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JRAP 43(2): 123-137. © 2013 MCRSA. All rights reserved. The User Cost of Low-Income Homeownership Sarah F. Riley, HongYu Ru, and Qing Feng University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill – USA Abstract. Empirical research examining whether owning a home is less costly than renting for low-income households is largely lacking. We use detailed property information provided by a set of low-income homeowners who participated in the Community Advantage Panel Survey, along with a matched sample of similar rental properties from the American Housing Survey, to determine whether low-income homeowners in the United States would have experienced lower housing costs by renting between 2003 and 2011. We calculate the homeowners’ user costs directly from the survey data, and we derive hedonic measures of equivalent rent for these homeowners via pooled regressions of house prices and rents on housing characteristics, from which we obtain capitalization rates. For the median homeowner in our sample, we find that owning was less costly than renting a comparable property between 2003 and 2011. 1. Introduction Although government efforts to foster lowincome homeownership have been ongoing for decades, it is still an open question as to whether and when such policies actually generate benefits for low-income households in financial or social terms (Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Shlay, 2006). From a financial perspective, proponents of low-income homeownership sometimes observe that low-income homeowners, on average, tend to accumulate positive wealth, while comparable renters do not (Boehm and Schlottman, 2004b; Turner and Luea, 2009). In particular, homeownership can be viewed as a savings commitment mechanism, and evidence also suggests that the return on investment from leveraged homeownership often dwarfs the unleveraged returns to other common investment vehicles, such as stocks and bonds (Stegman et al., 2007; Hasanov and Dacy, 2009). However, the extent to which individual lowincome households accumulate or lose wealth through homeownership depends greatly on the location and timing of the house purchase, as well as on the length of time for which homeownership is sustained (Case and Marynchenko, 2002; Duda and Belsky, 2002). Transaction costs are often a larger proportion of total homeownership costs for lowincome households, who have been historically likely to hold their houses for shorter periods of time (Boehm and Schlottman, 2004a,b; Turner and Smith, 2009). Moreover, any tax benefits from mortgage interest deductions are widely recognized to be small, if not negligible, for low-income households, especially when the standard deduction is considered (Beracha and Tibbs, 2010; Poterba and Sinai, 2011). Finally, surveys of financial literacy have called into question the general competence of American households, and especially the lowincome population, in making rational and informed financial decisions (Bucks and Pence, 2008; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009). Thus, it has been suggested that government programs that facilitate and promote low-income homeownership may do more financial harm than good to the households involved, and that low-income households would have been better off renting than owning during the recent housing price bubble and subsequent financial crisis (Baker, 2005). 124 Despite the longevity and vigor of the debate about whether homeownership makes sense for low-income households, empirical research examining directly whether owning is, in practice, less costly than renting for this population is largely lacking (Duda and Belsky, 2002). To address this shortcoming of the existing literature, we use detailed information provided by a set of community reinvestment mortgage recipients to assess whether low-income homeowners would have been financially better off renting during the period from 2003 to 2011 from the perspective of the ex post user cost of capital. Our primary data set comes from the Community Advantage Panel Survey (CAPS) and comprises information about a sample of primarily urban lowincome homeowners who all originally received 30year, fixed-rate mortgages at near-prime terms through the Community Advantage Program (CAP), which is a secondary mortgage market demonstration program for mortgages that meet the terms of the lending test of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The CRA encourages lenders to provide credit services as well as depository services to the communities in which they do business. Large lenders, in particular, are evaluated on the amount of residential credit that they extend to borrowers who either have household incomes of at most 80% of the metropolitan statistical area median income (MSAMI) or who live in Census tracts where the median household income is at most 80% of MSAMI. CAP was initiated in 1998 by the Ford Foundation, Fannie Mae, and Self-Help, a non-profit financial institution located in North Carolina, with the intention of demonstrating the viability of a secondary mortgage market for CRA-eligible mortgages. Under this program, Self-Help has purchased existing portfolios of eligible loans from originating lenders who have been otherwise unable to sell their loans in the secondary market, and then has resold them to Fannie Mae while initially retaining recourse. Overall, about half of the borrowers who have participated in the CAP program had household incomes of 60% of MSAMI or less at the time of loan origination, and about 40% are racial or ethnic minorities. CAP borrowers took out a median loan of $81,000 (or about 2.6 times median annual income) and purchased houses that were valued at a median of $85,200 at loan origination, for a median loan-to-value ratio of 97%. The Ford Foundation provided the original underwriting capital for the CAP purchasing arrange- Riley, Ru, and Feng ment and continues to fund the Community Advantage Panel Survey (CAPS), an ongoing annual survey that collects detailed financial, social, and demographic information from a subset of 3,743 of these borrowers who received CAP mortgages between 1999 and 2003. The data set contains