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Maritime Defence and Security
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Maritime Defence and Security
Introduction
The United States’ Forward Maritime Strategy of the 1980’s affected various
offensive activities in Europe’s Northern Waters, which unquestionably was a major
reason for the Soviet’s military posture in Central Europe.
The Maritime Strategy of the 1980’s
The Maritime Strategy was conceived in the 1980’s, in a period often called the
Second Cold War. The enemy, at the time of the 1980’s Maritime Strategy was solely the
Soviet Union, not Communist China or any other Communist nation. This strategy was
thus formulated as a tactical move against a single enemy. In terms of geography, this
strategy focused on four sets of seas in the vicinity of the Soviet, “each set being
composed of a near, or inner, sea and a further, or outer one” (Kurth 2007, p. 587). The
Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea were considered the most important, the Barents Sea
because it contained a strong presence of Soviet attack submarines and missile-launching
submarines. The others were the Baltic Sea and the North Sea; the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean Sea; and the Sea of Okhotst and the Sea of Japan. (Kurth 2007).
Containment and deterrence were the central concepts guiding the maritime strategy of
the 1980’s. Deterrence here is conceived as both nuclear and conventional.
The Scandinavian Peninsula and the Northern Waters were in the 1980’s an object
of tactical and strategic interest to the United States and the Soviet Union. The “Cold
Water Politics” of this time witnessed an offensive US maritime strategy that sought to
keep the Soviet from venturing into northern Europe so that US interests would be
protected in these areas, even though these were essentially “Soviet home waters”.
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(Tunander, 1989). US cruise missiles and its offensive strategy on the whole provoked
the Soviet to undertake defensive activities in Scandinavian waters.
Inter-service cooperation
In these collisions, the US Navy received considerable assistance from the US Air
Force. In 1982, the US Air Force and Navy even signed a Memorandum of Agreement,
with the object of undertaking “joint operational plans to fight the Soviets at Sea”
(Chipman 1990, p.1). As part of this cooperative effort, B-52’s were assigned to fly minelaying missions and harpoon strikes. In 1988, an exercise was conducted by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the Norwegian Sea, part of which involved B52’s planting capsulated torpedo (CapTor) minefields. The aim of this activity was to
check the Allies’ capability to conduct a campaign in the Norwegian Sea. (Chipman
1990). The Goldwater-Nichols Act, passed in the 1990’s by Congress, also served to
eliminate inter-service rivalry between the army, navy and air force. (Kurth 2007, p.
598).
These activities were followed by an upgrading of the Soviet’s submarine
program, which focused on protecting ballistic missile submarines in the Barents Sea.
(Chipman 1990).
Official Argument for the US Maritime Strategy
The US Navy’s strategy during the Cold War was intended to counter any threat
of Soviet maritime forces, since shipments from the US to Europe would have been
disrupted had war broken out. Soviet submarines and long-range bombers would have
been deployed in such an eventuality. NATO’s “sea control” strategy saw the
establishment of interceptive defensive barriers between Greenland, Iceland, and the UK
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as a tactic to prevent the Soviet from closing down sea-routes to Europe. (Congressional
Budget Office 2000).
The US maritime strategy of the mid-1980’s saw an offensive strategy which
“called for attacking Soviet maritime forces as far as possible – in their home bases or as
they traversed the Norwegian Sea en route to the Atlantic” (CBO 2000, pp.7). The US
navy justified such a strategy with the argument that Soviet forces would upset NATO
sea control in the Atlantic if given unquestioned access. Thus, US attack submarines were
deployed in the destruction of both Soviet submarines that could fire nuclear ballistic
missiles and even those “in defensive bastions near the Soviet homeland” (pp.7). US
Navy investment in attack submarines and anti-submarine warfare systems was
prioritized, as were investments in systems on surface ships that could resist air attacks.
Both strategies, the sea control strategy and the maritime strategy, were based on
the assumption that the Soviet would undertake an offensive strategy if allowed freely
into the Atlantic Ocean. Thus the goal of the Navy during the 1980’s was “to have a fleet
of 600 ships, including 100 attack submarines and 15 aircraft carriers” (par.9).
Soviet Maritime strategy
Unlike the US Navy’s strategy, the Soviet had until Gorshkov not espoused
“ocean-going offensive strategy” and its naval activities had been restricted to “short
range coastal defence, mostly at campaign levels” (Youji 2002, p.3). Military spending of
the Soviet focused on the building up of nuclear arsenal to the extent that there was no
well-established maritime strategy since the navy was considered essentially inferior to
the army, and in a way an arm of the army, without its own strategy. However, given that
the navy did not possess an exclusive strategy apart from the Soviet’s overall military
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strategy, this also meant that there was a high level of coordination between the army,
navy and air force in any operation near home waters. (Youji 2002, p.4)
Even when the Soviet did begin to make attempts to formulate a maritime strategy
in the 1960’s, this was in response to maritime activities of the US Navy. Gorshkov
initiated the establishment of a defence line in coastal waters in order to protect Moscow
from attacks by US Polaris missiles with a range of 1500 nautical miles. Even when these
were extended to the Norwegian Sea, it was to counter nuclear attacks by the US, through
the operation of the Soviet Northern Fleet consisting of nuclear submarines. Although the
Soviet did eventually develop an ocean-going offensive capability, this came about after
several decades of a defensive strategy. (Youji 2002, p. 7)
US policy of forward presence
The US Navy’s policy of forward presence pre-positioned the US Navy in various
regions, as a preemptive move against naval threat. (Preble 1993, p. 5). This policy was
envisioned as a method of checking the Soviet forces and the threat it posed in Western
Europe and East Asia. (Youji 2002, p. 6). During the Cold War, the US Navy checked
Soviet Forces in 2 ways. Firstly, nuclear attack on the US was prevented by maintaining
“retaliatory strike capability” through presence of ballistic missile submarines. Secondly,
“intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions” were frequently undertaken to
monitor the Soviet Navy’s expansion. (Submarine Centenial, p.2)
Although the US Navy argues that the Maritime Strategy came about in response
to the Soviet’s expanding nuclear arsenal and the growing presence of its submarines in
the Norwegian Sea, it cannot be denied that the US Navy’s own strategy in the 1980’s
heightened tension and triggered the offensive military stance of the Soviet in Central
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Europe. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in the 1980’s, Admiral James Watkins,
developed the Maritime Strategy along with the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman.
