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GEORGIA REGENTS UNIVERSITY AUGUSTA HONORS PROGRAM THESIS ACCEPTANCE FORM Completion of this form indicates that the thesis writer has successfully completed his or her Honors thesis. This form must be completed and submitted before the thesis writer can receive credit for HONR 4000XX. Signed by the Thesis Panel: Tftt \\T 1hrJ ~ Dt\-rrANAME (Thesis NAME {HP s·..\-e. NAME v Chair) Rep.) ~ rWtl~ ~IGNATURE~ . S' ttf!____ P_ e "" CJ ~ t.. (In-Field Reader) Approve<!,J!t DATE ~ -/;; JaAt1w~ jz~~NAME (HP DATE Director) NAME (Department Chair) SIGNATURE ~~ ~~ s'/b1r-- DATE ---· ....____!_____.~ /_ ; ___ DEPARTMENT ~s,·r J5· DATE 36 GEORGIA REGENTS UNIVERSITY AUGUSTA HONORS THESIS The Peloponnesian War: Analyzing the Causes of War through Offense-Defense Theory Submitted by: Harrison Joseph Frey Thesis Advisor: Dr. Craig Albert Major Field: Political Science ompletion: Spring 20 15 ~- Honors Program Director Approval Frey 1 Introduction The purpose of this thesis is to determine the probable cause of the Peloponnesian War according to Offensive-Defensive Theory (ODT). This paper argues that Offensive-Defensive Theory, a tool of realism, can explain the causes of war. In the strictest sense, ODT is not actually a theory; it is a variation of structural realism and it is a key component of defensive realism. To an offensive-defensive theorist, the offense-defense balance is the major factor that determines and drives states’ behavior. This project argues that offense-defense imbalances caused the Peloponnesian War (431404 BC). Specifically, I have two main points. First, the territorial goals of Athens were offensive in nature, as it used its military force to attack, seize, and hold territory for its own advantage with no regard or concern for its allies. Second, ODT indicates the most likely cause of war was the Athenian large advantage over the three critical factors: the cumulativity of resources, technology, and geography. This research includes three sections. The first section informs readers on the creation of Greek city-states, Sparta, and Athens, for historical context. Secondly, this paper will explore the literature pertaining to ODT. This paper defines the offense-defense balance as “as the ratio of the cost of the forces the attacker requires to take territory to the cost of the forces the defender has deployed” (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 50). There are two main factors that determine offense-defense balance: the attacker’s territorial goals and cost of fighting. Additionally, there are five critical factors that can have a significant effect on the balance: technology, geography, force size, nationalism, and the cumulativity of resources (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998). The final section is an analysis of how the offense-defense imbalances can explain the causes of the Frey 2 Peloponnesian War. Our main source of historical information on the Peloponnesian War comes from Thucydides. This paper begins with the history of the Greek city-states. History of the Polis, Sparta, and Athens Greek city-states (otherwise known as a polis) consisted of “hereditary monarchy with established rights and limitations…; [The Greeks] became more powerful and as the importance for acquiring money became more and more evident, tyrannies were established in nearly all the cities” (1.13.1-4). The main concern for Greek city-states was security. Thucydides notes this by stating that security was the “the chief political principle in [Greek] governments, … [and] nothing, in fact, that went beyond their immediate local interests” (1.17.4-6). Sparta was an important Greek city-state and was known for its military expertise. It was founded in 900 BC and was located between the Eurotas valley of Laconia and the southeast Peloponnese. According to Greek mythology, the founder of the city was the son of Zeus, Lacedaemon. Between the sixth and the fifth century BC, Sparta was considered the strongest polis in Greece. Its strength allowed them to assume a leadership position over the other Greek states. According to Thucydides, Sparta was successful because the state held the same governmental structure and basic constitutional principles for over four centuries. Unlike all other Greek cities, Sparta’s political stability was a great source of “internal strength… that enabled them to intervene in the affairs of other states” (1.18. 4-10). Athens was created sometime between 7000-5000 BC. According to Greek mythology, Athens’ name originated from the competition between Athena and Poseidon. The competition decided which God or Goddess would be the protector of the polis. Obviously, by name alone, the people chose the goddess Athena as their protector. During the Mycenaean period, Athens Frey 3 was governed by Ionian Tyrants who sought control over Attica. Attica was the region that encompasses Athens. The Persian Wars (500- 449 BC) made Athens a strong polis. Although Athens was much smaller and less powerful than Sparta, the state was effective against the Persian threat. Persia’s King Darius I tried to conquer Greece during the First Persian War. During this war, the Battle of Marathon took place. The Battle of Marathon (490 BC) was between the Persians and the Athenians (1.18.11-12). The Persians held roughly 26,000 troops while Athens had 10,000 with 1,000 soldiers from the city of Plataea (Addington 1990, 13). Athens and Persia sustained casualties from 1,000 to 2,000 and 4,000 to 5,000 respectively (Krentz 