information about changes in housing tenure status (i.e., tenancy vs. owner occupancy), incurred maintenance costs, itemization of tax deductions, and mortgage terms. The data set also contains quarterly zip-code-level house price estimates provided by Fannie Mae for the period 2003-2011. The CAP data are described in detail by Riley et al. (2009), who find that, with respect to income and race distributions, the CAPS participants are largely representative of the low-income homeowners who participated in the May 2003 Current Population Survey. Thus, using these data, we seek to inform policy discussions that concern CRA lending and the low-income and minority population in the U.S. that would be eligible for such lending. In brief, our methodological approach involves the following steps. We combine the CAPS data with a sample of matched rental properties from the American Housing Survey and use these combined data to derive tenure-pooled hedonic estimates of capitalization rates and equivalent rents for CAPS properties using methods developed by Linneman (1980) and Crone et al. (2009) that make use of the property attributes of owned and rented properties. We then also calculate ex post user costs for the CAPS owners directly from the survey data. We compare the estimated user costs with the estimated equivalent rents for the CAPS owners to assess whether owning was more costly than renting for these households between 2003 and 2011. We also then evaluate annual break-even house price appreciation by equating the user cost of owned housing, exclusive of observed appreciation, with the estimated equivalent rent in a given year. The user cost literature most closely related to this paper comprises the work of Elsinga (1996), Belsky et al. (2005), and Garner and Verbrugge (2009). Elsinga (1996) compares the ex post user cost of owner-occupied and rental housing units in six neighborhoods in Holland for the period from 1978 to 1993 based on survey data. Belsky et al. (2005) simulate the user costs of renting versus owning between 1983 and 2001 for low-income homeowners and renters in Boston, Chicago, Denver, and Washington, DC. Garner and Verbrugge (2009) also use survey data to compare user costs to rents for the median housing structure in New York City, User Cost of Low-Income Homeownership Philadelphia, Chicago, Houston, and Los Angeles between 1982 and 2002. Like much of the large existing user cost literature, these three analyses emphasize the primary importance of timing and market price movements in determining whether owning is less costly than renting. In addition, user costs for renters tend to be less volatile than those for owners as a result of fluctuations in house prices. Secondary factors that are found to reduce the relative user cost of owning include better mortgage terms, better property location, higher household income (due to the greater tax benefit of deducting mortgage interest), refinancing to obtain better mortgage terms, and government subsidies for owned housing. Our paper complements this existing work by considering more recent and more detailed data for known low-income households1 in the U.S., both before and during the recent housing market decline that began in 2006. Because investment decisions are often evaluated from an ex ante perspective in economic research, it is worth mentioning up front that we are interested in the ex post user costs during the survey period for a couple of reasons. First, Shiller (2007) suggests that house price expectations during this period may have been driven by psychological factors rather than economic fundamentals. Because rational ex ante investment decisions are predicated on rational expectations, “irrational exuberance” in the housing market causes problems for accurately assessing the user cost of owned housing. These problems are compounded by the possibility (noted above) that low-income borrowers may be less financially literate and thus prone to making financial mistakes. Second, as noted by Oulton (2007), the choice of an ex ante or ex post approach to measuring the user cost of capital is best informed by what one is trying to accomplish. In historical growth accounting exercises, for example, the ex post approach is often preferable because one is interested in what actually happened, rather than what was expected to happen. In this spirit, one can interpret our analysis as an historical evaluation of what happened when traditionally high-risk2 borrowers were given the Most analyses for low-income households tend to rely on houseprice proxies, under the assumption that low-income households will buy less expensive houses, rather than making use of actual income data. 2 CAP borrowers did have to provide full documentation and demonstrate an ability to repay their loans in order to qualify for the program. Therefore, these borrowers do represent somewhat lower risk than many subprime borrowers in the more general population who received subprime loans, which were sometimes made without any verification of borrower income or assets. 125 opportunity to buy houses financed with low-cost, high-leverage mortgages right before one of the most volatile periods in U.S. economic history. Understanding the evolution of realized housing costs for these borrowers during this period may help to inform future housing policy for urban low-income households.3 For the period of 2003-2011, we estimate median cumulative owner user costs of about $51,700 and capitalization rates of 8-10%. In comparison, we estimate a median cumulative equivalent rent of approximately $78,700, with a standard error of about $7,200. Thus, our analysis suggests that, at the median, homeownership was less costly than renting a comparable property for CRA homeowners during the period from 2003 to 2011. Decomposing these results by year indicates that median annual user costs were generally lower than median equivalent rents before 2007/2008 and were higher thereafter. Thus, because of when they purchased their homes, the households in our sample experienced gains from appreciation prior to the market downturn that were, at the median, sufficient to offset the relatively higher user costs that they have experienced since the decline began. In addition to these overall figures, we observe regional differences, with the discrepancy between median cumulative user costs and median cumulative equivalent rents being largest in the West, smallest in the Midwest, and intermediate in the South and Northeast. Overall, we estimate that annual house price appreciation of less than 5% was necessary to ensure that owning was no more costly than renting a comparable property for 95% of owners during the period considered. