Download Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00003947
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IBRD-78120, TF-95841)
ON A
LOAN
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$20 MILLION
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR
FOR A
FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE PROJECT
March 10, 2017
Governance Global Practice
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
The official currency unit in El Salvador is the U.S. Dollar
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 – December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CPS
DGA
DGII
DGP
DGT
DINAFI
GDP
GIZ
IADB
ICR
ICT
IMF
ISR
IT
LDSW
M&E
MoF
MTEF
OIR
PAD
PDO
PEFA
PFM
PIU
SAFI
SCPT
SIDUNEA
SIRH
TTL
UNAC
Country Partnership Strategy
Customs Agency (Dirección General de Aduanas)
Internal Revenue Agency (Dirección General de Impuestos Internos)
General Budget Office (Dirección General de Presupuesto)
Treasury Office (Dirección General de Tesorería)
National Financial Administration and Innovation Office (Dirección Nacional
de Administración Financiera e Innovación)
Gross Domestic Product
German Agency for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
Inter-American Development Bank
Implementation Completion and Results Report
Information and Communication Technology
International Monetary Fund
Implementation Status and Results Report
Information Technology
Locally Developed Software Solution
Monitoring and Evaluation
Ministry of Finance
Medium-term Expenditure Framework
Office of Information and Response (Oficinas de Información y Respuesta)
Project Appraisal Document
Project Development Objective
Public Expenditure and Financial Assessment
Public Financial Management
Project Implementation Unit
Integrated Financial Management System (Sistema de Administración
Financiera Integrada)
Secretariat of Citizen Participation and Transparency
Automated System for Customs Data Platform (Sistema Aduanero
Automatizado)
Human Resource Management System
Task Team Leader
National Procurement Office (Unidad Normativa de Adquisiciones y
Contrataciones de la Administración Publica)
UNCTAD
USAID
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
U.S. Agency for International Development
Senior Global Practice Director: Deborah Wetzel
Practice Manager: Arturo Herrera
Project Team Leader: Maria Guadalupe Toscano Nicolas
ICR Team Leader: Joanna Watkins
EL SALVADOR
Fiscal Management and Public Sector Performance Technical Assistance Project
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information........................................................................................................ i
B. Key Dates .................................................................................................................... i
C. Ratings Summary ........................................................................................................ i
D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... ii
E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................... ii
F. Results Framework Analysis ..................................................................................... iii
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs .................................................................... v
H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................ vi
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................................... 1
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................................. 4
3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................................... 12
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................................... 18
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................................... 19
6. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................................ 21
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners........................... 24
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................................... 25
Annex 2. Outputs by Component.................................................................................................. 26
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................................. 30
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes............................. 32
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................................... 34
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................................... 35
Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................................... 36
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................................... 37
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................................... 38
Annex 10. Achievement of Objectives Analysis .......................................................................... 39
Annex 11. El Salvador PEFA Indicators 2009 versus 2013 ......................................................... 44
MAP .............................................................................................................................................. 45
A. Basic Information
Country:
El Salvador
Project Name:
Fiscal Management and
Public Sector
Performance Technical
Assistance Loan
Project ID:
P095314
L/C/TF Number(s):
IBRD-78120, TF-95841
ICR Date:
03/10/2017
ICR Type:
Core ICR
Lending Instrument:
Technical Assistance
Loan
Borrower:
REPUBLIC OF EL
SALVADOR
Original Total
Commitment:
US$20.00 million
Disbursed Amount:
US$15.36 million
Revised Amount:
US$20.00 million
Environmental Category: C
Implementing Agencies:
Ministerio de Hacienda
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B. Key Dates
Process
Date
Process
Original Date
Revised / Actual
Date(s)
05/24/2011
05/24/2011
Concept Review:
09/10/2009
Effectiveness:
Appraisal:
10/19/2009
Restructuring(s):
—
10/08/2014
Approval:
11/24/2009
Midterm Review:
02/11/2013
02/11/2013
Closing:
12/31/2014
09/30/2016
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes:
Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:
Moderate
Bank Performance:
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance:
Unsatisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank
Ratings
Borrower
Moderately
Quality at Entry:
Government:
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Implementing
Quality of Supervision:
Unsatisfactory
Agency/Agencies:
Moderately
Overall Bank
Overall Borrower
Unsatisfactory
Performance:
Performance:
i
Ratings
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
QAG Assessments (if
Indicators
Performance
any)
Rating
Potential Problem Project at
No
any time (Yes/No):
Quality at Entry
(QEA):
Problem Project at any time
Yes
(Yes/No):
Quality of Supervision
None
(QSA):
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status:
None
Unsatisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original
Actual
Major Sector/Sector
Public Administration
Public Administration - Industry and Trade
15
15
Public Administration - Financial Sector
60
60
Central Government (Central Agencies)
25
25
Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme
Economic Policy
Fiscal Policy
15
15
Tax policy
15
15
Public Administration
45
45
Administrative and Civil Service Reform
10
10
Transparency, Accountability, and Good Governance
35
35
Public Finance Management
40
40
Domestic Revenue Administration
15
15
Public Expenditure Management
25
25
Public Sector Management
E. Bank Staff
Positions
At ICR
At Approval
Vice President:
Jorge Familiar Calderon
Pamela Cox
Country Director:
J. Humberto Lopez
Laura Frigenti
Practice Manager/Manager: Arturo Herrera Gutierrez
Nicholas Paul Manning
Project Team Leader:
Maria Guadalupe Toscano Nicolas
Alberto Leyton
ICR Team Leader:
Joanna Alexandra Watkins
ICR Primary Author:
Joanna Alexandra Watkins
ii
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)
To strengthen the institutional capacity of specific government processes and agencies to increase the
effectiveness and efficiency of revenue and expenditure management and enhance accountability and
transparency in the public sector.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
Not applicable.
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Original Target
Actual Value
Values (from
Formally Revised
Achieved at
Indicator
Baseline Value
approval
Target Values
Completion or
documents)
Target Years
Increased efficiency of customs through increased number of customs points
Indicator 1:
with nonintrusive control methods.
None of customs points
Value
use nonintrusive control
(quantitative or
—
7
6
methods, of a total of 10
qualitative)
(6 land, 2 air, 2 sea)
Date achieved
12/31/2009
—
09/30/2016
09/28/2016
Comments
(including %
Partially achieved. This indicator was added during the 2014 restructuring.
achievement)
Stronger planning, budgeting, treasury, and accounting systems in place, in line with
Indicator 2:
international standards
The MoF concluded
the development of
The new SAFI II
the budget
system is fully
formulation and
SAFI does not allow for
developed and
budget execution
program-based
ready to be
modules of SAFI
budgeting and payments
launched. It
Value
II. Program-based
are processed through a
includes program(quantitative or
—
budgeting is fully
quasi-Treasury Single
based budgeting,
qualitative)
embedded in SAFI II
Account in a separate
payment
as well as the MTEF.
system
processing through
Programs are also
the Treasury
results-based and
Single Account in
adopt the
a separate system
logic framework
methodology.
Date achieved
12/31/2009
—
09/30/2016
09/28/2016
Comments
Partially achieved (target value). This indicator was added during the 2014
(including %
restructuring.
achievement)
iii
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator
Indicator 1:
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Indicator 2:
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
Date achieved
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Original Target
Actual Value
Formally
Values (from
Achieved at
Baseline Value
Revised Target
approval
Completion or
Values
documents)
Target Years
Hours to clear merchandise from the moment it arrives to customs terminal until it is
released
60
48
17
21
12/31/2009
12/31/2014
09/30/2016
09/28/2016
Partially achieved. The targets for this indicator were revised during the 2014
restructuring.
% increase of web-processed transactions in customs
89
5
98
98
12/31/2009
12/31/2014
09/30/2016
09/28/2016
Achieved. The targets for this indicator were revised during the 2014 restructuring.
Development of the new SAFI II module for budget execution will include programbased budgeting
The MoF concluded
SAFI is able to
the development of
automatically create
the budget
A new module
accounting reports
formulation and
for budget
and financial
budget execution
The current SAFI system
execution in
statistics according
modules of SAFI
Value
does not include proper
SAFI II that
to the International
II. Program-based
(quantitative or budget execution controls
includes
Public Sector
budgeting is fully
qualitative)
and only allows for line
program-based
Accounting
embedded in SAFI II.
item budgeting.
budgeting has
Standards and 2001
Programs are also
been developed.
IMF Government
results-based and
Financial Statistics
adopt the logic
standards.
framework
methodology.
Date achieved
12/31/2009
12/31/2014
09/30/2016
09/28/2016
Comments
(including %
Achieved.
achievement)
Implementation of training and dissemination initiatives to strengthen Government
Indicator 4:
transparency, citizen participation, and access to public information
Value
22 initiatives
0 initiatives have been
50 initiatives
(quantitative or
—
have been
implemented
implemented
qualitative)
implemented.
Indicator 3:
iv
Date achieved
Comments
(including %
achievement)
Indicator 5:
—
12/31/2010
Institutional
capacity of the
Government is
strengthened
and knowledge
about right of
access to public
information and
Government
transparency
tools has
increased
among public
servants and
the general
public.
09/30/2016
09/28/2016
Achieved. This indicator was added during the 2014 restructuring.
Increased capacity in budget planning and formulation through the new integrated
financial system
Value
(quantitative or
0
12 training sessions
—
17 training sessions
qualitative)
Date achieved
12/31/2010
09/30/2016
—
09/28/2016
Comments
(including %
Achieved. This indicator was added during the 2014 restructuring.
achievement)
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Date ISR
Archived
06/04/2010
12/01/2010
07/11/2011
01/17/2012
07/01/2012
01/07/2013
09/03/2013
05/26/2014
12/30/2014
07/16/2015
02/17/2016
07/28/2016
DO
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
IP
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
v
Actual Disbursements
(US$, millions)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.35
1.38
3.11
6.28
6.74
8.05
8.86
12.10
H. Restructuring (if any)
ISR Ratings at
Amount
Board
Restructuring
Restructuring Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Key
Approved PDO
Date(s)
Restructuring
Changes Made
Change
DO
IP
in US$, millions
Delays in effectiveness and
2/16/2011
MU
MU
0.00
substantial changes to design of
components.
10/08/2014
MU
MU
6.53
I. Disbursement Profile
vi
Extension of closing date.
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
1.
Country context. At appraisal in 2009, El Salvador was facing an economic slowdown
precipitated by the 2008 global financial crisis. Declines in remittances, exports, foreign
investment, and tightened access to credit linked to the slowdown in the United States led to a
sudden drop in revenues, increasing the country’s fiscal deficit. In 2008, economic growth slowed
to 2.5 percent, while the fiscal deficit rose to 3.1 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) from
1.9 percent in 2007. The deterioration in macroeconomic and fiscal indicators posed a tremendous
challenge to the new Government. According to the 2008 Multiple Purpose Household Survey,
poverty had risen to 42.3 percent in 2008. Between 2008 and 2009, unemployment increased from
5.9 percent to 7.3 percent. More than 30,000 workers had lost their jobs, and combined with the
sudden decrease in family remittances, there was a risk of further exacerbating poverty levels and
social problems.
2.
In response to these challenges, the Government announced a comprehensive Anti-Crisis
Plan to protect vulnerable populations affected by job losses or lower remittances through actions
targeting revenue and expenditures to create the needed space for priority spending. These
included austerity measures to reduce non-priority spending and interventions to tackle tax evasion
to contain further declines in public revenues. On the expenditure side, the Government decided
to embark on the upgrading of budgeting, financial management, procurement systems, and
improvements in public access to Government financial and nonfinancial information. The
proposed World Bank operation was designed to specifically respond to a core pillar of the
Government’s Anti-Crisis Plan addressing short- and medium-term challenges in public sector
development and fiscal management. This operation was part of a package of lending operations
designed to support El Salvador’s response to the crisis. A Development Policy Lending operation
and various sector lending operations accompanied this loan. At appraisal, this operation was
considered critical by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to address weaknesses in its management of
revenue and expenditure.
3.
The objectives of the operation were aligned to the Government’s strategic priorities and
the World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS).1 The main objective of the FY2010–12
CPS for El Salvador was to support the Government’s focus on addressing poverty and inequality
through strengthening fundamentals for economic recovery by addressing macro and institutional
vulnerabilities; strengthening social service delivery; and increasing economic opportunities,
particularly for the poor. Under the first sub-objective (strengthening the fundamentals for
economic recovery), the CPS identified support to (a) the expansion of fiscal space, (b) improved
targeting of subsidies, (c) implementation of results-based budgeting, (d) enhanced access to
information, and (e) improved fiscal transparency. The proposed operation sought to address
critical short-term fiscal pressures through tax measures while developing institutional capacities
and systems in the areas of transparency, results-based budgeting, and public financial
management (PFM).
1
World Bank. 2009. El Salvador - Country Partnership Strategy 2010–2012. Report N. 50642-SV.
1
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)
4.
The PDO was to strengthen the institutional capacity of specific government processes and
agencies to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of revenue and expenditure management and
enhance accountability and transparency in the public sector.
5.
Progress toward achievement of the PDO was to be measured using the following PDOlevel indicators:
(a) Tax collection as a percent of GDP increases at least 1 percent as a result of greater
effectiveness and efficiency
(b) Stronger planning, budgeting, treasury, and accounting systems in place, in line with
international standards
(c) The introduction of multi-annual projections and programmatic structure in the budget
strengthens strategic planning and the implementation of performance-based
budgeting
(d) Savings generated in central government purchasing are at least 10 percent by
comparing the same type of items (by adopting optimizing procurement policies)
1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and
reasons/justification
6.
The PDO remained unchanged throughout implementation; however, key PDO indicators
were revised. During the first restructuring, three of the original four PDO indicators were dropped
and one new indicator was added (see table 1). This was done to retain the relevance of project
activities following delays in loan approval and advances in tax reforms and multi-annual
budgeting using alternative financing sources.
Table 1. List of Original and Revised PDO Indicators
PDO indicators
Original List
Tax collection as a percent of GDP increases at
least 1% as a result of greater effectiveness and
efficiency
Stronger planning, budgeting, treasury, and
accounting systems in place, in line with
international standards
The introduction of multi-annual projections and
programmatic structure in the budget strengthens
strategic planning and the implementation of
performance-based budgeting
Savings generated in central government
purchasing are at least 10% by comparing the
same type of items (by adopting optimizing
procurement policies)
