Download Russia Looks Out for Own Interests in Europe`s Elections But Risks

Russia Looks Out for Own Interests in Europe’s Elections But Risks Long-Term
Blowback. By Yuval Weber, April 19, 2017. Havard Kennedi School
Author: Yuval Weber is a visiting assistant professor at Harvard's Department of Government
and a fellow at the university's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He is also an
assistant professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.
As Europe faces key elections this year, and U.S. politics continue to reel from the controversy over
Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 presidential race, liberals in the West have been ringing
alarms over the prospect of Moscow’s meddling in countries from France to Serbia. Indeed,
Moscow has openly aligned itself with Euro-sceptical, nationalist-leaning politicians across the
continent. But, as with President Donald Trump, Russian preference for these political forces
comes not specifically from ideological overlap or any secret financial links , but from the
recognition that some candidates are much closer to satisfying Russia’s acute policy needs than
others. Russia didn’t create Euro-scepticism or Marine Le Pen. As in Soviet times, Moscow merely
recognizes the existing fissures in Western societies and tries to exploit them to its advantage. The
contemporary Russian turn toward supporting far-right groups is similar to Soviet support for farleft groups in the 20th century: Both are anti-systemic forces weakening local elites and intra-bloc
unity, obliging national governments to negotiate with Russia from a position of relative weakness.
If the current state of U.S.-Russian relations is any gauge, Moscow’s efforts may yet backfire, with
tactical successes giving way to renewed, entrenched, long-term Russo-phobia. But liberal societies’
options for countering Russian efforts to deepen existing cleavages or to “deliberative” the political
playing field must also be long-term, involving measures both to combat “false facts” and to more
effectively promote the virtues of open societies.
Europe: What is at Stake for Russia?
Even as FBI and Congressional investigations into Russia’s role in the U.S. presidential elections
continue, Western officials and analysts fear that President Vladimir Putin seeks to replicate the
purported “success” of electing Trump in Europe. The idea is that the Russian leader is deeply
motivated to stay in power at a particularly difficult period of extended foreign policy
commitments, and he is unbound by the lack of explicit rules in cyber-warfare. The ostensible goal
of Russian intervention would be to disrupt European elections through calculated leaks or hacks
to voting systems to place pro-Russian and Euro-sceptic politicians in power, or in coalitions, or
simply to weaken mainstream Atlanticist politicians. The result would be less motivation in Europe
to maintain sanctions against Russia, provide support to Ukraine and maintain pressure on
Moscow to stop supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, all achieved without expensive and
dangerous conventional escalation. The particularly important elections this year would be in
Bulgaria, France and Germany. (See table below for details.)
Moscow’s efforts to restructure the international order from Euro-Atlantic dominance to
multipolarity have been ongoing for at least a decade. Russia supports far-right Euro-skeptic
groups and politicians because it failed to forge common understanding with the European Union
over basic cooperation even prior to events in Ukraine, which have only accelerated the division.
The populist anti-EU forces in Europe existed long before Putin (indeed, Le Pen’s father, JeanMarie, founded the party she now heads in 1972) and they did not cause Putin to adopt Russia's
political positions as such, but Putin recognized the congruence and moved accordingly to weaken
the bloc. For the Euro-skeptic parties, there are some ideological overlaps with Russia and also the
benefit of financial and diplomatic support that identify them as “important” enough for Russian
attention and signals to domestic voters their distance from the Atlanticist-European mainstream.
New Means, Old Motives
Despite the oft-heard claim that alleged Russian interference in last year’s U.S. election was
unprecedented, that sort of activity fits into a long tradition. Russia used a variety of means to
influence politics in Europe and the United States prior to and during the Cold War, which actually
provide some clear historical lessons for today. From the post-revolutionary era through the end of
de-Stalinization, these means included overt, covert and semi-covert activities, run largely through
the Comintern, Cominform and local front organizations. As the visceral ideological appeal of
Soviet communism declined over the course of the Cold War and the revelation of Stalin’s crimes,
the Soviet Union changed tack, supporting peace and anti-nuclear movements in the 1970s and
1980s. In this approach, the Soviet Union took advantage of political polarization in Western
societies and the widening generation gap between those who lived through a traumatic event
(World War II) and those who did not. By supporting groups that appealed to Western values but
which were out of step with mainstream, anti-Soviet parties, the Soviet Union used the openness
and political liberalism of Western societies against Western governments.
Today, too, Russia’s reported cyber intrusions are part of a larger toolkit and, as frightening as they
may sound, they were described by the Obama administration’s former director of cybersecurity
policy as “relatively unsophisticated and something that probably about 60 countries around the
world have the capability of doing—which is to target third parties, to steal documents and emails,
and to selectively release them to create unfavorable conditions for that party. It’s unsubtle
interference.”