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we further describe the data set and provide details about the calculation of the owners’ equivalent rents and user costs. In the third and fourth sections, we present results and discuss the robustness of our estimates and the limitations of our analysis. In the final section, we conclude and suggest directions for future research. 1 We do also consider ex ante measures of the user cost based on expectations defined as some average of observed appreciation in prior years, but defining house price expectations in this way simply strengthens our general results in favor of homeownership, because rents tend to be relatively stable and house price appreciation rates have fallen in the most recent years, causing expected appreciation to exceed actual appreciation. Therefore, we present only our more conservative ex post analysis in this paper. 3 126 2. Data and methods 2.1. Samples and matching The survey data collected via CAPS forms the basis of our analysis. However, we restrict our initial sample to that subset of respondents who have not moved since their original baseline interview. This restriction allows us to make use of the property characteristics information, such as the number of bathrooms, that was collected by the survey beginning in 2008. As described in greater detail below, we use these property characteristics in a hedonic regression to estimate the average capitalization rate for this segment of the housing market and then calculate equivalent rents for these homeowners. However, deriving an accurate measure of the capitalization rate is complicated by the fact that, on average, the properties occupied by renters tend to be of a different quality and type than those of owneroccupiers. For example, owner-occupied properties in the U.S. are more likely to be single-family detached units, while renters are more likely to reside in multifamily housing. The substantial discrepancy between the characteristics of owned and rented properties is potentially a problem for two reasons. From a statistical perspective, this mismatch can cause regression analysis to perform poorly and coefficient estimates to be unreliable. From an economic perspective, the hedonic approach to deriving market capitalization rates rests on the assumption that the marginal contribution of property characteristics to the market prices of those properties is the same regardless of whether the property is owned or rented; however, this assumption of a single market is unlikely to be met if owned and rented properties have very different characteristics. Therefore, to create a counterfactual for these owners, we make use of matched properties from the American Housing Survey (AHS) that have characteristics that are similar to the properties owned by the CAP survey participants. For each year for which the AHS is available (2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011), we use one-to-one nearest neighbor propensity score matching to select a cohort of AHS rental properties that are roughly comparable to the CAP properties. In generating the propensity scores, we make use of the property characteristics variables that are available for both CAPS and the AHS: house type (single-family detached vs. other), the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, house quality (scale of 0-10), neighborhood quality (scale of 0-10), geographic Riley, Ru, and Feng region, square footage, the year of construction, and the year in which the respondent moved into the property. As noted by Rubin (2001) and Stuart (2010), the balance in two samples matched via propensity score methods, as measured by the standardized difference in the means of the propensity scores, should fall below 0.25 in order for subsequent regression analysis to provide reliable estimates. For our sample, the initial balance in these variables before the propensity score match varied by year between 0.17 and 0.18, and we achieve a final balance for each year below 0.14.4 Summary statistics for the CAP properties and the matched 2003 AHS rental properties are presented in Table 1. Although the number of matched properties (i.e., sample size) varies somewhat from year to year due to variations in the AHS data, the distributions of property characteristics in the subsequent years are similar to those presented here. Approximately 58% of the properties owned by CAPS respondents are located in the South, and 35% are located in the Midwest. The corresponding percentages for the AHS renters are 37% and 19%, respectively. About 4% of CAPS owners are located in the West, and 2% are located in the Northeast. Comparable percentages for the AHS rental properties are 26% and 18%, respectively. With regard to housing structure, 86% of the owner households live in single-family detached housing, compared with 72% of the AHS renter households. About 55% of CAPS properties have three bedrooms, compared with about 47% of AHS rental properties. Similarly, 48% and 45% of CAPS and AHS properties have 1.5-2 bathrooms, respectively. Most CAPS properties (63%) and AHS rental properties (55%) have between 1,000 and 2,000 square feet. About 21% of CAPS properties have more than 2,000 square feet, compared with 16% of AHS properties. About 22% of the properties in each sample were constructed between 1950 and 1970, with an additional 25% constructed between 1970 and 1990. About 23% of the CAPS properties and 16% of the AHS properties were constructed after 1990. Most CAPS owners moved into their residences between 2000 and 2002, while more than half of the AHS renters started occupying their properties before the year 2000. On a scale of 1 to 10, 91% of As a robustness check, we also replicate