Revised List
Stronger planning, budgeting, treasury, and
accounting systems in place, in line with
international standards
Increased efficiency of customs through increased
number of customs points with nonintrusive
control methods financed by the loan
2
1.4 Main Beneficiaries
7.
The project’s main beneficiaries were the MoF and its respective offices and agencies: the
National Financial Administration and Innovation Office (Dirección Nacional de Administración
Financiera e Innovación, DINAFI); the Customs Agency (Dirección General de Aduanas, DGA);
the Internal Revenue Agency (Dirección General de Impuestos Internos, DGII); the General
Budget Office (Dirección General de Presupuesto); the Treasury Office (Dirección General de
Tesorería, DGT); and the National Procurement Office (Unidad Normativa de Adquisiciones y
Contrataciones de la Administración Publica, UNAC). For the transparency component, the target
beneficiary was the Secretariat of Citizen Participation and Transparency (SCPT) within the
President’s Office. After the first restructuring, the DGII and the UNAC were no longer
beneficiaries of project activities. Secondary beneficiaries of the project include the 114
institutions of the central public administration and citizens, who would benefit from the reforms
introduced.
1.5 Original Components
8.
The project was structured around four main components:
9.
Component 1: Strengthening tax collection agencies (US$7.8 million). The objective of
this component was to analyze and implement options to integrate activities to strengthen revenue
agencies’ institutional capacity to control tax evasion and smuggling. Activities included (a)
strengthening coordination among the DGII, DGA, and DGT to improve information sharing
practices and increase common control procedures for better tax compliance; (b) strengthening the
DGII’s institutional capacity; and (c) supporting the DGA by strengthening its auditing and control
functions.
10.
Component 2: Modernizing of public expenditures and financial management
(US$7.5 million). This component sought to help the MoF modernize its budget and financial
management processes and systems through four main activities: (a) introduction of a multi-annual
and a performance-based budgetary framework; (b) implementation of a Treasury Single Account
and use of electronic payments; (c) strengthening and upgrading of the integrated financial
management information system (Sistema de Administración Financiera Integrada, SAFI); and
(d) modernization of the public procurement system.
11.
Component 3: Enhancing and piloting information management and public sector
transparency initiatives (US$3.2 million). The main purpose was to support complementary
initiatives to support planning and decision-making processes and transparency and access to
public information to strengthen existing accountability systems. This component was explicitly
designed to be flexible and adaptable to changing conditions.
12.
Component 4: Project coordination and strengthening of the MoF (US$1.1 million).
This component was designed to provide support to the MoF to adequately coordinate and monitor
project implementation through strengthening the capacities of DINAFI and the MoF’s
administrative units of financial management and procurement (UNAC).
3
1.6 Revised Components
13.
In 2011, before project effectiveness, the team conducted a Level 2 restructuring to respond
to changes in scope required by the National Assembly for their approval of the project. All
components were revised to modify specific activities that would be financed with funds from
other donors and the restructuring reoriented activities to focus on customs management, PFM,
and transparency activities. In particular, Component 1 (strengthening tax collection agencies) was
substantially reduced and reoriented to focus on customs. The restructuring dropped activities
related to the provision of software, equipment, and training for the DGII. Within Component 2,
which focused on modernizing public expenditure and financial management, various
subcomponents were revised, with the development of a multi-annual budgeting approach dropped
from this component, while activities related to the upgrading and integration of associated
financial information systems (SAFI II) were significantly expanded. The update of procurement
policies to increase efficiency was removed and a new subcomponent was added to support the
modernization of public investment and debt management systems. Overall, this component saw
the largest increase in reallocated funds (from US$7.5 million to US$13 million). Activities on
piloting information management under Component 3 were also reduced as alternative funding
became available. Component 4, which focused on project coordination, was also reduced. While
the four components of the project remained the same, the restructuring substantially altered the
subcomponents and reoriented activities to focus on custom management, SAFI II, and
transparency initiatives.
1.7 Other significant changes
14.
Other changes related to scope and scale resulted from the interplay of two factors. First,
the 18-month delay in effectiveness meant that the Government effectively had three years to
implement all activities, rather than the originally intended five years. In 2014, the team conducted
a second Level 2 restructuring of the project to extend the closing date by 21 months. The
justification for this change was to allow for sufficient time to develop and deliver the core of the
new financial management information system known as SAFI II, which experienced a number of
delays in implementation and was rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory at the time. Second, the
project activities were affected by the actions of the Government to fund the fiscal and PFM reform
program with other sources, including grants from bilateral donors. The fiscal reform partly
financed by this project was being carried out by a donor group (the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), German Agency for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ), European Union, and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB) and required significant coordination efforts. Throughout project implementation,
other donors contributed financial and technical expertise to the core activities under the project’s
components, necessitating frequent adjustments in the activities to be financed by loan proceeds,
albeit without additional formal restructuring of components and subcomponents.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry
15.
The Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) finds the quality at entry to be
Moderately Unsatisfactory because of the shortcomings in the project design, which included an
4
ambitiously large number of technically complex reforms underpinned by weak diagnostics.
Background Analysis
16.
The project design took into account lessons identified in the program and strategic
assessments under the CPS, as well as the project-specific lessons highlighted in the ICR of the
recently closed El Salvador Public Sector Modernization Technical Assistance Loan Project.2 The
team specifically noted two lessons from the ICR of relevance to the design of the operation. The
first was the creation and maintenance of well-staffed monitoring and evaluation (M&E) units,
given that the other implementing agency staff are overwhelmed with ‘getting things done’. The
Project Appraisal Document (PAD) described the need for effective coordination and included a
component for project coordination that would cover these functions. A second lesson that the
team incorporated was assigning project activities to appropriate agencies. The ICR for the El
Salvador Public Sector Modernization Technical Assistance Loan Project advised that the project
“components should be located within agencies that consider them to be a strategic priority,
otherwise progress will be compromised.” The design of Component 3 represents a practical
operationalization of this recommendation because activities were selected based on explicit
demands from implementing agencies and units.
17.
However, a few lessons from the previous ICR were not fully considered in the PAD and
underlying diagnostics were weak in some of the reform areas. From the previous project’s ICR,
technical assistance for change management and monitoring were highly recommendable in
supporting the Government’s implementation of reforms. While the PAD included resistance to
change as one of the key risks, none of the project activities contemplated change management
strategies nor was there an assessment of the capacity and engagement of senior and technical staff
in pursuing the PFM reform program. Rather, change management was interpreted as training for
staff. In addition, the previous El Salvador Public Sector Modernization Technical Assistance
Loan Project had also experienced problems with the Government combining various fund sources
with bilateral grants from other donors and had gone through four closing date extensions. Finally,
the depth of background analysis in some of the proposed reform areas was thin. For example, the
PAD contained no assessment of the readiness of El Salvador to adopt International Public Sector
Accounting Standards.
18.
Assessment of the project design. The project was designed to address a number of key
issues of relevance to authorities in strengthening both revenue and expenditure management
functions. The team drew on recent diagnostic assessments to identify priority actions, most
notably, the findings of the 2009 Public Expenditure and Financial Assessment (PEFA). The PEFA
results underscored the need to improve the strategic orientation of the budget through introduction
of a medium-term focus and a programmatic classification. However, the design lacked a thorough
assessment of the enabling environment for upgrading the financial management information
system (SAFI) and embarking on a complex integration with other systems (human resources, debt,
public investment). Designing and implementing a comprehensive financial management
information system project is a difficult process and must be carefully sequenced with other PFM
reforms (such as establishing a Treasury Single Account). How the proposed reforms would be
2
El Salvador Public Sector Modernization Technical Assistance Project (1997–2007) (P007164) of US$25 million,
which was rated Satisfactory.
5
sequenced under the Government’s PFM reform strategy was notably absent in the PAD. The
project length was also very short, based on what the literature suggests for these types of reforms.
According to a World Bank study analyzing 25 years of experience in implementing financial
management information system projects, financial management information system projects take
a minimum of six to seven years to complete and often require multiple operations for full
integration and rollout of the system across the government.3 The design of the project included
major PFM reforms that were sequenced in parallel with automation, including improvements to
the budget classification, Treasury Single Account operations, and cash management functions.
19.
Adequacy of Government commitment. The project was designed in close collaboration
with senior leadership of the MoF, and the Minister of Finance assumed an important leadership
role in advocating for the project in the Congress. The project anticipated the need to establish a
Coordination Committee under the direction of the Vice Minister of Finance with all line Directors
as members of the committee. DINAFI was to serve as the Technical Secretariat for the Committee,
and the Vice Minister of Finance was to play a championship role for the overall project. However,
there was uneven involvement of the beneficiary units across the MoF in the design of the activities
in Component 2, leading to some confusion of accountabilities and coordination once
implementation began.
20.
Assessment of risks. This operation was considered to pose Substantial risk due to risks
at the country and operational levels. The highest risk identified was the risk related to the approval
of the loan in Congress because the new administration did not have the required majority to
approve World Bank loans in the National Assembly. To mitigate this risk, the Government and
the World Bank engaged in a consensus-building process, including the involvement of the
opposition in defining priorities and providing the opportunity to comment on project design. In
addition, the loan was presented with the CPS and a package of loans to be approved by Congress,
which represented a carefully selected program focused on priorities where there was broad
support. Operationally, specific risks identified included limited capacity of the Government (the
new administration had assumed power after 20 years of opposition rule and had limited
experience in working in the Government), the lack of financial management and procurement
experience of the implementing agency, and resistance to change. The proposed mitigation
measures included setting realistic time frames and achievable targets in the Results Framework,
a flexible approach for selecting activities to be financed through Component 3, hiring of
specialized personnel for financial management and procurement, and an analysis of relevant
political and economic factors that may undermine progress.
21.
A number of these risks materialized during implementation. Once the package went to
Congress, this loan was the last of the World Bank projects to be approved, leading to the 18month delay in effectiveness. The operational risks proved to be high, rather than substantial,
during the implementation, leading to deserted procurement processes and resistance to reform by
beneficiaries. The risk of inadequate coordination between donors supporting the PFM reform was
not initially identified in the PAD as a risk. Given the lessons learned from the previous project,
this should have been contemplated in the risk assessment for this project. It was only during the
2011 restructuring, that an additional risk was identified regarding the implementation of
Dener, Cem, Joanna Watkins, and William Dorotinsky. “Financial Management Information Systems: 25 years of
World Bank Experience on What Works and What Doesn’t.” a World Bank Study, 2011.
3
6
complementary activities (previously under the scope of the loan) with alternative financing
sources. This risk related to the timely implementation of these complementary activities and was
identified as Moderate. The World Bank should have been more explicit about the risks of donor
coordination at design and ensured that the activities financed by World Bank proceeds were not
subject to other donor interventions.
2.2 Implementation
22.
During implementation, several factors negatively affected progress. With an 18-month
delay in effectiveness, implementation was off to a rocky start. It took more than a year to launch
project activities, explained mainly by the number of internal and external actors to coordinate; the
scope and technical complexity of the reforms (covering customs, PFM reforms and system
integration, and transparency); and the technical capacity of the Project Implementation Unit
(PIU). In the Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs), the rating for overall
implementation progress oscillated between Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory,
and Unsatisfactory over the course of implementation. The factors that negatively affected
progress include donor coordination, weak implementation agency and PIU capacity to execute
project activities, and overall governance of the fiscal and PFM reform program.
23.
Donor coordination. The PFM reform program—partly financed by the loan (Component
2)—was carried out by a donor group (USAID, GIZ, European Union, World Bank, IADB), which
required significant coordination efforts to ensure that each reform, as well as the integrated
financial management information system (SAFI II), were compatible and functional. At project
effectiveness, it was agreed that all donors involved, except for the World Bank, would contribute
grants and/or non-reimbursable assistance to various elements of the reform program. The MoF
preferred the use of non-reimbursable funds for process reforms and wanted to use loan proceeds
mainly for equipment and software development of the new SAFI II. In this context, each donor
was guided by distinct objectives, incentives, and deadlines without unified objectives under the
reform agenda defined by the Government. Aligning these incentives proved challenging, and the
Government’s focus on exhausting grant funds led to delays in loan disbursements (it took 11
months for the first loan disbursement after effectiveness). Donor meetings were regularly
organized to address issues, but interactions were mainly at a political/general level, even though
the reform was highly technical. Notably absent from the dialogue were technical discussions on
the sequencing of reform interventions and alignment of methodologies and objectives. As noted
in ISR 8, donor interests were not necessarily aligned given their own internal commitments to
prioritize their programs. In the development of an integrated financial management information
system, loan activities substantially depended on a close sequencing and alignment with USAID
interventions, which were developing the treasury and accounting modules of SAFI II, accounting
reforms, and partially funding the contract of the first project manager. Despite attempts to work
together, coordination remained tumultuous throughout implementation. The MoF’s coordination
of donor activities and funds was also very limited. Though DINAFI was the central unit
responsible for coordinating donor interventions each Directorate managed its own donor projects
in an independent and isolated way. At one point, the ministry had roughly 55 projects with distinct
sources of financing.
24.
The role of the implementing agency (DINAFI and PIU). Over the course of the project,
the head of DINAFI, the unit responsible for overall project coordination and monitoring, changed
7
three times and key staff in the PIU left. These changes in management negatively affected the
execution of project activities. The PIU had not managed a World Bank project before and required
time and training to understand World Bank policies and complex procurement procedures. With
the exception of the Financial Management Specialist, hired with loan proceeds, the PIU was
mainly formed by a small number of MoF employees (ranging from four to six persons over the
course of the project) who had full-time jobs in addition to their PIU functions. This lack of fulltime staff to attend to the operational, technical, and donor coordination aspects of the project