2010, 98). Persia’s defeat built confidence throughout the Greek world because many Greeks believed defeat was imminent. The first Persian War was declared over. Persia’s leader, Daruis I, wanted to bring a full scale invasion of Greece, but he failed to do so. A civil rebellion in his territory diverted his attention, and he died shortly thereafter. His successor and son, Xerxes I, quelled the rebellion. Thereafter, his armies traveled towards Greece and arrived by 481 BC. The Persians entered Greece through Thermopylae, which was the narrow pass between the northwest mountains of Athens and the sea. For a short period of time, three hundred Spartans stood against the massive Persian army. Although the Spartans failed to hold the passageway, they severely crippled Xerxes’ army. As a result of Spartan courage, the Greeks organized a large scale counter-offensive and successfully fought back against the invasion, which is known as the Battle of Thermopylae. This battle is important for two reasons. First, it was a major defeat for the Persians. The battle severely diminished its powers and resources. Second, the organized counter-offensive turned into a confederation of Greek-city states, otherwise known as the Hellenic League. Frey 4 The “allied Hellenic forces” or the Hellenic League was assembled around 481 BC; Sparta was in control of the Greek city-state confederation (Thucydides 1.18.14-16). The Hellenic League was vitally important during the Battle of Plataea because this was the last land battle to be fought. The Hellenic league required its constituents to give a binding oath—The Oath of Plataea. If any Greek city submitted voluntarily to Persia, the Persian army would gain great advantage. The oath was about “tithing” in hope that the threat might deter various states from agreeing voluntarily to support Persia (Burn 1984, 513). The Spartan controlled league successfully repelled the Persian for a second time and proclaimed victory. After the end of the Second Persian War, the Greeks faced new military and political responsibilities (1.96). However, as soon as the mutual enemy was defeated, Athens and Sparta could no longer sustain their war-time alliances (1.18.21-25). Rivalry ignited between the states. Athens feared Spartan power, but could not easily take over Sparta’s leadership position after the league’s triumphant victory against the Persians. The Spartans returned home with its new allies, while the Athenians with new allies from Ionia and the Hellespont pushed the Persians away from their homelands. The Persians retreated after its defeat on land and on sea while the Athenians and their allies eliminated residual occupants from their lands. (1.89; 1.93). After successfully reclaiming, rebuilding and fortifying its territory, Athens and their allies “regarded the Athenians as being perfectly capable of exercising the command” (1.95.31-33). Thereafter, a new confederation was born: the League of Delos (Delian League). Greek states had to choose sides, Sparta or Athens. The signing of the Delian League created two opposing powers and competing sides within the same Greek territories. Frey 5 Additionally, Athenian aggression sought to take away other cities’ political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thucydides states: When the Spartans heard of what was going on they sent an embassy to Athens. This was partly because they themselves did not like the idea of Athens or any other city being fortified, but chiefly because they were urged on by their allies, who were alarmed both by sudden growth of Athenian sea-power and by the daring which the Athenian had shown in the war against the Persians….In making this suggestion to the Athenians they concealed their real meaning and their real fear. (1.91.1-11) The real fear of Athens was Sparta’s offensive capabilities while Sparta feared the growth of Athenian power. Using Thucydides text as a guide, it is possible to identify the offense-defense imbalances that caused the Peloponnesian War. The following section explains Offensive- Defensive Theory. Offensive-Defensive Theory (ODT) As previously mentioned, Offensive-Defensive Theory (ODT or the Security Dilemma Theory), in the strictest sense is not actually a theory. The different variations of ODT should be classified as structural realist theory (or neorealist). ODT resolves many problems of ‘original’ structural realism, which was constructed by Kenneth Waltz. Waltz argued that war is more likely in a multipolar system and less likely under bipolarity (1979).1 Offensive-Defensive Theory is the “master key to the causes of conflict” (Van Evera 1999, 190). ODT suggests that there is an offense-defense balance (ODB). The offense-defense balance asks whether it is it easier taking or defending territory. Either the offense or the defense has the advantage. The terms ‘offense’ and ‘defense’ refer to actual military actions, not the political intentions or goals. Offense means the use of military force to attack, seize and hold a 1 A multipolar system is where there are many dominate powers, whereas a bipolar system is where there are two dominate powers. Waltz argued that that a multipolar system contains many potential hegemons all attempting to gain the great amount of power. Great powers in multipolar systems cannot keep their power for long as they will eventually be overthrown by another power because it greatly shifted the balance of power. Security is constantly threatened. Multipolar systems can therefore not endure or remain stable. World War I serves as