our analysis using Mahalanobis metric matching with propensity-score calipers, as described by Feng et al. (2006), but we find that the simple propensity score match provides slightly better balance for our data. 4 User Cost of Low-Income Homeownership 127 CAPS homeowners rate their homes at 7 or above, compared with 86% of AHS respondents. Similarly, 84% of CAPS owners give their neighborhoods a rating of 7 or above, compared with 83% of AHS renters. The next several sections discuss the construction of the equivalent rent, user cost, and breakeven appreciation measures for the CAPS owners. Table 1. Housing characteristics by matched sample for 2003. Variable Name CAPS Owners Sample (N=925) AHS Renters Sample (N=925) N % N % Residence Type Single-family 797 86 669 72 Other 128 14 256 28 Bedrooms 0-1 14 1 54 6 2 193 21 250 27 3 509 55 439 47 4+ 209 23 184 20 Bathrooms 0-1 274 30 358 51 1.5-2 445 48 320 45 2.5+ 206 22 38 4 House Quality Rating (Scale of 0-10) 0-4 8 1 26 3 5 28 3 48 5 6 47 5 58 6 7 161 17 143 16 8 345 37 263 28 9 153 17 138 15 10 183 20 249 27 Neighborhood Quality Rating (Scale of 0-10) 0-4 28 3 32 4 5 52 6 69 7 6 64 7 51 6 7 178 19 130 14 8 307 33 229 25 9 152 16 142 15 10 144 16 272 29 Region Midwest 318 35 173 19 Northeast 19 2 165 18 South 549 59 346 37 West 39 4 241 26 128 Riley, Ru, and Feng Table 1 (continued). Housing characteristics by matched sample for 2003. Variable Name CAPS Owners Sample (N=925) AHS Renters Sample (N=925) N % N % Square Feet <= 1,000 148 16 267 29 1,000-1,500 355 38 329 36 1,500-2,000 233 25 174 19 >2,000 189 21 155 16 Year of Construction Before 1930 151 16 153 17 1930-1950 138 15 185 20 1950-1970 201 22 206 22 1970-1990 224 24 231 25 After 1990 211 23 150 16 Year Moved into Residence Before 2000 34 4 481 52 2000 316 34 69 7 2001 294 32 108 12 2002 229 25 143 16 After 2002 52 5 124 13 2.2. Measuring equivalent rent Using methods developed by Linneman (1980) and Crone et al. (2009) and the matched CAPS-AHS data sets, we derive capitalization rates for each year by estimating tenure-pooled regressions of property values and rents on respondent tenure status and property characteristics. Using these estimated capitalization rates, we then calculate the equivalent rents for the homeowners sample. More formally, in the conventional hedonics framework, the annual rent 𝑅𝑖𝑡 of renter-occupied property 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is a function of property characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and a random error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ~𝒩(0, 𝜎 2 ), as follows: 𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛾𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (1) Noting that 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 𝑉𝑖𝑡 , where 𝐶𝑡 is the capitalization rate at time 𝑡 and 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the property value, one can derive a comparable hedonic model for owned property as 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑖𝑡 ) = − 𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑡 ) + 𝛾𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (2) Using these two expressions, one can create a pooled hedonic for both rented and owned properties that allows the estimation of 𝐶𝑡 . Specifically, the relationship of house values and rents to property characteristics can be expressed as 𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡 ) = − 𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑡 )𝐷0 + 𝛾𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (3) where 𝐷0 is an indicator for an owner-occupied property and where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = { 𝑉𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖𝑓 𝐷0 = 1 𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 (4) The average capitalization rate 𝐶𝑡 can then be obtained from the estimated coefficient on 𝐷0 . Using this approach, we derive average capitalization rates for each year between 2003 and 2011 for which AHS data are available. We present our estimation results for these hedonic regressions in Table 2. From among the variables that were used in the propensity score match, we retain only those variables that continue to be significant predictors of property value or annual rent: property type, number of bathrooms, and geographic region. Including the additional property characteristics variables does not User Cost of Low-Income Homeownership 129 substantively influence the results. We observe some variation in the estimated coefficients over time as a result of temporal changes in economic conditions. For intermediate years for which AHS data are not available, we take the average of the estimated capitalization rates for adjacent years; for example, the capitalization rate for 2004 is the average of the 2003 rate and the 2005 rate. For simplicity, we refer to this series of values as CapRate. The validity of this estimation approach rests on the assumption that γt is the same for both owned and rented properties. As noted above, we attempt to ensure that this is a reasonable assumption by limiting our analysis to owned and rented properties with similar characteristics. Note that the propensity score match does not eliminate the need for a multivariate framework in calculating the equivalent rent; rather, similar to the way in which multivariate methods are often used in analyzing data from randomized experiments in order to control for residual variation in potential confounders, matching methods and multivariate regression methods are complementary and improve the robustness of estimates from observational studies when used together (Rubin, 2001; Stuart, 2010). After deriving CapRate, we create corresponding measures of equivalent rent (EquivRent) for CAPS properties as the product of the capitalization rate and house value in each year. In an effort to capture the greatest amount of local variation in capitalization rates while working within sample size limitations, as well as to illustrate the sensitivity of our estimates to sample aggregation, we estimate CapRate and EquivRent both for the sample as a whole (i.e., a single national market) and separately for regional subsamples