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Transcript
FROM TULIP BULBS TO SUB-PRIME MORTGAGES: THE CASE FOR A
SYSTEMIC APPROACH
Vijay R. Kannan, Jon M. Huntsman School of Business, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322-3555,
435-797-7212, [email protected]
Alan A. Stephens, Jon M. Huntsman School of Business, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322-3530,
435-797-2367, [email protected]
J. Brian Atwater, Jon M. Huntsman School of Business, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322-3555,
435-797-3982, [email protected]
ABSTRACT
The crisis in the financial services sector continues to have a profound impact on both the U.S. and the
global economy. In hindsight (and foresight of those who had predicted the crisis), the collapse of the
sub-prime mortgage market and its ripple effects elsewhere in the financial services sector, was not
unexpected and could have been predicted. In this paper we examine the collapse and illustrate how
using systems dynamics and taking a systemic view of the crisis helps to explain recent events.
INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market illustrates what can happen when firms are over-zealous
in their efforts to expand their product portfolio and/or market base. Faced with pressure (ironically from
other firms in their sector) to increase earnings per share, financial institutions in saturated markets,
having already exhausted new product offerings to existing customers, sought to increase profits. While
revenue expansion is not the only way to increase profits, it is, historically, the preferred way. Given
limited opportunities to expand into overseas markets due to the regulatory environment in those
markets as well as the lack of infrastructure, they were reduced to seeking out new customers in existing
markets. Herein lay the challenge, as by inference, these were customers they ordinarily would not have
sought due to their profile; low/insecure income levels, few assets against which to secure financial
obligations, and consequently high risk of default. Regardless, the answer was to develop new products,
sub-prime mortgages, which in the short term offered low interest rates to borrowers but which were
subject to increases. As long as the real estate market continued to thrive, a critical assumption
particularly in light of the already extended period of growing real estate valuations, borrowers would
see increases in real estate equity against which they could either adjust their borrowing needs or sell
short. From the perspective of lenders, the new product and customer base represented a new source of
income, all be it with not insignificant risk. The rest is, as the saying goes, history.
Even a casual reading of the evolution and scope of the economic crisis in the popular press will cause a
financially literate reader to cringe at the complexity of the problem; complexity of the financial
instruments involved, complexity in terms of the players and the interrelationships of the players
involved, and complexity in terms of the ripple effects that spread beyond the primary participants.
Such complexity calls for a systems approach to analyzing the crisis. Tools from the systems dynamics
methodology such as Causal Loop Diagrams (CLD) can be used to illustrate and understand feedback
structures within a system. Using causal loop diagrams and the ‘Escalation’ and other modeling
archetypes, we illustrate that the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage and its consequences for the
financial services sector was not only predictable but followed a well established pattern.