an example of a multipolar system. Frey 6 portion or all of a defender’s territory. Defense involves using military force to prevent attackers from seizing territory” (Lieber 2000, 74). Jervis writes, “When we say that the offense has the advantage, we simply mean that it is easier to destroy the other’s army and take its territory than it is to defend one’s own. When the defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take” (1978, 187). When the offense has the advantage, states of equal size cannot gain high levels of security. High offensive advantage makes war more likely because wars will be quick and profitable (Jervis 1978, 187). The ODB measures the “relative ease” of offensive and defensive tactics (Evera 1998, 5). Relative ease “refers to the relative cost and benefits of attacking versus defending” (Lieber 2000, 74). ODT argues that shifts in the offense-defense balance, real or perceived, affects the likelihood of international conflict and war (Lynn-Jones 1995; Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, Gortzak, Haftel, and Sweeny 2005; Tang 2009; Jervis 2009). There are two types of shifts in the offense-defense balance: a shift towards offensive dominance or a shift towards defensive dominance. The balance determines states’ behavior. When the balance is defense dominant, war is less likely to occur because conquest is more difficult (Adams 2004, 59). For example, states are dissuaded from acting aggressively for fear that victory will be either too costly or not possible. When the balance is offense dominant, war is more likely to occur because conquest is easier. Offensive success is more likely when the offense has the advantage because as conquest becomes easier, expansion becomes attractive because there is less “cost” (Lynn-Jones 1995; Evera 1998; Glaser and Kaufmann 1998; Adams 2004; Goartzak 2005; Wilson 2010,). The “cost” requires a rigorous examination. But how does one conceptualize the term “cost” in Offensive-Defensive Theory? Frey 7 Glaser and Kaufmann define the offense-defense balance as a cost ratio. More specifically, it is “the ratio of the cost of the forces the attacker requires to take territory to the cost of the forces the defender has deployed. Larger ratios indicate a balance more in favor of defense” (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 50). Offense-defense balance links military capability to a state’s power (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 46; Glaser 2010, 44-45; Wilson 2010, 15). The definition assumes that a state chooses the most rational choice with its military forces and strategies (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 55-57; Glaser 2010, 44).2 The definition of power is the ratio of the attacker’s resources to the defender’s resources. To indicate the probability of success for the offense, the attacker’s power is divided by the offense-defense balance; the greater the quotient, the more likely the offense is to succeed (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 51; Glaser 2010, 43-44). The offense-defense balance determines a state’s potential military capacity and therefore its ability to sustain and maintain its security (Castillo 2003; Biddle 2004; Adams 2004; Glaser 2010, 44). For example, “when the defense has a large advantage, even a state that is much smaller than its adversaries may still be able to afford effective defense. Conversely, power imbalances can sometimes overwhelm the offense-defense balance. Even if defense has a large advantage, a much wealthier attacker might still be able to outspend a defender by a sufficient margin to gain an effective offensive capability” (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 51). There are two main factors to determine the offense-defense balance: the cost of fighting and the attacker’s territorial goals. 2 Realism is based on rational choices. A realist believes that the best and most rational choice will be implemented by an actor, that is, the actor will pick the choice with the best outcome for itself. An irrational choice would be an outcome that hurts the actor. For example, Athens believed that its empire was rational: “we have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered to use and then in refusing to give it up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from doing so‐ security, honour, and self‐interest” (1.76). Frey 8 The cost of fighting determines the offense-defense balance (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 51; Glaser 2010, 113; Powell 110-113; Wilson 2010, 20). The cost of fighting is “the cost of forces the attacker requires to launch a successful blitzkrieg to the cost of the defender’s forces” (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 52). In other words, the cost of fighting determines if conquest is worth accomplishing. The minimum investment ratio calculates the minimum number of forces required to successfully complete a mission, such as territorial expansion. The ratio includes an acceptable margin for loss of forces and resources. A more capable force can usually complete its mission with a lower cost of fighting because of tactical experiences (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 52; Glaser 2010, 113). The cost of fighting declines as the offense gains more soldiers, resources, and money. An important factor of the cost of fighting is the “offense-defense distinguishability,” that is, “the degree to which military forces that contribute to offensive missions also contribute to defensive missions