Download Diplomacy and International Theory Author(s): Barry H

Diplomacy and International Theory
Author(s): Barry H. Steiner
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Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 493-509
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Review
of International
Studies
(2004),
30, 493-509
? British
Copyright
International
Studies
Association
DOI: 10.1017IS0260210504006199
and international
Diplomacy
BARRY
H.
STEINER*
as a preoccupation
over
bargaining
as independent
Abstract.
has
Diplomacy
long been neglected
this deficiency,
this essay
focuses
upon
repair
two distinctions.
is between
One
diplomacy
of
Analysis
as when
theory
diplomacy
overcoming
as
studies
variable
independent
that increase
the danger
pressures
of
international
interstate
and
as
diplomatic
practice
of war or deadlock.
theory. To
and makes
disputes
dependent
as causal
This
variable.
influence,
is
perspective
important for developing a diplomatic 'point of view'. Dependent diplomacy analysis is
preoccupied with constraints upon diplomatic statecraft and with adaptation to them. A
second
distinction
non-negotiated
bargaining
dwells upon
hand,
and
is between
negotiated
that converges
the link between
dependent
diplomacy
bargaining,
to reconcile
common
upon
independent diplomacy
and
convergent
bargaining,
interests
divergent
between
and negotiated
on
state
interests,
states. The
bargaining,
and
essay
on one
the other.
No area of world politics has reflected a greater gap between experience and theory
than diplomatic
statecraft. This has placed students of diplomatic
statecraft increas
relations analysts who have aimed at
ingly out of phase with other international
controlled
broader explanation,
and cumulative
comparisons,
insights. There are a
variety of reasons for this condition.
students of diplomacy
have not been theoretically
oriented. They have
its extreme variability, and consequently
the difficulty of reaching empirical
'Of all the branches of human endeavour', Harold Nicolson
wrote
generalisations.
in support of this view, 'diplomacy
is the most protean'.1
those most
Second,
First,
stressed
to comprehensive
committed
international
from
theory have excluded diplomacy
on the grounds that it is too uncertain and unpredictable.
their generalisations
For
a prominent
neorealist
theorist, criticises multipolar
example, John Mearsheimer,
in them 'coalition
systems because
strength would depend heavily on vagaries of
is that
diplomacy'.2 A third reason for the failure to study diplomacy
theoretically
*
1
to the 41st Annual Meeting
This article is a revision of a presentation
made
of the International
on 15March
am indebted for helpful comments
Studies Association,
Los Angeles,
2000.1
California,
to Kenneth Waltz, Richard
and two anonymous
reviewers.
Betts, Patrick Morgan,
in William
C. Olson,
The Theory and Practice
9th edn. (Englewood
Relations,
of International
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1994), pp. 122f.
on negotiation
Works
include Adam Watson,
and diplomacy
PA: ISHI
Diplomacy
(Philadelphia,
New Approaches
inHistory,
Lauren
Publications,
1986); Paul Gordon
(ed.), Diplomacy:
Theory, and
Zartman
(New York: Free Press, 1979); I.William
(ed.), The 50% Solution
(Garden City, NY:
Policy
R. Berman,
Zartman
and Maureen
The Practical Negotiator
1976); I.William
Doubleday,
(New
and Christopher
Mitchell
Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1982); Daniel Druckman
(eds.),
Cited
in International
and Mediation,
Negotiation
Flexibility
special issue of The Annals, 42 (November
Zartman
in International
and J. Lewis Rasmussen
1995); I.William
(eds.), Peacemaking
Conflict:
Methods
and Techniques
DC: United
States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); Roger
(Washington,
NJ:
Fisher et al., Coping with International
Saddle
Prentice
River,
Hall,
1997); Janice
Conflict
(Upper
493
494
Barry H. Steiner
so have not provided
a satisfactory
For
foundation.
who regarded diplomatic
statecraft as central to inter
national peace, emphasised
the contrast between, on the one hand, the potential of
to mitigate
classical diplomacy
and on the other, the eclipse of
power politics,
Soviet-American
Cold
the
While
each of these arguments
War.3
diplomacy
during
could be theoretically analysed,
the two do not seem to fit into the same theoretical
to doing
committed
Hans
example,
Morgenthau,
those
framework.
or affirm any theory about diplomatic
article does not propound
behaviour;
more
it
foundation
that permits subjecting
instead,
modestly,
develops a pre-theory
to theoretical
to inductive, empirically
diplomatic
practice
inquiry
specifically,
not
studies
but
universal
Research
grounded
contingent
yielding
generalisations.
must be tailored to this foundation by having a relatively narrow focus and by taking
account of the variability of diplomatic
experience, no matter how 'protean'. These
are prerequisites
out
for drawing
broader implications
from particular case studies.
This
can and should be
As Alexander George has noted, apparently unique developments
more
a
a
described
'as particular value of
generally
general variable that is part of a
theoretical framework of independent, intervening, and dependent variables'.4 Analysis
in this article is limited to the diplomacy
of interstate dispute management
and
one of the most
in which high-stakes
resolution,
bargaining,
important aspects of
takes place.5
diplomacy,
The foundation
here contains a conceptual
framework
of
presented
consisting
two key distinctions. The first is between diplomacy as independent and as dependent
as dependent variable
takes into account
variable.6 Diplomacy
rising constraints
upon
diplomatic
statecraft,
such as public
opinion,
ideology,
and
the intrusion
of
to the Table (Baltimore, MD:
Stein (ed.), Getting
Johns Hopkins
Press, 1991; Fred C.
University
Ikl?, How Nations Negotiate
Raiffa, The Art and Science
(New York: Harper & Row,
1964); Howard
R. Polk, Neighbors
and
Press, 1982); William
of Negotiation
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
IL: University
of Chicago
3rd
Press, 1997); Harold Nicolson,
Strangers,
part 6 (Chicago,
Diplomacy,
edn. (London: Oxford University
in The
Press, 1963); Thomas
Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining',
Press, 1963), ch. 2; Sasson Sofer, 'Debate
(New York: Oxford University
Strategy
of Conflict
over Theory?' Review of International
14 (July 1988), pp. 195-208; E.L.
Revisited:
Practice
Studies,
36 (Spring 1947), pp. 405-422;
'The Old and the New Diplomacy',
Yale Review,
Robert
Woodward,
and Bargaining
in J. Roland
Pennock
and John W Chapman
Jervis, 'Bargaining
Tactics',
(eds.),
IL: Aldine,
Coercion
and H. Butterfield,
'The New Diplomacy
and
1972), pp. 272-88;
(Chicago,
Historical
in Herbert
Butterfield
and Martin Wight
Diplomacy',
(eds.), Diplomatic
Investigations,
(London: George Allen & Unwin,
1966), pp. 181-92.
2
in Graham
John Mearsheimer,
'Disorder Restored',
Allison
and Gregory
F. Treverton
(eds.),
Americas
Norton,
Rethinking
(New York: WW
Security
1992), p. 226.
Another
is 'International
of a
example of the neglect of diplomacy
Security Studies: A Report
on the State of the Field', by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones,
Conference
International
G.
concerns
as an
of 'non-military'
1988), pp. 5-27. The report cites the importance
but fails to cite the diplomatic
aspect of those concerns.
