Download The Integration of Islam in Europe: Preventing the radicalization of

Survey
yes no Was this document useful for you?
   Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Document related concepts
no text concepts found
Transcript
Thursday, 25 September 2008, 9.00-10.45
Section: Migration and European Integration
Room 264 Migration, Integration and Identity
The Integration of Islam in Europe: Preventing the radicalization
of Muslim diasporas and counterterrorism policy
Katrine Anspaha, PhD student
Department of Political Science, University of Latvia
Email: [email protected]
Paper prepared for the ECPR Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics
University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia
25 - 27 September 2008
1
Abstract
Nowadays the issue of Islam in Europe has moved up the European political agenda.
The Muslim diaspora communities now constitute the largest immigrant population in
the EU. Contrary to expectations that Muslim immigrants would successfully
assimilate, they are reaffirming their Islamic identity, as a new political identification,
and some of them turn to terrorism against their adopted country. Ineffective Muslim
integration and political representation, as well as the social exclusion, unemployment
and discrimination that the Muslims experience in their adopted countries- all have led
to their deeper exclusion and marginalization, facilitating the development of Islamic
radicalism and home-grown terrorism. The two different and independent social
phenomena, with different social sources and objectives, namely international
immigration and Islamist terrorism, find a convergence in Europe. The terrorist threat
comes primary from European indigenous Muslim immigrant population, and only then
from “imported” radicalism. That’s why the significant step forward in the EU
counterterrorism strategy is putting in the forefront four main pillars: prevent, protect,
pursue and respond. In the context of Islamist terrorism the first pillar “to prevent” is
particularly important, because it addresses the main drivers of the process of
radicalization at the “pre-radicalization” phase. That enables not only to disrupt the
radicalization process and prevent the terrorism threat currently, but also to stop the
next generation of terrorists from emerging.
Introduction
Nearly 20 million Muslims currently reside in the European Union1, and adherents
to Islamic religion now constitute the majority of immigrants and the second largest
religious group of European society. The largest Muslim communities are found in
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and their rate of growth continues to
accelerate.2 The vast majority of Muslims living in Western Europe is of immigrant
origin: most of them are the result of economic migration of 1960s and 1970s, their
1
The exact number of Muslim population in Europe is in doubt, because in the most European
countries there is no official statistics of religious adherents, as does, for example, the United States.
The number of the Muslim population is extrapolated from the EU immigration statistics, but official
estimates do not include illegal immigrants (between 120 and 500 thousands illegal immigrants enter
the EU annually), among whom there are lots from Muslim countries.
2
The Muslim birth rate in Europe is currently more than three times that of non-Muslims. Moreover,
by 2050 Europe’s Muslim population is expected to double, at least comprising at the result 20
percent of total Europe’s population.
2
descendants, second and third generation, born and raised in Europe, and recently
arrived, political refugees from Muslim countries.
Long before London bombings in July 2005, the murder of Dutch filmmaker in
November 2004, the riots in the French suburbs in November 2005, or cartoon
controversy in Denmark, Islam in Europe first emerged as a social issue in 1970s,
when some European governments changed their immigration policies, by closing
their doors to labour immigration and allowing family re-unification. This has led to
the emergence of the “second-generation” Muslim communities, which were no
longer composed of temporary migrant workers, but born and raised in Europe.
They began to see themselves as a permanent feature in a new Western European
society. The first public debates on Islam in Europe long before recent events we
may date year 1989 with the ”Foulard affair” in France and ”Rushdie affair” in
Britain3.
In spite of long enough history of Islam in Europe, European states just now
became very sensitive to their Muslim communities. Islam in Europe and the issue
of Muslim integration now has gained increasing importance on the European
agenda. The two different and independent, at first sight, social phenomena, namely
immigration and terrorism, with dissimilar causes and radically different
objectives,4 became directly interconnected in Europe. Since the migration flow to
the continent, mainly from the Muslim countries, being on the increase, during the
last decades, and since the terrorist attacks being launched on European soil by the
Muslim immigrants, the integration of Muslim communities has become extremely
actual and urgent in the context of EU counterterrorism policy.
