Download 169554_South Africa - Looking Forward

South Africa – Looking Forward (A Strategic Agenda)
The 2009 monograph on South Africa establishes the following five points as South Africa’s strategic
imperatives. These imperatives govern the country’s actions and are the departure point for this
discussion. The objective is to identify key opportunities and constraints that will emerge as South Africa
continues its development. This will guide forecasting and shape the assessment of South Africa’s
progress towards its inherent goals.
South African Strategic Imperatives:
1. Establish control of the highlands, or the eastern half of the country’s interior. Effective control also requires
holding sufficient portions of the southern and south-eastern coasts to ensure access to the port facilities
necessary for international trade. While the highlands are not where the modern country of South Africa got its
start — which was in Cape Town — they are nevertheless the country’s core.
2. Extend the state’s reach east, south and west to the sea in order to gain control over the entire tip of the South
African peninsula, along with the ports this territory provides. (Historically, “South Africa” achieved this aim
before it achieved control over the highlands, but this was during colonial times when an outside power with
different interests was using the territory for its own benefit.)
3. Utilize state power to remove political restrictions on using the regional labor pool in order to better tap the
Kimberley and Johannesburg region’s mineral wealth. This includes such strategies as granting economic
incentives, relaxing immigration and migration laws and militarily intimidating neighboring states.
4. Seek out international economic partners both to serve as markets for the country’s mineral wealth and as
sources of finance.
5. Take advantage of the lack of alternate port facilities and local financing sources throughout southern Africa to
extend the labor policy (including the economic incentives and military intimidations that go with it) north. This
provides the state with economic opportunities, deep influence with local rivals and a buffer against potential
foes farther afield.
In the present and in the immediate future South Africa faces no threat to the achievement of its first
two imperatives. Its borders are not threatened and the interior and coastal regions are politically
united in parliamentary democracy. The country will therefore be free focus on the latter three
imperatives, the achievement of which will first ensure South African economic and cultural stability and
then enable large-scale growth, consolidation of the country’s economic supremacy in sub-Saharan
Africa and its emergence as a regional hegemon.
South Africa is primarily constrained by a number of social issues which limit its productive capacity and
raise the risk of instability. In addition, while enjoying vast mineral resources, the country is dependent
on petroleum imports and suffers from a shortage of fresh water. The mitigation of these constraints
consumes much of the national budget and defines the fundamental question of how to simultaneously
pay for this mitigation and manage growth. South African expansion toward an endgame of regional
hegemony is ultimately based on economic dominance of the region supported by diplomatic and
military coercion. Politically however, the pursuit of these objectives without adequately addressing
social concerns could threaten the dominance of the ruling African National Congress (ANC). The rise in
ideological division and the emergence of political tribalism/regionalism will strengthen opposition
forces within and outside of the ruling party. This will ultimately lead to the fragmentation of the current
ruling alliance, though it will do everything in its power to continue to consolidate its position.
Social Imperatives:
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Stabilize and expand public healthcare provision and contain the impact of HIV/AIDS
Rebuild the public education system to raise the national skills base
Align migration policies and management with national interests
A discussion of social issues identifies the major constraints that act against South African advancement.
An understanding of these issues is critical to an assessment of the vigor with which South Africa will
face the future. Key issues include unemployment, education and skills, health and migration.
The official unemployment rate in recent years has been in the region of 25%. The economy is
unsustainably reliant on the public sector to create jobs and the onus will need to shift to the private
sector for growth to be sustained. An economy approaching structural full employment is crucial for
ensuring stability and internal demand. Crucial to private sector job growth is the relative
competitiveness of South African labor and fundamental to this is the national skills base. Currently, the
legacy of the apartheid education system and its gross mismanagement post-apartheid is reinforcing
and worsening the national skills deficit.
Underpinning these issues, is the fact that some 6 million people are living with HIV/AIDS in South
Africa, more than in any other country. The Mbeki government’s mishandling of the problem was
criminally negligent and though the Zuma regime has made progress, it has not been quickly enough to
materially improve the situation. More broadly, South Africa’s health system is facing an ever-increasing
burden on public facilities to provide services but also a progressive deterioration of infrastructure and
depletion of resources. While the system remains functional, it is under serious threat of collapse and is
a huge cost burden on the state.