3
For Morgenthau's
of the need to revive diplomacy
in order to strengthen
international
4th edn. (New York: Knopf,
for his argument
peace, see Politics Among Nations,
1967), pp. 532-50;
to operate and tends to
in the Soviet-American
that diplomacy
Cold War
'has little with which
see ibid., p. 531.
become obsolete',
4
Alexander
L. George,
'Case Studies and Theory Development:
The Method
of Structured,
Focused
in Lauren, Diplomacy:
New Approaches,
p. 47.
Comparison',
5
to one commonly-used
international
relations
text, 'the essence of the [diplomatic]
According
process
Security,
element
12 (Spring
of national
security,
discussion
in Frederic
S. Pearson
and J.Martin
International
Relations:
The
Rochester,
bargaining',
in the Twenty-First
Condition
4th edn. (New York: McGraw
Hill,
Century,
1998), p. 267.
6
as Independent
The present writer has previously
studied this distinction
in 'Diplomacy
and
International
6 (2001), pp. 79-104.
Variable',
Negotiation,
Dependent
remains
Global
Diplomacy
and international
theory
495
as dependent variable also focuses on the
of diplomacy
specialised actors. Analysis
to
which
idea of
diplomatic
practice adapts to these constraints. Nicolson's
degree
the
of
and
their
incorporates
potential
'protean' diplomacy
presumably
diplomats
to
to
and
economic
fate
the
governments
political, military,
adapt
changes affecting
of diplomatic
initiatives. On the other hand, Morgenthau,
the
of
effects
critiquing
on Cold War diplomacy
in the latter half
ideological
inflexibility and militarisation
of the twentieth century, was more pessimistic about diplomacy's
adaptive potential.
an independent variable when diplomats push for
constitutes
By contrast, diplomacy
to pressures
in
that increase the chances of war.
management
dispute
opposition
When Morgenthau
the
of
nineteenth
century European
praised
diplomats
qualities
for their ability to prevent war between major powers, and argued for taking the
on secondary questions,7
and for accommodating
crusading spirit out of diplomacy
as independent variable.
he had inmind diplomacy
A
is between negotiated
second distinction
and non-negotiated
types of bargain
states
cannot
is
when
the
interests
of
be
ing.8 Diplomacy
negotiated
fully reconciled,
is required to reveal the area of agreement.
and explicit bargaining
For example,
notes
Bull
the
for
is
that
that
'states
have
different
Hedley
problem
diplomacy
.
.
.
common
a
to
and
interests
have
first
be
identified
interests,
process of
by
can
of
before
maximization
of
them
Adam
arise'.9
Watson
any question
bargaining
as
has more
defined
between
entities
generally
diplomacy
'negotiation
political
which acknowledge
each other's
to negotiate
will or opportunity
converge upon and underscore
standings, highlight the potential
practical steps to strengthen the
norms
critical for international
independence'.10 On the other hand, even when the
is absent, and when it is not explicit, bargaining can
common
interests between
states, avoid misunder
for communication
between adversaries, and define
is
harmony of interests. Non-negotiated
bargaining
of behaviour. Convergence
is stimulated either by
to recognise
shifts in national
interest or by new opportunities
those shifts. An
is
of
of
the
former
the
France
into
the
international
system,
example
r?int?gration
on holding periodic
and agreement
consultative
between highly-placed
meetings
The latter is illustrated
great-power officials, in the era after the defeat of Napoleon.
between the United
States and China in the early 1970s on the
by the reconciliation
to the Soviet Union.
basis of their common opposition
are elaborated upon in this essay, a preliminary conclusion
As these distinctions
is
that independent diplomacy
is especially highlighted
in explicit, negotiated bargain
ismore common when bargaining
is convergent.
ing, whereas dependent diplomacy
must
to
the
be
alert
theorist
other
However,
logical possibilities:
negotiation
can be
takes place under sharp constraint,
and independent
frequently
diplomacy
as
a
when
state
Hitler
and
inter
showed,
highly significant,
Napoleon
employs
national norms to weaken them.
7
Politics Among Nations,
534-44.
pp. 446-7,
Morgenthau,
was suggested
to the present writer by Milton
The distinction
between
the two kinds of diplomacy
See Esman,
in Ethnic Conflict',
Esman.
'Political and Psychological
Factors
in Joseph V. Montville
inMultiethnic
Societies
Books,
(ed.) Conflict and Peacemaking
(New York: Lexington
1991),
pp. 60-62.
9
Bull, The Anarchical
Press, 1977), p. 177.
(New York: Columbia
Society
University
Hedley
10
Watson,
p. 33.
Diplomacy,
8
J.
Barry H. Steiner
496
to define a diplomatic
essay also uses independent and dependent diplomacy
to
it
of
evaluate
the
world
literature
and to raise questions
view', using
'point
politics
can
a viewpoint needs
that additional
work
focus
Such
upon.
theoretically-oriented
to be further developed and legitimised.
The
Diplomacy
as dependent
variable
as dependent variable refers to the consequences
of specified constraints
Diplomacy
with disputes with other states.
for the ability of states to cope diplomatically
Constraints
have effects either as possibilities,
with some courses of action made
more difficult or impossible by the constraints
or
and others easier to accomplish
or
as
in the environment,
that, because of changes
newly possible;
probabilities
action will be taken and others excluded.11
specified courses of diplomatic
as dependent
To illustrate
the use of diplomacy
variable, we study here the
norms
of classical
from the
assertion
that the
European
diplomacy,
dating
for some
century, have had a declining
impact upon state behaviour
eighteenth
of intervening modern
The classical norms
included
developments.
five great powers
in Europe;
(1) preserving
(2) limiting wars by restricting
in the field; and (3) limiting the ambitions
of states by strengthening
commanders
the balance of power.12 Gordon
argue in their study
Craig and Alexander
George
was
Force and Statecraft
about
revolution'
that, beginning
1890, a 'diplomatic
in technology,
in the public's
caused by changes
effect upon diplomacy
and
time because
in the intrusion of complex and technical economic
issues into world
diplomats,
and in the rise of ideologically-motivated
leaders. They maintain
that
politics,
taken together, weakened
and governments'
these developments,
diplomats'
to the older diplomatic
lessened diplomatic
and
commitments
norms,
flexibility,
to intensified war and conflict.13
contributed
In showing how the dependent variable - the diplomatic ability to defuse confront
ations - has been affected by the diplomatic
revolution, Craig and George note that
has been complicated
difficulties of controlling
allied
crisis management
by modern
action, of coordinating
forces, of slowing down the tempo of military
military
11 I am
and Harvey
indebted here to World Politics: A Menu for Choice, by Bruce Russett
Starr, 5th edn.
Freeman,
1996), pp. 20-21.
(New York: WH.
12
L. George,
Force and Statecraft,
A. Craig and Alexander
3rd edn. (New York: Oxford
Gordon
Press, 1995), p. x.
University
13
'The diplomatic
The full statement of the theory is as follows:
revolution
eroded both the conditions
in technology
and norms that supported
the classical European
and science
system. Developments
and the art of warfare;
the emergence
of mass
revolutionized
communications,
transportation,
it
and made
peace more precarious
political
parties and of special interest groups rendered domestic
more difficult for governments
as in the past; and the rise
to pursue coherent
and consistent
policies
and extreme forms of nationalism
of new ideologies
tended to increase international
friction and
became more conflict-prone,
the homogeneity
of the
community
dispute. As the international
to control,
deteriorated.
