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Thursday, 25 September 2008, 9.00-10.45 Section: Migration and European Integration Room 264 Migration, Integration and Identity The Integration of Islam in Europe: Preventing the radicalization of Muslim diasporas and counterterrorism policy Katrine Anspaha, PhD student Department of Political Science, University of Latvia Email: [email protected] Paper prepared for the ECPR Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia 25 - 27 September 2008 1 Abstract Nowadays the issue of Islam in Europe has moved up the European political agenda. The Muslim diaspora communities now constitute the largest immigrant population in the EU. Contrary to expectations that Muslim immigrants would successfully assimilate, they are reaffirming their Islamic identity, as a new political identification, and some of them turn to terrorism against their adopted country. Ineffective Muslim integration and political representation, as well as the social exclusion, unemployment and discrimination that the Muslims experience in their adopted countries- all have led to their deeper exclusion and marginalization, facilitating the development of Islamic radicalism and home-grown terrorism. The two different and independent social phenomena, with different social sources and objectives, namely international immigration and Islamist terrorism, find a convergence in Europe. The terrorist threat comes primary from European indigenous Muslim immigrant population, and only then from “imported” radicalism. That’s why the significant step forward in the EU counterterrorism strategy is putting in the forefront four main pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. In the context of Islamist terrorism the first pillar “to prevent” is particularly important, because it addresses the main drivers of the process of radicalization at the “pre-radicalization” phase. That enables not only to disrupt the radicalization process and prevent the terrorism threat currently, but also to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging. Introduction Nearly 20 million Muslims currently reside in the European Union1, and adherents to Islamic religion now constitute the majority of immigrants and the second largest religious group of European society. The largest Muslim communities are found in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and their rate of growth continues to accelerate.2 The vast majority of Muslims living in Western Europe is of immigrant origin: most of them are the result of economic migration of 1960s and 1970s, their 1 The exact number of Muslim population in Europe is in doubt, because in the most European countries there is no official statistics of religious adherents, as does, for example, the United States. The number of the Muslim population is extrapolated from the EU immigration statistics, but official estimates do not include illegal immigrants (between 120 and 500 thousands illegal immigrants enter the EU annually), among whom there are lots from Muslim countries. 2 The Muslim birth rate in Europe is currently more than three times that of non-Muslims. Moreover, by 2050 Europe’s Muslim population is expected to double, at least comprising at the result 20 percent of total Europe’s population. 2 descendants, second and third generation, born and raised in Europe, and recently arrived, political refugees from Muslim countries. Long before London bombings in July 2005, the murder of Dutch filmmaker in November 2004, the riots in the French suburbs in November 2005, or cartoon controversy in Denmark, Islam in Europe first emerged as a social issue in 1970s, when some European governments changed their immigration policies, by closing their doors to labour immigration and allowing family re-unification. This has led to the emergence of the “second-generation” Muslim communities, which were no longer composed of temporary migrant workers, but born and raised in Europe. They began to see themselves as a permanent feature in a new Western European society. The first public debates on Islam in Europe long before recent events we may date year 1989 with the ”Foulard affair” in France and ”Rushdie affair” in Britain3. In spite of long enough history of Islam in Europe, European states just now became very sensitive to their Muslim communities. Islam in Europe and the issue of Muslim integration now has gained increasing importance on the European agenda. The two different and independent, at first sight, social phenomena, namely immigration and terrorism, with dissimilar causes and radically different objectives,4 became directly interconnected in Europe. Since the migration flow to the continent, mainly from the Muslim countries, being on the increase, during the last decades, and since the terrorist attacks being launched on European soil by the Muslim immigrants, the integration of Muslim communities has become extremely actual and urgent in the context of EU counterterrorism policy. For Europe the integration of Muslim communities and struggle against radical Islam is much more immediate, because it is the issue of both domestic and foreign policy. Until recent times Europe’s Muslims had little direct impact on EU’s foreign 3 The Bradford demonstrations against Salman Rushdie’s “Satanic Verses” and book-burning was the answer of British Muslims on blasphemy against Islam and showing their solidarity with the “brothers” abroad. By doing so, the British Muslims made the first open claim that Islam should be protected against any disrespect. 