South Africa has seen mass immigration since 1994 particularly as a result of deteriorating situations in
Zimbabwe and the DRC. Insufficient management of this flow and the formal economy’s inability to
absorb these immigrants has contributed to social instability. While South Africa has benefitted from
migrant labor throughout its history, it now has limited need for unskilled foreign labor as the local labor
pool is more than able to meet increased demand. Government policy of providing basic services such as
free healthcare to foreign nationals is also an enormous fiscal drain which delivers limited benefit. The
result is that the threat of further xenophobic violence persists and could develop on a larger scale than
has previously occurred. In addition, large-scale emigration of skilled citizens has occurred since the end
of Apartheid and has served to weaken the public sector in particular. The economic downturn has
drawn some emigrants back however, the loss of skilled employees, particularly doctors and engineers,
is likely to continue. (For discussion - On this issue I diverge from the strategic imperative – I don’t believe
that the mass unskilled immigration has been a positive development. More important is effective
utilization of the local labor market)
These social constraints represent the core of the threat to South African development. The ANC
government has so far been more comfortable pursuing a top-down approach to these problems,
preferring to enact broad policies than get involved in the detail of actual troubleshooting. It must also
be remembered though that while the conditions described above are dire, they are often vastly
superior to other African countries and as such South Africa enjoys a relative advantage in its basic
healthcare and education infrastructure.
Areas to watch:
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Individual social issues are not of day-to-day concern, however policies to address them are
indicators of power alignment of individuals within government and of South Africa’s
development prospects going forward
Increasingly frequent and disruptive strike action, popular protest and/or xenophobic violence.
This will indicate the level of tolerance/intolerance of the electorate towards these issues.
Ongoing improvement or decline in the key social metrics are a measure of South Africa’s ability
and appetite for greater regional involvement
Economic Imperatives:
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Utilize excess labor capacity to maintain stability and drive growth
Foster a business friendly climate to ensure long-term foreign investment while securing the
interests of the private business elite
Shore up state finances and diversify income streams to fund development
Despite massive mineral reserves and a net exporting agricultural base, South Africa is constrained by
reliance on oil imports and scarcity of water resources. An abundance of coal means that oil is primarily
used for transportation and while import sources are diversified, the country is susceptible to oil price
hikes. Despite its large river systems, South Africa has insufficient fresh water to meet demand and must
rely on cheap imports from large transfer schemes in Lesotho and Mozambique. While little can be done
to mitigate oil price volatility, the growing global awareness of the value of fresh water poses a threat to
South African resource security. The country therefore retains an interest in keeping its supplier
neighbors underdeveloped and reliant on receipts from these schemes. It is possible that reform of the
South African Customs Union (SACU) will prompt Lesotho in particular to explore its water tariff
agreement with South Africa.
The South African economy accounts for around 40% of the GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa (This share may
have decreased in recent years as high oil prices have driven revenues in West Africa). South Africa is also
the biggest foreign investor in the region by some margin. Despite its first contraction since 1992, the
local economy handled the global downturn well, largely due to foreign exchange restrictions and
counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The growth outlook remains moderate however, in part because of social
inhibitors but also as a result of tight credit conditions and continuing long-term currency volatility.
Credit for the economy’s robust performance has been attributed to the finance ministry’s resistance to
calls to relax or abolish exchange controls. This ultimately reduced South African exposure to global
financial markets and limited the extent of capital flight, though in good times it has the effect of
restricting the attraction of foreign investment. Calls from the Left to abandon inflation targeting, review
the independence of the central bank and to nationalize key industries have thus far been resisted,
however, the ANC recognizes the need to retain an attractive business environment for foreign
investment and the likelihood of substantial policy shifts is low.
South Africa will remain a significant economic presence on the continent, however the maturity of its
mineral resources and its failure to invest in domestic demand risk reducing its relative importance over
time. Existing commitments to healthcare, education and a substantial social welfare system mean that
state finances are already stretched. This is compounded by the fact that the increasingly overburdened
tax base is shrinking relative to the number of people who are becoming reliant on welfare provision.
The result is that the government will be hard pressed to retain current levels of spending let alone
increase capacity to address its strategic imperatives.