determines the extent to which the state can deploy defensive capabilities without threatening the adversary’s ability to defend itself” (Glaser 2010, 34). For example, a more capable and skillful attacker can undertake in more ambitious offensive missions because it has a lower cost of fighting. The attacker’s territorial goals play a factor in the offense-defense balance (Lynn-Jones 1995, Evera 1998; Biddle 2001; Gortzak 2005; Tang 2009; Glaser 2010; Wilson 2010). The “more ambitious offensive missions, those that are designed to take more territory, tend to be more difficult than less ambitious ones. Facing a given defensive force, the offensive force required for a more ambitious mission will have to be larger, more technology advanced, or both, than would be required for a less ambitious mission” (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 53). Conquest over a large territory involves a greater cost as it requires more resources and soldiers. Additionally, as the offense advances through enemy territory, its supply lines become longer Frey 9 while the supply lines of the defense grow shorter. This gives the defense an advantage over the offense because it can acquire resources more quickly (Glaser 2010, 11). The reverse is also true. A smaller territorial conquest is usually easier because the attacker’s forces have a shorter distance to advance and shorter supply lines. Therefore, small territorial expansion is more favorable to the offense; large territorial expansion is more favorable to the defense (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 53; Glaser 2010, 43). However, any changes in the following factors can create a significant effect on the offense-defense balance: technology, geography, force size, nationalism, and the cumulativity of resources (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 61; Glaser 2010). Each factor will be explained in the following paragraphs. Technology is the most frequently cited influence on the offense-defense balance (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 61; Biddle 2001, 748; Adams 2004, 57, Glaser 2010, 43-61; Hamilton and Rathbun 2013, 449). What is most important about technology is “how the innovation differentially affects advancing forcing and non-advancing forces. Innovations that are usable only or primarily by non-advancing forces will tend to favor defense, while innovations that are equally usable by forces that are advancing into enemy-controlled territory will favor the offense” (1998, 61-62). Offense inherently requires mobility while defense does not; the defense can hold its position, but the offense has to be mobile to advance. Mobile technology includes chariots, ships, and motor vehicles. An increase in mobility technology generally favors the offense. An increase in counter mobility technology generally favors the defense. Counter mobility technology includes moats, barbed wire, MIRVs3 (Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle), ATGMs (antitank guided missiles) and land mines (Lynn-Jones 1995 660-91 3 Missile defense systems are defensive in nature. However, it is possible that the enemy does not perceive defensive weapons as such. Defensive weapons sometimes appear offensive to the opponents, and can cause perception that threat exists. Frey 10 Glaser and Kauffman 1998, 61-64; Adams 2004, 57-59; Glaser 2010, 61-62; Hamilton and Rathbun 2013, 449). The second critical factor to the offense-defense balance is geography. Geography generally favors the defense (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 65; Biddle 2001, 745-746; Glaser 2010, 43:141; Wilson 2010, 43-44). First, landscapes that slow the offense down or channel the offense’s movement strengthen the defense. Examples are “forests and swamps with few roads, mountains with few passes, and rivers with few bridges, or simply any region with sparse infrastructure. Such barrier channelize advances into the few roads, bridges, or passes that are available, thus reducing the defender’s intelligence difficulties as well as shortening the length of front requiring serious defense” (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 65). Large bodies of water usually favor the defense.4 Water can limit or slow offensive mobility because the offense must travel around it or over it (Mearsheimer 114-118; Glaser 2010, 141). Second, landscapes with cover favor the defense. Cover reduces the speed of the offensive force because it must be wary that any possible hiding spot is an ambush point. Consequently, dense cover reduces the speed of the offense. Third, distance favors the defense. The offense is disadvantaged the deeper it advances into enemy territory because its supply lines and lines of communications grow longer. The longer the line, the more it costs to keep the lines open (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 65; 2010 43).5 Nationalism can affect ODB by the “extent that people are imbued with nationalist consciousness” (Glaser and Kauffmann 1998, 66). People may be more determined to fight 4 The opposite will be true during the Peloponnesian War, as it was over 2,000 years ago. Ships were the major innovation of the time. It is to be expected that parts of ODT cannot be applied to the Peloponnesian War, as times were completely different. 