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The Hapsburg Monarchy Austria-Hungary History Ruling over the oldest European empire, the Hapsburg family traced its descent from the C8th Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne. The dynasty played a major role in European affairs for over 1000 years and had played a crucial part, in the Middle Ages, of enforcing Papal Decrees. Vital in repelling Moslem attacks from Turkey, Austria-Hungary regarded the Balkans as an indispensable bulwark in that mission long after any prospect of Moslem attack had evaporated. In practice, the Austrian Empire had coexisted with the Turkish, or Ottoman Empire, since the end of Turkish expansion in the Middle Ages. Because of their long association with the Roman Catholic Church, the Hapsburgs regarded themselves as the protectors of Balkan Christians and referred to their empire as the Holy Roman Empire. Over the long centuries of its rule, the Austrian empire had outgrown it capacity to administer its many territories. As a result, the late C19th found it presiding ever more precariously over a mixture of people’s, languages, aspirations and expectations. Ramshackle is the term most commonly used to describe Austrian administration, and it is appropriate enough for a system which relied upon tradition rather than efficiency, and on coercion rather than persuasion. Problems The growth of national consciousness menaced polyglot empires such as Austria’s. The movement known as Pan Slavism represented a menace to ongoing Austrian control over the Slavic peoples of the Balkans and allowed Russia to pose as the logical protector of fellow Slavs. Control of the West Balkans was also essential to preserving Austria’s maritime options. Although Austria had a seaboard on the Adriatic it could easily be blockaded and her fleet confined within that long, narrow waterway. By tradition and outlook, Austria was a land power rather than a maritime one, but much was changing in Europe of the day and the Hapsburgs saw no reason to limit their options. Finally, Austrian claims to leadership of the German peoples had received a major setback with her crushing defeat by Prussia in 1866 in a war that had lasted just seven weeks. This war, engineered by German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck as a trigger for German unification, cast Austria as the junior partner and made the Hapsburgs more determined than ever to strengthen their grip upon the Balkans. The Hohenzollern Monarchy Germany History Germany was the newest of the major powers at the end of the century. The 390 small provinces and states which had constituted ‘Germany’ since the Dark Ages had been amalgamated to about 10% of that number by Napoleon Bonaparte at the beginning of the century. The dominant German state in the struggle for independence from French occupation was Prussia, whose royal family was the Hohenzollerns. Formidable talent for organisation and especially for military organisation saw the Prussian Junker, or landowning class, emerge as the driving force of German consciousness after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. This consciousness was first expressed through the development of economic union between the German states under Prussia’s leadership. By 1844, the Zollverein, or toll free union, included most of the German states. Prussia had made a conscious commitment to modernisation. The process included steam technology, a postal system, railways, an efficient education system and compulsory military service for males. Under the Customs Union, the benefits of the first three of these institutions were made available to other German states and it was not long before Prussia was acknowledged by other states as their mentor and leader. At the same time, eventual conflict with Austria became inevitable. Problems The Hapsburgs regarded the Hohenzollern dynasty of Prussia as upstarts. Unfortunately, most of the Austrian empire was in fact non-German. This became obvious at the very time when the advantages of ‘Germanism’ were being expressed though the zollverein – which excluded Austria. Austria worked long and hard to confound Prussia’s attempts to dominate the German peoples, and succeeded until 1862 brought the appointment of Otto von Bismarck to the post of Minister-President of Prussia. The outstanding political principle of Bismarck’s life was his dedication to the pre-eminence of Prussia and the Prussian monarchy. Whilst his policies in crushing all liberal opposition to autocratic rule within Prussia need not concern us here, the fact that they succeeded so well was a pointer to the framework of attitudes within which he operated. Briefly, these were that might was right and that the end justified the means. Bismarck was the very man to settle the question of German hegemony, and he did so by fighting three carefully planned wars. With Denmark in 1864, which, although ostensibly over the ownership of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, was in effect a practice run for the Prussian army. With Austria in 1866 to settle the question of Germanic hegemony. With France in 1870 – 1871 to create the German empire and to establish the new Germany as the supreme land power in Europe. These wars revealed Bismarck to be a skilled statesman. Each was preceded by intense diplomatic activity to ensure that Germany never faced more than one enemy at a time. Although the performance of the army in each case was far from flawless, Bismarck’s careful groundwork ensured that no perceived deficiency ever invited intervention by a third party and proved the value of alliances. The new nation of Germany soon sought to acquire territories and colonies appropriate to its status as a power. Much of this was the doing of Kaiser Wilhelm II, grandson of Queen Victoria, who became Emperor in 1888 after throat cancer ended the three month reign of his father, Frederick. Wilhelm is generally regarded as an unstable personality who was obsessed with the pursuit of military glory. His insistence on the trappings of empire – overseas colonies and a navy powerful enough to defend them – soon brought him into conflict with Britain; the world’s foremost sea-power since 1805. A tactless man whose arrogance left him impatient with the niceties of diplomacy, Wilhelm’s determination to have his way in all things soon led to