The fundamental economic question is therefore: How will South Africa fund the measures required to
address its internal constraints and simultaneously fuel its expansion?
The issue of nationalization of some or all of South Africa’s mining interests (an agenda primarily driven
by the ANC Youth League), has generated a large amount of debate and hysteria. It is important to
understand this proposal as an ideological response to the fundamental question posed above. As such
it is one among many possible options.
As a mechanism for stabilizing and boosting public finances, reducing reliance on external debt and
enabling self-funded infrastructure investment, the argument for increased state participation in
country’s core strategic industry is strong. Government take in South Africa is relatively low and a
version of the model has served South Africa’s northern neighbor Botswana well, among others.
Currently the government is highly sensitive to perceptions about the friendliness of the business
environment and it will want to ensure that any compromise protects property rights and provides for
fair market value on any asset transfer. Whether future policy tends towards nationalization, the current
liberalized approach or some as yet undetermined middle-ground, the imperative for South Africa is to
resolve the issue or at least provide clearer direction.
It is sometimes joked that South Africa is a third-world country suffering from a first-world constitution.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the labor market where restrictive labor regulations consistently
rank South Africa in the bottom percentile in the world for hiring and firing practices, flexibility of wage
determination and cooperation in labor-employer relations. This allied to the fact that the workforce is
poorly educated and entitled to relatively high minimum wages, means that labor force competitiveness
remains a fundamental hurdle to South Africa’s economic development. The general precept of labor
market liberalization is a fundamental strategic imperative for the continued growth of the country,
though progress is likely to be slow due to the strong trade union influence within government.
Areas to watch:
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Mitigation measures regarding resource security and threats to this security – Sasol’s coal to
liquids program, shale gas and offshore oil exploration, moves by water supplying countries to
restructure tariff regimes
Changes to liberalized business policies and efforts to answer the fundamental question – this
would include the progression of the debate on nationalization, the moderation of its proposals
and the ultimate form that state participation in mining is authorized to take
Moves to liberalize the labor market and the success of opponents to this agenda
External Imperatives
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Pursue unilateral trade and investment partnerships to continually enhance economic strength
Consolidate the role of mediator within sub-Saharan Africa and the role of representative of the
region in global fora
Develop of military and diplomatic capacity to support economic power and strengthen regional
dominance
Despite being the largest economy on the continent, South Africa exerts neither a strong paternal nor
hegemonic influence on its sub-Saharan neighbors. The ANC’s revolutionary allies notwithstanding, the
country’s modern isolationist history means that ties with the rest of the continent are mostly new and
fragile. Despite this, acceptance of South African leadership is growing and the country is playing an ever
larger role in African affairs. Indeed, the opportunities have never been greater for South Africa to more
robustly assert its geopolitical interests.
Competition for strategic resources and access to growing consumer markets mean that the continent is
likely to become an increasingly important chessboard in the coming decades. South Africa’s
opportunity in this respect is to play all sides and act as mediator and regional gateway through which
sub-Saharan Africa can be accessed by foreign capital. The early fruits of this strategy can be seen with
Wal-Mart’s purchase of local wholesaler Massmart and the significant Chinese investment in the
Standard Bank. This will further enhance the country’s economic strength and supporting South African
led enterprise in Africa will be a principal objective of future foreign policy (Note that the asymmetry
between White capital and Black government mean that in the short-term there are practical hurdles to
the execution of this).
The role of the Mbeki administration in establishing the South African Development Community (SADC)
and the African Union (AU) was significant and it is through leadership in similar multilateral frameworks
that South Africa will consolidate its role as regional arbiter while pursuing unilateral economic
partnerships. In dealings with the rest of the world too, South Africa’s approach will be both multilateral,
as it emphasizes its strategic value as a spokesperson and conduit for Africa, and unilateral as it seeks
out preferential trade and investment deals to consolidate its economic strength.
As resources reserves are exploited and secondary economies emerge in the countries to its north,
South Africa retains a crucial strategic interest in ensuring that economic output continues to be
channeled through its infrastructure. The proposed North-South corridor is an extensive combination of
surface transport and power connections aimed at reducing transport costs by developing regional
infrastructure. Most importantly it does so in a manner that consolidates the ports at Durban and
Richards Bay as the continent’s transport primary transport hubs by linking them with the Zambian/DRC
copper-belt. Proposals to simultaneously develop transit routes to Dar es Salaam however pose a
strategic risk to South Africa which would prefer to see potential East African commercial rivals remain
weak.