As the new technologies
of war became more difficult
diplomatic
community
lost faith in the norms, procedures
and statesmen
and modalities
that had maintained
the
diplomats
and viability of the balance-of-power
also foreign affairs
system in the past. Increasingly
flexibility
to the currents of
heads of state who were more
sensitive
fell into the hands of popularly-elected
domestic
politics
and public
opinion.'
Ibid., p. 286.
Diplomacy
and international
theory
497
incentives for pre-emptive military
military and diplomatic moves, and of countering
case of the outbreak
of the First
solutions. The well-known
action and military
World War illustrates all four of these problems.
It might be hypothesised
that, as a
same
of these
the diplomatic
revolution rendered diplomats
consequence
problems,
If so, a larger
and governments
less able to defuse crisis by peaceful means.
of confrontations
between great powers in the twentieth century would
proportion
have ended in war than during the classical period. Craig and George
supply an
overview
this hypothesis.
historical
that seems to disconfirm
They note how 'the
in almost continuous
warfare against each other'
powers were engaged
during the classical period of the eighteenth century.14 And in the Cold War period
two hundred years later, by the time the diplomatic
revolution had presumably
taken
became a hallmark of Soviet-American
relations.
root, successful crisis management
Soviet-American
peace persisted during more than forty years of dangerous Cold
to Craig and George - the international
War conditions,
according
during which
concern about crisis
focused upon mutual
superpower
system was normatively
principal
to prevent a Third World War.
management
a link between the diplomatic
To hypothesise
revolution and peace or war is to
the variance in the dependent variable in terms of crisis outcomes. Such
understand
a link, if established, would display the impact of the diplomatic
revolution on crisis
if
in
its
But
the
form.
revolution
is not clearly
management
strongest
diplomatic
related to crisis outcomes, itmight nevertheless
affect diplomacy by introducing such
loss of flexibility, and multiple
channels of communic
pressures as war deadlines,
ation. It might be hypothesised
that these pressures made crisis more dangerous but
did not predetermine
crisis outcomes.
To state the relationship
between
the diplomatic
revolution and the process of
in this weaker form is to place the focus upon the
between governments
to the newer pressures. One possible
of diplomats
and governments
to
is
that
and governments were
say, diplomats
response was diplomatic
passivity;
to adapt to them. The rapidity
bewildered by the pressures and unable or unwilling
interaction
response
with which the assassination
in July 1914 was followed
of the Archduke
Ferdinand
war
the
of
such
outbreak
bewilderment.
When Morgenthau
by
major
might suggest
Cold War as 'obsolete',15 he seemed to
described diplomacy during Soviet-American
even if war took place as the consequence
of
accept that same position. However,
new crisis pressures,
to support the conclusion
this is insufficient
that diplomatic
norms and efforts were insignificant. According
to Richard N Lebow,
the most
was
in
remarkable
feature of German
1914
the
great difficulty
decision-making
German
in going to war;16 that difficulty can be reconciled with
leaders experienced
can only explain
older system norms. Furthermore,
successful
crisis
passivity
with reference to fortuitous circumstances. With reference
management
of successful Soviet-American
crisis management,
neither fortuitousness
of nuclear war are adequate explanations.
14
15
16
Craig and George,
See fn. 3.
Richard
N.
Lebow,
Force
and Statecraft,
to the record
nor the fear
16.
in Steven E. Miller
'Windows of Opportunity:
Do States Jump Through
Them?',
and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
(ed.), Military
Strategy
Press, 1985, p. 167.
Barry H. Steiner
498
of diplomatic passivity
Craig and George for their part reject such an assumption
in this context. They instead conclude - much
less pessimistically
than the full out
line of the theory suggests - that 'The diplomatic
revolution has both complicated
in a crisis to those that
and aided the ability of statesmen to confine military moves
to their limited
constitute clear demonstrations
of their resolve and are appropriate
added).17 Statesmen are aided, they observe, by the availability
resources
clearer means
for top
intelligence
sophisticated
providing
to evaluate the opposing
decision-makers
side's military moves.
Instead of being an
serves as an opportunity
for leaders to
unalloyed
negative constraint,
technology
and
for
the
conditions
their
freedom of
compensate
military
political
impairing
success in
action. Such a conclusion, which helps explain repeated Soviet-American
an
as
crisis management,
raises
dilemma
for those studying diplomacy
analytical
one
variable. On
and
hand, emphasis upon the strength of constraints
dependent
objectives'
of more
(emphasis
in the dependent
the resulting weakness
variable
should not lead to the
that the latter is informed by passivity
alone. On the other hand, the
assumption
more that diplomacy
is conceived of as adapting to or compensating
for constraints
in the international
the less problematic
for international
environment,
stability
those constraints appear to be.
Craig and George appear to be of two minds on this subject. In their overview of
- consistent with the
revolution
is with
international history, their focus
diplomatic
at bay, impeded
in accomplishing
what
it had notably
increasingly
diplomacy
upon
in the nineteenth
accommodation
of major
achieved
century, namely, peaceful
does remain effective during crises
disputes. The puzzle here is that diplomacy
to adapt
The ability of diplomats
and governments
despite the rising constraints.
seems to be part of the answer to
and to take advantage of new-found
opportunities
the impact of the diplomatic
revolution will be
this puzzle. However,
establishing
as well as limitations affecting
more difficult when account is taken of opportunities
for are
because
the channels of influence to be accounted
behaviour,
diplomatic
numerous.
more
in which the overall concern is
By contrast, in that portion of Force and Statecraft
to statecraft, so as to increase the chances of successful crisis
to apply knowledge
focus upon opportunities
management
(among other goals), Craig and George
about how policies have and
available to states, and especially upon information
in the past. This approach highlights
how shifts in international
have not worked
than are the willingness
may be less important for crisis management
developments
to learn from their past mistakes. Here the puzzle is how
and ability of policymakers
learn to overcome
international constraints, and why they do or do not
policymakers
do better
narrower,
on
the learning curve. The puzzle is resolved by the discovery,
through
and differences
case-focused
commonalities
analysis, of policy-relevant
in a variety of cases. Craig and George
in fact argue in this connection
for
appearing
more
limited,
propositions
17
18
theory, rather than for more
case-grounded
such as that of the diplomatic
revolution.18
Craig and George,
Ibid., pp. 153-63.
Development'.
Force
Such
and Statecraft,
added.
p. 224. Emphasis
an approach
is also advocated
by George
complex
in 'Case Studies
and broader
and Theory
Diplomacy
Diplomacy
as independent
and international
theory
499
variable
as an independent variable when, contrasting
Martin Wight understands
diplomacy
of particular wars, he
the inevitability
of war in general and the preventability
them
is
statecraft. 'It is
that
the
difference
between
argues
explainable by diplomatic
the task of diplomacy',
he writes, 'to circumvent the occasions of war, and to extend
to drive the automobile
of state along a one
the series of circumvented
occasions;
In the
head-on
traffic, past infinitely recurring precipices'.19
way track, against
as
in
the
of
nineteenth
the
mid-twentieth,
century,
importance
independent
diplo
matic action was directly associated with the magnitude
of the threat of great-power
war. And while diplomacy was certainly employed as it was earlier for propaganda,
and gamesmanship,
its greater importance was to counter the prevailing
deception
tide of conflict at the time of the greatest need. The crisis management
dimension of
can
in
it
be
appears, only by understanding
particular
fully examined,
diplomacy
as an independent variable - that is to say, the use of statesmanship
to
diplomacy
counter the drift to war, rivalry, and mistrust
arrange
by reaching cooperative
ments
in spite of those tendencies.
