Download The current financial crisis began in the United States` subprime

The current financial crisis began in the United States’ subprime crisis in Aug. 2007, but it wasn’t
until its escalation last autumn, that the subsequent credit crunch precipitated a global slowdown
in economic activity and an utter collapse in global trade. The global contraction soon exposed
many of Europe’s underlying structural problems, particularly in the Baltics, the Caucasus (can
probably take out the Caucasus), Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The scope of the problem
called for bold and swift action, and since October 2008 we’ve witnessed an unprecedented
showing of support by governments and monetary authorities for the financial, banking and
household sectors. The responses have helped tremendously to bring Europe’s economy back
from the brink of collapse and put growth on track, indeed the EU just exited recession in the third
quarter of 2009 after 5 straight quarters of contraction.
However, while the recession may be technically over, the financial crisis in Europe is not. Banks
are still expected to write-down some 200 to 400 billion euros through 2011, and Germany’s
Bundesbank recently warned that Germany alone faces another 60 to 90 billion euros next year.
While many financial problems and structural imbalances have yet to be resolved or work their
way through the system, it’s clear that rising unemployment, lower growth and higher public
indebtedness will haunt nearly every European government for years to come.
Demand Collapses Without Credit
The root of the financial crisis in Europe was the unsustainable consumption binge fueled by
cheap credit. The cheap credit was initially provided by (1) the spreading of very low interest rates
through euro adoption by new eurozone members, and (2) various forms of the carry-trade which,
under the aegis of stable FX foreign exchange (we do not use the FX abbreviation at STRAT)
rates, brought low interest rates to non-eurozone economies.
When the arrival of this credit ignited consumption two things happened: (1) prices, growth and
investment began to increase, and (2) that increase set into motion the self-reinforcing banking
phenomenon known as leveraging. Since the new demand bid prices up, it led to investment and
growth, and therefore to job creation and more consumption. At the same time, as the value of
the collateral posted for these loans increased (i.e. a house in Spain or Ireland), it made the
destinations more attractive for investment while enabling banks to increase lending further by
flattering their capital ratios. As more and more banks piled into these emerging markets not only
was more credit provided but competition for market exposure made the credit cheaper—all of
which simply stoked more consumption, more growth, and ultimately more credit. (let’s get this
paragraph slimmed down. I think using “leveraging” is important, but I think you explanation of it
could be explained more simply.
It’s unclear how much longer this self-reinforcing credit orgy could have lasted in the absence of
the U.S. subprime crisis, but when the financial crisis escalated in autumn of last year, both
abruptly reversed as capital was called in or flew to safety. Since credit was caught in the
undertow, the ensuing crunch precipitated the global slowdown in economic activity and the utter
collapse of global trade.
Financial Sector and Banking Support
Credit is the lifeblood of the economy. When banks cannot or will not financing finance the
economy, trade is paralyzed, small and medium-sized enterprises cannot invest, and households
can’t consume— in other words, economic activity simply cannot take place without credit. To
keep economies from buckling under their own weight and giving way to a self-reinforcing
deflationary spiral, therefore, monetary authorities and governments have tried to address the two
areas worst hit by the crisis— credit and demand— by easing credit conditions and supporting
demand through various fiscal measures and public works.
The crisis’ effects on European countries have varied based on the exposure to toxic assets,
prevalence of foreign currency-denominated lending, reliance on exports, and the existence of
housing bubbles, amongst other imbalances. This asymmetry of the financial crisis’ effects has
therefore encouraged national, as opposed to pan-European, anti-crisis measures tailored
specifically to their respective country’s circumstances and vulnerabilities. There are, however,
some overarching themes to the public support to the financial and private sectors. VERY nice
graph
The first casualty of the liquidity financial crisis was credit. To address the liquidity shortage and
ease credit conditions, Europe’s central banks slashed interest rates and pumped money into
their economies by modifying or establishing new liquidity facilities, such as currency swap
facilities explain to address FX-denominated loans. The ECB extended the maturity on its repo
(“repurchase agreement”) operations explain and lowered collateral requirements, enabling banks
to use more of their assets as collateral and obtain cheaper credit the ECB for longer (the SNB
spell out always on first use even lowered its repo rate to 5 bps at one point, so it was probably
more than free because… ).
Though the measures have varied from state to state, most governments have sought to
supporting the functioning of the financial and banking sector by involved all or some combination
of the following: earmarking public funds for capital injections and asset purchases, established
impaired asset relief facilities (‘bad banks”), granted loan/deposit guarantees, and established
liquidity faculties. Shouldn’t this paragraph go above the one above? This one just seems more
broad, whereas the one above is more detailed. I like to go from broad to more detailed.
