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IN OFFICE AFTER AN 8.8 EARTHQUAKE: ON THE RESILIENCE OF CHILEAN ENERGY SECTOR Ricardo Raineri Pontificia Univerisdad Católica de Chile +562 2354 4272 [email protected] Overview Chile is a country highly exposed to extreme natural events such as severe earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, volcano eruptions, and extreme dry seasons, which are all part of its history. The country is within the 15% of the more exposed countries to extreme natural events. Since 1900, Chile possess the unfortunate record of having the strongest of the ten strongest earthquakes, with a magnitude 9.5 MMS in May 22-1960; and more recently, on February 27-2010, it’s scored the 6th strongest earthquake with a magnitude of 8.8 MMS. Both earthquakes were followed with severe tsunami which increased the number of casualties and amplified the damage on private and public infrastructure. In this paper we analyze the resilience of the Chilean energy sector as was hit by the extreme event of F27 earthquake, in terms of how it responded during the shake and tsunami, the aftermath emergency, and the reconstruction process, looking at the industry preparedness, its institutional strength and business model, looking over the private, public and household main effects. Methods The paper revises the earthquake and tsunami impact on the energy sector and its infrastructure, and on the aftermath response to de event, during the emergency, on service restoration, and the reconstruction process to rebuild the sector infrastructure and its resilience to extreme events, and the actions taken by the industry and the government during the emergency and the reconstruction process. The analysis starts looking at the history on how the country has build its resilience to catastrophic events like the F27 event, where it embed increasing degrees of resilience in its institutions and here, in particular, in the energy sector, being state owned or private systems and infrastructure. Recording the events highlights the haves and have not that become evident with 27F, and the lessons that we learn in terms of the strengths and the weakness of the industry. The paper describes the main actions and policies taken by the government and the private sector to overcome the emergency and to improve even more the resilience of the system regarding future catastrophic events. Results Identify country and industry conditions which enable a more resilient energy sector regarding natural catastrophic events, underscoring the importance of strong institutions with a well crafted national emergency response system, committed and flexible institution and civil servants, and the strategic role of a strong private sector within an enabling business and regulatory environment, with well functioning financial markets, and finally the importance of leadership with a strong resolution capability to organize and speed up the mobilization of resources in the emergency and the reconstruction process. The paper highlights the haves and have-not in terms of the resilience of the Chilean energy industry on the catastrophic F27 earthquake and tsunami. Conclusions Preparedness in terms of tough construction norms, strong institutions, well crafted national emergency response system; with an efficient and flexible public sector partnering with a strong private sector was crucial for the organization during the emergency and to move forward fast in the reconstruction process. The earthquake demanded large budget reallocations in the state and private sector, and an express unlock of important resources to be used in the emergency and afterward reconstruction process was essential. In this regard, the Ministry of Energy contributed with the largest percentage budget cut among all ministries. Also, the capability of a strong and efficient private sector was strategic to restore energy services during the emergency, and next to mobilize the financial and human resources needed in the reconstruction process. During the emergency and reconstruction, leadership at the highest level of the government was critical, but also was important the tremendous and important contribution of the civil servants, employees, managers and entrepreneurs in state and in private companies. The generosity of all acting as a team and with a clear and common objectives, as overcoming the emergency, to move ahead with the reconstruction process, and to bring life back to normal as soon as possible, have been essential. In short, leadership acted as a unifying force to mobilize the key role of the private sector, the government and the state, which generously enabled an environment of compromise and cooperation through the emergency, and also make the way for a successful reconstruction. References Akerlof, George A. (1970). "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". Quarterly Journal of Economics (The MIT Press) 84 (3): 488–500. 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