representing local markets. Table 2. Pooled hedonic estimation results for 2003-2011 (odd years). Variable Name 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Owner occupied 2.32 (0.02)*** 2.39 (0.03)*** 2.49 (0.03)*** 2.32 (0.03)*** 2.28 (0.03)*** Single-family residence 0.05 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.14 (0.04)*** Two or more bathrooms 0.36 (0.02)*** 0.36 (0.03)*** 0.43 (0.03)*** 0.46 (0.03)*** 0.52 (0.03)*** Northeast 0.15 (0.04)*** 0.24 (0.05)*** 0.17 (0.05)** 0.23 (0.05)*** 0.31 (0.05)*** Midwest -0.06 (0.03)** -0.06 (0.03)* -0.11 (0.03)*** -0.12 (0.03)*** -0.09 (0.03)** West 0.23 (0.03)*** 0.36 (0.04)*** 0.34 (0.04)*** 0.23 (0.04)*** 0.21 (0.04)*** N 1,850 1,420 1,452 1,764 1,530 R2 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.82 0.83 Region: Notes: *** indicates p ≤ 0.01; ** indicates p ≤ 0.05; * indicates p ≤ 0.10. The dependent variable is the logged house price (for owner-occupied CAPS properties) or the logged annual rent (for renter-occupied AHS properties). 2.3. Measuring the user cost For each owner household 𝑖 in year 𝑡, we construct the user cost 𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑡 as 𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 𝑉𝑖𝑡 − [𝑇𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑉𝑖𝑡 ] (5) where the notation is as follows: 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the annual mortgage payment, including property taxes and insurance.5 While we do observe the actual change in the unpaid principal balance for those households that retained their original CAP mortgages, we do not observe this amount for those who refinanced. Thus, for consistency, we do not subtract out the principal contributions in either case. However, the contribution of 5 𝐸𝑖𝑡 is equity in the house as of the third quarter of year 𝑡. The survey has been administered annually during the summer and fall, so the beginning of the third quarter falls roughly at the midpoint of the survey completion dates. 𝑟𝑡 is the after-tax interest rate that could be earned by investing in something other than housing. We set 𝑟𝑡 equal to the return on a 10year Treasury bill, reduced by the taxes that the household would have paid on such interest. This provides a counterfactual for holding home equity in a virtually risk-free principal payments to the user cost is small, given the relatively recent origination and high leverage of these loans. 130 Riley, Ru, and Feng but similarly illiquid asset.6 This choice of alternative interest rate has previously been adopted by Garner and Verbrugge (2009), among others. if claimed.8 Beracha and Tibbs (2010) argue that the tax refund associated with claiming the mortgage interest tax deduction is often overstated in analyses of the user cost of homeownership. In particular, they suggest that only the portion of the tax refund derived from claiming a deduction in excess of the standard deduction should be considered in calculating the user cost for homeowners. Therefore, our user cost measure addresses this concern and considers only that portion of the refund that exceeds what would have been received anyway under the standard deduction. This choice makes our results somewhat conservative relative to similar measures considered in other papers that have found homeownership to be less costly than renting. 𝐾𝑖𝑡 is the sum of all other miscellaneous expenses, including mortgage closing costs and origination fees, homeowners association fees, and maintenance expenditures. Note that all CAP mortgages were originated directly by lenders, so no brokerage fees were incurred. Data on all maintenance expenditures that were incurred between loan origination and 2008 were collected in 2008, and those for the period from 2009 to 2011 were collected in 2012. We spread the former costs evenly across the years 2003-2008 and similarly assign the four-year average of costs reported in 2012 to each year from 2009 to 2011. ∆𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the house price appreciation observed between the beginning of the third quarter of year 𝑡 and the beginning of the third quarter of year 𝑡 + 1. Note that this term is meant to replace the term for house price expectations that commonly appears in ex ante expressions of the user cost. 𝑑𝑡 is annual depreciation, which is not already included in observed house price changes (see ∆𝑉𝑖𝑡 below), because the house price index used to obtain estimates of house value assumes constant quality of the housing stock over time. Based on work by Poterba (1992) and Harding et al. (2007), we set 𝑑𝑡 = 0.02. 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the observed property value as of the third quarter of year 𝑡. With the exception of the purchase price at loan origination, which we obtain from Self-Help’s database, we use the quarterly house price estimates provided for these properties by Fannie Mae. These estimates are based on a zip-code-level constant-quality house price index, which is then adjusted for refinance bias and information concerning property characteristics and taxes.7 𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the tax refund received in year 𝑡 from claiming the mortgage interest tax deduction, We also consider other conventional interest rate assumptions, including the 6-month T-bill rate and the mortgage note rate, but the amount of equity held in the house is very small for this sample, so the choice of an external rate of return has little effect on the results. 7 Further details about how these estimates were constructed is not available, because Fannie Mae uses an internal, proprietary process. However, we perform a robustness check of the data by comparing these estimates with actual sale prices for the 499 CAPS owners who sold their CAP properties during the survey period. We match these sale prices with the closest house price estimates based on the sale date and find a correlation of 0.82 between these two measures. The price estimates over-estimate the actual sale price for two-thirds of these observations and under- estimate the market value in the remaining cases. The median discrepancy is about $3,000, or about 3% of the final sale price. 