For Europe the integration of Muslim communities and struggle against radical
Islam is much more immediate, because it is the issue of both domestic and foreign
policy. Until recent times Europe’s Muslims had little direct impact on EU’s foreign
3
The Bradford demonstrations against Salman Rushdie’s “Satanic Verses” and book-burning was the
answer of British Muslims on blasphemy against Islam and showing their solidarity with the
“brothers” abroad. By doing so, the British Muslims made the first open claim that Islam should be
protected against any disrespect.
4
Robert S. Leiken, “Europe's Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism”,
Backgrounder, April, 2005, Center for Immigration Studies: p. 1.
5
For instance, in the issue of Turkey’s EU membership the Turkish community in Germany remained
salient and has not used its collective influence to speed up the process of Turkey’s membership. See
Cameron, Fraser, “The Islamic Factor in the European Union’s Foreign Policy,” in Hunter, Shireen
(ed.), Islam, Europe ’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural and Political Landscape (Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2002), p.262.
3
policy.5 But since the EU has actively engaged in global politics, especially, in the
War on Terror, the Islamic factor began to play a growing role. Such events, which
found a support by many European states, as in the past the Persian Gulf War, or
the war in Iraq may create tensions in Europan-Muslim relations.6 That’s why every
European policymaker’s decisions must now be deliberately influenced by European
Muslim interests.
The issue is not only the Islamic terrorism and security of the European countries,
but more fundamental is the issue of integration of Muslim communities within
European secular societies, accepting and respecting Western system of values. It
seems to be a hard task, because, both societal and state attitudes towards Muslims
and Islam are more negative rather positive. The most significant concern in the
Western perceptions of Islam is a threat and fear of Islam. Many Europeans perceive
Islam as menace to European culture and civilization, and to the West as a whole.
The Muslims in Europe often are considered to be an alien minority with social and
cultural values and belief system diametrically opposed to the West. The prejudices
about Islam among ordinary European citizens occurred not on the empty ground.
The European historical memory retains the events, such as the Spanish
Reconquista, or the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1453. The historical evolution of
European society and the formation of its Judaeo-Christian European identity are
based on its opposition to Islam and struggle against the threat of Islamic
expansion. The terrorist atacks in the name of Islam even more
create an
atmosphere of suspiction toward Muslims, causing xenophoby and islamophoby.
Such islamophobia is supported by Huntington’s theory of “clash of civilizations”.
The opinions on Islam in Europe are divided: there are those, who support the
immigration, the tolerant and multicultural European society. Others oppose them,
raising the doubts on the Muslim integration across Europe. More people in the
political mainstream are arguing that Islam is incompatible with liberalism and
6
According to Max-Peter Ratzel, the director of Europol, the decision by the British Government to
go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq ‘has left Europe at risk of attack from Islamic terrorists’. He is
insisting that Britain's foreign policy is to blame for EU-wide terror attacks, and that these conflicts
are being used as a tool to recruit disaffected Muslim youngsters throughout Europe to the extremist
cause. http://news.scotsman.com/ViewArticle.aspx?articleid=3295837
4
democracy and cannot be reconciled with European values. Sometimes it seems that
it is becoming politically correct to attack Islam.7 The voices against Islam are rising
by the far-right parties, which have the success in the elections across Europe.8 All
this makes hard for moderates on both sides, Europeans and Muslims, to remain
rational.
New identity around Islam
Here the question may arise about the role of religion in shaping the culture and
the culture in shaping of integration process.9 Too often we may see how Europe is
described as a territory of clash of cultures, confrontation between Islam and the
West. As we know, Samuel Huntington emphasized culture and religion as the
important factors in global politics. According to his thesis of ”clash of civilizations”,
the Western culture is under the
threat from the Islamic and Confucian
civilizations. As religion provides a basis for identity, the future conflicts will take
place at the fault lines between ”civilizations”, ”cultures” and different religions,
between the West and the Muslim world.The events such terrorist atacks in 2004 in
Madrid and July 2005 in London, the murder of Dutch filmmaker in 2004 seem to
confirm this view, but we may also disagree to such apocalyptic vision of Islam and
Europe’s coexistence.
If we move away from this polarised worldview, we may observe that today’s
second- third generation Muslims do not identify themselves neither with their
families’ roots, the culture of country of origin, neither with the European country,
in which they reside,
but first with Islam.