5 For example, the Ho Chi Minh Trail was the main supply lines that used by Northern Vietnam troops to travel into South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. It is estimated that over 1 million ton of supplies and 2 over million troops traveled this trail from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. This trail became a target for U.S. forces in order to disrupt the supply chain. Frey 11 harder for their homeland while less determined to fight for other territories (Jervis, 204; Glaser and Kauffmann 1998, 66). More specifically, Wilson refers to this as defensive nationalism. The purpose of defensive nationalism is to unite citizens against the common enemy (Wilson 2010, 81). Nationalism can also play to the advantage of the attacker and therefore affects the ODB (Glaser and Kauffman 1998, 67; Wilson 2010, 80-82). This is referred to as offensive nationalism. Offensive nationalism is a characteristic of expansive and imperialistic policy. There are two indicators to identify offensive nationalism. The first indicator is that the offense seeks territorial expansion or its sphere of influence. The second indicator is that the offense believes that it can achieve total victory or that the use-value of territorial expansion is worth the investment (Wilson 2010, 81). Force size can affect the offense-defense balance (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 66; Biddle 2001; Glaser 2010 79,). Force size determines the ability to perform certain offensive and defensive missions (Glaser 2010, 74:133). Force-to-force ratio is the proportion of the offensive’s forces to the defensive’s (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 66; Biddle 2001, 749). Glaser writes “equal increases in the size of conventional ground forces can result in an increase in the state’s ability to defend, by enabling it to increase the density of forces along the front” (2010, 61). Therefore, an increase in force size generally favors the defense because the defense can defend more of its territory (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 66). A sufficiently large force size can create a power advantage for the defense, that is, the defense can deploy an effective defense and also have an effective offense (Glaser 2010, 79; Wilson 2010, 185-188). The cumulativity of resources can affect the offense-defense balance (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 67). Glaser states that a force’s “ability to deploy effective military capabilities depends not only on the raw-material resources that are commonly included in definitions and Frey 12 measures of power—including, for example, wealth, territory, and population—but also on its ability to extract resources and then convert them into effective military forces” (Glaser 2010, 181). As resources become low or no longer available to a side, the probability of victory is also low; a war cannot be won without resources (Wilson 2010, 59, 70). When the offense destroys or takes the defense’s resources, then the attacker can invest less of its own resources. As the length of war increases, the offensive’s chances of victory decrease because of resource strain (Slantchev 2004). The following section is an application of ODT to the Peloponnesian War. First, I explain the territorial goals of Sparta and Athens. Second, I follow up on the individual variables as applicable to the war. Analysis The Peloponnesian League (Spartan League) was the model for the allied Hellenic League. The allied Hellenic League was the counter-offensive confederation composed of all Greek city-states under the leadership of Sparta in order to defend against the Persian Empire. However, Spartan leader, Pausanias, was unable to keep the confederation of Greek city-states together in an alliance after the threat subsided. Thucydides wrote, "for a short time the wartime alliance held together, but it was not long before quarrels took place and Athens and Sparta, each with her own allies, were at war with each other, while among the rest of the Hellenes states that had their own differences now joined on or other of the two sides" (1.18). Athens and its followers defected into its own league (the Delian League) and essentially the Hellenic League reverted to the Peloponnesian League.6 6 There is a gap of evidence missing during this time. We have no evidence of formal constitutions or treaties amongst other city‐states. However, we can infer that a formal constitution or agreement existed because representatives of Greek city‐states spoke of the violations on such treaties and constitutions. Therefore, any such terms will be used generally because it is required to do so. Thucydides mentions treaties in several instances, however, we have very little information about prewar treaties because the evidence has be lost. Frey 13 As a reminder to the readers, the attacker’s territorial goals play a factor in the offensedefense balance. As territorial conquest becomes more ambitious (i.e. missions designed to take more land), the more difficult the mission becomes. The analysis begins with an insight into the territorial goals of Sparta and Athens. First, I address Spartan and the Peloponnesian League’s territorial goals. Second, I address Athens and the Delian League’s territorial goals. The Peloponnesian League reclaimed its territories and those of other city-states. Sparta’s goal aimed for maximum security for itself and its allies (Kagan 2013, 19-20). Sparta allowed its allies their political independence without forced pretenses or threats of annihilations. Allies enjoyed political independence except in times of war. Sparta required no tribute from its allies, but established an oligarchy within its allies to ensure Sparta's interests were met. The territorial goals of