The second casualty, which is a function of the availability of credit, was the collapse in demand
for practically everything, especially as threat of rising unemployment turned paychecks of
worried consumers into savings. Governments have therefore sought to lift aggregate demand
by increasing their own discretionary public spending. Discretionary spending has mainly taken
the form of stimulus packages, most of which have been aimed at infrastructure development—
list the size of the packages here (links). Governments have also brought forward spending or
reallocated to more critical purposes, notably aggregate demand. explain
The measures have also been designed to shelter the most vulnerable social groups from fallout
and have most often taken the form of targeted tax breaks/credits, subsidies and social transfers.
To stimulate demand, Governments have also sought to help households maintain their
consumption and further stimulate it. Germany, France, and the UK have all implemented car
scrappage schemes, whereby the government subsidizes the purchase of a new car if certain
criteria are met.
The collapse in demand means that many economies are facing serious overcapacity issues,
particularly in manufacturing (countries) and the construction sectors (Ireland, Spain), both of
which are labor intensive. You are trying to say here that this could lead to unemployment… say it
directly. Therefore, to protect households’ ability to consume, governments have sought to
preserve their income by targeting unemployment through wage subsidies and employment
schemes that motivate employers to hoard labor.
Germany has implemented a short-shift
scheme that subsidies a portion of their wages that would otherwise not have been lost due to the
lower hours worked, list other country examples here.
These measures have been relatively effective and unemployment has only risen by X
percentage points (pps.) since 200X. we want probably 2007 numbers compared to 2009
forecasts But without further extension of or the introduction of new ones, the schemes are
expire at the end of this year and next. As such, the EC expects unemployment to rise through
2011 to X percent in the eurozone and Y percent in the EU-27.
I think this section needs a graphic (can just be a text chart) that shows all the different
government stimulus efforts enacted by Europe.
Lending Will Be Slow to Resume Without Employment Ok, this is where you start talking
about the NOW… so let’s make the title more badass
By supporting credit, consumption, and employment governments have stopped by the
contractions and growth resumed in the 3rd quarter of 2009. LINK to piece on third quarter growth
However, despite these positive readings, the financial crisis in Europe is far from over.
Lets let the graph above really soke in…
While there has been some improvement in financial conditions in recent quarters, credit
nevertheless remains tight because of the expectation of rising unemployment when the
temporary measures peter out and the expectation of further writedowns, particularly in Europe’s
larger economies:
Germany, Italy, Spain. We really need some numbers on what these
writedowns are expected to be… maybe a GRAPHIC with some figures. Probably want to insert
them here…
The expectation that Unemployment (right?) will rise once the temporarily simulative measures
expire is one reason why banks’ suppressing lending. Unless an economic recovery clearly gains
traction, and the economic fog clears and the true health of the economy is no longer obscured
by government fueled growth, banks have reason to remain risk averse, preferring to instead
continue to reduce financial exposure to risky markets, pull back on lending, pay down debts, and
repair their balance sheets. Banks need to know that they’ve hit bottom because stimulus
measures are unsustainable.
Banks are holding back on lending because they are expecting further writedowns, which could
get worse if unemployment rises when the measures fade out. The housing bust has a significant
impact on the banking sector as NPLs are expected to rise
OS items Marko sent to Eurasia

X writedowns since 2007

200-400 billion euros of writedowns to come by the end of 2010 (EC forecast)
Germany’s banks not lending (link) GRAPHIC?
What it all means for growth
The two important factors weighing on future potential growth are risk aversion and the cost of
capital. If either risk aversion or the cost of capital to remain elevated for an extended period of
time, either one could depress potential growth by restricting foreign capital inflows and
investment, both of which would necessary to regain the capacity and size lost to the crisis on a
decent time scale.
Secondly, another round of financial re-regulation will likely place tighter
controls on both lenders and borrowers, which could severely restricting the abundant of foreign
capital that had once helped the Baltic countries, such as Latvia, achieve rapid growth. The first
part of this graph is not really clear, the second sounds like it was written by the Economist.
Remember that it was precisely because there was no regulation of the “abundant foreign capital”
that Lilliputian states like the Baltics achieved ludicrous growth they should have never achieved.
Also weighing on future growth will be competitiveness lost during the boom years. There is still
a bubble in unit labor costs, particularly in Latvia and Spain explain. One way to reduce these
costs and regain competitiveness would be to devalue their currency, but their ability to do this is
severely restricted because of either their large stock of FX-denominated debt (X, Y, Z), they
cannot devalue because they’re in the eurozone, or they’re maintaining a peg to the euro (Latvia)
in hopes of joining the eurozone, which is viewed as a accession criteria. Ahh yes… the question
of whether to devalue and export or maintain peg and repay debt… You definitely want to link to
my
monstrosity:
Armageddon
Averted
here:
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090801_recession_central_europe_part_1_armageddon_aver
ted These two paragraphs are kind of iffy. The first paragraph I don’t like and I am not sure
where it goes. The second I just think might need to be moved somewhere.