If diplomacy
'circumvents
then intrinsic gain in agreement
is less
occasions',
critical than avoiding a breakdown
of discussions. The larger the risks and dangers
of such a breakdown,
more understandable
and the more unacceptable
therefore a diplomatic
failure, the
as independent variable. Despite
is the focus upon diplomacy
as a dependent variable in relation to the diplomatic
revolution,
treating diplomacy
appear to treat it as an independent variable in relation to the
Craig and George
in which
of successful
crisis management,
the consequences
of
requirements
mean
'If catastrophe
failure could
is to be
diplomatic
highly destructive warfare.
in a
'decision makers
avoided', they write in relation to superpower confrontation,
a
at
crisis must be capable of functioning
very high level'.20 They justify this
conclusion
primarily by the scale of the effort required to restrain armed forces
on
levels. Of seven crisis management
war-readiness
placed
requirements Craig and
set forth, four relate entirely to military
restraint - irrespective of diplomatic
George
to
the most
active diplomatic
such restraint,
posture designed
options. Without
the distinction
between passive and
preserve peace will be inadequate. However,
even if military
active diplomacy
has a bearing on Craig and George's
conclusion
restraint is practised. They recognise
the importance
of diplomatic
efforts: one of
a
and
their rules provides for reconciling diplomatic
second entails
military moves;
rather than to seek a
that signal a desire to negotiate
options
'diplomatic-military
that
solution'; and a third entails choosing
options
military
'diplomatic-military
a way out of the crisis'.21 On the latter two points they cite
leave the opponent
fear of annihilating warfare,
grounds for optimism:
(1) because of the widespread
current
in
'The
of policy makers
the industrialized
is likely to
world
generation
avenue
rather than resort to force'; and (2)
of negotiation
explore every possible
19
Martin
Power Politics,
eds. Hedley
Bull and Carsten Holbraad
(New York: Holmes
Wight,
1978), p. 137.
20
Force and Statecraft,
p. 227.
Craig and George,
21
in the next sentence are also ibid., pp. 225-6.
Ibid., p. 216. The quotations
& Meier,
500
because
Barry H. Steiner
of
advances
in communication
and
transportation,
governments
are
better
to 'separate] the opponent's
fundamental
interests from his rhetoric'.
to
these
last
underestimate
the difficulties of initiating an
However,
points appear
In particular,
active diplomacy
under time-urgent, highly pressured conditions.
the
a
to
to
of
solution
crisis
is
the
be
finding
peaceful
problem
likely
complicated
by
in which the crisis has arisen: most modern-day
circumstances
crises occur because
of some diplomatic
failure brought
about by faulty reading of the opponent's
enabled
intentions. As Robert Jervis has noted, upon the onset of crisis the credibility of the
and of one's own country will be in question.22 Yet questioning
the value
opponent
of trusting the adversary will likely prevent a government
from 'exploring every
to selective
Instead, it can be expected to contribute
possible avenue of negotiation'.
to take advantage of communic
and to retard the willingness
outlooks,
diplomatic
trust between
ation
links compromised
Moreover,
by prior misunderstanding.
harder to re-establish during crisis when diplomats
adversaries may be paradoxically
move
restraint, defusing
'against the flow', so to speak. In short, apart from military
even unnatural,
crisis may require an improbable,
of the prevailing
transcending
political environment.
is frequently reflected in frantic and uphill efforts
While
independent diplomacy
to prevent war, it is also evident in efforts to shape the terms of defection and war.
behaviour can affect military
realities by (1) increasing or decreasing
the
Diplomatic
level for which defection
is a response;
frustration
(2) adding to the dependence
as opposed
an
to military
and (3) itself becoming
channels;
upon diplomatic
of facilitating
defection. With
respect to the first of these,
indispensable means
on some preliminary
numerous cases exist in which the will to defect is conditioned
its
In 1941, for example, the Japanese naval staff postponed
programme.
diplomatic
to permit Japanese diplomats
inWashington
attack against Pearl Harbor
additional
to work out a territorial arrangement with the United
States over the
opportunity
Far East that would make the attack unnecessary. Only when additional discussions
did the naval staff proceed with its war plans.23 The
failed to break the deadlock
in 1979: in
Soviet Union went still further as it prepared for war in Afghanistan
October
States so as to
1979, it 'telegraphed its intentions to intervene' to the United
reactions. American
failure to protest may well have been taken by
gauge American
to the intervention.24
the Soviets as evidence that the United States had no objection
to defect is linked either to confirmation
In these cases, the decision
of an un
some favourable one in which certain
favourable diplomatic
reality, or to obtaining
goals will not be damaged by the defection.
can affect military
not by utilitarian
conditions,
Second, diplomacy
diplomatic
that can flourish as a substitute
for defection
but by a process
what
demands,
22
in International
Relations
Jervis, The Logic of Images
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University
state opponents
too
1970), p. 95. One reason for this may be that leaders trust their adversary
a confrontation.
the latter would not precipitate
much,
presuming
trust was a cause of the Cuban missile
For a study concluding
that too much
and
crisis, see Albert
in Cuba', Adelphi Paper no. 17 (London:
the Risks
Institute of
Roberta Wohlstetter,
'Controlling
Robert
Press,
1965).
Strategic Studies, April
Gordon W Prange, The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor
(New York: McGraw-Hill,
1981), pp. 368-9.
For helpful analysis of this and related issues, I am indebted to unpublished
work by Sutee Ketsiri.
24
in Teheran',
Edward
'Secrets from the CIA Archive
Orbis, 31 (Spring 1987), pp. 39^10.
Jay Epstein,
23
Diplomacy
and international
theory
501
existed in the
Kennan
has termed 'that cushion of safety that normally
to talk with one another over the diplomatic
channel'.25 This
ability of governments
for world politics
of the much-studied
the relevance
prisoners'
point weakens
dilemma game, which has been adduced in recent decades to explain how, without
occurs as mutual
to co
override
incentives
defection
communication,
suspicions
even
an
in
alliance
that otherwise
encourages
operate,
relationship
cooperation.
From the diplomatic
of states to
point of view, on the other hand, the decision
George
defect, or to act to exclude each other from the game, is likely to depend on a
can be obtained,
a calculation
calculation
of whether mutually
beneficial outcomes
that logically requires taking account of existing diplomatic
channels.26 There is no a
priori reason to assume that states should invariably behave as if communication
or inconsequential,
between them were relatively unimportant
and be compelled,
for
to develop
in which they are required to decide
lack of it, to allow for a condition
once and for all whether
to defect.27 In addition,
the perceived value of the pre
the
relationship needs to be taken into account by those who emphasise
if it is not, the importance
of defection;
of defection
is deflated. The
directs
'Defection from What?' though coloured by military developments,
question,
attention as well to the perceived importance of the diplomatic cushion.
can itself be a tool of defection. For example, the illusion of a
Finally, diplomacy
Nazi-Soviet
framework was critical to Hitler's
the
strategy of defeating
cooperative
was
more
to
in
Russians
attack
1941.
