Download Power Struggle in Pyongyang

ISSUE BRIEF
No. 3671 | JULY 17, 2012
Power Struggle in Pyongyang
Bruce Klingner
N
orth Korea’s dismissal of Vice
Marshal Ri Yong-ho, chief of
the Korea People’s Army General
Staff, suggests there has been more
turmoil behind the curtain of power
than observers had previously
thought. Yet it is unclear whether Ri’s
removal was due to a more secure
Kim Jong-un feeling confident
enough to purge even from the innermost circle to further consolidate his
power or instead a pushback by older
elites challenging a second North
Korean dynastic succession.
In either case, additional seniorlevel purges are likely, potentially
even including an attempt to overthrow Kim Jong-un. North Korean
leadership instability is worrisome
to the United States and its allies,
since it increases the potential for
volatility, additional provocative acts,
or implosion of a regime possessing
nuclear weapons.
This paper, in its entirety, can be found at
http://report.heritage.org/ib3671
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The Heritage Foundation
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Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily
reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or
as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill
before Congress.
As such, the U.S., South Korea,
and Japan should implement all
necessary steps to defend against the
spectrum of potential North Korean
threats. Pyongyang’s attempted
launch of a long-range missile in
April—another clear violation of U.N.
resolutions—along with harsh and
detailed threats against South Korea,
shows that North Korea has not
become any less dangerous under its
new leader.
Dismissal from Power. Ri was
a fast-rising military officer during
Kim Jong-il’s rule. He was appointed
as head of the General Staff in 2009
and had been expected to remain
for several more years. He previously served as commander of the
Pyongyang Defense Command, a
prestigious corps-sized praetorian
guard for the North Korean leader.
More importantly, Ri had been
an important component of the
leadership transition to Kim Jongun. In 2010, he was appointed to the
inner political circle as a member
of the Central Committee Political
Bureau Presidium and vice chair of
the Central Military Commission
and was perceived as Kim’s military
tutor. Ri was one of eight pallbearers
for Kim Jong-il’s funeral. During the
past two years, Ri accompanied Kim
Jong-un on numerous inspection
trips and participated in several
important public events, including
commemorating the 100th anniversary of North Korean founder Kim
Il-sung’s birth.
Byzantine Power Structure.
The interlocking nature of the
North Korean party, state, and
military structures creates overlapping, competing allegiances. Senior
elites owe their power more to their
proximity to the leader rather than
from formal titles. Over time, there
have also been shifts in influence
among the main government power
centers. Under Kim Jong-il, power
shifted from the Korean Workers’
Party (KWP) to the military and the
National Defense Commission.
More recently under Kim Jongun, it appeared that the KWP was
assuming greater status, drawing power from the military. Some
experts speculated that the KWP’s
Central Military Commission under
Kim Jong-un could eclipse the
National Defense Commission as the
pre-eminent center of governmental
power.
Vice Marshal Ri had a foot in
many of these competing camps,
being rewarded by both Kim Jong-il
and Kim Jong-un. His titles reflected
authority in both the military and
KWP, including co-chairing the
ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3671
JULY 17, 2012
Central Military Commission with
Kim Jong-un. As such, it is difficult
to interpret whether Ri’s removal
reflects a further solidifying of power
by Kim Jong-un or instead a direct
challenge to the new leader. If the latter, it could represent an attempt by
senior elites to maintain their positions by forcing a collective political
leadership. Alternatively, it could be
military leaders resisting a loss of
power vis-à-vis the KWP.
Regime Stability Problematic.
During the past two years, hundreds
of senior officials have been removed
from office, reportedly purged for
resisting a second North Korean
dynastic succession. Executions and
detentions of officials were also used
to quell any potential resistance to
the new regime, including 60 public
executions in 2010.
Given the nature of the informational black hole that is North
Korea, little is known of what political wrangling might be occurring
behind the curtain. Even the U.S.
intelligence community will have difficulty predicting or identifying rapid
leadership change.
The North Korean regime has
shown remarkable resilience over
the past 15 years to overcome
domestic and foreign pressures that
appeared to portend unavoidable
regime collapse. Sudden regime
change would be difficult due to
the pervasiveness and brutality
of North Korea’s security services,
which operate not only against the
populace but also against the senior
echelons of power. Once again,
Pyongyang could belie repeated predictions of its imminent demise.
Conversely, sudden leadership
change, with its attendant stability risks, remains a real possibility.
Even an initially efficacious succession could deteriorate into a power
struggle, with fissures among the
senior leadership arising over time.
Elite resistance to Kim Jong-un’s
rule could manifest itself in outright
opposition or in usurping his power
and leaving him a mere figurehead.
Nor does continuity of leadership guarantee regional stability.
Belligerent behavior, whether by Kim
Jong-un or another ruler, jeopardizes
America’s interests, and such behavior should be expected, as Pyongyang
has routinely used threats, provocations, and military attacks to gain its
objectives.
What Washington Should Do.
The U.S. should ensure that it has the
capability to meet any threats from a
belligerent North Korea—regardless
of who is controlling the regime—by
taking the following actions:
■■
Develop multilateral contingency planning for effective crisis
response. The U.S., South Korea,
and Japan should coordinate
their national contingency plans
for North Korean scenarios and
conduct joint exercises to identify
these plans’ weaknesses.
■■
■■
Affirm unequivocal commitment
to defending South Korea and
Japan through the promise of
extended deterrence comprised
of conventional forces, missile
defense, and the nuclear umbrella.
Maintain a robust forwarddeployed military presence in
South Korea and Japan and fully
fund U.S. defense requirements.
Reducing U.S. military capabilities undercuts America’s ability
to defend its allies, deter security threats, and respond quickly
to aggressive actions or natural
disasters in Asia.
A Deteriorating Situation. The
North Korean situation is not static;
the country is deteriorating, which
in turn increases the risk for sudden
change. The leadership succession
may be on track, but the U.S. should
prepare for an unexpected North
Korean collapse that could trigger a
series of security, political, and economic challenges.
—Bruce Klingner is Senior
Research Fellow for Northeast Asia
in the Asian Studies Center at The
Heritage Foundation.
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