Anemic Growth Means Lower Revenues and Rising Expenditure
Public finances have taken a serious hit because of the financial crisis because spending is up
and revenue is down. Governments have had to shell out cash to support the economy while the
declining and lower economic activity has depressed tax receipts.
Government stimulus
spending has caused an explosion in debt across of the EU, with every country running a defici
with the exception of Bulgaria…. Something like that. As such, every country in the EU with the
exception of Bulgaria is running a deficit this year above the 3 percent threshold specified by the
Maastricht Treaty guidelines, indeed the eurozone average is X and the EU average in Y. These
two trends have negative implications for member states’ overall level of indebtedness, and this
year the gross government debt (which excludes contingent liabilities like bank guarantees etc) is
supposed to jump by X pps and by 2011 the eurozone is suppressed to be A and the EU is
supposed to be B— way above the 60 percent stipulated by the treaty.
Deteriorated public finances puts pressures on governments ability to finance their deficits as
investors start to question the government’s ability to service their debts, thus lenders start
demanding a higher risk premium for lending. There is positive feedback loop between overall
levels of indebtedness and the risk premium explain what this means, and this is particularly
worrisome for governments’ ability to finance their deficits unless the governments can not only
put forth credible plans for fiscal consolidation but also effectively prosecute them.
Here, I think we need some sort of a graphic that talks about the most highly threatened
economies… We need to talk specifically about Greece and the fact that the Europeans are
meeting on Dec. 17 to talk about its problems like we discussed today on econ.
http://imarketnews.com/node/5667
European governments’ age-related expenditure has also been expected to rise due in large part
to Europe’s general infertility and rapidly aging population. That phenomenon is still very much in
place (Chart: birthrates).
The EC has forecast that the EU’s age-related expenses as a
percentage of GDP in the EU will rise by 5 percentage points by 2060, up to an average of about
30 percent.
Since the bursting of that debt-fueled consumption and investment bubble has deflated the size of
nearly every EU economy, in some regions, particularly the Baltic’s, quite significantly. (CHART:
GDP declines) it has also reduced the tax base from which government generate their revenues.
Wow, super unclear first sentence… let’s break it down simply… it is a nice point, let’s just
explain it.
This is particularly bad for tax-intensive sectors like finance sectors (UK) and
construction (Spain, Ireland). Additionally, restricted capital flows and lending regulations could
potentially keep it there for a while, meaning the tax base could be smaller for longer. Structurally
lower growth is going to amplify increasing debts’ impact on public finances if their ability to
generate revenue sufficient to cover both the increasing interest burden and pay down principal in
compromised.
Issues going forward
There is a great amount of divergence between the recoveries, which is masked by aggregate
numbers. While Germany and France, who account for X percent of Eurozone GDP, have been
able to implement big stimulus packages etc, they’ve weighted the eurozone recovery, despite
the fact that smaller countries are falling behind. But growth has returned to more than just
Germany and France though Divergence has raised issues about protectionism (since Germany
doesn’t want to foot the bill for Europe’s recovery), and threatened EU and eurozone solidarity,
and pushed EU expansion into the future. I think there certainly is a time-bomb aspect built into
this for the future… let me think about how we want to address this.
Eastern European countries (which are at the epicenter of the financial crisis in Europe) still have
many structural imbalances that need adjustment that need to be made before an economic
recovery can begin in earnest— among these are the still high levels of external debt (the real
cost of servicing of which has increased exchange rates have moved against them), the ongoing
need for households to deleverage, ongoing adjustments in the labor market and in labor costs,
public finances and expected write-downs. These adjustments will be gradual and take time to
work their way through the system, which means that central Europe is in for a long slog. I would
like to expand this graph.
Additionally, since some countries are unable to use their currency as an instrument to address
these imbalances due to high levels of FX-denominated debts (Hungary) or eurozone accession
hopes (Latvia), fiscal policy will be key to very important to keeping the economy on track, which
means that general elections in Romania (now), Poland (October 2010), Czech Republic (May
2010), and Hungary (Spring 2010) need to be followed closely. We are basically banking on
Europeans
So far the recovery has been led by large countries and big stimulus packages (insert q3 notes
here), but as these temporary stimulus measures peter out towards the end of this year and next,
the pressure on the financial sector to resume its financing of the economy will become all the
more critical. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091113_eurozone_quarter_growth
Again, not so sure man. Poland has not had a single quarter of recession thus far, Slovakia
averaged 1.6 percent growth, Lithuania was at ludicrous 6 percent for 3 rd quarter, Austria and
Portugal at 0.9… The idea that this is Germany and France leading Europe out is not completely
true (not wrong either, just not what I want to conclude the piece with).