Download Central and (South

Central and (South-)Eastern Europe:
From Dependence to Independence and Integration
I. Historical background up to the 19th century:
1. The changing borders of Europe in history. From Charlemagne’s Carolingian
Empire to the Post-Communist „New Europe.” Is there a „third,” Central Europe
between East and West?
The changing dimensions of „Europe,” an elusive term
In Greek mythology the daughter of the King of Tyrus, carried away by Zeus to Crete the Greek world, then the continent named after her
Geography: from the Atlantic to …where [?] (highest peak is not Mont Blanc)
Culturally: “West,” Occidens, Abendlandes, Western Christianity (Huntington: Clash of
Civilisations
Politically: from Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire to the “Neo-Carolingian Empire” West European Union, “capitalist” Europe, Common Market, EC, EU - expanding,
absorbing
Hugh Seton-Watson’s remarkable essay "What is Europe, Where is Europe?”
(Encounter, July, 1985)
History gives the answer: an expanding and contracting term, from the Hellenic world
through the Imperium Romanum to “Europe whole and free”
The north-eastern border was constantly shifting, but in 1945 the Iron Curtain fell largely
where Charlemagne’s Empire ended. East of that was dependable, disposable, easy to
be written off (1956, 1938/39, 1945, 1956, 1968, 1981) [what these dates denote?]
Metternich: “Asia begins at the Landstrasse…”
Two or three Europes? (or only one?)
Exponents of “two”:
post-45 western usage, “second serfdom” East of the River Elbe, strong autocratic (as
opposed to democratic or pluralistic) tradition - a justification for Soviet control
Arguments for a “Central Europe” (“Danubian Europe”), “the sick heart of Europe” (1975
Seattle talks by HSW) [it is really the centre, strategically important], “Mitteleuropa,”
“ZWISCHENEUROPA”, “the Lands Between,” “Intermareum” - after 1945 “Socialist”
Europe
Geography: Carpathian Basin and the Balkan Mountains (linked by the Danube)
separated the West from the flat Russian steppe region. But the German-Polish
lowlands present no obstacle or barrier - except for the Vistula and other rivers
Ethnographic/linguistic meeting place of major linguistic groups and religions
Culturally very rich (music, literature, science - A-bomb, film) HISTORY distinguishes it from E and W: smaller nations wedged between the two
largest, influenced by both, repeatedly invaded by both with the intention to annex and
absorb (Germany/Habsburgs and Russia + Ottomans - but re-emerged in modern times.
Common themes: fight for independence and survival; adoption of Christianity (in two
versions), late feudalism to survive until the 19/20th century; “ill fate:” long foreign rule;
passionate national awakening/revival; radical border changes in 1919/21 (and briefly in
1938/44); alien Communism imposed; testing ground of the “command economy” watched by the “third world”; suitable for agriculture, but also considerable industry;
intellectual traditions strong; before 1940 strong Jewish presence, few survived (mainly
in HU); large emigration to the U.S.; fall of the Communist dominoes and victory in the
Cold War.
A permanent war zone or a BRIDGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST?
Failure to know and understand the history and peculiarities of Central Europe
contributed to both world wars, to the birth of Communism and Nazism. (Chamberlain in
September 1938: “a land of which we know nothing…”). But, alas, Stalin knew its
importance.
CE shows a mixture of the two major political traditions in Europe, authoritarian and
pluralistic. In the East social and economic functions were often (but not always)
performed by the state. (But centralization was typical of Russia and France!) Society
and even the Church was expected to be obedient and to serve the common cause, the
greatness of the Monarch and of the State (gosudarstvo), to carry out necessary
changes from above.
In CE (as opposed to E) there was pluralism, representative tradition: Diets, towns and
ethnic groups with their privileges, the nobility had the right to resist the Sovereign
(Poland, Hungary), the Reformation was a democratizing influence.
2. The emergence of Christian East-Central Europe. The rivalry of „the two
Romes,” Byzantium and the Papacy for influence in the eastern border region.
Kievan Rus and the impact of the Great Schism. The “national dynasties” (Piast,
Przemysl, Árpád). The Mongol Invasion. The rise of Poland and Lithuania to
become the largest state of Europe. Muscovy “gathering” Russia and moving
West.
Christianity is one predominant roots of European culture. When the commonly shared
values and ethical rules were enshrined in the constitutions of the age of the
Enlightenment or in the fundamental texts on human rights, these drew upon Europe's
Christian heritage, although they did not directly refer to religion. (Archbishop Erdő in
MN, Dec. 24, 2003)
No people is really “autochtonous,” indigenous, others preceded it. We know a lot about
those who recorded their acts, e.g. the Greeks and Romans. Their chroniclers and
authors give some clues about the territories beyond the confines of the Empire. The
early history of Central and Eastern Europe is known thanks to Arab travelers and
Constantinos Porphyrogenitos.
Scythians, Sarmatians, Greek colonies on the Black Sea.
The Great Migration started c. the 1st century: Goths, Huns (up to 453 AD), Avars (6-7th
cent.) - all were warriors, living on, with and off their horses and other animals. An
energetic chieftain could build empires, which did not survive his death - typical: Attila
the Hun.
The Khazar Empire was more commercial, adopted Judaism.
Slavs (a linguistic, not an ethnic term) moved into the Balkans in the 6-7th c., Western
Slavs occupied the territory east of the Elbe around the 8 th century. (The “Drang nach
Osten involved also the Slavs.) The result: a great mixture of peoples and languages, all
states were multiethnic.
In the 9th cent. the Byzantine Empire converted the Bulgarians and sent out Cyrill and
Methodius to the short-lived Great Moravia (and probably also beyond the Carpathians),
while the Frankish kingdom tried to spread eastward.
Legend of three brothers, Lech, Czech and Rus. But Piast, Rurik, and Árpád (and
Przemysl) are real founders of their respective dynasties and kingdoms. All four
countries adopted Christianity and created a state at the turn of the 1 st millennium.
Mieszko (d. 992) - son Boleslav Chrobry (992-1025) the first Polish king, St. Stephen
(1000-1038) both received their crown from the Pope (to help resisting the Emperor),
and the descendants of Premysl (and Wenceslas/Vaclav) also created a “national”
dynasty, and their countries followed Rome after the Great Schism.
Kievan Rus
Origins hotly debated: the Norman controversy. Scandinavia was further away from
civilization, coins, literature and law appeared later than in Russia, but the presence of
Norsemen (Vikings) in Rus is certain, its first rulers and retinue were from Scandinavia,
a kind of ruling caste (like Bulgars, Hungarians, or the Norman Conquest in England)
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Oleg of Novgorod (late 9th cent.) led a successful campaign against Constantinople, the
town despised, admired and envied by all Nomadic people, advantageous treaty in 911.
Igor, Olga (945-962) became a saint, but cruel, Sviatoslav defeated the Bulgars and
wanted to move his capital there, killed by the Petchenegs. Rudimentary government.
Besides agriculture, based on the fertile earth, trade, bee (honey).
Saint Vladimir (980-1015) married Anne, the sister of the Emperor Basil, baptised in
988. (Islam no good for “drink is the joy of the Russian,” Judaism has no state, but
Byzantine liturgy was found appealing). Its impact: penetrated and changed Kievan
society, strengthened authority, boosted the national language - but separated Russia
from the West, led to lasting suspicions about it (“orthodoxy” = the correct religion),
lasting enmity with the Poles. After struggles Iaroslav “the Wise” (1019-1054) - heyday
of Kiev: from the Baltic to the Black Sea, dynastic links (6 with HU, 5 Bohemia, 15 PL,
11 GER); Metropolitan Hilarion, legal code. Old Slavic (based on eastern South Slavic)
Decline: primogeniture not established, many sons (udel or appanage system), constant
wars (internal and barbarians) - rapid succession of rulers: 17 in 30 years as opposed to
14 in 250 years
Rise of towns - Novgorod (veche), sacking of Kiev in 1169, Vladimir-Suzdal and Galicia,
sacking of Constantinople in 1204.
Poland until 1385 [N. Davis]
Had no natural, easily defensible borders (p. 23.) - its location and size showed great
variations, but a vast region comes under the term ‘Poland’ (p. 33.)
Polanie = the people of the open fields gradually came to denote the whole population
of the kingdom, but the Germans built towns (Magdeburg law), the Teutonic Knights
ruled in the North, Jews moved in (charter in 1265).
Gniezno the first See, but Christianity came from Moravia, and its vocabulary was Slavic
rather than Latin or German.
Period of Fragmentation (mid 12th to l320, Wladyslav I Lokietek) - many princes and
dynastic links with the neighbours. Mongol invasion in 1241 and 1259. Mongol invasion
in 1241 and 1259.
Kazimierz the Great (1333-1370) won Red Ruthenia and Podolia, codified Polish law
(1347), built castles, introduced a silver currency, established the Acadamy of Cracow
and organized a “summit” of kings (1364), built the Wawel and St. Mary’s Church in
Cracow
Bohemia, the Czech lands
Ephemeral Great Moravian Empire in the mid-9th cent (Moimir- Ratislav), work of Cyril
and Methodius. Svatopluk - with German help - took over and ousted the Slavonic
liturgy, replacing it with Latin/German. Pribina of Nitra moved to Lake Balaton region.
St. Wenceslas (Vaclav) c. 920 of the Premyslid dynasty. German vassalage until Ottokar
I (1197-1230) was recognized by Frederic II. His grandson, Ottokar II (1253-78) tried to
become Emperor, but was defeated by Rudolf of Habsburg and Ladislas IV of Hungary
in 1278. His son, Vaslav II acquired the throne of Poland and (almost) of Hungary. With
his son’s death in Poland the dynasty became extinct. John of Luxemburg (1310-46), his
son, Charles also Emperor, founded the University of Prague in 1348.
Hungary
From the Ural into the Carpathian Basin (895), after raids into W Eur. Géza and István
introduced western Christianity (997) and founded a strong state (1000-38) - defeating
rivals and defending it from the Empire. Became one of the most stable states of
Europe, with permanent borders, in a personal union with Croatia since the12th cent.
Laws of St. Stephen and St. Ladislaus. Staving off Byzantine attempts at influence.
1222, the “Golden Bull” gave extensive rights to the nobility, including resisting unlawful
acts of the King. German settlers, receiving privileges.
The Mongol invasion of 1240-41 almost destroyed the country, but under Charles
Robert of Anjou became a prosperous state, producing most of the gold mined in
Europe, also minting the best currency modeled upon the florin of Florence. Under his
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son, Louis the Great, HU reached its largest extension, even without counting the Polish
throne won in 1370. He, too, founded a university at Pécs.
In 1374 at Kassa he gave extensive rights to the Polish nobility (no taxation, but to do
military service and to keep their castles in good shape). The Polish throne passed on to
his 10 year old daughter, Jadwiga. Polish-Hungarian ties remained unique: p.113-4.
Lithuania
Emerged as a pagan power in the 13th cent under Gedymin (Vilna). Ruling caste of
warrior boyars spoke Ruski (Old Byelorussian). Olgerd conquered Volhynia, Kiev and
Smolensk,reaching the Black Sea. Jagiello in 1386 married Jadwiga, the daughter of
Louis of Hungary, converted to Catholicism, and linked Poland and Lithuania in a
personal union. That enabled him to defeat the Teutonic Knights in 1410 at Grünwald.
But half of their state passed under Poland only in 1466.
Witold was running Lithuania and reached the mouth of the Dnieper, then eastern
Podolia, while the Poles western P. = Kamieniec.
Five estates: clergy, nobility, burghers, Jews, peasantry - each governed by special
rules.
Growing economy: Danzig, grain trade, salt, iron. Price revolution - Zloty in 1526.
Jagello’s descendants were not outstanding but founded three dynasties, including the
Hohenzollern. For shorter periods they sat on the Bohemian and the Hungarian throne
respectively, but the lost battle of Mohács ended the Jagiello period in Bohemia and
Hungary. Conflict with Muscovy was already the greatest challenge.
The Rise of Muscovy
First mention in 1147 (walled), destroyed by the Mongols in 1237. Son of Alexander
Nevskii, Daniel, ruled with Mongol approval, rivalry with Tver’s ruler. Ivan Kalita
(moneybag) was commissioned to gather the tribute for the Golden Horde, succeeded in
moving the Metropolitan from Kiev, increasing his prestige. Alexis successful in this
office, also cultivating the Tatars - whose infighting weakened them. Ivan the Meek’s
son, Dimitrij (1359-89) overcame the principle of seniority, fought against Olgerd and the
latter’s protégée, Michael of Tver. The Mongols, seeing his rising strength, decided to
crush him, allied with Jagiello, but before the latter’s arrival they were defeated at
Kulikovo (1380) on the Don. That turned several Russian rulers toward him, though two
years later the Mongols took revenge and sacked Moscow (with a deceitful trick) while
he was in the North.
Basil (Vasilii), 1389-1425 secured peace with Lithuania and with the Golden Horde (with
gifts), his son, Basil II (till 1462) held out against several Mongol attacks - but the Golden
Horde already broke up: Crimean, Kazan, Astrakhan.
Before the fall of Constantinople the Greek clergy united with Rome (Florence, 1439), it
was denounced in Moscow in 1443 - independence asserted.
Ivan III (1462-1505): sped up the “gathering” of Russia: Iaroslav, Rostov, Dmitrrov,
Perm, Viatka, Riazan, culminating in the conquest of Novgorod, abolishing its
government system (1471-1478-1489). Tver annexed in 1485. In 1493 declared himself
gosudar of All Russia, claiming all the inheritance of Kiev. Several appanage princes
defected from Lithuania to him, and he defeated the Lithuanians in two wars (1503).
Renounced all allegiance to the Golden Horde in 1480, allying with the Crimean Tatars
against Casimir IV, success on the Ugra river.
Marriage to Zoe (Sophia) Paleologue, niece of the last Emperor in 1472. Tsar (Caesar),
Autocrat, solemn Byzantine court ceremonies and coronation, adoption of the twoheaded eagle (adding to St. George), also cultivating legends. No league with the Pope.
Causes of the success of Moscow:
Geography: central position, major road and waterways
Economy: trade artery and relative peace - attracted people, even boyars
The Church provided a lot of help.
This success ensured that the despotic pattern prevailed.
Humanism and the Renaissance
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Struck deep roots in Hungary and Poland. Young men studied at the Italian universities
(most at Padua) and soon became high dignitaries at home. With victory over the Turks
at Belgrade (then a Hungarian fortress) in 1456 by John of Hunyad there was a long
respite from the Ottomans, who were also busy fighting Tamerlane.
In Central Europe it was not painting or music but letters where much lasting was born.
Matthias Corvinus (1458-90) built up a strong mercenary army, encouraged trade,
protected the peasants and the burgers, created a new nobility, married an Italian
princess and cultivated the arts (Bibliotheca Corviniana). Latin poetry and writing
(history, philosophy) flourished. Printing was introduced in Buda in 1472, in Cracow in
1473, during the reign of Casimir IV., “the father of Europe.” In Poland Sigismund I took
Bona Sforza as wife, also with many literati. Copernicus proving that the Earth was
moving around the Sun caused an intellectual revolution. Polish Renaissance had its
peak under Sigismund I (1506-48) and his son, Sigismund Augustus (1548-72): the
court was highly intellectual, setting an example for the society.
