fourteen percent of the total vote. He was out of
Parliament for the first time in twenty-two years. He later told
the King that "he had always held Dundee by speeches and
argument, which required three weeks campaigning. He could
not do it in three days" (winstonchurchill.org/actsrl922.htrn).
The pattern of events in 1922 that occurred together brought
about Churchill's fall from power. The Chanak Incident
propelled him and the Coalition leaders into action that were
not supported by key elements they needed. They had ignored
important factors that would lead to their downfall. They
ignored the necessity ofjoint action of the French and Italians,
who were also guarantors of the Treaty of Sevres. Also
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R. Keller
ignored were the arguments of Lord Curzon, the Foreign
Secretary who was against military action in Chanak because
he believed a peaceful solution could be met with
negotiations. The advice of General Sir Charles Harrington
was being misinterpreted and largely disregarded. All
elements for a rational solution to the Chanak crisis were
ignored (James 158).
These factors working against him at the same time secured
his political downfall in 1922. However, the story of a man
such as Winston Churchill had many pages left before the end.
The political rollercoaster he rode made him prone to much
upheaval from which he would continually rise, making him
the quintessential phoenix rising time and again from political
ashes.
REFERENCES
Figure 2: Winston Churchill had been elected to his seat in Parliament four
times from the constituency of Dundee, Scotland. In 1922, he would lose his
seat, receiving only fourteen percent of the electorate. (Source: Gilbert,
Martin. Churchill A Life. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1991)
Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda, 1900-1939. London:
Public Records Office.
Charmley, John. Churchill: The End of Glory. Great
Britain: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1993.
Gilbert, Martin. Churchill: A Life. New York: Henry Holt
and Company, Inc., 1991.
Gilbert, Martin. Winston S. Churchill, The Stricken World,
Volume IV, 1916-1922. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1975.
James, Robert Rhodes. Churchill: A Study in Failure,
1900-1939. Ohio: The World Publishing Company,
1970
Kinnear, Michael. The Fall of Lloyd George: The Political
Crisis of 1922. New York: Houghton and Mifflin
Company, 1967.
Taylor, A.J.P., et al. Churchill Revised A Critical
Assessment. New York: The Dial Press, Inc, 1969.
The Winston Churchill Home Page. Washington D.C.
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/actsrl 922.htm.
Accessed April 6, 2000.
ROBYN KELLER graduated in May 2001 with a degree in Social Studies Education and certification in U.S. History,
World History, and Psychology. She became interested in the subject of Winston Churchill's political career in the
spring of 2000 for 1495, Letters from Churchill, with Dr. Roy Schreiber. "Professor Schreiber has a way of studying
history that makes you feel as if you were there. It was in his classes that I decided to switch majors and become a
History teacher. Thanks, Professor Scheiber."