Bismarck’s resignation. With the ‘Iron Chancellor’ (Bismarck), went his considerable talent for keeping in balance the complex web of alliances and power groupings which he had spent much of his life creating. The result may be compared with depriving a high-performance engine of the services of a mechanic. German military thinking was constrained by the nation’s position in the centre of Europe. Her seizure of the western provinces of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 ensured the lasting enmity of France, while German policy toward Russia, the eastern colossus, had to take note of that country’s close financial and diplomatic relationship with France. The German General Staff were all too aware of the dangers of a war on two fronts, but Bismarck’s skilled diplomacy had always prevented such an occurrence. With Bismarck gone, military thinking in Germany turned toward a consideration not of ‘if’ but ‘when’, and planning for an unavoidable two front war went ahead. The Third French Republic France History During the period of the French Revolution (1789 – 1804) and the subsequent First Empire (1804 – 1815) France had been the bogey of Europe. Since then a Second Republic had come and gone, and in 1870 French stock in Europe was low. Louis Napoleon, the architect and the destroyer of the Second Empire, had died a broken man after the war with Prussia. The legacy of that war for his successors was an enduring bitterness toward Germany in respect of the huge indemnity which she demanded of France, but more importantly because of the loss of the border provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. For twenty years after that war with Germany, France was not a major player in world affairs. A succession of Governments, class based internal divisions, continuing and bitter debate over whether the new France should be Republican or Royalist, and a series of personal, financial and political scandals, racked the nation until 1890, and forced its attention inward rather than outward. Although Louis Napoleon had styled himself France’s second Emperor, the nation’s overseas possessions were meagre and their contribution to France’s Treasury even more so. Colonies and Protectorates were established in North Africa and Indo-China. The former involved France in some confrontation with Britain, who tended to regard any non-British activity in the region of the Suez Canal as a threat to its communications with India. Historically, Anglo-French relations were not good. Since the C11th Norman Conquest, the two nations had fought each other at least once every century. Britain had led European resistance to French expansion for twenty years during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. France was fixed in British minds so firmly as the national enemy that Lord Raglan, the general commanding British troops in the Crimean War (1854 – 1856) in which Britain and France fought together against Russia, frequently referred to the enemy as ‘The French’. Problems Trouble between France and Britain arose when France sought to take advantage of a power vacuum in the Sudan in 1898. Britain, objecting to any Power other than itself having a presence in the area which might affect the security of Egypt and hence the Suez Canal, sent an expedition to reestablish a British presence in the Sudan. For a six week period, the French and British forces confronted each other at the Sudanese town of Fashoda whilst their respective governments worked out whether Sudan was worth going to war over. In the end, Delcasse, the French Foreign Minister, recognised that France could not afford to alienate both Britain and Germany, and French forces made an embarrassing withdrawal. Trivial though the Fashoda incident appears, its significance lay in France’s recognition that her long term aims of recovering Alsace and Lorraine and avenging herself on Germany would be achieved only through alliance with another power. That power would need to be one clearly opposed to German interests. It was obvious by the end of the century that German and British concerns were on a collision course despite the close links between Queen Victoria’s children. Earlier in the century, however, it had seemed that a natural ally for France was Russia. Despite differences in type of government, both countries were seen by Britain as something of a menace to her Indian possessions – France because of her pre-eminence in the Mediterranean and the Canal area, and Russia because of her attempts to destabilise British influence in India’s north-west. Indeed, the story of Russia’s ambitions in that area of the world extended over most of the C19th and is known to students of British imperial history as the ‘Great Game’. Therefore, Britain had little cause to love either country, and when political stability returned to France after 1890 the Third Republic began to woo an industrially backward Russia with offers of loans and modern technology. By 1894 a Franco-Russian Military Convention ensured two things. Firstly, that Germany would not be able to act with impunity either in the east or the west. Secondly, that France had breached a wall of isolation which Bismarck had so carefully crafted. Standing on their military tradition of ‘La Gloire’ and fuelled by the determination to recover the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, the French began to look towards a settling of the account with Germany. The Romanov Monarchy Russia History The key to understanding the Russian position in the approach to WWI is the fact that the Russian empire was more archaic in its institutions than any other. Power was centred in the Tsar, who wielded it with complete indifference for any interests other than Russian. In part this condition arose from the immensity of the land – Mother Russia was unbelievably huge and immensely backward in administration and technology and no other Power took such poor care of its peoples. This, in turn, arose from the curious mixture of Western and Oriental philosophies that characterised the Russian ruling classes. Problems Traditional Russian foreign policy in the C19th was aimed at the securing of warm water ports. Landlocked in some of the coldest regions on earth, Russia’s ports were ice-free for only part of the year and this did nothing to lessen the physical isolation of its peoples or to encourage commerce