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Nuclear diplomacy and some of its contradictions
By-M. Abdul Hafiz
The Daily Sun, 29 August 2012
When by the turn of the eighteenth century the Pax Britanica gave way to Pax
Americana there was no ripple in the public mood on either side of the Atlantic.
Because it was all in the family. Since then the meteoric rise of the United States to an
unrivalled military supremacy backed by a four trillion dollar economy could not but
be savoured by Anglosaxon Community in Europe and elsewhere. After all, the US is
the fine flowering of the European Civilisation which shaped the history of the
mankind and guided their destiny for nearly half a millennium.
Largely unaffected by the devastation of both the world wars – while her allies in
Europe lay prostrate in their ruins the US continued to boom economically and her
military industrial complexes flourished unabated. But it was the possession of her
nuclear weapons in the closing years of the Second-World War that instantly put her at
the apex of the international power structure. Today the whole debate ranging from the
NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), its un-conditional extension, Comprehensive Test Bar
Treaty (CTBT) and so on revolve essentially round her unwillingness to be dislodged
from that exalted position.
Subsequently the United States had to willy-nilly share her nuclear monopoly with
Britain, France and Soviet Union — her wartime allies — but certainly did not like to
see more fingers on the nuclear button. This American hope however, proved illusory.
It was a shock to the Western alliance with US at its helm when China exploded her
nuclear bomb in 1964. Because, so long it was confined only to the community and
now it would no more be its monopoly.
During the sixties at the height of the Cold War there were enough indications that
more countries would soon acquire nuclear capability. And the nuclear powers were
already contemplating putting a lid over further possible proliferation in future. The
Chinese proliferation only hastened the process. In the late sixties it was feared that up
to thirty countries would acquire nuclear weapons in 25 years thereafter.
It was thus high time that the expanded nuclear club now stopped the likelihood of a
nuclear Armageddon and maintained their monopoly over the nuclear weapons and the
privileges that went with the capability of producing them. After a grand bargain, the
NPT was signed in 1970 for twenty-five years in return of a promised disarmament of
the nuclear stockpile by the nuclear powers. The NWS (Nuclear Weapon States) did
not keep their promise. On the other hand, NNWS (Non-nuclear Weapons States) did.
They, out of 78 signatories of the NPT, abided by the terms and obligations of the
treaty.
There were great restraints on the part of those which had the full potential of
producing nuclear weapons. The breach of trust between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have
nots’ brought to the fore some of the serious contradictions implicit in the
implementations of the treaty and a crisis of intent inherent in it remained a nagging
disincentive throughout. Not that the people did not understand the tricks resorted to by
either the nuclear watchdog or diplomats. But they had their own limitations in a world
of asymmetric dispensation of power of potential. If anything, NPT already proved not
only discriminatory but also highly immoral.
Nevertheless, as the NPT period 25 years came to a close, obviously the NWS lobby
had fresh anxiety to review and extend it. For this the case was built right from the
days of Iraq conflict in 1991. The alleged nuclear build-up of Iraq and a few other
instances were frequently quoted for justifying the extension and strengthening of
NPT. Soon afterwards the world witnessed with apparent helplessness how the great
power condominium blatantly carried through the extension of the treaty by an open
voting and how the conditions for nuclear disarmament and time limit for it imposed in
1970 were also dispensed with thus making the nuclear discrimination a permanent
feature of international politics.
When the marathon conference on disarmament in Geneva is viewed in the backdrop
of NPT extended unconditionally and indefinitely the question of comprehensive test
ban treaty seems to be a veritable enigma. There are still at least two irritants for it for
NWS. The nuclear threshold countries — India, Pakistan and Israel staged out of the
NPT extension as they did even in the initial conclusion of the treaty itself in 1970.
The CTBT is yet another exercise aimed at roping them in and restraining them from
possible proliferation on their part. The CTBT, in reality, embodies a major strategic
confrontation between the US and China and the game played in the conference on
disarmament is merely a charade. The USA’s main purpose in CTBT is to freeze
China’s nuclear Weapon Technology at the current technological level. On the part of
the Chinese they want to avoid a confrontation with the US at this stage and are trying
to get as much advantage as possible from the deliberations on CTBT. They knew that
in case, India with her very high stake in the issue was likely to block it.
If the nuclear powers are really serious about making the plant nuclear free they would
have first dismantled their own nuclear arsenal instead of urging the other nations to
give up their nuclear option. Far from this, some of the NWS countries, France and
China were carrying out live tests even recently while the CTBT was being debated.
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The CTBT, in fact only partially bans the test because it allows the NWS to carry out
simulated, low yield and hydro nuclear tests.
It is blatant hypocrisy to ban the tests, but not put restriction on the perfection of the
nuclear weaponry through high technology acquired by some of the NWS. The biggest
question that remains unanswered at the end of the day is what happens to the nuclear
stockpile already possessed by the NWS. It is difficult to be convinced that the world
will be safe with any amount of non-proliferation or test ban while the present
stockpile holds mankind hostage to the five members of the nuclear club. The planet is
already on the top of an active volcano of massive nuclear arsenal which even after the
reduction achieved through the INF treaty and START-I as well as START-II grew to
about a million times the fire power of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs with total yield
of 20,000 million ton of TNT-enough to destroy the world fifty times over.
Brig (retd) M Abdul Hafiz is a former DG of BIISS.
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