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The Institute for Clinical Social Work
WINNICOTT’S TRANSFORMATIONAL METAPHORS:
A COGNITIVE-LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
Institute for Clinical Social Work in Partial Fulfillment
of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by
MICHAEL A. CASALI
Chicago, Illinois
January, 2010
Copyright © 2009 by Michael Casali
All rights reserved
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ABSTRACT
This study examined D.W. Winnicott’s construct object usage and related
transformational metaphors from a cognitive-linguistic perspective. The paper The Use of
an Object was positioned historically among extant theoretical models and employed to
investigate the semantic evolution of key Winnicottian concepts.
Biographical accounts revealed core developmental themes which elucidated the
conceptual foundations of Winnicott’s ontology and offered alternatives ways to
understand the nature and function of his ideas. Overall the findings were congruent with
the epistemological stance of “experientialism” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), which is
neither objectivist nor subjectivist and corresponds to the notion of psychoanalysis as
hovering in the area between positivistic science and hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1970).
Implications for professional development included how the clinician-learner
similarly draws on embodied-metaphorical processes within the context of history and
personal development.
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For Sherry and Michael
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank all who have contributed to this work over past few years:
Thayer Linder for the encouragement to pursue the topic and methodology, Marco
Casonato and Vito Evola for guidance on the use of conceptual metaphor, and my
dissertation committee Barbara Berger, Sherwood Faigen, Dennis McCaughan, and R.D.
Shelby for their commentary and feedback during the process.
Finally, a special thanks to my committee chairperson, Jennifer Tolleson, for her
support and trust in the ideas that came to fruition in this document.
MAC
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………….………..iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………..………...v
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………..……….x
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………….………xi
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION/FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM……...…1
General Statement of Purpose and Introduction
Definitions of Key Concepts
Significance of the Study for Clinical Social Work
Statement of the Problem and Objectives
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Chapter
Page
II. LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………..….12
Introduction/Overview
Metaphor Basics
Metaphor as a Conceptual Tool
Metaphor and the Body
THERAPY IS A JOURNEY: A Psychoanalytic Application of
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
Conceptual Blending and Mental Spaces
THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS: A Winnicottian Application of
Conceptual Blending Theory
Science and Meaning: Metapsychology and Clinical Theory
Metaphor and Clinical Writing
Winnicott in Context: Early Development
Winnicott’s Conceptual Style
Instinctual Fusion: The Semantic Foundation of Winnicottian
Ontology
The Use of an Object in Context
III. METHODOLOGY………………….. ……………………….……..….82
Description of the Methodology
Outline of Analysis
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT………………………………………..…..91
V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS………………………….…….……….....214
Overview
Revealed Conceptual Metaphors
Winnicott’s Ontology of the Mind
Developmental Implications of the Conception of Mind
Winnicott’s Ontology of the Self
Developmental Implications of the Conception of Self
Winnicott’s Ontology of Time
Developmental Implications of the Conception of Time
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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Chapter
Page
VI. DISCUSSION……………………………..…………………………247
Review of the Methodology
Implications for Social Work
Limitations of the Study
Possible Future Directions
Appendices
A. KEY FINDINGS OF MODERN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS WITH
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN SCIENCES ……………………259
B. PRIMARY CONCEPTUAL (EMBODIED) METAPHORS….………...262
C. METAPHORS OF EVENTS AND CAUSES...…………………………267
D. METAPHORS OF MIND…………………….……………………...…..270
E. METAPHORS OF SELF………………..………………………………..274
F. METAPHORS OF TIME …………………..…….……………..….....…281
G. THE EMBODIED MIND’S CHALLENGE TO WESTERN
THOUGHT: NINE MYTHS ABOUT HUMAN REASON FROM
TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY …..………………………….….….....284
H. THE SURGEON IS A BUTCHER BLEND.............................................286
I. “THE BYPASS” BLEND………………………………………………..288
J. THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS BLEND…………………………………290
K. RAPPAPORT & GILL’S (1959) METAPSYCHOLOGICAL
POINTS OF VIEW AND ASSUMPTIONS WITH RELATED
CONCEPTUAL AND PSYCHOANALYTICALLY-DERIVED
METAPHORS……………………………………………......………....292
L. “THE TREE” (Poem by Donald Winnicott)……………..……..……….295
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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Chapter
Page
M. TENETS OF EMPIRICAL VERSUS CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH
IN PSYCHOANALYSIS……………………………………………....298
N. EGO PSYCHOLOGY CRITIQUE OF KLEINIAN THEORY AND
TECHNIQUE……….……….……………………………………..…..300
O. REVEALED CONCEPTUAL (EMBODIED) METAPHORS ……….305
REFERENCES………………………………………………………..……314
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LIST OF TABLES
Table
Page
1. Definition of Rhetorical Tropes ………………………………………17
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
Page
1. Conceptual Metaphor Mapping…………………………………...….…26
2. Cross-mappings Between a Journey & Therapy………………….…….29
3. Primary Differences Between CMT & BT……………………………..32
4. How Information That Forms the Blends Is Derived……………..……33
5. Fauconnier & Turner Schema……………………………………..……36
6. Use and Capacity in Relation to Time………………………………....161
7. Winnicottian Conception of Mind & Traditional Western Philosophy..222
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CHAPTER I
FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
General Statement of Purpose and Introduction
This study will examine the concept of object usage and its associated metaphors
of psychic transformation in the works of Donald Winnicott, using a textual analysis that
combines elements of cognitive linguistics and psychoanalysis. Two central constructs of
modern cognitive linguistics, conceptual (embodied) metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson,
1999) and conceptual blending of mental spaces (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), will be
utilized to elucidate the semantic foundation on which the construct of object usage is
built. In addition, the analysis will examine Winnicott’s personal development in the
context of cultural and historical factors to better understand the origins and evolution of
his core constructs, as reflected in his unique style of scientific writing. From these
examinations a Winnicottian ontology and epistemology with implications for clinical
theory and practice will be posited. The study will also provide the opportunity to assess
the value of the methodology as a tool for a conducting conceptual research in
psychoanalysis (Dreher, 2000), which has as its goal the clarification and systematization
of explicit and implicit uses of clinical constructs.
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The impetus for this study was the introduction to the ideas of George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to
Western Thought (1999) during my immersion in psychoanalytic theory and its clinical
applications as a PhD student. The findings that established the embodied-metaphorical
basis of commonly accepted ideas in philosophy raised questions about the semantic
basis of concepts in psychoanalysis, whose depictions of the human experience appeared
to utilize much of the same conceptual rationale. In general both appeared to be
“speaking the same language” in terms of positing the embodied nature of the mind, the
mostly unconscious nature of thought, and the metaphorical basis of abstract concepts.
The attraction to cognitive linguistics was also in part a function of a personal
background in foreign language study and instruction, which had demonstrated the
importance of words, syntax and idiomatic expressions in shaping how experience is
conceptualized into a worldview. As a student and instructor, I found that how adult
learners uniquely meet the challenge of understanding a new language involves not only
rational cognitive processes but also experiential ones related personal development (e.g.,
anxiety, self-esteem, mastery). It occurred to me that academic and clinical training in
clinical social work involves a similar process, in that learners are exposed to what is
essentially a new language and ways of thinking about themselves and the world.
Another revelation was that the process of understanding and integrating the
meanings of theoretical constructs appeared to not only reveal valuable information about
one’s unique learning and developmental processes, but also the nature of the ideas
themselves. For novice and seasoned psychoanalytic professionals alike theoretical
constructs seemed to take on a life of their own in the minds of different clinicians,
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providing diverse shades of meaning that expanded, altered, or reified the conceptual
territory on which the ideas are based. From a psychodynamic perspective one could say
that the clinical constructs become incorporated internal objects and acquire a uniquely
subjective status whose elaboration either reinforces or transforms their existing or
implied meaning. The learning process involves a continual conceptual navigation of
dialectics such as subject-object, internal-external space, conscious-unconscious thought,
and internal-external reality, to name just a few. In this way how clinical concepts
become uniquely elaborated over time appeared to reveal important insights into human
ontology and epistemology, with practical implications for clinical work.
Finally, in terms of the models of the mind which guide practice, I noticed that the
way a writer characterizes abstract psychic phenomena has important implications on the
lives of those who are influenced by its rationale—patient, clinician, and society alike.
The concepts that are used to depict change from one state to another via constructs of
transformation are crucial to the semantic foundation of any clinical theory. That modern
cognitive science has demonstrated that reason and truth are not disembodied, universal
and dispassionate but rather embodied, experiential, and emotional would seem to add
importance to better understanding the experience of those who create and use clinical
theories.
Definitions of Key Concepts
Cognitive science investigates how human and non-human entities systematically
process information using representations (International Encyclopedia of Linguistics,
2003). The field is interdisciplinary in nature and includes linguistics, psychology,
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computer science, neuroscience, philosophy, biology, and anthropology. Cognitive
linguistics is a branch of the cognitive sciences that began in the late 1980’s and is
interested mainly in how cognition is related to the way humans understand, create, and
use language. Before that time the mind was thought to have a separate module that
functioned specifically for the purpose of acquiring and using language. Cognitive
linguistics has generally shown that the cognitive mechanisms that are used for language
acquisition are the same as those utilized in understanding all phenomena. In opposition
to truth-conditional semantics (e.g., the notion that meaning is based on the most literal
interpretation of word or ideas), cognitive linguistics views meaning as an outcome of
conceptual processes that include what some would conceive of as “figurative” (e.g.,
metaphor). In general, Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) is
representative of the view that metaphor as not simply about words but essentially about
thought.
Traditionally metaphor has been thought of as simply a figure of speech and a
way to convey similarities between objects and phenomena. The Concise Oxford
Dictionary of Linguistics (1997) defines metaphor as, “A figure of speech in which a
word or expression normally used of one kind of object, action, etc. is extended to
another” (see Table 1 for more complete description of metaphor and the rhetorical
tropes). An example of metaphor as a figure of speech would be, “Achilles was a lion in
the fight.” Here the attributes of a lion are used to describe the actions and character of
the subject of the sentence. However, metaphor in modern cognitive linguistics is broader
and connotes the method by which humans reason about the world through transferring
information (based primarily on our embodied nature and somatic experiences)
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conceptually from one domain of thought (not simply words) to another. The phrase “Our
relationship is on the right path” is an example of a conceptual metaphor in that the data
used to describe a relationship is not only the word “path” but the larger concept of a
journey. This phrase is based on the commonly used conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A
JOURNEY (e.g., “I think we might be on the right path, but we’re not there yet”), in
which the idea of a journey is projected from what is called the source domain to the
target domain of love.1 The notion of an objects moving in space and arriving at
destinations is based on sensorimotor experiences beginning in utero and is reinforced
throughout life, forming the rationale (via source domains) by which we reason about
both simple events and abstract ideas. In this study “metaphor” will be used to connote
both its function as a mechanism of our conceptual system (e.g., thoughts) and its
application in language (e.g., words). A working definition of metaphor is: the conceptual
and linguistic mechanism by which ideas derive meaning and are communicated through
association with words and with larger domains of thought.2
Fauconnier & Turner’s (2003) conceptual blending theory (BT) is another idea
from cognitive linguistics that seeks to explain the mechanisms by which humans reason
about the world. Like Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) theory of conceptual metaphor,
it views metaphor as not simply a linguistic event but more importantly as a conceptual
1
The designation in capital letters signifies a conceptual metaphor or the underlying conceptual reasoning
upon which language or ideas are based. The transfer of conceptual data from source domain to target
domain in the cognitive linguistic literature is depicted as S T. So, in this metaphor the process—called
a “mapping”— would written as Journey Love, in that what is used to describe the emotion of love
derives from a more basic sensori-motor experience (see Appendix A for a list of Primary Conceptual
Metaphors).
2
The term “conceptual metaphor” will be used for emphasis in a description or argument to call attention to
its more conceptual (versus simply linguistic) nature. However, because conceptual metaphor reveals the
built-in system of thought from which language emerges it is always also reflective of spoken and written
words.
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one. However, in conceptual blending the “domains” of conceptual metaphor are
replaced with “mental spaces” as a way of characterizing the basis through which
meaning is made and communicated. The construct of a mental space allows for more
than a one to one correspondence of ideas that is implicit in metaphor (e.g., this is that,
this is like that, or this is like that only in this way). In general, BT shows how the mind is
able to combine and distill similar and dissimilar aspects of ideas in mental space to
produce meanings that go beyond a simple one to one transfer conceptual data. As such
conceptual blending reveals our innate imaginative capacities that create potentially
infinite meanings from combining different ideas. Among other things it demonstrates
our conceptual ability to instantaneously draw inferences between opposing phenomena,
automatically including certain elements while omitting others.
For example, combining the words “surgeon” and “butcher” in a mental space
automatically renders certain associations of similarity and dissimilarity. However, the
statement “That surgeon is a butcher” (see Appendix G for a complete blending account)
is unambiguous in conveying the intended meaning concerning the poor quality of the
surgeon, even though not all qualities are shared between the entities. In particular, a
surgeon and a butcher’s role related to the purpose of their respective crafts are
diametrically opposed (one is to save life the other to end it). In this way conceptual
blending is better suited than conceptual metaphor in accounting for the underlying
conceptual processes that go into deciphering that statement, largely because it accounts
for dissimilar as well as similar qualities that are projected to create meaning. In general,
conceptual blending is better equipped to account for more abstract conceptual
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phenomena, especially novel ideas that inherently transcend typical conception of reality
based on conceptual (embodied) metaphor.
Finally, transformational metaphors are defined as those theoretical constructs
that depict psychic change from one mental state to another. Though object usage will be
the main metaphor of transformation under consideration, the study will examine others
whose meaning is crucial for a more complete semantic understanding, including
Winnicott’s own (e.g., transitional space and phenomena, true and false self, destruction)
as well at those of Freud (e.g., fusion) and Klein (e.g., projective identification,
depressive position).
Objectives of the Study
Modern cognitive science has shown that metaphor is not simply a poetic device
useful only as an “affair of style” or “an ornament of discourse” but rather the primary
construct on which not only language but thought itself is based (Franke, 2000). CMT—
also referred to as embodied metaphor theory—has challenged traditional Western
philosophical notions of reason as disembodied and based on a literal “autonomous
faculty” applied to objectively knowable objects in the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999)3.
It follows that conceptual metaphor needs to be accounted for in any discussion of how
meaning is achieved and how knowledge is transmitted, as well as how physical
experience and conceptual processes coalesce to shape human ontology and
epistemology. A central thrust of modern cognitive linguistics is to examine topics such
as the relationship between universal symbolism and person meaning, literal and abstract
3
See Appendix A for the key findings of modern cognitive science with implications for psychological
theory and practice.
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thought, and conscious and unconscious processes, themes long critical to psychoanalysis
and clinical social work.
As evidenced in Lakoff & Johnson’s groundbreaking work Philosophy in the
Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (1999), a multitude of
a priori epistemological assumptions pervade both philosophy and the modern sciences.
These findings have ramifications for psychoanalysis, whose core theoretical constructs
(e.g., metapsychology) have strong roots in 19th century science and philosophy. The
empirical results establishing the embodied-metaphorical (versus disembodied and
transcendent) basis of core ontological concepts such as mind, self, time, and causation
suggest that like philosophy many constructs in psychoanalysis are grounded in similar
disembodied assumptions about the nature of reality (Borbely, 2008). Though the body is
ubiquitous in psychoanalytic conceptions of the mind, there has not been a systematic
appraisal of how built-in conceptual processes based on the findings of conceptual
metaphor plays a role in the creation and understanding of clinical constructs that guide
psychoanalytic theory and practice. This study is designed to investigate one central
idea—object usage—and its relationship to other theoretical constructs as a way of
beginning to understand the implications of modern metaphor research for
psychoanalysis. Because the central findings of modern cognitive linguistics which reveal
the embodied basis of reason, the mostly unconscious processing of mind and thought,
and the metaphorical nature of abstract concepts are generally in line with the main tenets
of psychoanalysis, an additional objective is to uncover how each model can augment the
other in terms of how humans conceive and express their unique realities.
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Additional questions related to objectives for the study surround the implications
for theory and practice that are raised with the recent findings of modern metaphor
theory. For example, how does the human embodied mind, based primary on metaphor,
alter our understanding of how motivation, behavior change, and psychic causality are
represented in theoretical constructs? How do psychoanalytic theoreticians and
practioners explicitly or implicitly use conceptual metaphor for conveying clinicallyderived truths? For clinician-readers of theory, what is it about certain linguistic
conceptualizations of human experience that makes intuitive sense and has practical
value in the realm of psychotherapy? How might a clinician-reader’s own development in
the context of sociocultural and historical factors play a role in the conceptualization and
utilization of clinical constructs? Do the tools of modern cognitive linguistics aid in better
assessing the validity and usefulness of clinical theories? To begin to answer these
questions the clinical constructs that underpin theories of psychotherapy need to be
scrutinized using the recent findings from the cognitive sciences. The primary
epistemological construct posited by Lakoff and Johnson (1999), experientialism, which
is neither objectivist nor subjectivist, will be applied in this study to Winnicott’s idea of
object usage and its supportive constructs of psychic transformation.
The main objectives of this study are:
1. To identify the primary conceptual (embodied) metaphors and separate
but related elements of conceptual blending on which the Winnicottian
concept of object usage and other related constructs of transformation are
based;
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2. To analyze, in turn, how Winnicott’s constructs of transformation
contribute to an understanding of embodied metaphors and conceptual
blending;
3. To propose a Winnicottian ontology and epistemology as revealed
through the cognitive linguistic examination using embodied metaphors
and conceptual blending;
4. To investigate how personal and historical factors contribute to an
understanding of Winnicottian constructs of transformation and his
particular use of language to describe them, and
5. To test the usefulness of the proposed methodology as a way of
examining psychoanalytic concepts.
Significance of the Study for Clinical Social Work
Drawing on the many of same conclusions reached by psychoanalytic theory, like
the ubiquity of unconscious mental processes, the embodied nature of the mind, and the
metaphorical basis for abstract thought (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), modern cognitive
linguistics can offer an alternative lens to more closely examine the relationship between
psychoanalytic theory, language, and clinical practice. Using conceptual metaphor and
conceptual blending to reveal the semantic structure of clinical constructs of change is
commensurate with the basic psycholinguistic foundations of psychoanalysis—in
particular, the relationship between language and subjective meaning in the context of
more universal forms of symbolism. Additionally, by applying a cognitive-linguistic lens
to the phenomenon of transformation as it is conceived in clinical concepts such as object
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usage, this study will additionally contribute to psychoanalytic scholarship by offering an
alternative method for understanding the relationship between metapsychology and
clinical theory, or more simply how clinical social workers understand and integrate more
abstract theoretical constructs into clinical practice (Klein, 1975). In a closely related way
this study also has implications for how clinicians translate experiential treatment data
into words, via case notes, more formal evaluations, and professional publications
(Ogden, 2005).
Though not specifically geared toward investigating the multitude of variables
involved in learning psychoanalytic constructs, this study also has important implications
for how social workers conceptually encounter, understand, and elaborate the meaning of
clinical concepts. Specifically, in terms of psychoanalytic learning and development, a
linguistic examination of theoretical and clinical writing can be one way to elucidate the
processes involved in “cognitive learning” that is part and parcel of the overall
experiential processes involved in professional psychoanalytic development (Ekstein &
Wallerstein, 1958; Fleming & Benedek, 1983;). An ongoing task in clinical development
is the ability to continually navigate and combine the realms of abstract theory with the
practical usage of clinical concepts. Along those lines, the theory of conceptual metaphor
and the epistemological stance of experientialism fit closely with the idea of
psychoanalysis as hovering in an intermediate area between positivistic science and
hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1970). Applying modern metaphor theory and the related position
of experientialism to Winnicott’s psychoanalytic constructs of transformation and their
application in clinical writing is also one way to test the level of conceptual congruence
between theory and practice.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction/Overview
The literature review will begin with an overview of conceptual metaphor theory
and conceptual blending, the two main constructs from cognitive linguistics that will be
used to elucidate Winnicott’s constructs of transformation. Since these ideas are likely
new to most clinical social workers, a brief application of the ideas will be provided with
respect to a set of psychoanalytically-derived constructions that have relevance for an
understanding of object usage. In general the literature review will assume a basic
understanding of psychoanalytic theory and will not attempt address major concepts,
trends, positioning with respect to other psychological models, critiques of its validity as
a method of treatment, etc. However, there will be an account of debates which have
taken place in psychoanalysis surrounding the validity and applicability of its
foundational metapyschological constructs,4 drawing attention to the larger question of
theory as a positivistic science versus an interpreter or communicator of personal
meaning (e.g., hermeneutics). A central theme in the discussions has been the extent to
4
According to Moore and Fine (1990) metapsychology (“beyond psychology”) specifically refers to the
five conceptual vantage points from which psychoanalysis is viewed: dynamic (forces, drives), economic
(energy), structural (topography, id, ego, superego), genetic (time), and adaptational (individual in
environment).
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which metapsychological constructs are “metaphorical” and thus not observable,
quantifiable and ultimately valid. Besides ramifications for psychoanalysis as a science
(Grunbaum, 1983), the metaphoricity of it concepts has also been questions with respect
to clinical theory (Klein, 1975). This is background is relevant to this study because
cognitive science in general (and CMT in particular) has significantly shifted the position
of language vis-à-vis metaphor—in particular, modern research shows that even abstract
and complex constructs of science are ultimately related to the mind’s embodiment,
which functions primary by way of metaphor. In this way, dichotomies such as subjective
versus objective, logical versus rhetorical, and truth versus metaphor are no longer suited
to accurately depict the nature of thought and reason. Language is at the core of
discussions surrounding science or “truth” versus personal meaning; specifically, how we
use words to understand and communicate the nature of events and reality.
The literature review will also include an account of Winnicott’s early
development, which provides many clues to the origins of his ideas and manner in which
he would ultimately express them. In general this section contextualizes the subjectiveexperiential foundations of the key constructs of transformation under consideration.
Along those lines the review will briefly outline key biographers’ analyses and
interpretations of Winnicott’s life story in the context of particular clinical formulations
and his unique style of communicating his ideas. Though the literature review will not
outline the substantial corpus of Winnicottian thought, it will provide an account of a
thread of ideas (e.g., aggression in the context of early development) that lays the
groundwork for the textual analysis of the paper on object usage.
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This section also incorporates some basics of metaphor theory, providing the
reader a taste of how conceptual metaphor relates to clinical constructs. It should be
noted that many of Winnicott’s core clinical ideas will be covered in the textual analysis
section (Chapter 3). Overall, the literature review is designed to provide a basic
theoretical, historical, subjective-developmental background to understand and apply
ideas related to embodied metaphor and conceptual blending to an analysis of The Use of
an Object.