3. Reformation and Counter-Reformation. The „second serfdom.” Three centuries
of warfare and the absorption of East-Central Europe by four Empires: the
Ottomans, the Habsburgs, Russia, and Prussia
The end of the Middle Ages brought great achievements in the arts in Western Europe.
The Reformation, starting in German Central Europe, spread rapidly. One of its
consequences was that the vernacular, native languages, came to flourish. At the same
time the Balkans and Hungary became involved in a life-and-death struggle with a kind
of Islamic fundamentalism, the onslaught of the Ottoman Empire.
Hussitism, the Czech Brethren, and the Reformation made a strong impact on all three
countries. The German burgers stuck with Lutheranism. The Teutonic Order converted
to Lutheranism and entered the Polish Kingdom as a fief. Much of the Hungarian and
Polish nobility followed Calvinism. By 1572 Calvinists commanded a majority in the
Polish Senate. The Brest Bible of 1563 - Statute of General Toleration promulgated in
Warsaw in 1573, coinciding with a similar edict at Torda by the Transylvanian Diet. But
the courts remained Catholic.
Literature in the native language followed the translations of the Bible. Kochanowski and
Balassi in poetry had great appeal and impact - easily readable even today.
Economy: decline after the discovery of America, shift of wealth from Italy to the Atlantic
coast, growth of industry (textile etc.) in the West, demand for food (grain, meat) met
partly from Central Europe. The nobility started to produce for the market, needed
labour, that led to the creation of great estates (manors) and the so-called second
serfdom (east of the river Elbe). That generated prosperity, particularly in Poland, in the
16th century, but the wars of the next two centuries reduced supply while demand also
diminished. Constant warfare aggravated the decline of trade, of towns and of the
standard of living, which was very marked in Poland-Lithuania in the 18th century.
The partition of Hungary
Realizing the danger presented by the Ottomans King Sigismund of Hungary led an
army of knights against them, only to be routed at Nicopolis on the Danube in 1396.
John Hunyadi took revenge in 1443, liberating Walachia and Serbia, but in the following
year he was prevailed upon to break the peace and his army, led by the young Jagiello
King, was destroyed at Varna. Emboldened, Mohammed I attacked Hungary in 1456,
but now he was defeated at today’s Belgrade, then a Hungarian fortress. Suleiman the
Magnificent (greatest extent of the Empire) defeated Hungary at Mohács (1526) and the
country became partitioned. The NW came under the rule of Habsburg kings, while
Transylvania (and the Partium) became a principality ruled by Hungarian princes (from
the Zápolya, Báthory, Bethlen and Rákóczi families) while paying tribute to the “Sublime
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Porte,” the imperial court (serai). Central Hungary (almost identical with present-day HU
was under the rule of the Ottomans, leading to much devastation and depopulation.
Turkish expeditions held up in and by Hungary: 1529, 1532, 1541, 1543, 1552 (Eger),
1566 (Szigetvár), and the 15 Year War of 1591-1606. The peace signed in Vienna
(1606) guaranteed religious freedom for the Protestants.
Religion and culture
Protestantism (Lutheran, Calvinist and Unitarian versions) spread, using the vernacular.
The role of printing. Impact on thinking and literature. Bohemia, Hungary and even much
of Poland followed the Reformation, but after the Council of Trent the CounterReformation took the offensive, esp. under Ferdinand II (1619-37), using coercion and
patronage. Cuis regio eius religio. In contrast, religious tolerance was enacted in
Transylvania in 1572, while the Turks did not bother about religious conflicts among the
“infidels.”
Creation of the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church at Brest (1596), followed in Hungary in
1646 (Ungvár) and by the Romanian church hierarchy in Transylvania at the end of the
17th century - resulting in the birth of the “Latin school” and the fiction of “DacoRomanian continuity.”
Even during these war years learning spread in all Central European territories not
under Turkish rule.
Economy and devastations
In the first half of the 16th cent. Western European industrial and commercial
development generated a growing demand for food, leading to a continent-wide division
of labour. The agricultural boom contributed to the “second serfdom” and the growth of
manors, large estates - as discussed in connection with Poland - but constant warfare
against the Turks (and also the between the Catholic Habsburg party and the
Hungarian/Transylvanian Protestants) destroyed the crops, the villages and reduced the
population. Tens of thousands were marched on foot to the slave markets of Istanbul,
the central and southern part of the Hungarian Plain became a depopulated wasteland.
In the Balkans, which became an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, the population
was heavily taxed but left in peace, or often enlisted in the army.
Religious wars, liberation from the Turks and reconstruction (17-18th cent.)
The Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) started in Prague with the “defenestration” of two
Habsburg plenipotentiaries, but the battle at the nearby White Mountain (1620), a defeat
for the Bohemian (Czech and German!) Protestants, led to Austrian ascendancy over
the country. Transylvania under Gábor Bethlen and György Rákóczi flourished and was
an important ally of the Protestant bloc (including England and Sweden), until the Turks
(using Tatar auxiliaries) crushed it in 1660.
The Ottoman Empire, in decline after 1606, was revitalized by Albanian Grand Viziers,
but in 1683, they failed to take Vienna and were defeated by the Holy League of the
Habsburgs, Venice, the Papal States, Poland and Russia, particularly by Jan Sobieski of
Poland. Buda was taken back in 1686 (destroying the medieval town), and the Treaty of
Karlowatz (1699) meant the liberation of almost whole Hungary. A Military Frontier Zone
was created using Croat, Serb and Hungarian Szekler peasant-soldiers. Several other
wars against the Ottomans ended in 1792 with the Danube separating the Habsburg
and the Ottoman Empires. The Danubian principalities exploited by the Greek
Phanariots.
The Habsburg Empire grew in the 18th cent.: to Hungary (and as a separate principality
Transylvania) was added Naples and Sicily (until 1735), Mantua, Tuscany and Parma,
while having only titular influence over the rest of Germany, where Prussia was on the
ascendancy. In Hungary absolutism and religious persecution led to the rising led by
Francis Rákóczi II (1703-11). The wars of the Spanish (1700-13) and Austrian
Succession (1740-48, 1757-63) needed manpower and food, Hungary was to provide
both, and Maria Theresa successfully placated the Hungarian nobility.
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Slow economic recovery, repopulation by Serbs, Wlachs or Romanians, Slovaks,
Rusyns and mainly Germans (“Donauschwaben”).
The acquisition of Bukovina (1774) from the Turks and Galicia (1772, 1795) from Poland
made Habsburg Austria a multinational empire comprising twelve national groups.
The decline and fall of Poland-Lithuania
Modus vivendi with Prussia (1657), Sweden (1660, Treaty of Oliwa), and Russia (1667,
Andrusovo). Sobieski saved Vienna from the Turks (1683), recovered Podolia, but left
Ukraine with Russia (1686). The Habsburgs revived as a great power, Prussia was
recognized as such in 1701, and in the 18 th cent. Poland became a protectorate of
Russia. Besides the foreign monarchs (Wasa, Saxon) Sobieski’s responsibility, and
inertia, the schlachta, the magnates, the conservative hierarchy of the Church. But
Stanislaw Leszczynski (driven out in 1733) and many reformers, including the last king,
Stanislaw-August Poniatowski, were thwarted by Russia. Catherine wanted to keep the
Republic as an impoverished and feeble client state, the high dignitaries were in her
pay, and in order to stop the rebellious reformers she had to buy the acquiescence of
Prussia and Austria by the first partition in 1773. When on 3 May 1791 a liberal
Constitution was passed the Empress ordered her Polish Hetmans to form the
Confederation of Targowica and in 1793 took Byelorussia and Volhynia, giving Prussia
Danzig and Poznan. Spirited Polish resistance led by Kosciuszko and Poniatowski, until
the last Sejm annulled the Constitution and accepted the second partition. Kosciuszko’s
National Rising was overwhelmed by Suvorov and Poland was finished in 1795.
The collaborationist Poles at critical junctures usually turned out to be Polish patriots Poniatowski, later Czartoryski, Pilsudski, or even Gomulka and Jaruzelski.
II. Towards Independence
4. The impact of the French Revolution and the birth of modern nationalism in the
eastern half of Europe. Risings for independence. Capitalism and social
transformation
Inducements for political change
The three Revolutions (English, American, French) had much to do with the great social
and political transformation in CE in the 19th century.
Marxism was a western product, where economic and social changes led to political
changes - on the whole, with ideas playing an irreplaceable role. The hard-working and
God-fearing English Protestant middle class and the French “third estate” - artisans,
merchants, entrepreneurs - became fed up with religious intolerance, the rule and vices
of noble aristocracy. Locke’s two Treatises on Government, Montesquieu, Rousseau
(Contract sociale) convinced many people of the need and justification of radical political
changes. The American colonies refused “taxation without representation,” and the
uncompromising representatives of the ancien regime radicalized their critics, provoking
the revolutions. In the eastern half Europe technical progress was due almost
exclusively to Western influence and the need to boost income (both for the court and
the elite) and also to modernize the armies. Books and travellers spread the notion of
backwardness, having been left behind, and urged all to be “enlightened,” to catch up
with the more advanced countries. The divine right of kings was shattered by the three
revolutions, self-determination was proclaimed by the American colonies and it proved
to work. The legacy of the French Revolution was more ambiguous, mainly because of
the accompanying terror and opposition to the conquests of Napoleon. Nevertheless the
educated public of Central Europe, primarily Poles and Hungarians, were attracted by
the example of the 13 colonies and their success, but even more were inspired by
“On the Changes in France
Countries still trapped within the snare of servitude
Nations that groan in pain, by iron bonds subdued,
Who have not shaken off the collar of the slave,
The yoke that drags you down into your wretched grave,
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And you, too, sacred kings, who, consecrated, kill
- Since Earth cries out for blood - the subjects of your will,
To Paris turn your eyes!!! Let France elucidate
For king and shackled slave your future and your fate.” (János Batsányi, 1791)
Immediate reactions: Hungary’s Diet demanding the restoration of independence (Law X
of 1790) and the Poles the 3 May 1791 Constitution. Edmund Burke wrote about the
latter: “probably the most pure… public good which has ever been conferred on
mankind.” (Also for being achieved with no blood spilled.) But French conquests
alienated most subdued nations. The Poles (a large number fighting under Napoleon in
the legions - “For Your Freedom and for Ours”) were disappointed with the small and
short-lived Duchy of Warsaw, and the Hungarians turned down his call for revolt.
The Congress of Vienna restored many monarchies but not Poland. With that allowed
permanent friction between the three continental great powers. Alexander I created the
Congress Kingdom with a relatively liberal constitution, but as a dependency. The Holy
Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance tried to freeze Europe and guarantee existing
regimes and borders. (Britain ready for modest changes - in Italy, Greece, Belgium - the
others very rigid.) Economic conditions deteriorated rather than improved after the wars.
The Polish revolt of 1830/31 was disheartening for other discontented people.
Liberty in CE had two meanings: freedom from the oppressive political system, striving
for liberal constitutions, for extending political rights (and the suffrage) and for
representative government - but also for the freedom of the nation, for independence.
Equality in WE meant the abolition of all privileges based on birth and wealth, political
rights to be extended to the “third estate,” to the bourgeoisie, and only later, grudgingly
to the working class. It was true that real equality was not possible between people of
very different means, between the rich and the poor. So the pursuit of equality was
bound to lead to the advocacy of abolishing difference in wealth and income, i.e. to a
social utopia where property will disappear.
"National Awakening" - challenging the Empires
The independence of all the “historic” Central European nations remained only a faint
hope but was not forgotten. Popular sovereignty called for emancipation, for
enfranchisement; for cultivating the language, culture and traditions. In the wake of the
French revolution territorial nationalism gave way to linguistic nationalism. Its
concomitant was that it is not dynastic-political arrangements (and not existing borders)
that determine a "nation." French model: a state to become a nation, identifying
citizenship with nationality. German: (Kulturnation) cultural unity to lead to political unity.
Overlapping claims to national territory - were solved in 1815 by disregarding the
principle of nationality. Nevertheless that proved to be the third dominant idea of the 19th
century.
Primary loyalty to the nation, which embraces all who speak the same language and
share the same traditions and history. The aim was liberating the nation, to enable it to
realize its aims as master of its own fate.
In C&EE this idea challenged the reigning Empires. Two periods: linguistic-cultural,
political. “Pan” movements, Pan-Slavism, “irredentism” (Italy)
It had/has a Janus-face: liberation of the people and oppression, even “cleansing” of the
rivals. Tolerance is rare once one has achieved the aim.
Polish Risings - “Christ Among the Nations”
At least once in every generation - 1768, 1794, 1830, 1848, 1863, 1905, 1919, 1944
In 1846 a rising in Cracow led to massacres by the peasants abetted by the Austrian
officials - (repeated in 1848/49 in Transylvania).
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After suppressing the 1863 rising (prompted by the emancipation of the serfs) 80,000
were deported to Siberia. After 1905 “organic work” - and divisions, e.g. Dmowski Pilsudski - each to work under the conditions given in their respective countries.
Different treatment of nationalities in Russia: unrecognized Ukrainians, religious and
cultural tolerance towards Baltic Germans, autonomy for the Finns.
Industry and capitalism
Britain took the lead in industrialization (coal and iron, machinery) in the 18th century but
the Belgium - Ruhr - Silesia axis, and the Paris-Marseilles - Northern Italy axis, later
Bohemia - Vienna axis followed, after the 1850s spreading to Hungary and the Poland,
reaching northern Russia. Europe became split now along economic lines, not only
geographically but also within one country into advanced and backward regions. The
availability of raw materials counted a lot, but they needed arteries - the rapid
development of railways brought development and prosperity. Need for capital. An
eastward-moving frontier. of modernization.
Improving health-care led also to a population explosion (150 m to 450 in the century)but also to terrible poverty in the slums and often in the countryside. The growing social
and economic cleavages led to movements for eliminating the problems created by
industrial capitalism: Christian Socialism, trade unionism, utopian socialism and
Marxism. At first they appeared in the advanced West, but on the long run the poorer
countries proved more receptive, esp. to the more radical, revolutionary versions.
Socialist movements in Russia
In an autocratic system conspiracies, underground organizations, anarchistic-terroristic
movements and radicalism in general was bound to prevail. Sons of the small educated
middle class, rather than masses of workers. 1825 Decembrists: young officers
influenced by French and Polish enlightened thought - “Konstantin - Konstitutia”
Herzen and Chernyshevsky - narodnichestvo movement (1860s and ‘70s) “going to the
people” - who failed to react, so they turned to violence and assassination (Alexander II
in 1881) Lenin accepted that for lack of mass support a revolutionary elite should take
the initiative and seize power. His faction did not really command a majority in the SDP.
Anarchism (Bakunin, Kropotkin) and its opposite, Tolstoyan non-violence.
Jewish movements (about 9 million in Europe in 1900) also originated and were
strongest in EE, particularly in Russia and Poland. In most European countries
emancipation and assimilation became the rule in the 19 th century, while in Russia,
where they had to live inside the Pale, pogroms occurred in 1881, 1903-06, and 191721. Hebrew Revival, Yiddish Revival, political Zionism is older than Herzl, whose Der
Judenstaat was most influential. Strongest in Congress Poland (they were not
assimilated like in A-H or Germany). Socialist wing: the Bund, radical socialist Jews
renounced their Jewish heritage. Causes of anti-Semitism: their drive, talents,
education, contacts. Most of them, however, remained poor. The better-off looked down
upon the poorer Ostjuden.