Hitler
offer
Stalin
still
by surprise
required
terms than those contained
in the Molotov-Ribbentrop
favourable
Pact of 1939 indeed, virtually any terms that Stalin asked for, in order to establish the cover of the
German-Soviet
of defection
rather than
alliance.28 In such cases, the underestimate
the objective danger of defection
is the key condition.
makers
under
'[D]ecision
estimate the ability of others to defect', Jervis has written,
'and therefore frequently
... [They have
that they can get away with some exploitation
believe,
incorrectly,
defection
importance
thought] they could
ated the constraints
safely act against the other side's interests because
inhibiting the rival's retaliation'.29
they exagger
25
1950-1963
Kennan, Memoirs:
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown,
1973), p. 139.
26
can be totally neglected.
To be sure, the formal diplomatic
Kennan
refrained
from
potential
George
at all with Stalin for nearly a year when
in the Soviet Union
in
any contact
serving as ambassador
1953 and 1954. And, prior to the Seven Years War
in 1756, British and French
leaders, assuming
that their opposite
in North America,
did not want war over their relative empires
did
counterparts
were they of peace, that when
not question
each other's pacific
intent. So confident
reports of
inMaine
and the Ohio Valley
reached London
and Paris, the governments
fighting
rejected
to probe their opponents'
intentions with force. The two countries
decided
negotiations,
preferring
... at all cost', since
to embark upon limited war while maintaining
to
'cordiality
they wished
than destroy
each other. Because
of their political
and diplomatic
optimism,
they
the urgency
of the crisis, and the outstanding
issues were never really discussed.
of the Seven Years' War', Journal of Modern
Louis-Ren?
'The Origins
Higonnet,
History,
40 (March
1968), p. 78.
27
. . could become
a dominant motive
The case in which
'the urge to preempt.
if the character of
forces endowed haste and initiative with a decisive advantage'
is incisively discussed
in
military
Press, 1966), pp. 227ff.
(New Haven, CT: Yale University
Schelling, Arms and Influence
28
as a Special Case',
to Threat Perception:
Peter Karsten,
Accommodation
in Klaus Knorr
'Response
Dimensions
Press of
(ed.), Historical
(Lawrence, KS: University
of National
Security Problems
impress
played
Patrice
29
rather
down
Kansas,
1976), pp. 123^1.
Robert
Jervis, 'Realism, Game
pp. 338-9.
Theory,
and Cooperation',
World
Politics,
40 (April
1988),
502
Barry H. Steiner
Bargaining
over divergent
and incompatible
interests
as an independent variable ismost compelling when
The case for treating diplomacy
states
must be taken into account to manage a crisis.
in
of
conflict
interests
divergent
must
view
the occasions
that
'circumvent
of war' suggests that
diplomacy
Wight's
will
that
is
struck
be
viewed
the
because their
any bargain
differently by
participants
are likely to be different
interests and expectations
and perhaps
irreconcilable.
Bargaining may be impeded by a lack of clarity about the adversary's interests, since,
as Charles Lockhart has remarked, prior to crises states 'do not adequately recognize
.
one another's interests, or . . misperceive
that others are able and willing to support
these interests.30 In such cases, crisis management
requires clarifying the adversaries'
of Berlin, a high-water diplomatic
interests for each other. At the Congress
achieve
was
more
to
is
said
have
been
the
fact
that
ment, diplomacy
peace
by
facilitated
threatened by the absence of clearly defined objectives than by major incompatibility
state interests.31 Mediation
and later by Jimmy Carter to
by Henry Kissinger
over
conflict
the
Sinai
also
illustrates the importance
of
manage
Israeli-Egyptian
for
the
interests
each
other.
clarifying
opponents'
can be clarified under
if the diplomacy
time constraints,
is not too
Goals
a
In the Cuban missile
in
for
'least
effort'
ambitious.
crisis,
agreement
example,
was
remove
to
in
which
the
Soviet
reached
Union
relatively quickly,
agreed
principle
its missiles
from Cuba, in exchange for an American
agreement not to invade Cuba
of
in Turkey would
and private assurances
that American
missiles
intermediate-range
seems particularly desirable when the risks of
be removed.32 'Least effort' agreement
miscalculation
and of inadvertent war are high
that is, when military preparations
to gauge
of war must be made, but where the preparing country is not in a position
how itsmilitary moves are perceived by its adversary.
interests thus need not, in themselves,
Divergent
impede the chances of bargain
interests stimulate bargaining,
because as the parties have
ing agreement. Divergent
assessments
of
to exchange
the
value
of
agreement
contrasting
they are prepared
more
more
the
for
other
benefits
valued
'It
benefits
valued by
party
by themselves.33
a
even
'to
reach
if
Fisher
has
the
be
settlement
easier', Roger
written,
may
peaceful
parties do not see things the same way, but rather see things differently'.34
to manage
to those highlighting
of diplomatic
the potential
activism
Opposed
crises are others who view diplomatic
activism as a major cause of confrontations
that constrain diplomats. This second viewpoint
the dangerousness
of
emphasises
30
31
Charles
p.
Lockhart,
Bargaining
in International
Conflicts
(New York:
Columbia
University
Press,
1979),
141.
true to say that the absence of clearly defined
toWN. Medlicott,
'[I]t is probably
a more
serious threat to the peace of Europe
of
provided
[at the time of the Congress
between
the ultimate
aims of Austria,
and Russia'.
Berlin] than any real incompatibility
England,
Books,
Congress
1963), p. 4.
of Berlin and After, 2nd edn. (Hamden, CT: Archon
32
For diplomatic
of the Cuban missile
L. Garthoff,
conflict management
crisis, see Raymond
on the Cuban Missile
DC: The Brookings
Crisis, revised edn. (Washington,
Institution,
Reflections
According
objectives
1989), pp. 97ff.
33
see Zartman
and Berman,
The Practical Negotiator,
This is known as Homan's
theorem;
p. 13.
34
Fisher et al., Coping with International
and Berman
p. 47. Zartman
Conflict,
(The Practical
that this statement
is
pp. 175-6) point out that it is in the details of negotiation
Negotiator,
illustrated.
The
Diplomacy
interstate
and international
503
theory
confrontations
of governments
in
promoted
by the hard bargaining
is of a loss of control
that can lead to war despite
the
danger
of the parties to avoid it, and the hard bargaining
reflects inflexible
Thomas Schelling conceives of states as
dispute. The
determination
objectives.
in demonstrations
continually
engaged
and misunderstandings
understandings
. . .The
is itself unpredictable.
resulting
in risk-taking,
characterized
competition
of
tests of nerve,
and explorations
for
resolve,
. . .
a diplomatic
of commitment
process
through
international
often have
relations
the character
not
so much
tests
by
in the relations
between
adversaries...issues
Particularly
major
or on a particular
the most
to bear
in a locality,
force
bring
more
or
to
to
force
bear
to make
able
it appear
willing
bring
that
of
a
as by tests of nerve.
are decided
can
not by who
of
issue,
force
but
that more
is eventually
by who
is forthcoming.35
of resolve that diplomats
example of a demonstration
was
the
crisis
that
the First World War.
successfully manage
preceded
concerns were then compounded
Positional
commitments
and the strength
by prior
of national will, ruling out flexibility.