4 Robert S. Leiken, “Europe's Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism”, Backgrounder, April, 2005, Center for Immigration Studies: p. 1. 5 For instance, in the issue of Turkey’s EU membership the Turkish community in Germany remained salient and has not used its collective influence to speed up the process of Turkey’s membership. See Cameron, Fraser, “The Islamic Factor in the European Union’s Foreign Policy,” in Hunter, Shireen (ed.), Islam, Europe ’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural and Political Landscape (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2002), p.262. 3 policy.5 But since the EU has actively engaged in global politics, especially, in the War on Terror, the Islamic factor began to play a growing role. Such events, which found a support by many European states, as in the past the Persian Gulf War, or the war in Iraq may create tensions in Europan-Muslim relations.6 That’s why every European policymaker’s decisions must now be deliberately influenced by European Muslim interests. The issue is not only the Islamic terrorism and security of the European countries, but more fundamental is the issue of integration of Muslim communities within European secular societies, accepting and respecting Western system of values. It seems to be a hard task, because, both societal and state attitudes towards Muslims and Islam are more negative rather positive. The most significant concern in the Western perceptions of Islam is a threat and fear of Islam. Many Europeans perceive Islam as menace to European culture and civilization, and to the West as a whole. The Muslims in Europe often are considered to be an alien minority with social and cultural values and belief system diametrically opposed to the West. The prejudices about Islam among ordinary European citizens occurred not on the empty ground. The European historical memory retains the events, such as the Spanish Reconquista, or the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1453. The historical evolution of European society and the formation of its Judaeo-Christian European identity are based on its opposition to Islam and struggle against the threat of Islamic expansion. The terrorist atacks in the name of Islam even more create an atmosphere of suspiction toward Muslims, causing xenophoby and islamophoby. Such islamophobia is supported by Huntington’s theory of “clash of civilizations”. The opinions on Islam in Europe are divided: there are those, who support the immigration, the tolerant and multicultural European society. Others oppose them, raising the doubts on the Muslim integration across Europe. More people in the political mainstream are arguing that Islam is incompatible with liberalism and 6 According to Max-Peter Ratzel, the director of Europol, the decision by the British Government to go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq ‘has left Europe at risk of attack from Islamic terrorists’. He is insisting that Britain's foreign policy is to blame for EU-wide terror attacks, and that these conflicts are being used as a tool to recruit disaffected Muslim youngsters throughout Europe to the extremist cause. http://news.scotsman.com/ViewArticle.aspx?articleid=3295837 4 democracy and cannot be reconciled with European values. Sometimes it seems that it is becoming politically correct to attack Islam.7 The voices against Islam are rising by the far-right parties, which have the success in the elections across Europe.8 All this makes hard for moderates on both sides, Europeans and Muslims, to remain rational. New identity around Islam Here the question may arise about the role of religion in shaping the culture and the culture in shaping of integration process.9 Too often we may see how Europe is described as a territory of clash of cultures, confrontation between Islam and the West. As we know, Samuel Huntington emphasized culture and religion as the important factors in global politics. According to his thesis of ”clash of civilizations”, the Western culture is under the threat from the Islamic and Confucian civilizations. As religion provides a basis for identity, the future conflicts will take place at the fault lines between ”civilizations”, ”cultures” and different religions, between the West and the Muslim world.The events such terrorist atacks in 2004 in Madrid and July 2005 in London, the murder of Dutch filmmaker in 2004 seem to confirm this view, but we may also disagree to such apocalyptic vision of Islam and Europe’s coexistence. If we move away from this polarised worldview, we may observe that today’s second- third generation Muslims do not identify themselves neither with their families’ roots, the culture of country of origin, neither with the European country, in which they reside, but first with Islam. A shift from immigrant political mobilization around ethnic and national categories, to an increasing level of mobilization around the political category of “Muslim” is especially evident among younger generations of Muslims who were born and raised in the EU. The “new Muslims” with a new transnational Islamic identity are separating religion and 7 For instance, if remember the speech of the Pope Benedict XVI in September 2006, where he described Islam as aggressive religion, including in his speech the quotation calling Islam as “evil and inhuman” religion. 