Metaphor Basics
“[The] drive towards the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive.”
~Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth
The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines metaphor as: “A figure of speech
in which a name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object or action
different from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable.” Metaphor is a
tool of comprehension and communication that functions in its ability to draw attention to
the similarities between objects in the world. Beginning with Aristotle, metaphor has
been associated with communicating information by means of analogy or comparison:
A metaphor is the application of a noun which properly applies to something else.
The transfer may be from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to
species, or by analogy (Aristotle, trans. 1996).
In the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric (2001), Aristotle cites the phrase “the evening of
a man’s life” to demonstrate how a time of day can be recruited via analogy to depict a
human life stage. This transference or substitution of conceptual material is outlined in
the following categories:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
concrete for abstract or abstract for concrete;
animate for inanimate or inanimate for animate;
non-visual for visual or visual for non-visual;
positive for negative or negative for positive;
of small for large.
A trope is a figure of speech that involves the figurative extension of the meaning of a
word or other expression. Along with metonymy, synecdoche, and irony, metaphor is one
of the master tropes that encompass the main categories of figurative language (see Table
1). Tropes provide diverse ways of understanding phenomena, by “rendering the
unfamiliar more familiar” (Chandler, 2002). Besides the qualities of the phenomena that
it conveys, the structure of tropes themselves have a way of calling attention to aspects of
experience would not be revealed by literal language alone. That is, tropes trigger
imaginative aspects of the mind that allow for considering words from a wider conceptual
perspective. For example, in communicating meaning by using a part to stand for the
whole, metonymy directs the reader to consider certain aspects of person or object over
others. In the statement “The ham sandwich is waiting for his check” (from Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980), the representation of a person as a ham sandwich evokes associations to
gustatory habits or tastes as well as qualities of personality. Common uses of metonymy
from the mental health work involve the utilization of a time slot or diagnosis to
designate a particular person as in, “My three o clock is late” or “The depressive in the
waiting room.”
Metaphor had long been thought to be simply an ornamental device of poetry and
a “linguistic deviance” (Evola, 2008), less concerned with the literal or objective
conception of reality. Undergoing what Franke (2000) called a “renaissance,” metaphor is
increasingly associated with the foundations of language and knowledge itself. It has
16
become representative of the four rhetorical tropes and has been increasingly shown to be
a key process involved in the making of meaning. Metaphor’s history has always been
linked to rhetoric and philosophy, and with what has been called the “linguistic” or
“rhetorical turn” of the 20th century has become increasingly accepted in the human
sciences as revealing important elements of ontology and epistemology (Cazeaux, 2007;
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). As such metaphor is well positioned moving forward as a tool
for examining a range of scientific texts—in particular, the examination of theoretical
concepts and their relationship to and coherence with broader theories.
Within the area of language study, metaphor has been evaluated within various
disciplines and most if not all literary figures and philosophers have weighed in on its
validity and utility in representing reality. Certain trends of modern philosophical
thought, broadly viewed as Continental Philosophy with roots in late the 19th century
method of phenomenology of Brentano and Husserl, would come to view metaphor not
simply as a poetic device but also as illustrative of language and ontology itself
(Critchley & Schroeder, 1998). From within movements such as semiotics, poststructuralism, existentialism, and hermeneutics, the rise of metaphor has coincided with
challenges to scientism and its a priori determination of experience (Lakoff & Johnson,
1999). One common set of assumptions within these positions is the general view of
ontology as variable and inseparable from the subjective, historical, and textual context in
which it occurs, along with a conception of metaphor as more primary to language and
experience itself (Cazeaux, 2007).
Table 1
RHETORICAL
TROPES
METAPHOR
*Oxford Dictionary of
English Grammar
** Encyclopedia of Rhetoric
* The application of a name
or descriptive term or phrase
to an object or action to
which it is imaginatively but
not literally applicable (e.g. a
glaring error, a loud check).
Concise Oxford Dictionary
of Linguistics
Concise Oxford Companion to
the English Language
Pocket Fowler’s Modern
English Usage
Figure of speech in which a
word or expression normally
used of one kind of object,
action, etc. is extended to
another. This may lead to
metaphoric change in
meaning: thus what is now
the normal sense of lousy is
in origin a metaphorical
extension from the basic
sense ‘full of lice’.
In rhetoric a figure with two
senses, both originating with
Aristotle in the 4c BC: (1) All
figures of speeches that
achieve their effect through
association, comparison, and
resemblance. Figures like
antithesis, hyperbole,
metonymy, simile, are all
species of metaphor. Although
this sense is not current, it lies
behind the use of metaphorical
and figurative as antonyms of
literal. (2) A figure of speech
which concisely compares two
things by saying that one is the
other. A warrior compared to a
lion becomes a lion: Achilles
was a lion in the fight. In such
usages, the perception of
something held in common
brings together words and
images from different fields:
warriors and lions share
bravery and strength, and so
(Vis á vis simile) The
difference between these
two figures of speech,
which together constitute a
major element of English
idiom, is largely one of
form. A simile is a fanciful
comparison couched in a
form introduced by as or
like, for example Byron's
line The Assyrian came
down like the wolf on the
fold, whereas a metaphor
directly equates the image
with the person or thing it
is compared to: Achilles
was a lion in the fight.
Many figurative uses of
words (e.g. the mouth of a
river, a blanket of fog,
music to one's ears) and
many idioms (e.g. get the
green light, have one foot
in the grave, take the rough
with the smooth, off the
2. Used by G. P. Lakoff in
the 1980s of a general
pattern in which one domain
is systematically conceived
and spoken of in terms of
another. E.g. terms directly
applicable to war, as one
domain, are systematically
applied to that of courtship:
She was besieged by suitors,
I have lost count of her
conquests, and so on.
18
METONYM(Y)
SYNECODCHE
* A word or expression
which is used as a substitute
for another word or
expression with which it is in
a close semantic relationship.
E.g. Whitehall for ‘the
British civil service’, the
Turf for ‘the racing world’,
per head for ‘per person’.
** A metasememe that
signifies a relationship of the
particular and the general.
Like metonymy, it is
constituted by a substitution
Figure of speech in which a
word or expression normally
or strictly used of one thing
is used of something
physically or otherwise
associated with it: e.g. the
Pentagon (strictly a building)
when used of the military
inhabiting it. This may lead
to metonymic change of
meaning: e.g. the sense of
bureau changed successively
from ‘cloth used to cover
desks’, first to ‘desk’ itself,
then to ‘agency etc. (working
from a desk)’.
Defined in the most general
sense as any figure based on
‘contiguity’: as such often
taken to include e.g.
synecdoche opposed in this
sense to metaphor as a figure
based on ‘similarity’.
Figure of speech in which an
expression denoting a part is
used to refer to a whole: also,
in the traditional definition,
vice versa. Hence a term in
the warrior is a lion among
men and the lion is a warrior
among beasts
wall) can be regarded as
metaphors.
Figure of speech which
designates something by the
name of something associated
with it: the Crown substituting
for monarchy, the stage for the
theatre, No. 10 Downing Street
for the British Prime Minister,
the White House for the US
President. A word used
metonymically (crown, as
above) is a metonym
Metonymy is closely related to
and sometimes hard to
distinguish from metaphor. It
has sometimes been seen as a
kind of synecdoche and
sometimes as containing
synecdoche. Both metaphor
and metonymy express
association, metaphor through
comparison, metonymy
through contiguity and
possession.
Figure of speech in which
an attribute or property is
used to refer to the person
or thing that has it, e.g. the
White House for the
American presidency and
the Crown for the British
monarchy. In the proverb
The pen is mightier than
the sword, pen and sword,
by a process of metonymy,
represent the written word
and warfare respectively.
In rhetoric, a figure of speech
concerned with parts and
wholes: (1) Where the part
represents the whole: ‘All
hands on deck’ (the members
Figure of speech in which a
more inclusive term is used
for a less inclusive one or
vice versa, as in England
came out to bat (England
19
IRONY
of contiguities. Synecdoche
presents either particular
things instead of a whole, or
a whole instead of something
particular. An example of the
former case is the expression
“Caesar conquered Gallia,”
in which “Caesar” represents
the members of the Roman
army; an example of the
latter is the sentence, “The
Americans have landed on
the moon,” in which the term
Americans denotes only the
astronauts involved.
** Irony's general
characteristic is to make
something understood by
expressing its opposite. We
can therefore isolate three
separate ways of applying
this rhetorical form. Irony
can refer to (1) individual
figures of speech (ironia
verbi); (2) particular ways of
interpreting life (ironia
vitae); and (3) existence in
its entirety (ironia entis). The
three dimensions of irony—
trope, figure, and universal
paradigm—can be
understood as rhetorical,
existential, and ontological.
typologies of semantic
change: e.g. flower has by
synecdoche the sense ‘plant
bearing flowers’. Often
treated as a special case of
metonymy.
of a ship's crew represented by
their hands alone). (2) Where
the whole represents the part:
‘England lost to Australia in
the last Test Match’ (the
countries standing for the
teams representing them and
taking a plural verb).
more inclusive for ‘the
England team’) and a fleet
of fifty sail (sail less
inclusive for ‘ships’).
Traditionally of a figure of
speech in which one thing is
said but the opposite is
meant: e.g. ‘That's just what
I needed!’, said as the tool
one is using comes apart in
one's hands. Usage in
pragmatics or linguistics
generally tends to reflect
this, but others are also
current, in literary studies
especially.
In rhetoric, words with an
implication opposite to their
usual meaning. Ironic
comment may be humorous or
mildly sarcastic, as for
example when, at a difficult
moment, an act of kindness
makes things worse, and
someone says, ‘Well, that's a
lot better, isn't it?’ Expressions
heavy with irony are often used
to drive a point home: ‘I'm
really looking forward to
seeing him, I don't think’;
‘You're pleased to see me?
Pull the other leg/one (it's got
bells on).’ In such usages,
irony slides into sarcasm.
In the ordinary use of
language irony means
primarily ‘an expression of
meaning by use of words
that have an opposite literal
meaning or tendency’.
When we look out of the
window at the pouring rain
and exclaim ‘What a lovely
day!’, we are using a trivial
form of irony. Literary
forms of irony include (1)
dramatic irony, in which
an audience is taken into
the writer's confidence and
is made aware of more than
the participating characters
know, and (2) so-called
20
2. In general usage,
incongruity between what is
expected and what happens,
and an outcome that displays
such incongruity. The sentence
adverb ironically is often used
to draw attention to it:
‘Ironically, his kindness only
made things worse.’ In many
instances, ironically serves
virtually as a synonym of
paradoxically.
3. Wry awareness of life's
incongruity and irrationality.
Socratic irony (after the
Greek philosopher
Socrates, who used it), in
which a participant in a
discussion falsely purports
to be ignorant of a matter
in order to elicit a
particular response from
the other participants.
21
Metaphor as Conceptual Tool
The publication of Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) marked a
pivotal turning point in the positioning of metaphor as the primary mechanism of human
conceptual capacity. Metaphor had still been viewed by many as mostly as a poetic
device or a “linguistic event” (Evola, 2008) and not constitutive of meaning itself. With
findings that linked it to our core ontological existence—based mainly on our embodied
nature—metaphor could be used to examine knowledge claims in science and the
humanities. In particular, Lakoff & Johnson’s examination of the semantic roots of
common expressions put into serious question the relegation of metaphor to a purely
figurative device devoid of any connection with cognition, biology, and meaning. They
clearly assert their claims at the outset:
Metaphor is for most people device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical
flourish—a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover,
metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of
words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can
get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that
metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and
action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act,
is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (p.3).
Drawing on the expressions of ordinary speakers, Lakoff and Johnson
demonstrated how language, concepts, and the processes that create meaning are
metaphorically structured (Coulson, 2001). They posited an epistemology largely based
on unconscious perceptual capacities that shape how humans view the world, from
understanding ordinary everyday events to abstract concepts of philosophy. From that
point on, language in general and metaphor in particular would be increasingly viewed as
22
an outcome of cognitive-semantic processes that are embedded in the experience of
inhabiting a body.
A primary way that metaphor functions in speech is by using conceptual
information about one idea to understand another. In this way meaning and understanding
are largely based on a cross-referencing process between subject areas that are perceived
to be more or less similar to one another. Evidence for the ubiquity of metaphor derives
from everyday linguistic constructions such as ARGUMENT IS WAR5 (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980), in which speakers routinely invoke words associated with war to
communicate characteristics of a verbal argument:
ARUGUMENT IS WAR
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in our argument.
If you use that strategy, she’ll wipe you out.
They shot down all my arguments.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
I never won an argument with him.
The range of expressions demonstrates that using war to talk about an argument is
not isolated. Various characteristics of a physical battle like attacking, shooting, and
defending are readily utilized to convey meanings that we associate with a disagreement.
Importantly, this interchange of language to communicate the idea of an argument points
to how it is not really the words themselves, but rather the logical structure that is
5
In the cognitive-linguistic literature, conceptual metaphors are depicted using capital letters to denote their
relationship to built-in conceptual structure. As evidenced in Appendix A, B, C and D, conceptual
metaphors are written in all capital letters (e.g., THE MIND IS A BOY) when illustrated as the primary
heading under which submappings (e.g., Thinking Is Moving) occur. However, submappings can also be
primary mappings in other configurations (e.g., THINKING IS MOVING The Mind Is A Body). For
clarity, this study will use all capital letters to depict any conceptual metaphor (primary metaphor or
derived from primary metaphor) when illustrated without other submappings. When illustrations are
provided that do not include submappings but rather describe in narrative form the conceptual relationship
to the metaphor, the first letter of each word will only be capitalized.
23
recruited from one domain of meaning to another (Coulson, 2001). In other words the
linguistic use of metaphor is an outcome of what has already occurred conceptually,
revealing how humans make meaning by virtue of association with perceived similar
phenomena. It is through the correlation of certain core bodily experiences with other
objects in infancy that our conceptual systems are based.
With the 1999 publication of Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its
Challenge to Western Thought, Lakoff and Johnson refined aspects of CMT and applied
it to the semantic foundations of philosophy. They posited that most if not all theory in
the natural and human sciences are built on certain a priori assumptions about central
constructs related to time, the mind, the self, events and causes, and morality. The book
examined how these ideas central to Western thought held up under the scrutiny of
conceptual metaphor. In general Lakoff and Johnson sought to determine whether basic
ontological concepts we use to understand existence—both simple everyday events as
well as abstract ideas of science—are based on some literal correspondence to an external
universal truth or reality or on more internal subjective processes related to conceptual
metaphor. These results have important implications for the semantic basis of
psychological theories and also how clinicians interpret and use those theories in the
treatment process.
To begin to understand the influence and ubiquity of metaphor requires a
clarification of its status vis-á-vis language and thought. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) point
out that that there are four basic myths about metaphor that cloud our ability to
understand its pervasiveness. As already mentioned the first is that metaphor is about
language only and not about concepts. In other words, many believe that metaphor is
24
simply an embellished way of using words to communicate ideas. What is missing in this
conception is that metaphor actually forms the basis of our conceptual systems of thought
which guide the manner in which reasoning occurs. A second related myth is that
concepts represent real things in the world and must therefore be viewed as literal. It
would follow then that metaphor, as only a stylized way of using words, cannot
necessarily be associated with what is real or true. In fact, what is metaphorical is often
associated with what is imaginary or outright false. A third myth is that metaphor is based
on the similarity of opposing ideas, when in fact it functions by virtue of experiences
related to inhabiting a body. In particular, the foundation for metaphor is set via
sensorimotor experiences in infancy which are then correlated with other events
perceived to be similar (see Appendix B). Thus the nature of ideas is not somehow
transcendent of experience, but rather derived from interacting with other objects in the
world. Last and most importantly is the myth that the structure and function of our
physical body and brains has nothing to do with reason. This belief holds that there exists
absolute and transcendent and disembodied “truths” that are revealed by virtue of
tapping into a system of rational thinking that is somehow separate from our body and
brains. A related tenet is that subjectivity is a barrier to comprehending reality and
therefore must be eliminated—or at the very least controlled—in order to comprehend
that which is true.
Metaphor and the Body
One important piece of evidence for the embodied basis of thought and language
that forms our basic ontology is the process involved in the formation of conceptual
25
metaphors. From a cognitive linguistic perspective a conceptual metaphor is the outcome
of a psycho-linguistic process whereby one conceptual domain (target domain) is
understood in terms of another (source domain), as in STATES ARE LOCATIONS (e.g.,
“I’m not in a good place today”). Source domains relate directly to the physical
experience of inhabiting a body and form the basis for understanding more abstract ideas.
In this example, the state or emotion of, say, irritability is the target and is conceptualized
using information from the more basic source domain. Because affective states are
primary to human experience beginning from the time in the womb, and because as
physical entities humans perceive themselves as bounded objects in space, location is
used to reflect the more complex phenomenon of feeling or emotion. Overall, the
utilization of a location in space to comprehend and communicate states of emotions is
one example that demonstrates the embodied nature of thought and language.
As discussed conceptual metaphors are formed by transferring or “mapping”
elements from a source domain (based on sensorimotor experiences) to a target domain,
as in the statement “I’m feeling down today.” 6 Following is a visual depiction of the
mapping of domains that occurs to create the conceptual metaphor SAD IS DOWN:
6
The cognitive linguistic literature depicts a mapping with an arrow form one domain to another. For
primary conceptual metaphors the direction proceeds from the source domain to the target domain (S T),
as in Down Sad. It is important to note that mappings the underlie metaphor reflect conceptual
information stored in long-term memory, not an “on the spot” construction or application of words.
26
SOURCE
DOMAIN
TARGET
DOMAIN
Location/Directionality
Emotional State
“Down”
“Sad”
Mapping
Figure 1. Conceptual Metaphor Mapping
The broader conceptual metaphor in this framework is STATES ARE
LOCATIONS, in which the subjective experience associated with a state of mind is
equated with existing below or above some imagined point in space. From this
construction is derived the corresponding metaphors SAD IS DOWN (“She’s been under
the weather for two weeks”) and its counterpart HAPPY IS UP (“They’re on a high since
winning the lottery”). This correlation of space and emotion is related to such physical
experiences as bodily slumping, sensations of heaviness, or the eyes pointing downward
when one is depressed. The construction SAD IS DOWN is considered “unidirectional”
because linguistic and conceptual elements are projected only from source to target, and
not vice versa.7 In other words the position in space signifying “down” informs the
7
Conceptual blending will be shown to involve a bi-directional flow of conceptual information.
27
understanding of feeling sad, but sadness does not in any way add to the conception of
being in a low spatial position.
The correlation of experience that forms the basis for conceptual metaphors has
been found by Christopher Johnson (as cited in Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) to be related to
the co-occurrence of pre-verbal perceptual processes and interaction with objects in the
environment. This “conflation” involved in early learning was determined to form the
basis for conceptual metaphor. Specifically, Johnson’s work on conflation found that
prior to the ability to utilize primary conceptual metaphors in speech certain perceptual
experiences become associated with common events in the environment. For example,
KNOWING IS SEEING comes from the repeated experience of finding out about objects
by being able to have them in one’s visual sight (e.g., peek a boo).8 From this comes an
expression such as “I don’t see the relationship between those variables,” demonstrating
that the nature of knowing is informed by the physical capacity of vision. The list of
primary conceptual (embodied) metaphors in Appendix B shows the direct correlation of
sensorimotor domains of experiences with meaning.
The “embodied mind” is how Lakoff and Johnson (1999) characterize the nature
and function of the human conceptual system as based on the same neurological
mechanisms that are involved in ordinary perceptual and motor processes (e.g., visual,
auditory, tactile, and movement). These sensorimotor systems form the foundation for
what and how humans are able to experience the world—the self, others, objects, events,
etc. How we reason, then, is based not on some amorphous ability that exists apart from
8
From a neurological standpoint such experiences are stored in neural networks and activated when
experiencing similar events.
28
our biology (e.g., “faculty psychology”), but rather on the particular form and function
our bodies possess. In general, the embodied mind is posited in cognitive science via
findings in the field of “neural modeling” and is generally concerned with how the human
perceptual system conceives basic categories (e.g., color) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
Lacking the findings of modern cognitive science, the traditional philosophical theories
on which psychoanalysis is primarily based did not take into account human reason is not
disconnected from the most basic bodily capacities that we share with other animals (see
Appendix G for the a priori assumptions about reason and reality upon which Western
Philosophy is based).
A Psychoanalytic Application of CMT
Casonato (2001) outlines a number of psychoanalytically-derived constructions
based on primary (embodied) conceptual metaphors. Overall, the paper shows how tenets
of CMT can be applied to understanding the semantic roots of commonly used (though
often implicit) metaphorical concepts in psychoanalysis. A central discussion in the paper
centers on how depictions of therapy (e.g., transference, therapeutic alliance) draw on
many of the same conceptual elements love relationships. Drawing on Lakoff and
Johnson’s (1980) LOVE IS A JOURNEY, Casonato posits THERAPY IS A JOURNEY
as a primary way aspects of the treatment relationship are understood in terms of a love
relationship. In this schema the ubiquitous sensorimotor experience of intentionally
moving through space to and from objects in order to meet needs, complete tasks, reach
goals, etc. is used to depict the qualities of an intimate relationship. The following
outlines the relationship or cross-mappings between a journey and therapy:
29
Source (Journey) ---------------------------------- Target (Therapy)
Travelers
Participants
Vehicle
Therapy Relationship
Journey
Events in the Relationship
Distance Traversed
Progress Made
Obstacles
Difficulties
Travel Decisions
Relationship Decisions
Destination
Goals of the Relationship
Figure 2. Cross-Mappings Between a Journey & Therapy
From these correspondences come statements such as “The therapy is at an
impasse,” “I think we’re headed in the right direction” and “It’s been difficult, but
you’ve come a long way.”
The paper additionally examines other ways love is conceptualized using
metaphors that are often similarly applied when conceptualizing therapy. For example,
LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE describes how individuals are attracted to each other as
in, “He felt electricity when he first met his therapist” or “They (the relationship) have
great energy.” LOVE IS A PATIENT reveals how love is thought of in terms of health
status as in “That is a sick relationship,” “She has a healthy marriage,” or “The therapy is
on its last legs.” In an interesting irony, love and the therapy relationship can also be
equated with being mentally imbalanced, as in LOVE IS MADNESS (e.g. “I’m crazy
about her” or “She raves about her therapist”). Finally, LOVE IS WAR is conveyed
30
through such constructions as “She fled from his advances” and “She is known for her
many conquests.”