Moreover, much of Russia’s support for the European parties it favors is completely out in the
open. Putin’s ruling party, United Russia, has signed memoranda of understanding with Italy’s
Northern League , Austria’s Freedom Party and Greece's Independent Greeks; it has hosted
members of the European Parliament from Italy’s Five-Star Movement and leaders of Le Pen’s
National Front (NF), Germany’s Alternative for Germany , Hungary’s Jobbik , Bulgaria’s Ataka and
others at lower levels of official interaction, such as participation in conferences. Le Pen herself has
openly sought and received financial assistance from Russian-linked banks and paid a high-profile
visit to Moscow in March.
Boomerang Effect?
For Moscow, there may be an irony in “successful” interventions in European elections: If one
party is seen as winning because of Russian interference that poisons local societal relations or is
carried out in unacceptable ways (like covert funding or vote rigging), then the short-term tactical
success of helping put a willing interlocutor in office could quickly descend into long-term
Russophobia. The current mood in Washington gives a taste of that: While Russia may have
affected the U.S. election outcome at the margins, the perception of Moscow as a player in that
contest has generated opposition on a much more sustained basis.
In Europe, we could very well see a similar backlash. After the fallout from Brexit, for example,
some Euro-sceptics have grown disappointed, reflecting increased uncertainty to the tune that
“maybe Europe isn’t such a bad thing.” If Moscow were seen as complicit, that could cast Russia in
a negative light.
The combination of polarization in Washington and wariness in Brussels also threatens Russia
with a difficult long-term strategic outcome—a collective view of Russia as a revisionist power. If
elections in France and Germany retain liberal politicians alongside the same result in the
Netherlands, then it is more likely that the Euro-Atlantic community reaches broad agreement on
an adversarial view of Russia because of its interference in domestic politics abroad. Policy
measures in any one state meant to limit or punish Russia could inspire similar efforts in other
states.
What Is To Be Done?
Now, as during the Cold War, Russia does not seem able to determine the basic outcomes of
foreign elections, but it certainly can muddy the waters by disturbing the informational space and it
often does so by exacerbating open societies’ most salient political differences. A recent remark by
former Estonian President Toomas Henrik Ilves could apply as easily to the Cold War era as to
current affairs: “What they do is asymmetric—what they do to us we cannot do them. This applies
to all authoritarian regimes. Liberal democracies with a free press and free and fair elections are at
an asymmetric disadvantage because they can be interfered with—the tools of their democratic and
free speech can be used against them.”
The policy response for the West is to recognize that openness might be a weakness in an
information war, but it is a source of strength for the societies themselves. Curtailing that openness
to tighten up tactical defences would be short-sighted and strategically unwise in conceding a key
source of attractiveness to others. Direct retaliation would only justify escalation on terms
favorable to those who were seeking to avoid conventional confrontation in the first place.
To limit the impact of foreign interference in elections, the fixes are long-term. First, this would
mean a two-pronged, supply-and-demand approach to fighting so-called false facts: various forms
of self-policing by the purveyors of information, on one hand (such as the nascent efforts by
Facebook ), and promoting “informational literacy ” among young people—i.e., teaching them to
tell apart real news from fake—on the other. In addition, a widely watched draft law in the German
Bundestag aims to equate purposefully misleading news-like stories (“fake news”) with hate speech
and incitement, putting the onus on social networks to remove such objectionable material or else
face punitive fines. Passage of the bill looks likely ahead of September’s elections, and EU officials
are already exploring how to implement the law across Europe. Second, the political elites in
Western countries must recognize that anti-establishment, isolationist and nationalist messages
are finding fertile ground because of popular dissatisfaction with macro-level political and
economic changes, just as in the 1970s-1980s. Defining attractive anti-populist messages could
undercut the popularity of populist rhetoric and false facts, and draw greater distinctions between
open societies and closed ones.
Major European Elections in 2017
Country,
election
France,
presidential
Date
Alleged Russian involvement/
connections/ interference
Candidate Marine Le Pen received a
9-million-euro loan from a Russian
4/23 bank in 2014 and her party’s Cotelec
fund got a 2-million-euro loan from a
Russian-backed fund in Cyprus.
Stakes
Le Pen has criticized the EU for
mistreating Russia, has urged an end
to sanctions against Russia and has
been supportive of Russia’s military
operation in Syria and its annexation
of Crimea. She is actively anti-NATO.
Candidate Emmanuel Macron’s party Macron supports EU sanctions on
chief has said Macron is a “fake
Russia and believes NATO is a
news” target of Russian media and
his campaign faced “hundreds if not
thousands” of cyberattacks from
Russia.
Former PM Francois Fillon, once the
frontrunner in the race, reportedly
received 50,000 euros for setting up
a meeting between Putin, a Lebanese
billionaire and a French oil executive
in 2015.