8 For example, the proposition of the Belgian rightist party Vlaams Belang to repatriate those immigrants, who do not make the greater efforts to integrate, or the protest demonstration in Brussels on September 11, 2007 “Stop the Islamization of Europe, organized by the German right-wing organization “Pax Europa”, or a release of the anti-Islamic film “Fitna” by Dutch politician and the leader of ultra-right “Party of Freedom”, Geert Wilders. 9 Brent F. Nelsen, Religion and European Unity: Toward a Cultural Theory of Integration// prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, I11, 30 August- 2 September 2007, p. 20. 5 ethnicity. Islam, not ethnicity becomes a unifying force for collective action and political mobilization. The category of “Muslim” has emerged as a way of framing political demands and as the means for connecting the experiences of Muslims in Europe to a broader geopolitical context. The use of “Muslim” as a political category makes stronger symbolic links with Muslims around the world, thus creating the direct links between the situations of Muslims in Europe, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kashmir. The interviews, made in Britain, suggest that Muslims are more integrated into a global Muslim community, adopting a transnational, global identification. The first Gulf War, Bosnia, events in Israel and Palestine, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq have all fuelled this feeling of Muslim solidarity.10 Muslims express their transnational identity not just through their espousal of an orthodox Islam, free from the national or ethnic traditions, but also through their sense of solidarity with their “brothers”.11 The radical Muslim terrorists, who were involved in recent terrorist atacks, were not ”traditional Muslims”, they did not embody a traditional culture, rather were de-culturalized.12 Here we can speak about the Islamic conservative religious values versus secular European multicultural, liberal ideas, rather Islam versus any European identity and culture. Many Muslim migrants cannot fit into their new society and live life on the margins. As a result, they become marginalized and involved in attacks against their adopted country. Reaffirmation of Muslim identity is a reaction to the social exclusion, unemployment and discrimination that the Muslims experience in their adopted countries in the West. As the current reality shows, the more discrimination and social exclusion members of a minority face, the more they tend to unite around their religious affiliation. The alienated Muslims ignore the traditional channels of political participation and mobilization, and express their demands by another means, that is, terrorism.13 10 The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism, ed. B. Hoffman, W. Rosenau (Zurich: RAND Corporation, 2007), p. 11. 11 Jocelyne Cesari, ”Muslim Minorities in Europe: The Silent Revolution” // Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and in Europe, ed. J. Esposito and F. Burgat (Rutgers University Press, 2003), p. 135. 12 Olivier Roy, “A Clash of Cultures or a Debate on Europe’s Values?”// ISIM Review 15 (Spring, 2005): p.6. 13 Striking example is the Madrid bombings, the main result of which was European withdrawal from Iraq, first Spain and then Italy and Poland. 6 Integration issue Until recent time the European governments neglected Muslim problems and had no concrete policy on integration of Islam in Europe. However, the fast growth of Muslim population and ever increasing tensions between Islamic conservative values and Europe's traditionally secular liberalism have created a need of integration of Muslims within the European societies. The previous studies on Muslim communities in Europe focused attention on immigration, economic and citizenship issues, ignoring questions of the religious identity and needs of Muslims. The reason for this ignoring was a perception among social scientists, that Western Europe is secular and the issues of Church and State are no longer relevant to public policy. However, the migration and settlement of large numbers of Muslims in Western Europe pose a new challenge to the existing Church-State arrangements and have resurrected old religious disputes.14 Many recent studies have revealed the fact that the effective Muslim integration strategy until now in the EU has failed. Maybe the Muslim integration problem is the consequence of Europe’s general hostility to religion. In absence of effective integration many Muslims live in socalled “parallel societies”, ethnic enclaves, or ghettos. “The Common Principles for the Integration of Immigrants into the EU” adopted on 19 November 2004, resulted with an increasingly more radicalising Muslim community. The integration problems entail the fact that the European Union has no