contributed to delays in implementation and elevated the costs of supervision and assistance by
the World Bank team. As noted in the ISRs, the Government had committed to strengthen the
procurement function by hiring a Procurement Specialist, but this was not done until near project
closing. The Government’s justification was to not distort the internal job market (salaries would
be higher for a person financed through project funds). The project management ratings oscillated
between Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, and was rated
Highly Unsatisfactory in the last two ISRs.
25.
Governance of the overall PFM reform. While the senior management of the MoF
continued to view the project as strategically important throughout implementation, a number of
critical decisions related to the integration of treasury, budget, and accounting processes were
decentralized to lower levels (to Directors and, sometimes, external consultants), jeopardizing the
integration of modules under SAFI II. At the start of the project, a Coordination Committee was
established, headed by the Vice Minister, with the task of resolving issues of coordination between
the different modules with all relevant Directors present. However, the committee was not fully
operational until the last year of the project. While the original intention was to meet on a
bimonthly basis, in practice, meetings were held only a few times every year. The frequency
increased in the last year, but it was not sufficient for a project that needed quick and definitive
solutions at key points in time. Finally, as documented in the Aide Memoires, the Minister took a
strategic decision to allow the information technology (IT) development of SAFI II along two
parallel tracks—one financed by the World Bank and led by DINAFI and another financed by
USAID and led by a contractor. Unfortunately, the different teams used distinct methodologies to
build the system and had different perspectives on the functional aspects of the system.
Implementation of Component 1 (Customs)
26.
This component required a number of large and complex procurement processes for
equipment and software to improve customs control systems. A major procurement was that of the
commercial nonintrusive scanners (básculas camioneras), which failed four times before it was
eventually deserted. The reasons behind these repeated failures were mistakes in the technical
specifications, inadequate market assessments, and difficulties in adhering to World Bank
procurement procedures. To avoid another procurement failure with the scanners, at one point,
DINAFI and the Customs Directorate jointly reviewed the bidding documents and carried out an
on-site visit to the locations in which the weighing equipment would be placed. As a result of the
visit, it was found that one of the locations was not suitable for placing a scale because of weight
restrictions. The World Bank team attempted many times to support the Government in the
technical definitions of the goods and services and in trainings on World Bank procurement
procedures. Despite these procurement failures, the Government moved forward with the
nonintrusive customs control strategy by acquiring scanners on a concessionary basis.
8
27.
The other major activity of this component was the upgrading of the customs software
system. A contract was issued with United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) to purchase their Automated System for Customs Data platform (SIDUNEA, for its
Spanish acronym). This platform automates and integrates customs business processes (for
example, transit, regimes, and control of deposits and guarantees). This contract suffered a number
of setbacks because of delays in start-up and major differences between the Government and
UNCTAD with regard to the customization of the software. There were problems with the
interoperability between existing customs systems (for example, the transit system) and SIDUNEA.
The Government filed a complaint with UNCTAD for the development of the system, citing
problems with the low level of attention provided by the technical staff of UNCTAD to the project,
the parametrization of the software, and other technical aspects to make it web accessible. Though
the system was close to finalization by the time of the project’s closing, unresolved contractual
issues remain between UNCTAD and the Government.
Implementation of Component 2 (PFM)
28.
This component suffered several setbacks during implementation because of resistance to
the reform by different divisions within the MoF, major donor coordination problems, weak
capacity of the coordinating unit, and lack of a Project Director for the design and implementation
of SAFI II.
29.
Once the project became effective, it was clear that the initial design of the PFM reform
program—specifically, the upgrading and integration of the financial management information
system—was not feasible. The PFM reform strategy was revised, leading to a gradual
implementation and sequencing of reforms. Initially, the design of SAFI II was to include a
considerable number of modules, including public investment and human resources. In view of
the accumulated delays and the challenges posed by interagency coordination and ensuring that all
modules (often financed by different donors) were compatible with one another, the Government
decided at the end of 2013 that it was necessary to pursue a gradual implementation approach and,
as such, reduce the scope of SAFI II for the first stage. Recognizing the need for sequencing of the
PFM reform, the Government modified its reform approach into three phases. The first phase of
SAFI II was reduced to the ‘financial core’ budget, treasury, and accounting modules.
30.
In selecting the software solution, the Government decided to pursue a locally developed
software (LDSW) solution rather than purchase a commercial, off-the-shelf solution. 4 The
Government tried to procure a firm to implement the LDSW system. However, this procurement
failed twice because of a lack of firms willing to bid on the project. The contingency plan was to
contract 20 local developers because there was not enough time before project closing to conduct
another bidding process. Given the size of the project and the lack of technical leadership by the
Government, donors consistently called for the Government to put in place a Project Manager with
solid technical background for SAFI II. Eventually, a Project Manager was selected, but within
three months, the manager resigned. In September 2015, the World Bank financed a new Project
Manager but the reception by some Government Directors was complicated. Directors had already
4
LDSW is usually less expensive and the client owns the rights to the software. Necessary modifications to the
software can be done more easily. However, it requires substantial leadership and coordination to implement the
decisions needed for LDSW.
9
experienced distinct approaches from various consultants and it was hard to have any agreement
between World Bank consultants, USAID, and the Directors. The two main donors involved in
SAFI II (the World Bank and USAID) had conceptual differences and utilized distinct
methodological approaches. Within the MoF, coordination among the various divisions posed a
serious challenge, and there was no clear hierarchy for resolving challenges. The situation
deteriorated to the point that the Project Manager and main technical consultants resigned. At that
point, DINAFI continued software development with the methodologies and approaches defined
by the last Project Manager and technical consultants and finalized the development of the budget
formulation, budget execution, and management of human resources structures modules with local
consultants. The World Bank provided significant technical support and used project supervision
missions to convene stakeholders to discuss pending issues, achievements, and next steps. Aside
from this technical assistance, loan proceeds were directed to upgrading the hardware of the MoF.
Detailed Aide Memoires provide evidence of the World Bank team’s advice to the Government
on system implementation.
31.
As originally conceived, DINAFI did not play a major leadership role in ensuring that the
overall PFM reform strategy was well articulated. DINAFI started to drift from the strategy of
developing an integrated financial management information system (SAFI II) by financing
modules with other funding sources, thereby limiting the strategic orientation across
components/subcomponents. DINAFI was thrifty with loan funds, mindful that they could finance
activities using grants from donors. Organizationally, DINAFI was also limited in its ability to
coordinate and resolve conflicts between Directors (necessary for the integration of processes for
SAFI II). Hierarchically, DINAFI is on the same level with the other directions in the ministry.
Legally, DINAFI’s responsibility for implementing the new system was by way of delegation from
the minister through an Executive Order. This was important because in the Organic Budget Law
(Ley Orgánica de Administración Financiera del Estado), DINAFI was responsible for integration
and not for functional modifications. 5 As a result, the Directors of Budget, Treasury, and
Accounting did not think they had to comply with DINAFI’s requests.
Implementation of Component 3 (Transparency)
32.
Despite some initial delay in the start of activities, once the project became effective,
implementation proceeded smoothly. The Law on Access to Public Information became effective
in 2011 and dissemination activities commenced under the project. Initial delays under this
component were because of a lack of communication between the PIU and the SCPT and delays
in planning its activities in accordance with the Operations Manual. The World Bank served as a
facilitator between the PIU and the SCPT to ease communication and speed up implementation,
which then proceeded relatively smoothly.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization
33.
The project’s M&E framework is considered to be modest. The original design of the
operation’s M&E framework exhibited weaknesses in the logic connecting project inputs with
outputs and outcomes. While some of the original shortcomings were overcome during the first
restructuring with the dropping of some indicators and revisions to targets, weaknesses in the
5
See Articles 9 and 24.
10
logical framework and the formulation of indicators proved challenging in the evaluation of the
operation’s impact.
34.
M&E design. The Results Framework included in annex 3 of the PAD specified four
project outcome indicators and 20 intermediate outcome indicators which monitored a mixture of
higher-level outcomes and outputs of subcomponent activities. The original Result Framework
included a number of PEFA indicators to measure performance in PFM practices and used the
2009 PEFA to establish the baseline. However, in some cases, the design of the Results Framework
was not amenable to changes in the activities of subcomponents, because a number of the
intermediate indicators were directly linked to outputs such as the procurement of software or
number of trainings conducted (for example, The Human Resource Management System [Sistema
Integral de Recursos Humanos - SIRH] is updated and interoperable with SAFI). Some of the
indicators were also not well defined. For example, one of the PDO indicators was, “stronger
planning, budgeting, treasury, and accounting systems in place, in line with international standards.”
It was not clear how this would be measured. This was only partially corrected with the changes
introduced in the Results Framework in the first restructuring where many indicators were dropped
or revised. Such changes are indicative of elements of both a corrective and adaptive restructuring
to fix design flaws in the original indicators and improve the relevance of the activities and
associated Results Framework, in light of the delays to the effectiveness in the project and changes
in loan-financed activities.
35.
M&E implementation. DINAFI coordinated the monitoring of project activities
throughout implementation; however, the PIU within DINAFI was small and a person was never
hired to take on the M&E functions. Though the PAD did note the need for careful consideration
of M&E arrangements (as a lesson learned from the ICR of the previous project), this was not
translated into practice. Data collection relied heavily on meetings and reports by the counterparts
involved in each of the subcomponents, which on occasion, led to delays in the provision of timely
information. The lesson from the ICR of the previous operation on M&E was not translated into
practice during implementation. Information on key project outputs and indicator progress was
regularly collected as part of the World Bank’s supervision efforts. In the ISRs, the ratings for
M&E ranged from Moderately Satisfactory to Satisfactory, with the exception of ISR 12 when it
was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory, noting “the PIU has not satisfactorily monitored the project.
Production of project performance information is not adequately systematized and takes significant
time to be integrated and sent to the Bank.”
36.
M&E utilization. As originally conceived in the PAD, the MoF was to establish a
Coordination Committee under the direction of the Vice Minister of Finance responsible for
strategic planning and project monitoring. DINAFI was to serve as the Technical Secretariat of
this committee, with specialized personnel to be hired for this purpose. Participating agencies were
to be present on the committee to ensure all activities were monitored timely and substantively.
However, in practice, this Coordination Committee mainly focused on activities related to PFM
reform and did not take on a substantive monitoring role across all components.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
37.
Safeguards. No safeguard policies were triggered by the project.
11
38.
Financial management. Financial management performance is considered to have been
Satisfactory. Some issues arose at the start of the project with the need to hire a dedicated Financial
Management Specialist in the PIU. Once this issue was resolved, financial management
performance was rated Satisfactory in the remaining ISRs (4–13).
39.
Procurement. Procurement performance is considered to have been Moderately
Unsatisfactory. In all of the ISRs, procurement performance was rated Moderately Satisfactory;
however, the PIU did not hire a dedicated Procurement Specialist as was initially agreed with the
World Bank until the end of the project. There were recurrent delays and failures in the largest
procurements of the project, particularly in equipment and software in the customs and PFM
components. Procurement plans were revised substantially during implementation and a large
number of complex procurement activities were undertaken—15 International Competitive
Bidding packages (US$6.9 million in total, almost half of the disbursements). There were 18
cancelled procurement packages. Staff capacity in the implementing agencies responsible for the
technical specifications was also very weak. This situation could have been avoided by careful
planning, bringing experienced IT experts to the team, and learning more from similar activities
using available World Bank resources.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
40.
There are no planned World Bank supported follow-up operations. The Government is
committed to continue working on the remaining modules of SAFI II and will continue to receive
the support of other donors, such as USAID and IADB, on parts of the PFM reform agenda. SAFI
II will need to be rolled out to 118 institutions, and the latest decision of the MoF is that it will
continue the rollout using internal technical expertise. Elections for Congress are scheduled for
2018 and presidential elections are scheduled for 2019. Though uncertainties naturally attend such
changes in administration, it is unlikely that the activities associated with the purchasing of
hardware will be undermined by the change in administration. On the other hand, there are some
risks that a transition in administration will affect the transparency agenda and specifically, the
main beneficiary agency, the SCPT. Secretariats are established by decrees and they could
disappear in 2019 with the elections. The SCPT is aware of this and has established a far-reaching
network of public servants in each of the institutions they work with to improve the sustainability
of their interventions.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
41.
The PDO continues to be relevant to both Government priorities and to the World Bank’s
strategic priorities and, as such, relevance is rated Substantial. The World Bank’s Country
Partnership Framework covering 2016 to 2019 sets out a strategic objective of promoting the
efficiency of public spending under Pillar 2 to foster sustainability and resilience. Moreover, the
Government’s Five-Year Development Plan (2014–19)6 sets out an agenda on fiscal policy and
PFM with the following lines of action: increase tax collection, increase and improve the execution
and quality of public investments, improve the efficiency of social programs and subsidies, and
6
El Salvador Productivo, Educado y Seguro. Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo (2014–19).
12
generate primary savings so that finances are sustainable in the medium and long term. The 2016
Article IV mission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that El Salvador continues
to suffer from significantly lower growth than neighboring countries with GDP growth expected
to be 2.4 percent in 2017. According to IMF estimates, the fiscal deficit is expected to widen
further over the medium term without austerity measures, and public debt is projected to rise to
above 70 percent of GDP by 2021. Wage pressures, higher interest rates, additional security costs,
and public investment projects are all expected to add to demands on fiscal resources.
42.
The relevance of the project’s design to the objective is considered Modest. While the
project was restructured and substantially adjusted over time to respond to changes in Government
priorities, the PDO was not adjusted nor was the design of the components. The design of the
subcomponents of the project was not fully aligned with the stated objective and this disconnect
was not addressed through a Level 1 restructuring. The team faced the constraint that the project
would have to go back to the National Assembly for approval if there were any changes in
objective (which would require a Level 1 restructuring). The subcomponents corresponding to the
revenue management objective were considerably reduced at effectiveness and reoriented to
