Download In the AfPak review President Obama stated that the US would

1. In the AfPak review President Obama stated that the US would continue its focus on
breaking the momentum of the Taliban and invest in better governance in Afghanistan. Do
you think the US-NATO forces will be able to achieve its military goals?
Ahmed Rashid
Journalist and author of Taliban and Descent into Chaos
No, I don’t think so, because the military goals need to be supplemented by strategic talks with
the Taliban, the US and NATO. There can be no military victory as the surge won’t be successful,
because it is not sustainable and lacks support from the Afghanistan government and police.
Ayaz Wazir
Former Ambassador
If they couldn’t achieve that in nine years, how are they going to achieve it now when they have
already declared that the withdrawal momentum will begin from July 2011 onwards and
culminate by 2014? It will not happen because they have used every practice in Afghanistan,
[yet] they have not subdued the Taliban and they have recently announced a policy of
reconciliation and reintegration. The Afghanistan president had already constituted a high level
peace council for this purpose but if the Obama administration is now focussing on military
success, then where is it going? Why is he bent upon moving the goal posts? That will not bring
the desired peace into the region.
General (rtd.) Talat Masood
Former General, Defence Analyst
The military goals depend on how the transition takes place and the transition depends on how
the Afghan army is able to take on the responsibility of security in Afghanistan. Considering the
fact that at the moment there is hardly any representation of Pashtuns in the armed forces, the
army, the police and other services, it is somewhat problematic for these to be able to acquire a
national character. That is one of the major flaws. The other thing is that there is a lot of
resistance on part of the Pashtun community to join the army because they think that it is the
adversary, because the Northern Alliance has been used against them by the US. The cleavage
between the Tajiks and them is quite wide. So they are finding it difficult to recruit them. Much
would depend on how the armed forces are constituted and have been trained and have acquired
a national character. It is very difficult to foresee this happening by 2014, considering the
reaction of the Pashtuns, since I believe their representation is barely 4 per cent.
Dr. Rifaat Hussain
Head of Department, Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University
This is largely a question of operational strategy. The Americans have made gains against the
Taliban but have yet to push them out of the main areas, particularly in the south. This requires
expending many more resources, which may not bring about as many results. America must
develop the Afghan National Army as a credible alternative to the NATO forces to bring order to
Afghanistan. Unless governance is handed back to the Afghans, it will not be sustainable.
2. Will securing stability and governance in Afghanistan be accomplished by the strategy
outlined in the Review? What should be the roadmap for a post-conflict transition to a
stable political equation?
Ahmed Rashid
Journalist and author of Taliban and Descent into Chaos
What the review needs fundamentally is a change from a military strategy to a political strategy.
That, and talks with regional countries that have a stake in Afghanistan. At the moment, the
focus of the AfPak review was on the success or the failure of the military strategy, and as I said,
there is a lack of support from the Afghan police. There also have to be talks with the Taliban.
Aziz Ahmad Khan
Former Ambassador
The success of strategy will depend on how much trust and confidence the people in the conflict areas
have in the Afgan government’s ability to provide security from the Taliban. Presently, people depend on
the Taliban to save them from the excesses of the Afghan officials, particularly the Afghan police. The
Afghan government has to pull its act together and be in the forefront of providing governance and
security. The Americans should be providing just backup support; [they should] stay in the background.
Enough Afghan army and police personnel have been trained. We should not forget that the Taliban have
not been trained at any military academy and their number can’t be more than 20-30,000 at the most.
Soldiers afraid of getting killed can’t fight and that is what is wrong with the Afghan security forces. The
US can train another 200,000 and even then the Taliban will remain a threat if the Afghan army displays
the present levels of commitment and courage.
Mosharraf Zaidi
Analyst
The current strategy, which is rooted in the Bruce Riedel review ordered by President Obama early into
his administration, is incapable of delivering on any of the four key, interlinked, objectives that the US has
in AfPak. America wants security in Afghanistan, a better-governed Afghanistan than the one it took over
in 2001, an Al Qaeda-less AfPak region, and a stable and prosperous Pakistan.
However the US is constrained by the instruments available to it. These objectives require the instruments
currently employed by the US in the region “” military forces, diplomacy and development assistance.
However, the most important instrument required is time. US political cycles and domestic economic
imperatives make time in AfPak a most impossible commodity. Simply put, US objectives could be
achieved with a re-calibration of military force, diplomacy and development assistance “” but they cannot
be achieved under the duress of timelines such as July, 2011, and December, 2014.
Given the limitations of American power, because of time constraints, the roadmap for a stable political
equation in Afghanistan needs to be altered. The use of military force is a poor bargaining instrument,
especially when the ultimate solution will involve handing over power to parts of the groups against whom
force is currently being employed. Reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban requires the availability of the
threat of the use of force, not the actual use of it. The only rapid outcome that will resemble success for
the US in Afghanistan will be one that involves negotiations with the Taliban that ensure human rights for
the Afghan people, a cessation of all Taliban support and succour for global terrorist networks inspired
by, affiliated with or directly working as Al Qaeda.