one single integration model. The European countries have different approaches and different national models of integration, and no one has come up with the ideal solution. For example, France maintains assimilation and a secular republic, promoting a citizenship as a primary tool in integration of migrants. Contrary to France, the United Kingdom and Netherlands promote multicultural model, supporting liberal values and respect for cultural autonomy. But Germany chooses between assimilation and multiculturalism, but insisting on citizenship. This significant difference between the integration strategies is explainable by the different historical, social, economical and legal frameworks of the European countries. Integration of Muslims must take place at local, regional and national 14 J. Christopher Soper and J. Fetzer, ”Religious Institutions, Church-State History and Muslim Mobilisation in Britain, France and Germany” // Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 33, No.6, August, 2007: p. 934. 7 (EU) levels. To elaborate integration strategies it is essential for the EU member states to engage in cooperation with Muslim communities. Therefore, the implementation of integration policy is primarily the responsibility of individual member states rather than of the EU as a whole. The next complicating factor of successful Muslim integration is the absence of representative bodies that can speak with authority on behalf of religiously committed Muslims. Muslim communities do not organise in one single organization, which could represent all the European Muslims. This is explainable by the nature of Islam itself, which is not homogenous with different branches, having no any central authority. Muslims are also diverse in their ethnic, linguistic affiliation and political adherence. The presence of Muslims in Europe is testing the notions and principles of liberal pluralism in European societies. According to “Common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the European Union”, integration is a “dynamic, long-term, and continuous two-way process”, which involves, on the one hand, “the receiving society, which should create the opportunities for the immigrants economic, social, cultural, and political participation,” on the other hand, integration implies respect for the basic values of the EU, such as “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law”.15 The accommodation of Muslims on the basis of difference especially challenges the capacity of “liberal” European societies. 16 We have to distinguish the Muslim integration on the individual and collective level. In liberal democracies the political equality of citizens is primarily defined on the individual level (in France, Germany), and communitarianism or group pluralism (in Netherlands, Belgium) commonly are not recognized. Thus the traditional view of the relation of the individual and the community needs rethinking.17 In fact, religious radicalism denies the right of individual Muslims to follow their own way in non-Muslim countries.18 15 Common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the European Union http://www.enaro.eu/dsip/download/eu-Common-Basic-Principles.pdf 16 Zafar Khan, “Muslim Presence in Europe- the British Dimension- Identity, Integration and Community Activism”// Current Sociology, October 2000, Vol. 48(4): p. 29. 17 Frank J.Buijs & Jan Rath, “Muslims in Europe: the State of Research”// Essay prepared for the Russell Sage Foundation, New York City, USA, October 2002: p. 19. 18 Ibid, p. 20. 8 The Muslim community radicalization and counterterrorism At the EU's Interministerial Conference on Integration Policy, held on 9-11 November 2004, the former Netherlands Minister for Immigration and Integration, Mrs Rita Verdonk, said that Europe must not become a breeding ground for Muslim terrorism and that it had perhaps been too naive in previous years in ignoring the radicalisation that was taking place. It is hard to disagree with such statement, especially after the murder of Theo Van Gogh in November 2004, which simply delegitimized the Dutch multicultural model of immigrant integration. In this connection we may to recall other events in the recent European history, such as, the Muslim protests to the published Danish cartoons in 2005, the riots of Muslim immigrants in France in October 2005, and train bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and London bombings in July 2005, which give weight to link the terrorism with Islamic fundamentalism. The Madrid terrorist bombings and the London attacks showed that Europe has become one of its main battlegrounds of international terrorism.19 The investigations, made aftermath these terrorist attacks, reveal that the Islamic terrorism20 in Europe is home-grown. And the number of home-grown Islamist terrorists in Europe is continuing to increase. According to Europol report, for 2007 in the EU member states there were arrested 201 suspects for Islamist terrorist offences. The majority of those arrested had the citizenship of the country of arrest.21 The islamists in the spreading of their ideology use the propaganda, as an important tool for attracting resources and recruits to terrorist groups. For 2007 six percent of the arrested were accused of offences related to the production and 19 Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe”// MERIA Journal Vol. 10 No. 3 (September 2006), p. 1. 