customs management. The component on PFM was also significantly altered during
implementation when the World Bank stopped financing the development of the core modules of
SAFI II. The PDO was not adjusted to align with the change in these activities. The Results
Framework was also not well suited to measure the project objectives. A lack of internal logic
connecting the project’s inputs, outputs, and outcomes make the project’s contributions to the
development objective difficult to evaluate.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
43.
Before addressing the achievement of the PDO, it is important to clarify how the efficacy
of the project is rated. In line with the ICR guidelines, the overall project performance is a weighted
average of the three primary objectives as described in the PDO. Each objective is rated equally.
To assess each objective, PDO and intermediate outcome indicators, as well supplementary
evidence, are used to arrive at an overall assessment. Annex 10 provides a detailed analysis of this
evidence base, organized by objective.
44.
From the PDO, one can identify three main objectives of the project: (a) increase the
effectiveness and efficiency of revenue management, (b) increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of expenditure management, and (c) enhance the accountability and transparency in the
public sector.
45.
To analyze the first objective, one should consider whether the project strengthened the
institutional capacity to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of revenue management. At
design, the project components were focused on strengthening the links between tax and customs
with the aim of improving revenue management. However, at effectiveness, the revenue
management component was substantially adjusted to focus solely on the customs aspects of
keeping out undesirable goods, trade facilitation, and back-office improvements to customs
systems. The role of customs management is generally to keep undesirable goods out while
collecting revenue and taxes on goods that are allowed in, as well as facilitate trade.7 The PDO
7
Gerard McLinden et al, “Border Management Modernization,” World Bank (2011).
13
indicator on increasing tax revenue was dropped. The objective of revenue management remained
the same, but the project effectively de-emphasized revenue improvement activities.
46.
The PDO and intermediate indicators focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of customs
management. The PDO indicator was partially achieved—the target was to have seven customs
points with nonintrusive control methods, and at project closing, six were achieved. However,
none of the six customs points’ nonintrusive methods were actually funded through the loan
(because of procurement problems), but the strategy funded through the project did contribute to
the end result. Before the project, the strategy and mechanisms in customs points did not exist.
The intermediate indicator on web-processed transactions was achieved. The intermediate
indicator related to reducing the hours to clear merchandise was partially achieved, reduced from
60 to 21 hours (the target was 17 hours).
47.
While the indicators were partially achieved, it is not clear that there were any attributable
improvements in revenue management as a result of project activities. From this assessment, it
appears that the project had a negligible contribution to increasing the effectiveness and efficiency
of revenue management.
48.
To analyze the second objective, one should consider whether the project strengthened the
institutional capacity of the MoF to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of expenditure
management. The PDO indicator was “stronger planning, budgeting, treasury, and accounting
systems in place, in line with international standards.” Given the breadth of areas that this indicator
covers, the target value was defined as the SAFI II system to be fully developed and ready to be
launched and to include program-based budgeting and payment processing through the Treasury
Single Account. According to the ISRs, this indicator was partially achieved (because the budget
formulation and execution modules funded by a combination of World Bank and USAID funds of
SAFI II were completed by project closing), though a more nuanced assessment of this indicator
would likely have relied on PEFA indicators, which appeared in the original Results Framework.
El Salvador’s two most recent PEFAs are from 2009 (at the time of project design) and 2013. A
comparison of the relevant PEFA indicators between 2009 and 2013 provides no evidence of
progress on the relevant indicators (see annex 11).
49.
With regard to stronger budget planning, program-based budgeting, and the medium-term
expenditure framework (MTEF), these reforms are embedded in the design of the new SAFI II
modules. Treasury reforms, which were initially conceptually guided by the World Bank and
operationalized by USAID, did achieve some results. Payment processing for Central Government
payments (excluding payroll) is now being done through the Treasury Single Account. Full
implementation of the Treasury Single Account (across all institutions and for the payroll) is
expected once SAFI II is fully operational. Even with partial payments through the Treasury Single
Account, the Government has seen a reduction in the time to pay private contractors. Before the
reform, it took two weeks (15 days) for funds to arrive to providers, now it takes one day or less.
This has helped resolve serious issues in paying health and education providers. The Treasury now
also has real-time information on its cash balances. All of the debts are registered and finance
officials can conduct a daily analysis of the operations, which is critical given the liquidity crisis
facing the country. Nonetheless, project performance can only be partially attributed to these
results, given the predominant role of USAID in this area.
14
50.
Both intermediate indicators were also achieved. The SAFI II modules—budget
formulation, budget execution, and the Management of Human Resources Structures—were
developed by project closing, but they are not operational yet. The Government expects to put the
modules in operation in the 2017/18 budget process. Training sessions on how to use the modules
were conducted for the Government staff. At closing, SAFI II was not operational. Modules that
were the responsibility of the World Bank have been developed, and other modules being
developed by USAID are still in development.
51.
Other achievements not captured in the Results Framework were the rollout of resultsbased budgeting and the substantial upgrading of the MoF’s IT hardware. The legal framework
has been modified to allow institutions in the central public administration to prepare their budgets
following a programmatic classification. As of September 2016, 79 out of 84 public sector
institutions (excluding 30 hospitals) have a programmatic budget structure, which is ready to be
applied in the preparation of the 2018 budget through the SAFI II budget formulation module.
Approximately 1,820 Government officials of the public administration have been trained on the
results-based budgeting techniques. As a result of the project-financed investments in upgrading
hardware, the MoF’s information and communication technology (ICT) capabilities have
improved. About 90 percent of the hardware of the MoF has been updated through the purchasing
of new computers, servers, video conferencing equipment, critical network infrastructure, and a
data warehouse. This infrastructure has contributed to improvements in the processing, storage,
accessibility, and security of data which in turn has contributed to an increase in the number of
online citizen/business services provided by the MoF (see section on unintended outcomes in
section 3.5 for further details).
52.
While there is no evidence of improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of
expenditure management as measured by comparing relevant PEFA indicators between 2009 and
2013, the project was able to introduce some of the inputs necessary for eventually realizing these
changes (new systems, processes, hardware, and so on). From this assessment, it appears that the
project had a negligible contribution to increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of expenditure
management.
53.
The third objective, as stated in the PDO, was to enhance the accountability and
transparency in the public sector. No PDO indicator was established for the transparency
component, but the related intermediate indicator was achieved and surpassed, with 50 training
and dissemination initiatives conducted to strengthen Government transparency. However, this
indicator does not provide much evidence of the impact of the range of activities financed under
this component. From supplemental evidence, it appears that this component had a substantial
impact. With regard to transparency initiatives, the project supported improvement and expansion
of the InfoÚtil Portal (originally developed with funding from the IADB in 2012), which enables
citizens to access useful day-to-day public information (public procedures and services) for health,
education, economy, and finances. This portal allows citizens to obtain updated information and
submit suggestions, opinions, or complains about public management. The portal has received
more than 5.3 million visits in the last three years. The project also financed a user satisfaction
survey of the portal.8 The survey results suggest that users were generally satisfied with content,
design, and accessibility of the portal (see annex 10 for details on the results of the survey). The
8
InfoÚtil, “Evaluación Ciudadana del Portal Infoútil,” 2014.
15
project also supported the development of a Public Jobs Vacancy Portal (portal empleos publicos)
that was launched in December 2015, which consolidates vacancies from 45 public institutions.
The project also contributed to the design of the proposal for open data policy and the creation of
the Gobierno Abierto Portal which integrates information, requests for information, complaints,
and rankings of the performance of public institutions. Evidence of the impact of these reforms are
reflected in improvement to El Salvador’s Open Government score. From 2014 to 2016, Open
Government improved from 0.37 to 0.51.9
54.
With regard to accountability initiatives, this component supported the national and
international dissemination of El Salvador’s Law on Access to Public Information through
television campaigns, brochures, and trainings in schools and public institutions. Eighty-three
Offices of Information and Response (OIRs) were created within the Central Government. As of
November 2013, the OIRs had received 24,021 requests for information and responded to 90
percent of the requests. 10 Higher-level evidence of the impact of these reforms reflected in
improvement to El Salvador’s voice and accountability scores. From 2012 to 2015, the score
improved from 46.5 to 50.7.11 For a comprehensive analysis of the results of each objective, see
annex 10. For the list of outputs by component, see annex 2.
3.3 Efficiency
55.
Project efficiency is considered to be negligible. Given the nature of the project, no formal
economic cost-benefit analysis was performed at the time of design. While results, such as
increases in the web-processing of various transactions and reductions in hours to clear customs
merchandise are likely to have contributed to savings from enhanced efficiency, it is difficult to
quantify such benefits ex post given the lack of concrete data.
56.
The PAD’s Economic and Financial Analysis listed a number of potential financial and
economic impacts mainly related to efficiencies generated from improvements in revenue
collection, facilitation of payments to public sector suppliers, and reductions in idle balances in
commercial banks. To the extent possible, these impacts have been updated based on the results
of the project and are captured in annex 3. Some of the achievements, such as systems development
and capacity building, affect back-office government processes, and while it is expected that such
improvements will end up contributing to improved services for citizens and businesses, such gains
are difficult to measure.
57.
Nevertheless, aspects of project implementation likely reduced the efficiency of some
activities. In line with ICR guidelines, beyond traditional measures of efficiency, the review should
take into account aspects of design and implementation that reduced efficiency. As discussed in
the implementation section, the restructuring and extension of the project as a result of
procurement issues and the complexity of reform reduced the overall efficiency in a number of the
subcomponents.
9
World Justice Project.
Rendición de Cuentas Fondos de Cooperación 2009–14.
11
Worldwide Governance Indicators.
10
16
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Unsatisfactory
58.
The overall outcome rating is considered to be Unsatisfactory (see table 2), reflecting major
shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its objectives. While the objectives of the project
are still relevant, the design of the project was not fully consistent with the objectives. The efficacy
of project interventions was negligible in terms of revenue and expenditure management but
substantial in improving transparency of the public sector. The efficiency of the project was
negligible.
Table 2. Overall Outcome Rating
Dimension
Relevance
Relevance of Objectives
Relevance of Design
Efficacy (equal weight across three objectives)
Objective 1 (revenue management)
Objective 2 (expenditure management)
Objective 3 (transparency)
Efficiency
Overall
Rating
Substantial
Modest
Negligible
Negligible
Substantial
Negligible
Unsatisfactory
3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
59.
Through the dissemination and implementation of the Access to Public Information Law
(signed into law in 2012) and transparency initiatives, the operation has had an impact on the
accessibility of public information for citizens. While the project was not designed to have a direct
impact on poverty, gender, or social development, access to information and transactional services
for citizens through online portals has improved. For example, the InfoÚtil Portal was redesigned
enabling citizens to access useful day-to-day public information (public procedures and services)
for a range of health, education, economic, and financial services.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
60.
This project has been an important catalyst in the institutional strengthening of both the
MoF and the SCPT. From a long-term institutional development perspective, the activities begun
during the first loan and continued in the second loan have strengthened the MoF’s ability to
perform critical functions related to cash management, program-based budgeting, medium-term
budgeting, and customs management. Through this project, the World Bank has maintained a
continuous policy dialogue on PFM and other important areas for the country’s development with
the authorities over the last decade.
61.
The institutional evolution of the SCPT also suggests that the transparency and
accountability agenda has taken hold in the administration. In 2009, the Secretariat was a SubSecretariat of Transparency and Anti-corruption (Subsecretaría de Transpaencia y
Anticorrupción) under the Secretary for Strategic Matters of the Presidency. In 2014, it was
converted into the Secretary of Citizen Participation and Transparency (SCPT), as citizen
17
participation was added to its functions. The number of staff increased from 45 in 2014 to 60 in
2016. The SCPT has also built a network of public officials across institutions to promote and
incorporate tools related to transparency, citizen participation, and accountability.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)
62.
As a result of project-financed investments in upgrading hardware, the MoF’s ICT
capabilities have improved. Approximately 90 percent of the hardware of the MoF has been
updated through the purchasing of new computers, servers, video conferencing equipment, critical
network infrastructure, and a data warehouse. This infrastructure has contributed to improvements
in the processing, storage, accessibility, and security of data that has contributed to an increase in
the number of online citizen/business services provided by the MoF. The upgraded infrastructure
contributed directly to improving the capacity of the MoF to make the following citizen services
available online: (a) tax refund consultations; (b) presentation of information and declarations and
payment of taxes online; (c) request forms and consultations for tax solvency; and (d) requests for
cancellation, receipt, or modifications of one’s Tax Identification Number (Número de
Identificación Tributaria) for naturalized citizens. These services represent about 20 percent of
total number of services available on the MoF’s online portal. Along with the infrastructure, the
project also contributed to improvements in ICT knowledge of the MoF staff through trainings.
3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
63.
No beneficiary survey or stakeholder workshops were conducted.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Moderate
64.
The progress made under the project is likely to be sustained for a number of reasons,
though full implementation of SAFI II will require a concerted effort by the MoF leadership. First,
the legal framework provided by laws and decrees across a number of areas (transparency, treasury,
PFM), makes the sustainability of project outcomes more likely. Second, the use of transparency
and open data tools by the ministries and agencies has created a demand for support from the SCPT.
The tools developed through this project have been incorporated into the agencies’ current
procedures and are unlikely to be reversed. The moderate, rather than low, risk rating for these
reforms is because of potential difficulties in the full implementation of SAFI II. The budget
preparation, budget execution, and human resource modules have all been developed and are
expected to be operational in 2017/18. Nonetheless, critical interconnection issues remain between
the Treasury, accounting, and the budget divisions of the MoF to ensure that all modules are
integrated within SAFI II. Once these issues are resolved, the software modification should be
relatively straightforward given improvement to the IT capacity of DINAFI staff. It appears likely
that SAFI II will be implemented in the next 1–3 years given continued USAID support to the
reform and the Government’s expressed interest in ensuring the new system is up and running.
18
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
65.