'The game of power politics,
if really played
in reference to multipolarity,
hard', Kenneth Waltz
argued more generally
'presses
Perhaps
could not
the most
famous
the players into two rival camps, though so complicated
is the business of making
and maintaining
alliances that the game may be played hard enough to produce that
result only under the pressure of war'.36 Produced by war pressures, hard bargaining
was extremely difficult to sustain without producing widespread
under multipolarity
allies were determined
not to
hostilities, because, Waltz maintains,
hard-bargaining
defect from their alliances.
More recently hard bargaining was a characteristic
of the diplomacy of the Soviet
in
communist
the
after
the Second World War, when
regime
period
immediately
Soviet representatives were said to be 'under compulsion
to try for a certain number
of times to secure each Soviet point, no matter how minor',
even
and consequently
minor
became
an
of
While
disputes
'test[s]
staying power'.37
posing
extremely
difficult challenge toWestern patience, such tactics were paradoxically
as
contagious:
hard bargaining for individualistic
one
is
sensible
for
it
also
becomes
state,
any
gain
sensible to any and all the others, irrespective of the 'regulated environment'
that
was in conflict with such bargaining.
states that are attracted
to
Yet, the more
as a political
the less attractive
instrument
becomes.
individualism,
free-loading
and
of
Indeed, by complicating
convergence
dispute management
interests, such
can make all states worse off by heightening
individualism
the search for relative
advantage.
can
Questions
condition.
First,
tions of resolve'
crisis diplomacy
be raised from a diplomatic
point of view about this problematic
to
states
reference
Schelling's
'continually engaged in demonstra
deflates
the
distinction
between pre-crisis and intra
(my emphasis)
that permits gauging the full impact of the onset of the sense of
mutual danger, which is in turn conditioned
by the confrontation's
unpredictability.
as ineffectively during crisis as beforehand,
If diplomacy
functions
the chances of
35
in original.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 93^. Emphasis
Kenneth N. Waltz,
Politics
Theory of International
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1979), p. 167.
added.
Emphasis
37
'Some Soviet Techniques
of Negotiation',
in The Kremlin and World Politics:
Philip E. Mosely,
in Soviet Policy and Action
Studies
Books,
(New York: Vintage
1960), pp. 21-2.
36
504
Barry H
Steiner
are quite high, and yet Schelling does not appear to allow for the
to the crisis that would help to forestall that result. Moreover,
adaptation
diplomatic
and the onset of crisis, as Schelling understands
the link between diplomacy
it, can
an
has
of
crises
the
that
be questioned.
impact upon
dangerousness
Schelling argues
pre-crisis behaviour of states. 'What deters such crises', he wrote in reference to the
is that they are
'and makes
them infrequent
Cuban missile
crisis, for example,
in this
not
should
be
is
clear
crises
But
it
discouraged
why
genuinely dangerous'.38
as
states
to
crises
the
time
that
if,
appear dangerous,
way prior
Schelling contends,
ultimate
defection
engage in tests of resolve.
continually
to confront
while
Second,
Schelling focuses on problematic diplomacy contributing
on
confrontation.
Governments
that
such
ation, he is silent
discourages
diplomacy
appear to make binding commitments more frequently when they assume that these
under conditions
of multipolarity
is correct, governments
will not be tested. IfWaltz
a diplomatic
to
their
fear
of
because
of
make
commitments
hesitate
mostly
in
that
from such a
their position
and of the loss
breakdown,
they anticipated
tended
toward
the model of
'Politics among the European
breakdown.
great powers
a zero-sum
game',
Waltz
argues.
'Each
power
viewed
another's
loss
as
its own
gain.
each state became
to cooperate for mutual benefit,
Faced with the temptation
wary
and was inclined to draw back'.39
that concerns about relative advantage
thus agrees with Schelling
Waltz
impede
and suspicions of states
but he suggests that the diffidence
interstate cooperation,
tests of
of each other. A second limitation on diplomatic
limit their confrontations
Jervis has argued,
resolve is the use of ambiguity. Without
ambiguity,
diplomatic
to retreat as much as possible and
tend to force their adversaries
countries would
would find it more difficult to probe each other's views.40 A third limitation is that
rather than maximal
associated
with minimal
is usually
the hardest bargaining
For example, as Henry Kissinger
noted, countries desiring a negotiated
positions.
to
that are subject
will ordinarily
objectives
agreement
begin with maximal
to defect will start a negotiation
with
while only countries determined
modification,
their minimal position.41
Convergent
interests
as increasing
of
the potential
understood
interests are commonly
Convergent
most
in
such
In
international
their
interstate cooperation.
form,
regimes,
developed
about others' patterns of behaviour
interests 'establish stable mutual
expectations
that will allow the parties to adapt their
and . . . develop working
relationships
new
that result from convergent
situations'.42 Cooperative
arrangements
practices to
that otherwise make cooperation
interests temper concerns about relative advantage
between states difficult or impossible.
38
Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 96.
39
Politics,
p. 70.
Waltz,
Theory of International
40
Jervis, The Logic of Images, pp. 127-8.
41
1812-1822
and the Problems
A World Restored: Metternich,
Castlereagh,
of Peace,
Henry Kissinger,
1964 [1957]), p. 73.
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap,
42
Robert O. Keohane,
Press, 1984), p. 89.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University
After Hegemony
and international
Diplomacy
505
theory
about
convergent
bargaining
employ
contrasting
assumptions
one
that convergence defuses crises
hand, they hypothesise
diplomatic behaviour. On
or traditions
by limiting tests of resolve. 'One of the values of laws, conventions,
in games of nerve', Schelling has written,
'is that they
that restrain participation
not lack of
for declining
is manifestly
provide a graceful way out. If one's motive
are
as
no
costs
to
in refusing
the absence of
nerve, there
enduring
compete'.43 Even
Advocates
of
to increase the danger of war, tacit rules, situationally
communication
appears
can be a way to resolve a
and not requiring any explicit communication,
determined
some
is needed', Schelling has written,
'and when formal
crisis. '[W]hen
agreement
has been virtually severed, when neither side trusts the other nor expects
diplomacy
to be enforceable, when there is neither time nor place for negotiating
agreements
new understandings,
that is available may have a take-it-or-leave-it
any agreement
that
quality. It can be accepted tacitly by both sides or by unilateral announcements
one will abide by it if the other does too'.44
On the other hand, Schelling takes account of the possibility
that a multitude
of
channels may be available during crisis. This he finds problematic
communications
new objectives, making
to communicate
because the channels provide opportunities
crisis results more indeterminate.45
'One difficulty with overt negotiations',
Schelling
wrote,
Is that
there
between
have
a
are
too many
to consider,
too many
to compromise,
too many
places
possibilities
can discriminate
too many
that the exact choice
of language
ways
to
too much
In marriage
freedom
of choice.
and real estate
it helps
involved,
to reconcile,
interests
parties
'standard-form
bargaining
is often
restrictive;
similarly
it restricts
because
contract',
each
anything
in negotiation.
can't go
saying
side's
can't
that
flexibility
go without
Tacit
the
into
understanding. Only bold outlines can be perceived. Both sides have to identify, separately
but simultaneously, a plausible and expectable dividing line or mode of behavior, with few
alternatives
any
the
to choose
among
at all....In
understanding
restrictive
language
of
and
knowing
warfare
action
and
on
success
that
the dialogue
a dictionary
the first
between
of
common
be
try may
is often
adversaries
and
perceptions
essential
to
confined
to
precedents.46
concern
When diplomacy
is inadequate, and yet the overriding
of states is with
two scenarios the search for common
interests, the difference between Schelling's
the absence of communication
and large-scale communication
is insignificant.
that states can define common
interests, negotiated
Assuming
diplomacy will either
so
be inconsequential
(when diplomatic
linkages are severed) or needs to be made
are
more
that
whether
their
distractions).