A shift from immigrant political
mobilization around ethnic and national categories, to an increasing level of
mobilization around the political category of “Muslim” is especially evident among
younger generations of Muslims who were born and raised in the EU. The “new
Muslims” with a new transnational Islamic identity are separating religion and
7
For instance, if remember the speech of the Pope Benedict XVI in September 2006, where he
described Islam as aggressive religion, including in his speech the quotation calling Islam as “evil and
inhuman” religion.
8
For example, the proposition of the Belgian rightist party Vlaams Belang to repatriate those
immigrants, who do not make the greater efforts to integrate, or the protest demonstration in
Brussels on September 11, 2007 “Stop the Islamization of Europe, organized by the German right-wing
organization “Pax Europa”, or a release of the anti-Islamic film “Fitna” by Dutch politician and the
leader of ultra-right “Party of Freedom”, Geert Wilders.
9
Brent F. Nelsen, Religion and European Unity: Toward a Cultural Theory of Integration// prepared
for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, I11, 30
August- 2 September 2007, p. 20.
5
ethnicity. Islam, not ethnicity becomes a unifying force for collective action and
political mobilization. The category of “Muslim” has emerged as a way of framing
political demands and as the means for connecting the experiences of Muslims in
Europe to a broader geopolitical context. The use of “Muslim” as a political category
makes stronger symbolic links with Muslims around the world, thus creating the
direct links between the situations of Muslims in Europe, Palestine, Iraq,
Afghanistan and Kashmir. The interviews, made in Britain, suggest that Muslims are
more integrated into a global Muslim community, adopting a transnational, global
identification. The first Gulf War, Bosnia, events in Israel and Palestine, the Taliban
in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq have all fuelled this feeling of Muslim
solidarity.10 Muslims express their transnational identity not just through their
espousal of an orthodox Islam, free from the national or ethnic traditions, but also
through their sense of solidarity with their “brothers”.11 The radical Muslim
terrorists, who were involved in recent terrorist atacks,
were not ”traditional
Muslims”, they did not embody a traditional culture, rather were de-culturalized.12
Here we can speak about the Islamic conservative religious values versus secular
European multicultural, liberal ideas, rather Islam versus any European identity
and culture.
Many Muslim migrants cannot fit into their new society and live life on the
margins. As a result, they become marginalized and involved in attacks against their
adopted country. Reaffirmation of Muslim identity is a reaction to the social
exclusion, unemployment and discrimination that the Muslims experience in their
adopted countries in the West. As the current reality shows, the more
discrimination and social exclusion members of a minority face, the more they tend
to unite around their religious affiliation. The alienated Muslims ignore the
traditional channels of political participation and mobilization, and express their
demands by another means, that is, terrorism.13
10
The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism, ed. B. Hoffman, W. Rosenau (Zurich: RAND
Corporation, 2007), p. 11.
11
Jocelyne Cesari, ”Muslim Minorities in Europe: The Silent Revolution” // Modernizing Islam:
Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and in Europe, ed. J. Esposito and F. Burgat (Rutgers
University Press, 2003), p. 135.
12
Olivier Roy, “A Clash of Cultures or a Debate on Europe’s Values?”// ISIM Review 15 (Spring, 2005):
p.6.
13
Striking example is the Madrid bombings, the main result of which was European withdrawal from
Iraq, first Spain and then Italy and Poland.
6
Integration issue
Until recent time the European governments neglected Muslim problems and had
no concrete policy on integration of Islam in Europe. However, the fast growth of
Muslim population and ever increasing tensions between Islamic conservative
values and Europe's traditionally secular liberalism have created a need of
integration of Muslims within the European societies. The previous studies on
Muslim communities in Europe focused attention on immigration, economic and
citizenship issues, ignoring questions of the religious identity and needs of Muslims.
The reason for this ignoring was a perception among social scientists, that Western
Europe is secular and the issues of Church and State are no longer relevant to public
policy. However, the migration and settlement of large numbers of Muslims in
Western Europe pose a new challenge to the existing Church-State arrangements
and have resurrected old religious disputes.14 Many recent studies have revealed the
fact that the effective Muslim integration strategy until now in the EU has failed.
Maybe the Muslim integration problem is the consequence of Europe’s general
hostility to religion. In absence of effective integration many Muslims live in socalled “parallel societies”, ethnic enclaves, or ghettos. “The Common Principles for
the Integration of Immigrants into the EU” adopted on 19 November 2004, resulted
with an increasingly more radicalising Muslim community.