During project preparation, the World Bank team drew upon its previous experience in
implementing the El Salvador Public Sector Modernization Technical Assistance Loan Project
from 1997–07 (P007164), an understanding of the political economy of El Salvador, and PFM and
tax diagnostic assessments to inform the design of reforms. The overall risk of the operation was
rated Substantial and the risk of delays in the approval of the loan in Congress was the most
significant risk identified. Other risks identified included institutional implementation capacity,
procurement, and resistance to change. While these risks were acknowledged in the PAD, the
calibration of activities and components to these risks could have been better reflected in the design
of the reforms by reducing the scope of activities. The proposed mitigation measures were also not
sufficient for reducing the high costs of coordination inherent to the design of the project.
66.
Moreover, from the complex design of the project—covering tax, PFM, financial
management information system, and transparency reforms—it is not clear if similar projects from
other contexts were reviewed to anticipate implementation problems. The integrated financial
management information system reform, in particular, was overly ambitious from the start. It
appears that the project did not take into account the lessons of other financial management
information system projects, which on average take seven years to complete, and must be
appropriately sequenced (starting with core budget and treasury modules, and eventually moving
to integration of additional modules such as human resources or public investment management
PIM). The large and complex procurement packages were also not given enough attention at the
design phase. It appears that the original bar was set too high for a number of the PFM reforms.
For example, the application of International Public Sector Accounting Standards and Government
Financial Statistics 2001. There was limited description of the weaknesses of the current
arrangements in the PAD or attention to how to sequence the introduction of the standards.
67.
Finally, while the PAD acknowledged that the new administration, which had assumed
power after 20 years of opposition rule, might lack the political and technical experience needed
to implement the project, the design of the project was not adequately tailored to potential problems
in capacity to execute reforms. Additional support and supervision were seen as mitigating
measures rather than reducing reform expectations or coordination costs across components.
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
68.
Over the course of the project, the World Bank team was somewhat inconsistent in the
quality of its supervision. At times, it was proactive, organizing several missions and meetings
with the Government and donors to align incentives and priorities and strengthen the
implementation capacity of the PIU. At other times, it was noticeably absent in defining the reform
trajectory, using restructurings to adjust the PDO or better align activities with the PDO or was
slow in responding to client requests for ‘no-objections’.
19
69.
There were three official Task Team Leaders (TTLs) during the life of the project. This
turnover contributed to different approaches in supporting implementation—at times focusing on
components where the TTL had technical expertise and notably absent in areas where the TTL
lacked the technical expertise to engage. The World Bank was also remiss in ensuring adequate
transition arrangements between TTLs, leading to some gaps in the dialogue. Importantly, a World
Bank ICT Technical Specialist was not on the team for the majority of the life of the project. At
times, there were difficult technical decisions that the team was not equipped to make regarding
SAFI II. This situation improved toward the end of the project, but there were missed opportunities
early on.
70.
Transaction costs were high with the Government to keep the project moving forward and
in response, the team did increase supervision and monitoring of the project. The Country
Management Unit was very engaged in this project, participating in the donor roundtables and in
the high-level meetings with the Government. Workshops with the PIU and Procurement and
Financial Management Specialists were also scheduled to provide information and build capacity
about World Bank policies and procedures.
71.
Once challenges in the integration of the conceptual modules of SAFI II became apparent,
the World Bank financed an evaluation of the IT system to provide recommendations on the way
forward. Though the World Bank stopped financing the technological development of SAFI II,
periodic video and audio conferences were scheduled to closely follow up on the conceptualization
and programming of activities, and the team continued to provide advice on SAFI II development.
This was done through hiring independent consultants and utilizing supervision missions to
convene stakeholders and discuss achievements and pending issues. The results of these meetings
were documented in detailed Aide Memoires.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
72.
Overall, World Bank performance is considered to have been Moderately Unsatisfactory.
The design of the reform path was overly ambitious for the country context. The calibration of
activities and components to the risks could have been better reflected in design. During
supervision, the World Bank team was somewhat inconsistent in its focus across various
components, though over time, supervision across all components did improve.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
73.
The Government’s political commitment was highly uneven across components over the
course of the project, negatively affecting the achievement of the PDO. Component 2, in particular,
suffered from the absence of leadership and coordination of donors involved. Problems in the
coordination of donors led to multiple changes in activities supported by the project. While a
Governance Committee was formed to support the PFM reforms, led by senior officials, many of
the difficult decisions and mediation required to ensure integration of SAFI II modules were not
resolved through the committee. While senior leadership expressed interest in moving forward
20
with reform implementation, there was substantial resistance to reform at the Director level. The
Government was not able to effectively coordinate Technical Directors or donors in support of its
fiscal and PFM reform program, leading to serious problems in developing an integrated financial
management information system. Advances in Component 3 (transparency), on the other hand,
were underpinned by a clear commitment and interest of the Government in consolidating
transparency and accountability reforms.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
74.
The implementing agency for the project was DINAFI, which also housed the PIU. High
turnover in DINAFI and a small PIU undermined the pace and quality of implementing project
activities. To save resources, the Government decided to not fully staff the PIU and resisted hiring
additional procurement staff into the project. The PIU was small and for the majority of
implementation the only full-time person was the Financial Management specialist.
Implementation issues were not resolved in a timely fashion. No staff were hired to perform M&E
functions as originally envisioned in the PAD and this delayed reports on project progress. The
pace of implementation in the final year of the project (reflected by an increase in disbursements)
improved as a result of more direct engagement of senior management and the hiring of a
Procurement Specialist for the PIU.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
75.
The overall borrower performance is Unsatisfactory because of major shortcomings in the
Government’s coordination of the project, the PFM reform trajectory, and issues of capacity of the
implementing agency to guide project implementation.
6. Lessons Learned
76.
There are several lessons that can be drawn from the design, implementation, and results
of this operation of relevance for both similar projects dealing with customs, PFM, transparency
reforms, and the management World Bank operations in El Salvador. These lessons are drawn
from project documents and interviews with staff who worked on the project both inside and
outside of the Government.
Project Management
77.
The lack of full-time staff working for the PIU limited the Government’s support to
the implementation of activities. For the majority of the project, the PIU consisted mainly of a
few full-time DINAFI staff assigned to the PIU on an honorary basis, where the functions of the
PIU were added to their day-to-day tasks. The only exception was the contracting of a Financial
Management Specialist in 2012, as a result of pressure from the World Bank. The PIU should have
been separated from the implementing agency (DINAFI) to ensure some independence and
oversight in its functions. The PIU would have benefited from the presence of Procurement, M&E,
and Technical Specialists to support the implementation of activities.
78.
The absence of a dedicated Project Manager to guide the development of SAFI II led
21
to significant integration issues. While the Government attempted to hire a Project Manager on
various occasions, the absence of a full-time dedicated Project Manager throughout
implementation significantly slowed progress and left many conceptual and functional issues
unresolved. The World Bank attempted to fill the gap through increased supervision, but ultimately
this was not sufficient to manage the day-to-day issues of system integration.
79.
The absence of appropriate technical expertise (in the areas of financial management
information system and PFM) on the World Bank team during the first years of project
implementation contributed to oversights in design and limited the ability of the World Bank
to advise the Government during reform implementation. This was particularly acute at the
start of project implementation. Consultants were hired to address this issue and eventually, the
design of the reform strategy for SAFI II implementation was scaled back and sequenced.
80.
The project suffered from a lack of engagement of senior public officials in resolving
technical disagreements in the development of SAFI II. During the implementation of the
activities related to SAFI II, serious concerns about the direction, pace, and underlying reforms
required for integration emerged. While a Governance Committee was formed, led by senior
officials, many of the difficult decisions and mediation required to ensure integration would occur
was not resolved. Resistance to such reforms is common to these types of projects, and more direct
senior engagement and communication could have facilitated a smoother transition. The design of
the project should also have carefully considered the need for change management interventions
and sought to build broader coalition for the reform at the technical level to advance reforms.
81.
Standard World Bank supervision missions (two per year) were not sufficient in such
a challenging reform environment. As illustrated by the numbers of weeks dedicated to
supervision, these missions increased significantly between 2014 and 2016. In general, financial
management information system reforms require greater technical guidance to launch the process,
ensure the creation of technical conditions and coordination arrangement among all stakeholders,
and follow up, given the size and characteristics of the reform and the capacity of the counterpart,
for whom most of the reforms were not only complex but also new (for example, program-based
budgeting, International Standards of Public Sector Accounting). A more robust capacity
assessment was needed before project implementation.
82.
A positive lesson from the operation was the engagement of the opposition in Congress
to help get the project approved. The team adapted the project design to reflect the concerns of
the opposition by strengthening the transparency component and demonstrating how such
interventions would directly contribute to citizen access to information and government services.
This adaptation facilitated project approval.
Reform Design
83.
A deeper assessment of the viability of the proposed PFM reforms should have been
undertaken at effectiveness because of the substantial delay in project approval. As a result
of the 18-month delay in the effectiveness of the project, the operating environment in which the
project was conceived changed significantly, with donors directly engaged in many of the activities
originally foreseen in the PAD. During the first restructuring, some of the components were
adjusted to reflect changes in the operating environment, but no thorough assessment was
22
conducted nor was the project extended. Major procurements were not prepared in advance and
the teams were under immense pressure to proceed as quickly as possible with procurements,
rushing studies and sometimes fragmenting activities to simplify the procurement process and save
time.
84.
Combining major PFM reforms with a move to integration and automation created
reform overload. The lack of sequencing of the public financial reforms included under the
project caused substantial confusion and overload of the technical directions involved. Not until
the ministry adjusted its reform strategy to proceed in phases did the situation improve. A deeper
understanding of the prerequisites needed for financial management information system
implementation and reform sequencing should have gone into preparation.
85.
Coordination of various donor interventions by the Government was weak, leading
to overlapping interventions and divergent interests between donors, undermining the
overall coherence of the Government’s PFM reform strategy. Various sources of funds—
grants, loans, consultant projects—from several donors were utilized by the Government to fund
the implementation of PFM reforms. Donors were not adequately coordinated, resulting in
different methods and approaches and conflicting reform advice to the Government.
86.
More careful consideration of the implications of selecting an LDSW solution should
have preceded implementation. The limited capacity of the Government to steer the reforms, the
number of donors involved, and the lack of a Project Director all undermined the Government’s
ability to effectively implement an LDSW solution. It is not clear from project documentation that
the full implications of pursuing an LDSW were considered at the onset.
Procurement
87.
The PIU’s and the implementing agencies’ limited degree of experience working with
World Bank procurement procedures negatively affected the rhythm of project execution.
At the design phase, the project entailed the procurement of complex goods and services, requiring
a substantial degree of technical expertise, a solid understanding of the market, and familiarity
with the World Bank’s procurement rules and procedures. The PIU did not have a full-time
Procurement Specialist until 2015 but rather had to rely on the MoF staff to fulfill the functions.
Moreover, the implementing agencies were unfamiliar with World Bank procurement procedures
and in some cases, lacked the technical capacity to develop the required specifications and
undertake market analysis.
88.
The absence of a strategic approach to the planning of ICT procurement at the onset
led to major failures in procurement. The limited understanding by both the Government and
the World Bank of the products and services of the market for customs and ICT software included
under the project contributed to major failures in procurement. On the World Bank side, restrictive
terms and conditions effectively dissuaded domestic providers from participating in the selection
process and many did not know how to respond to the World Bank’s call for proposals. A better
understanding of the market dynamics at project design would have substantially increased the
viability of the International Competitive Bidding and National Competitive Bidding procurement
processes. Strategic planning of ICT procurement should be an integral part of project design and
task teams can benefit from regularly updated resources (for example, financial management
23
information system database, PFM systems and e-Services, Digital Governance database) to
minimize the number of complex ICT procurement packages, optimize technical design, and learn
more about cost/time implications of different ICT solutions and development paths.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
Not applicable.
(b) Cofinanciers
Not applicable.
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
Not applicable.
24
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$, millions equivalent)
Components
Appraisal Estimate
(US$, millions)
7.80
Revised Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate
(US$, millions)
(US$, millions)*
5.20
2.90
Strengthening tax collection agencies
Modernizing of public expenditures and
7.50
13.00
7.30
financial management
Enhancing and piloting information
management and public sector transparency
3.20
0.80
0.40
initiatives
Project coordination and strengthening of the
1.09
0.95
0.30
MoF
19.60
19.95
10.90
Total baseline cost
Physical contingencies
0.42
0.00
0.00
Price contingencies
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Total project costs
Project Preparation Fund
0.00
0.00
0.00
Front-end fee IBRD
0.05
0.05
0.05
20.00
20.00
10.95
Total financing required
*Source: Interim Financial Report from June 30, 2016, covering the first semester of 2016. Therefore, the final
numbers may vary from what is presented in this table.
(b) Financing
Source of Funds
Borrower
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
Type of
Cofinancing
—
—
Appraisal
Actual/Latest
Estimate
Estimate
(US$, millions) (US$, millions)
0.00
0.00
20.00
25
0.00
Percentage of
Appraisal
0.00
0.00
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
Component 1: Strengthening tax collection agencies
Indicator
Increased efficiency of customs
through increased number of
customs points with nonintrusive
control methods financed by
the loan
Hours to clear merchandise from
the moment it arrives to custom
terminal until it is released
End Target
Status at Closing
7 customs points
Not achieved. 6 customs points*
17 hours
Partially achieved. 21 hours (from
baseline of 60 hours)
% increase of web-processed
98%
Achieved.
transactions in customs
Note: *Though none of the current six customs points were funded by the loan, the strategy that led to the introduction
of this strengthened customs management and control mechanism was originated as part of the project. Before the
project, this strategy and mechanism in customs points did not exist.
Summary of Outputs