(when linkages
Schelling argues
generally
or plentiful,
communication
is minimal
need to coordinate
their
antagonists
a
to
off
because
have
'common
their
certain
eyes
they
inability
keep
expectations
from a diplomatic
outcomes'.47 However,
point of view, the problem of acting on
common
interests raises a different set of questions. First, defining and acting upon
convergent
solutions may
be problematic
43
Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 120.
44
in original.
Ibid., p. 139. Emphasis
45
Observations
cited in The Bomb
by Schelling,
Delacorte
Press, 1968), p. 71.
46
Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 140-41.
47
The Strategy
p. 73.
of Conflict,
Schelling,
because
and
(1) conflicting
the Computer,
by Andrew
goals
Wilson
and attitudes
(New York:
Barry H
506
Steiner
is not well-defined;
and
solutions; (2) convergence
prevent reaching convergent
are
move
to
the
determined
(3)
parties
beyond convergence.
contacts are likely to
interests and norms exist, diplomatic
Second, when common
act
When
the
Cold
define
and
them.
War
between
the Western
upon
help
analysing
as an international
Powers and the Soviet Union
assert
and
system, Craig
George
war
that the two sides had only one objective in common
another
world
preventing
and this common
overrode
their
conflicts
and
rivalries.
many
objective
They
succeeded because of the widespread
fear
explain that Cold War crisis management
that any superpower war would escalate, and because of military
Yet
deterrence.48
the regular exchange of views between American
diplomatic
practice, particularly
was also significant
in helping
to manage
and Soviet diplomatic
representatives,
may
crises.49
to uphold
norms
frameworks
constructed
international
Diplomatic
commonly
states adapt
to affirm and strengthen
illustrate
how
the norms. They
also
illustrate how states capitalise opportunistically
upon those norms for
paradoxically
as governments
are more
relative gain. Such frameworks
stimulate opportunism
confident that they will not need to pay a high price for their commitments. Writing
about
that
relations
superpower
in the Middle
for example, Harold
East,
Saunders
wrote
With the safety net of ... a diplomatic framework to fall back on, [theUnited States and
Soviet Union had] been willing to use the Arab-Israeli conflict as a vehicle in their
competition,
to accept
but
setbacks.
each
side has
. . .
recognized
some
they were
Interestingly,
limits
most
of
tolerance
cautious
in the other's
in 1967
and
willingness
1983 when
their
bilateral relationship was least well developed. They were most daring in terms of their own
competitive military involvement in 1970, when they had begun to develop enough of a
relationship to be more confident of their ability to avoid confrontation but were still testing
each other in the process of building that relationship.50
to be the prime
than ruling out confrontation,
the safety-net
appears
that can itself lead to confrontation;
stimulator, in turn, of trust between adversaries
the framework emboldens
the parties to strengthen their positions and commitments
so that the latter is tested.51
in a manner
that cannot be sustained by the framework,
Schelling and Saunders can evidently agree that the same situational problems that
Rather
create
a
normative
preference
for
convergent
solutions
also
draw
attention
to what
48
p. 105.
Craig and George, Force and Statecraft,
49 In
that 'To urge that the superpowers
undertake
another
study, George wrote
timely, serious
area and to identify actions by the other
to clarify their interests in a particular
discussions
diplomatic
those interests is to do no more
than to enjoin US and
side that they would
regard as threatening
He went on to note 'sporadic
Soviet leaders to make greater use of traditional
practices'.
diplomatic
ones in the 1980s, and noted that 'The question
some successful
efforts' to do so, including
is how to
and make
them more effective'.
'US-Soviet
practices
et al. (eds.), US-Soviet
and Crisis Avoidance',
in George
Press, 1988), p. 595. Yet regular useful exchanges
(New York: Oxford University
Security Cooperation
are known
to have occurred
between American
and Soviet diplomats
through much of the Cold War
than George
See, for example, As I
important
period, and appear to have been more
acknowledges.
S. Papp (New York: Penguin Books,
Saw It, by Dean Rusk, ed. Daniel
1991), pp. 357-61.
50
in the Arab-Israeli
Harold H. Saunders,
Soviet-US
and Cooperation
Arena,
'Regulating
Competition
in US-Soviet
1967-86',
pp. 575, 578-9.
Security Cooperation,
51
see The Practical Negotiator,
On the value of trust in negotiations,
pp. 27ff.
institutionalize
such
to Cooperate
Efforts
traditional
diplomatic
in Crisis Management
Diplomacy
and international
507
theory
states away from the convergence. But Schelling's concern that diplomatic
to international
solutions
of convergent
crisis is
weakens
the potential
common
norms
a
to
that
different
and
transformed
Saunders
very
problem:
by
to take greater risks in exploiting
their differences,
interests embolden governments
relies upon common
the tests of resolve that Schelling
and indirectly stimulate
distracts
activism
norms
to
temper.
with ample convergence
because
the
Bargaining may to be more opportunistic
are
to
to
needs
the
less
be
of
breakdown
smaller;
diplomacy
geared
dangers
narrow
can
more
a
for
demands
it
be
conditioned
the
breakdown,
by
preventing
the
is insignificant, or absent altogether,
national advantage. But when convergence
are larger and bargaining must be narrower if crisis instabilities
risks of breakdowns
are to be overcome.
of the contending
Concluding
In such a case, the context rather than the myopic
states forms the major danger to stability.
self-interests
observations
This article has tried to develop a diplomatic point of view and to refine concepts to
to be the object of theoretical
of conflict management
enable the diplomacy
study.
the main arguments and elaborates further on
This concluding
section summarises
a point of view and refining concepts are related
them. It also shows that developing
preoccupations.
A diplomatic point of view is developed here in two ways. One is to point out how
focus upon diplomatic
that do not explicitly
arguments
practice have unstudied
of these implications
detracts from isolating the
implications. Neglect
diplomatic
on other developments,
which we may term
significance of diplomacy
independent
as
a
causal influence practice
'diplomatic potential'. Understanding
diplomatic
that is, how it impacts upon other specified variables
requires theorists to anticip
ate diverse ways in which that potential can be actualised.
occurs is linked
Failure to appreciate a variety of ways in which this actualisation
as an independent
to the neglect of crisis management
variable. In this
diplomacy
that
article, for example, we have noted the argument made by Craig and George
in Soviet-American
is to be explained by the mutual
crisis management
cooperation
fear that any outbreak of superpower war could escalate, and by deterrence. While
these affected diplomacy
directed to superpower disputes,
they do not focus upon
the independent
power
contribution
that diplomacy
made
to the management
of
super
confrontation.
as independent
This article has argued that diplomacy
is most conse
variable
'circumvent occasions' when
quential when, as in the Cold War period, diplomats
faced with a common, highly threatening danger. At this preliminary point, it may
the independent
be suggested that among the first steps for appreciating
significance
of diplomatic practice must be to probe the operational
significance of what Wight
The circumventing
occasions'.
necessitates
negotiated
'circumventing]
and
the
have
because
rules and norms
larger importance
bargaining,
negotiations
are relatively weak.
to diplomatic
necessitates
For example, circumvention
resistances
anticipating
of
the
threat
the
element
and
of failure to
initiatives, overcoming
them, using
danger
has
termed
508
Barry H
Steiner
establish a basis of accommodation,
being able to make expeditious decisions and to
force expeditious decisions by others, and limiting the focus of negotiations.
