Download Transcription Oudot – sequence b Let us now turn to the first of the

Transcription Oudot – sequence b
Let us now turn to the first of the critical issues.
The choice of suppliers resident on the national territory or in another
country is based on strategic and capacity considerations, under economic
constraints.
Depending on the type of equipment concerned, the strategic and capacity
aspects will be more or less decisive, permitting, or not, the order to be
opened to competition and the possible recourse to a supplier resident in
another country.
From 1983 to 2005 the British systematically opened orders to competition.
The pressure exerted on the industry, called the tough love policy, was
aimed at stimulating productivity in order to be more efficient, both at
home and internationally. It also led to the destruction of part of the
industrial and technological base of British defence, leading in 2005 to a
change of practice in the framework of the industrial defence strategy.
At the present time, around 50% of British defence investments are open to
competition.
Concerning procurement choices in nuclear deterrence, a sovereign domain
par excellence, the British lean on American capacities for critical
technologies and systems (submarines, strategic missiles, nuclear
warheads). Bilateral agreements were signed in 1958 and 1962, and have so
far always been renewed.
France, on the other hand, guides her procurement options towards suppliers
who are resident on national territory, in particular for strategic systems
(fighter aircraft, missiles, submarines…), both for conventional and
nuclear systems. The Direction Générale de l’Armement and the État-major
des armées in particular hold a watching brief on State and industry
competence in this respect.
In France 90% of financial commitments in defence investment are negotiated
with suppliers resident on national territory.
A second structuring decision in terms of capacity that we will analyse
together is the choice between national procurement and cooperation with
other countries.
There are many examples of cooperation programmes. In the United Kingdom:
the A400M, the Joint Strike Fighter, the Typhoon. In France there are in
particular the Tigre helicopter, the NH90, the A400M, the Horizon frigates,
the FREMMs, and also the future ground-to-air missiles family.
The decision to choose a cooperation programme is based on economic
considerations, with strategic and capacity constraints.
The aim is to cut the cost of equipment (or to limit its increase) by
mutualising fixed costs, development costs in particular, and by achieving
economies of scale; all this implies some degree of convergence of each
country’s demands. Such an economic approach only works if strategic and
capacity requirements are respected, concerning security of supply and
control of technology in particular.
During the period from 2006 to 2012, France and the United Kingdom adopted
different approaches to international cooperation. In terms of quantity, in
France the share of cooperation programmes in defence investments for the
period was around 15%, while it reached 20% for the United Kingdom. In
qualitative terms, during the same period the British had cooperation
programmes outside the European Union to the tune of 12%, while for France
such programmes were strictly limited to the EU.