The integration problems entail the fact that the European Union has no one
single integration model. The European countries have different approaches and
different national models of integration, and no one has come up with the ideal
solution. For example, France maintains assimilation and a secular republic,
promoting a citizenship as a primary tool in integration of migrants. Contrary to
France, the United Kingdom and Netherlands promote multicultural model,
supporting liberal values and respect for cultural autonomy. But Germany chooses
between assimilation and multiculturalism, but insisting on citizenship. This
significant difference between the integration strategies is explainable by the
different historical, social, economical and legal frameworks of the European
countries. Integration of Muslims must take place at local, regional and national
14
J. Christopher Soper and J. Fetzer, ”Religious Institutions, Church-State History and Muslim
Mobilisation in Britain, France and Germany” // Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 33,
No.6, August, 2007: p. 934.
7
(EU) levels. To elaborate integration strategies it is essential for the EU member
states to engage in cooperation with Muslim communities. Therefore, the
implementation of integration policy is primarily the responsibility of individual
member states rather than of the EU as a whole.
The next complicating factor of successful Muslim integration is the absence of
representative bodies that can speak with authority on behalf of religiously
committed Muslims. Muslim communities do not organise in one single
organization, which could represent all the European Muslims. This is explainable
by the nature of Islam itself, which is not homogenous with different branches,
having no any central authority. Muslims are also diverse in their ethnic, linguistic
affiliation and political adherence.
The presence of Muslims in Europe is testing the notions and principles of liberal
pluralism in European societies. According to “Common basic principles for
immigrant integration policy in the European Union”, integration is a “dynamic,
long-term, and continuous two-way process”, which involves, on the one hand, “the
receiving society, which should create the opportunities for the immigrants
economic, social, cultural, and political participation,” on the other hand,
integration implies respect for the basic values of the EU, such as “the principles of
liberty, democracy, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule
of law”.15 The accommodation of Muslims on the basis of difference especially
challenges the capacity of “liberal” European societies. 16
We have to distinguish the Muslim integration on the individual and collective
level. In liberal democracies the political equality of citizens is primarily defined on
the individual level (in France, Germany), and communitarianism or group
pluralism (in Netherlands, Belgium) commonly are not recognized. Thus the
traditional view of the relation of the individual and the community needs
rethinking.17 In fact, religious radicalism denies the right of individual Muslims to
follow their own way in non-Muslim countries.18
15
Common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the European Union
http://www.enaro.eu/dsip/download/eu-Common-Basic-Principles.pdf
16
Zafar Khan, “Muslim Presence in Europe- the British Dimension- Identity, Integration and
Community Activism”// Current Sociology, October 2000, Vol. 48(4): p. 29.
17
Frank J.Buijs & Jan Rath, “Muslims in Europe: the State of Research”// Essay prepared for the
Russell Sage Foundation, New York City, USA, October 2002: p. 19.
18
Ibid, p. 20.
8
The Muslim community radicalization and counterterrorism
At the EU's Interministerial Conference on Integration Policy, held on 9-11
November 2004, the former Netherlands Minister for Immigration and Integration,
Mrs Rita Verdonk,
said that Europe must not become a breeding ground for
Muslim terrorism and that it had perhaps been too naive in previous years in
ignoring the radicalisation that was taking place. It is hard to disagree with such
statement, especially after the murder of Theo Van Gogh in November 2004, which
simply delegitimized the Dutch multicultural model of immigrant integration. In
this connection we may to recall other events in the recent European history, such
as, the Muslim protests to the published Danish cartoons in 2005, the riots of
Muslim immigrants in France in October 2005, and train bombings in Madrid in
March 2004 and London bombings in July 2005, which give weight to link the
terrorism with Islamic fundamentalism.
The Madrid terrorist bombings and the London attacks showed that Europe has
become one of its main battlegrounds of international terrorism.19 The
investigations, made aftermath these terrorist attacks, reveal that the Islamic
terrorism20 in Europe is home-grown. And the number of home-grown Islamist
terrorists in Europe is continuing to increase. According to Europol report, for 2007
in the EU member states there were arrested 201 suspects for Islamist terrorist
offences. The majority of those arrested had the citizenship of the country of
arrest.21 The islamists in the spreading of their ideology use the propaganda, as an
important tool for attracting resources and recruits to terrorist groups. For 2007 six
percent of the arrested were accused of offences related to the production and
19
Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim
Communities in Europe”// MERIA Journal Vol. 10 No. 3 (September 2006), p. 1.