The idiomatic expressions above reveal the ubiquity of conceptual metaphor in
how we conceptualize relationships and love, in personal relationships and in a
therapeutic context. Tracing the origins of metaphor back to common sensorimotor
(embodied) experiences is fairly straightforward in such constructions. However,
conceptual metaphor is also involved in the shaping of the more complex ideas that form
the basis of metapsychology and related clinical theory in psychoanalysis. Along those
lines, conceptual metaphor will be similarly shown to be related to more abstract
concepts guide theory and practice, most notably related to conceptions of mind, self,
time, and causality.
Conceptual Blending
A related cognitive-linguistic framework that is rooted in CMT is called
“conceptual blending theory” (BT) or “conceptual integration” of mental spaces
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner, 1996). Like CMT, BT attempts to describe the basic
mental operations which reflect the underlying cognitive processes at work in creating
meaning. Each model also views metaphor as more than a literary device disconnected
from biology and cognition, and thus not simply a “literary event” but a “conceptual
phenomenon” (Coulson & Oakley, 2000; Evola, 2008). BT and CMT differ, however, in
how they characterize the nature and function of the processes that go into what are
considered “metaphorical,” or less than purely literal language constructions. In general,
31
BT is thought to be better suited to account for language constructions that draw on
information that is both metaphorical and literal.
BT can be thought of as supplementing CMT in that it can account for
constructions that utilize primary conceptual metaphorical data but whose ultimate
meaning cannot be completely explained by the more concrete and unidirectional transfer
of information from a source to a target domain (e.g., DOWN SAD). One important
way it accomplishes this by incorporating source and target information (based on
embodied metaphor) into its main input category called “mental spaces.” That is, in the
BT model mental spaces include conceptual data that comprises both the basic
sensorimotor experience (e.g., “source data” related to space, objects, time, etc.) and its
uses in language constructions (e.g., “target data” reflecting the complete meaning as in
“I’m feeling down today” or “She’s on a high”). So, while for CMT the complete or finite
meaning is established in target domain, for BT the source and target are inputs that lead
to additional meaning(s) in the “blended space.” A corollary is that blended space is more
fluid than a target space, in that it meanings that are an outcome of the combined data
from mental spaces are one variation of infinite possibilities (e.g., “partial” with respect
to the potential whole). The illustration below reveals some primary differences between
CMT and BT with respect to the quality and flow of information from source to ultimate
meaning:
32
Model
CMT
BT
Source (Input)
Source Domain
Target
Meaning
Target Domain
In Target
(Sensorimotor
Experience)
(Embodied Metaphor)
(Finite)
Mental Spaces
Blended Space
(Sensorimotor Experience + (Similar & Dissimilar
Embodied Metaphor)
Qualities)
In Blend
(Part of Infinite
Meanings)
Figure 3. Primary Differences Between CMT & BT
A related quality of BT that sets it apart from CMT is that instead of drawing
information from two spaces in a unidirectional manner (e.g., from source to target, S T), it utilizes a four-space model of conceptual integration in which information flows in
more than one direction. By having more than one input space a broader range of data
can be drawn on to utilize in the blended or “emergent” space. “Generic space”
represents the information that the mental space inputs already have in common. These
are typically broad categories like role, subject, goal, or means to arrive at the goal. The
inputs—characterized in BT as “mental spaces”—account for how information
simultaneously flows in a bidirectional manner between domains of ideas. In an
important way, bidirectional and multi-source input frames allow for both similar and
dissimilar elements of a word, idea, or metaphor to be incorporated into the final
meaning. As a result, BT can account for the processes that form the basis of more
abstract and complex meanings. The diagram below (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002)
illustrates how information that forms the blend or “emergent” meaning is derived:
33
Figure 4. How Information That Forms the Blend Is Derived
The nature and function of mental spaces determines many of the differences
between BT and CMT, and it also sheds lights on the more imaginative capacities that
form the basis of the human conceptual system. In contrast to source and target domains,
mental spaces generally describe the more fluid and less static quality of the human
representational system, accounting for how particular elements of ideas are included or
discarded when creating meaning (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). A mental space is a
“partial” representational structure that contains “small conceptual packets constructed as
we talk, for purposes of understanding and action” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p.101).
Though essentially built-in to our neurological hardware and a product of evolution,
conceptual blending is highly imaginative and allows for the capacity to comprehend and
create an infinite number of language constructions. As such, BT can be a useful
construct with which to analyze clinical constructs of transformation that often involve
complex relationships between basic ontological categories such as time, space, objects,
34
as well as the more immediate conceptual constructions created by the free association of
patients in clinical treatment.9
A prototypical example of how CMT struggles to account for more abstract and
nuanced constructions commonly used in speech and writing is “That surgeon is a
butcher” (see Appendix G for a complete mapping). Though the statement is obviously
metaphorical (e.g., not literally true), CMT and its unidirectional source to target domain
depiction is not equipped to explain how humans are able to easily compute the implied
meaning. Specifically, directly transferring (e.g., mapping) information from the source
domain (butcher) to the target domain (surgeon) does not account for the primary
meaning of the statement—the incompetence of the surgeon (Grady, Oakley, and
Coulson, 1999). That is, a butcher is not inherently incompetent or incapable of
successfully performing the task of animal butchery. One main distinction that allows the
blend to function is that a butcher and surgeon share similar roles (e.g., cutting flesh),
though their goals are diametrically opposed (e.g., killing versus healing). It is basically
the projection of similar roles into a space with conflicting goals (e.g., the operating
room) that allows the blend to function. The value of BT is that it demonstrates how
9
With respect to characterizing the treatment process, both CMT and BT have direct and indirect
implications. In general, CMT would be a way of understanding a patient’s thought processes with respect
to more universal categories of metaphor based on sensorimotor experience (e.g., HAPPY IS UP,
RELATIONSHIPS ARE PATHS, INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS, etc.). In contrast, BT is better suited to
explain emergent meanings that go beyond more basic one to one correspondence of relationship between
ideas. For example, CMT might better account for the statement “Our relationship is on the rocks”
(STATES ARE LOCATIONS), while BT is better suited to explain the implied and nuanced meanings
inherent in that statement (e.g., how disparate emotions and experiences go into the status of the
relationship).
35
humans are capable of utilizing similar and dissimilar qualities of ideas to draw coherent
meanings.10
How is the human conceptual system able to instantaneously perform such
seemingly complex operations to arrive at shared meanings? Grady, Oakley, and Coulson
(1999) posit that conceptual blending is based on three main processes:
1. Composition;
2. Completion;
3. Elaboration.
Composition involves how information is projected from the content of each input
space into the blended space. It involves how information from mental spaces can
combine to create a meaning or circumstance (real or not) that was not present in either of
the separate inputs. In the above example, the “surgeon” (Agent in Input #1) and
“butcher” (Agent in Input #2) merge into one person in blended space. The process that
underlies this conceptual process is called “fusion” in that parts of each element are
combined to create a separate and unique whole. Completion refers to how the mind is
designed to form patterns from disparate sensory elements. In BT familiar qualities of
images or ideas that are stored in long-term memory from each input space are projected
into the blended space to “finalize” the meaning construction. Fauconnier and Turner
(2002) provide the well-known schema from psychology that depicts how humans
inherently complete a pattern by inferring that the line runs behind the rectangle:
10
That the human conceptual system is inherently set-up to perform operations to make sense of statements
such as “That surgeon is a butcher” is likely not new to clinicians whose central task is to understand how
people come to conclusions about themselves and the larger world. How humans instinctively distill
disparate and often conflicting pieces of information based on biology, cognition, and experience to make
sense of reality is embedded in psychoanalytic metapsychology and clinical theory. Whether accounted for
by BT or CMT, a primary objective of this study is to uncover how concepts of transformation reflect the
embodied processes of thought based on metaphor.
36
Figure 5. Fauconnier & Turner Schema
In the example blend, completion is demonstrated by how the butcher is
“projected” into an operating room, which is crucial to conveying the idea of
incompetence. Finally, elaboration involves how one’s imagination “simulates” the
qualities of the blend which is capable of continuing indefinitely and creating infinite
meanings. Elaboration is associated with how once a meaning scenario is established, it
can be projected forward following a number of potential trajectories based on the
standards set by the particular blend. Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (1999) conjure an
elaboration scenario of the example blend in which after the butcher cuts up the patient,
body parts are then packaged as cold cuts.11 The process of elaboration demonstrates how
imaginative capacities are central to conceptual blending.
Fauconnier and Turner (2002) provide a blend called “The Bypass” (see
Appendix H) which highlights the core elements at work in creating meaning. The ad is
calling attention to our collective need to take early education seriously, by raising the
standards to match the technical sophistication required to practice in occupations like
11
Another aspect of elaboration involves the application of the “emergent” meaning of the blend in a
different (but related) construction. For example, “He’s not a butcher, he’s a surgeon” can be used to
describe an overly cautious novice cutting up meat (Grady, Oakley & Coulson 1999).
37
medicine. The blend basically “works” by our inherent ability to project into the future
the consequences of one potential path (e.g., composition, completion, elaboration) in
which poor education leads to incompetency. In this scenario the age of the children
“matches” their future level of competency, as poignantly demonstrated in their depiction
as presumably ready to perform an operation! The implied scenario (e.g., not pictured but
evoked in mental space) is one in which the children—at their current age and “potential”
for learning—are provided an improved quality of education that will lead to enhanced
future competency. In this way the blend is set-up in a way that forces the reader to
consider the potential effects of not changing education standards, primarily by our
inherent capacity to elaborate certain scenarios along a hypothetical path into the future.12
Mental space and its ability to distill and combine similar and dissimilar qualities of ideas
is a key process that is not accounted for in CMT.
THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS:
A Winnicottian of Application of Conceptual Blending Theory
Winnicott’s conceptualization of the aggressive elements of infant development
provides a means by which BT can be further elucidated and shown to be involved in the
formation of novel constructs of transformation. An examination of the statement “The
infant is ruthless” (see Appendix J for complete mapping) demonstrates how blending
might be used by conceptual researchers within psychoanalysis (Dreher, 2000). Though
the processes of blending which go into an understanding of the ideas are essentially the
same, an important quality that sets apart the current example with “That surgeon is a
12
The human ability to mentally transcend time and space will be shown to be a central quality of
Winnicottian ontology.
38
butcher” is that comprehending the complete meaning of the statement requires
familiarity of aspects of psychoanalytic theory. As such the statement and related
constructs that derive meaning from it are thus termed a “psychoanalytic-derivatives.” 13
Historically, aggression as a primary force in early psychic development is an
idea inherited directly from Melanie Klein, while the broader idea of the “fusion” of
erotic and aggressive impulses is a cornerstone of Classical theory (Freud, 1961).14 For
Winnicott the quality of “ruthlessness” characterizes the infant at the stage of “preconcern” (1945), or pre-depressive position, in the context of instinctual fusion. The
underlying construction THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS implies that certain qualities and
manifestations of early development are a function of built-in aggression, which is
posited as the primary force in his conception of mind (e.g., AGGRESSION IS A
FORCE). In line with his British object relations tradition, aggression is a force that
comes to assume various roles with respect to psychic advancement and thus it
characterization as purely negative or positive (or psychically stagnating versus
generative) does not adequately capture its complete conceptual quality.
In general the statement “The infant is ruthless” is metaphorical in that
ruthlessness is literally associated being devoid of pity or compassion, qualities that are
typically assigned to more cognitively mature persons. Similar to the “That surgeon is a
butcher” conceptual blending is better equipped to deconstruct the semantic foundations
13
The implication is that the information required in the “inputs” of mental space is beyond that which is
available to ordinary speakers or readers. In this way all theoretical constructs within specialized fields
similarly build on established ideas that become the foundation (e.g., paradigms) of future meaning.
14
The idea of the fusion or aggressive and erotic energy will be shown to play a significant role in the
construct of object usage, Winnicott’s last major statement on development.
39
of the statement. One of the ways Winnicott linguistically sets-up this idea is by using a
word (“ruthless”) that has a connotation that transcends the barriers of time, in that it
forces the reader to “age” the child in ways reminiscent of “The Bypass.” On the surface
assigning ruthlessness to an infant is an extreme notion, though the experience it creates
in the reader (e.g., dissonance) assists in drawing out new ways of thinking about the
subject.
Juxtaposing in mental space similar and dissimilar elements of aggression and
love, the reader is forced to consider aspects of ideas that go beyond their most obvious
meanings. In the blend, erotic aspects of aggression (e.g., “I hate (really) love you”) and
aggressive aspects of eroticism (e.g., “He loves her to death”) already present in the
cognitive unconscious and long-term memory, are tapped into automatically.15 Blending
aids in the process, drawing out more subtle qualities of these ubiquitous concepts whose
meanings are easily reified in everyday usage. In terms of “composition” and
“completion” leading to emergent meanings, part of what is projected into blended space
is an infant that is capable of possessing both emotional qualities—one (love) that is
usually taken for granted and the other that is less often considered (aggression). The
elements from each input space are fused into a complete entity that possesses these
“dual” qualities (e.g., loving and hating).16 With respect to “elaboration” these new
15
An important element that is present in long-term memory with respect to aggression is its relationship to
primitive energy. That is, even those who would not posit aggression as a primary psychic force would
agree that raw energy contains a quality that acts on behalf of the organism without regard for secondary
consequences. As a neutral energy, aggression is inherently a-motivational and a driving force in nature
(e.g., metamorphosis, evolution). So, the position being taken here is that Winnicott’s larger meaning with
respect to aggression in early development depends on the capacity of the embodied mind (via blending) to
discard the more intentional (motivational) aspects of aggression and project into the blended space those
elemental qualities associated with raw emotional energy (e.g., motility).
16
Because aggression is not typically considered an element of infancy, the “emergent” infant in the blend
can be characterized as adult-like, reminiscent of ‘The Bypass.”
40
features of the infant can be projected forward in a way that various possible scenarios
can play out in the mind of a reader-clinician. One path with respect to theory and
practice is considering how a psychic system in which both love and aggression are of
equal value plays a role in development and the characterization of object relationships.17
In general, BT provides an alternative lens through which to examine the
foundation of meaning. It demonstrates the inherent human capacity to combine, distill,
and elaborate meanings based on ideas that arise in mental space. One relevant
implication for the current study is that writers and readers of theory are continually
implementing aspects of blending when conceptualizing and integrating ideas. The same
processes are occurring in a parallel way in the treatment setting, where ideas related to a
developmental history and current object relations are subjected to mental space of both
participants in an effort to create new and “emergent” meanings. With respect to modern
metaphor theory, a goal of all treatment, as well as theory building, is to expand and
make more fluid the conceptual vantage points from which a patient or reader views
reality.
17
That is, if aggression is viewed as a force (itself or along with love) it must be considered within the
larger frame of instinctual development (not simply a “reaction” to the reality principle or unmet needs).
This feature would not of course be new to adherents of object relations theory, but certainly to those who
never considered that aggression can play a generative role in development or that there can be destructive
elements of love. It should be pointed out that unlike the relatively universal agreement with respect to the
meaning of “That surgeon is a butcher,” the blend under consideration as a theoretical statement does not
assure a similar consensus. From a theoretical point of view, what is taken for granted in “generic space”
(e.g., LOVE IS A FORCE or AGGRESSION IS A FORCE) and thus within the inputs (“mental spaces”)
varies considerably from model to model.
41
Science and Meaning: Metapsychology and Clinical Theory
Over the years metaphor has been discussed within psychoanalysis in the
context of two main areas: its correspondence to Freud’s psychological concepts
of the mind (e.g., metapsychology) and its general use in the treatment setting. In
contrast to the utilization of metaphor in the clinical setting, where there seems to
be a general consensus as to its ubiquity and usefulness in the deconstruction of
patients’ unique meanings (Hymer, 1997; Carveth, 1984; Arlow, 1979), the
discussions related to metapsychology essentially question the scientific validity
of core constructs based on their metaphorical nature (Gill, 1988; Wurmser, 1977;
Schafer, 1976; Klein, 1975; Kubie, 1947).18
From a linguistic perspective these debates have centered on whether
words used to describe mental processes (e.g., ego, libido, drives, energy, etc)
reflect actual phenomena or whether they are abstractions based on reified notions
of the mind. Proposed solutions have ranged from positioning metapsychology
within a broader levels of philosophical abstraction (Waelder, 1962) to
abandoning it completely and making a conscious effort in the treatment setting to
use language that does not impose an a priori model of mental experience (e.g.,
Shafer’s “action language”).19
18
To be clear the consensus surrounds the general use of metaphor in communicating and understanding
elements of the treatment process in general (e.g., the patient’s story and its relationship to larger meanings)
but not the necessity to view metapsychological constructs as a sine qua non of those understandings. It is
generally the overvaluation of these constructs that has been questioned by detractors.
19
Waelder’s (1962) schema posits metaphychology as the fifth of six levels of philosophical abstraction
upon which psychoanalysis rests: 1) Observation; 2) Interpretations; 3) Generalizations (e.g., diagnosis); 4)
Clinical theory (e.g., application of theoretical concepts like transference, defense, regression, etc); 5)
42
A movement in the United States that came to fruition in the 1970’s
proposing alternatives to the strict application of metapsychological concepts to
treatment came primarily from analytically trained psychologists, most notably
students of David Rapport whose work (1959, 1951) centered on deconstructing
the semantics of metapsychology.20 In particular, the work of Gill (1976), Klein
(1975), and Shafer (1976) was generally an exercise in tightening the gap between
metapsychology and clinical work, bringing hermeneutics more centrally into the
equation in psychoanalysis (Gedo, 2007).
Like similar discussions in the human sciences, the main questions came
to essentially focus on epistemology and whether it is possible to accurately
depict not only the form, structure, and functional aspects of the mind, but also its
ultimate relationship to ontology and meaning (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003;
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Searle, 1997). In general this
attention to metapsychology spawned a renewed attention to the manner in which
language and personal meaning coalesce, which has its roots in the origins of
psychoanalysis and Freud’s attempt to marry science and hermeneutics.
Discussions of the relevance and utility of metapsychology is relevant to this
study because it centers on examining language and the conceptual basis on which
theory and practice are based.
Metapsychology or higher-level clinical theory (e.g., psychic energy, drive force, cathexis, eros, etc.); 6)
“Beyond metapsychology” or philosophical considerations (e.g., metaphysics).
20
The deconstruction of psychoanalytic metapsychology has close parallels to Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999)
examination of philosophy. See Appendix I for a brief conceptual overview of Rappaport & Gill’s (1959)
overview of metapsychology and related conceptual metaphors.
43
Freud’s endeavor to map the mind was from the beginning suffused with
ideas from philosophy, neurology, and psychology, and it appears he was acutely
aware of the inherent difficulties in reconciling these broad areas of thought into a
comprehensive model of human mental functioning (Gedo, 2007). An early
dilemma involved how to fit into the experimental science of the day the data he
collected on hysteria and the etiology of what he would call the neuroses.21 One
finding was that processes of the human mind cannot be completely understood in
terms of the rational principles of causality on which science viewed natural
phenomena. In particular, mental processes (e.g., a symptom) are the embodiment
of the individual’s past history and current interpretation of that history, which
may or may not reflect objective truth or reason. Subjective factors such as
wishes, desires, and cultural prohibitions are involved in the unique form that
symptomatic thoughts and behaviors take. The findings required taking seriously
the manner in which people attributed meaning to experiences, thereby combining
the realms of positivistic science with that of rhetoric or narrative (Cohler &
Galatzer-Levy, 2007). In general, his early findings on the psychological
foundations of neurosis led him to position his theory more in the realm of the
humanities rather than science. Home (1966) summarizes the inherent difference
between science and meaning in the context of how psychoanalysis views
psychological symptoms:
21
Cohler & Galatzer-Levy (2007) characterize this quest as the “neuroscience of meaning” which has close
parallels to the findings of modern cognitive linguistics; that is, the relationship between neural structure
and meaning. Modern attempts to combine brain science with psychoanalysis are numerous (Basch, 1976,
1981, 1985; Gedo, 1991, 2007; Palombo, 2001, 2006).
44
That the symptom has meaning, if it is neurotic, is Freud's basic discovery, the
basic insight which opened up the way to an understanding of functional illness
and the principles of psycho-analytic treatment. It is not surprising that, in the
excitement of so great a discovery and one that opened up such vast new
territories, Freud should have overlooked the logical implications for theory of the
step he had taken. Those implications are however very great, for in the
mechanistic medicine of Freud's time, as in all organic medicine of our own day,
the symptom is logically regarded as a fact and a fact is regarded as the product
of causes [emphasis not in original]. In this, medicine simply follows the practice
of chemico/physical science and the canons of thought which are exemplified
with special clarity in physics. In discovering that the symptom had meaning and
basing his treatment on this hypothesis, Freud took the psycho-analytic study of
neurosis out of the world of science into the world of the humanities, because a
meaning is not the product of causes but the creation of a subject [emphasis not in
original]. This is a major difference; for the logic and method of the humanities is
radically different from that of science, though no less respectable and rational,
and of course much longer established.
The above discussion points to the primary semantic difference on which
positivistic science and hermeneutics are based. From a conceptual-metaphorical
viewpoint both science and the humanities draw primarily on the Event Structure
Metaphor (Appendix B) and Metaphors of the Mind (Appendix D), whereby causation is
conceived as an object’s arrival at a destination via forced movement through space.
However, each utilizes the formula in different ways. In the world of physical science,
the force that imparts motion (CAUSES ARE FORCES) to arrive at the “location” or
truth (IDEAS ARE LOCATIONS) is based on transcendent reason (REASON IS A
FORCE), completely disconnected from the experience of the individual. The symptom,
as a “fact” or product of the cause or force of reason, must be seen as similarly
disconnected from experience because it is based on a phenomenon that disavows the
embodied mind as the source of reason (e.g., that reason is at its core built on early
sensorimotor experiences as understood by metaphor). This rationale, then, by its very
nature creates and reinforces the misguided notion that the mind and body are separate,
thus disconnecting the individual from what is actual felt experience.
45
Home asserts that the underlying conceptual rationale in the humanities is based
not on “facts” as the products of disembodied “causes,” but rather on meaning as the
creation of “subjects” In this model meaning is not a product of a cause, but rather is the
cause (e.g., MEANINGS ARE CAUSES) or force (e.g., MEANINGS ARE FORCES)
that creates how phenomena (e.g., “subject matter”) are understood. The implication is
that because meaning is inherently embodied and based on sensorimotor (versus
transcendent) experience, all thought, behavior, motivation, intentionality, etc. are subject
to its processes. Therefore, a symptom—like any other phenomenon that is essentially a
manifestation of an embodied reality—is ascribed meaning and as such comes to reveal
aspects of the logic on which its reasoning is based. In treatment, the symbolic
reenactment of past traumas would be one way that the meaning or logic of symptoms are
made manifest. In general, meanings— as the outcome of a lifetime of sensorimotor
“learning” through metaphor—impose a certain conceptual structure on experience and
thus can be thought of as the ongoing creation of unique themes (e.g., “subjects”) that are
always based one’s embodied subjecthood.