6 2.4. Measuring break-even appreciation Because the rate of house price appreciation is generally recognized as the primary driver of the user cost of owner-occupied housing, we also calculate the amount of house price appreciation that would be required to make the user cost equal to the equivalent rent. Specifically, we calculate the breakeven appreciation rate 𝑟𝑏 as 𝑟𝑏 = 𝑏 ∆𝑉𝑖𝑡 𝑉𝑖𝑡 (6) where ∆𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑏 is the dollar amount of appreciation necessary to equate the user cost (exclusive of actual appreciation) and the equivalent rent for household 𝑖 at time 𝑡, as follows: ∆𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑏 = 𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 (7) We observe only gross income and must make assumptions about marital filing status and the number of deductions claimed for dependents based on reported household structure. Therefore, the tax refund may be overstated in some cases. 8 User Cost of Low-Income Homeownership 131 3. Results Complete user cost information for each year of the survey is available for 604 CAPS owners. Therefore, we restrict our comparison of user costs and equivalent rents to this subset of owners to achieve a constant sample size across time. The estimated average capitalization rates, median user costs, and median equivalent rents for these CAPS owners are presented in Table 3 for each year of the survey, 2003-2011. We present both user cost and equivalent rent estimates based on the national sample and estimates separately obtained from regional estimations based only on the properties located in each region. Table 3:. Capitalization rates, ex post user costs, and equivalent rents by year (N=604). Median Annual UserCost EquivRent (Std Error) CapRate 2003 9.85 $3,604 $8,325 ($642) $3,604 $8,325 ($642) 2004 9.51 $3,464 $8,376 ($685) $6,753 $16,715 ($1,344) 2005 9.17 $550 $8,467 ($748) $7,365 $25,206 ($2,064) 2006 8.74 $2,341 $8,463 ($786) $9,497 $33,758 ($2,898) 2007 8.31 $5,209 $8,250 ($834) $13,776 $42,032 ($3,731) 2008 9.08 $9,503 $8,815 ($869) $22,400 $50,889 ($4,638) 2009 9.85 $10,827 $9,105 ($819) $32,873 $60,170 ($5,514) 2010 10.03 $7,564 $9,189 ($845) $40,803 $69,491 ($6,353) 2011 10.22 $10,498 $9,026 ($877) $51,699 $78,712 ($7,194) The estimated average capitalization rates are in the neighborhood of 8-10% throughout the period. For the user costs and equivalent rents, we present medians, rather than means, because the user cost distribution tends to be skewed and have long tails. We use the standard nonparametric bootstrap with 200 repetitions to generate standard errors for the median equivalent rents.9 On an annual basis, the median user cost was approximately $3,600 for these owners in 2003 and fell slightly through 2006, after which it rose to $5,200 in 2007 and reached above $10,000 in 2009. In comparison, the median annual equivalent rent was about $8,300 in 2003 and remained relatively stable through the 2003-2011 period, reaching a maximum of about $9,200 in 2010, with an annual standard error between $600 and $900. Thus, relative to median equivalent rents, annual median user costs were generally lower than annual median equivalent rents between 2003 and 2007/2008 but tended to be higher thereafter. In other words, homeownership was less costly than renting on an annual basis during the period of housing market appreciation, while the reverse has been true since the market For a discussion of bootstrapping methods and sufficient repetitions, see Efron and Tibshirani (1986), Andrews and Buchinsky (2000), and MacKinnon (2006). 9 Median Cumulative UserCost EquivRent (Std Error) Year downturn began. On a cumulative basis, the median user cost was about $51,700, while the median equivalent rent was about $78,700, with a standard error of about $7,200. Therefore, the median homeowner, on the whole, experienced lower costs from owning than renting during this period. Table 4 presents similar estimates for each of the four regions. The regional variation that we observe largely reflects underlying housing market trends. Median user costs for Western homeowners on an annual basis were substantially negative for the beginning of the period as a result of the high appreciation observed in those markets prior to 2007. In contrast, for Midwestern, Southern, and Northeastern homeowners, annual median user costs were positive, or very nearly so, during each year of the study period. In the West, the annual median user cost ranged from a minimum of -$4,435 in 2003 to a maximum of $46,771 in 2009. In the other regions, the variation was less pronounced: between $1,563 and $11,642 in the Midwest, between $656 and $10,723 in the South, and between -$54 and $11,704 in the Northeast. The discrepancy between the annual median user costs and equivalent rents was also most volatile in the West. In 2005, the median equivalent rent exceeded the median user cost by more than $50,000, while in 2009 the median user cost exceeded the median equivalent rent by more 132 Riley, Ru, and Feng than $32,000. This volatility reflects the underlying volatility in regional house prices that was present during the period, and the corresponding differences were smaller in the other regions. On a cumu- lative basis, the extent to which median equivalent rents exceeded median user costs was largest in the West ($51,152), followed by the Northeast ($39,818), South ($28,784), and Midwest ($14,699). Table 4. Capitalization rates, ex post user costs, and equivalent rents by year and region. Median Annual UserCost EquivRent (Std Error) -$4,435 $10,480 ($603) Median Cumulative UserCost EquivRent (Std Error) -$4,435 $10,480 ($603) Region West Year 2003 CapRate 9.09 (N=34) 2004 7.77 -$17,664 $14,611 ($1,400) -$18,213 $25,211 ($1,774) 2005 6.46 -$41,339 $11,131 ($1,060) -$53,397 $36,140 ($2,654) 2006 6.14 -$8,808 $11,550 ($1,106) -$69,364 $47,778 ($3,781) 2007 5.83 $20,126 $10,963 ($1,050) -$43,617 $58,785 ($4,868) 2008 7.66 $46,771 $14,399 ($1,379) -$5,995 $73,246 ($6,322) 2009 9.49 $40,753 $11,837 ($1,423) $32,826 $85,522 ($6,733) 2010 10.03 $12,298 $18,855 ($1,806) $49,612 $104,427 ($8,661) 2011 10.57 $16,151 $12,038 ($1,833) $65,759 $116,911 ($9,197) Midwest 2003 10.15 $3,750 $7,657 ($564) $3,750 $7,657 ($564) (N=138) 2004 