5. The First World War: its causes and consequences. The victory of the
Bolsheviks in Russia and their attempt at world revolution. The Paris Peace
Conference and the peace treaties create “a New Europe”
The multinational Austro-Hungarian Monarchy [no longer called an Empire]
Following the defeat of the Austrian arms in the Italian War (1859) and local risings,
Lombardia, Modena and Tuscany were lost, to unite with Piedmont-Sardinia and
Naples-Sicily in the Kingdom of Italy (1861). Bismarck’s Prussia defeated Austria and
ousted it from Germany in 1866. That led to a reconciliation or Ausgleich (settlement)
between the dynasty and the Hungarians led by Deák and Andrássy, Franz Josef was
crowned King in 1867. The Dual Monarchy was composed of two independent states
9
(with separate parliaments and governments) joined in the person of the common
sovereign, but with a common army, common foreign policy (and ministry), a joint
customs territory and a common currency - in short a kind of forerunner of the European
Union. “Cisleithania” was composed of 17 provinces, each with its own Diet, but with a
central government and the imperial Reichsrat. Hungary tried to placate the nonHungarians with a liberal Law on Nationalities (1868), but falling short of granting
territorial autonomy and recognizing the minorities as separate nations, as they
demanded. Croatia was however recognized as an autonomous kingdom, maintaining
its sabor, in the Nagodba (settlement) of 1868. Fiume (Rijeka) was a corpus separatum
of the Hungarian Crown. The influx of capital, the building of railways, industrialization
and urbanization made for rapid economic growth, Budapest became “the pearl of the
Danube,” but only the Germans and the Jews assimilated into the Hungarian nation.
Throughout the Monarchy capitalism created a large working class, ably represented by
Social Democracy, and also a relatively large, economically independent middle class
among the national minorities, too, led by intellectuals who tried to mobilize the peasants
and the workers through clubs, banks and parties. Far from being “the jailhouse of
nations” in the Austrian half the Poles, Czechs, Italians, Slovenes and even the
Ukrainians attained increasing influence over their own affairs. It was only developments
in the Balkans and foreign affairs in general which led eventually to the break-up of the
Monarchy.
The “eastern question” and the transformation of the Balkans
From the 1830s on “the sick man of Europe,” the Ottoman Empire, tried to modernize
itself, even introducing local government in the vilajets, while granting autonomy to the
Romanian and Serb principalities. That only helped cultural nationalism, while Russia
presented itself as the protector of the Slavs and of the Orthodox Christians.
Walachia and Moldavia elected a common prince and united in 1858, assuming the
name Romania in 1862.
National risings broke out in 1875 in Herzegovina, then in Bosnia and Bulgaria, all
brutally crushed. Serbia declared war on the Empire, was defeated, prompting the Tsar
to intervene in 1877, joined by Romania. The Treaty of San Stefano created a large
Bulgarian (including Macedonia), but the Congress of Berlin reduced it, while making
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro independent and placing Bosnia-Herzegovina under
Austro-Hungarian occupation.
In 1885 Bulgaria united with East Rumelia, prompting Serbia to attack the young state only to be defeated. The message was that the small Balkan states can only quarrel and
need the restraining influence of the Great Powers. When the restrain was gone conflict
was bound to break out.
The Balkan territories still under Ottoman rule, esp. Macedonia, were an ethnic mixture
of Bulgars, Serbs, Greeks, Albanians, Vlachs and Slavs -often not sure what nationality
they belonged to. Rival bands tried to create an ethnic tabula rasa by “ethnic cleansing.”
Causes of the Great War: age-old Franco-German hostility, new Anglo-German and
other imperial rivalry, unsatisfied nationalisms in the empires, particularly irredentist
schemes against A-H and Serbia’s support by Russia after 1908, deterioration of
German-Russian relations. Nationalism captured the dynasties, the aristocracies, the
diplomats and the masses.
The “eastern question” was about Turkey and the Balkans, but German-Russian
relations were crucial for the peace of Europe. When Bismarck’s successors abandoned
the policy of keeping Russia a friend (at any price) they brought about the FrancoRussian alliance and the danger of a war on two fronts. Germany often appealed to
conservative solidarity, but national sentiment, imperial ambitions grew in Russia, too.
Following the war against Japan the Balkan offered some consolation. With the 1907
entente with Britain Europe was on a collision course, and neither side felt it could afford
losing any client and thus to upset the balance. With Germany no longer ready to
appease Russia the unholy alliance to keep Poland prostrate ceased. But Russia was
totally unaware how fragile its hold on the non-Russians was, how much Poles, Finns,
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Baltic people hoped for an international crisis that would overthrow the status quo.
Capitalism made them better educated and better off, nationalism made them more
united (the workers and peasants, too, endorsed the national aims) and all thought that
national liberation would give them a better life. But in Russia even the defeat in 1905
and the subsequent revolution did not bring national liberation for the subject people any
closer: there was not outside support, on the contrary. The world war, however, offered
a chance to change the whole European order, created in 1815 and modified in 1871.
The collapse of the Empires
Since 1907 the western allies of Russia were increasingly critical of the internal
conditions of the Habsburg Monarchy (the alleged mistreatment of its Slavic
nationalities), now the ally of the German enemy was said to be oppressive and soon
the centuries-old tradition of insisting on the existence of a Central European great
power was gradually abandoned in favour of breaking it up along national (ethnic) lines.
(Nevertheless a separate peace with the Monarchy was sought until the spring of 1918.)
The U.S. (entering the war in 1917 as a retaliation for the German submarine warfare),
proposed autonomies for the peoples of A-H in Wilson’s 14 points.
War enthusiasm gave way to war weariness, first in Russia, leading to a revolution in
February 1917. The Germans allowed Lenin to return from his exile in Switzerland to
make a social revolution in Russia. Following the successful coup in St. Petersburg
(October Revolution creating councils, soviets) the Bolsheviks promised selfdetermination for all the peoples of the Empire. Finland, the Baltic peoples and Ukraine
proclaimed their independence. That was recognized in the peace signed in BrestLitovsk between the Central Powers and Soviet Russia in March, 1918.
Fearing a German victory, in the spring of 1918 a policy of subverting Austria-Hungary
was launched, in the name of the principle of self-determination, to liberate the Slav and
other nationalities from “oppression.” The Allies recognized the still non-existing
Czechoslovakia in the summer. (Yugoslavia’s recognition was blocked by Italy.)
Following the collapse of Bulgaria in September and of Turkey in October, A-H, too,
asked for an armistice on October 3, based on Wilson’s 14 Points, but the Allies granted
it only on condition of recognizing the independence of Cz-Sl and YU.
October 25-31: peaceful national revolutions in Prague, Zagreb, Vienna and Budapest.
Revolution ensued in Germany (3 November), the armistice was signed at Compiegne
on 11 November.
Tackling Bolshevism
The Bolsheviks (Communists) thought that a socialist revolution was bound to be
victorious all over the world, states would be abolished to give way to a world-wide
alliance of governments by councils (Soviets). The antidote appeared to be nationalism
(the fruits of victory among the Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, South Slavs), while the
vanquished Germans and Hungarians shifted towards leftist radicalism.
In Hungary Count Károlyi's radical, pro-Entente government did not resist the military
occupation of large parts of the old kingdom by the neighbours, with Allied support. This
fait accompli meant that the new states gained control of the territories they claimed well before the peace conference. („Possession is 9/10 of the law.”) These gains made
those countries immune to Bolshevik propaganda. When on March 20 a note by the
victorious allies demanded the evacuation of further territories in the East Károlyi
handed over the government to the Socialists, who merged with the Bolsheviks and set
up a Soviet Republic. Its exalted aims were marred by the “Red Terror” and many other
blunders. Prompted by Paris it was attacked by Czechoslovakia and Romania, after
initial military successes it was crushed and Budapest was occupied by the Romanian
army. Following a “white” counter-revolution and its serious excesses Admiral Horthy
was elected Regent in March 1920.
11
The westward march of the Red Army was stopped in August in Poland (“the miracle on
the Vistula”) and the Soviets recognized the independence of the three Baltic republics
and Poland (1921).
The Paris Peace Conference creates “a new Europe”
In treaties imposed rather than negotiated Germany (Versailles, June 28, 1919) and
Bulgaria (Neuilly in November) suffered minor territorial losses, while Austria (at Saint
German in Sep.) became a small German state denied the right to join Germany. Based
on ethnic, historical, economic and strategic arguments Hungary (June 4, 1920 at
Trianon) was reduced to a quarter of its former territory and a third of its population,
transferring 3.5 million protesting Hungarians (as well as 88 % of forests, 83 % of iron,
100 % of salt, 74 % of roads and 62 % of railways) to the neighbouring states.
Turkey lost 80 % of its pre-war territory (Arabia as well as Istanbul and the coast of Asia
Minor) in the Treaty of Sevres (1920), but Kemal pasha (“Atatürk”) organized successful
resistance and secured all predominantly Turkish territories in the Treaty of Lausanne
(July, 1923).
The treaties stated that sole responsibility for the war rested with the losers, who were
also to pay war reparations.
Since the ethnic principle was not followed in many cases (Dobruja, Macedonia,
Southern Slovakia, Vojvodina, Transylvania, Silesia, the western rim of Czechoslovakia,
Eastern Poland) special treaties were signed for the protection of the 30 million people
who became national minorities as a result of the new borders. The newly created
League of Nations was to guarantee all the provisions of the new European order.
The defeated countries were convinced that they were victims of grave injustice; the
result was the perpetuation of the division of Europe into hostile groups. The
arrangements combined what was probably necessary and inevitable with unnecessary
humiliation.
6.
The triumph of economic and political nationalism. The “Little Entente” and
the “cordon sanitaire.” The impact of the Great Depression: the rise of
authoritarianism
High hopes: no more wars, just (ethnic) borders, effective League of Nations, social
justice including land reform (by democratic or dictatorial methods), democratic
constitutions, end of (foreign) exploitation, minority rights. None of those materialized „There is not one of the peoples or provinces that constituted the Empire of the
Habsburgs to whom gaining their independence has not brought the tortures which
ancient poets and theologians had reserved for the dammed." Winston Churchill, The
Gathering Storm (London, 1948), 14.
Common features: new countries made up of territories with different languages,
traditions, laws, currencies, railway gauges. Efforts to create “nation-states” by
assimilation and coercion, also by re-making the past and creating new myths. Reality:
out of 109 m population (in 14 states) 30 m national minorities.[See table and maps]
Discrimination against the minorities (expulsions, closing their institutions, restricting the
use of their language) esp. in eastern Poland, Dobrudja, Macedonia, Southern Slovakia,
Vojvodina, Transylvania. Efforts to "change the past": destroying monuments, nationalist
education. National statistics distorted.
Economic nationalism destroyed unity: many borders, roads and railways closed, broke
up natural links and units. High protective tariffs, self-sufficiency. Inflation - stabilization
in the mid-1920s with foreign loans. Agricultural societies with high birth-rate and land
hunger.
Nationalist foreign policy against the neighbours, relying on selfish protectors. No
reconciliation, the losers were bent on overthrowing the status quo at any price.
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Fear of Bolshevism (“cordon sanitaire”) and of minorities precluded genuine democracy.
(Bibó on “the misery of the small states of Easter Europe”: “territorial-centric” policies
and thought.) "In each of the new states there prevailed a narrow official nationalism,"
and the repressive policies pursued towards the large national minorities led to internal
and external tensions and conflicts. […] This state of generalized and mutual hostility
provided opportunities for any great power intent on disturbing the peace.” (H. SetonWatson: Making of a New Europe…p. 324.)
Poland
From 26 to 35 million, predominantly agrarian and almost a third non-Polish.
Hostile neighbours.
Weak presidency, many parties, hyperinflation (until 1926), corruption - May 1926 coup
by Marshal Pilsudski, with the help of the Left fearing a nationalist takeover. “Sanacja”
regime - restoring health. But not a formal dictatorship, parties and parliament
continued, trials of radical Left and Right. Role of the unselfish army officers.
Non-aggression pacts with the SU (1932) and Nazi Germany (1934 - after the idea of a
preventive war rebuffed by the West).
1935 constitution quite authoritarian, led largely by colonels, increasingly nationalistic
towards the minorities.
Following Hitler’s march into Prague the British guarantee was rightly seen by Hitler and
Stalin as an empty bluff, and concluded the 1939 Aug. 23 Pact with the secret protocol
dividing the North-East. Despite its weaknesses Poland did not collapse, it was “foully
murdered by two assailants acting in collusion.”
Czechoslovakia
Two “birth defects”: too large with irreconcilable Germans and Hungarians; fiction of
“Czechoslovak” unity, rather than autonomy to the Slovaks (promised in Pittsburgh on
June 30, 1918). That precluded real autonomy to Podkarpatskaja Rus. Both proved
fatal.
Stable constitution (Feb 1920), Masaryk and Benes in team for 17 years led to stable
politics. Strong Social Democrats (Tusar), Agrarians (Svehla) joined by Slovaks led by
Hodza (Republican Party - that party also satisfied many opportunists by obtaining small
favours, “autonomist” Slovaks (Hlinka’s People’s Party), Communists (Smeral), National
Democrats (Kramar), National Socialists (Benes).
Tuka’s claim in 1928 for secession earned him 14 years, the closure of industrial
enterprises in Slovakia cost more to the idea of unity. Overpopulation and
underemployment in Slovakia helped the Communists, too.
In Ruthenia opportunists, Ukrainian and Rusyn parties and Communists.
The rise of the Sudetendeutsche Partei (Henlein, 1935) and the Nazi neighbour.
Petty discrimination in favour of Czechs explains that all others were happy to see the
break-up, in 1945 they were made scapegoats and blamed for 1938/39.
Hungary: "kingdom without a King, led by an Admiral (Horthy) without a fleet." Peasants
and workers had little infulence under Bethlen's conservative system. Communists
banned.
Romania: became three times larger but 30 % non-Romanian. Corruption rampant.
Yugoslavia (or SHS Kingdom): widely different traditions, 1921 Constitution boycotted by
2/5, esp. the Croats. Killing of the Radic brothers (1928) led to royal dictatorship in 1929.
Bulgaria: peasant quasi-dictator Stamboliski overthrown in 1923.
Austria: Anschluss denied. Conflict of "red" Vienna with the Christian Social countryside.
The Baltic States and Finland: less passion, more education and hard work, agrarianmiddle class democracy. Tolerance towards the formerly dominating minorities
(Germans, Swedes, Poles, Russians)
The Finns gave full autonomy to the Aland Islands and extensive rights to the Swedes.
Strongest party the socialist democrats, then the agrarians. Communists banned (1930)
13
In Estonia cultural autonomy for the 10 % minority population. Land reform. The
democratic constitution was replaced in 1933 by a mildly authoritarian under Päts.
The Latvians in 1934 also moved toward a corporate state fair to all groups: PM Ulmanis
dissolved Parliament and was elected President in 1936.
Lithuania was preoccupied with the Vilna question (also its Polish minority) and German
Memel, annexed in 1923. Despite a growing economy army coup in 1926 made
Smetona President.
Crisis and "the Little Dictators" ("politics of backwardness?")
The Depression was more severe than in the U.S. or Western Europe: agricultural
prices fell to 37 % of 1919 level, no markets. 1931: collapse of the European financial
system. Victims: lower and middle classes - who often turned to false gods, to the
extreme Left or Right. Mussolini is the model.