Surrounded by the Indian, Southern and Atlantic oceans to the east, south and west, South Africa’s
geography means that it should be a maritime nation. That the country has never developed a
meaningful capability in this regard is due to its long occupation by existing maritime powers followed
by a period of inwardly-focused isolationism. In the medium-term, South Africa can be expected to
pursue the long-term objective of developing a naval presence capable of supporting its designs on
regional hegemony. With the economic emergence of India and the Asian tigers, Turkish and Persian
rivalry in the Middle-East and the strategic ambitions of Russia and China, the Indian Ocean will assume
ever greater strategic relevance and along with the short-term but immediate threat of piracy will be
the focus of the South African fleet. Responding to these forces will also enable power to be projected
up the Atlantic coast, where regional hydrocarbon heavyweights Angola and Nigeria will probably lack
the naval capability and diversified economies required to rival South African dominance.
To the South African public, military buildup will not be palatable when major social issues remain at
home. The coalescing justification for strengthening the navy may come from a perceived threat closer
to home – protection of strategic fisheries and domestic waters to the south. Additionally, with a
nominal territorial claim and permanent scientific mission on Antarctica as well as possession of the
Prince Edward Islands, South Africa has a key interest in emerging debates over polar/ocean
management and sovereignty.
Along with a growing naval presence, South African dominance on the continent will, at least, require a
greater, continuous role in AU peacekeeping deployments. While there is no direct regional threat to
South African military superiority, the state's ability to project power through its relative military
advantage is severely hampered by operational constraints that stem from funding and human resource
capacity issues. The skills and experience drained from the armed forces post-apartheid were significant
and have never been adequately replaced. There were also a number of disastrous attempts to
modernize and restructure which caused further problems. From its peak in the late 1980s, South
Africa’s armed forces have been in decline over the past two decades and recent high profile arms
imports have largely to replaced ageing equipment and have not significantly enhanced capacity or
capability. The medium term outlook will see defense budget allocation as a percentage of GDP stabilize
just above 2%. This is recognized as a minimum threshold for the adequate servicing and maintenance
of the force.
Areas to watch:
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Indications as to the relative success or failure of the mediator/representative strategy
Refinement and leadership of north-south corridor development to consolidate economic
dominance
Development of naval capacity and expanded involvement in peacekeeping missions as a means
of projecting power throughout the sub-Saharan region.
Political Assessment
What will most influence whether South Africa achieves its imperatives over time is the composition of
its government. The current system is dominated by a single party and often lacks the means to
constrain counter-productive government activity. Without a credible electoral threat at the national
level to stimulate competition, there will be little incentive for government efficiency to improve.
The ANC has ruled unchallenged since 1994 and may continue to do so into the distant future. As the
revolutionary movement that brought freedom to the majority, the ANC’s accomplishments are
considerable and this legacy ensures broad-based support among the country’s African ethnic groups.
This support has been enough to secure healthy majorities in all post-Apartheid elections and the party’s
dominance at national and provincial levels means that the political status quo will persist in the short
term.
Like in many African countries though, the ANC has struggled with the transition from revolutionary
movement to government and it continues to do so. State structures are rife with inefficiency, capacity
constraints and corruption. Whether intentional or otherwise, the ANC has facilitated this deterioration
in state function, failing to contain corrupt elements, clamping down on independent media and
displaying an increasingly intolerant and autocratic approach to law-making. Without a strong
opposition in place, long-term ANC tripartite rule is likely to be characterized by stagnation, increasingly
self-interested government and only limited achievement of the county’s imperatives.
While very possible, this scenario does ignore the contradictions that are inherent in the party.
The ANC faces a number of threats to its dominance. Formally, it is a tripartite alliance consisting of the
ANC itself, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist
Party (SACP). Practically, the party is a remarkably “broad tent” comprising disparate ideologies and
ethnic groups. These groups were bound together by a common enemy during Apartheid a coalescing
factor has been replaced by the desire for access to power that government participation provides. It is
not surprising that such a movement should arise in opposition to a period of oppressive minority rule.