Circum
not
be over
vention also entails the risks of failure; diplomatic
should
potential
a
rate the
in
because
instances
herself
rated,
many
dangerous
diplomat may
as
success.
in
of
failure
than
the
of
chances
probability
higher
negotiated bargaining
action evidently drives this effort, and not the chances of
The necessity of diplomatic
success, yet the chances of success may be increased or diminished
by the choices
diplomats make.
some also discussed
in this article, suggests that
A much
larger body of writings,
variables such as military plans and dispositions,
ideology, public opinion, and the
of
commitments,
making
by limiting
diplomacy
impact upon crisis management
a
From
choices.
the weakness
of these writings
is
diplomatic
viewpoint,
diplomatic
as dependent
variable cannot adequately
be illuminated
solely by
the constraints
it
upon diplomacy
brought about by other variables;
highlighting
must also allow diplomats'
to these constraints.
it should
adaptation
Specifically,
action based upon skill and ingenuity in particular circum
allow for opportunistic
for
that limit diplomatic
choices. Writings
that
stances, compensating
developments
a
so
are
to
too
from
do
fail
confining
point of view. Failure to allow
diplomatic
to constraints,
for example, weakens Schelling's discussion
of
diplomatic
adaptation
that diplomacy
tests of resolve; Morgenthau's
of diplomacy
characterisation
during the
Cold War as 'obsolete'; and Craig and George's
about the
argument
'diplomatic revolution'.
is more
accept limitations posed by
Adaptation
likely to occur when diplomats
as a given. But the analyst should also anticipate,
added constraints
alternatively,
in
that diplomats may be unaware of the constraints,
and thus may act
perhaps
- as
fashion
counterproductive
though they do not exist; or that diplomats may be
aware of the constraints
and accept them passively without
taking compensatory
as they impact upon diplomatic
the weight of the constraints
action. To determine
a null hypothesis
as a hypothetical
the theorist, who must
introduce
practice,
as a binding
should never accept a priori the constraints
possibility,
obligatory
diplomatic
superpower
element upon diplomatic action. Instead, their importance will have to be determined
on a case-by-case
them as
basis, taking into account whether diplomats understand
affect diplomatic
limits upon their behaviour, and in what ways. If the constraints
behaviour, presumably
they would also affect the results of negotiated
bargaining
that takes place.
While many types of constraints present themselves for study, and some, such as
in recent years,
domestic political
structure, have arguably become more
important
those most
in this article have been norms,
rules, and convergent
emphasised
can and should guide
that these developments
argument
Schelling's
to promote
accommodation
should receive empirical
working
study.
diplomats
takes its cues from norms,
negotiated
Perhaps, as Schelling recommends,
bargaining
able to ignore or downplay
interests, even when it is potentially
rules, and convergent
interests.
the independent
rules and interests diminish
importance of
more
to
and
it
confine
On
the
other hand,
bargaining,
predictable paths.
negotiated
cues
not
from
take
their
and
norms,
rules,
may
convergent
negotiating
diplomats
interests. This would be more probable when normative
and convergence
elements
as dependent variable
are weaker. It is argued here that the significance of diplomacy
or to some
to negotiated
in this context not in relation
is greatest
bargaining
them. Then
the norms,
Diplomacy
and international
509
theory
of diplomatic
behaviour, but instead when norms and rules are
superceded model
clear-cut and respected. The logic is that when international norms are strong, there
to circumvent occasions.
is relatively little need for diplomacy
we have played up the differences
and analytical
tensions between
Although
on one hand, and norms and rules, on the other, in practice
negotiated
bargaining,
the other. As Harold
Saunders and Robert
neither
is likely to fully overshadow
for negotiated
is often encouraged
Jervis have noted, hard bargaining
advantage
as in the
when norms and rules provide a well-established
framework,
diplomatic
concert. And relatively unstable periods, such as the
nineteenth
century great-power
Wars and the superpower Cold War rivalry,
classical period prior to the Napoleonic
were not without norms.52 A more difficult issue is that independent and dependent
are illuminated by investigating
similar elements,
behaviour
aspects of diplomatic
for
and the diplo
search
and
the
norms,
influence,
constraints,
leverage
including
as
Kennan.
We
have
noted
that
matic
'cushion of safety' highlighted
by
diplomacy
can
to
the
decision
of
about
whether
variable
illuminate
governments
independent
with allies and adversaries.
is
commitments
Furthermore,
diplomacy
as
is
if
basis
of
constitutes
the
it
deception.
Diplomacy
highlighted
independent
to
international
variable when governments
upon
capitalise
dependent
regimes
when
their
hard
relative
and
and
for
constraints
advantage,
they employ
bargain
those of other states as sources of political
leverage for the same purpose. These
are particularly
in light of the contemporary
it appears,
tendencies
significant,
defect
from
of international
regimes.
proliferation
and convergent bargaining
between
As between negotiated
states, it is doubtful
about the
whether one can be adequately understood without making
assumptions
can be studied on the assumption
that certain
other. The dynamics of negotiation
norms are given. Robert Keohane
and Joseph Nye have argued, for
international
which
the ability of some
that
by
they mean
sensitivity
interdependence,
example,
of others, 'can provide the basis
states to capitalise on the dependence
constraints
influence only when the rules and norms in effect can be taken
for significant political
cannot be understood,
they
for granted'.53 The full effects of this interdependence
term
in the political bargaining
'the
"translation"
without
what
note,
examining
they
and Nye
process'.54 We propose here that this bargaining process, which Keohane
and convergent
did not study, will be affected by the balance between negotiated
the relative importance of one type of bargaining being inversely related
bargaining,
to
52
the
A
other.
range of views exists on the importance
the neorealist
view in Theory of International
in 'International
Systems and International
1965), pp. 88-122.
remarkable
Compare
Hoffmann
Praeger,
Even
of norms
Politics,
Law',
in the Soviet-American
Cold War.
pp. 170ff, with that of Stanley
in The State of War (New York:
norms favourable
to
revolution weakened
if it is conceded
that the modern
diplomatic
it remains to be explained
how the 'almost continuous
warfare' noted by Craig
classical diplomacy,
norms
in the classical period
classical diplomatic
and George
p. 16) permitted
(Force and Statecraft,
to arise.
53
Robert
and Joseph
O. Keohane
18. Emphasis
added.
1977), p.
54
Ibid.
S. Nye
Jr, Power
and Interdependence
(Boston,
MA:
Little,
Brown,