Two “well-researched books” have
brought attention to Russia’s “intense
lobbying … in [French] cultural,
political and business circles.”
strategically important alliance. He
likewise wants to strengthen the EU.
Like LePen, Fillon has long called for
better Franco-Russian relations and
for lifting sanctions on Russia and has
signaled support for the Crimea
annexation, but he grew more critical
of Moscow after Le Pen’s high-profile
visit there, calling Russia “dangerous”
and “not identical to a Western
democracy.”
France has said it would take
“retaliatory measures” if Russia or
“any other state” interferes in
elections.
Petry has called for sanctions against
Russia to be lifted and is anti-NATO .
Her party has supported the
Candidate Frauke Petry of the farannexation of Crimea, and sought
right Alternative for Germany has
formal and informal ties with Russia’s
met with the speaker of the Russian
Germany,
dominant party and other Kremlin9/27 Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, as well as
friendly institutions, like the Russian
parliamentary
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the
Orthodox Church and the Young
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia
Guard youth movement. Petry has
and a vociferous critic of the West.
criticized Merkel over Germany’s
support for Ukraine in its conflict with
Russia.
Merkel has been the leading politician
Chancellor Angela Merkel has said
within Europe on the issues of
Germany is under threat of
supporting Ukraine in its conflict with
cyberattacks and disinformation from
Russia, and has led the imposition and
Russia that could affect the election.
maintenance of sanctions.
The EU’s East StratCom Task Force,
set up in 2015 to counter Russian
propaganda, has reportedly found
Merkel to be the target of thousands
of demonstrably false news stories
across a range of languages.
Germany’s domestic intelligence chief Germany is home to several million
has said the Kremlin is trying “to
Russian-speakers, including voters,
influence public opinion and
whose views can be affected by
decision-making processes” ahead of Russian-language media among other
the elections and publicly accused
factors.
Russia of cyber-spying and attempts
at sabotage following a hacking attack
against the Bundestag, which
authorities suspect was “steered by
the Russian state.”
The German state also found itself
trying to counter a viral campaign
based on an alleged rape of a Russian
girl that was deplored by Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, but
which turned out to be a hoax .
The Dutch Safety Board was the
target of cyberattacks, reportedly by a
Netherlands,
3/15 pro-Russian hacker group, in 2015 as
parliamentary
it was about to present a report on
the MH-17 downing.
Bulgaria,
The Dutch Safety Board blamed
Russia-backed separatist rebels for
shooting down a Malayasian Airlines
passenger jet that carried mostly
Dutch citizens.
In the run-up to the election Dutch
intelligence accused Russia of being
particularly active in foreign hacks of
state employees’ email accounts,
possibly including Prime Minister
Mark Rutte’s. Some IT analysts have
linked the attacks to the same groups
suspected of cyber-interference in the
U.S. presidential race, APT28 and
APT29, a.k.a. Fancy Bear and Cozy
Bear.
Rutte has supported the European
Union’s policies of seeking resolution
of the Russia-Ukraine conflict via
implementation of the Minsk Accords,
as well as sanctions against Russia
over the MH-17 bombing.
Fears of electoral interference led
Dutch election authorities to handcount every vote to ensure accuracy;
the interior minister said Russia was
among the external actors that could
influence the vote.
While anti-establishment candidate
Geert Wilders has not openly sought
support from Russia, as the country
remains generally unpopular in the
Netherlands after the MH-17
bombing, his agenda dovetails with
the Kremlin’s in terms of favoring a
weaker EU.
Ahead of presidential elections in
3/26 2016, the opposition Socialist Party
parliamentary
reportedly received a secret strategy
Socialist Rumen Radev won Bulgaria’s
presidency on a platform of better ties
with Moscow and the lifting of
document from a Kremlin-connected
think tank proposing a road map to
victory at the ballot box, involving
planting fake news and promoting
exaggerated polling data; the roughly
30-page document was allegedly
delivered by a former Russian spy on
a U.S. sanctions list.
European sanctions against Russia,
which his party believes hurt Bulgaria.
Radev’s victory led former Prime
Minister Boyko Borisov to say he
would resign.
With pro-Russia sentiment running
high among the electorate, both of
Bulgaria’s biggest parties, although
sticking to a pro-EU platform, said
ahead of parliamentary elections that
they would boost economic
cooperation with Russia.
Borisov’s center-right GERB party
narrowly won the snap elections in
Bulgaria but was forced to form a
coalition with a group of nationalist
parties with strongly pro-Russian
positions.
Bulgaria is a NATO member and is
due to hold the EU's rotating
presidency next year.
Table compiled by the author, RM student associate Sarah VanSickle and RM editor Natasha
Yefimova-Trilling.