The following is an overview of the semantic foundation of causation in
positivistic science versus hermeneutics vis-à-vis the Location Event-Structure
Metaphor:
Scientific Mapping of Causation
States Are Locations
•
Objects exist in a hypothetical position in space
Changes Are Movements
•
Object’s movement from one position to another signifies change
46
Causes Are Forces
•
•
Object’s movement attributed to a force
Force is based on reason (disembodied, transcendent)
Causation Is Forced Movement
•
Reason is the force that propels object from one location to another (why
movement occurred)
Purposes Are Destinations
•
•
•
Forced movement of object through space leads to arrival at location of “truth”
or “fact”
Location of “truth” or “facts” universal, transcendent, and disembodied (e.g.,
subjectless)
Facts (e.g., symptoms) derive from antecedent causes and forces
Hermeneutic Mapping of Causation
States Are Locations
•
Objects exist in a hypothetical position in space
Changes Are Movements
•
Object’s movement from one position to another signifies change
Causes Are Forces
•
•
Object’s movement attributed to meaning, based on the embodied mind
Meaning is embodied and based on real experience and mental hardware (e.g.,
experientialism)
Causation Is Forced Movement
•
Force (meaning) that moved object is reason for object movement (why movement
occurred)
47
Purposes Are Destinations
•
•
•
Forced movement of object through space leads to arrival at location of
“experiential” truth
Experiential truth is neither completely subjective not objective (see Appendix A)
Subjective facts derive from meanings attributed to experience NOT disembodied
causes or facts
Much of the criticism of psychoanalysis has rested on its presumed lack of
experimental verification and the implied acceptance of its epistemology by its
practioners (Cohler & Galatzer-Levy, 2007). Positivistic science’s requirement of
subjecting claims of truth to verifiable hypotheses using the experimental method
challenges the hermeneutic view of reality, significantly limiting the value of
personal experience in the conception of reality. Critiques from within
psychoanalysis (Eagle, 1986) as well as from a philosophy of science point of
view (Grunbaum, 1983) have challenged its validity as a science. From these
points of view psychoanalysis should not be content with seeing itself as a
hermeneutic science but rather seek to establish a “natural science of the soul”
(Dreher, 2000), based on verifiable experimental tenets. The general assumption
is that until shown otherwise, the nature of its core concepts are “metaphorical”
(e.g., false or not proven) in nature and thus not reflective of a universal reality.
Inherent in the worldview is the notion that truth is transcendent and somehow
divorced from individual experience, which directly follows from a belief in a
disembodied mind (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Such beliefs discount or do not take
into consideration the key findings of modern cognitive science (see Appendix
A).
48
Despite claims of unscientific foundation of psychoanalysis there have
been, there have been quantitative studies and related models that have
empirically tested clinical hypotheses within the treatment setting (Dreher, 2000;
Fonagy & Target, 1996; Kächele & Thoma, 1993; Luborsky & Spence, 1978;
Wallerstein, 2001). Detractors assert that such work is tainted by inherent
suggestibility in the treatment setting, in particular, the interpretive nature of
gathering data and drawing conclusions (Gedo, 1997). There is inherent difficulty
in proving the validity of abstract concepts and ideas such as transference, libido,
and psychic determinism. Along these lines, Dreher (2000) suggests that
adequately accounting for such a comprehensive and dynamic theory like
psychoanalysis additionally requires “conceptual” research that examines the
nature of its main constructs and their particular use in writing and practice. The
goal of conceptual research is generally to investigate the historical context of a
concept’s origin and its evolution through time in the context of diverse
understandings and uses, testing the logical consistency and coherence concepts.
Two examples of such work cited by Dreher (2000) are Back to Freud’s Texts by
Grubrich-Smitis (1996) and The Patient and the Analyst (1992) by Sandler, Dare,
and Holder. The current study in which the historical origins of object usage and
related transformational metaphors are examined using a methodology of modern
cognitive linguistics is a similar example of conceptual research.
49
Metaphor and Clinical Writing
The task of illuminating primordial phenomena has been characterized as more
suited for poets, painters, and philosophers rather than scientists who must explain data in
more logical and systematic ways through language. The presumption is that at more
subtle levels the nature of being becomes ineffable and revealed only through more
abstract mediums of communication and that experience is something that “happens in
spite of language” (Foster, 2007). Beginning with Freud psychoanalytic writing has been
as well concerned with characterizing elemental experiences of mental life, though for
the dual purpose of ameliorating as well as understanding the human condition. Freud
was considered one of the best German writers of his day and his work navigated
between the worlds of science and art (Jauregui, & Méndez, 2002). He also thought of
himself as much as a philosopher as a scientist. His use of metaphors (e.g. archeology and
themes from Classical literature) to portray his psychological theory are well known. In
one way, the literary history of psychoanalysis can be viewed as a portrayal of the human
condition from a hermeneutic vantage point of science and meaning. How psychoanalytic
writing serves the dual purpose of unifying and communicating scientific and subjective
truths remains an issue (Atwood & Stolorow, 1993).
Psychoanalytic social work clinicians are similarly involved in creating their own
unique literary rendition of existential experiences (Ogden, 1997). Attempting to convey
in words the meaning of psychic events that occur in the course of a treatment can be a
daunting task. Despite theoretical orientation, clinicians must conceptually and
linguistically account for intrapsychic processes within the patient and within themselves,
as well as what occurs intersubjectively within the “analytic space” between them. This
50
requires a continual conceptual navigation of the apparently opposing worlds of theory
and practice—e.g., cognitive and affective experience—and the related ability to use
clinical ideas in a way that communicates the unique phenomena of the treatment. The
quest of writing in ways that do not reify theory is a skill that begins in clinical training
and continues, along with practical technique, on a developmental path into professional
maturity (Spence, 1990).
Though not specifically geared toward investigating the multitude of variables
involved in learning psychoanalytic constructs, this study has important implications for
how social workers conceptually encounter, understand, and elaborate the meaning of
clinical concepts. Specifically, in terms of psychoanalytic learning and development, a
linguistic examination of theoretical and clinical writing in the context of metaphor can
be one way to elucidate the processes involved in “cognitive learning” that is part and
parcel of the overall experiential processes involved in professional psychoanalytic
development (Ekstein & Wallerstein, 1957; Fleming & Benedek, 1984). An ongoing task
in clinical development is the ability to continually navigate and combine the realms of
abstract theory with the practical usage of clinical concepts. Along those lines, the theory
of conceptual metaphor and the epistemological stance of experientialism (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999) fits closely with the idea of psychoanalysis as hovering in an intermediate
area between positivistic science and hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1970). Applying modern
metaphor theory and the related position of experientialism to Winnicott’s psychoanalytic
constructs of transformation and their application in clinical writing is one way to test the
level of congruence between theory and practice, a goal of conceptual research.
51
Winnicott in Context: Early Development
Born in1896 and living until 1971, Donald Woods Winnicott lived a long and
prodigious life. The youngest of three children raised in the English countryside, his
second wife Clare portrayed his childhood setting as idyllic and fostering the imaginative
capacities that would suffuse his professional work.22 At age 14 he was sent to boarding
school, and by 1920 he had served in the Royal Navy as a medial officer and completed a
medical degree. It was during his medical training that he came across Freud’s
Interpretation of Dreams, presumably in response to a sudden inability to recall his
dreams (Rodman, 2003). Winnicott would enter analysis in 1923 with James Strachey
(the same year he married his first wife Alice Taylor) and a few years later become a
candidate in the British Society.23 He graduated in 1934 and shortly after became
qualified as a child analyst. Winnicott would be supervised in child cases by Melanie
Klein and in the mid- 1930’s began making written contributions on topics related to
psychoanalysis.24 His career as a psychoanalyst and writer on human development would
span the next five decades.25
Over the years biographers and commentators have mined events of Winnicott’s
formative years for clues that might help explain his contributions to psychology,
22
See D.W.W: A Reflection (C. Winnicott, 1989).
23
Rodman (2003) notes that Ernest Jones founded the London Psycho-Analytical Society in 1913 but
decided to dissolve it when one member came to avow the ideas of Carl Jung. Theoretical divisions would
become the hallmark of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, which Jones subsequently established in
1919.
24
Ibid. At Klein’s request Winnicott later analyzed her son Eric. Winnicott’s membership paper was The
Manic Defense, presented to the British Society in 1935.
25
Ibid. Winnicott worked as a pediatric consultant at Paddington Green Children’s Hospital from 1923 to
1963. Prior to his psychoanalytic training, Winnicott wrote and presented papers on the importance of
mothering in the emotional health of the baby. In 1931 Clinical Notes on Disorders of Childhood was
published, which was mainly focused on general pediatrics.
52
especially his unique style of blending original thought with extant psychoanalytic theory
(Rodman, 2003; Abram, 1996; Kahr, 1996; Goldman, 1993; Phillips, 1988). Historical
and cultural factors have been advanced, including, among others things, the status of
women and motherhood in patriarchal Victorian England, the independent spirit of his
early Wesleyan faith, the influence of British Empiricism and the blending of art and
science of the Romantic poets, and the impact of living through a World War in young
adulthood. The often contentious milieu in which Winnicott professionally developed and
worked within the British Society has also been extensively examined. However,
interpreting the meaning and impact of his status within his family system has probably
received the most attention in terms of locating the seeds of his unique account of human
ontology and epistemology.
Winnicott was the youngest (by 5 and 6 years) and only male of three children
born to 34 year old Martha Woods Winnicott and 44 old Frederick Winnicott.26 His
father owned a family business dealing in hardware and also served in a number of civic
capacities, including being elected mayor of the town twice.27 Rodman (2003) generally
describes his mother Martha as typical of the times, basically a secondary figure in a
patriarchal household. Clare Winnicott (1989) described his mother as “vivacious and
26
Ibid. His sisters Violet and Kathleen never married and toward the end of their lives knew virtually
nothing of their brother’s professional standing or contributions.
27
Ibid. Frederick was knighted in 1924 for his community service. His father was not educated and likely
had learning difficulties, which may have prevented him from seeking the Parliament. By all accounts the
family was financially “comfortable” though the Winnicott’s may have been viewed as lower middle-class
due to Frederick’s status as a “shopkeeper.”
53
outgoing . . . and able to show and express her feeling easily (p.5).28 A paternal uncle
lived nearby, and Winnicott and his cousins (three male and two female) were raised like
siblings (C. Winnicott, 1989). The family home and rural surroundings provided
opportunities for both relatedness and solitude. Clare Winnicott’s depiction of the family
atmosphere was generally one of love, stability and predictability, themes central to his
writing on optimal child development.
The overvaluation of the mother-infant relationship in Winnicott’s writing brings
into focus his own experiences that form the conceptual basis of his core theoretical
ideas.29 Among the implications of these early experiences are the particular nature of his
psychodynamic formulations and manner in which he communicated them in writing. In
general two key dynamics have emerged in the historical analysis of his mother Martha
as an influence: her possible depression and her perceived asexual nature.30 Regularly
cited with respect to the former is a portion of a poem, “The Tree” (see Appendix J) in
which Winnicott’s early perception of his value and role vis-á-vis his mother was
revealed:
28
Ibid. Accounts by Winnicott himself and others call into question this general characterization. In
particular, her lively outward manner and gesticulations (see note on “clapping” by Rodman, 2003, p. 383)
may have revealed a depression and inner deadness.
29
In cognitive linguistic terms the process of conflation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) that underpins the
formation of primary conceptual metaphors can be said to occur mainly in the context of early intimate
relationships, like that of the mother-infant.
30
See Rodman (2003) for a discussion of the “idealization of the sexless woman” that was fostered by
English Protestantism.
54
Mother below is weeping
weeping
weeping
Thus I knew her
Once, stretched out on her lap
as now on dead tree
I learned to make her smile
to stem her tears
to undo her guilt
to cure her inward death
To enliven her was my living. 31
The lines reveal associations to experiences that would become conceptualized in
constructs such as the “holding environment,” the “spontaneous gesture,” and
“impingement,” as well as overarching themes of reliability and predictability. The
relational stance he found himself in would seem to provide a valid clue as to the origins
of his originality, namely as an emotional provocateur who came to deem himself as
omnipotent and capable of (and responsible for) imparting life. The poem points to a
precarious balance that Winnicott perceives he was forced to strike, not only to
“resurrect” his mother but to preserve her fragile state through mothering of his own.32
31
Among uses of enliven cited in the Oxford English Dictionary is to “diversify agreeably” which provides
an alternative conceptual angle from which to view Winnicott’s theorizing and means of communicating it.
In contrast to portraying his conceptual stance in terms of, for example, compliance versus non-compliance
(Newman, 1995) or theory versus anti-theory (Fogel, 1992), the idea of making an object more diverse
better captures how ideas exist in a potential space, thus rendering them malleable and revealed in different
ways but never absolute.
32
Phillips (1988) cites the importance of Winnicott’s identification with Christ and his sufferings on the
cross (“tree”) as part of his broader identification with the feminine, possibly fueled by his father’s
egocentrism, strictness, and emotional distance. Phillips notes an interest in the novel King Jesus, written in
1946 by Robert Graves, a well-known expert on Hebrew religion and mythology and the Gnostic gospels
with whom Winnicott corresponded. In this semi-historical novel, Jesus is presented as a prophet who after
coming to “destroy the power of the Female” as represented in the pre-Jehovah Great Mother Goddess in
the end sacrifices himself for the feminine cause.
55
As discussed, Winnicott’s writing style can be similarly said to have a provocative
quality that aims to enliven or evoke and the experience of the reader (Ogden, 2001).
Rodman (2003) notes that along with obvious the absence of the father figure, the
asexual portrayal of the mother comprises a significant gap in Winnicott’s theorizing that
is revealing of his early development. 33 Overall, the patriarchal tenor of the times,
characterizations of his mother Martha’s “inhibited” nature and his father’s emotional
aloofness are generally portrayed as forming the basis for his clinical portrayals of
sexuality as well as his own sexual identity.34 Along those lines, Winnicott’s first
marriage to Alice Taylor was suspected to be unconsummated and to have revealed more
general struggles to express himself in an intimate fashion.35
33
Goldman (1993) characterizes the often cited omission of the father as “overstated” in that Winnicott
primary concern was the infant and the immediate caregiving environment, which in certain ways
precluded the figure of the father. Also, Rodman (2003) notes that the form of Methodism the family
adhered to, Wesleyanism, promoted in turn of the century Britain an ideal of middle-class women as
sexless “blushing young maidens.”
34
Winnicott confided to Marion Milner (Rodman, 2003) that his mother was over-stimulated by
breastfeeding, and as a consequence he was prematurely weaned. A related effect may have been the actual
fact or his perceived notion that his mother needed to see him as a girl.
35
Ibid. She was four years his elder and emotionally unstable. Described as similarly eccentric she and
Winnicott shared musical talents and were able to express themselves through that medium. They were
however not successful at expressing intimacy and the eventual turmoil of the relationship (reportedly
never overtly conflictual) was thought to have led to at least two of Winnicott’s heart attacks and their
eventual divorce in 1948. Winnicott reportedly waited until his father’s death to leave the marriage, though
he met and had a sexual affair with his second wife Clare by this time. It has been pointed out that his
relationship with Clare coincides with a creative turning point in his writing.
56
Winnicott’s physical characteristics, demeanor and even voice were considered
feminine, which possibly reinforced a sense of being female (e.g., mother to his mother)
and the related belief that was or needed to be unthreatening.36 His clinical constructs
related to the authentic encounter with an object in the context of an “unimpinged” (e.g.,
solipsistic, sterile, or under-stimulated) environment is among the different ways he
might have revealed his inability to act decisively in response to erotic stimulation. Based
on what is known of his early object relationships, this was most likely not a learned
reaction to having been the recipient of extensive stimulation, but rather the perceived
effect on love objects of his instinctual desires and needs.
Later in his career Winnicott would more directly explore states of mind he
associated with masculinity and femininity which most likely reflected factors in his own
early development. In The Split-Off Male and Female Elements Found in Men and
Women (1966), he drew primarily on the case of a man who viewed himself as a woman.
What Winnicott ultimately posited was that essential elements of personality could be
divided up into male “doing” and female “being.” In general, the activity associated with
masculine activity can be linked to the manner in which the first “not-me” object is
encountered. That is, in a properly managed caregiving environment activity is used to
spontaneously meet the object for the purpose of transforming the subject into a world of
36
Ibid. It is not clear to what extent if at all Winnicott dealt with his own sexuality in his two analyses.
Winnicott’s first analyst, James Strachey, was married and had homosexual liaisons but there is no
evidence that this led to a discussion of this topic. Masud Khan, a patient and later editor of Winnicott’s
works, was perhaps one of his closest confidantes in the latter years of his life (the treatment lased from
1951 to 1966). A reportedly strikingly handsome man Winnicott would come to cross many professional
boundaries in their relationship. Rodman notes that their collaboration outside the treatment interestingly
began around the time he met Clare Winnicott, which may be viewed as a defensive maneuver against
heterosexual love and/or an opening-up of homosexual impulses.
57
shared reality. In situations that go awry this masculine energy can become split-off with
corresponding effects related to inhibition based on prematurely exposed separateness.
He notes that while the male element “presupposes separateness,” the female
characteristic of “being” is more akin to that which is more fundamental to the human
organism (e.g., the bodily container where ideas and physical objects are incorporated
and projected) and the realm of “object relating” (e.g., a pre-differentiated state). Viewed
from this perspective, the complications of his early relations with his mother in addition
to certain noticeable characteristically feminine qualities may have among other things
heightened his sensitivity to and interest in gender-related qualities of primary psychic
processes.
Like most fathers, Frederick Winnicott seems to have loomed large in his son’s
emotional world. Rodman (2003) describes him as a man of immense local import and as
having a certain personal flare.37 Frederick is said to have taught young Donald to read
the bible and allowed him the freedom to interpret its meaning in his own way. Clare
Winnicott (1989) wrote that he was “slim and tallish and had an old-fashioned quiet
dignity and poise about him, and a deep sense of fun” (p.5). Despite an apparent capacity
for humor, there is evidence that there was also a more serious and prohibitive side to
Frederick Winnicott. In what is possibly on of his earliest memories cited in his
autobiographical notes (C. Winnicott, 1989), Donald reported that when he was 3 years
37
Ibid. A childhood friend of Winnicott believed Frederick was often “overdressed.” He was an exemplary
civic figure who provided a number of functions which benefitted the community. Of this Rodman writes:
“The survival of so much documentation of Frederick’s good deeds and personal prominence suggests that
he was an overpowering, narcissistic presence for his son” (p. 17).
58
old he smashed the face of his sisters’ doll “Rosie” because his father would incessantly
tease him about it:
Rosie said to Donald
I love you
Donald said to Rosie
I don’t believe you do
In Winnicott’s account he was relieved that his father did not respond at all
harshly and mended the doll’s face. He would come to laud his father for this act of
“reparation” and ability to tolerate his aggression. However, according to Goldman
(1993) this assessment may have been “disingenuously benign” and downplaying the
way his father may have been thwarting of his masculinity.38 Events later in Winnicott’s
development would seem to show that Frederick had strict and prohibitive side. Along
these lines, Rodman (2003) generally characterized the underlying tone in the family as
consisting of “severe strictures on disruptive behavior” (p. 20).39
Clare Winnicott recounted that when Donald was 9 years old he came to the
conclusion that he was “too nice” which preceded a phase in which he struggled in school
with grades and poor behavior (Rodman, 2003). At age 12 the young Donald, under the
influence of negative peers, used the word “drat” which is apparently the reason his
father decided to send him to boarding school.
38
Goldman (1993) cites Adam Phillip’s (1988) assertion that Winnicott’s view of the incident is “narrowly
oedipal, not fully acknowledging the degree to which Sir Frederick was threatening Donald’s burgeoning
personality” (p. 41). Goldman goes on to say that the young Winnicott’s destruction of the doll can be
simultaneously viewed as a symbolic “crushing” of his “confusing masculinity.”
39
If so, this would have existed in opposition to the outgoing, humorous, and fun-loving atmosphere
characterized by Clare Winnicott (1989). Among other things it raises questions about the meaning that
“playfulness” served in the family system; that is, whether such demonstrations were completely
“spontaneous” acts or ones suffused with the need to cope with other inhibitions, prohibitions, and anxiety.
59
Winnicott wrote that he was appreciative of his father’s gesture, as it probably
reinforced for him a sense of his father’s power and willingness to act on behalf of his
masculinity.40 To that point Donald had been tended to primarily by females, with
seemingly little significant interaction with his father. Subsequent incidents later in life
point to an emotional distance and inability confide in his father with important personal
life matters. For example, while away at school Donald would use his childhood friend
Jim Ede to convey to his father his decision to become a doctor and not enter the family
business (Rodman, 2003).41 Though there would be life-long correspondence between
father and son the tenor of the letters suggests a formal relationship often focusing on
finances, which was a lifelong struggle for Donald.42 Further evidence pointing to the
emotional distance and lack of trust in this relationship is that he waited until the death of
his father to fully consummate his divorce with Alice Taylor. In general the portrayals of
Donald and his father reveal a gulf in their relationship that was never quite mended.
Their history suggests a unacknowledged, displaced, or denied aggressive energy that
likely found its way in Winnicott’s later conceptions of aggression (e.g., as a more
benevolent life force versus a annihilator or as part and parcel of finding reality itself).
40
Winnicott wrote, “So my father was there to kill and be killed, but it is probably true that in the early
years he left me too much to all my mothers (e.g., Martha, sisters, nanny, governess). Things never quite
righted themselves” (In, C. Winnicott, 1989, p. 8).
41
Rodman (2003) reminds the reader that this essentially left his father without a successor. He writes:
“Did Donald feel hostility to his father threatened to show through in the revealing of the simple fact that
he wanted to be a doctor? Was it the news: ‘I am not like you are, Father’? And was it also: ‘Look, Father, I
can’t face you with this, can’t bear your hurt. Nothing between us has prepared us for this moment of
parting’?” (p. 32).
42
Ibid. Frederick assisted his son financially even when Donald was an established professional with
income. Perhaps this was the one way that they were able to give and take more freely with each other.
