Download Recent work by Hanoch Sheinman (2013

Recent work by Hanoch Sheinman (2013-2014)
• “Tort Law and Distributive Justice,” in Philosophical Foundations of the
Law of Torts, John Oberdiek, ed., Oxford UP, 2014, pp. 354-384
Abstract
It is sometimes said that corrective justice is more important to the normative foundation of tort
law than distributive justice. This paper argues that tort law's distributive justice is corrective
justice. It offers an account of the Aristotelian distinction in which corrective justice is a distinct
principle of distributive justice, one that requires redistributing person-affecting consequences of
directed wrongful interactions in a way that reflects its wrong-making features. The chapter
applies the account to tort law, and shows how it can help to understand liability to repair
harm. The paper also tries to say what the availability of insurance against such liability means
and does not mean for tort law's corrective justice. The paper then examines the implications of
the account for understanding competing claims about the relative place of corrective and
distributive justice in the justification of tort law. It closes by offering one way to understand the
justificatory priority of corrective justice and remarking on its possible repercussions.
• “Two Faces of Discrimination,” in Philosophical Foundations of
Discrimination Law, Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, eds., Oxford
UP, 2014, pp. 28-50
The argument of this chapter is conciliatory. It claims that neither side to the
debate over the interpersonally comparative nature of discrimination has the whole
truth. Each has some of the truth. Th e individualist is right to resist the inference
from the heavily interpersonally comparative language of discrimination to
the general conclusion that the ethics of discrimination is comparative. Reflection
on the badness/wrongness of conduct in paradigm discrimination cases reveals
intrinsically normative considerations that favor treating persons well regardless
of how well we treat others. But contemporary individualists have gone too far in
dismissing deep-seated moral sentiments that are directly sensitive to interpersonal
treatment gaps. Part of what we fi nd intrinsically disturbing about paradigm cases
of discrimination is sufficiently large interpersonal treatment gaps. Perhaps that is
because such gaps are intrinsically objectionable.
• “The Embedding Social Context of Promises and Contracts,” Oxford
Studies in Philosophy of Law 2 (2013): 228-276 (Leslie Green & Brian
Leiter, eds.)
This chapter discusses the social context of promising. It takes for
granted the intuitive distinction between central and non-central cases.
To say that X is the social context of promises/contracts, is to say that,
in their central case, promises/contracts are embedded in some X context;
promises/contracts that are embedded in some non-X context are
imperfect promises/contracts: they fall outside the central case. " is
chapter raises some doubts about the notion that promises/contracts
have a non-trivial social context. It rejects the view that the context of
promises is relational and the opposing view that it is transactional . It
then rejects the view that the context of contracts is transactional and
the opposing view that it is relational. It recommends a pluralistic view
in which the social contexts in which promises and contracts are embedded
in the central case cuts across the relational-transactional divide.