Sparta were purely defensive as it used its military forces to eliminate the Persian invaders from its territories. Spartan goals were gained through mutual beneficial formal alliances. This was unlike how the Athenians treated its allies.7 Athenians used coercion and threats of destruction and enslavement for city-states that failed to pay proper tribute or refused to join the Delian League. The newly found Delian League reclaimed its own territories and the territories of other Greek city-states that were conquered by the Persians. Athens' territorial goals aimed for maximum security for itself through fear and without regard to the cost it placed on its allies. It secured its allies through coercion and threats of annihilation. The failure to meet such tribute to Athens, as will be explained by the variable of the cumulativity of resources, ended in destruction or complete, tyrannical rule of its allies. Athens’ allies lost their political independence and security in the Delian league. Allies were forced into agreements with threats of invasion or enslavement. It should be acknowledged 7 Although it should be noted using the word “ally” is essentially forced. Allies were turned into Athenian colonies Frey 14 Athens' generals admitted that the Delian League was set to build an empire gained through conquest (2.63.3). An example is the revolt against Athenian tyranny in Naxos (1.98.4). Athens enslaved the people, who failed to provide the proper amount of tribute, for the “Athenians insisted on obligations being exactly met, and made themselves unpopular by bringing the severest pressure to bear on allies who were not used to making sacrifices and did not want to make them. The result was that the Athenian navy grew strong at their expense, and when they revolted they always found themselves inadequately armed and inexperienced in war” (1.99). Therefore, the territorial goals of Athens were offensive in nature, as it used its military force to attack, seize, and hold territory for its own advantage with no regard or concern for its allies. As a reminder to the reader, there are five critical factors that can affect the OD balance: technology, geography, force size, nationalism, and the cumulativity of resources. However, this does not mean that all factors are necessary or appropriate for every conflict. While these variables can have a significant effect, they may also have little to no effect. Thus, it is up to the specific circumstances to determine which variables are applicable and to what extent (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 57-58). Two variables do not fit the characteristics of the Peloponnesian War. First, I explain that nationalism was not present in either the Delian or Peloponnesian League. Second, there is no evidence force size created a significant effect on the ODB. There is no evidence nationalism created a significant effect on the ODB. At first glance, it could be said that Athens held a form of offensive nationalism, that is, it had characteristics of expansive and imperialistic policies. It could be said that Sparta, its allies, and the allies of Athens that revolted against their tyrants displayed defensive nationalism, that is, citizens united against the common enemy. However, the presence of a united citizenry against a common enemy is not a sufficient condition for defensive nationalism. The presence of expansive, Frey 15 imperialistic policies is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of offensive nationalism. To assert that either side displays nationalism, it would require a unifying characteristic such as ethnicity, religion, or nationality. It is not known if Greek nationalism existed (Motyl 2000, 200). Jaeger and Highet write that “Greece was incapable of achieving unity by dissolving the independent city-states into a single nation-state, even if the several states were as weak as was then the case. Greek unity could only come from outside. Nothing could unite the Hellenes8 into a nation, except a fight against a common enemy (1986, 282). For example, the closest example of defensive nationalism would have been the allied Hellenic League that shared the same ethnicity. Although every city-state was involved in the Hellenic Forces, the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues cannot be considered to meet the criterion for defensive nationalism. Taking sides was only taking sides and was based on perceived convenience rather than a sense of nationalism. The Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues placed no significant impact on any of these unifying characteristics.9 Even if we assume that every city-state embodied some form of nationalism, then it essentially cancels each other out.10 Next, there is no evidence suggesting force size created a significant effect on the ODB. Specifically, there is no evidence that can provide numbers on the total force size of either League. It should be acknowledged that Sparta and Athens had large armies. However force size was mitigated by the Athenian strategy. The Athenians’ power did not come from its force size, but from its domination of the sea. Athens prewar strategy did not rely on its force size, but its fleet size. The overall strategy of Athens was to avoid the Spartan ground. The Spartan were landlocked and unable to stop the Athenian advances. Sparta did not have a capable navy until 8 It is the ethnic group native to Greece an ethnic group native to Greece In any case, Thucydides does not give an account of the social or economic history of the Peloponnesian War. 10 Even if we assume that there are varying degrees of nationalism can exist within a group, ODT does not discriminate between different degrees of nationalism. Additionally there is no evidence that could be used to measure degrees of nationalism. 