Nasim Zehra
Journalist, Director Current Affairs at Dunya TV
The problem with the review is the denial of the scale of the problem, not the failure to identify the
elements required to solve the problems of violence and insecurity. The review correctly mentions good
governance, dialogue with the Taliban, ending Pakistan-based sanctuaries, military force and the Pakistan
factor amongst others as prerequisites for securing stability in Afghanistan. However, it leaves out
important factors such as a commitment to women’s participation and the need to factor in Pakistan’s
security concerns. Similarly, it does not acknowledge some critical elements that influence the effort to
stabilise Afghanistan. These include the Taliban’s military strength, war fatigue at the popular level, the
“˜occupation’ nature of the US-NATO forces, public support for Karzai’s dialogue initiative and the near
failure of the NATO effort to build up the Afghan National Army, etc.
The roadmap for a post-conflict transition should include entering into a dialogue with all the Afghan
forces willing to acknowledge the Afghan constitution as the document that sets the parameters for
governing the country. This must be a Karzai-led process, in partnership with Pakistan, which should
undertake to “˜deliver’ the Pakistan-based Taliban at the negotiating table. This process will also need the
tacit but low-profile backing of the US-Isaf forces. Depending on the conditions set by the warring factions,
while retaining their presence these forces may need to maintain a low profile and perhaps de-escalate
their military operations to create favourable conditions for dialogue. Additionally, international support
for the dialogue and the endorsement of a transitional roadmap will also be required.
General (rtd.) Talat Masood
Former General, Defence Analyst
Again, it’s very important for there to be representation of all the power centres in the post-withdrawal
period. That doesn’t seem to be the case as of now, because the present Karzai government is represented
by Tajiks and Uzbeks, rather than Pashtuns, in the real sense. It also has to acquire national character, and
the major ethnic community has to be associated with it. If that doesn’t happen then it is very likely that
Isaf and the American forces will withdraw, and the Taliban will fill the ranks. Corruption and governance
are also very important factors. Corruption will have to be controlled and governance has to be improved
in order to truly achieve any tangible results and get the people’s support, who will then be in a position
to support a future government. Otherwise they will lean on the Taliban or other local power centres.
3. What are Pakistan’s stakes in the endgame of this conflict? Should Islamabad review its
own strategy?
Ayaz Wazir
Former Ambassador
Obviously Islamabad has to seriously reconsider its policy towards Afghanistan. Islamabad and Rawalpindi
are not very serious about a policy towards the tribal areas of Pakistan, what to say of Afghanistan? The
tribal areas of Pakistan cannot be totally separated from the issue. If conditions are good in Afghanistan,
it will bring stability to FATA and vice versa. Pakistan has to seriously re-evaluate its policy towards
Afghanistan and particular emphasis has to be laid on reviewing its own tribal areas. Political leaders also
have to come into the field regarding FATA, which they have left to the army to handle for so many years
Mosharraf Zaidi
Analyst
There is no endgame in Afghanistan for Pakistan. Pakistan is situated in a location that makes a strong and
vibrant relationship between the two countries an essential ingredient to the mix of regional conditions
that could be described as stable, secure and prosperous. Both the weak Afghan state and the everweakening Pakistani state have a fundamental interest in pursuing stability, security and prosperity for
their people. Islamabad has allowed Rawalpindi, and a range of global capitals that includes Washington
D.C., Riyadh and London to consistently influence the shape of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The time
has come for infusing this relationship with facts and reason.
The bonds of fraternity between Afghans and Pakistanis are infinitely more powerful instruments of
foreign policy for both countries than the various ideologies injected into the narrative “” be they Islamist,
non-Islamist, nationalist, or Westernised. Millions of Afghans have roots and interests in Pakistan, and
reasonable leaders in Afghanistan have always expressed deep and sincere gratitude for Pakistan’s open
doors towards the Afghan people.
Linguistic, cultural, tribal and geographical bonds between the two countries are also not subject to
external factors. They predate conflict, and will exist long after the dust has settled.
Islamabad must invest in a constitutional government in Afghanistan that is a product of democratic
processes, as the current government is. It must encourage its friends in Afghanistan to reconcile and
make common cause with the constitutional government, and to eventually participate in formal politics.
Pakistan must support economic growth in Afghanistan, and allow special access to Afghan citizens to visit
Pakistan, live in Pakistan, do business with Pakistan, and learn and seek health in Pakistan.
None of this requires Pakistan to concede its legitimate concerns about Indian hegemony in the region.
However, imposing Pakistani fears onto the relationship with Afghanistan is a toxic policy posture that can
only do damage to long-term prospects for stability in the region.
General (rtd.) Talat Masood
Former General, Defence Analyst
Pakistan has to work as much as possible with the international community to see that Afghanistan is
stable, because the future of Pakistan’s stability is linked with Afghanistan’s stability. Pakistan should work
in a cooperative and positive mode. In case Afghanistan slips into anarchy after the withdrawal, then
Pakistan should take all measures to contain the situation and ensure that Pakistan suffers as little damage
as possible. We should be guarded and protected against adverse consequences if this situation arises.