That it could effectively govern a nation always looked more doubtful.
The election of Jacob Zuma in 2009 has not brought about the change in policy direction that his leftist
support-base had hoped for. Discontent over this fact has led to increased factionalism emerging within
the ruling party. Previously, infighting was privately mediated; however these squabbles are now spilling
out into the public arena on a regular basis, highlighting the inability of party leadership to keep
discipline as well as the increasingly irreconcilable differences between alliance factions. This raises
questions about the long-term sustainability of the ANC in its current form.
The most likely internal challenge to the ANC status quo will come from the trade unions which will be
unlikely to settle for another proxy candidate as they did with Zuma. The Communists will support such
a move if they perceive it to have a chance of success, though their popular support is nominal. This may
play out as an internal transition or as a definitive split from the alliance. Regardless, the ANC would
then have split along ideological lines with the nationalist element that enjoys the ascendency today
relegated to the fringes.
Another potentially divisive issue is the re-emergence of tribalism. The transition that ousted Mbeki at
Polokwane in 2008 was as much a revolt against Xhosa dominance of party structures as it was about
ideological differences. This was also the primary reason for the formation of the breakaway party, the
Congress of the People (COPE) which performed strongly in the Xhosa strongholds of the Eastern Cape
and Free State in the 2009 elections, but has since been wracked by a bitter leadership struggle. As a
Zulu, Zuma represents the traditionally ascendant tribal faction in South African society and his presence
in the presidency has further neutralized the independent-minded Zulu movement personified by the
ageing Mangosuthu Buthelezi. The ANC was founded as a unifying Africanist movement as a direct
response to tribal divisions. However, while the violent tribal conflicts that took place in KwaZulu-Natal
after 1994 have settled, the possibility of their re-emergence cannot be discounted.
The ANC will recognize these threats and will actively pursue constant conciliation between tribal and
ideological groups; however this will also serve to further decrease government effectiveness.
The divisions within the ANC and growing discontent among the electorate over non-delivery of basic
services will also serve to strengthen the opposition outside of the ruling party. The Democratic Alliance
(DA) has secured its hold on power in Cape Town and surrounding Western Cape Province and has
proved a very competent provincial manager, achieving a level of consistent service delivery far better
than anything the ANC has managed. Indeed, the 2009 elections saw the party also make significant
headway in Gauteng province and strong showings in upcoming votes in the province could raise the
prospect of the ANC losing control of three of South Africa’s four major cities, a situation that the ruling
party will find unacceptable.
On the national stage, the DA lacks legitimacy as it relies on the white and colored minorities for its
support and has so far struggled to diversify from this base. As such, the DA in its current form does not
represent a long-term threat to the ANC though it provides an important oversight function by
scrutinizing government activity. Where the DA will benefit is in the event of a split within the ANC. Its
track record and strong organization will leave it well placed to incorporate factions that come adrift
from the ANC allowing it to form the core of any significant opposition coalition that may emerge.
These envisaged splits within the ANC and the rise of a more vigorous opposition are analogous to the
experience of India which first voted as an independent post-colonial nation in 1950 and was dominated
by the National Congress for 27 years until 1977 when a democratic transfer of power was first
achieved. Tellingly, the 1977 result was underpinned by dissatisfaction amongst the electorate over
increasingly autocratic and intolerant behavior by the National Congress. Driven by broad diversity in
society, the modern Indian political landscape is characterized by governing alliances born out of a lack
of dominance by any single party. Bearing many of the same societal characteristics, it is not
unreasonable to see South African politics moving in similar direction.
Areas to watch:
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Indications as to whether emerging internal divisions within the ANC exist along ideological or
tribal lines or both
Measures by the ANC to actively reinforce the alliance – this would include cycling key
leadership positions through various tribal groups and/or sharing key ministries and government
posts between ideological factions
Ongoing stakeholder analysis to determine factional membership and the relative balance of
power within the ANC
Gains by the opposition parties positioning them to pose a stronger challenge to the ANC at
provincial or national levels – this would include alliances that consolidate support bases or
substantial success in diversifying these bases.