9 Frey 16 the Second Peloponnesian War (Grant 2011, 39).11 As a reminder to the reader, force size can affect the offense-defense balance, but not necessarily. Force size determines the ability to perform certain offensive or defensive maneuvers and it consists only of conventional ground forces (Glaser 2010, 133). ODT hypothesizes that an increase in force size generally favors the defense because the defense can defend more of its territory. However, the hypothesis is limited to ground forces only and this conflict. Conventional ground forces are nearly, if not completely, powerless against a sea-bound force. Quite simply, one soldier or twenty thousand soldiers cannot stop a ship out at sea.12 The sea served as a natural blockade against the Peloponnesian ground forces. As Pericles stated “if they invade our country by land, we will invade theirs by sea…For they can get no more land without fighting for it, while we have plenty of land" (1.142). The Athenians’ power did not come from its force size, but from its domination of the sea. Athens held the offensive advantage over its enemies. Next, I argue that the cumulativity of resources, technology, and geography impacted the OD balance in favor of Athens and created a very low cost of fighting for the Athenian empire. I begin with the cumulativity of resources. The cumulativity of resources can affect the ODB. There is evidence indicating this variable created a significant effect on the ODB. As a reminder to the reader, the cumulativity of resources is the ability of a military force to acquire raw resources such as wealth, territory, and population. Resources are vital to the war effort because without resources, a war cannot be won. The offense may use less of its own resources as it conquers more territories and therefore has a surplus of resources. 11 The current king of Persia, Darius II, provided the capital for Sparta to create a capable naval fleet (Grant 2011, 39). 12 These exclude any advancement in counter‐mobility technology. No evidence suggests the Peloponnesian League had such technology. Frey 17 Athens had a surplus of resources from its conquests. It confiscated resources from its allies. The greatest evidence that shows the surplus was spoken by Pericles, the leading “man of his time among the Athenians” (1.139). He stated, “now, as to the war and to the resources available to each side, I should like you to listen to a detailed account and to realize that we are not the weaker party. The Peloponnesians cultivate their own land themselves; they have no financial resources either as individuals or as states” (1.141). In other words, the Peloponnesian allies were handicapped for their lack of money and resources; its allies had also very little to provide (1.142). There is no evidence to the contrary. However, all textual evidence suggests that Athens enjoyed a large surplus of resources (1.90; 1.21; 1.141; 1.143). As it has already been explained, Athens confiscated the money and resources of its allies. What we know is that tribute was used as pay for sailors, soldiers, shipbuilders, and supplies for ship shipbuilders (1.81.3-4; 1.122.1). Athenian dominance over its allies insured that it had a high cumulativity of resources. Supply lines were continually shortened as Athens created more colonies along the coast (1.81). It colonized Naxos, Eion, Scyros, and Carystus for its resources (1.98). Additionally, it seized their ships to add to its own naval power.13 The advantage of Athens was its vast naval fleet and sea powers ensured its cumulativity of resources. Evidence shows that technology created a significant impact on the ODB in favor of Athens. As a reminder to the reader, technology is one of the most cited influences on the ODB. Any changes or advances in technology can exert significant alteration of the balance. There are two types: mobile and counter-mobile technologies. The former favors the offense, the latter favors the defense. Thucydides emphasized that a large navy was the greatest strength in the 13 It should be noted that Athens purposefully colonized specific areas, as it held natural harbors that gave ships easy access. Frey 18 development of offensive military technology during this age. Naval supremacy is how Athens gained its empire (1.121; 141). The History emphasizes that a “modern empire” is impossible without a strong fleet (1.14.3; 2.75-76; 7.36.2-3). For Thucydides then, modern empire needed the naval technology to allow Athenian supplies and ground forces to travel more quickly than they would have on land. There is clear evidence that geography created a significant impact on the ODB. As a reminder to the readers, geography generally favors the defense. For example, a landscape that provides cover, channels the offense's movement, or a large body of water favors the defense. However, geography in this sense and as defined by ODB only applies to conventional ground forces. In the case of the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ strength did not come from conventional ground forces but from its naval power. Athens had the geographic advantage over Sparta. Geography played two important roles. First, it allowed the Athenian army complete mobility around its territory and coastal areas that the Sparta would