20 For the reasons of political correctness, the EU officially rejects the automatic identification of terrorism with Islam. The Brussels officials advice to refrain from linking Islam and terrorism in the statements. According to classified lexicon handbook, which offers “non-offensive” phrases, banned terms are said to include “jihad”, “Islamic” or “fundamentalist”. See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1547133/Don%27t-confuse-terrorism-with-Islam%2Csays-EU.html 21 TE-SAT 2008- EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report // European Police Office (Europol), Hague, 2008: p. 18-19. 9 spreading of propaganda, including the Al-Qa’ida propaganda on the Internet.22 The actions of terrorist cells and groups, which form in Europe, affect not only European persons and interests, but also an audience outside Europe.23 The potential European born Muslim terrorists with European citizenship are able to enter the United States easily without obtaining a visa through the Visa Waiver Program. Thus the European domestic security danger becomes the international threat. Many EU nationals are recruited for jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007 Iraq attracted the largest number of recruits from EU member states. The Europeanbased islamist terrorists provide logistical support to terrorist groups also outside the EU, providing funds and false identity documents.24 The Muslim radicalism in Europe is also imported by the Islamist movements, the most of which are banned in the Middle East countries, but are active in the West. Apart from the Islamist groups, included in the EU Council’s list of terrorist organizations,25 the following Islamist organizations are particularly active in Europe: Hizballah, Jamaat al-Tabligh, Hizb ut-Tahrir, ”The Muslim Brotherhood”. Hizballah appeared in the European Union in the 1980s along with refugees from the civil war in Lebanon. Despite its terror act record and a 2005 European Parliament resolution recommending the banning of this group, it is still legal in Europe.26 Hizballah operates freely within expatriate Lebanese-Muslim communities. It became known that 900 Lebanese Hizballah members live in Germany alone. In Europe Hizballah is engaged in financial and logistical support operations as well as political activities. Although the organization has not conducted terrorist attacks in Europe for many years, it is still active in the region, 22 Ibid, p. 19. Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? Felice Dassetto, European Parliament, Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies, Brussels, May, 2007, p. 15. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/expert/eStudies.do?language=EN 24 TE-SAT 2008- EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report // European Police Office (Europol), Hague, 2008:, p. 23. 25 Among them are, for instance, Al Qaida, Taliban, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Armed Islamic Group (GIA),Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, May 27, 2002, Official Journal of the European Communities, 29.5.2002. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:139:0009:0022:EN:PDF 26 Alexander Ritzmann, “Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List”// Statement before the United States House of Representatives, June, 20, 2007: p.2. 23 10 primarily using Europe as a fundraising and recruiting ground. Hizballah has also used Europe as a launching pad for sending operatives into Israel to conduct surveillance and attacks.27 For the radicalization of Muslim communities and recruitment of new potential Islamic terrorists throughout Europe Hizballah actively uses all the information and communication means: Internet, radio, TV. Jamaat al-Tabligh is generally described as an Islamic reform and missionary movement, and with millions of members worldwide, does not appear on the UN or U.S. lists of designated terrorist groups. Despite its’ apparent apolitical and peaceful character, it appears to have become an ideological and spiritual platform for terrorism. Jamaat al-Tabligh and the “Muslim Brotherhood” are two Islamist groups, which form the basis for further militant recruitment. These movements interact in mosques, lessons, and religious meetings, spreading their beliefs by the personal interaction, activities in mosques, seminars, and lectures.28 Western intelligence services view the Jamaat al-Tabligh as a vehicle through which extremists can leave their country without suspicion to travel to Europe, for example, to plan terrorist attacks. That confirms the event in Spain, when on January 19, 2008 Spanish police arrested 14 Pakistani and Indian individuals belonging to the Jamaat al-Tabligh for planning to carry out suicide bomb attacks in Barcelona and other European cities. Another suspicious Islamist organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir, maybe is not involved in terrorism and political violence, but it can be thought of as a conveyor belt for terrorists:29 through indoctrination of individuals with radical ideology for the further their recruitment by the more extremist groups. Hizb ut-Tahrir is banned in most of the Muslim countries, as well as in some European, Germany and Russia, but until now it operates freely in the United Kingdom, where it radicalizes the British Muslim youth. 