(Kurth 2007).
Impact on Soviet military posture
US Maritime Strategy and the ensuing destruction of Soviet strategic missile
submarines instigated military aggression by the Soviet in Russia, and proof of this lies in
the “barrage of arms-control proposals from Muscow that also aim to restrict naval
operations in the sea approaches to the Soviet missile submarine bastions” (Langdon &
Ross, p. 21).
In formulating a maritime strategy the US did not factor in the possibility of
conventional deterrence exacerbating the crisis. In deciding on an offensive strategy, the
US overlooked the fact that “decision makers might still opt for war even though the risks
of military action are very high” (Mearsheimer 1986), p.6). Also, “rival deterrent
postures” might be “configured so as to cause fears and provide incentives to strike first
in a crisis” (p. 7). It might then follow that Soviet military policy in Europe in the 1980’s
did stem forth from the offensive US Maritime Strategy. Soviet military planning was
guided by the “exaggeration of the military threat posed by the West” which encouraged
“exaggerated notions of the force requirements necessary to meet it” (Jones et.al, p. 319).
The offensive maritime strategy was counter-productive in that it actually served to
undermine deterrence. Mearsheimer notes in 1986 how the Maritime Strategy with its
combination of “four offensive concepts (direct military impact, horizontal escalation,
offensive sea control, and counterforce coercion)” would not contribute to preventing a
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war in Europe, but would in fact undermine “NATO’s deterrent posture”. (Mearsheimer
1986, p. 56).
The Soviet enhanced its military capability in the mid-1980s in Europe and this
definitely followed from NATO’s offensive strategy and the US Maritime Strategy.
Between 15 to 17 percent of the Soviets Annual GNP was devoted to military spending
by the mid-1980s, and there was a per annum increase of 4 to 7 percent in defense
expenditures. A military budget of 77.3 billion rubles in 1989 saw the Soviet exert its
military strength in Europe. According to analysts in the west, the budget was actually
double of that declared by Gorbachev. The 1980’s thus saw an increased spending on
weapons research and development, training, military construction, and arms production.
By the end of the 1980’s the Soviet army was greatly feared in Europe. (Global Security
Organisation)
Conclusion
The US Maritime Strategy of the 1980’s saw the US Navy take on an offensive
stance in order to prevent potential threats from the Soviet in the open ocean. This
strategy saw a build up of attack submarines that were positioned in waters surrounding
the Soviet. This Strategy saw a retaliatory build-up of the Soviet’s military power with
increased military spending and a demonstration of military strength. That the Maritime
Strategy of the US had an enormous bearing on the Soviet’s aggressive stance in Europe
during this time is a very strong argument. Even advisors like Mearsheimer in the 1980’s
had spoken against such an excessive strategy, pointing to how it would not guarantee
deterrence. The build-up of US naval power in Soviet’s home seas necessitated Soviet
military action in Europe as a tactical response.
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References
Chipman, D.,D. (1990). The Transformation of Soviet Maritime Air Operations
Implications for US Maritime Strategy. Airpower Journal, Summer 1990.
Retrieved
from
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj90/sum90/5sum90.htm
Congressional Budget Office. (2000). Budgeting for Naval Forces: Structuring
Tomorrow’s Navy at Today’s Funding Level. Chapter One: The US Navy in the
Post-Cold War World. Retrieved from
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=2603&type=0&sequence=2
Global Security.org. Russian Military Budget. (2011). Retrieved on February 18, 2012
from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mo-budget.htm
Jones, S.M.L. (1989). Soviet Military Policy: an International Security Reader.
Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
Kurth, J. (2007). The New Maritime Strategy: Confronting Peer Competitors, Rogue
States, and Transnational Insurgents. Orbis. Fall 2007, p.585-600. Foreign Policy
Research Institute.
Langdon, F., & Ross, D.A. (1990). Superpower Maritime Strategy in the Pacific. New
York, London: Routledge.
Mearsheimer, J.J. (1986). A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in
Europe. International Security, 11(2). Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Preble, C.A. (1993). Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 195: The Cold War Navy in the
Post War World.
Maritime Defence and Security
Submarine Centennial. (n.d). The Cold War. Retrieved on February 17, 2012 from
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Tunander, O. (1989). Cold Water Politics - the Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the
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Youji. (2002). The Evolution of China’s Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models: 19492001. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. Singapore.
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