Gömbös in Hungary (1932-36, "95 points"), Dolfuss in Austria (the Heimwehr defeated
the Social Democrats in Feb. 1934, followed by a failed Nazi coup in July, Pilsudski's
"colonels" kept power, Masaryk replaced by the narrow nationalist Benes - against
strong Slovak autonomist movement.
Royal dictators: Alexander in YU assassinated in Marseille in 1934, Zog in Albania since
1928, Czar Boris' dictatorship after 1934/35, Carol of Romania assumed power in 1938
in face of strong Iron Guard movement.
Failed efforts at customs unions and regional cooperation.
Penetration by Nazi Germany
Internal and external causes of Hitler's rise. Failure of the western democracies. Failure
of economic or political collaboration
Agricultural surplus bought up by Germany through "clearing [barter] agreements capturing more than 50 % of their trade. Western economic withdrawal.
Growth of German economic and military power, broken agreements - causes of
Western acquiescence.
Barthou's "Eastern Locarno" plan, Polish idea of pre-emptive strike, Soviet-FrenchCzechoslovak alliance in 1935,
“Appeasement” born out a sense of equity, fear, and love of comfort - the vain hope is to
turn Hitler against the Soviet Union. That meant practically abandoning “the lands
between:”
March, 1938: Anschluss accepted
Bled agreement between Hungary and the Little Entente in Aug. 1938
Munich conference in September 1938 - end of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 –
creation of a Slovak puppet state.
III. The Loss of Independence
7.
The Nazi and Soviet conquest. Between resistance and collaboration. The
attempt to exterminate the Jews. Was Yalta a betrayal?
Conquest of Central Europe by Hitler and Stalin
The rape of Czechoslovakia was an eye-opener, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (23 Aug.
’39) a shock, even without knowledge of the secret protocol
The fourth partition of Poland followed by the Soviet invasion of Finland (Nov. ’39) and
the annexation of the Baltic states (June, ’40). The West stood idle until it was defeated
in 1940. Soviet annexation of Bessarabia (June ’40) and Hitler divides Transylvania
(Aug., ’40).
Tripartite Pact in Sep. 1940, joined by Hungary, Romania, Slovakia (Nov.), Bulgaria
(Feb.) and Yugoslavia (March ’41). Coup in Belgrade, invasion of YU and Greece (to
help Mussolini’s parallel war). By June 1941 Central Europe (indeed whole continental
Europe) was divided between Hitler and Stalin.
Between collaboration and resistance
14
Despite Stalin’s “loyal” collaboration with Germany Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on
June 22, 1941. That life-and-death struggle made the fate of the people caught up
between those two totalitarian states even more difficult. Their behaviour was
determined mainly by their geographical position, and by the attitude of those two
dictatorships towards each. Individuals were still responsible for their conduct, some
showed remarkable heroism, others committed terrible crimes, but most wanted simply
to survive. It is wrong to categorize whole nations as “guilty” or “right,” nevertheless
some became victors, others were branded as satellites of Germany.
Austria’s enthusiasm at the Anschluss was forgotten and forgiven;
Czechoslovakia: passive resistance paid, the country (as an ally) was not bombed and
escaped serious damage. Although Slovakia was (until summer, ’44) a loyal puppet
state of Germany, deporting its Jews by 1942, it was treated as a victor.
Poland was a true hero, strong resistance at home (“Underground State”) and the 4th
largest Allied armed force abroad: 6 million dead, half of them Jews. Tragic betrayal:
Warsaw Uprising, Aug. -Oct. ’44.
Hungary: PM Teleki’s suicide in April ’41 did not prevent HU becoming “the unwilling
satellite” of Germany, but remained a safe place for Jews and escaped POWs. German
invasion in March ’44 (to prevent HU joining the Allies) led to the deportation of most of
the Jewish Hungarians, half a million killed in the gas chambers. Failed attempt at an
armistice (Oct. ’44) was followed by the rule of the pro-Nazi Arrow Cross rabble, and a
devastating war fought over the country until April ’45.
Romania repudiated the British territorial guarantee in June, ’40, lost Bessarabia (to SU)
and Northern Transylvania (to HU), Marshal Antonescu became the dictatorial leader
and the favourite of Hitler. Participated in the war against the SU with large forces,
brutally murdered 3-400 000 Jews, but on Aug. 23, ’44 young King Michael arrested
Antonescu and changed sides, thus recapturing Transylvania.
Bulgaria was allied to Germany, controlled Macedonia during the war. Did not join the
war against the SU, still occupied by the Red Army in Sep. ’44, and communized in a
few months.
Yugoslavia: following the coup of March 25, ’41 Hitler attacked and defeated it, Croatia
declared its independence and became a Nazi puppet state (Ustashi). Communist and
patriotic resistance fought each other and the Germans, but there was also a
collaborationist regime in Serbia led by Gen. Nedic , which committing great crimes. The
Allies eventually endorsed Tito, “since he killed more Germans.” Mutual massacres went
on until May, ’45.
Albania was annexed by Italy in April, ’39, but after the fall of YU was allowed to
administer Kosovo. Communist partisans took over in Nov. ’44.
Greece threw back the attack of Italy (Oct. ’40), but crushed by Germany, strong
resistance, partly communist.
Until 1943 the idea of federation was very popular in the whole region, but Stalin
opposed it, so Benes (head of Czech government-in- exile) dropped it and made a
special deal with Stalin to expel all the Germans and Hungarians after the war.
Stalin at war
His blunders in 1941. Helped by Hitler’s blunders and saved by Marshal Zhukov and his
western allies. Revived patriotism and Czarist expansionist aims. Stalingrad.
The Tehran Conference and FD Roosevelt enabled him to conquer Central Europe, but
his country was in ruins.
8. Revolutions or Communist takeovers? Internal and external forces in the postwar transformation
Despite the high-sounding phrases of the Atlantic Charter and the Yalta Declaration,
embodied in the Charter of the UN, by 1948 all Central Europe was run by Communists
15
imposed on the countries by the Red Army and various Soviet agents by brutal and
unlawful methods. Since compared to the West Central and Eastern Europe certainly
looked backward, and was characterized by grave social problems, some observers
thought that there was indeed need for a kind of revolution in the eastern part of Europe,
which must have facilitated the Communist takeovers.
“Revisionist” American historians have written so much nonsense about the origins of
the Cold War that a brief re-examination of the sad story of the late 1940s is warranted
The international background
This region was important for the Soviet Union (not really for security but for exploitation
and as a bridgehead for spreading Communism), but France was weak and Britain had
little interest in its fate, while the U.S. even less. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1942: "the
region [Central Europe] lies beyond the reach of American power...We should not be
promising these nations a protection we are unable to provide... Does this mean that
Poland and the Danubian and Balkan states have no prospect of independence, and
that they are mercilessly condemned to become satellites of Russia or be absorbed into
the Soviet Union? We cannot today give a categorical answer to this."
That attitude was reflected in the discussions at the war-time conferences about the
future of Europe. F.D. Roosevelt often spoke about the need for “four policemen” to
maintain peace, and he assigned East-Central Europe to the SU.
Stalin had three aims: to maintain the wartime alliance with the U.S. and the U.K. for
economic and political benefits, to create a zone of security made up by countries under
his total control, i.e. communized ones, and, thirdly, to gain a foothold in Western
Europe through communist parties there, which may eventually help a communist
takeover there, too. We don’t know for sure if he considered a military advance on
Western Europe, and as long as the U.S. had a monopoly of atomic weapons, he could
not risk that, but there is much evidence (large tank divisions, military equipment left in
the GDR, training of Hungarian and other Warsaw Pact soldiers for invading neutral
Austria) that he was not preparing for that.
Though the 1944 percentage agreement between Churchill and Stalin was not endorsed
by the U.S., and Churchill meant it only as a temporary arrangement for getting as much
from the SU as was possible, Stalin had definite ideas about three zones (See Ch. Gati):
inner (PL, RO, BLG – essential) -, intermediate (HU, CS, Finland, YU, Austria, Albania,
East Germany – negotiable) -, and outer (Western Europe, esp. W Germany, France
and Italy – dependable).
During the war the U.S. was not willing to make any commitments about post-war
borders, being confident of its decisive position at the end, and FDR thought he could
handle Stalin. At the decisive conference of Teheran (Nov. ’43) he accepted a Soviet
sphere of influence in exchange for a pledge from Stalin to enter the war against Japan
within three months after victory in Europe. At the Yalta conference (February, ’45) there
was no conscious betrayal, only concessions following from Teheran and from the
actual military situation. The “Declaration on Liberated Europe” was a new version of the
Atlantic Charter; the problem was that the SU had no intention to keep it, never lived up
to those high principles.
Despite the many warnings (Soviet conduct in Poland) the new president, Truman,
refused Churchill’s advice to take as much territory in Germany as possible (e.g.
reaching Berlin, taking Prague) and to use that as leverage against the SU. He sent the
pro-Soviet Hopkins to Moscow to ensure further cooperation (against Japan) and had no
objection to the Polish government being composed mainly of Soviet puppets, key
positions given to the communists.
At Potsdam (July, ‘45) an agreement was reached about Poland’s western borders,
peace treaties were to be prepared by the FM-s, and authorization was given to the
expulsion of Germans from PL, CS and HU. “Uncle Joe” had been made really very
popular by the American media, people wanted “One World” (Republican presidential
candidate Willkie) with a friendly SU.
The appeal of communism
16
In the West many intellectuals liked this utopia, some became life-long supporters, even
spies (the Cambridge group of Philby, Maclean etc.)
In CE the need for radical social changes was obvious, Social Democrats and CentreLeft parties thought that their time had come, but few wished for a Soviet-type shortcut
for “catching up with the West.” The few “home communists” were joined by the
“Muscovites” (those who survived Stalin’s purges) – broken and servile agents of Soviet
rule. Small-fry pro-Nazis and other opportunists were welcome to swell the ranks of the
communist parties. (Those could be blackmailed, too.)
But the bravest patriots, resisting the Nazis, suffered enormous losses (esp. in Poland),
the destructions of the war decimated the middle class, many fled from the Red Army,
the Jews were murdered in the gas-chambers, society was atomized and broken – all
that helped the communists.
The conduct of the Red Army (large-scale robbery, mass rape of women) did not make
the Soviets more popular, but they could arrest anyone, and in the defeated countries
sovereignty rested with the Soviet heads of the Allied Control Commission.
On the other hand Soviet policy helped the Poles and Czechs to realize some old
territorial and national dreams.
Many surviving Jews had illusions about the SU, believing that communism was a
guarantee against anti-Semitism.
Three stages of the takeover (first described by Hugh Seton-Watson)
Genuine (broad) coalition: communists, social democrats and non-compromised
“bourgeois” and agrarian parties uniting in common aims (reconstruction, punishment of
pro-Nazis, land reform, some social reform (land redistribution, partial nationalization),
friendly ties with all the allies. Free elections – if held.
Bogus (narrow) coalition: govt dominated by communists, other parties purged and led
by “fellow-travellers” or secret communists planted. Street violence and police used
against the opposition. Elections postponed and the rigged.
From 1948 by the creation of “national fronts,” merging the Communist Party and the
(purged) Social Dem-s, suppressing of the opposition (trials or exile) a monolithic regime
was established.
Western indifference and Soviet determination, plus a few convinced local communists
and many opportunists led to the communist takeovers and to monolithic Stalinist rule.
Now let’s see three case studies.
Yugoslavia went through terrible times during the war, less due to German brutality than
to internecine conflicts between the various national and political groups (11 %
perished). The Croat ustashi and the Serb chetniks discredited and defeated, Tito was
not only in full control (having killed tens of thousands of his captives and also innocent
civilians), enjoying wide international support, but also promised an end to national
antagonisms. In backward societies communism also had genuine appeal. Elections on
Nov. 11, ’45: 88-90 % for the communist People’s Front - not only due to intimidation.
Execution of Mihajlovic and imprisonment of Cardinal Stepinac - one Serb, another
Croat. The constitution adopted on Jan. 31, ’46 was a federal one, curtailing excessive
Serbian ambitions. More radical internal measures than in the SU and in the
neighbouring states.
For Romania the acquisition of Transylvania was more important than independence
from Soviet control. Following excesses against the Hungarians the Soviets placed
Northern Transylvania under their military govt, employing leftists from both nations, but
in March, ’45 gave back control to Bucharest, provided the King appointed the “fellow
traveller” Groza Prime Minister. The latter, to impress the peacemakers, showed
tolerance towards the Hungarians and allowed their university to continue. Under
western pressure the government was widened in Feb, ’46, but by the November
(rigged) elections the communist-led National Democratic Front was master of the
country. After the Paris peace conference confirmed the return of the whole of
Transylvania (1947), many Hungarians and the non-communist Romanian politicians
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(Maniu) were arrested and imprisoned, King Michael was forced to abdicate and leave
the country (Dec. ’47). The April ’48 Constitution (confirmed by managed elections) was
already a Soviet-type. The purge and execution of “home” communists completed the
story.
In Hungary free elections were held in Nov. ’45, where the Communist Party (swelled by
small-fry Nazis) achieved a disappointing 17 %, and the centrist Smallholders had 57 %.
The Allied Control Commission led by Marshal Voroshilov, however, did not permit the
victor to form a government alone, the (genuine) coalition had to include the CP, giving
them the crucial portfolio of the Interior. Using economic blackmail (reparations), also
holding out the hope of some territorial concessions, and finally by arbitrary arrests and
a show trial, the “salami tactics” was applied in reducing and finally eliminating the
“bourgeois” politicians. New (openly falsified) elections in August ’47 still failed to
produce more than 22 % for the CP, but the bogus coalition soon gave way, the
SocDem-s “merged” with the CP and the Aug. ’49 Constitution introduced the “people’s
democracy.” It is unlikely that any other course by the non-communists would have led
to different results, but the example of Finland (having avoided communism) continues
to haunt the imagination.
Was the communist takeover inevitable? Could the U.S. prevent it? Can the noncommunist politicians be blamed for that?
9. Stalinism and “national communism.” The “command economy.” Attempts at
change: 1956
Stalinism (1948-56, Hell on earth)
The years 1948-53/55 represent a nightmare, no horror film can match the sufferings of
300 million people. “Asiatic despotism,” Hitler-type extermination camps (though less
efficient), slave labour (“Gulag archipelago”), cold doctrinaires dedicated to the utopia
but believing that the end justifies any means, sadistic and coward brutes torturing
innocents - Dante’s hell on earth.
“People’s democracy” - a redundant phrase and a lie - reign of terror even against
communists. “Personality cult,” “infractions of socialist legality” were euphemisms hiding
the terrible reality. Today many features of Stalinism look ridiculous but it claimed
millions of lives and terrible sufferings.
Direct rule by SU or Stalin’s local agents, close imitation of SU (constitution, national
symbols, art etc), Soviet methods and practise followed even when local conditions
made them unsuitable. Orwell’s 1984 reveals the true nature of the system.
Conformity through the Cominform
9 parties in Sep. ’47 at Szklarska Poreba (Poland) urged all to show more strength, to
speed up monopolizing power, to fall in line, follow Soviet orders, even when insane.
Tito was the most radical, but in less than a year he was denounced for his
independence and excommunicated by the same organization.
Political life: having eliminated the “bourgeois” opponents “the class struggle became
more accentuated,” affecting the whole population. (“Whoever is not with us is against
us!”) Borders became closed and countries isolated, foreign contacts not permitted.