with the outside world. Russia came into conflict with Britain when its need to expand into kinder climates saw it begin to destabilise British rule in north-west India. Although this, the ‘Great Game’, was pursued at various stages throughout the century, a Russian conquest of India was never a serious possibility in the face of a prompt and vigorous British reaction. Easier conquests appeared to exist in the Balkans, where the ageing and tottering Ottoman Empire experienced increasing difficulty in holding on to its European possessions after the 1878 Congress of Berlin gave many of them away. To gain a toehold here, Russia fell back upon its traditional claim to be the protector of Balkan Slavs and other Christians against their Moslem overlords. A strong Russian presence in the Balkans would lead inevitably to the opening of the Dardanelles and thereafter the eastern Mediterranean to Russian shipping. The other power with an interest in the Balkans was Austria-Hungary. Russia’s ambitions in the Balkans brought it into conflict with the Hapsburgs because the Austrians themselves had an eye upon Turkish territories. Russian encouragement of the Pan Slavic independence movements was an obvious menace to Austrian oppressors of Slavs. It was also a problem that Austria’s humiliation in the Seven Weeks War with Prussia in 1866 made them take an even more intense interest in the Balkans by way of compensation. It was thus hardly likely to look kindly on Russian pretensions in the area. Austria was encouraged in this attitude by the Germans, who made it plain that they regarded the Balkans as an Austrian sphere of influence. Russia could, however, counter this German pressure by developing the sort of relationship with France which would compel Germany to avoid antagonising her. French technology was made available to Russia, as was the finance necessary to develop it. Huge loans for railway construction were made to Russia by France between 1887 – 1897, on condition that the railways built had the capability to deliver Russian troops to the German border in the event of war. Military cooperation began with the visit of a French fleet to Russia in 1891 and a reciprocal visit by the Russians to Toulon in 1893. Discussions were held between the General Staffs of both countries in 1892 before the signing in 1894 of an agreement that bound each country to intervene if the other were attacked by a member of the Triple Alliance. Thus Russia identified itself as a potential enemy of the Central Powers of Germany and Austria. Although a relatively soft military target because of its organisational deficiencies, Russia nevertheless posed too big a threat for the Central Powers to ignore. Its contribution to the outbreak of war lay mainly in compelling Germany to develop a war plan that depended upon crushing France before turning to deal with Russia and that had the effect of widening the area of conflict to include Britain. The Windsor Monarchy Great Britain History While Britain is in Europe, it is not actually a part of Europe. Its situation as an offshore island has been its salvation on more than one occasion in its history and it may be said that this situation has bred at least a little insularity in the British. The major aim of British foreign policy even before the C19th was the preservation of the world’s trade routes. Altruism played no part in this – as the world’s first industrial nation and the world’s leading maritime power, the world was Britain’s trading oyster. Keeping peace on the continents and oceans of the world played a significant part in maintaining that situation. Although Britain traditionally steered clear of Continental involvement, she had an interest in Belgian independence that dated from the nation’s birth in 1839. At that time Britain, together with other European nations, had guaranteed Belgian independence. Unlike the other nations, Britain had stuck to her word ever since, and this had given Britain virtually its only interest in Continental affairs. Ironically this, the very slightest of connections with an arena in which Britain had remarkably little interest, was to be the means of involving Britain in cataclysm. Problems No part of Britain’s foreign policy was held as more important than the preservation of India. The wealth of India flowed into British coffers. India alone justified Victoria’s claim to the title of “Queen-Empress” and it was described as “the jewel in the Crown”. Before the construction of the Suez Canal, Britain needed to secure sea routes to India. This gave rise to more territorial acquisition. Because Britain kept only a small standing army on home soil, with the bulk of her forces in overseas garrisons, she put a high value on avoiding Continental entanglements through a policy of “Isolation”. The demands of servicing a far-flung Empire saw the adoption of the “Two Power Standard”; the Royal Navy was to be at all times capable of matching any two navies in the world combined. However, German acquisition of overseas colonies after 1888 challenged this policy. Driven by his wish to create an immediate Empire, the Kaiser did not consider the results of his crash programme of naval expansion, and in particular his determination to create a modern fleet capable of meeting the Royal Navy. This was completely unacceptable to London and the naval race began to spiral out of control. Britain had other grounds for her dislike of Germany. Tactless as ever, the Kaiser had given support to the Boers of South Africa in their war with Britain. Economically and commercially Britain found herself being muscled out by the emerging industrial giants of Germany and the US after 1890. The world’s first industrial society had taught other nations the lessons of industrialisation all too well. Britain’s technology became outdated in comparison with ‘second generation’ technologies in other countries, for example, German use of steel and American use of steam and petrol technology in agriculture. At the turn of the century Britain had a centuries old distrust of France, a profound dislike of Russia, a growing irritation with Germany, a preoccupation with her Empire and a determination to preserve her naval advantage. British pre-eminence over her commercial rivals was under threat. If the sun had not yet set on the British Empire, the shadows were at least beginning to lengthen.