Interestingly, there are reports of Winnicott presumably forgetting to pay for a consultation with Ernest
Jones, and continually being in arrears with his two analysts James Strachey and Joan Riviere. This points
to what Rodman (p. 97) calls Winnicott’s struggle to “spend one’s goodness” which was a lifelong theme
and one which was apparently softened in his relationship with Clare Winnicott.
60
In summary, Winnicott’s early development reveals certain emotional crises that
would be revealed in the nature and function of his core theoretical constructs of
transformation. Though this study is not designed to systematically investigate all the
potential ramifications early life experience had on his unique conception of
psychoanalysis, the textual analysis will developmental factors in the context of the
formulation of his final notable theoretical construct “object usage.”
Winnicott’s Conceptual Style
Winnicott’s unique clinical concepts and writing style offer the opportunity to
examine the relationship between language and ontology, a central concern of philosophy
and psychoanalysis alike (Ricoeur, 1970). Ogden (2001) deems Winnicott the “one great
English-speaking writer” within psychoanalysis whose style is geared toward creating
experience versus establishing well-defined conclusions. Through “playing” with
language Winnicott seems to have understood both the power of language to create
meaning, as well as its inherent limitations and imprecision in conveying more ineffable
experiences. The mother-infant dyad is the primary lens through which deeper realities of
human existence are uncovered. A hallmark of Winnicottian style is the revelation of
ontology through the seemingly mundane depiction of a child’s day to day existence,
using plain and ordinary language that a reader can easily grasp and identify with.
Developmental advancement is explicitly linked to the corresponding level of
understanding it allows via the symbolic elaboration of experience (e.g., reality-based
thinking as finding of “not-me” object). The emergence of any developmental capacity is
61
viewed not only for what it allows the child to think or do, but also for what it reveals
about more basic experiences and meanings of existence.
The characteristic Winnicottian conceptual vantage point which merges elements
of development (e.g., symbolic capacities that increasingly allow for participation in
“shared reality”—objectivity) with that of ontology reality places him squarely in the
realm of the continental philosophy and its quest to link language with ontology
(Cerveaux, 2007). The unique writing style he employs to uncover deeper meanings
through aligns him with Wittgenstein, who similarly grappled with language and its
ability to reveal the metaphysical (Horn, 2005). Winnicott’s “solution” was to juxtapose
the ambiguity and expansiveness of language with everyday events of development to
depict the more basic qualities of experience. Part of his inventiveness lay in utilizing the
primal realm of the infant-mother matrix to reveal key elements of existence itself,
thereby extending ontology to an “experiential field of psychic experience” (Fogel,
1992). His approach to language and ontology made Winnicott a “transitional” figure in
terms of propelling psychoanalysis into more of a developmentally-based two-person
psychology (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Winnicott’s use of constructs of
transformation as a way to both depict early human existence and reveal certain truths
about psychic development offers an opportunity to “test” the limits of language as a tool
for uniting science and meaning.
Despite essentially elaborating a new phenomenology Winnicott was not a theorybuilder, which presents interesting challenges to any attempt to systematize his writing
(Goldman, 1993). Nevertheless, the psychic phenomena he elucidated, and the way he
attempted to describe it, provide a novel vantage point from which to examine the
62
broader relationship between language and meaning. Winnicott’s prose style has been
described as not only “interdependent” but “inseparable” from the very ideas he sought to
elucidate, with meaning being transmitted as much or more via the “experience” of
reading than from a pure intellectual comprehension of the words (Ogden, 2001). His
prose and conceptual style have also been characterized as closely reflecting his
personality: “quixotic” (Goldman, 1993), “elliptical” (Kwawer, 1998), “pixieish” (Fogel,
1992), and “non-compliant” (Newman, 1995).
Winnicott encountered the often cantankerous intellectual milieu of the British
Psychoanalytic Society by remaining distant from the fray, though subtly challenging
entrenched ways of thinking through his conceptual play with words and ideas. In this
way, the environment provided the raw material to hone his style as a dialectician and
synthesizer of ideas (Ogden, 1985). As will be shown, it also brought clearly into focus
life-long struggles with reconciling loving and hating qualities in the context of selfassertion: specifically, meeting the need for his unique subjecthood to be recognized
through “spontaneous” acts of while not damaging those who were the recipients of his
“gestures.”
Instinctual Fusion: The Semantic Foundation of Winnicottian Ontology
This section will highlight one strand of ideas on psychoanalytic psychic
development, as a way to review certain core Winnicottian concepts relevant to this study
and to more generally contextualize and focus the remainder of the literature review. It
will also provide a glimpse of how methodological framework under consideration in this
study functions with respect to deconstructing psychoanalytic concepts of transformation.
63
For this exercise the construct of “fusion” and associated processes related to libidinal
and aggressive impulses will be examined in terms of its original conceptualization and
elaboration over time.
The concept of aggression (and the closely related idea of destruction) is an
example of a psychoanalytic derivative that Winnicott utilizes in much of his work to
posit his formula of psychic functioning and transformation. As a metaphorically based
linguistic derivative from an established field of study, aggression and destruction will be
shown to possess similar and dissimilar connotations with respect to ordinary usage—that
is, the terms draw both on established frames of meaning and ones unique to
psychoanalysis, creating a semantic tension in the paper The Use of an Object. Among
other things, this review points to how the reading of a text inherently involves a
conceptual navigation based on the writer’s utilization of expected and unexpected
meanings, based on embodied notions of time, space, objects, causation, etc.
Within psychoanalysis aggression is generally associated with Freud’s instinctual
theory, or more basically erotic (or loving) and aggressive impulses within the context of
sexual development. 43 It is typically associated with the id and death instinct, though it
can also be utilized for adaptive purposes when ego functions are successful in
counterbalancing aggression’s purely selfish and destructive motivations. For example,
qualities such as assertiveness, initiative, and goal-directed activity have at their core
elements of generative aggressive energy. Moore & Fine (1990) note that from a dynamic
perspective, aggression can be used as a defense against libidinal conflicts (e.g.,
prohibitions, guilt) or contrarily defended against by libidinal impulses (e.g., fantasies,
43
See Melnick (1997) for a critique of Freud’s psychosexual theory using elements of Lakoff and
Johnson’s (1980) early perspectives on metaphor.
64
wishes). Therefore, the manifestation of aggression or love does not in itself indicate the
ultimate motivation of the instinct within the larger scheme of psychic functioning. Their
broader function and meaning is always embedded in the writer’s larger theoretical
scheme based on unique configurations of conceptual metaphor.
Laplanche & Pontalis (1973) write that fusion was originally used by Freud in his
final instinct theory to depict the balance of forces between erotic and aggressive
impulses in a given behavior or symptom. Sadomasochism is the prototypical example of
how seemingly opposing qualities of instincts are inherent in any behavior or thought. In
this as in any other mental phenomenon, eroticism and aggressiveness are prevalent at
any given moment to more or less of a degree, with fusion a connoting a balance and
defusion an incomplete process of fusion. In general though these impulses are viewed as
having equal status, aggression is always more or less implied by Freud to be the cause of
a move away from fusion—that is, libido is defined by its ability to “bind” and aggression
serves to “undo connections.” Defusion is best typified by the psychic mechanisms of
displacement, isolation, and undoing involved in the obsessional neuroses. While Freud
does not posit a specific formula for the achievement of fusion, the implication is that that
bringing unconscious forbidden wishes, thoughts, etc. into conscious awareness alleviates
the excessive manifestation of either instinct.
Taking the preceding outline of fusion from theoretical-historical perspective, the
following basic mapping using key related primary conceptual metaphors can be posited:
States Are Locations
•
•
Love “binds” and is close (e.g., fusion)
Aggression “repels” and is far away (e.g., defusion)
65
Changes Are Movements
•
•
Instinctual (drive) force toward or away from pleasurable or hated object
Cathexis as psychic attraction to objects
Causes are Forces
•
•
Based on dynamic (force) or economic (energy) metapsychological viewpoint
Force and energy influenced by particular stage of development (embodied
location of erotogenic zone as represented psychically)
Purposes are Destinations
•
•
Force or energy as arriving at the location of the object
Cathexis as “occupation” of object
Embedded in these conceptualizations of instinctual energy are a number of
metaphors that provide a semantic frame of reference for the reader of a psychoanalytic
text. As mentioned, THE MIND IS A BODY (Appendix C) is a primary embodied
metaphor in Western thought that basically pervades all depictions of mental activity.44 In
terms of the conceptual elements drawn upon the with respect to instinctual activity and
fusion AGGRESSION IS SELFISH, AGGRESSION IS DEATH, AGGRESSION IS
DESTRUCTION, and AGGRESSION IS DEFENSIVE describe the less productive
qualities of aggression that are more common to ordinary language usage. In terms of its
more adaptational aspects, AGGRESSION IS SELF-ASSERTION, AGGRESSION IS
PURPOSEFUL ACTION, and AGGRESSION IS GENERATIVE ENERGY are drawn
upon to describe the less obvious elements of aggression that form the basis for other
psychic qualities. With respect to the fusion of libidinal and aggressive impulses,
FUSION IS BALANCE and DEFUSION IS IMBALANCE point to the paradigm of
homeostasis on which the construct is essentially based. In general, the idea that balance
44
The metaphor primarily allows mental activity to be depicted in terms of bodily activity (e.g., movement
of objects within a confined space).
66
is related to optimal functioning (e.g., BALANCE IS HEALTH) is deeply rooted in the
sensorimotor experience of human existence from birth (see Appendix A for Primary
Metaphors). FUSION IS THE CREATION OF GENERATIVE AGGRESSION reveals
the transformational properties associated with attaining a state of balance in the
homeostatic system of the embodied mind.
Winnicott would come of age professionally in a theoretical milieu that took
seriously the more purely destructive elements of early instinctual life. Specifically, Klein
(1935, 1946) would elaborate on Freud’s sadistic elements of psychic functioning (e.g.,
death instinct) and position aggressive processes within a larger scheme of psychic
development (e.g., paranoid-schizoid position and depressive positions). In her scheme
libidinal and aggressive impulses were not inherently positive or negative, in that both are
capable of generative or debilitating effects on the psyche. In addition, anxiety came to
represent more than simply harnessed libido as a response to an external (societal)
prohibition against sex, but rather as internal conflict (e.g., based on phantasy) between
the instincts themselves (Hinshelwood, 1989).
For Klein the resulting depressive and persecutory anxiety that is part and parcel
of emotional development involves aggressive energy (e.g., to ward off threatening
objects and to greedily incorporate desired objects). The fusion of loving and aggressive
impulse for Klein occurs with the onset of the depressive position, in which related
images of the inherent goodness and badness of objects are reconciled. Aggression is also
relevant for its position with respect to the reality principle, an aspect of theory that
Winnicott draws upon considerably on in his conceptualization of object usage.
Specifically, Winnicott (1969) highlights how for Freud aggression is generally a reaction
67
to the onset of the reality principle, whereas for Klein it is more specifically projective
processes (suffused with aggressive energy) that form the basis for the capacity to
perceive reality.
Primary Aggression
Aggression always played a significant role in Winnicott’s depiction of infant
development. As a clinical construct it was prevalent in the British Society from the time
he entered psychoanalytic training, and it would be reinforced in his supervision with
Melanie Klein from 1935-1940 (Rodman, 2003). Early on in his writing Winnicott (1939)
spoke of “primary aggression” as related to instinct and also part of “appetite.” He would
highlight the necessity of a responsive caregiving relationship as the primary means by
which the child develops the capacity to integrate inborn or “unintentional” aggression,
positing the presence of more extreme (“actual”) aggression (e.g., anti-social tendencies)
as marking the absence or failure of the facilitating environment. The term “destruction”
would over time be the concept Winnicott used to denote both normal and pathological
enactments of aggression. Overall, Abram (1996) summarizes four central areas in
Winnicott’s theory of aggression:
1. The task of fusion;
2. The need for opposition;
3. The need for reality of the external object feel real, and
4. The need for an object rather than pleasure.
In a 1939 paper Winnicott would lay down his primary conceptual viewpoint on
aggression that would remain intact throughout his writing. His position would take into
68
account the actual manifestation of aggression (e.g., the infant feeding situation) as well
as the fantasies that both the infant and mother have about destruction and preservation.
The fusion of erotic and aggressive impulses and their relocation to fantasy—in part out
of a need to protect the loved object, a Kleinian idea—is a central precept in the construct
of object usage that would be written 30 years later. In 1939 Winnicott writes:
If it is true then, that the infant has a vast capacity for destruction it is also
true that he has a vast capacity for protecting what he loves from his own
destructiveness, and the main destruction must always exist in fantasy
(emphasis not in original). And the important thing to note about
instinctual aggressiveness is that although it soon becomes something that
can be mobilized in the service of hate, it is originally a part of appetite, or
some other form of instinctual love. It is something that increases during
excitement, and the exercise of it is very pleasurable. Perhaps the word
greed conveys more easily than any other the idea of original fusion of
love and aggression, though the love is confined to mouth love.
Winnicott’s Formula of Fusion
In Winnicott’s various depictions of psychic functioning, the interaction and
reconciliation of aggressive and loving impulses is a central concern. Aggression is
prevalent from birth in the form of “ruthless love,” which he posits as akin to primary
motility or spontaneity that occurs in the infant’s initial unintegrated state. What was in
1939 “primary aggression” later becomes equated with “life force”, which is converted to
“aggressive potential” through opposition from the environment. Winnicott (1950-54)
writes:
The aggressive impulses do not give any satisfactory experience unless
there is opposition. The opposition must come from the environment, from
the Not-Me which gradually comes to be distinguished from the Me . . . in
normal development opposition from the outside brings along the
development of the aggressive impulse (p.215).
69
The external (“not me”) object will be the vehicle through which reality is found
and objects are recognized as whole (e.g., stage of concern) and separate. He would later
describe that this achievement occurs within an environment reminiscent of “primary
maternal preoccupation” (1956), in which the psychic state of the mother becomes mostly
merged with that of the infant. Among other things, the mother must experience, tolerate,
and ultimately survive the aggressive emotions of the infant in a way that closely
parallels the integration is simultaneously occurring for the child. For Winnicott the
instincts and environment always exist in a symbiotic relationship, with each contributing
significantly to the state of the other. A common related theme is that there always exists
a precarious balance between opposition from the environment and the natural unfolding
of instinctual processes. Though not attempting to quantify in any technical way an
optimal level of opposition required, the significant outcome to be evaluated is whether
or not raw (“ruthless”) forms of aggression are transformed into generative ones:
The complication is that the amount of aggressive potential an infant
carries depends on the amount of opposition that has been met with. In
other words, opposition affects the conversion of life force into aggressive
potential. Moreover, an excess of opposition introduces complications
that make it impossible for the existence of an individual who, having
aggressive potential, could achieve its fusion with the erotic (p. 216).
To solve the problem of what happens to the original “ruthless” aggression,
Winnicott merges the well-know metaphor THE MIND IS A CONTAINER with the
established psychoanalytic construct of fantasy. In his schema fusion is accomplished via
the successful transfer of ruthless aggression to containment in unconscious fantasy,
where it will from that point on reside and serve as the foundation for generative forms of
self-assertion. Opposition from the environment is crucial in this process, with too little
70
(e.g., unresponsiveness) or too much (e.g., impingement) derailing optimal development.
In general, the paper The Use of an Object deals with treating individuals who have not
been able to transform purely aggressive energy into productive potential. To summarize,
a basic mapping on fusion using aspects of the Location Event Structure Metaphor (see
Appendix B) can be posited:
Winnicott’s Fusion of Erotic and Aggressive Instincts
The Mind is a Container
•
Psychic elements reside in a hypothetical space conceived of as mind
States are Locations
•
•
Love is close and binds
Aggression is far away and repels45
Causes Are Physical Forces
•
Life force based on love and generative forms of aggression (motility)
Changes are Movements
•
•
Life force travels through space to seek opposition in environment
Fusion transports “ruthless” aggression to space associated with fantasy
Purposes are Destinations
•
•
•
45
Life force arrives at location of object
Location is “subjective” in object relating
Location is “objective” or shared in object usage
Though Winnicott ultimately turns this conception on its head, this is the typical conception of
aggression as conceived in related primary conceptual metaphors (e.g., “His anger pushed her away”). This
is one of many examples of how he utilizes both expected and unexpected meanings of words to draw out
novel or expanded ways of viewing reality.
71
Health is Integration
•
•
Integration is fusion of erotic and aggressive impulses
Fusion leads to reality-based thinking, empathy (stage of concern), self-object
differentiation
Difficulties are Impediments to Integration
•
•
•
Excessive opposition (impingement)
No opposition (isolation)
Lack of survival (destruction from infant’s point of view)
(Internal) Integration is External Containment
•
Holding, responding, attending, surviving
The fusion of erotic and aggressive impulses would play a central role in
Winnicott’s later conception of object usage, where destructive processes place the object
outside the subject’s area of omnipotence and contribute to the ability to view objects as
whole and real.46 Fusion is seen as a developmental achievement and is a foundational
construct contained in his other constructs of transformation (e.g., transitional objects,
holding, playing). In his conception aggression generally takes on a more explicitly
productive role, and is among other things the central means of attaining integration and
viewing the world realistically. Typical of his style, Winnicott borrows words and ideas
with established meanings and alters them (often without acknowledgment) for his own
purposes. For example, by directly linking aggression to motility and “life force” it
essentially becomes the main vehicle through which fusion occurs. In this way, it is
46
As will be shown Winnicott’s more positive or useful conception of aggression can be viewed as tied to
his early family experience—specifically, the combination of external restrictions on displaying anger and
his need to protect his fragile mother (Rodman, 2003). Among the related dilemmas he faced was how to
assert himself in a way that allowed his primary object to be responsive and ultimately survive. That
aggression would become for him a creative versus destructive psychic process can be traced to both his
earliest interactions with his mother and related oedipal dynamics that took the form of squelching his
inherent male power.
72
aggression (not love) which is directly responsible for binding and integration (e.g.,
AGGRESSION IS BINDING, AGGRESSION IS INTEGRATION, etc). By expanding
the meaning of an accepted theoretical construct, Winnicott taps into a novel way of
viewing aggression and conceiving of its relationship to development and the treatment
process.
Ruthless Love, Fusion, & Stage of Concern
In Winnicott’s 1954-55 paper The Depressive Position in Normal Emotional
Development (1975), he coins the term “stage of concern” as a depiction of the
achievement of whole object status that marks conceptual differences with both Klein and
Freud. The main shift involves an alteration in the conceptual vantage point of the
transformative phenomena under consideration, basically from a unidirectional field of
experience to a bidirectional one. Specifically, the environment is posited as a critical
feature in the integration of erotic and aggressive impulses, characterized metaphorically
as MOTHER IS ENVIRONMENT. Offshoots of this central metaphor involving
biological processes are used to describe the attainment of the depressive position or
stage of concern. For example, MOTHER IS EMOTIONAL NOURISHMENT
conceptually utilizes her actual provision of food to describe her other role as provider of
affective sustenance. Her ability to perform an emotional function is described as a
process akin to digestion, resulting in MOTHER IS A BODYILY ORGAN and
MOTHER IS A CONTAINER. In these conceptualizations the mother “holds” the child
both physically and emotionally. He writes:
In terms of environment: the toddler is in a family situation, working out
an instinctual life in interpersonal relationships, and the baby is being held
73
by a mother who adapts to ego needs; in between the two is the infant or
small child arriving at the depressive position, being held by the mother,
but more than that, being held over a phase of living. It will be noted that a
time factor has entered, and the mother holds a situation so that the infant
has the chance to work through the consequences of instinctual
experiences; as we shall see, the working through is quite comparable to
the digestive process, and is comparably complex.
The mother holds the situation, and does so over and over again,
and at a critical period in the baby's life. The consequence is that
something can be done about something. The mother's technique enables
the infant's co-existing love and hate to become sorted out and interrelated
and gradually brought under control from within in a way that is healthy.
Below is a basic schema outlining the relationship between embodied
metaphors and Winnicott’s depiction of psychic functioning and transformation.
A key process involves the mother’s activity of “holding” and metabolizing
emotional energy through processes akin to “digestion,” which draw on primary
metaphors common to Western thought (e.g., THE MIND IS A BODY,
ACQUIRING IDEAS IS EATING). The scheme illustrates how closely the
mother is involved in the very sensorimotor experiences which form the basis for
conceptual metaphor and how she also becomes the subject of metaphors of
transformation:
1. Sensorimotor Experience: Living in an enclosed space
Primary Metaphors: States Are Locations, Relationships Are Enclosures, Similarity Is
Closeness, Intimacy Is Closeness
Winnicottian Metaphors: Mother Is Space, Mother Is Environment, Mother Is Object
Related Themes: Subjective and objective space and objects, transitional space, location
of cultural experience, primary maternal preoccupation
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2. Sensorimotor Experience: Being physically held
Primary Metaphors: Affection Is Warmth, Help Is Support
Winnicottian Metaphors: Mother Is Container, Mother Is Warmth, Mother Is Support
Related Themes: Holding, containment, support, integration
3. Sensorimotor Experience: Grasping (or possessing) objects in space
Primary Metaphors: Understanding Is Grasping, Purposes Are Desired Objects
Winnicottian Metaphors: Holding Is Understanding, Possession Of Transitional Object Is Reality
Related Themes: Breast, spatula game, transitional object (e.g., blanket, teddy)
4. Sensorimotor Experience: Eating/Drinking
Primary Metaphors: Communication Is Feeding, Acquiring Ideas Is Eating, Good Ideas Are
Healthy (Good Tasting Food), Bad Ideas Are Harmful (Bad Tasting) Food
Winnicottian Metaphors: Mother/Breast Is Emotional Nourishment, Mother/Environment
Is Impingement, Mother/Environment Is Noxious, Feeding On The Self (“Me”) Is
Noxious, Feeding On The Nutritious Other (“Not-Me”) Is Healthy, Survival Is Digestion
Related Themes: Feeding (actual and emotional), metabolism of ideas via digestion, survival
The outline points to the semantic-linguistic origins of key emotional functions
that the mother/caregiver comes to represent in Winnicottian thought. It points to how the
mother’s physical provision of physical care closely coincides with her emotional
functions in the context of the infant’s emerging conceptual metaphorical system.
Specifically, from a conceptual metaphorical perspective, it is clear from the outline that
the mother is intimately involved in events that comprise the infant’s “conflation” of
learning (Grady, 1997)—that is, how early sensorimotor experiences develop the
foundation of the human conceptual system based on metaphor.