Then the “Muscovites” purged the “home communists,” in show trials based on trumped
up charges, using ordinary torture and special methods. In Poland
Gomulka was lucky, he was only imprisoned in 1951 for “rightist and nationalist
deviations”, but in Czechoslovakia Clementis and later Slánsky+13 were executed in
1952 as “Trotskyite-Zionist-Titoist-bourgeois-nationalist traitors, spies, and saboteurs,
enemies of the Czechoslovak nation, of its People’s Democratic order, and of
Socialism.” (The trials continued into 1954.) Similar trials - mainly in and after 1949 –
were held in all the captive nations.
Gulag-type of camps, often with 50 per cent mortality. Secret police, host of spies, often
through blackmail.
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Political establishment: the single party controls the government (Politburo). Abolition of
the division of powers, the judiciary totally subservient, acting only as a prosecutor.
The “command economies” closely following the Soviet model: nationalization down to
small shops; 5-year plans for reconstruction and development (fixed but unachievable
targets); central planning, emphasis on heavy industry and metallurgy; high rate of
investment leading to pauperization and neglecting maintenance or safety; compulsory
employment resulting in waste of manpower; extensive growth; rapid urbanization.
Artificial price structure.
Typical faults: lack of feasibility, low quality, low productivity, obsolete technology, lack of
competitiveness, large bureaucracy, shortage. Comecon (1949) bound each country to
the SU.
The collectivization of agriculture led to drop in production, even famine. Campaign
against the better farmers (“kulaks”). Compulsory delivery quotas. Prices and
investments artificially low to pay for industrialization. Control over the countryside.
Society in change (social engineering on grand scale - experimenting with people)
Having eliminated the upper and the middle classes the workers and peasants were
declared “the ruling class,” but they bore the burden of enforced industrialization without
the protection given by trade unions or the courts. (Wajda: Man of Marble)
Women compelled to take up employment, to the detriment of the family.
Clubs and organizations banned - “Gleichschaltung”
Churches persecuted, deprived of assets and social functions, brought under control.
Some benefits (at a very high price): better social mobility, expanded education, cheap
food (if available), collective recreational facilities, cheap entertainment often with a high
quality. An egalitarian society (equality in misery) - with the affluent new class (party
apparatchiki) hidden.
Intellectuals: purged and intimidated but essential for propagating the Marxist-Leninist
ideology, for controlling “the captive mind” (Cz. Milos). “Everyone is a link in the chain”
(Hungarian poet Gy. Illyés)
“Cultural revolution” combined with a cult of all that was Russian.
The first rift in Stalin’s bloc: Tito’s “national communism”
After 1948 most of the executed ones were communists, but millions, from aristocrats
and other “class enemies” to ordinary peasants suffered from dozens of inhuman
decrees. Resistance was practically impossible in a totalitarian system, and any change
could come only from within the system.
Stalin evolved into a “great-Russian chauvinist,” and his empire surpassed the wildest
dreams of the Tsars or the Pan-Slavists. Nevertheless many Russians and nonRussians (including western “intellectuals”) genuinely admired him - and some continue
to do so. But Stalin was also a realist, not a wild revolutionary, so he was ready to
betray the German communist to Hitler after the 1939 Pact, and in 1945-47 failed to
support the Greek communists - while expecting a free hand in the zone assigned to him
by his wartime allies.
Tito’s fault was being too sincere a communist, bent on making YU a real communist
state very quickly and spreading the doctrine further. At first he welcomed the Soviet
“advisors,” but refused to accept their bad advice and their haughty manners. When the
Cominform criticized him in a letter in March ’48 he defended himself instead of the
usual self-criticism. That infuriated Stalin who ordered his removal. But Tito’s strong
position at home prevented that, leading to YU’s expulsion from the “socialist camp” and
to efforts to overthrow him from the inside, orchestrating a campaign mainly by the
neighbouring countries. Favourable geographical position of YU and fresh memory of
the successes of the partisans kept Stalin from attacking YU.
Even with opportunistic western support it took time for Tito to abandon his leftist
doctrines and to find an ideology: “workers’ self management” and some sensible
decentralisation. Even after Khruschev exposed Stalin (1956) the YU party congress of
1958 was denounced as “right-wing revisionism.” In reality pluralism was not permitted,
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Tito’s former right-hand-man, M. Djilas was imprisoned for his criticism (“The New
Class”), and political opponents were imprisoned under inhuman conditions.
THE QUEST FOR CHANGE, 1956-1989
Stalinism turned people into bitter opponents of the system - but the brainwashing was
effective enough for many to accept that “socialism is a good thing,” only the practical
realization was faulty. State ownership and the much publicized social benefits were
regarded as “progressive,” worth keeping. People wanted a kind of welfare state, where
they would really have the promised good life.
The first attempts to change, or rather to improve the system took place in the three
"most western" countries (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) - which had the
strongest pluralist, democratic traditions, highest cultural level, best educated
population, - where the legacy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the strongest.
In all three the "intellectuals" (esp. writers, scholars, teachers, and artists) played a
strong political role, but the workers and peasants provided the "masses" - and often the
fighters, also the victims of eventual repression.
The example of "felix" Austria
1955 State Treaty: a ray of hope: Soviet withdrawal, neutrality and a market economy.
Soviet plans for a neutral Germany added to the hope. (But behind that there were
sinister plans: the Warsaw Pact to attack Western Europe through neutral territory.)
1956: "the Little October Revolution" in Hungary
Khruschev's apologies to Tito (until recently the "chained dog of the imperialists") in
May, 1955.
In Febr. 1956 the 20th Congress of the CPSU denounced Stalin.
In July in Poznan, Poland, the workers’ demonstrations were answered by shooting,
Gomulka ("a national communist") was rehabilitated and was nominated leader in
October, thus Soviet intervention was (barely) averted.
Traditional friendship between Poles and Hungarians [causes in history]
Rákosi was an especially brutal dictator in Hungary, replaced in 1953 by the Kremlin,
but got back to power by 1955.
Impact of the 20th Congress - "rehabilitation" of the "purged," i.e. executed Communists
like Rajk, public debates led by disillusioned Marxist intellectuals.
Support for Poland turned into students' demands and a mass demonstration on Oct.
23. Reasons: long-suppressed anger, attractive 16 points, the Party vacillated, then a
provoking speech by the hard-liner Gerõ, AVO (state police) shot at the people at the
Radio, Soviet intervention (requested or arbitrary - we don’t know for sure) against "the
fascist counter-revolutionaries" - but the police and the army tended to side with the
people, and the ill-prepared Soviets were forced to withdraw from the streets.
"Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin": Nagy Govt. adopted pluralism, restored the
1945 coalition, - unforgettable happiness all over the country.
Plans for a mixed economy, neutrality.
World-wide attention (remembered even by many present leaders), and the SU
announced a new policy towards the "people's democracies" on Oct. 30.
But over-cautious western reactions (Eisenhower: "poor fellows, I wish we could help
them. I'll pray for them") and the Anglo-French intervention over Suez doomed Hungary:
her success would have endangered the rest of the satellites; their leaders demanded
intervention. Following Khrushchev's tour of the worrying neighbours, including Tito, who
all urged suppressing HU by military means, a second intervention launched on Nov. 4,
with new, reliable troops.
Brutal repression followed, many thousands killed, later about 300 in judicial murder,
including Nagy and his closest associates, after their treacherous kidnapping upon
leaving the YU Embassy, where they had taken refuge.
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Impact on the world: shock, sympathy, the first war watched on TV, the intellectual left
lost much of its credibility, the first blow on the myth of "the march of communism to
inevitable victory."
The conclusion was: liberation through direct action was impossible and foreign
promises were empty, personal survival was essential until better international
conditions came or until the SU changed. But the SU and its puppet, János Kádár,
concluded that HU required special attention, with timid reforms HU developed into the
most “liberal” communist country - that wouldn't have taken place without 1956!
Questions to be thought about
Could the world/the UN/the U.S. have helped? Were the Hungarians let down, perhaps
even betrayed? Why the term "liberation" and "rollback" proved empty slogans? Did
Eisenhower mean well in declaring that the U.S. did not intend to win new allies or
change the political system in Eastern Europe? The Soviets regarded that as a green
light for intervention. The unwritten division of Europe came to be recognized until 1989.
10. Attempts at change: 1968 and the Polish crises. The growth of diversity in the
Soviet Bloc
Attempt through the Party: Czechoslovakia
The "Prague Spring " did not go beyond planning and discussion, the Soviet intervention
of August 21 stopped it. That shows that what mattered for the SU was not ideology "socialism" was not threatened - only total control by and subservience to the SU. There
was ambivalence in Moscow before the invasion, so the mistake of the West was not
taking seriously the information about a likely invasion and not warning the Soviets of
the possible damage to detente by taking such a step. (Such a warning worked later in
the Polish Solidarity crisis.)
The "Brezhnev Doctrine": "when external and internal forces... try to turn the
development of a given socialist country in the direction of the restoration of the
capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country, this is
no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the
concern of all socialist countries." It meant that any threat to the system was to be
answered by common intervention.
There were no death sentences passed in CZSl, but people were compelled to
denounce the “Prague Spring” and endorse the servile regime of Husak. Economic
stagnation – the country appeared to be “an industrial museum.”
Stagnation under Brezhnev and his successors
Crushing the “Prague Spring” was the victory of the hardliners, but they could not stop
first the relative decline of the SU (compared with western affluence), and later real fall
in performance. Only bureaucracy, cynicism, inefficiency and corruption grew.
From containment to détente
The West recognized Soviet interests from 1941 on, only hoped that it would not mean
total Soviet control. Wanted to continue war-time cooperation and expected the Soviet
system to mellow as a result. After a slow wake-up a test of strength over West-Berlin
and the formation of NATO, but containment was not intended to lead to “rollback”, the
promise of the “liberation” of the captive nations proved to by only a slogan, a myth - as
demonstrated over Hungary in 1956. The erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 showed
mutual acceptance of a divided Europe, and that was dramatically reaffirmed with the
muted reactions to the invasion of CS and to the “Brezhnev Doctrine.”
Détente (starting in 1955) resumed, the “Eurocommunists” regrouped, Brandt started his
Ostpolitik in 1970 and recognized the eastern borders and the DDR.
SALT talks from 1969 on, Nixon in 1970 accepted that EE was sovereign, tried to utilize
the Sino-Soviet split and visited both China and SU in 1972. The rationale behind it was
that contacts would bridge much of the old differences, “peaceful co-existence” would
“loosen up” the Soviet system and the two systems would eventually “converge.” The
Soviets also badly needed western technology. Despite communists protests that in
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ideology there was no coexistence, the desire to enjoy western goods and life corrupted
the communist officials, they adopted a new vocabulary in dealing with western people,
befriended them, preparing the ground for the transition and to be endorsed after.
Conflicts by proxy: Cuba, Arab-Israeli wars, Angola, battle for the “third world.”
CSCE and its impact
B. Kovrig: ”For the SU the German and Berlin agreements were steps toward a
comprehensive E-W agreement on European security that would legitimate its sphere of
influence in EE." SU wanted a multilateral confirmation of the status quo, easier access
to Western markets and technology, and declaring the inviolability of borders (to assure
the permanent division of Germany). The West wanted to preserve the possibility of
peaceful change and political evolution in the Soviet sphere. Peaceful change of borders
was permitted on the insistence of the Fed. Rep. of Germany.
The great achievement was to firmly entrench human rights on the diplomatic agenda,
thereby subverting traditional notions of sovereignty and countering strong Soviet claims
about non-interference. Linking individual rights and freer movement of people and
ideas to international security was pushed not by the US, having "the oldest tradition of
idealism in foreign policy", but France, Italy, and the EC.
Soviet efforts to subordinate “Basket Three” to "the laws and customs of participating
states" - to counter the impact of Soviet (and other) dissidents.
Principle VII invited respect for "human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief", signatories "will promote and
encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic and other rights and
freedoms, all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are
essential for his free and full development," and "confirm the right of the individual to
know and act upon his rights and duties in this field." This reiteration was less significant
than "endevour jointly and separately... to promote universal and effective respect for
them." That went beyond the UN Declaration on Human Rights: external scrutiny of
national practices. The 1975 Final Act does not have binding force, it is full of artfully
vague and often ambiguous formulations. It became an ongoing process: follow up
conferences (Madrid, Geneva, Budapest) on implementation.
CSCE a surrogate peace treaty, "high water mark of the détente era."
Few anticipated the enormous impact Helsinki was to have on the process of E-W
relations - and progress inside the countries. The West conceded nothing, and the
liberal principles gained at the expense of the socialist slogan of collective (social) rights.
Poland’s self-limiting revolution and its aftermath
Gomulka’s reforms and concessions to patriotism (acknowledging the London-led
resistance) had its limits, he preferred the “Natolinites” to the liberals, appalled by the
popularity of Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, suppression of students in 1968 by
Moczar's nationalism.
Baltic coast riots in 1970 brought Gierek to power, but instead of structural reforms he
raised loans to modernize industry and to buy social peace. A depressed world market
did not buy substandard Polish products, compelling him to make the same mistake as
Gomulka in 1970. The food price-hikes in 1976 led to riots again. Now the Committee
for Workers’ Defence (KOR) created an alliance between workers and intellectuals.
Wojtila’s election as Pope and his visit in 1979 galvanized the people. In July ’80 the
new attempt to raise food prices led to the creation of a genuine working class
movement (the dream of Marx), the Solidarity Free Trade Union in the Lenin Shipyard of
Gdansk. 1980-81 was a "self-limiting revolution" by 10 million people, its aim was not to
overthrow the hated regime but to improve their conditions and to guarantee their rights.
Beyond that to create an independent society within "the geopolitical cage." Walesa
proved an excellent leader, balancing between radicalism and compromise. "Dual
power" lasted for one and a half years. The SU was unable to provide economic help,
intervention was considered but with the war in Afghanistan and the need for European
help it was not feasible. The alternative was martial law on Dec. 13, planned and carried
out by General, now PM and party boss Jaruzelski. 10,000 in detention, intimidation,
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clashes - “war on Polish society.” But not on the pattern of HU, CS, or Latin America. His
Army precluded an easy Soviet intervention.
Was it a strange act of patriotism, shown by moderation in repression, not allowing the
old guard to take control?
Repression worked but the economy did not. Real incomes fell by 25 %, queuing and
abject poverty. Western sanctions (prompted by the U.S.led by Reagan) hit the
economy and especially the party cadres. The stalemate was aggravated by the
changes in the SU. Finally a compromise was reached at the roundtable discussions in
1989 leding to semi-free elections in June. (The slogan I remember: "The next elections
will be free!") The overwhelming victory of Solidarity led President Jaruzelski to appoint
Mazowiecki as PM. (See cartoon) Poland’s Odyssey was not yet over but now it was up
to the Poles how to sail and which port to set their aims at.
Versions of Communist Orthodoxy: Romania, Bulgaria, Albania - and the GDR
Despite the 1984 LA Olympic Games Romania was a detestable national communist
dictatorship. It has a most painful history (Byzantine traditions and long Ottoman rule
under Phanariot princes) -it was deliberately manipulated to look more heroic.
Communists under Gheorghiu-Dej banned the Greek Catholic Church, purged the Jews
and Hungarians (often identical), crackdown following 1956, the Soviet troops
withdrawn.
