Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
The Milkweed Dairy’s best marketing info and insights Issue No. 322, May 2006 CFTC Probing CME Cheese Cash Market Activities by Pete Hardin and John Bunting The parties involved won’t, or can’t acknowledge. But the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is actively investigating alleged irregularities in cash Cheddar markets at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). CFTC’s specific angle is alleged manipulation of cash Cheddar markets that may have influenced settlement of futures and options contracts. Sources in the cheese industry tell The Milkweed that CFTC has been actively investigating CME cash market activities for Cheddar for the past two to three months. When questioned, a media spokeswoman at CME that she could not comment on an investigation, if there was one or not. She advised contacting CFTC directly. CFTC was equally informative. “The Commission does not comment on what it is or is not investigating,” an employee stated in response to a question from The Milkweed. Midwest cheese industry sources have been more helpful—confirming visits from CFTC investigators out of the Commission’s regional office in Kansas City, Missouri. Beyond such helpful comments from CME and CFTC, The Milkweed has learned that an active CFTC probe of cash Cheddar markets and related settlement of futures/options has been ongoing for the past 60 to 90 days. A number of cheese industry participants have been interviewed by CFTC investigators. It’s important to note that CFTC’s investigatory powers extend only to matters involving manipulations of cash markets to influence resolution of futures/options. One key target: DFA A major focus of CFTC’s investigation centers on Cheddar cash market activities by Dairy Farmers of America—the nation’s largest dairy farmers’ cooperative. From summer 2000 until sometime in spring 2005, when DFA’s cash flow constricted … DFA had been the predominant purchaser of Cheddar in cash market trading at CME. DFA’s involvement CME Cheddar cash market “oddities” has occurred several times in the past five-plus years. *In August-September 2000, DFA drove up the Cheddar cash markets by over 25 cents per pound through purchases of hundreds of carloads of Cheddar cheese (both 40-lb. blocks and 500-lb. barrels). Trouble was: DFA violated CME rules by failing to pay for these mega-purchases on a timely basis. The Milkweed’s editor filed a formal complaint with CFTC shortly thereafter, providing investigators with an September 18, 2000 audio tape of DFA CEO/President Gary Hanman bragging about DFA’s strategy to drive up farm milk prices by driving up CME Cheddar purchases through large purchases. CFTC took no action against DFA, although a person at the Commission acknowledged it was unusual for a complaining party to provide an audio tape detailing alleged misdeeds. *In 2003 and 2004, various sharp run-ups in CME cash Cheddar markets caused Class III milk prices in the federal milk order program to eclipse Class I (fluid) milk prices—resulting in a so-called “price-inversion”. DFA and its marketing affiliates then “depooled” the Class III milk for April-May 2004—pirating tens of millions of dollars in what should have been revenue destined for dairy producers. *Two other strange “interventions” by DFA in the CME cash Cheddar markets occurred. In MayJune 2004, for weeks DFA maintained a flat-line price of $1.80/lb. for block Cheddar. And then, in late summer/early fall 2004, DFA’s purchases held block Cheddar constantly at $1.60/lb., as the co-op was negotiating a complex, major financial restructuring with insurance companies. More than DFA, however … Cheese industry sources state that CFTC’s probe of CME Cheddar pricing antics may hook more than DFA. Sources cite strange price antics in November 2004 and January 2005, which saw one trader almost single-handedly drive up CME Cheddar prices to unduly high levels … and then benefit on resolution of previously-contracted futures/options positions. These antics were closely covered by The Milkweed in its February 2005 issue, in an article titled “CME Price Yo-Yo: Futures-Based Manipulation?” Specifically, a trader from Minnesota is reportedly gaining CFTC’s focus for these trading antics. He netted millions in settling futures positions, after driving up the cash Cheddar markets. CFTC probe just the start There is, an active CFTC investigation, let’s hope CFTC staffers get it right. Manipulating dairy’s most important pricing mechanism—CME Cheddar cash markets—is wrong, whatever the manipulators’ motives may be. The complexity of dairy pricing…and the ability of certain parties to manipulate the system for venal gain…merits thorough investigation far beyond CFTC’s limited mandate. April Class III: $10.93 The April 2006 Class III (cheese) milk price for USDA’s federal milk order system is $10.93/cwt. That price is down 19 cents per cwt. from the March 2006 Class III price. Shockingly, the April 2006 Class III price represents a drop of $3.67/cwt. below the April 2005 Class III price. We fear that similar Class III prices may be registered for perhaps the next two months. In calculating the April 2006 Class III price, USDA used the following values (determined from the monthly average of weekly dairy commodity price surveys for Cheddar cheese, butter, whey and nonfat dry milk): Butterfat: $1.2343/lb. Nonfat Solids: $.6959/lb. Protein: $1.9238/lb. Other solids: $.1508/lb. The low level of Class III prices reflects current rock-bottom values for dairy commodities. The Milkweed 5/06 Invest in your best source for dairy news and analysis. Know what’s really going on! New U.S. Law Restricting Producer-Handlers Could Devastate California Fluid Quota Values by John Bunting and Pete Hardin One of the first lessons taught to kids learning to shoot a .22 rifle is that the bullet can carry up to a mile, well past the intended target. Thus, caution must be exercised to look beyond the immediate target and weigh all of the potential targets within the full range of the projectile. California Congressman Devin Nunes (R), author of the “Milk Regulatory Equity Act of 2005”, may have shot more victims in dairy than he intended, in his attempts to gun down alleged competitive advantages enjoyed by nefarious “producer-handlers” outside the federal milk regulation. Trouble is: Nunes’ bill, which became Public Law 1090-215 on April 11, 2006, when signed by President Bush, contains another provision, which exempts Nevada from federal milk order regulation. And the brand new, big fluid milk plant owned by Dean Foods in Reno, Nevada is poised to deluge California with unregulated, packaged Class I milk. The ultimate danger to California dairy producers is losing several BILLION dollars of fluid quota which they own. Under California’s state milk pricing program, dairy producers who own fluid milk quota share in the higher receipts of the Class I market. Quota is commonly bought, sold, traded … and used as collateral for loans … by California dairy producers. Continued on page 7 Visit our Web site: www.themilkweed.com To subscribe, send your check to: The Milkweed P.O. Box 10 Brooklyn, WI 53521-0010 Subscription rates: $40 per year (12 issues); $75 for two years, OR 2 subscriptions. Foreign subscription rates, one year: Canada: $50 U.S.; foreign air mail: $75 U.S. (Name) (Street or Rural Address) (City, State, Zip) A