20
For the reasons of political correctness, the EU officially rejects the automatic identification of
terrorism with Islam. The Brussels officials advice to refrain from linking Islam and terrorism in the
statements. According to classified lexicon handbook, which offers “non-offensive” phrases, banned
terms
are
said
to
include
“jihad”,
“Islamic”
or
“fundamentalist”.
See
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1547133/Don%27t-confuse-terrorism-with-Islam%2Csays-EU.html
21
TE-SAT 2008- EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report // European Police Office (Europol),
Hague, 2008: p. 18-19.
9
spreading of propaganda, including the Al-Qa’ida propaganda on the Internet.22 The
actions of terrorist cells and groups, which form in Europe, affect not only European
persons and interests, but also an audience outside Europe.23 The potential
European born Muslim terrorists with European citizenship are able to enter the
United States easily without obtaining a visa through the Visa Waiver Program.
Thus the European domestic security danger becomes the international threat.
Many EU nationals are recruited for jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007 Iraq
attracted the largest number of recruits from EU member states. The Europeanbased islamist terrorists provide logistical support to terrorist groups also outside
the EU, providing funds and false identity documents.24
The Muslim radicalism in Europe is also imported by the Islamist movements, the
most of which are banned in the Middle East countries, but are active in the West.
Apart from the Islamist groups, included in the EU Council’s list of terrorist
organizations,25 the
following Islamist organizations are particularly
active in
Europe: Hizballah, Jamaat al-Tabligh, Hizb ut-Tahrir, ”The Muslim Brotherhood”.
Hizballah appeared in the European Union in the 1980s along with refugees from
the civil war in Lebanon. Despite its terror act record and a 2005 European
Parliament resolution recommending the banning of this group, it is still legal in
Europe.26
Hizballah
operates
freely
within
expatriate
Lebanese-Muslim
communities. It became known that 900 Lebanese Hizballah members live in
Germany alone. In Europe Hizballah is engaged in financial and logistical support
operations as well as political activities. Although the organization has not
conducted terrorist attacks in Europe for many years, it is still active in the region,
22
Ibid, p. 19.
Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? Felice Dassetto, European Parliament,
Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies, Brussels, May, 2007, p. 15.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/expert/eStudies.do?language=EN
24
TE-SAT 2008- EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report // European Police Office (Europol),
Hague, 2008:, p. 23.
25
Among them are, for instance, Al Qaida, Taliban, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Armed Islamic Group
(GIA),Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, May 27, 2002, Official Journal of the European
Communities, 29.5.2002.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:139:0009:0022:EN:PDF
26
Alexander Ritzmann, “Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List”// Statement before the United
States House of Representatives, June, 20, 2007: p.2.
23
10
primarily using Europe as a fundraising and recruiting ground. Hizballah has also
used Europe as a launching pad for sending operatives into Israel to conduct
surveillance and attacks.27 For the radicalization of Muslim communities and
recruitment of new potential Islamic terrorists throughout Europe Hizballah
actively uses all the information and communication means: Internet, radio, TV.
Jamaat al-Tabligh is generally described as an Islamic reform and missionary
movement, and with millions of members worldwide, does not appear on the UN or
U.S. lists of designated terrorist groups. Despite its’ apparent apolitical and peaceful
character, it appears to have become an ideological and spiritual platform for
terrorism. Jamaat al-Tabligh and the “Muslim Brotherhood” are two Islamist groups,
which form the basis for further militant recruitment. These movements interact in
mosques, lessons, and religious meetings, spreading their beliefs by the personal
interaction, activities in mosques, seminars, and lectures.28 Western intelligence
services view the Jamaat al-Tabligh as a vehicle through which extremists can leave
their country without suspicion to travel to Europe, for example, to plan terrorist
attacks. That confirms the event in Spain, when on January 19, 2008 Spanish police
arrested 14 Pakistani and Indian individuals belonging to the Jamaat al-Tabligh for
planning to carry out suicide bomb attacks in Barcelona and other European cities.