75
The mother’s continual presence in close physical space, her physical handling of
the infant, breastfeeding, and overall tending correspond Winnicottian constructs such as
the subject object as it occurring in states associated with “object relating” (1969),
“primary maternal preoccupation” (1956), and the well known idea that “There is no such
thing as an infant.” In broader terms these ideas are associated with well-known
conceptions in psychoanalysis that portray the infant’s under-developed view of
externality as undifferentiated such as “primary narcissism” (Freud, 1914), “symbiosis”
(Mahler, 1968), and “selfobject” functioning (Kohut, 1977).
Inherent in all these conceptions is that the accurate conception of reality is a
developmental milestone that is associated with both emotional and cognitive elements of
the infant’s experience. In sum, overall the mother is significant for not only what she
does on a physical and emotional level, but also what she comes to represent in terms of
an object in the infant’s emerging categories of uniquely conceived notions of reality visà-vis metaphor.47
A related point evident in these depictions of the infant and mother with respect to
conceptual metaphor is that the function and nature of the primary metaphors themselves
closely parallel that of the mother in Winnicott’s depiction of early development. That is,
metaphors communicate reality based on embodied, concrete and reified notions of time,
space, and objects, which are coincidentally the same functions the mother actually
provides (e.g., actual functions) and represents (e.g., symbolic functions). The nature of
47
One significant point is that CMT does not consider the variability of experience based on early object
relationships that leads to a potential variety of meanings of primary metaphors. For example, the
subjective meanings associated with primary metaphors related to space (e.g., INTIMACY IS
CLOSENESS) or physical support (e.g., HELP IS SUPPORT) can take on radically different forms based
on an adequate versus inadequate caregiving experience.
76
what she provides and represents can be thought of as mirroring the more mature
conceptual system of the infant, which from the point of view of the transformational
constructs such as object usage exists in statu nascendi.48 It could be said then that the
mother—as the temporary “embodiment” of reality for the infant—comes to assume not
only emotional functions via the provision of physical ones, but that of metaphor itself. In
this way MOTHER IS METAPHOR could be posited to convey the practical array of
functions she serves as well as the more transcendent ideas she comes to represent. With
respect to Winnicott’s clinical theory, the utility of his constructs of transformation lay in
his ability to position the mother as both real and metaphorical, with each stance
contributing and enhancing the other in dialectical tension.
From a historical perspective it was Melanie Klein who provided the basic
template for the bodily depiction or anthropomorphization of psychic processes that
Winnicott would elaborate on throughout his career. From a conceptual metaphorical
vantage point it could be posited that object relation theory provides the ultimate
depiction of embodied metaphors as applied to psychology, in that it applies most
literally the qualities and vicissitudes of physical objects, space, time, etc. to mental life.
The validity and utility of utilizing embodied-metaphorical notions of reality for
depicting the mental apparatus has long been discussed in psychoanalysis (Gedo, 1997;
Gill, 1988; Melnick, 2000; Schaefer, 1976), though not directly with respect to the
current findings of modern metaphor theory. Along these lines, any evaluation of
psychoanalytic theory or technique would seem to require taking into consideration
48
Modern developmental constructs from psychology such as affective attunement, reflective function, and
mindsharing convey in different but related ways how the caregiver functions as an interpreter or bridge
between physiological and emotional phenomena in the context of embodied metaphor (e.g., symbolism).
77
conceptual metaphor, not simply as a way that humans subjectively make meaning of
themselves and experience, but also how metaphor itself makes meaning out of us
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
Object Usage in Context
Winnicott’s transformational metaphor object usage is suitable concept to study
the relationship between modern metaphor theory and psychoanalysis for its positioning
within Winnicottian thinking, as well as for its historical and clinical value. First, because
the central paper on object usage was among the last written in his long career, it
provides a favorable conceptual vantage point from which to examine Winnicott’s more
advanced thinking in relationship to all the other key ideas that came before it. Object
usage can be viewed at the very least as an outgrowth of earlier clinical constructs, if not
as a culmination of the transformational metaphors that preceded it (Goldman, 1993).
Also, like other constructs in his schema (holding environment, playing, transitional
space), object usage sought to depict the non-interpretive aspects of cure, which,
importantly, foreshadowed the modern “relational turn” in psychoanalysis (Mills, 2005).
Overall, an examination of the conceptual-metaphorical basis of object usage—in the
context of other historically-positioned transformational constructs (both his own and
others)—falls directly within the realm of conceptual research (Dreher, 2000).
Winnicott’s conceptualization and writing style in The Use of an Object is
reminiscent of previous works and is illustrative of the way he approached clinical ideas
(Goldman, 1993). His prose presents a formidable challenge as well as a unique
opportunity to test the value of embodied metaphor and conceptual blending as tools for
78
bridging the gap between science and meaning. The questions concerning Winnicottian
constructs and his un-systematized manner of thought were highlighted when the paper
was publicly read by Winnicott in 1968 to the New York Psychoanalytic Society. The
reactions to it provide a snapshot in time of how this idea was received by a divergent
theoretical perspective and culture within psychoanalysis. Many of those immediate
responses encapsulate what would later become common criticisms to Winnicott’s style
and language as his work became better known on the American continent (Goldman,
1993, Ogden, 2001). Similar to many of his constructs of change and his writing style in
general, object usage takes into account a wide variety and complexity of clinical data
without positing specific formulas or the exact relationships between ideas with which it
co-exists (Slochower, 1991). The reader is left to essentially fill-in many details, such as
just how the therapist “survives” the destructive attacks reminiscent of object relating and
facilitates the transformation to object usage.
Another common reaction to Winnicott’s style is the allegation that his schemas
are simply different ways of depicting already formulated clinical constructs, and that he
essentially “sidesteps” his theoretical differences by minimizing or ignoring them
(Greenburg & Mitchell, 1983). For example, one criticism by a respondent to the paper
questioned whether the phenomenon he describes as “object relating” is simply
narcissistic object relationships and identification (Goldman, 1993). Overall, Winnicott’s
writing and personal style of relating (e.g., outwardly self-effacing but insidiously
provocative and rebellious) were capable of provoking strong reactions, revealing among
other things how personality and “human” factors (e.g., not purely intellectual) influence
how concepts within a field of study evolve over time. In this way, just as Winnicott’s
79
writing and way of thinking challenged traditional scientific approaches to describing
psychic functioning typified by American ego psychologists—whose core members were
Austrian and German émigrés with roots in the more systematized thinking reminiscent
of analytic philosophy—it similarly provides a test for modern metaphor theory and its
ability to deconstruct meanings in ways that take into account but go beyond objectivist
truth considerations.
Another familiar criticism which presents an opportunity to examine the
usefulness of modern metaphor theory as it relates to psychoanalysis is Winnicott’s
unique employment of words in defining a his clinical constructs (Goldman, 1993;
Ogden, 2001; Slochower, 1991) Winnicott’s casual utilization of everyday words such as
“use” or “destroy” in his clinical conceptualization is often viewed as vague and leading
to unnecessary ambiguity. One explanation for his less conventional use of language was
that Winnicott was avowedly more a natural observer than a systematizer of grand
themes (Goldman, 1993; Greenburg & Mitchell, 1983; Guntrip, 1975). His conceptual
style has been described as “anti-theory” (Fogel, 1992) and “non-compliance” (Newman,
1995), which provides a unique challenge in attempting to organize the foundations of his
thought. His writing style has also been described as more akin to poetry (Ogden, 1999,
2001) and influenced by the Romantic emphasis on subjectivity and its contact with
reality (Newman, 1997). These influences are atypical for scientific writing and
theorizing, but contribute to both the appeal of Winnicott’s ideas as well as struggles one
can have in pinning them down.
Perhaps one such appeal of Winnicott’s writing style is manner in which he is
able to account for a wide range of information and experience utilizes divergent ways of
80
knowing. For example, the more free-flowing and unstructured nature of his ideas contain
a corresponding depth and breadth that represents both abstract phenomena (e.g.,
metapsychology) as well as practical and experience-near depictions of being (e.g.,
“using”, “survival”, “playing” etc.). In particular, Winnicott’s more open and nondogmatic style creates an intellectual space where a reader is invited to explore the
continuum of potential meaning. His unique use of language—according to Ogden (2001)
more poetic than scientific—is uniquely suited to create in the reader unique experiences
which reveal nuanced meanings of psychoanalytically-derived constructs. In a significant
way, Winnicott’s writing style, thinking process, and specific concepts of transformation
are emblematic of the inherent nature of metaphor itself —that is, as a vehicle that
simultaneously points towards both hidden and obvious meanings by the simple
juxtaposition of like and dissimilar ideas (Franke, 2000). Systematizing that which is
seemingly not capable of being systematized (e.g., the connections between language,
thought, and biology) is essentially the task of modern cognitive linguistics, and
Winnicottian thought in general and object usage in particular provide a unique
opportunity to test its value as a bridge-builder between science and meaning.
Lastly, not only do certain central precepts contained in object usage and its
associated metaphors of transformation provide a connection to early psychoanalysis,
they also foreshadow clinical trends that would take root in the decade following
Winnicott’s death, providing an opportunity to examine how history and language
contribute to meaning and clinical utility. For example, the idea that non-interpretive
mechanisms involved in a developmentally-oriented two person psychology (e.g.,
“holding environment”) can affect change would be further elaborated in the self
81
psychology, intersubjective and relational movements that continue to prosper within
psychoanalysis, a phenomenon coined the “relational turn” in psychoanalysis (Mills,
2005). Thus, a conceptual-linguistic analysis of object usage can not only provide a
historically relevant account of the ideas that formed a Winnicottian ontology as it
evolved from early psychoanalytic thought, but also an intellectual vantage point out of
which more modern notions of the psychoanalytic change process emerged.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLGY
Description of the Methodology
The methodology for this study is a hybrid model using modes of textual analysis
from linguistics and from psychoanalytic conceptual research (Dreher, 2000; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999; Pragglejazz Group, 2007). The primary strategy of examining the raw
text is taken from Pragglejazz Group (2007), wherein spoken or written words are
systematically analyzed for metaphorical constructions. The designers coin their
approach the “metaphor identification procedure” (MIP), and its stated intent is to
provide researchers from various fields of study a reliable and flexible technique for
uncovering metaphor in both written and oral language. This methodology is explicitly an
alternative to what the authors deem as overly prescribed techniques of investigating
language via “isolated constructed examples,” reminiscent of linguistic approaches, as
well as experimentally-manipulated responses common in psychological research. The
primary intent of capturing “metaphors in the wild” parallels in significant ways
qualitative approaches (e.g., grounded theory) in the human sciences as well as
psychoanalytic modes of clinical data collection.
83
The MIP approach uses each word as a lexical unit of analysis (e.g., The /
therapist / is / on / the / phone /) which is designed to uncover metaphorical usage at its
most basic level (e.g., even definite articles and prepositions like “the” and “on”). The
authors term this a “maximal approach” where a broad range of words is examined for
relationships to metaphor. Because this level of analysis is beyond the current scope—in
that transformational constructs or ideas are the primary focus of investigation—this
study essentially uses compete phrases as lexical units from which to identify
metaphorical constructions. Also, though MIP identifies metaphoricity on a word to word
basis, it does not relate metaphorically-determined words’ relationship to broader
conceptual metaphorical constructions (e.g., STATES ARE LOCATIONS, HAPPY IS
UP, SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS) which is a primary goal of this study. As such, this
study broadens the scope of MIP by incorporating methods from conceptual metaphor
theory.
The background for determining a construct or phrase’s relationship to conceptual
metaphor is taken primarily from the work Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999). Though the
current study does not seek to establish the empirical rationale for each metaphorical
usage, it does reveal the correspondence between transformational constructs and
established categories of conceptual metaphor. In other words, categories of conceptual
(embodied) metaphors as set forth by Lakoff and Johnson are taken for granted as
essentially reflecting the humans’ built-in conceptual system—which as discussed is
neurologically constructed and itself based on metaphor. The determinations with respect
to categories of embodied metaphors are made in the “Related Conceptual Metaphor”
section of the analysis. Specifically, this study utilizes primary conceptual metaphors
84
(Appendix B), as well as more specific Metaphors of Causes and Events (Appendix C),
Metaphors of Self (Appendix D), and Metaphors of Time (Appendix E) as templates
from which to examine transformational metaphors as well as related language usage.
Other relevant language constructions (e.g., non-theoretical metaphorical constructs,
pertinent language style or syntax) will be considered for their relationship to embodied
metaphor and broader relevant meanings. Such examinations include the personal (e.g.,
subjective Winnicottian) and theoretical-historical (e.g., psychoanalytic) context from
which the language usage emerges.
The historical-psychoanalytic context from which the metaphors of
transformation emerge will be examined in the “Theoretical-Contextual Meaning”
portion of the analysis, which begins each section of text under consideration. Though no
specific methodology exists for making exact determinations, the utilization of similar
concepts (e.g., “cathexis,” “breast,” “destruction”) and explicit or implied references to
other theoretical ideas (e.g., Freud’s “fusion,” Klein’s “depressive position,” and Bion’s
“psychotic core”) will primary be used as a means of drawing distinctions and
conclusions. Concepts or ideas that emerge more directly from existing constructs of
psychoanalysis are termed “psychoanalytically-derived metaphors.” These share a similar
function to conceptual metaphor in that both serve as templates from which other ideas
emerge.49 This linguistic analysis of theoretical constructs is generally in line with
49
That is, similar to any field of study, psychoanalytic ideas emerge from established conceptual metaphors
based on our built-in neurological/conceptual systems. However, these concepts have come to assume
varied and nuanced meanings based on various writers’ conceptions, uses, and theoretical trends over the
years. For example, “countertransference” is a psychoanalytically-derived metaphor that can be traced to
primary metaphors such as THE MIND IS BODY, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, and CHANGE IS
MOTION THROUGH SPACE (e.g., projection, incorporation, identification). So, when one is utilizing the
term it must always be viewed with respect to: 1) The embodied conceptual metaphors from which it
emerges; 2) Its original meaning and usage (e.g., Freud’s conception as a therapist’s transference), and; 3)
85
methodological propositions from within psychoanalysis research, which seek to
differentiate conceptual versus empirical perspectives of experimentation Dreher (2000).
Dreher (2000) provides a distinction between “empirical” and “conceptual”
research methodology which has implications for this study (see Appendix J for more
complete overview). She identifies examples of empirical research studies in
psychoanalysis as those which examine the therapeutic process and outcomes, using
transcribed sessions, questionnaires, and coding systems for analyzing data. In contrast,
and in line with the current study, conceptual research is defined as systematic attempts
to optimally clarify the explicit and implicit use of concepts in theory and practice. These
approaches are concerned with the logical consistency and coherence of the concepts
with respect to other theoretical models and ideas. In general, studies that deal with the
conceptual origins of constructs that guide theory and practice inherently are more
focused on the process (e.g., in this study’s case, embodied metaphor) of how we
establish semantic relationships between ideas. Unlike strict empirical methodologies
(e.g., cognitive-linguistic approaches, experimental psychology) the manner in which
ideas come to have conceptual coherence and utility, for both writer and reader of the
text, necessarily brings into play subjective and historical influences on meaning
construction. Dreher terms such research models the “philosophical analysis of concepts”
and posits the following as the primary objectives: 1) The investigation of the historical
context of a concept’s origin; 2) The history of a concept viewed against the changes of
psychoanalytic theory; 3) The current use of a concept in clinical practice, and; 4) A
Its current or particular nuanced meaning and usage (e.g., countertransference as data). Implicit in this
methodological analysis of the idea of object usage and other transformational metaphors are these three
levels of conceptual scrutiny.
86
critical discussion and, possibly, formulation of a suggestion for a different use of the
concept (2000, p. 16).
Elements of the above methodology will be applied to the text of The Use of an
Object. Besides the main objective of uncovering the semantic foundations of core
Winnicottian constructs of transformation, the analysis is also designed to demonstrate
the application of an analysis that draws from cognitive linguistics and psychoanalysis. In
the process its value as a methodology for analyzing other theoretical and clinical texts
can be assessed.
Outline of Analysis
Text Details
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Title: The Use of an Object:
Source: International Journal of Psychoanalysis (PEP Archive)
Mode: Written
Date: 1969
Genre, Register: Professional Journal
Length of Text: 3,984 Words
Readership Assumed for Text
Advanced students and professionals trained in psychoanalytic theory and practice.
87
Description of Sections
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
This is primarily related to three mainstream psychoanalytic ideas available at the
time of publication.50 For this study the models of psychoanalytic schools under
consideration are: Classical Freudian (PS1), Ego Psychology (PS2), and Kleinian British
Object Relations (PS3). One purpose of this section is to contextualize Winnicott’s ideas
within the larger frame of psychoanalytic theory. Of the three schools Winnicottian ideas
are most closely related to those of Melanie Klein (PS3), by whom he was trained and
whose ideas formed the cornerstone of the British Society that both were a part. In
general all of Winnicott’s clinical concepts can be seen as embedded in Kleinian ideas, as
direct derivations or as points of departure. The PS2 model is important because it
provides a contrasting view of psychoanalysis as it evolved on a separate continent with a
different set of socio-historical influences. It is also significant because members’ public
responses to Winnicott’s presentation of the paper on object usage in 1969 to the New
York Psychoanalytic Society provide a unique historical snapshot of how the ideas were
received conceptually. Along those same lines, this contextual examination is on a
practical level designed to provide a hypothetical simulation of a clinician-reader’s
conceptual processes at work in the reading of a text. Though the comparative aspect of
this section will not provide a complete analysis of theoretical concepts, it will focus on
broad themes that might be triggered by the ideas encountered in reading the paper.
50
A major psychoanalytic viewpoint noticeably absent from this section is the “interpersonal” model of
Henry Stack Sullivan, Clara Thompson, and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, among others. Though the larger
Winnicottian emphasis on the environment and on the actual nature of the therapist as subject bears close
resemblance to the interpersonalist school, the decision was made omit it from direct analysis. The two
main considerations were limiting the scope of theoretical comparisons for readability and the relative lack
of intellectual contact between the British School and Interpersonal Psychoanalysis.
88
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
For each section of text in which transformational concepts are used, the
constructs under consideration will be cited and basic definitions provided. This category
of analysis is designed to provide the more literal interpretation of words in the
metaphorical constructs under consideration. In general “basic” here denotes that which
is most easily understood vis-à-vis common usage, putting value on the concrete nature
and historical longevity of a word’s meaning. To aid in this process definitions will be
taken from Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners of American English
(2002), a corpus which provides contemporary meanings based on ordinary usage. Where
relevant the historical uses of words or expressions will also be provided using the
Oxford Concise Companion to the English Language (2005). In a section under analysis
where no new construct is being examined, “not applicable” will be indicated.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
Winnicott’s constructs of transformation that comprise the idea of object usage
will be examined using Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) primary categories of conceptual
metaphor (Appendix B, C, D, and E). In some instances the connections drawn will be
illustrated using linguistic mappings with a narrative for clarity and ease of
comprehension. In addition, when relevant to the overall understanding of the key
transformational concepts as revealed in the text, other metaphorical constructions and
stylistic uses will be discussed in terms of their conceptual-metaphorical foundations and
89
implications. In most instances a concept or idea’s semantic relationship to
psychoanalytically-derived metaphors will be shown in this section.
As discussed, these metaphorical constructions reveal more than merely the writer’s
particular ornamental use of words, but more importantly they reflect the underlying
system of human thought itself.
Lexical Unit Decisions
Though each word in the text will be examined for its metaphorical versus more
literal usage, the main purpose of this analysis is to uncover the conceptual metaphors
that underpin the core theoretical constructs of transformation in the paper. Therefore, as
mentioned, not every metaphorical usage in the paper will be identified, but rather those
constructions that most directly contribute to gaining an understanding of the primary
construct—object usage. For example, “put forward” in the first sentence of the paper is
metaphorical (IDEAS ARE OBJECTS) but would not be considered since it does not add
to the central idea. However, when deemed to be relevant to an understanding of the main
theoretical constructs under consideration, similar metaphorical constructions (e.g.,
“evolution of my work” in Line 5) and other word use, style, etc. will be taken into
account and addressed in the Conceptual Metaphor and Commentary sections.
Primary Resources Used
The discussion of theoretical-contextual meanings at the beginning of each
section of analysis will be primarily based on the following: The Language of Winnicott:
A Dictionary of Winnicott’s Use of Words (Abram, 1996); A Dictionary of Kleinian
90
Thought (Hinshelwood, 1991); Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts (Moore & Fine, eds.,
1990); and; The Language of Psychoanalysis (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973).
Coding Decisions for Text
In line with American Psychological Association’s (2002) standards and
recommendations for dissertations, the text under consideration will be presented in its
original form with no additional markings (e.g., bold, italics, underlining).51 Therefore,
all italicized words in the text are from the original. The determinations and related
rationale (e.g., metaphoricity, theoretical relevance, significance to broader
understandings, etc.) will be reflected in each section of the analysis. Each sentence of
the text will be numbered for ease of referencing the text in the four analysis sections.
Finally, as mentioned, for clarity the designation PS1, PS2, and PS3 will be used to
identify Classical Freudian Theory, Ego Psychology, and Kleinian Theory respectively.
51
An omission is the last paragraph in which Winnicott summarizes in outline form the main findings of
the paper. This was deemed redundant and not included in the analysis.
91
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT
Text and Analysis, Lines 1-3
1. In this paper I propose to put forward for discussion the idea of the use of an
object.
2. The allied subject of relating to objects seems to me to have had our full attention.
3. The idea of the use of an object has not, however, been so much examined, and it
may not even have been specifically studied.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning of “Object” and “Object Relating”
An object in classical psychoanalytic thought (PS1) is generally related to
tangible entities (people, things) or mental representations of psychologically significant
phenomena. In Freud’s instinct theory objects are impersonal and more important as the
entities through which drives achieve their aim—energy discharge and pleasure—than as
sources of emotional sustenance. Objects are both the source of attraction and the entities
to which sexual aims are directed. An object’s status as the main source of early
dependency also contributes to the intensity with which it is sought and also to its overall
importance relative to the infant. The superego is essentially an internalized object that
represents parental and societal demands. Internal objects are thought to be comprised of
92
both real and imagined characteristics of external objects.52 Generally, how an object
becomes significant as a target of drives is related to its meeting of dependency needs
(anaclisis) and its level of idealization as achieved through (narcissistic) identification.
Internalization and introjection are psychic processes involved in identification and thus
related to the importance of an object.