Growing nationalism (at first economical and pro-Chinese), esp. hard on the Hungarians
(closing of their university), perfected by Ceausescu (1965-89) - “socialism in one
family,” the dreaded Securitate involved 15 % of the population. Crazy economic
projects - paying back all debt led to misery. (Bitter joke about the coming year being
“average”: worse than the previous but better than the following.) Ambitious
“independent” foreign policy was tolerated by the SU - why? Nationalization even of
Church records, Bibles turned into toilet paper, village erosion starting in the late 1980s.
Bulgaria felt grateful for Russian liberation in 1877/78. Great disappointment in 1913 in
the 2nd Balkan War - long conflict with Serbia.
Takeover completed by 1947 (Petkov trial), purge of Kostov in 1949. Zivkov a staunch
Muscovite, happily criticizing Tito’s “revisionism.”
Albania most backward, Ottoman rule until 1913, then Italian influence. Hoxa’s changing
orientations: YU, Soviet until 1961, then Chinese until 1978. Total ban on religion, no
cars, many small concrete bunkers.
The GDR tried to show that even Communism could work in good German hands. The
“bogus coalition” survived until the very end. 1949-61 2,5 million people voted with their
feet. After ousting the too rigid Ulbricht the 1974 consitution stated that “the state of
Socialist workers and peasant…. For ever and irrevocably allied to the Soviet Union.”
International recognition following Brandt’s new eastern policy - despite the sordid role
played in Africa (2700 advisers)
Opposition within the Lutheran Church.
Hungary's Road to "the jolliest barrack in the Communist Bloc"
Communism in Hungary remained most unpopular following the brutal reprisals after the
1956 revolution, with hundreds of people sentenced to death or long imprisonment. Both
the Soviet and the Hungarian authorities felt that in order to prevent another outbreak,
concessions had to be given to the people.
Following the repressions (execution of I. Nagy and his fellow-martyrs in 1958) recollectivization of agriculture - but small household plots allowed - became a success.
Following the victory of Khruschev in 1961 at the XXII. Congress of the CPSU) and a
new wave of “de-Stalinization” Kádár gave amnesty in 1963 - a secret deal was made
with the U.S. to remove "the Hungarian Question" from the agenda of the U.N. and then
to release the political prisoners.
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The best way to sweeten the pill of dictatorship appeared to be to satisfy the material
desires: to feed the population better, to give them cheap housing, to allow them a little
freedom in foreign travel and above all to encourage them to cultivate their own
gardens. In a society were practically all private properties were confiscated,
"nationalized", people were allowed to build second homes with a little garden, either for
pleasure or for growing food. It worked admirably. Eventually the villagers, too, whether
remaining in agriculture after the new wave of forced collectivization in the early 1960's,
or working in nearby new industrial centres, were permitted to grow vegetables or keep
animals in the small plots around their house, and by a very industrious and labourintensive activity these people came to produce well over a third of all Hungarian
agricultural exports. Sullenness gave way to activity and Kádár, the puppet leader
imposed by the Soviets, could declare that "Those who are not against us are with us!"
The cautious "liberalization" made people materially better off and “allowed the dog to
bark – on a longer leash" - this was a version of corruption.
A "New Economic Mechanism" was introduced in 1968: elements of the market and
profit as motivation, combined with more rational prices and more responsibility on the
enterprises and their managers.
By then the majority of Hungarians made their peace with Kádár, became opportunistic,
interested only in their private well-being, suppressing the unpleasant memories.
Craving for goods - “rather a car than a baby”
Society in Communism was homogenized, "proletarianized" with both standards and
aspirations kept low. At the same time in Central Europe, and particularly in Hungary,
there developed what some sociologist called "a premature welfare state," i.e. social
benefits were relatively high, the retirement age was low (55 and 60 respectively for
women and men), and there was free medical care - although of a very low quality
unless the doctors and nurses were given extra payment into their pockets. Basic food
and medicine prices as well as rents and transportation costs were kept down artificially.
All that worked as compensation for the low incomes and also for the lack of freedom.
From the 1970's Hungarians came to enjoy modest prosperity, with full employment in
subsidized industries. The economy was dependent on cheap energy imported from the
Soviet Union, and in return supplying an undemanding but safe Soviet market with food
and some industrial products like buses. That is how Hungary already in the 1970's
came to be called "the jolliest barrack in the Socialist camp."
11. From détente to “annus mirablis.” The fall of the communist dominoes
The Road to 1989: 1956, 1968, détente and CSCE (1975), Poland 1976-81, arms race
of the 1970s by the SU (SS 20 medium range missiles – deploying cruise missiles by
NATO), the Strategic Defence Initiative (“star wars”), “Evil Empire” speech.
“ANNUS MIRABLIS” - HOW DID THE DOMINOES FALL?
The “domino theory” was feared on both sides: 1956, 1968 (Brezhnev Doctrine) - and it
did occur in SE Asia after the fall of South Vietnam.
In the mid-1980s "socialism" was in obvious crisis: falling production, rising corruption
and crime, heavy pollution, deteriorating health conditions, decreasing population,
apathy and cynicism, growing bureaucracy, - while the West was overcoming its
internal problems and the electronic revolution started to penetrate the East.
The communist bloc was no longer a colourless, but threatening mass, there were big
differences among the states. “Orthodox,” or rigid: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, GDR – against the “reforming” ones: Poland and HU, and partly SU.
But the “geopolitical cage” was still a formidable, threatening reality.
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Gorbachev (coming from the KGB as the protégée of Andropov) wanted to save the
system by controlled change, to make it more effective, to advance its obsolete
technology and to enable it to continue the arms race (the “star wars”). Hungary was a
testing ground, its feeble attempts at economic reform and its apparently successful
agriculture. Openness (glaznost’) exposed the depth of the crisis, "restructuring"
(perestroyka) tried to reduce the Party and to increase the role of elected central and
local bodies, also to use the people against the reactionary nomenklatura. G. refused to
support the Old Guard in the satellite countries, too, which were in crisis.
“Whodunit?” Success has many fathers: Wojtyla, the Polish Pope, who understood the
evil nature of communism and inspired not only his countrymen, not only Christians, but
a large number of non- Christians, too? Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher with their
uncompromising opposition to Communism? But they got on well with the Soviet
leaders. Gorbachev? He wanted to save, not to overthrow the system. Kohl continuing
Brandt’s “Ostpolitik” and ready to pay for it? Bush in early 1989 deciding to visit Warsaw
and Budapest rather than Moscow?
The most effective weapon of the West was prosperity, its consumer goods (esp. the
car, the most important status symbol), its pop music, its high and low culture. That won
over the citizens of the communist countries, even their leaders became keen on
western contacts, scholarships and visits to the department stores. It became obvious
that the SU will never catch up with the West, let alone bury it, as promised by
Khrushchev in the early sixties. In Poland these ties were frozen following martial law
and the Hungarian leaders did not want a similar fate, so in their economic crisis they
abandoned the plans for arresting the movement for further change. Also the massive
foreign debt owed by HU (and the growing business ties) made the communist leaders
interested in survival through change. The old beliefs were totally gone, the desire to
make profit in order to have ever more private property was on the increase even in the
SU. [A typical joke: "What is socialism? The longest and most painful road from
capitalism to capitalism"]
Milton Friedman, Mrs. Thather, Kohl and especially the King of Spain, his peaceful
transition not hurting the officials of the previous regime, came to inspire the leaders of
the modernizing CEE countries. Reagan's "Evil Empire" language and Thather's rhetoric
appealed to the non-communist "silent majority" and inspired it.
The CSCE follow-up conferences of Madrid, Geneva, Budapest were utilized by the
"dissidents" and, in the wake of Poland, alliances were formed between (Jewish)
intellectuals, conservative patriots, religious groups and discontented workers.
The collapse of the “jolliest barrack” - pushing over the rest
Negotiated compromise in Poland led to semi-free elections in June. The slogan I
remember: "The next elections will be free!" - the overwhelming victory of Solidarity led
Jaruzelski to appoint Mazowiecki. (See cartoon) (In 1990 Dec. Walesa elected
President.)
The replacement of Kádár in May ’88 - “It’s Hungary again” on the front page of the
Economist.
Re-burial of I. Nagy and his fellow-martyrs on June 16, ’89 - attended by the world
media, inspiring the neighbours. Round-table talks in the summer led to radical changes
in the constitution and the adoption of a timetable for the political transformation. PanEuropean Picnic (Aug. 19) prompted tens of thousands from the GDR to come to
Hungary, hoping they could leave for the West, that compelled the HU Govt to permit
the East Germans to leave (Sept. 11, ’89).
Proclamation of the Republic on October 23, help for Havel and Dubcek by making
Hungarian television available for them. The foreign channels forwarded the sensations
to the GDR and Czechoslovakia. King Michael of Romania on Hungarian TV.
The Hungarian Communists renamed themselves Socialist in the October Congress,
and on Oct. 23., 33 years after the Revolution, the Republic was proclaimed, replacing
the ”People's Republic”.
25
In the GDR the Neues Forum emerged as an umbrella organization demanding
changes. October visit of Gorbachev was discouraging for Honecker. The successful
escape of tens of thousands made it pointless to keep the Berlin Wall closed. When a
reformist leadership decided to open it the people tore the Wall into pieces (like once
Stalin’s statue in Bp and more recently Saddam’s) on Nov. 9.
That was too much for the Czechs to watch: the “velvet revolution” ensued.
A memorial meeting on Nov. 17 turned into a mass demonstration against the system,
with the police dispersing it, but continued in the next days, now directed by the Civic
Forum formed on Nov. 19 and the Slovak Openness against Violence. Nov. 26: demo
with 750,000 people, next day a general strike. On Nov. 29 the govt started negotiations
with the opposition and soon agreed to the formation of a new govt of national unity,
headed by the reformist communist Calfa, while the old parliament elected Havel
provisional President on Dec. 29.
By that time Ceausescu was dead. In December a Hungarian Calvinist pastor at
Timisoara/Temesvár refused to give up his parish, and the people demonstrated in his
support. Bloody reprisals, but a mass rally in Bucharest ended in the helicopter escape
of the dreaded dictator, who was soon captured and summarily executed, thus ending
widespread fighting. The Council of National Liberation was headed by his former close
ally, Iliescu, and many thought that the revolution was rather a coup, perhaps
orchestrated from Moscow.
Bulgaria changed more gradually (Zivkov replaced on Nov. 10), and Albania in two steps
by 1991.
Aftermath: Soviet failed coup of August ’91, Baltic independence in September, –
break-up in December.
The real heroes are the people who did not give up and who brought about the
changes, taking very considerable risks.
Frequently raised questions: was that all spontaneous, or at least partly planned by the
old guard, perhaps by the KGB? (A very valid question in Romania.) What role did the
West play? Were the western loans a ploy? Was there any secret agreement on Malta
in December 1989 about the peaceful transition, without trials??
How much was the West prepared for the changes and to make them a success? Is the
West responsible for the Communists not answering for their crimes? How did the SU
break-up, was that inevitable after 1989?
IV. Independence and Integration
12. Independence restored or born. The break-up of the involuntary federations
With the sudden collapse of the communist utopia in 1989 and the failure of the
attempted coup in Moscow in 1991 the post-Second World War period came to an end
and a new era in world history has begun. Thus after 1918-1920 and 1944-1947, 19891991 was this century's third historic turning point, and like with the previous ones, the
zone between Western Europe and the Russian heartland was the scene of events
which moulded history. 1989 continued through 1993, while the largely artificial
federations: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia ceased to exist, when
nations emerged from decades or sometimes centuries of oblivion, and Parliaments
became real centres of debate and even power not only in such old European capitals
like Prague or Budapest but also in Bratislava and Kiev, not to mention Vilnius, Riga or
Tallinn. The first multinational country to fall apart was
YUGOSLAVIA.
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1918-1948
The Yugoslav idea was attractive for Serbs who were dreaming about dominating all the
Southern Slavs, and for the Croats who were unhappy about the Dualist system in
Austria-Hungary. Its strongest advocates were the Serbs of Croatia. The Entente
Powers in World War I welcomed the idea and pushed for its realization. The Croats
were traditionally very loyal to the Habsburgs, but in 1918 preferred to be counted
among the victors rather than among the vanquished, so they endorsed the idea.
The centralized Constitution of the newly created “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes” (“Vidovdan Constitution”) was adopted in the face of strong Croat opposition
in 1921. They boycotted the first elections, and when they joined the Parliament in 1928,
two of their leaders were promptly shot and killed in the Chamber. In response to that
outrage a royal dictatorship introduced by King Alexander Karageorgevich (Serb
Karadjordjevic) tried to mould the country into unity, but its mainstay remained Serbia.
An agreement between the two major groups was reached only in 1939, but when the
pro-German line pursued by the government was too much for the Serbian patriotic
officers, they staged a coup in late March 1941 – resulting in being attacked by Nazi
Germany and destroyed in two weeks. On April 11 Croatia proclaimed its independence,
but was a satellite of Nazi Germany, led by the notorious Ustashi of the dictator A.
Pavelic.
The Appeal of Communism
It was a genuine but limited one. Tito, a Moscow-trained communist (from a Croat father
and a Slovene mother) organized partisan units who fought the Nazi invaders in the
inaccessible mountains. They were not so much devoted to the idea of Communism
(like e.g. the International Brigades in the Spanish civil war), but were young people
opposed to the foreign masters, and who enjoyed free but dangerous life in the
mountains. There was a four-cornered fight between the Cetniks (Serbs loyal to the
government-in-exile), the pro-Nazi Serbs (Nedic government in Belgrade), Tito’s
partisans, and the pro-Nazi Croats - but not all Croats were Ustashi. Many Serbs were
against Tito, his main support came from the Bosnian Serbs and the Montenegrins.
After 1944/45 terrible reprisals committed by Tito’s partisans (tens of thousands of
captured enemy soldiers as well as Hungarian civilians massacred), but finally peace
was welcomed by most. By the end of 1945 Tito established a communist dictatorship in
the restored “second” Yugoslavia. He made it into a federation of six republics (Serbia,
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia, with autonomy – but not
republic status – given to Kosovo and Vojvodina, two regions with a large number of
non-Slav minorities.
He helped the Communists in Albania and Greece, wanted to be the head of a Balkan
(Communist) Federation.
Illusions about Tito: was he a relatively mild, liberal communist? Certainly not!
Turning a blind eye on the dark side of Tito's Yugoslavia:
Following the break between Stalin and Tito the United States and her allies gave very
substantial economic and military support to Yugoslavia - for perfectly valid reasons. But
in the following decades western countries turned a blind eye on the gross violations of
human rights in Yugoslavia, and were apparently unaware of the growing resentment
felt by the non-Serbs towards the political and economic domination of the country by
Serbs disguised as Yugoslav internationalist Communists. The understandable desire to
keep Yugoslavia united (and also memories of Serbia as an ally in two world wars)
made most members of NATO very reluctant to accept that the non-Serbs of Yugoslavia
had very legitimate grievances (just like 13 colonies in North America had legitimate
grievances against the English King's government in 1776) and that undoubtedly
contributed to the use of the military in trying to forestall the assertion of independence
by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, after free elections held in early 1990 were won by the
advocates of secession. (The federal Constitution allowed such an option.)
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How fair was Tito’s Yugoslavia for the non-Serbs and the national minorities? On paper
and in principle quite, but there was increasing discontent on all sides, the Croats and
Slovenes felt the were being robbed of much of their due by the Serbs, but the rights the
other republics and autonomous territories enjoyed were regarded as too extensive by
most Serbs.