Another suspicious Islamist organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir, maybe is not involved in
terrorism and political violence, but it can be thought of as a conveyor belt for
terrorists:29 through indoctrination of individuals with radical ideology for the
further their recruitment by the more extremist groups. Hizb ut-Tahrir is banned in
most of the Muslim countries, as well as in some European, Germany and Russia,
but until now it operates freely in the United Kingdom, where it radicalizes the
British Muslim youth.
27
Matthew Levitt, Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List // Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittiee on Europe United States House of Representatives, June 20, 2007: p.3.
28
Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas” in Foreign Affairs November 2005, Vol. 84, No. 6: p. 68.
29
Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim
Communities in Europe”// MERIA Journal Vol. 10 No. 3 (September 2006), p. 5.
11
The three risk groups are targeted by the recruiters in particular: first-generation
Muslims, second or third-generation Muslims and the converts.30 We may to
distiguish three different types of Muslim immigrant terrorists. The first are socalled ”insiders”,31 those who were born and educated in Europe, second-third
generation Muslims, who have gained European citizenship, but in searching of
identity, became alienated, re-islamized and radicalized. For instance, in the case of
7/7 bombings, the bombers were all British residents, young British Muslim men. In
the case of 11/3, some of the terrorists were well-integrated into the Spanish
community. These suicide bombers appear to have been radicalized while living in
Europe.
The second are ”outsiders”, those who have immigrated to Europe in recent time,
to study or to work, planning to become terrorists. They are foreign dissidents and
asylum seekers, or radical imams who hail from Muslim countries and who preach
extreme Islamism.32 The third are converts and ”born-again” Muslims.33 Many of
them were second-generation citizens, speaking their adopted country's language
fluently. For instance, Muhammad Atta, who led the attacks of September 11, and
the killer of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, Mohammed Bouyeri, both were
radicalized not in the Middle East, but while living in Western Europe.
The causes for Muslim immigrants to turn to terrorism on European soil are:
1. Experience of unemployment, social exclusion, racism and discrimination, which
cause them to become marginalised and radicalised;
2. The generational gap between first and second, third- generations of Muslim
immigrants, and loose of family roots with country of origin;
3.
The lack of single religious authority and religious schooling, and as
consequence self-teaching and individualization of faith, which lead young
European Muslims to radicalization and extremism.
4. The influence of ”imported”radical imams and their hate speeches;
30
Ibid, p.9.
Robert S. Leiken, “Europe's Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism”,
Backgrounder, April, 2005, Center for Immigration Studies: p. 7.
32
Ibid
33
Russell Hardin, “Politics without compromise: immigrant terrorism”// prepared for delivery at the
th
nd
2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30 -September 2 , 2007:
p. 8; Olivier Roy, “A Clash of Cultures or a Debate on Europe’s Values?”// ISIM Review 15 (Spring,
2005): p.6.
31
12
5. The EU foreign policy, in particular, some of the European countries’ support of
Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or war in Afghanistan and Iraq;
6. As the most important factor in Muslim diaspora communities’ radicalization we
may suggest the failure of successful Muslim integration and absence of
institutionalization of Islam in many European countries.
The EU response to the threat of immigrant terrorism includes the following
official EU documents:
The Barcelona Declaration of 1995, which sets as the main objective to stem a
significant flow of illegal immigrants into the EU. The Muslim states, in their turn,
are interested in securing the legal status of their nationals within the EU.34
The Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct for Countering Terrorism of 2005 is
aiming ”to reject any attempt to associate terrorism with any nation, culture or
religion”, encourage moderation, tolerance, dialogue and understanding amongst
the societies,35 to promote dialogue among peoples of all religions in the
Mediterranean.
The Hague Programme, adopted in November 2004 by the Directorate General
Justice and Home Affairs.36 It aims to set up a common immigration and asylym
policy for the all member states, putting the main emphasis on counterterrorism
and cross-border crime, and calling the EU member states to increase mutual
concern and cooperation.