In ego psychology (PS2) objects generally correspond to (PS1), though certain
elaborations and emphases are made. In general, object representations refer to the ego’s
internal depiction of the object that roughly begins at the stage of object permanence or
object constancy. This more stable relation with the object is thought to occur once the
infant goes beyond viewing the mother as merely need-satisfying and corresponds with
its transformation as permanently available intrapsychically to the infant. Object
relationships (real people) are given more emphasis than in (PS1) or (PS3), in line with
the importance in ego psychology of maintaining mature (e.g., not dependent, cold,
hostile, etc.) connections as part of an overall goal of positively adapting to one’s
surroundings.
A Kleinian (PS3) view of object relations is significant for positing objects as
existing from birth, being imbued with a uniquely phenomenological (versus
52
Moore and Fine (1990) note that “object relationship” is used to depict interactions between real people
(two subjects) whereas “object relations” generally signifies how one subject represents objects
psychologically or internally. The Kleinian concept “internal object” is an example of the more subjectively
imbued object relation, though it connotes more a sense of concreteness and anthropomorphism than mere
mental representation. Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) point out that the conception of an object in
psychoanalysis is at its core in line with traditional philosophy and epistemology: an object as a concrete
and separate entity that is perceived by a knowing subject. In addition, our general view of reality comes
from the notion of objects (e.g., “objectivity”) and is related to attempts to accurately perceive tangible
things in the world. As discussed, conceptual metaphor theory has discovered that an object is a primary
construct used for conceiving of human ontology related to cause and effect, the mind, and the self, among
other things.
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mechanistic) quality, and for being felt by the subject as having a real physical existence
(e.g., inside or outside the body). As such objects can exist intrapsychically as physical or
mental, internal or external, good or bad, and part or whole. Unconscious phantasy, the
mental equivalent of physiological experience, is the foundation of all mental activity and
thus plays an important role in how an object is ultimately viewed. In the Kleinan
formulation, mental representations, as viewed in (PS1) and (PS2), are less concrete and
more akin to secondary manifestations or symbols related to memory. The infant’s
experience of internal objects, on the other hand, are more closely related to phantasies
about physiological processes as function of imagining that entities exist in the body,
which in turn contribute significantly to how other objects are perceived and experienced.
The psychic development from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position
marks an increased ability to view objects more accurately, with more empathy, and as
whole versus in parts.
Basic Meaning of “Use”, “Object”, and “Relating”
Use (noun) implies the putting of a thing or person to a given purpose so as to
accomplish an end.53 Object (noun) implies a thing that can be seen or touched; a material
thing that occupies space.54 Relate (verb) implies making a connection between two
different things.55
53
Contemporary definitions of use (n): 1) the act of using something; 2) a way of using something; 3) the
right, opportunity, or permission to use something; 4) the ability to use part of your body or mind; 5)
meaning of a word or a way of speaking or writing a word. Expressions: to be of use, come into/go out of
use, have its/your uses, it’s/there’s no use, make use of, what’s the use?
54
Contemporary definitions of object (n): 1) a thing you can see or touch that is not alive an usually solid;
2) something you plan to achieve; 3) the person or thing that something happens to or that people have a
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Related Conceptual Metaphors
The idea of interacting (e.g., using and relating) with tangible objects in the world
(e.g., items, utensils, people, etc.) is ubiquitous and comprises the primary rationale for
human ontology and epistemology. As embodied beings from conception, we are
essentially objects located in space who exist in a world of other tangible and mental
objects.56 Johnson’s work on conflation in early learning (as cited in Lakoff & Johnson,
1999) demonstrates that the perception and manipulation of objects contributes
significantly to how we come to conceptualize both physical and psychic phenomena (see
Appendix B for Primary Conceptual Metaphors). Physical objects are part of the infant’s
world from birth, and they are interacted with using all five senses. In general, modern
developmental research shows that infants learn from the combination of perception and
action, especially through the exploration of their environment (Rochat, 1999). Objects
used in these early learning processes can be animate or inanimate and part of the body
(e.g., fingers, toes), within the body (e.g., inside of the mouth), or external to it (e.g.,
pacifier, toys).
particular feeling about; 4) Linguistics – A noun pronoun of phrase that is affected in a direct or indirect
way by the action of a verb. Expressions: no object (“Money’s no object”), the object of the exercise
(purpose for doing something).
55
Contemporary definitions of relate (v): 1) to show or make a connection between two different things; 2)
to tell someone something that has happened or what someone has said. Expressions: Relate to (to be about
something or connected with something or to be able to understand a situation or the way someone feels
and thinks).
56
The dual quality of consciousness itself contributes to the division between subject and object, which
also leads to the ability of a subject to relate to parts of itself as objects. The relation of a person to the self
has a long history in philosophy and has been found to be built on conceptual metaphors (see Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999, 267-289). From Freud onward the basic conception the self or ego in psychoanalysis
essentially utilizes the same conceptual metaphors (see Metaphors of Self in Appendix E), with
elaborations essentially only shifting its vantage point, function, and relationship to other internal and
external objects.
95
Though not yet defined in the paper, in this brief introduction “object,” “using,”
and “relating” conjure conceptual references to THE MIND IS A BODY, THINKING IS
OBJECT MANIPULATION, and OBJECTS ARE PURPOSES. As discussed, implied in
all characterizations of the mind in psychoanalysis is the notion that objects exist in the
contained (bodily) space of the mind (see Appendix D for Metaphors of Mind). The
experience of interacting with physical objects in the world (e.g., computers, forks,
people) is used to depict what occurs psychologically (e.g., object relationships). From
these ubiquitous physical experiences also come judgments about the motivational
elements involved in mental functioning. In other words, because physical objects serve
certain primary functions related to meeting needs (e.g., food, warmth, comfort) and
performing tasks (e.g., eating, writing, grooming), the same criteria is applied to explain
mental acts. For example, because physical objects are handled and utilized for achieving
a goal, mental objects are assigned similar roles and purposes. From this come
expressions such as “Let’s toss that idea around” (THINKING IS OBJECT
MANIPULATION) and “He has not grasped the complex formula (OBJECTS ARE
PURPOSES).
That Winnicott chooses to represent a clinical-developmental idea with words that
reflect one of the most elemental concepts used to understand our whole existence is
significant (see Appendix C for Location Event-Structure Metaphor and Object EventStructure Metaphor). The vicissitudes of objects in space (e.g., a location) is the primary
way humans not only understand basic feeling states and other everyday events in the
world, but it is also how more abstract ideas are constructed. A wide range of potential
meanings come into play when words basic to ontology (e.g., object, use, hold, play, etc.)
96
are used in non-specific ways, which is a hallmark of Winnicottian style. The ubiquity
and essential nature of the words contained in his key constructs of transformation
broadens the range of potential meanings that they can come to assume. Over the years
critiques of this style range from viewing it as evasive, provocative, or facile on one hand
and mystical and revealing on the other. Apart from the deciphering the ultimate meaning
or the utility of his style, what is clear is that this way of incorporating language leaves
broad gaps or spaces which are left to be filled-in by the individual reader.
Commentary
In the first paragraph of the paper the concepts of object usage and object relating
are introduced. A reader of the day would most likely have theoretical associations
triggered by the terms “object” (in “use of an object”) and “object relating.” Object
relationships and associated terms have a long history in psychoanalysis and in the
British School of which Winnicott was a part. The complete construction of the concept
“use of an object” is new, and it possibly evokes ideas both related to past theory
(Winnicott and others) as well as basic (literal) meanings outlined above. As evidenced
by its numerous definitions and related expressions, the noun “use” covers a wide range
of ground semantically (e.g., relating to the user, that which is used, the process of being
used, the purpose of use, rights (legal) related to use, religious rites, and even sexual
exploitation). It is from these possible meanings that the reader might here begin to
consider other ways of conceiving the nature of relating to an object, prompted by
Winnicott’s allusion in Line 1 to the unexamined nature of the idea he is about to put
forth.
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Text and Analysis, Lines 4-5
4. This work on the use of an object arises out of my clinical experience and is in the
direct line of development that is peculiarly mine.
5. I cannot assume, of course, that the way my ideas have developed has been
followed by others, but I could like to point out that there has been a sequence,
and the order that there may be in the sequence belongs to the evolution of my
work.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
Though still not defined Winnicott generally relates that his proposed construct of
the use of an object is the outcome of a personal and professional process. Those versed
in his writings would be generally familiar with his tendency to provide a subjective
account of his discoveries—specifically, how the uncovering of theoretical-clinical ideas
is always contextualized within his own developmental processes.57 By doing this
Winnicott highlights the importance and reality of the clinician-reader’s subjecthood, as
well as the mutually reinforcing nature of the subject-object-environment which will be
found to be central to the idea under consideration. In a general sense none of the three
psychoanalytic models under consideration expressly consider the therapist’s
subjectivity, nor do they put as much emphasis on the child’s environment as they do on
internal psychic processes. Along those lines an informed reader of the time might also
associate to how Winnicott’s status as an “Independent” in the British School is being
57
This more personal account and style in professional writing is in direct opposition to the scientific
stance of American ego psychologists (PS2), many of whom European émigrés steeped in analytic
philosophy and the scientific method.
98
asserted here.58 This could prompt thoughts of past divergences of opinion he had with
Klein on such topics as the importance of the environment in early infant development
and the significance and meaning of infant aggression. Similarly, “line of development”
might evoke Anna Freud’s take on the emotional processes of early childhood. Overall,
Winnicott generally shared with Anna Freud and ego psychologists the view that the
environment was instrumental in building the psychic organization in which object
relations existed, in direct contrast to the Kleinian notion that the infant is born with a set
of predetermined structures that recognized and fantasized about objects like the mother
(Rodman, 2003).
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not Applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
Metaphorical constructions used in this paragraph related to the “development” of
“ideas” (IDEAS ARE OBJECTS) and the “sequence” and “evolution” of Winnicott’s
professional work are worth noting. The depiction of development as a “line” (a path
with a particular sequence of steps) is related to the conceptual metaphor PURPOSES
ARE DESTINATIONS, in which achieving a goal is understood through the experience
of transporting oneself to a desired place. “She’s feeling a bit better, but she’s not quite
there yet” is an example of how well-being is related to arriving at a destination. From
58
Winnicott had by this time written much to distinguish certain aspects of his theory (e.g., generative
nature of aggression, importance of the environment) from the Kleinian camp. Also, the “Controversial
Discussions” might be one of many such divisions within the School that could be evoked here.
99
this one could conceive of DEVELOPMENT IS A PATH as describing the process of
physical and emotional maturation. Implied in all ideas of development is the notion that
there are unhealthy and healthy paths. One function of a theory is to set down the
conditions that facilitate a successful course toward optimal development.
In general Winnicott similarly utilizes the DEVELOPEMNT IS A PATH
mapping, though here and in other writing he characterizes the “journey” towards a
destination as seemingly more important than the arrival. In Winnicott’s writing
“arriving” is often quite mundane and anticlimactic (almost as if it were a forgone
conclusion all along), while the “journey” holds all the important and exciting details.
This is perhaps part of his larger preoccupation with that which occurs “in between”
(transitional object and phenomena) what is typically conceived of as more tangible and
notable events and objects (Rodman, 2003). Emphasizing the sequential processes that
underpin significant developmental outcomes is characteristic of his thinking and also
relates to his imaginative conception of time to reveal nuances in experience.59
The primary metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS is another way we conceive
of ideas related to development. A healthy or unhealthy state is depicted as a location in
space (“I’m close to being out of my depression, but I’m worried one more comment
from him will send me over the edge). Arriving at destinations that reflects locations in
space and the attainment or manipulation of objects are primary ways we conceptualize
subjective experiences (see Appendix C for Location Event-Structure Metaphor and
59
The paradox of the child “creating” the object that was waiting to be created first alluded to in his paper
on transitional objects and (later) in the current paper is one such illustration of altering our typical
conceptual sequence of time (see Metaphors of Time in Appendix F). Winnicott is essentially highlighting
the notion that future events are not simply outcomes of antecedent actions, but also related to causes of yet
to be experienced phenomena.
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Object Event-Structure Metaphor). In a parallel way achieving the psychological state
associated with object usage will be shown to be the outcome of a developmental process
related not to the transportation of oneself to a destination, but rather the psychological
placement (e.g., movement) of the therapist (e.g., object) outside the subjective area (e.g.,
location/space) of omnipotence.
Commentary
As pointed out by Ogden (2002) Winnicott is masterful at using his style of
writing to convey an experiential component of an idea he is proposing.60 By reminding
the reader that his discovery of object usage is an outcome of a personal and professional
process, he seems to be demonstrating how each person must similarly arrive at this
important destination representing true subjecthood in a unique way—one that is
“peculiarly” (Line 4) or experientially theirs.61 Among other things, he is laying the
groundwork for shifting in his characteristic way the commonly accepted logic and order
of developmental events. In this case he is highlighting how the forces which propel
development do not manifest in a uniform way, but rather form a template from which
each individual experiences its elements in unique ways. Part of the variety of experience
will be shown to related to how the element of time vis-à-vis transient states of mind
60
“Because style and content are so interdependent in Winnicott's writing, his papers are not well served by
a thematic reading aimed exclusively at gleaning ‘what the paper is about.’ Such efforts often result in
trivial aphorisms. Winnicott, for the most part, does not use language to arrive at conclusions; rather, he
uses language to create experiences in reading that are inseparable from the ideas he is presenting, or more
accurately, the ideas he is playing with” (Ogden, 2001, p. 299).
61
The syntax in section reinforces the idea of the importance of personal experience and individuality in
Winnicottian thought: The personal pronoun “my” is used four times and the possessive pronoun “mine”
once.
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plays a role in shifting the commonly understood unidirectional flow of energy from past
to present, object to object, subjective state to objective state, to name a few.
A related idea inherent here and in other Winnicottian papers is the notion that the
process (e.g., directionality) of differentiation (from objects) and unification (with
objects) is complex. Attempts to depict such abstract psychological phenomena challenge
our typical conceptual schemas for cause and effect, especially depictions that view
forces as unidirectional and unimpeded by other factors.62 Winnicott’s emphasis on
“sequence” (mentioned twice in Line 5 along with the redundant concept “order”) points
toward what will be a central thrust of his argument: that object relating is a
developmental process that precedes object usage and is thus only a marker and not the
final destination on the path to full psychic realization. The processes involved in
attaining the status object usage—in particular the caregiver or therapist’s qualities ability
to “survive”—must be made manifest to both subjects (the emerging subjecthood of the
infant and established subjecthood of the caregiver) in order to accurately perceive
oneself and others. However, one related inherent paradox of Winnicottian ontology that
will be further demonstrated is that discovery is always “re-discovery” (e.g., conflation of
time states) and “mutual discovery” (e.g., self and object, self and other self). These more
subtle and complex conceptions of time, self, and reality test not only the viability of a
practioner’s clinical repertoire, but also the limits of embodied metaphor as a viable tool
of conceptual research.
62
Ogden (2001) cites the “paradox” of progressing from an undifferentiated to a differentiated state as a
function of “living an experience together,” pointing to the idea that psychic separation is an outcome of
unity. However, one could also view if from the perspective of separation/differentiation creating unity, in
that what is “experienced together” in a psychological sense is still separate from the point of view of the
infant. For Winnicott the environment and individual organism always contain forces that are both
interdependent and mutually exclusive.
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In terms of technique and professional development, “evolution of my work”
(Line 5) alludes to the notion that the capacity to be used is in a parallel way an outcome
of his coming to understand the importance of surviving clients’ attacks.63 Survival is
also closely related to the biological idea of evolution, and along with “sequence” and
“order” connotes a certain logical process that Winnicott views as inherent in human
development. The use of “evolution” may prompt the reader to consider that the
phenomenon he is describing is at its core related to natural laws (e.g., Darwin’s
“survival of the fittest”).64 Evolution is also importantly concerned with an individual
organism’s environment as crucial for development, which is a central preoccupation for
Winnicott throughout his writing.
Text and Analysis, Lines 6-1265
6. My work on transitional objects and phenomena which followed on naturally after
'The Observation of Infants in a Set Situation' is fairly well known.
7. Obviously the idea of the use of an object is related to the capacity to play.
8. I have recently given attention to the subject of creative playing.
9. This is near to my present subject.
10. Then also there is a natural development from my point of view along the line of
the concepts of the holding environment, this facilitating the individual's
discovery of the self.
11. Arising out of failure in this area of the facilitating environment can be seen the
whole subject of the development of character disorders associated with the
63
Over his career Winnicott had written extensively on the intensity of working with psychotic and
borderline patients. Viewed from this perspective, this paper is a final statement of his position on
transference, countertransference, and technique.
64
See Phillips (1988) for the role of Darwin’s theory in his early professional development, especially
Winnicott’s interest in “gaps” of knowledge.
65
This paragraph does not appear in this paper as published in Playing and Reality (1971) and
Psychoanalytic Explorations (1989).
103
setting up of various kinds of false self, these representing failures of selfestablishment and self-discovery.
12. All this makes sense, for me, of the special focus that there is in my work on what
I have called transitional phenomena and the study of the minute details that are
available to the clinician that illustrate the gradual build-up of the individual's
capacity to play and the capacity to find and then to use the 'external' world with
its own independence and autonomy.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning of “Transitional Object” (and “Phenomena”),
“Holding Environment,” “Playing,” and “False Self”
The compounds transitional object and transitional phenomena were clinical
constructs introduced in the seminal paper Transitional Objects and Transitional
Phenomena (1951). According to Abram (1996) it was the first idea in psychoanalysis to
account for what exists psychically in the location between a subject and object.
Transitional phenomena are related to hypothetical psychic space that occurs between
subject and object (“me” and “not me”), internal and external reality, and inner and outer
in a physical sense. Similarly referred to by Winnicott as an intermediate area or potential
space, transitional phenomena play a crucial role in the perceptual development of the
infant from a psychic state characterized as merged with the environment to eventual
whole and separate unit status.66
A transitional object can be a tangible item (e.g., blanket, doll, etc.) used by the
infant to represent inner experiences and to aid in actual and perceived emotional
separation from important love objects. It also stands for individuals in the external
world, most notably a mother or caretaker. Winnicott posits that from the point of view of
the infant, a transitional object does not exactly indicate that the child is employing
66
See Rochat (1999) for a modern developmental account that demonstrates self-differentiation as a
function of proprioceptive capacities present from about three months of age.
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symbolism, which requires more advanced cognitive capacity marked by ability to
conceive of objects as separate from the experiencing subject. Its importance lays more
its status as an item belonging to (e.g., a possession) the infant. It does, nevertheless,
provide a window into similar elements and processes that will soon come to comprise
formal symbolism and the closely related topic of conceptual metaphor.
Transitional phenomena and objects will be shown to play a crucial role in the
attainment of object usage. A view from PS1 and PS2 would hold that the processes
being described in the construct transitional phenomena are related to the oral phase of
libidinal development. These can be said to represent how the infant’s experiences with
the primary love object are sought to be maintained through displacement onto external
substitutes. Potentially occurring both before and after the achievement of object
constancy, fears of loss of or abandonment by the love object are dealt with the use of a
transitional object which is called upon in times of distress. Ideas of the day that were
emerging from infant developmental research adopted by PS2 might characterize these
elements as related to the process of differentiation and individuation that originate in
states of symbiosis and progress through stages in which the mother is viewed
ambivalently (Mahler, 1968).
Views of internal objects from PS3, which account for their more concrete and
anthropomorphic nature, do not directly account for that which exists in the space
between objects, between a subject and object, or between subjective and objective
reality.67 However, the key psychic processes (e.g., projection, introjection, splitting of
67
In Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena Winnicott writes: “It is interesting to compare the
transitional object concept with Melanie Klein's concept of the internal object. The transitional object is not
105
the ego and object) involved in development from the paranoid-schizoid to depressive
position can be said to generally occur in the territory of Winnicott’s transitional
phenomena, in part because all psychic processes in PS3 involve unconscious phantasy
which encompasses physical and mental object phenomena. For Klein the central
outcome of healthy development is the ability to differentiate oneself from other “whole”
objects, to have the capacity for concern (Winnicott’s “ruth”), and to be able to
conceptualize and tolerate loving and hating aspects of other objects (Winnicott’s
“fusion”). For this to occur, the infant must have (and perceive) a “good” internal object
that is both loving and protecting. Generally, with such assistance the infant is able to
master the fear related to the pull from “bad” persecutory objects.
The PS3 construct of unconscious phantasy can be more directly viewed as
existing in the psychic realm of transitional phenomena. As essentially the ground of all
psychic phenomena that links biological impulses with thought processes (most
importantly through imagined relationships between objects thought to physically exist in
body) unconscious phantasy like transitional phenomena plays a crucial role in making
meaning of embodied experiences through symbolic or metaphorical processes as
manifested through behavioral elaboration (e.g., play in children).68 The anthropomorphic
an internal object (which is a mental concept)—it is a possession. Yet it is not (for the infant) an external
object either” (p. 9).
68
The construct of unconscious phantasy and the broad range of phenomena it came to represent would be
bring about debates on metapsychology and the difference between “science” and “meaning.” Similar
debates around language use in describing metapsychological versus clinical phenomena would occur some
three decades later in the United States (see Gill, 1988). In the British School some believed that
unconscious phantasy’s depiction as both the built-in psychic structure as well as the meaning derived by
the subject from utilizing those very mechanisms deluded its usefulness (Hinshelwood, 1989). Modern
cognitive science has shown that our conceptual systems are based on our biology (embodiment) and that
viewing form or structure as completely distinct from experience is a difficult proposition (Turner &
Fauconnier, 2002). Akin to the findings of embodied metaphor theory, Hinshelwood (1989) posits that
Klein’s philosophical position reflected “interactionism” or the notion that mind and body (including brain)
are mutually influential, as evidenced by embodied expressions concerning the experience of discomfort or
106
nature of psychic functioning put forth by Klein is supported by cognitive science’s
discovery of the embodied basis of our conceptual systems (see Appendix B).
Christopher Johnson’s findings (as cited in Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) involving the
“conflation” processes of learning supports the idea that there exists from birth a
rudimentary capacity to symbolize biological experiences by conceiving objects as
existing in space, both inside and outside the container of the body. This can be seen in
the view that the infant attempts to cope with various biological states such as hunger via
the existence of internal “good” and “bad” objects as later reflected in such expressions
as: something “gnawing” at one’s insides,” having a “lump” in one’s throat” or
“butterflies” in one’s stomach (Hinshelwood, 1989; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
Winnicott’s holding (or facilitating) environment is a key concept in his depiction
of human development that also has implications for treatment. The “environment” is
essentially comprised of those individuals (most often mother) and events related to the
care of the infant. For Winnicott the holding environment it is a prime determiner of the
eventual emotional health of the child. His oft-quoted statement “There is no such thing
as an infant” reflects the undifferentiated nature of the infant-mother-environment matrix,
both from the point of view of an objective observer as well as from the pre-subjective
state of the infant. It is within a successful holding environment that the child’s state is
transformed from one amorphously merged with its surroundings to subjectively
separate. For Winnicott a successful holding environment includes early on the mother’s
anxiety (e.g., “butterflies” in one’s stomach). Moreover, modern developmental research has shown that
from birth the infant’s conceptual system is an outcome of mutually influential and inseparable process
involving sensory experiences and mental operations (Rochat, 1999). Many expressions reflecting the
conflation of psychic and somatic experiences is based on the MIND IS A BODY metaphor (see Appendix
D).