Strengthening of data processing capacities for the DGA and the DGII Audit Units,
the DGT tax collecting units, and users of SIDUNEA World through the acquisition
of 1,237 computers (laptops and desktop).

Improvement of control mechanisms for customs through the implementation of a
video surveillance system with more than 100 cameras, using the corporate data
network of the ministry.

Customization and implementation of SIDUNEA World, as well as significant
advances in its respective integration with other customs systems.

Strategy to incorporate nonintrusive mechanism (that motivated the integration of
scanners in six customs points).
Component 2: Modernizing of public expenditures and financial management
Indicator
End Target
Stronger planning, budgeting,
treasury, and accounting
systems in place, in line with
international standards
The new SAFI II system is fully
developed and ready to be
launched. It includes programbased budgeting and payment
processing through the Treasury
Single Account
Development of the new SAFI
II module for Budget Execution
will include program-based
budgeting.
A new module for budget
execution in SAFI II that includes
program-based budgeting has
been developed.
26
Status at Closing
Partially achieved. The MoF concluded
the development of the budget
formulation and budget execution
modules of SAFI II. Program-based
budgeting is fully embedded in SAFI II as
well as the MTEF. Programs are also
results-based and adopt the logic
framework methodology.
Achieved. The MoF concluded the
development of the budget formulation
and budget execution modules of SAFI II.
Program-based budgeting is fully
embedded in SAFI II. Programs are also
Increased capacity in budget
planning and formulation
through the new integrated
financial system
results-based and adopt the logic
framework methodology.
Achieved. 17 training sessions financed
by the group of donors with the objective
of increasing capacity in managing public
expenditures to take full advantage of
SAFI II functionalities.
12 training sessions
Summary of Outputs