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy launched by the Council in 2005, has the
current four pillars: to prevent, to protect, to pursuit and to respond,
37
to prevent
new recruits to terrorism; better protect potential targets; pursue and investigate
members of existing networks and improve capability to respond to and manage
the consequences of terrorist attacks.38
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, The EU Action Plan on Terrorism was
accepted in 2002 by the European Council. Following the Madrid attacks,a revised
34
Cameron, Fraser, “The Islamic Factor in the European Union’s Foreign Policy,” in Hunter, Shireen
(ed.), Islam, Europe ’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural and Political Landscape (Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2002), p.261.
35
The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the EU Action Plan on Terrorism, JHA Council,
1-2 December 2005 (http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf).
36
The Hague Programme,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/documents_en.h
tm
37
The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the EU Action Plan on Terrorism, p.6
38
Ibid, p.3.
13
action plan was released by the Commission on June 2005. It sets out seven
objectives, one of them is ”to address the factors which contribute to support for,
and recruitment into terrorism”.39
In the context of Muslim terrorism, the latest ones are particularly important. The
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is based on four pillars: to prevent, to protect, to
pursue and to respond. For the first time the particular attention is paid to
prevention of radicalization and recruitment. There is no doubt that to barring from
radical ideologists entering Europe or arresting them is not enough to prevent
terrorism.40 More important is to understand the key factors and root causes of
one’s turning to radicalization and then to violent acts. The threat comes primary
from European indigenous Muslim immigrant population, and only then from
“imported” radicalism.
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment
to Terrorism highights three objectives:
To disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw peope into
terrorism;
To ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism;
To promote yet more vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity for
all.41
To prevent the Muslim radicalization at the very “pre-radicalization” phase, the EU
member states should implement the following measures:
1. Terrorism must be fought at both national and international levels. EU member
states should cooperate, firstly, at European level in the form of cooperation
between member states. Secondly, at international level by the cooperation
between the European Union and its partners throughout the world (U.S. and
UN);
39
The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 30
November 2005, p. 7.
40
Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim
Communities in Europe”// MERIA Journal Vol. 10 No. 3 (September 2006) p. 9.
41
The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to
Terrorism, 14781/1/05 REV 1, Brussels, 24 November 2005, p. 3.
14
2. Through its common foreign and security policy, the EU should expand its
positive political role in the Middle East, especially, in Arab-Israeli conflict, which
is one of the main causes of Muslim radicalization;
3. The European countries, while upholding the principle of secularism, should
respect the diversity of religions, promote social cohesion and prevent
discrimination against Muslims;
4. The EU governments should monitor the radicals in ways that do not risk further
alienating Muslim communities;
5. The EU governments should support the moderate Muslim groups and integrate
them better, while avoiding a right-wing populism;
6. Concerning the institutionalization of Islam, the Europe’s officials should
promote the ”mainstream” representation of Islam through the creation at
national level of advisory representative Islamic institutions;42
7. The European Muslims should not rely on foreign Islamic fund organizations,
rather on local European funding. The EU should monitor the funds of local
mosques and Muslim organizations in order to discover the financing sources
and stop terrorism financing;
8. To limit radical individual or group activities in public places: in worship places
(mosques), education or religious training places (schools and madrasas),
prisons;
9. The radical imams are posing a threat to Muslim assimilation process into
European liberal democratic society. That’s why the imams should be educated
and certified not in Muslim countries, but in Europe. The European governments
should further the emergence of moderate“home-grown” imams and new Muslim
leaders, who would protect the European Muslims from radical imam influence
and Islamist terrrorist group recruitment;
10. It is important to pay attention to Muslim young people who are susceptible to
radicalization. By discovering the motives of engaging in terrorist activities of
42
But there are also the critics of such idea. According to one of them, this would risk deeping
existing divisions between different versions of Islam, and creating hierarchies that do not exist in
the tradition and history of Islam. Thus any attempt to organise these iniatives around the idea of
promoting ”moderate” Islam should be avoided. See Sara Silvestri, Islam and the EU: the merits and
risks of Inter-Cultural Dialogue, Policy Brief, European Policy Centre, June 2007, p. 4.
15
young people, such as, social exclusion and marginalization, unemployment,
poverty, it becomes easier to achieve an effective anti-terrorism approach;
11. To prevent individuals gaining access to terorist training, travelling to conflict
zones;
12. The use of Internet by the European Islamic extremist groups or individuals
should be monitored, especially forum chats, in preventing of religiously
motivated Muslim immigrant radicalization;
16