10.15 $4,116 $8,120 ($589) $7,286 $15,831 ($1,170) 2005 10.15 $1,563 $8,118 ($589) $9,564 $23,966 ($1,751) 2006 9.90 $5,341 $7,921 ($574) $13,802 $31,889 ($2,320) 2007 9.66 $7,576 $7,700 ($451) $20,435 $39,488 ($2,811) 2008 10.47 $11,642 $8,378 ($607) $31,633 $47,862 ($3,436) 2009 11.29 $9,082 $8,190 ($539) $40,871 $55,954 ($3,744) 2010 11.47 $6,760 $9,174 ($665) $50,013 $65,134 ($4,420) 2011 11.65 $9,191 $8,057 ($551) $58,414 $73,113 ($4,706) South 2003 9.46 $3,814 $8,195 ($586) $3,814 $8,195 ($586) (N=413) 2004 9.12 $3,612 $9,201 ($737) $7,361 $17,513 ($1,403) 2005 8.78 $656 $8,342 ($689) $7,495 $25,874 ($2,101) 2006 8.48 $1,641 $8,556 ($685) $8,828 $34,463 ($2,788) 2007 8.19 $4,214 $8,526 ($689) $13,075 $43,009 ($3,457) 2008 8.74 $8,718 $8,812 ($705) $20,214 $51,843 ($4,154) 2009 9.29 $10,723 $9,113 ($677) $30,183 $60,993 ($4,834) 2010 9.28 $7,785 $9,364 ($750) $38,114 $70,322 ($5,597) 2011 9.28 $10,654 $8,659 ($666) $49,343 $79,127 ($6,313) Northeast 2003 15.07 $2,860 $8,685 ($1,578) $2,860 $8,685 ($1,578) (N=19) 2004 14.78 -$54 $9,771 ($1,954) $1,646 $18,591 ($3,442) 2005 14.49 -$181 $9,863 ($2,026) $581 $28,478 ($5,450) 2006 11.59 $3,378 $7,663 ($1,532) $1,887 $36,141 ($6,963) 2007 8.69 $4,498 $6,592 ($975) $5,491 $42,689 ($7,996) 2008 8.81 $11,704 $5,823 ($1,164) $11,299 $48,512 ($9,140) 2009 8.92 $8,834 $6,667 ($893) $17,289 $55,201 ($10,159) 2010 10.15 $4,568 $6,708 ($1,341) $25,818 $61,910 ($11,483) 2011 11.37 $5,605 $8,057 ($773) $30,253 $70,071 ($12,526) User Cost of Low-Income Homeownership 133 To assess how much appreciation would have been necessary for these low-income households to face equivalent housing costs from renting comparable properties, we also calculate break-even appreciation rates. These estimates are presented in Tables 5 and 6. We find that, at the median, breakeven appreciation rates are negative for the entire period and range between 1% and 3% in absolute value. Positive appreciation of less than 1% would have would have ensured that 75% of CAPS owners found owning no more expensive than renting; at the 95th percentile, the required appreciation rate jumps to around 5%. Regional variation also exists in the break-even appreciation rates, with higher rates of appreciation required in the Midwest and Northeast and lower rates generally needed in the South and West. Overall, these results illustrate the key role that local economic conditions and market timing play in driving the relative cost of homeownership. Most of the owner households in our sample experienced gains from appreciation prior to the market downturn that were sufficient to offset the relatively higher user costs that they have experienced since the decline began. Table 5. Break-Even appreciation rate (%) quintiles by year (N=604). Year 5th Percentile 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 95th Percentile 2003 -3.57 -2.26 -0.93 1.14 6.43 2004 -9.36 -3.22 -1.97 -0.52 4.12 2005 -10.89 -8.10 -2.81 -1.15 2.87 2006 -4.97 -2.53 -1.33 0.21 4.78 2007 -4.50 -2.45 -1.17 0.43 4.91 2008 -5.23 -3.08 -1.70 0.21 4.85 2009 -5.67 -3.56 -2.04 -0.37 4.28 2010 -5.92 -3.84 -2.16 -0.33 4.67 2011 -7.56 -4.03 -2.34 -0.09 4.98 4. Robustness and limitations 4.1. Mobility Because of data limitations, we have chosen to focus our analysis on those CAPS owners who did not move during the sample period. However, if user costs influence mobility, then restricting the sample in this fashion could bias our results; in particular, if those households with relatively higher user costs are the same households who moved, then our sample will be biased in favor of those households who had lower relative user costs and thus found it cost effective to remain homeowners. In an effort to check for bias, we first investigate whether absolute user costs were higher for movers than for non-movers in the year prior to the move, and we do not find any evidence of systematically higher user costs for movers. Therefore, if the properties that non-movers would have occupied, if they had moved, are similar to those actually occupied by movers, we should not expect any systematic bias in the user costs of these two groups relative to the cost of comparable rental housing. As a second means of checking for mobility bias, we investigate whether the movers experienced systematically lower user costs after moving, but we do not find that user costs are substantially different after the move than before the move. Therefore, we infer that user costs may not be the primary driver of mobility decisions for these homeowners. Consistent with this inference, and in a related but more comprehensive analysis of the drivers of CAPS homeowner mobility during the period 2003-2011, Riley et al. (2012) find that CAPS homeowners moved out of the CAP residence primarily for family-related reasons, such as divorce or the birth of a child, with housing costs playing only a secondary role in mobility decisions. In light of these findings, we do not believe that our results suffer from systematic bias with respect to mobility. 134 Riley, Ru, and Feng Table 6. Break-Even appreciation rate (%) quintiles by year and region. Sample Year 5th Percentile 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 95th Percentile West 2003 -3.98 -2.31 -1.55 0.12 14.93 (N =34) 2004 -11.77 -6.65 -4.86 -3.40 1.44 2005 -8.30 -7.46 -4.33 -1.21 0.42 2006 -3.21 -2.48 -1.52 -0.83 3.11 2007 -3.42 -2.02 -1.41 -0.49 2.75 2008 -9.76 -5.74 -3.64 -1.85 0.73 2009 -6.35 -3.45 -2.19 -0.82 2.05 2010 -22.49 -13.36 -9.13 -4.32 -1.77 2011 -12.46 -5.02 -3.13 -1.01 3.15 Midwest 2003 -3.32 -1.92 -0.28 1.19 8.92 (N =138) 2004 -11.28 -3.46 -2.06 -0.19 5.80 2005 -12.03 -9.91 -3.51 -1.48 2.91 2006 -4.23 -2.32 -1.00 0.60 6.91 2007 -4.53 -2.33 -1.06 0.87 6.82 2008 -5.93 -3.11 -1.24 0.73 7.49 2009 -6.69 -3.87 -2.21 -0.25 5.74 2010 -7.37 -4.91 -3.15 -1.37 5.09 2011 -6.82 -4.17 -2.40 0.41 6.77 South 2003 -3.23 -1.93 -0.68 1.23 5.62 (N =413) 2004 -9.14 -3.99 -2.78 -1.46 2.50 2005 -10.48 -5.95 -2.26 -0.96 2.79 2006 -4.34 -2.28 -1.33 -0.05 4.18 2007 -4.10 -2.32 -1.30 -0.08 3.58 2008 -6.04 -2.73 -1.68 -0.37 3.27 2009 -5.38 -3.15 -1.92 -0.39 3.90 2010 -7.86 -3.68 -2.17 -0.49 3.47 2011 -7.22 -3.21 -1.77 0.03 4.62 Northeast 2003 -10.97 -6.33 -3.12 1.22 11.88 (N =19) 