Conceptual design document for SAFI II.

IT development for SAFI II concluded for the modules of budget preparation, budget
execution, and human resources. Updating the skills of the technical staff of the
central institutional Finance Directorates in the core business practices and computer
areas through training and hiring of specialized consultancies (budget, Treasury,
investment, human resources, and so on).

Results-based budgeting outputs: Methodological guide; guide for the validation of
programs; training of 1,820 public servants; review of program classification structure
for 25 Central Government institutions, 72 decentralized institutions, 4 State Owned
Enterprises, and pilot in 5 entities.

Updating the communications infrastructure of the MoF through the acquisition of
structured cabling with a shelf life of 15 years; networking equipment for the core of
the corporate network, robust enough to support current and new services for the next
five years.

Reinforcement of the data processing and storage infrastructure of the MoF Data
Center, by implementing a private cloud, based on the virtualization platform that
makes the use of computational resources more efficient and strengthens aspects of
security, scalability, and availability of current and new business services for the next
10 years.

Strengthening of information security mechanisms.

Renovation of the client computer plant of the MoF with the acquisition of 768
computers for the central institutional Finance Directorates; extending the shelf life
by five years.
Component 3: Enhancing and piloting information management and public sector
transparency initiatives
Indicator
Implementation of training and
dissemination initiatives to
strengthen Government
transparency, citizen participation,
and access to public information
End target
22 initiatives have been
implemented. Institutional capacity
of the Government is strengthened
and knowledge about right of
access to public information and
27
Status at closing
Achieved. 50 initiatives
implemented.
Government transparency tools has
increased among public servants
and the general public
Summary of Outputs

Promotion of the national and international dissemination of the Law on Access to
Public Information through various mechanisms:
o
2 dissemination campaigns for three months
o
Training of 40 leaders of nongovernmental organizations on the Law on Access
to Public Information
o
Printed materials and printing in Braille of the law
o
Training of 1,600 leaders from the central and eastern parts of the country

Technical assistance support to the development of two web portals (InfoÚtil and
Open Government)

Technical assistance and equipment for 14 regional OIRs and 42 OIRs in the
municipalities

Carrying out of the first Salvadoran Open Government ‘hackathon’ to find innovative
ways for the Government to provide information services (100+ youth participants, 3
apps winners)

Two studies into the typology of information for public consumption

Study into the public usefulness of the Law on Access to Public Information

Computer equipment to promote a pilot plan of face points for the multichannel
window, based on the experience of Uruguay

Establishment of a universal and standardized system for the receipt of complaints by
the OIRs and their analysis by those in charge of the internal audit

Development of the norms for the management of archives within the framework of
the Law on Access to Public Information through one university diploma (40 public
servants), workshops for 80 public servants, and 1 validated national normative
framework

Transparency in the information on the recruitment of human resources in the
Executive Body
o
Technical assistance to 12 autonomous institutions and methodology of
monitoring compliance with the publication of information
28
o
Workshops with 80+ public institutions, tutorial videos

Support in the implementation of the Citizen Care System

Exchange visit to the Brazilian Comptroller-General (Controladoria Geral da União
– CGU) on the implementation of efficient mechanisms for the management of
requests for public information

Promotion of citizen culture of transparency and accountability
29
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
As this was a technical assistance project devoted to a range of public administration reforms,
computations of rate of return and cost effectiveness are difficult to assess and do not capture the
range of intended benefits from the reforms. Nevertheless, it was expected to have a positive fiscal
impact and generate economic gains that were to come from more efficient use of public finances
through reductions in tax evasion and smuggling, improved cash management, and increased
competition in purchasing. Because the project was restructured to focus on customs, PFM, and
transparency activities, table 3.1 summarizes some of the potential efficiency/fiscal and social
impact of project activities in each of the components. No formal studies were carried out during
project implementation to verify these results, so these gains are considered indicative.
Table 3.1: Potential Economic and Social Gains from Project Activities
Component
Activities


1. Strengthening
tax collection
agencies
Strengthening of the
Customs Office processes
and procedures


Strengthening of the
Customs Office IT
systems


2. Modernizing
of public
expenditures and
financial
management
Implementation of a
Treasury Single Account
and electronic payments

Upgrade of the financial
management information
system (SAFI II)
Introduction of resultsbased budgeting
(program-based
budgeting)
Economic Gains/Social Gains
(based on Self-Reporting-Expected/Realized)
Realized private sector efficiency gains from the reduction in
hours to clear merchandise from the moment it arrives to the
customs terminal until it is released (from 21 to 17 hours).
Realized private sector efficiency and effectiveness gains from
increased number of customs points with nonintrusive control
methods financed by the loan. The new process is faster, more
accurate, and less intrusive. (for example, the opening of
packages).
Realized effectiveness gains in the control of customs
merchandise through the implementation of a system of video
surveillance with more than 100 cameras.
Realized private sector efficiency gains from the increase in
web-processed transactions in customs
Expected efficiency gains from time-savings and processing
moving toward an integrated, secure, and web-based customs
platform (SIDUNEA World)
Partially realized private sector efficiency gains from the
adoption of a Treasury Single Account—reduction in the time
required for the Government to pay private contractors. Earlier,
it took 2 weeks (15 days) for the funds to arrive to providers;
now it takes 1 day or less. Full implementation (all institutions
and payroll expenses) is expected by fiscal 2018.
Realized efficiency gains for the central public administration
from the introduction of payment cards for small purchases to
facilitate the processes of purchasing.

Expected efficiency gains from time-savings and processing of
the preparation and execution of the budget in SAFI II for the
central public administration

Expected efficacy gains in the use of a program-based budget
linked to results for the central public administration
30

Upgrade of the MoF’s IT
infrastructure

3. Enhancing and
piloting
information
management and
public sector
transparency
initiatives
Dissemination and
implementation of
transparency initiatives


Realized private sector and citizen time-savings gains from the
MoF’s services available online as a result of upgrades in the
MoF’s IT infrastructure. Services are (a) tax refund
consultations; (b) presentation of information and declarations
and payment of taxes online; (c) request forms and consultation
of tax solvency; and (d) requests for cancellation, receipt, or
modifications of one’s Tax Identification Number for
naturalized citizens.
Realized time-savings gains for the public through the InfoÚtil
portal, which provides access to useful day-to-day information
on health, education, economic, and financial services. The
portal has received more than 5.3 million visits in the last 3
years.
Realized time-savings gains for those seeking a job in the
public sector as a result of the Public Jobs Vacancy Portal,
which consolidates public vacancies from 45 institutions.
Realized time-savings gains for citizens to submit complaints
to the Government (and improved access to information)
through the creation of 83 OIRs within the Central
Government, which have received more than 80,000
information requests, from which 90% have been responded to.
1.
Despite some of these gains, overall efficiency of the project is rated negligible given the
elapsed time and modest achievements in key project interventions. Moreover, many of the
expected benefits will only be realized if the Government fully adopts the new IT systems for dayto-day operations (for example, SAFI II and SIDUNEA World).
31
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names
Lending
Alberto Leyton
Alejandro Alcalá
Alma Hernandez
Alvaro Larrea
Carmen Zuleta
Dean Thompson
Enrique Fanta
Fabienne Mrozka
Henry Forero
Jania Ibarra
João Veiga Malta
Karla Lopez Flores
Manuel Rosales
Title
Task Team Leader
Senior Counsel
Program Assistant
Procurement Specialist
Consultant
Consultant
Senior Public Sector Specialist
Financial Management Specialist
Senior Information Officer
Operations Analyst
Senior Procurement Specialist
Language Program Assistant
Consultant
LCC2C
LEGLA
LCCSV
LCSPT
LCSPS
LCSPS
LCSPS
LCSFM
CITPO
LCSPS
LCSPT
LCSPS
LCCSV
Marcos Mendiburu
Social Development Specialist
WBIGV
Mayra Moran
Pedro Aritzi
Supervision/ICR
Alejandra Ramon Y Martinez De
Alva
Ana Sirani Romero Mata
Angela Nieves Marques Porto
Arturo Herrera Gutierrez
Daniel Jorge Arguindegui
David Santos Ruano
Enrique Fanta Ivanovic
Jania Ibarra
Joanna Alexandra Watkins
Consultant
Public Sector Specialist
LCSPS
LCSPS
TTL
Counsel
Administrative support
Procurement
SAFI II
—
Customs specialist
Financial management
IT specialist
Operational support
Procurement
Administrative support
—
Transparency
component
—
—
Program Assistant
LCC1C
Administrative support
GGODR
GGO16
GGO16
GGO04
GGO16
GTC04
LCCSV
GGO16
—
Operational support
Practice Manager
Procurement
IT specialist
Customs specialist
Operational support
TTL of ICR
GGO22
Financial management
LCC2C
GGO16
LCC2C
GGO16
Operational support
TTL at closing
—
Operations support
GTCLA
—
GSUSD
GGO22
Safeguards specialist
Financial management
—
Consultant
Practice Manager
Senior Procurement Specialist
Public Sector Specialist
Senior Private Sector Specialist
Operations Officer
Senior Public Sector Specialist
Senior Financial Management
Jose Simon Rezk
Specialist
Jovana Stojanovic
Operations Officer
Maria Guadalupe Toscano Nicolas Public Sector Management Specialist
Maryanne Sharp
Country Operations Advisor
May Cabilas Olalia
Senior Public Sector Specialist
Mayra Del Carmen Alfaro De
Senior Private Sector Specialist
Moran
Reidar Kvam
Safeguards Specialist
Sandra Lisette Flores De Mixco
Financial Management Analyst
Unit
Responsibility
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
US$, thousands (including travel
No. of Staff Weeks
and consultant costs)
Lending
32
Stage of Project Cycle
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
Total:
Supervision/ICR
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
Total:
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
US$, thousands (including travel
No. of Staff Weeks
and consultant costs)
28.57
100.03
11.89
31.87
15.47
33.32
7.01
15.29
15.18
97.51
78.12
278.02
1.48
8.23
12.36
11.53
25.86
41.11
28.73
12.93
142.23
33
23.69
38.41
70.93
74.26
123.49
161.71
155.58
61.68
709.75
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results
Not applicable.
34
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
Not applicable.
35
Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
No comments were received from the Borrower.
36
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
Not applicable.
37
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents
Dener, Cem, Joanna Watkins, and William Dorotinsky. 2011. “Financial Management
Information Systems: 25 years of World Bank Experience on What Works and What
Doesn’t.” World Bank Study.
Decree No. 516, Ley Orgánica de Administración Financiera del Estado, El Salvador.
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2016. El Salvador: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2016
Article IV Mission. May 6, (accessed at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2016/050616.htm).
McLinden, Gerard et al. 2011. “Border Management Modernization.” Washington, DC: World
Bank.
InfoÚtil. 2014. “Evaluación Ciudadana del Portal Infoútil.”
Secretaria Técnica de Planificación. El Salvador Productivo, Educado y Seguro. Plan
Quinquenal de Desarrollo (2014–19).
World Bank, Aide Memoires, Back-to-Office Reports, Project ISRs, and Project Assessments.
World Bank. 2009. El Salvador - Country Partnership Strategy 2010-2012. Report No. 50642SV.
World Bank. “Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Fiscal Management
and Public Sector Performance Technical Assistance Loan Project.” Report No. 59754SV 2011.
World Bank. “Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Fiscal Management
and Public Sector Performance Technical Assistance Loan Project.” Report No.
RES14771, 20114
38
Annex 10. Achievement of Objectives Analysis
Type of
Evidence/
Indicator
PDO-level Results
Indicators (Objective to
which they correspond)
Target
Final Value
Level of
Achievement
To strengthen the institutional capacity of specific government processes and agencies to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of revenue and expenditure
management and enhance accountability and transparency in the public sector
Component 1: Strengthening tax collection agencies
PDO
Indicator
Tax collection as a percent of
GDP increases at least 1% as
a result of greater
effectiveness and efficiency
PDO
Indicator
Increased efficiency of
customs through increased
number of customs points
with nonintrusive control
methods financed by
the loan
7
6
Partially achieved
Intermediate
Indicator
Hours to clear merchandise
from the moment it
arrives to customs terminal
until it is released
17
21
Partially achieved
Intermediate
Indicator
% increase of web-processed
transactions in customs
98
98
Achieved
Intermediate
Indicator
% recovery of tax arrears
portfolio
60
64 (December 2013)
Dropped
Development of the
conceptual model for the
programmatic classification in
the budget
Tax collection as percentage of GDP
has increased at least 1%
The conceptual model for the
programmatic classification in
the budget has been
developed and the budget is
structured by programs.
39
Tax collection as a
percentage of GDP was
15.8% by December 2013
The conceptual model for the
budgeting module was
approved on October 15,
2012, and it includes the
programmatic classification of the
budget. Operalization of the
conceptual plan in the new
SAFI is still under development
(December 2013).
Dropped
Dropped
Type of
Evidence/
Indicator
Supplemental
evidence
PDO-level Results
Indicators (Objective to
which they correspond)
Target
Final Value
Level of
Achievement
The customization of SIDUNEA World is concluded for relevant customs business processes (declaration, transit, regimes, and control of
deposits and guarantees); however, final adaptations will be done by the local team, including tests and stabilization of the solution.
SIDUNEA World is expected to be launched in 2017. Launching SIDUNEA World will modernize customs management processes, with
potential results in time-savings, accuracy of information, security of information, interoperability, and verification of information,
accessibility, and so on.
Component 2: Modernizing of public expenditure and financial management
PDO
Indicator
Stronger planning, budgeting,
treasury, and accounting
systems in place, in line with
international standards
The new SAFI II system is fully
developed and ready to be launched. It
includes program-based budgeting,
payment processing through the
Treasury Single Account
The MoF concluded the development of
the budget formulation and budget
execution modules of SAFI II. Programbased budgeting is fully embedded in
SAFI II as well as the MTEF. Programs
are also results-based and adopt the
logic framework methodology.
Partially achieved.
Modules have been
developed but are
not fully
operational.
PDO
Indicator
Savings generated in central
government purchasing are at
least 10% by comparing the
same type of
items (by adopting optimizing
procurement policies)
n.a.
n.a.
Dropped
PDO
Indicator
The introduction of multiannual projections
and programmatic structure in
the budget
strengthens strategic planning
and the
implementation of
performance-based
budgeting
Improvements in the ratings in
PEFA indicator 12: Multiyear
perspective in fiscal
planning, expenditure policy
and budgeting, and PEFA
indicator 5: Classification of
the budget
Several legal and
methodological instruments
approved to introduce multi-annual
projections and
program-based budgeting (December
2013)
Dropped
Intermediate
Indicator
Development of the new
SAFI II module for budget
execution will include
program-based budgeting
A new module for budget execution in
SAFI II that includes program-based
budgeting has been developed.
The MoF concluded the development of
the budget formulation and budget
execution modules of SAFI II. Programbased budgeting is fully embedded in
SAFI II. Programs are also results-based
Achieved
40
Type of
Evidence/
Indicator
PDO-level Results
Indicators (Objective to
which they correspond)
Target
Final Value
Level of
Achievement
and adopt the logic framework
methodology.
12 training sessions
17 training sessions financed by the
group of donors with the objective of
increasing capacity in managing public
expenditures to take full advantage of
the SAFI II functionalities
Achieved
Intermediate
Indicator
Availability of a new
electronic purchasing
system designed and
implemented
(COMPRASAL)
A new electronic purchasing
system designed and
implemented in Central
Government institutions
(COMPRASAL)
COMPRASAL has been
developed and is working
although not 100% of
the Government agencies are using
the system (December 2013).
Dropped
Intermediate
Indicator
Implementation of the
Treasury Single Account
and electronic payment
module
implemented in all Central
Government, including the
national hospitals network.
The Treasury Single Account
and electronic payment
module was implemented in
all Central Government institutions,
including the national
hospitals network
Treasury Single Account is under
development
within the new SAFI (December 2013)
Intermediate
Indicator
The SIRH is updated and
inter-operating with
SAFI
Budget formulation for human resources
and payroll is automatic and
linked to SAFI
SIRH is being developed
under the new SAFI (December 2013)
Intermediate
Indicator
Increased capacity in budget
planning and formulation
through the new integrated
financial system