Serb aims in the conflict
Originally their aim was to preserve their dominance and to continue shifting resources
from the hard-working western republics to the more backward ones.
June 1991: Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence – but the Serbs of Croatia
(half a million out of less than 5), in the name of the right to self-determination, did not
accept that. The slogan of the nationalist communist leader Milosevic "All Serbs must be
united in one country" did not give a damn to the non-Serbs living in regions partly
inhabited by Serbs, like the Vojvodina. With the military advance of the “Yugoslav
People’s Army” (in reality a Serbian army) two Serbian “krajina” (=region, country) were
established in eastern and central Croatia respectively.- the non-Serbs (Croats,
Hungarians) being “cleansed,” i.e. expelled or killed.
Terrible war crimes were committed in September-November, 1991 in Croatia, but the
Croats could not be crushed and, following several failed efforts, the European
Community managed to arrange for a lasting truce.
Once the secession of Slovenia and Croatia became an established fact and in early
1992 these two republics were recognized by the EU (with strong misgivings), the
Bosnian Croats and Muslims did not want to stay in Yugoslavia, in a referendum voted
in April 1992 voted for independence. The Serbian third of Bosnia-Herzegovina rejected
that and a civil war ensued, with Belgrade helping the Serbs. The Macedonians and the
Albanians of Kosovo also wanted to leave Yugoslavia, but the latter were prevented by
the Serbs, who insisted on retaining that province with its 85 per cent Albanian majority.
(The nominal autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina had been abolished in 1989 – leading
to eight years of passive resistance by the Albanians.)
Efforts for a diplomatic/political solution
All foreign observers and the European Community in particular, tried to find a way for
reconciling the various national communities, to give them guarantees against future
aggression or retaliation, to find ways for peaceful co-existence. Lord Carrington, on
behalf of the EC, proposed “special status,” practically regional autonomy for the Serbrun krajinas in Croatia, but it was found insufficient by the Serbs. The United Nations
sent out peacekeepers (UNPROFOR), who were not impartial and were unable to
prevent further violence, esp. in Bosnia.
The War in Bosnia
It claimed more than 200,000 lives and incredible war crimes were committed (killings
and expulsions based on ethnic/religious identity – euphemistically called ethnic
cleansing, mass rapes in so-called rape camps, massacres of all the men (including
teen-agers) of the town of Srebrenica) until military intervention by NATO (prompted by
the U.S.) ended it in 1995.
The original idea of not allowing border changes gradually gave way to the idea of
dividing Bosnia into three national ‘entities,’ acquiescing in the results of ethnic
cleansing.
(An earlier plan called for Swiss-type cantons, but after the brutalities a return to the prewar ethnically mixed conditions was impractical and impossible.)
The division of Bosnia is better than endless war, but a permanent international
protectorate is no real solution. The Serbs still want to join Serbia and the Croats
Croatia. Why that is not permitted?
The conflict in Kosovo
By 1998 both sides in Kosovo were fed up with the deadlock, the Albanians seeing no
result from passive resistance and the Serbs having no real control over the Albanian
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countryside. That led to armed resistance and bloody reprisals. The international
community tried to mediate (Rambouillet talks), in vain, leading to the mass expulsion of
the Albanian population of the province by the Serbian authorities in early 1999. Seeing
the annihilation of close to two million (mainly Muslim) Albanians, NATO intervened in
March 1999: tried to stop the “ethnic cleansing” in an air campaign. Air strikes destroyed
buildings and bridges in Serbia, too, and the threat of a land invasion compelled
Milosevic to give in, to withdraw his forces from Kosovo. The Albanians could return and
turned against the local Serbs – who either escaped or now live under the protection of
EU peacekeepers.
For many years no agreement for the legal status of Kosovo could be reached, since
Belgrade and its Russian and Chinese supporters refused recognizing its independence.
Finally in 2008 the United States and most members of the EU accepted the plan drawn
up by former Finnish President, M. Ahtisaari, which called for independence with
guarantees for the extensive autonomy of the c. 100,000 Serbs, who today comprise
less than 6 per cent of the 2.1 million strong population.
Rump-Yugoslavia/Serbia
Milosevic was overthrown in October 2000. The pro-Western leader, Djindjic saw
Serbia's fate as linked to the West. He was pivotal in arresting and handing Milosevic
over to the war crimes tribunal in June 2001, where Milosevic was standing trial on
charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. For this, Djindjic was blasted by
Serbian nationalists, including his former ally Vojislav Kostunica, who stepped down as
Yugoslav president in March 2002 after the formation of a new state, Serbia and
Montenegro. On March 12, 2003 PM Djindjic was assassinated, and in 2004 the radical
nationalists gathered most of the votes, but the pro-Western Boris Tadiæ was elected
President (re-elected in Feb. 2008). The death of Milosevic in The Hague boosted the
Radicals, but in 2008 they lost to the moderate Democrats.
Montenegro or Crna Gora (Black Mountains)
Was an independent principality (since 1910 Kingdom) until 1918, when it was
incorporated in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS Kingdom). It stuck
with Serbia during the recent Balkan wars, but in a referendum held in May, 2006 55,5
per cent voted for independence. Since then the 620,000 strong small state has
attracted much investment, mainly in tourism.
Vojvodina
This nominally autonomous region of Serbia (population 2,000,000) used to be part of
the Kingdom of Hungary until the end of World War I. When in 1920 the Treaty of
Trianon attached it to the SHS Kingdom it had roughly equal number of Hungarian,
Serbian and German inhabitants. When in 1941 Nazi Germany attacked and destroyed
Yugoslavia the Backa region of the province was returned to Hungary. In 1944 Tito’s
partisans occupied it, killed or expelled most of the Germans, and caused also the
Hungarians to suffer great losses. By today Serbs have come to form almost 70 per cent
of the population, and the Hungarians have been reduced to 13 per cent, but the region
has remained an ethnic mosaic: it has six official languages, and there are more than 26
ethnic groups in the region. Although the Constitution provides guarantees for the
national minorities, and in 2008 the autonomy of the province was given more
recognition, the non-Serbs (Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks etc) often face intolerance,
attacks, probably by the hands of Serbian refugees from Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo.
The solution could be genuine autonomy for the northern part of Vojvodina, but the
Serbs are not inclined to grant it, on the contrary, by settling the refugee Serbs in the
Vojvodina the ethnic balance keeps changing to the advantage of the Serbs.
Potential further problems in the post-Yugoslav area
Greater Albania?
From a recent poster:
Big Albania -The dream of Albanians gaining a Greater Albania is near. Once Kosovo is
officially recognised as an Independant state belonging to the true owners of the land 29
being the Albanians, your people can officially start expanding into other territories
which were also once Albanian including Macedonia, Greece and a large section of
Montenegro. The Serbs will never ever touch Kosovo-Albania ever again as they have
lost the moral as a nation to fight, they have lost every war they participated in. The KLA
is getting stronger and in time I truely hope that the mighty KLA expand their lands into
Serbia proper as the need for space will be needed because the Albanian population in
the area will double in seven years reaching over 3 million. GOD BLESS
ALBANIA..........
It is true, in addition to Albania and Kosovo, Albanians make up well over one third of
the 2 m. strong population of Macedonia. In Serbia several thousand Albanians live in
the Presovo Valley, and a few thousand can be found in Montenegro.
So is a Great Albania inevitable?
Greater Serbia?
Serbia could be placated by receiving some compensation if the Serbs of Bosnia were
permitted to join Serbia. 1,5 million strong, they make up 38 per cent of the population of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they are eager to join Serbia.
The border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia
Looks strange, even ridiculous that the two allies in the fight for independence cannot
agree on a small section of the land border between them, and they have an even more
serious quarrel over the sea border in the Bay of Piran.
THE PEACEFUL DISRUPTION OF THE SOVIET UNION
"Openness" and "Restructuring" had an immediate response and impact among the
non-Russians, particularly in the Baltic region and, to a lesser extent, in Ukraine: they
claimed more autonomy, the bolder ones the restoration of independence. (In the other
republics it was not so much national feeling which reasserted itself, rather the
traditional wish of some local bosses to have less interference from above, to be able to
imitate the style of the leaders in the Kremlin.) In 1990 and 1991 even most of the
Russians in the Baltic region and Ukraine favoured independence, expecting a better life
from that, from “devolution”.
The re-emergence of Russia from the Soviet Union was also motivated by the belief that
the non-Russians (and even the satellite countries) were a burden on Russian
resources. In March 1989 at the semi-free elections to the "Congress of People's
Deputies" Yeltsin won over 85 per cent of the vote in Moscow, and on May 20 1990 he
was elected President of Russia's Supreme Soviet. Even after the fall of the communist
dominoes and when the adverse economic impact of the changes started to be felt, on
June 12, 1991 Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Republic with 57.3 per cent.
By that time Gorbachev's authority was on the wane, despite his efforts to go back on
many of his reforms and his efforts to placate the military. The August 13, 1991 coup
was foiled by Yeltsin (and by parts of the Army and the secret services); that further
undermined Gorbachev’s authority (people blamed him for their growing misery). Still
the general mood was towards devolution and Yeltsin denounced efforts to keep the
Baltic nations within the Union with force. He did not copy the Serbs' slogan that "All
Serbs must be united in one country." Applying that to Russians would have led to
terrible conflicts.
Ukraine, by way of a referendum held on December 1, declared its independence, with
no opposition either from the Soviet President or from Yeltsin.
On Dec. 8, 1991, at Minsk the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarus Presidents declared that
the USSR no longer existed and signed an agreement to set up the “Commonwealth of
Independent States” (CIS) between the three, with all other republics invited to join.
(Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev on Dec. 6 told me about plans to follow the British in
setting up a Commonwealth and the European Community in keeping the area
30
economically integrated, and looked at NATO as a model military alliance for the new
set of States.)
On December 21 eleven Republics signed the foundation document of CIS, and
recognized Russia as the sole successor to the USSR. That was recognized by the UN
(esp. the Security Council), by the EC and the USA: all the international rights and
obligations of the former USSR would in future be exercised by Russia. On Dec. 25 the
red flag, the symbol of Soviet communism was lowered from the Kremlin and replaced
by the red-white-blue national colours of Russia.
The world was no longer adamant that the Soviet Union should be preserved, but was
happy that its demise occurred peacefully – refuting many fears. Contrary to Marx’
predictions it was not the notion of the state that withered away but the Soviet State.
THE “VELVET DIVORCE” OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Inter-war Czechoslovakia was the most prosperous and stable of the successor states,
the favourite of the West, but it was let down by Britain and France at the 1938 Munich
Conference. Its prestige was reinforced by the 1968 Prague Spring, and the country
under its highly popular and respected President, Vaclav Havel, looked like bound to be
successful after 1990.
The Slovaks were never fully satisfied with their union with the Czechs. Following the
changes, they managed to rename the country Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
Soon a communist-turned-nationalist, Vladimir Meciar, emerged as the strong man of
the county (May 1992). His first target was ending the association with the Czechs, and
he succeeded to bring about separation not only in a peaceful way but also without
putting that case to the test of a referendum - for very good reasons. PM Klaus, the
Czech leader thought that his people could do far better without the burden of the poorer
brother Slovakia.
13. The pains of the transition to democracy and the market economy
“Who is a post-communist? A former communist, who has a post now.”
(Joke in Hungary from 2006)
How much of the hopes of 1989-91 have been realized? What happened to the
"Revolution of the Intellectuals"? "Where have all the flowers gone" that we saw amidst
the flags in 1989? How is it that so many communists, including spies and foreign
agents, have returned to office to run the new democracies? Why are people in ECE not
exuberant upon joining the EU? And what happened to the New World Order that
appeared to be within reach after the spectacular results of the Gulf War? Was the
brutal, cruel, senseless war in the former Yugoslavia an aberration or a warning of
things to come? Do the Central Europeans have to choose between the EU and the
U.S. – or Europe between Christianity and Islam? Or perhaps “Back to the past”: to the
embrace of Russia?
In 1990 everybody thought that communism was dead, the communists were
discredited, but today while we continue to have democratic constitutions in most
formerly communists countries, the very communists - mostly but not always their
younger echelon, cold and pragmatic apparatchiks, are back in office and power, only
this time not thanks to the brutal force of the Soviet Red Army but with proper electoral
legitimacy, and relying upon their privatized property and the press mainly in their
hands. “[Banks replaced the tanks”] How is it possible that the very Poles and
Hungarians who put up such a spectacular resistance to communism in 1956 and 198081, voted former communists into power first in 1992 and1994, then in 2001 and 2002
respectively?
31
The transition
A new era in world history, evident in EE, less in WE, and hardly realized in America.
Uncharted road, almost like making eggs from scrambled eggs. Dahrendorf on the
political, the economic and the mental transformation. Surprising success - and the
disillusionment, the return of the communists is the next unexpected surprise.
Difference: under Communism very little was available but that little was affordable now everything is available but very little is affordable, and that frustrates people.
But the changes opened up great possibilities - we have no longer to blame others only
ourselves if we do not make the best of it.
Achievements of the “transition” countries – profiting the whole world
Victory in the Cold War, without a shot in the air, was the outcome of the peaceful
political transformation in Poland and Hungary in 1989. The former unwilling enemies
became new allies as freedom was restored over vast territories in Central and Eastern
Europe. With that formerly closed markets opened up for exports and imports, creating
new jobs in the U.S. and elsewhere. The investment-friendly climate of Central Europe
(as opposed to Russia) enabled new businesses to start in those beautiful historic
places.
The first non-communist government of Hungary achieved a lot in four years, many
unpleasant but necessary measures and laws were introduced.
- new laws regulating property rights, a preliminary measure was to give
- compensation for the victims of illegal "nationalizations" and collectivization, also for
those who or whose family suffered from judicial crimes (execution, deportation, forced
labor, imprisonment)
- laws regulating a market economy
- privatization - today more than 8O % of the GNP is coming from private firms
- laws encouraging foreign investments (7 billion $ arrived in four years)
- a European legal system
- helping the victims of the transition to survive (unemployment benefits)
- extra benefits for families with children
- keeping pensions adequate
- provisions for expanding education
- (combined with privatization and FDIs): substantial investments in telecommunications
– improving the infrastructure, esp. motorway construction, but also bikepaths
In foreign policy we took the lead in dismantling the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, we
were the first to be admitted into the Council of Europe, the community of democratic
European states, we negotiated an agreement with the European Community and on 1
May 2004 became members in the European Union. At the same time we managed to
build solid political and economic relations with Russia and Ukraine, and we initiated the
political and economic cooperation of the Central European countries, named after the
venue of the first meeting the Visegrad Four. We preserved peace while the brutal
Southern Slav war was fought along our southern border, inundating us with refugees.
We tried to support the cause of close to three million Hungarians in the states
neighbouring us in their struggle for survival.
Notwithstanding all the results the majority of the ten million citizens of the country,
"proletarianized" during 45 years of communism, resented that while the traditional
shortage of goods was over, affluence spread only to a small section of the population.
People under communism thought that life was a zero-sum game: one person's gain
was seen in direct correlation with another person's loss, and thought that the new rich
meant that they became poorer.
But our friends, the western countries, could also have shown more understanding. Too
many people expected immediate improvements in their life once communism was over.