27 Matthew Levitt, Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List // Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittiee on Europe United States House of Representatives, June 20, 2007: p.3. 28 Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas” in Foreign Affairs November 2005, Vol. 84, No. 6: p. 68. 29 Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe”// MERIA Journal Vol. 10 No. 3 (September 2006), p. 5. 11 The three risk groups are targeted by the recruiters in particular: first-generation Muslims, second or third-generation Muslims and the converts.30 We may to distiguish three different types of Muslim immigrant terrorists. The first are socalled ”insiders”,31 those who were born and educated in Europe, second-third generation Muslims, who have gained European citizenship, but in searching of identity, became alienated, re-islamized and radicalized. For instance, in the case of 7/7 bombings, the bombers were all British residents, young British Muslim men. In the case of 11/3, some of the terrorists were well-integrated into the Spanish community. These suicide bombers appear to have been radicalized while living in Europe. The second are ”outsiders”, those who have immigrated to Europe in recent time, to study or to work, planning to become terrorists. They are foreign dissidents and asylum seekers, or radical imams who hail from Muslim countries and who preach extreme Islamism.32 The third are converts and ”born-again” Muslims.33 Many of them were second-generation citizens, speaking their adopted country's language fluently. For instance, Muhammad Atta, who led the attacks of September 11, and the killer of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, Mohammed Bouyeri, both were radicalized not in the Middle East, but while living in Western Europe. The causes for Muslim immigrants to turn to terrorism on European soil are: 1. Experience of unemployment, social exclusion, racism and discrimination, which cause them to become marginalised and radicalised; 2. The generational gap between first and second, third- generations of Muslim immigrants, and loose of family roots with country of origin; 3. The lack of single religious authority and religious schooling, and as consequence self-teaching and individualization of faith, which lead young European Muslims to radicalization and extremism. 4. The influence of ”imported”radical imams and their hate speeches; 30 Ibid, p.9. Robert S. Leiken, “Europe's Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism”, Backgrounder, April, 2005, Center for Immigration Studies: p. 7. 32 Ibid 33 Russell Hardin, “Politics without compromise: immigrant terrorism”// prepared for delivery at the th nd 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30 -September 2 , 2007: p. 8; Olivier Roy, “A Clash of Cultures or a Debate on Europe’s Values?”// ISIM Review 15 (Spring, 2005): p.6. 31 12 5. The EU foreign policy, in particular, some of the European countries’ support of Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or war in Afghanistan and Iraq; 6. As the most important factor in Muslim diaspora communities’ radicalization we may suggest the failure of successful Muslim integration and absence of institutionalization of Islam in many European countries. The EU response to the threat of immigrant terrorism includes the following official EU documents: The Barcelona Declaration of 1995, which sets as the main objective to stem a significant flow of illegal immigrants into the EU. The Muslim states, in their turn, are interested in securing the legal status of their nationals within the EU.34 The Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct for Countering Terrorism of 2005 is aiming ”to reject any attempt to associate terrorism with any nation, culture or religion”, encourage moderation, tolerance, dialogue and understanding amongst the societies,35 to promote dialogue among peoples of all religions in the Mediterranean. The Hague Programme, adopted in November 2004 by the Directorate General Justice and Home Affairs.36 It aims to set up a common immigration and asylym policy for the all member states, putting the main emphasis on counterterrorism and cross-border crime, and calling the EU member states to increase mutual concern and cooperation. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy launched by the Council in 2005, has the current four pillars: to prevent, to protect, to pursuit and to respond, 37 to prevent new recruits to terrorism; better protect potential targets; pursue and investigate members of existing networks and improve capability to respond to and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks.38 Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, The EU Action Plan on Terrorism was accepted in 2002 by the European Council. Following the Madrid attacks,a revised 34 Cameron, Fraser, “The Islamic Factor in the European Union’s Foreign Policy,” in Hunter, Shireen (ed.), Islam, Europe ’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural and Political Landscape (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2002), p.261. 