2004 -16.78 -9.14 -7.08 -3.45 0.66 2005 -16.49 -14.92 -6.81 -3.81 -1.01 2006 -7.16 -3.91 -1.16 0.61 17.32 2007 -5.75 -4.04 -0.43 3.34 4.69 2008 -5.89 -1.81 0.51 4.23 10.32 2009 -5.15 -3.87 -0.81 1.12 12.82 2010 -10.86 -5.17 -0.07 1.09 8.17 2011 -13.26 -7.03 -3.99 -3.21 6.78 User Cost of Low-Income Homeownership 4.2. Terminal transactions cost Some user cost analyses that seek to compare the relative costs of owning and renting include a term for the eventual transaction costs of property liquidation. We do not include such a measure because all of the properties continue to be occupied by their CAPS owners and we are interested in the costs incurred to date. However, if one considers homeownership as a fixed-term investment, there is certainly scope for incorporating the transaction costs associated with moving. If a 5-10% liquidation cost (equivalent to standard real estate brokerage commissions) were added to the user cost, the difference between the user cost and equivalent rent for the median homeowner would be reduced by as much as 50%. 4.3. Risk While some existing user cost analyses also incorporate a risk premium for owned housing relative to other investment assets or relative to rental housing (e.g., Poterba, 1992; Himmelberg et al., 2005; Poterba and Sinai, 2011), others do not (e.g., Poterba, 1984; Elsinga, 1996; Quigley and Raphael, 2004; Beracha and Tibbs, 2010; Haffner and Heylen, 2011), and it is not clear whether or why one method should be preferred over the other. Moreover, determining the magnitude and direction of a risk premium for investment in owned housing is complicated by the fact that this risk premium varies across markets, which vary in their supply and demand conditions, and that homeownership can actually serve to hedge both housing-related risks and portfolio risks associated with other investment assets (Sinai and Souleles, 2005; Hasanov and Dacy, 2009; Sinai, 2011; Han, 2011). Therefore, for simplicity, we have omitted any explicit consideration of a risk premium from our current analysis. We hope to extend our analysis in future research to examine this issue. 4.4. Maintenance An important limitation to keep in mind is that the median CAP borrower in our sample reported spending less than 1% of the house value on renovations and maintenance on an annual basis during the survey period considered. In fact, only about 25% of these homeowners spent at least 2% on home repairs and renovations. So our assumed depreciation rate of 2% may understate the true extent of depreciation on these properties. This inference is consistent with the results of Van Zandt and Rohe (2011), who find that many low-income homeowners face challenges 135 in sustaining homeownership and maintaining their property values as a result of maintenance and repair expenses that they do not foresee when purchasing their houses. To the extent that CAP properties may require higher levels of maintenance in the future, it is unclear whether the user costs that we have estimated for the period of 2003-2011 may underestimate the longer-term trend in this regard. 4.5. Market segmentation A further limitation is that, while we have calculated equivalent rents for comparable properties, in practice finding rental equivalents of the owneroccupied housing stock is difficult or impossible in many locations. The housing units that are available for owner occupation often tend to be of greater quality and of a different type (e.g., single-family detached vs. apartment complex) than available rental housing. If the quality of rental and owneroccupied housing differs systematically, which would be consistent with the fact that renters tend to spend a smaller fraction of their incomes on housing than do owners (Sinai, 2011), then the cost of renting (given lower housing quality) may be systematically lower than that of owning. Thus, we infer that the owners in our sample have likely benefitted from higher quality housing, as well as possibly somewhat lower housing costs given the quality of that housing, as a result of the decision to become homeowners. 5. Conclusion Using data from the Community Advantage Panel Survey and matched data from the American Housing Survey, we have compared the user cost of homeownership with hedonic estimates of equivalent rent for low-income households in the United States who received community reinvestment mortgages between 1999 and 2003. We find that owning was less costly than renting a comparable property for the median homeowner in our sample during the period from 2003 to 2011. The median annual user cost was less than the median equivalent rent before 2007/2008 and greater thereafter, but the initial period of house price appreciation has been sufficient to offset the more recent higher user costs for the period as a whole. Some regional variation exists in the extent to which equivalent rents exceeded user costs during the period, but the direction of the results remains robust by region. Furthermore, we estimate that annual house price appreciation of less than 5% was sufficient to ensure that owning was no 136 more costly than renting a comparable property for 95% of the homeowners in our sample between 2003 and 2011. Our results are driven in part by the high original loan-to-value ratio (median of 97%) associated with all of the loans considered here. A low down payment on the loan has a couple of effects that tend to make owning more attractive relative to renting: the increased leverage raises the benefit from even small amounts of house price appreciation while simultaneously reducing the opportunity cost of equity. Thus, while low-income households may generally tend to derive less financial benefit from homeownership than more affluent borrowers, our results suggest that this difference may be partly offset under reduced down-payment requirements. This observation may partly explain why community reinvestment mortgages tend to permit such low down payments: these not only reduce entry costs for new homeowners but can also help to contain user costs during the initial period for which the property is held, thus increasing the likelihood that homeownership will be sustained. 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