Freedom from fear and liberty (even to misbehave) did not prevent disillusionment to be
the prevailing mood of the people. People have lost much of their previous faith in the
32
West, in democracy, in the changes starting in 1989. Many have become passive,
others are turning to false gods, including extremism of both left and right. The
(temporary) success of aggressive forces in the Balkans have induced many throughout
the former Soviet Union to have recourse to force. Intolerance towards communities
whose language, culture and traditions differ from the majority (Tartars, Chechens and
so many others in Russia, Albanians, Hungarians and Croats in Serbia and Bosnia, to
list only a few instances) has grown to alarming proportions. The one-time victims of
Russian/Soviet imperialism in regions called threateningly "near abroad" feel unsafe.
There was hunger, exasperation, the outbreak of long-forgotten epidemics throughout
the former Soviet Union. One possible answer was to run away. But obviously it was
impossible to build a new Iron Curtain to keep the conflicts and the refugees away. So
the question we all face is how to transform the victory of freedom and democracy into
lasting results that are perceived and appreciated by everyone, how to make the whole
of Europe safe and happy.
Unfortunately the Central and Eastern European peoples had been fed upon promises
for decades and the new freedom could not compensate them for the hardships they
had to encounter during the transition to a market economy.
The symptoms of disappointment which set in almost immediately after the regime
change in the ex-communists countries, when inflation soared and unemployment
became widespread, are largely known. It was inevitable that the governments and the
political forces which were called upon to direct the first phase of the transition were
bound to lose popularity. The new, democratic politicians, coming mainly from
intellectual professions, scrupulously observed the rules of democratic conduct, even
towards the beneficiaries of communism, accepting their conversion into democrats and
free-marketers. They faced a hostile, often viciously hostile press written by the
mouthpieces of the old communist regime, whose papers were bought up and brought
to high professional standards by West-European capitalists. (A good example was the
Polish satirical journal Nie edited by the spokesman of the Jaruzelski regime during the
martial law period.) The critics, who often had a Marxist, or even a Maoist or New-Leftist
past, magnified the problems and the mistakes.
The crimes of Communism are being forgotten, the political and the economic
consequences of the communist system are not noticed, and neither how strong an
impact 45 years of totalitarian dictatorship had on the thinking of the people who grew
up under it. After the failed attempts to change the system imposed from the outside,
people in these countries learned that the art of survival and advancement was
opportunistic behaviour, to keep silent and to look only after their own individual, shortterm interests. People in Hungary since the 1970s had a modest economic safety
without real responsibilities, there was full employment in subsidized industries (largely
dependent on cheap energy imported from the Soviet Union, and in return supplying an
undemanding but safe Soviet market), but all that was possible only through
accumulating also a huge external debt. So in the 1980's the citizens of Hungary were
living in a fool's paradise. Meanwhile the gap between Eastern Europe and the
advanced countries was rapidly growing. When the communist leadership reached the
end of the road and admitted the previously concealed huge debt and that they were
running out of ideas how to continue, everybody admitted the need for change, but few
were aware of the costs. Of course most people were happy in 1990 with fear and all
the constraints gone, but they did not know how to make the best of a free, competitive
system, and what the demands of the market economy meant. As Aristotle said: “it is
easier to be a slave than to be a free man,” so under freedom many people found hard
to appreciate the changes and showed some longing for a world in which they had lived
in poverty, fear and anger, but in which they were young and felt economically secure.
People are confident that the dictatorship cannot come back.
The political merry-go-round: Left and Right in Post-Communist Europe
Political life revived immediately in 1988/89, at first new, all-embracing parties
(Hungarian Democratic Forum, Neues Forum (GDR), Civic Forum (Czechs) emerged,
33
but the long-banned “historic” parties also resumed their activities. Fear of too many
parties in parliament, unstable coalitions, led to the introduction of electoral thresholds:
only parties achieving a certain percentage (3-5 %) could enter the legislative bodies. In
the last 20 years many parties split, disappeared, but on the whole the party structure
has become quite stable in most countries. Polarization into Right and Left (usually
former Communists presenting themselves as democratic Socialists) is a general
tendency. Political life is quite passionate (while a large section of the population is
apathetic and does not bother to participate at the elections – like in so many older
democracies), but with the exception of the former Yugoslavia, violence is almost
unknown.
The pattern has been an almost cyclic change between Centre-Right and Centre-Left
governments. Some parties (seldom accepted into the governments) are termed
extremist, but they are more aptly called radical, like the Hungarian Life and Justice
Party of I. Csurka, or recently Jobbik (it is demagogic and often uses extremist
language, its most successful slogan is to fight against “Gypsy crime”), the Slovak
National Party, or Vadim Tudor’s Greater Romania Party. Their “anti-“ attitudes (towards
the national minorities, Jews, Gypsies) are detestable, but – fortunately - usually verbal
rather than expressed in violent acts, like so often is the case in Western Europe.
Pains and disappointments in the transition - the comeback of the former communists
As Ralph Dahrendorf, a German-born Oxford don said, the political transformation was
quite easy, in a few months new constitutions could be written and adopted. The
transition from the command economy to a market economy was bound to be far more
difficult, was expected to take years. But the mental transformation was predicted to
require several decades.
The newfound freedom was no compensation for the hardships of the transition to a
market economy. Ignorance about the prerequisites for a smoothly functioning,
developed society gave rise to unrealistic expectations in 1990. Communism, which was
characterized by shortages (very little was available, but that little was affordable),
created a perverted consumerism and an incredible preoccupation with material goods.
When goods appeared in the previously empty shop windows (overnight everything
became available, but very little was now affordable), many people were ready to do
almost anything to obtain them. It was not obvious to the average citizen of the former
communist countries how the high standard of living so manifest in Western countries
was achieved. People became frustrated and despondent, and they quickly blamed their
new problems and disappointments on their new, democratically elected leaders. To
some extent, they also blamed their foreign supporters, who failed to provide a new
Marshall Plan.
The results of the 1994 elections in Hungary resembled those of Lithuania, Poland,
Bulgaria and others: a relative majority for the ex-Communists now calling themselves
Socialists, and a leftist coalition replacing the previous centre-right Conservative one.
The turnout was higher than in 1990, a sign that the election was a kind of protest vote
against the government which introduced changes that brought hardship on the people.
With 33 % of the popular vote in the first round and preserving the lead in the individual
constituencies in the second, the Socialist party, led by Gyula Horn, party won 54 % of
the seats in Parliament. Horn is a shrewd, smooth-talking and strong-willed, Soviettrained apparatchik who joined the reformist in 1989, and was foreign minister of the last
communist government. (He is one of the very few Hungarians who in 1956 sided with
the Soviet invaders.) In order to win more confidence in the western democracies, to
assuage public concerns over the return of ex-communists to power, also to ensure a
favourable press he took into a coalition the Alliance of Free Democrats (69 seats with
20 per cent of the votes). In 1990 that party took the most vociferous anti-Communist
line and it was led mainly by people who became disappointed with Marxism in the
1970's. They won 18 % of the mandates, a little less than in 1990. Thus what is often
described a "Social-Liberal" alliance was established and had a two-thirds majority in
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Parliament. The Democratic Forum lost a half of its voters, the 12 per cent of votes gave
it only 36 seats.
The survival and success of the one-time prominent but discredited communists, both in
the political and in the economic sphere, was not foreseen, but probably unavoidable.
Communism was not defeated in a war, it surrendered without a fight. There was so
much happiness, even gratitude for that that no western leader (and few in the excommunist countries) thought of taking the communist leaders to task, let alone thinking
of a Nuremberg-type trial. But what in my opinion could have been done, should have
been done, was a large-scale information campaign in the formerly communistdominated countries about the crimes, follies and ineptitudes of the system and its
executors. (Something along what was done after WWII in Germany and Japan, to a
lesser degree in Italy.) I did recommend that to many foreign leaders and colleagues, we
did plan something along that line in Hungary (a White Book), but more urgent matters
and rather poor drafts swept it aside. I also deplore that many of the obvious crimes
committed by the communists in Hungary came under the statute of limitations, and the
efforts of the Hungarian Parliament to start the period of limitation with 1990, the first
session of the freely elected parliament, and thus to prosecute some old communist
leaders, perpetrators of judicial crimes and torture, were foiled by the Constitutional
Court, much applauded abroad. Likewise a lustration law, banning high-ranking
communists from office, was declared unconstitutional by scrupulous constitutional
lawyers. But if such a lustration had been introduced, probably even a larger number of
influential former communist bigwigs would have moved to business, and earlier. What
seems to be apparent is that the electors in Central and Eastern Europe are very little
influenced by the past of the candidates, they support the party and the leader who
promises most, and who looks most appealing.
14. The drive for integration. The enlargement of NATO and the European Union
External problems of the transition
The western democracies could have, should have shown more understanding for the
difficulties of the transition. Disillusionment became the prevailing mood of the people.
Many people lost much of their previous faith in the West, in parliamentary democracy,
in the changes starting in 1989. Many have become passive; others are turning to false
gods, including extremism of both left and right. The temporary success of aggressive
forces in the Balkans has induced many throughout the former Soviet Union to have
recourse to force. Intolerance towards communities whose language, culture and
traditions differ from the majority (Tartars, Chechens and so many others in Russia,
Albanians, Hungarians and Croats in Serbia and Bosnia, to list only a few instances) has
grown to alarming proportions. The one-time victims of Russian/Soviet imperialism in
regions called threateningly "near abroad" understandably felt and still feel unsafe.
There was hunger, exasperation, the outbreak of long-forgotten epidemics throughout
the former Soviet Union. So the question we all continue to face is how to transform the
victory of freedom and democracy into lasting results that are perceived and appreciated
by everyone, how to make the whole of Europe safe and happy.
My own fear, which I often expressed to foreign audiences, was: “Vincere scis Hannibal,
victoriam uti nescis!”(You know how to win, Hannibal, but you don’t know how to utilize
victory!)
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) marked the new era
with the signature of the Paris Charter in November, 1990. It hailed „the end of division,
the new spirit of unity and the community of values” the 35 member states professed to
share. A permanent Secretariat, a Conflict Prevention Centre, an Office of Free
Elections (later Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ODIHR) was set
up, to which the High Commissioner on National Minorites was added at the next
summit in Helsinki in 1992. At the Budapest Summit in 1994 the term „conference” gave
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way to „organization” (OSCE), but that could not hide the failure of the institution to deal
with first serious crisis, that in the Balkans. The CSCE lacked „teeth,” i.e. armed forces,
to carry out decisions and to maintain peace.
The Council of Europe, this community of democratic European states was the first to
admit „the new democracies” of Central and Eastern Europe, starting with Hungary in
November 1990, followed by Czechoslovakia, Poland, countries which were found to
have met the strict legal standards of the organization. Romania was admitted in 1993.
Charles A. Kupchan (Foreign Affairs, May-June, 1996) was satisfied that „Democracy
and capitalism have triumphed over fascism and communism,” but warned the West
against trying to set up a federal Europe with a common foreign and security policy and
a centralized government - such an attempt would founder on the determination of the
individual states to preserve their sovereignty. NATO must also change, must become a
looser, less rigid organization. „To preserve and enlarge the West, leaders must scale
back their vision,” otherwise the transatlantic community will be undermined „as member
states attempt to escape unwanted responsibilities.” I am afraid something like that
happened.
The attractiveness of the EU and NATO
Reasons: in history, culture Central Europe has always been close to the West. Under
Communism it meant freedom, democracy and prosperity. After 1990 everybody, the
SU included, wanted that, but mainly the last, thinking that there was an automatic
connection between them. The EC looked very much like a success story, and joining it
promised much of the outside help which the “new Europe” wanted. (Example of Spain
etc.) Accession also offered a guarantee that the changes are irreversible. (Before the
Moscow coup of 1991 there was such a fear.)
“Europe Agreements” in Dec. 1991 with the three “Visegrád” countries - but their desire
to join was not returned until June 1993, the Copenhagen Summit. Hungary the first to
submit its application for membership (Apr. 1, 1994) - but all started to harmonize their
laws. Polish PM Suchocka’s “five year rule.” PHARE programs.
Why NATO? Its old members feared dilution and had no confidence in Soviet-trained
armies. They also feared Russian reaction and a return to more aggressive policies.
(Smacked of appeasement.) Wörner: “NATO either goes out of area or out of service.”
The Balkan wars, lack of stability and fear of renewed Russian imperialism induced the
Central Europeans to seek membership.
U.S. Partnership for Peace in October, 1993 - the Prague Summit in January ’94
accepted enlargement in principle.
The brutal war in Bosnia, watched helplessly by the Europeans and discrediting the UN
for its irresolute peacekeeping, was ended in the summer of 1995 with the intervention
of NATO.
Political and military conditions: democracy, rule of law, good-neighbor relations,
minority rights, civil control, not to be a liability - “no free ride.” “To die for Warsaw etc?”
Military reforms in the ex-Warsaw Pact countries, common exercises and participation in
the Balkan stabilization forces. HU’s strong contribution (Taszár base etc.)
July ’97 NATO Summit invited three Visegrád countries (Slovakia left out despite its
strategic significance). Hungarian referendum endorsed it in Nov. with 85 % in favor.
Russia was placated with pledges about the use of the territory of the new members,
with the Permanent Joint NATO-Russia Council and with an invitation to the G-8 (the
leading economic powers) meetings.
The U.S. Senate ratified it with impressive majority in 1998, admission in March 1999 at
Independence, Missouri.
The slowness of the EU in the talks, the slowness of the transformation of the “new
Europe,” the invitation of 10, rather mean terms offered for the newcomers - all that
explains that enthusiasm decreased on both sides, nevertheless May 1 2004 as the
date of entry has been accepted by all.
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„The New Europe” (the formerly Communist-dominated countries) do not want to choose
between the U.S. and the EU. They need the continued political and military presence,
sympathy and support of the U.S., but they want to be members of the EU and not of
the U.S. I believe that we, the Central Europeans know and understand both the U.S.,
Western Europe and also Russia. Our contribution to the EU will be just this special
wisdom, we learned it in our tragic 20th century.
The western institutions, by opening their ranks, by expanding eastward (NATO in 1999
and 2002 respectively, the European Union in 2004), ensured that in the wake of the
ideas and the principles and the goods, eventually stability and some prosperity, too,
came to dominate “the new Europe.” The expansion of the area of stability and security
eastward did not harm Russian interests let alone posed a threat to that country. On the
contrary, a stable and eventually prosperous Central Europe (hopefully including even
Ukraine) can be advantageous for all the countries east of it.
The former communist countries, apart from their own serious efforts to put their house
into order and to curtail endemic corruption, need stability, protection from threats
coming from the outside, and prosperity to perceive the benefits of the changes. Since
the year 2000 some of them (the Baltic States, Slovakia, recently Romania) showed
impressive growth rates, catching up with the former front-runners (the Czechs and the
Hungarians), Hungary has fallen back, and Slovenia is becoming another Austria. But
they are all much dependent on oil and natural gas coming mainly from the former
Soviet area, and Russia is clearly using that as leverage towards re-creating its former
predominant influence. If the European Union cannot present a common front, cannot
have a common energy policy, and its major members make their own deals with the
Russians, some of the former satellites might turn back towards Russia, in the false
hope that by that they can have a reliable supply of energy and a huge market for their
goods. There are indications of such a tendency.
In my personal view it is only a united Europe in close alliance with the United States
which can continue and fulfil its mission, what a Hungarian author (S. Márai of Embers)
once described as proving that "reason and solidarity is mightier than the terror of
passions." It is only in this way that we can utilize the results of 1989, that annus
mirabilis, so that despite terrorism and fundamentalism and economic downturn the 21st
century could be better than the 20th was.
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