Supplemental
evidence



Dropped
Dropped
Program and results-based budgeting is close to a reality. The legal framework is already set as well as the practice in the institutions.
In the last two years, the institutions have been designing and integrating their programs. As of September 2016, there are 79 (out of 84,
excluding 30 hospitals) institutions with a programmatic structure of the budget that are ready to start integrating Budget 2018 under a
program approach. The launching of the reform was deferred for one year (from Budget 2017 to Budget 2018) to match this policy
reform with the tool that would make it operational (SAFI II - budget formulation module).
The MTEF is also embedded in the budget reform as well as in SAFI II and would be put in practice in Budget 2018. This is a major
reform that would should improve budget credibility, critical to the current fiscal situation.
The Treasury Single Account is operating for Central Government payments, except for payroll expenses. Full implementation (all
institutions and payroll expenses) is expected for fiscal year 2018 once SAFI II is fully operational.
The budget formulation and budget execution modules for SAFI II are fully developed and will be used in May 2017. Treasury and
accounting modules are expected to be finished in the next semester.
41
Type of
Evidence/
Indicator
PDO-level Results
Indicators (Objective to
which they correspond)




Target
Final Value
Level of
Achievement
The technical platform for web-based access to SAFI II is in development.
ICT infrastructure of the MoF has been substantially upgraded. Hardware infrastructure to run the system is in place (new computers,
servers, updating of critical networks, security solutions, data warehouse). About 90% of the hardware of the ministry has been
updated. The ministry now has videoconferencing facilities and this has been helpful for all of the ministry’s projects and activities.
This infrastructure platform has also allowed for an increase in the number of services that the MoF can offer online. The upgraded
infrastructure contributed directly to improving the capacity of the MoF to process, store, and increase accessibility and security of the
following citizen services available online:
o Tax refund consultations
o Presentation of information and declarations and payment of taxes online
o Request forms and consultation of tax solvency
o Requests for cancellation, receipt, or modifications of the Tax Identification Number for naturalized citizens
This represents about 20% of total number of services available on the MoF’s portal. Additionally, the hardware upgrade supported the
use of the new public procurement system (COMPRASAL II), which is being used by all the central and municipal government’s
contracts units and the support of the Treasury Single Account, increasing the security and efficiency of the payment processes.
Transfer of ICT knowledge to the ministries’ staff—with various consultants teaching the teams how to program—will be helpful for
future iterations of the software (SAFI III or IV).
Component 3: Enhancing and piloting information management and public sector transparency initiatives
PDO
Indicator
Intermediate
Indicator
—
Implementation of training
and dissemination initiatives
to strengthen Government
transparency, citizen
participation, and access to
public information

Supplemental
Evidence
—
—
22 initiatives have been implemented.
Institutional capacity of the Government
is strengthened and knowledge about
right of access to public information and
Government transparency tools has
increased among public servants and the
general public.
50 initiatives implemented
—
Achieved
Expansion and improvements to the InfoÚtil Portal (originally developed with funding from the IADB), enabling citizens to access
useful day-to-day public information (public procedures and services) for health, education, economy, and finances. The portal contains
information on different topics—health, education, economy, finances—of use for citizens and business. This portal allows the citizens
to obtain updated information and to submit suggestions, opinions, or complaints about public management. The portal has received
more than 5.3 million visits in the last 3 years.
o In 2013, the portal had 29 databases. In 2016, the portal had 53 databases.
o The number of users has increased from 151,312 in 2013 to 818,020 in 2016.
o Site visits have increased from 196,926 in 2013 to 1,188,964 in 2016.
42
Type of
Evidence/
Indicator
PDO-level Results
Indicators (Objective to
which they correspond)








Target
Final Value
Level of
Achievement
o As of 2016, 29 public institutions are involved in the portal—such as the Ministries of Health, Education, and Labor.
Results of the InfoÚtil user satisfaction survey undertaken between 2013 and 2014:
o Number of respondents: 85.
o 85% found the portal to be very useful
o 79% considered the website easy to access, attractive, and dynamic.
o 81% of respondents encountered the information they were looking for, while 19% did not find the information.
o 80% of respondents found the website easy to understand, while 20% did not.
o 91% of respondents would recommend the portal to others.
Support to the Public Sector Jobs Vacancy Portal that was launched in December 2015 (consolidating vacancies for 45 institutions) and
the design and creation of the Social Programs Portal that was launched by the end of 2016.
The project also contributed with the design of the proposal for the open data policy and the creation of the Gobierno Abierto Portal
which integrated information, requests for information under way, complaints, and ranking of the performance of institutions.
Different actions to disseminate the Law of Access to Public Information across the country by different means (television campaigns,
brochures, trainings in schools and public institutions).
83 OIRs have been created within the Central Government. As of November 2013, they had 24,021 requests for information, of which
90% have been responded to (Source: Rendición de Cuentas Fondos de Cooperación 2009–14).
The SCPT conducted a ranking of all the institutions for monitoring their compliance with the law.
Creation of the app ‘Camino a la U’ which provides information about universities, aptitude test results, and scholarships.
Introduction and dissemination of a structured process for holding public institutions to account for results. In 2010, 37 central
institutions participated in the process and by 2012, 89 central institutions and 14 Management Cabinets (Gabinete de Gestión) from
each of the regional departments, and schools (approximately 5,000).
43
Annex 11. El Salvador PEFA Indicators 2009 versus 2013
I. CREDIBILITY OF THE BUDGET
1. Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget
2. Composition of expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget
3. Aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved budget
4. Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears
II. COMPREHENSIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY
5. Classification of the budget
6. Comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation
7. Extent of unreported government operations
8. Transparency of inter-governmental fiscal relations
9. Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from other public sector entities
10. Public access to key fiscal information
III. POLICY-BASED BUDGETING
11. Orderliness and participation in the annual budget process
12. Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting
IV. PREDICTABILITY AND CONTROL IN BUDGET EXECUTION
13. Transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities
14. Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax assessment
15. Effectiveness in collection of tax payments
16. Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures
17. Recording and management of cash balances, debt and guarantees
18. Effectiveness of payroll controls
19. Transparency, competition and complaints mechanisms in procurement
20. Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditure
21. Effectiveness of internal audit
V. ACCOUNTING, RECORDING AND REPORTING
22. Timeliness and regularity of accounts reconciliation
23. Availability of information on resources received by service delivery units
24. Quality and timeliness of in-year budget reports
25. Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements
VI. EXTERNAL SCRUTINY AND AUDIT
26. Scope, nature and follow-up of external audit
27. Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law
28. Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports
DONOR PRACTICES
D-1 Predictability of Direct Budget Support
D-2 Financial information provided by donors for budgeting and reporting on
project and program aid
D-3 Proportion of aid that is managed by use of national procedures
2009
2013
C
B
A
B
A
A
A
NR
C
A
A
B+
C+
B
C
B
C+
B+
C
B
B
C+
B
C+
B
B
B+
B+
B
A
B+
B+
C+
B+
B
D+
B+
B
C+
B
C+
C+
B+
B
B+
A
B+
B
B+
B+
C+
C+
D
D+
B+
D
A
D
D
D
D
C
Source: PEFA. El Salvador Assessment Data and Report. Accessible from: https://pefa.org/country/el-salvador
44
MAP
45