35 The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the EU Action Plan on Terrorism, JHA Council, 1-2 December 2005 (http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf). 36 The Hague Programme, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/documents_en.h tm 37 The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the EU Action Plan on Terrorism, p.6 38 Ibid, p.3. 13 action plan was released by the Commission on June 2005. It sets out seven objectives, one of them is ”to address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into terrorism”.39 In the context of Muslim terrorism, the latest ones are particularly important. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is based on four pillars: to prevent, to protect, to pursue and to respond. For the first time the particular attention is paid to prevention of radicalization and recruitment. There is no doubt that to barring from radical ideologists entering Europe or arresting them is not enough to prevent terrorism.40 More important is to understand the key factors and root causes of one’s turning to radicalization and then to violent acts. The threat comes primary from European indigenous Muslim immigrant population, and only then from “imported” radicalism. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism highights three objectives: To disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw peope into terrorism; To ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism; To promote yet more vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all.41 To prevent the Muslim radicalization at the very “pre-radicalization” phase, the EU member states should implement the following measures: 1. Terrorism must be fought at both national and international levels. EU member states should cooperate, firstly, at European level in the form of cooperation between member states. Secondly, at international level by the cooperation between the European Union and its partners throughout the world (U.S. and UN); 39 The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 30 November 2005, p. 7. 40 Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe”// MERIA Journal Vol. 10 No. 3 (September 2006) p. 9. 41 The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 14781/1/05 REV 1, Brussels, 24 November 2005, p. 3. 14 2. Through its common foreign and security policy, the EU should expand its positive political role in the Middle East, especially, in Arab-Israeli conflict, which is one of the main causes of Muslim radicalization; 3. The European countries, while upholding the principle of secularism, should respect the diversity of religions, promote social cohesion and prevent discrimination against Muslims; 4. The EU governments should monitor the radicals in ways that do not risk further alienating Muslim communities; 5. The EU governments should support the moderate Muslim groups and integrate them better, while avoiding a right-wing populism; 6. Concerning the institutionalization of Islam, the Europe’s officials should promote the ”mainstream” representation of Islam through the creation at national level of advisory representative Islamic institutions;42 7. The European Muslims should not rely on foreign Islamic fund organizations, rather on local European funding. The EU should monitor the funds of local mosques and Muslim organizations in order to discover the financing sources and stop terrorism financing; 8. To limit radical individual or group activities in public places: in worship places (mosques), education or religious training places (schools and madrasas), prisons; 9. The radical imams are posing a threat to Muslim assimilation process into European liberal democratic society. That’s why the imams should be educated and certified not in Muslim countries, but in Europe. The European governments should further the emergence of moderate“home-grown” imams and new Muslim leaders, who would protect the European Muslims from radical imam influence and Islamist terrrorist group recruitment; 10. It is important to pay attention to Muslim young people who are susceptible to radicalization. By discovering the motives of engaging in terrorist activities of 42 But there are also the critics of such idea. According to one of them, this would risk deeping existing divisions between different versions of Islam, and creating hierarchies that do not exist in the tradition and history of Islam. Thus any attempt to organise these iniatives around the idea of promoting ”moderate” Islam should be avoided. See Sara Silvestri, Islam and the EU: the merits and risks of Inter-Cultural Dialogue, Policy Brief, European Policy Centre, June 2007, p. 4. 15 young people, such as, social exclusion and marginalization, unemployment, poverty, it becomes easier to achieve an effective anti-terrorism approach; 11. To prevent individuals gaining access to terorist training, travelling to conflict zones; 12. The use of Internet by the European Islamic extremist groups or individuals should be monitored, especially forum chats, in preventing of religiously motivated Muslim immigrant radicalization; 16