not be able to access as quickly. More importantly, the geography allowed Athens to be able to transport resources and ground forces in its ships. Athens enjoyed almost perfectly secured transportation lines as ground forces cannot generally stop a ship that is at sea. The sea served as a natural blockade against the Spartan forces. Pericles describes the advantage very well “for [the Peloponnesian League] can get no more land without fighting for it, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and on the continent” (1.143). Athens essentially had a two-part war strategy. First, avoid fights with the Peloponnesian forces and, second, secure a surplus of resources that would enable it to win the war of attrition (1.444; 2.13). Most importantly, why did the Peloponnesian War occur? The immediate causes of war center on the disputes between Athens and Sparta regarding their influences in dealing with each Frey 19 other’s allies. Disputes broke out over Athenian economic sanctions against Megara (1.67) and Athens created a naval blockade at Potidaea which was then destroyed. This was the unfortunate fate of many Athenian allies (1.58-1.60). Corinth attempted to help Potidaea, but Athens proclaimed war against them (1.54-56). As Thucydides wrote, “This was the first cause of the war that Corinth had against the Athenians.” (1.55). However, the greatest cause of war was the ambition for hegemony and fear of each other’s power. In the end for Athens it was perfectly rational to pursue an empire as it has the power to do so. The purpose of this thesis is to determine the most likely cause of the Peloponnesian War according to Offensive-Defensive Theory. Sparta feared the growth of Athenian power. The probable cause for war, according to Thucydides, was “the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable” (1.23). Athenian offensive dominance was the cause (1.23). As Athens enjoyed all the advantages, it held a low cost of fighting. The cost of fighting is lowered as the offense gains more soldiers, resources, and money. Finally, ODT indicates the most likely cause of war was the Athenian advantage over the three critical applicable factors of cumulativity of resources, technology, and geography. Athens calculated that it was rational to pursue such an empire because it had the power to do so (1.75; 5.89). Conclusion In this paper, I offer an explanation of the Offensive-Defensive Theory and OffenseDefense balance. I use the theory to explain the cause of the Peloponnesian War. In doing so, I contributed to the ongoing debate about the usefulness of ODT as an explanation of war. The shifts in ODB can affect the likelihood of war; however, Sparta can teach us a very important lesson, namely that offensive-dominant systems do not necessarily cause war. A main factor that Frey 20 causes war is intent. The difference between Sparta and Athens were their territorial goals (intent); the former defended while the latter conquered. There are other approaches to the OB such as advocated by Van Evera. One possible criticism to this paper is that Evera’s systematic approach is a more complete theory of ODT. However, I argue that the systematic approach uses numerous aggregating variables to suggest the causes of war such as social and political order. This makes it very difficult to calculate the probability of war. It attributes war to many factors and cannot narrow it down to a main cause. The systematic approach to ODB becomes even more complicated because many factors require extremely subjective judgments. Finally, ODB offers interesting possibilities in explaining contemporary examples such as the current Russian-Ukraine conflict. Ukraine’s political landscape is in complete turmoil as a result of the Ukraine Revolution in 2014. The revolution was in response to the Ukrainian President Vikor Yanukovych rejection of the EU proposal, which would have allowed the Ukrainian economy to grow considerably. The president accepted an $18 billion dollar loan from Russia. The Ukraine Crisis began when President Viktor Yanukovych refused to integrate with the European Union, which the majority of the population wanted. The refusal of the EU deal created anti-government protests. The population protested and was split into two groups, the pro-Russian separatists and the Ukraine nationalists. By July 2014, the president dismissed the entire government, as demanded by the tens of thousands of protesters that stormed the capital. Russia has incited violence amongst the separatists. As of April 12, 2015, Russia continues to support the separatists with weapons, supplies, training, and troops. ODT may suggest that Russia is actively encouraging the division in Ukraine. Ukraine is edging closer to civil war. The EU and Russia may see Ukraine as an opportunity to gain power through economic expansion. Ukraine, under EU control, may be a direct geopolitical threat to Russian security. As Russia Frey 21 continues to feel threatened, it may take more drastic measures to regain its security. The Russian-Ukraine conflict may lead to Russian conquest. However, it is much more likely that Russia will use the separatists as its offensive medium to control Ukraine. In the 21st century, Russia certainly knows it cannot declare war on Ukraine because for the EU and NATO will surely respond in turn, as the Spartan did against Athens. Frey 22 References Adams, Karen R. 2003-2004. “Attack and conquer? International Anarchy and the OffenseDefense-deterrence Balance”. 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