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capacity for intense emotional attunement (primary maternal preoccupation) and overall
“good enough” practical care.
From PS2 perhaps the closest related construct is Hartmann’s (1939) “average
expectable environment” which depicts the hypothetical conditions in the child’s
surroundings that will produce a reasonable level of physical and psychological
development. In a more indirect way Benedek’s (1959) notion of the inter-relationship
between mother and infant as expressed through mutual drive satisfaction and Mahler’s
(1968) work on the symbiosis stage that precedes individuation are also related. In PS3
the environment is generally viewed as the mother (and in particular the breast), whose
importance is measured not as much by her actual actions or intentions, but rather by the
infant’s interpretation of internal events based mainly on physical sensations. The
vicissitudes of the external environment can contribute to distortions as well as alleviate
anxiety, contributing to the overall psychic set-up of “good” and “bad” internal objects.
Posited as occurring in the realm of transitional space, Winnicott’s construct of
playing essentially involves the external or behavioral elaboration of internal psychic
processes that are at early stages related to making meaning of inner and outer reality. As
a developmental function, the ability to play is a milestone and points the way toward
more mature forms of self structure, creativity and imagination. As such Winnicott would
come to conceive of effective therapy as a form of playing reflected in the un-impinged
(“good enough”) overlapping of two subjectivities. Ideas from PS2 might conceive of
such phenomena as related to the ego functions designed to cope with and adapt to
immediate psychic circumstances and to accurately perceive reality, with as little
interference as possible from libidinal or aggressive id impulses (Moore & Fine, 1990).
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Parallel implications for therapy from a PS2 viewpoint are associated with Hartmann’s
(1939) idea of an “average expectable environment” that is designed to help the patient
foster the capacity to adequately perceive reality and to cope with external stressors. In
the realm of child treatment Anna Freud’s approach similarly supported adaptable ego
functions in a way that some perceived as more educational than analytic.69 In contrast,
the PS3 view generally views children’s “play” as synonymous with adult free
association and dreams. One of its primary functions is to enact internal mental conflicts
in an attempt at mastering anxiety-filled experiences. According to this view, the clinical
material revealed by play demonstrates the anthropomorphic nature of psychic contents
and points toward the importance of objects as existing in space as the foundation of
conceptual understanding.
The false self in Winnicott’s theorizing is related to defense (“caretaker self”),
forming out of a need to protect the person’s core or true self. The false self can range in
its level of health or dysfunction, though its characteristic function involves
intellectualization and symbolism in the service of compliance and compromise with the
environment. The true self is thought to exist from birth, reflecting the essence of what it
means to feel “real.” It is nurtured mainly by the mother’s ability to tolerate and make
meaning of the infant’s omnipotence, as manifested in her acceptance of spontaneous
gestures.
69
Anna Freud began her career as a teacher. See Grosskurth (1986) for accounts of the Controversial
Discussions related to theory and technique as applied to children. Winnicott, like the Kleinians, did not
distinguish between the “play” of children versus adults, nor did he propose a distinct method based on the
age of the patient (Winnicott, 1962).
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In general the PS2 depiction of the ego similarly focuses on its adaptive or
maladaptive functioning capacity in relation to the environment. Like Winnicott’s ideas
of the true and false self, the ego is also involved in the accurate perception of reality. In
relation to objects, ego defense mechanisms are designed to protect against the loss of the
object, its love, its disapproval and/or punishment via castration. In contrast, in PS3 the
process does not directly involve protecting the self or ego, but the object itself. The mind
inherently seeks to preserve that which it deems capable of providing security. This
depiction calls attention to the more indirect ways that the ego seeks to survive and
provides a glimpse into the earliest processes that come to compromise empathy.
Basic Meanings of “Transition,” “Capacity,” “Play,” “Holding,” “Facilitating,”
“Environment,” and “Self”
A transition (n) describes the process of passing from a condition, stage, or form
to another.70 Capacity (n) involves the ability to do something or hold something in
space.71 Play (v) is related to having fun or taking an active role in a game or sport.72
Holding (noun or adj.) is associated with physical the act of being supported, carried, or
contained by another object.73 Facilitating relates to the ability to make something
70
Contemporary definition of transition (n): 1) the process of changing from one situation, form, or state to
another. Transitional (adj.): temporary, or in the process of changing from one situation, form, or state to
another (a transitional government).
71
Contemporary definition of capacity (n): 1) the amount of something that can be put in a container or the
number of people that a place has room for; 2) the ability to do something; 3) the amount of goods a
company can produce or the amount of work it can do.
72
Contemporary definitions of play (v): 1) to take part in a sport or game; 2) to make music or sound; 3) to
have a part in a play; 4) the act (usually children) of doing something enjoyable; 4a) to pretend to be
someone else.
73
Contemporary definition of hold (v): 1) to carry; 2) to stop something from moving; 3) to put arms
around something; 4) (to be able to) contain; 5) to have; 6) to continue in same state; 7) to keep or stop
110
manageable.74 An environment (n) is a place or situation in which humans exist.75
Something false (adj.) is not true or something made to look real which is not.76 Self (n)
is the conscious identification of one as distinct from other people.77
Related Conceptual Metaphors
This section essentially provides an outline of Winnicott’s central theorizing
leading up to the paper on object usage. Transitional phenomena and transitional objects
are foundational constructs in the overall structure which will be central to an
understanding of his new construct of object usage. As a tangible object that represents
both inner and outer psychic processes—and experienced through the physical space of a
bodily container—transitional objects and transitional phenomena cover a wide range of
experience. These ideas provide a unique window into the early conflation of infant
experience that forms the foundation of conceptual metaphor. Because transitional
phenomena describe the rudimentary processes involved in the acquisition of basic selfobject differentiation as a part of a larger capacity to accurately perceive reality and
something; 8) to not lose to opponent; 9) to believe; 10) to organize and event; 11) to wait on telephone;
12) to position part of body; 13) to have quality or feeling; 14) to keep having feeling.
74
Contemporary definition of facilitate (v): to make it possible or easier to for something to happen.
75
Contemporary definition of environment (n): 1) the place in which people live and work, including all the
physical conditions that affect them; 1a) the conditions and influences in which people carry on a particular
activity; 1b) computing the system that a computer or computer program operates in. 2) the natural world,
including the land, water, air, plants, and animals, especially considered as something that is affected by
human activity.
76
Contemporary definition of false (adj.): 1) not true; 2) made to look like something real (ARTIFICIAL);
2a) not real and intended to trick people; 3) based on a mistake or on wrong information; 4) not showing
what you really feel or intend (INSINCERE).
77
Contemporary definition of self (n): who you are and what you think and feel, especially the conscious
feeling of being separate and different from other people.
111
symbolize, it essentially provides an account of how and why certain embodied
metaphors come to be central to our conceptual systems. As an actual object that a child
utilizes for physical and emotional comfort, the processes associated with a transitional
object can be said to relate to at least a handful of primary metaphors which form the
basis for more abstract thinking. For example, a transitional object such as a teddy can be
held closely by the child for comfort, warmth, and overall intimacy, reflecting the
primary metaphors AFFECTION IS WARMTH and INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS. On
an emotional level identification processes are perhaps reflected in SIMILARITY IS
CLOSENESS in which the teddy-child is imagined to be a love object to the self-mother.
As perhaps the prime item of physical and emotional security at a certain stage of
development, PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS reflects how transitional objects
are intensely sought after by the child, at times to the exclusion of even the mother. In a
parallel way, the purpose or “desired” outcome of possessing a transitional object is
achieving “independence” and “autonomy” which will be later linked to achieving object
usage status.
Based on the brief outline provided above which encompasses key Winnicottian
constructs of transformation, a preliminary metaphorical mapping can be devised to
contextualize the ideas that will form the foundation for the object usage paradigm. Using
aspects of the Event Structure Metaphor (Appendix C), which is an account of how
humans conceive of cause and effect, the following mapping based on the self and reality
is one way to conceptualize the key constructs in this section:
112
FINDING THE TRUE SELF IS FINDING THE EXTERNAL WORLD
States Are Locations
•
•
•
•
The infant exists in undifferentiated psychic (narcissistic) space
Transitional space is potential space because of the possibility for transformation
toward differentiation, self-realization, objective perception of objects, etc.
Transitional space is exists hypothetically in-between a merged/undifferentiated
state and a separate unit state
Transitional space contains or coexists with the infant’s innate capacities for
creativity, illusion, and playing, all manifestations of the True Self
Attributes Are Possessions
•
•
A healthy functioning infant “possesses” a transitional object, which reflects past
states of pleasure and security from a caregiving object (transfer of time)
A possession also reflects current interaction with the environment and to
“finding” externality itself (unfolding or creation of time)
Changes Are Movements
•
•
Psychic movement reflects innate curiosity and exploration of objects that
represent “not me” as well as those that are part of “me”
A transitional object stands for both “me” and “not me” and reflects the internal
status of external objects.
Causes Are Forces
•
•
Motility—a generative form of aggression akin to a life force—is designed to
move toward fusion of libidinal and aggressive force
Fusion is associated with reality-testing and uncovering the True Self
Causation Is Forced Movement
•
•
In health, instinctual forces (libidinal and aggressive) are transformed in
transitional space and allow movement from narcissistic/object relating space
into object usage space (shared reality, bi-directionality, whole and separate
objects, birth of subjectivity)
Developmental stagnation is inability to move outside narcissistic/object relating
space (movement is auto-contained, unidirectional, and reflects merged state—no
subjectivity)
113
Purposes Are Destinations
•
•
Purposes related to transitional objects and phenomena include finding the
“location” of externality and ultimately of the True Self, which is often “hidden”
by False Self protection through compliance
Finding the authentic version (its “nature”) of the object will be shown to be part
of finding reality itself
Means Are Paths
•
Paths reflect the “developmental line” or “sequence” leading from
undifferentiated to differentiated states—part to whole objects, unidirectional to
bidirectional causation, no-time to time
Difficulties Are Impediments to Motion
•
•
False Self compliance keeps the True Self hidden (e.g., prohibits movement to
location of True Self)
In treatment the therapist’s collusion with the False Self (e.g., treating “psychotic
core” as neurotic, self-defensive interpretations designed to diffuse or avoid
aggressive energy, etc.) reinforces impediments to arriving at True Self location
Freedom of Action Is the Lack of Impediments to Motion
•
•
•
False Self compliance is main impediment (e.g., alteration or inhibition of self to
meet environmental demands, overvaluing “reason” versus “experiencing,”
viewing adaptation as compliance via “self-control”)
True Self elements like “spontaneous gestures” and “ playing” reflect lack of
impediments or transcendence of them (e.g., revelation of “essential” elements of
self that may include controlled and non-controlled aspects, “experiencing” or
engaging of environment and being known is valued over controlled-reason).
The presence of an adequate “holding environment,” sufficient “primary
maternal preoccupation,” and overall lack of impingement allow for freedom of
movement in space
Long-Term Purposeful Activities Are Journeys
•
Development is a “path” from undifferentiated to differentiated states, from
subjective objects to objects more objectively perceived, and from False Self to
True Self functioning
114
Commentary
The above mapping based primarily on the Location-Event Structure Metaphor
delineates the conceptual foundation on which many Winnicottian constructs of
transformation are based. It reveals much of the rationale that informed his clinical
technique and which pointed toward his larger depiction of human ontology and
epistemology. As such it also provides a scheme and context from which to analyze,
understand, and contextualize other psychoanalytic constructs, both from a theoretical
and clinical perspective. Winnicott generally spends the remainder of the paper
positioning object usage into this established paradigm of psychic functioning and
transformation.
Perhaps the main conceptual attribute that sets Winnicott’s overall schema of
transformation apart from others is the notion of transitional phenomena and the related
idea of transitional or potential space. By positing a psychic-conceptual area that not only
exists in-between the subject and object, but whose function is primary in connecting the
two areas through metaphorical or symbolic processes, Winnicott prompts the reader to
consider alternative ways of conceiving cause and effect. For example, in typical
depictions of cause and effect, (e.g., STATES ARE LOCATIONS, PURPOSES ARE
DESTINATION, etc.) locations or destinations are generally given primary importance
and are conceived of as more solid, tangible, and separate (things in themselves). In
certain important ways for Winnicott the causative elements occur not simply by virtue of
arriving at location (e.g., “I’m not quite there yet”), but also by the subject’s experience
and interaction with object-phenomena occurring “in-between” locales, where more
rudimentary psychic processes are unfolding. From a conceptual perspective, the
115
connotation of the word “transition” draws the reader away from absolutes (e.g., arriving
at a solid location) and more toward the nature of events in progress or in statu nascendi.
Among other things this activity requires the reader to consider that causation as
externally understood and depicted is an outcome of what has already occurred with this
hidden and less quantifiable area of transitional space.78
In a similar way, unlike other psychic accounts that put more emphasis on forces
(e.g., aggressive and libidinal energy, projective and introjective mechanisms) as existing
for the most part independently of externality (e.g., intrapsychically in auto-contained
spaces), for Winnicott forces are always considered as part and parcel of the environment
in which they function. The nature of the environment is itself a force as manifested in
the quality of the facilitating environment. Along those lines the environmental object is
important not necessarily as a separate and unique entity whose nature emerges once
“arrived at” (PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS) or “possessed” (PURPOSES ARE
DESIRED OR POSSESSED OBJECTS), but rather for what it comes to represent as
being already present in the child. Though ultimately aided by the actual externality of
the object (e.g., in the attainment of reality-based thinking) the self already contains all
the necessary elements for achieving purposes in the environment. As a microcosm of
78
Though not commonly viewable or known from the perspective of externality, transitional space still
depicts objects as existing in and arriving at recognizable locations via motion. In other words, the basic
causative structure that defines the relationship between objects is essentially the same as in nontransitional space. However, one key difference is that the nature of the concept as representing a less than
solid and ethereal realm where key processes of transformation occur requires the reader to expand their
conceptual vantage point and consider another dimension or layer of existence. This additional realm is in
important ways both part and not part of external reality, both in terms of it spatial positioning as both in
and out of recognizable space and in its time-based and timeless nature.
116
that which exists externally, discovery for a Winnicottian self is thus always essentially
re-discovery.
The depictions related to “finding” the self as a function of finding externality
reflected in the conceptual mapping have important implications for object usage and also
demonstrate Winnicott’s inventive use of writing to communicate a complex
transformational experience. In this case he combines the atemporal quality of
transitional space with the commonly accepted sequence of time inherent in our ideas of
causation (see Appendix F for Time Orientation Metaphor) to draw attention to the
experience of the infant in relation to the environment. Specifically, in depicting the
object as always there “waiting to be created” (Line 59) for the infant, Winnicott abruptly
and unexpectedly shifts the focus from the point of view of the infant (subject) to that of
the observer (object), paralleling for the reader the “sudden” nature of discovery that
similarly takes place for the infant when reality is encountered for the first time.79 To the
outside observer the object was present all along, but to the infant it appears magically
and is perceived to have been given it existence by the infant. Winnicott also uses
temporality to reflect the incomplete nature of the infant and the “missing” time that is
filled in by the presence of the object. To the infant-subject in an undifferentiated state,
there is the feeling of “no time” and there is no other object. To the object-observer, there
was a past, is a present, and can be a future, and there have always existed two subjects. It
is only through the combined vantage points of both subject and object that time is
79
A more complete systematization of time as it relates to subject and object will be provided later. It is
mentioned here because a more expansive conception of time is required to fully understand the idea of
transitional phenomena, a key concept upon which object usage is based.
117
completely accounted for. It can be said then that for the infant, time, like subjectivity,
comes into being with its creation of the object.
Text and Analysis, Lines 13-21
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
20.
21.
What I have to say in this present paper is extremely simple.
Although it comes out of my psychoanalytical experience I would not say that it
could have come out of my psychoanalytical experience of two decades ago,
because I would not then have had the technique to make possible the
transference movements that I wish to describe.
For instance, it is only in recent years that I have become able to wait and wait
for the natural evolution of the transference arising out of the patient's growing
trust in the psychoanalytic technique and setting, and to avoid breaking up this
natural process by making interpretations.
It will be noticed that I am talking about the making of interpretations and not
about interpretations as such.
It appeals me to think how much deep change I have prevented or delayed in
patients in a certain classification category by my personal need to interpret.
If only we can wait, the patient arrives at understanding creatively and with
immense joy, and I now enjoy this joy more than I used to enjoy the sense of
having been clever. 19. I think I interpret mainly to let the patient know the
limits of my understanding.
The principle is that it is the patient and only the patient who has the answers.
We may or may not enable him or her to be able to encompass what is known or
become aware of it with acceptance.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
The paragraph deals mainly with clinical technique and its implication for
psychoanalytic treatment. A position is staked out on the nature of the borderline
personality configuration and how, for Winnicott, commonly accepted techniques with
such patients lead to a mutual deprivation of experience. Overall, a PS1 and PS2
classification of a borderline personality disorder or a borderline personality organization
relates to the psychological and behavioral symptoms and phenomena that are thought to
occur between neurotic and psychotic levels of functioning. Treatment approaches for the
118
most part consisted of analyzing and confronting through interpretation the transference
resistances that occur in the therapeutic relationship. Interestingly, though, when this
paper was published new ideas were emerging about the nature of borderline phenomena
which included alternations in technique.80
Theory and technique in PS3 related to borderline phenomena per se is not as
clearly delineated as it is in PS1 and PS2.81 Kleinian theory would see the manifestations
of borderline functioning as falling into the realm of the paranoid-schizoid position, not
really distinguished from other character organizations. In contrast to the characterization
of drives as the main forces in accounting for borderline phenomena, Klein understood
the nature and function of anxiety as a central task. In general, PS3 technique involved
from the outset of treatment direct interpretations of primitive psychic states (especially
the negative transference) for the purpose of modifying anxiety.82 These deep
interpretations of pre-oedipal material would be in direct contrast to the modifications of
80
Kernberg (1966, 1967, 1968, & 1969) had begun to re-formulize PS1 and PS2 conceptions of borderline
phenomena to include ideas from British Object Relations, including the meaning and function of egosplitting and aggressive processes (See Appendix N for a section of the 1969 paper which provides a
historical account of PS2’s status vis-á-vis both Kleinian theory and significant portions of Winnicottian
thought). Significant differences in terms of technique included preventing a full transference neurosis to
develop and the idea that interpretation is not the only vehicle used to arrive at the transference resolution.
Because the nature of the therapeutic alliance is different, the “expressive” psychotherapy he recommended
included not only dealing directly with negative transference but also allowing for certain adjustments in
technique (e.g., frequency of session, between hour contacts, providing practical advice). The adjustments
were meant to on the one hand contain “transference acting out” and on the other provide alternative
opportunities for the patient to express emotions.
81
Borderline phenomena became more elaborated in the 1970’s and 1980’s, included under the broader
term “pathological organization” (Hinshelwood, 1991).
82
Ogden (1986) characterizes primitive psychic experience as conceived by Klein as based on “deep
structure,” a construct from renowned linguist Noam Chomsky. The idea conveys the basic notion of the
conceptual structure on which the embodied mind and conceptual metaphor is based. While not discounting
the influence of environmental influences on development, it highlights the parameters of human
psychological experience as a function of biological givens. Unconscious phantasy is one such vehicle
through which human biology is manifested psychologically.
119
more classical treatment being proposed by Kernberg (1968), which included limiting
regression and certain efforts to preserve a positive transference for the purpose of the
therapeutic alliance.
Basic Meanings of Transformational Concepts
Not Applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
Transference in this section is discussed in the context of motion through time,
revealing the underlying work of the Event-Structure Metaphor. If unimpeded by
unnecessary interpretations trust in the therapeutic process grows and transference
evolves into creativity, which is for Winnicott one of the ultimate signs of emotional
health. From a conceptual metaphor standpoint one could posit TRANSFERENCE IS A
JOURNEY, in which the desired destination is creativity and joy for both patient and
therapist. The related submapping INTERPRETATIONS ARE IMPEDIMENTS
describes how the path to creativity and joy is blocked. In particular what is interfered
with by the “making” (Line 16) of an interpretation is not only the transference itself, but
also the underlying “natural process” (Line 15) that for Winnicott connotes the ground of
experience.83 In contrast, for PS1, PS2, and PS3 it is successful interpretation (especially
83
Here the therapist’s “creativity” (e.g., to create or make) is paradoxically viewed as a premature
imposition of subjectivity in a realm where none is able to exist. In this way primary existence can be said
to be not only subject-less but also knowledge-less, in that cause-effect rationality is not what
“encompasses” (Line 21) experience. Therefore, for Winnicott interpretations communicate understanding
to the patient not by the transmission of knowable phenomena from one entity to another, but rather by
revealing and reinforcing the ubiquity and power of the natural processes of psychic existence.
120
of negative transference) that plays a key role in transporting the patient toward more
reality-based functioning.
Commentary
A 1969 reader might find Winnicott’s preliminary assertions about technique
intriguing, confusing, or both. Whereas the protocol of the day called for direct
confrontation via the interpretation of negative transference—and with new ideas
emerging that expanded the repertoire of therapist’s activity—Winnicott here seems to be
proposing a more passive stance. He is portraying interpretation as an interruption or
intrusion on what is viewed as the inherent process of the transference relationship. One
may initially wonder just what he does do if not interpret overtly, which was one crucial
factor that set the therapeutic endeavor apart from typical relationships. For example,
how do individuals who functions on the cusp of reality really have “answers” (Line 20)
or posses anything that might extricate themselves from such a confusing and painful
existence? What is the “technique” (Line 14) that was not available to him early in his
career that he now possesses?
Again the use of language is put into service as a way of conveying a key clinical
point. Specifically, for both the patient and therapist time is an important factor in the
development of the capacity to become aware of the psychic phenomena that Winnicott is
setting forth. In Lines 14 and 15 the experience of time is expressed by the length of the
sentences (46 words in Line 14 and 48 words in Line 15) as well as the repetition of
certain words and ideas. Besides the direct reference to time in “two decades,”
“psychoanalytic experience” is stated twice as well as the verb “wait,” all of which call
121
attention to an experience of temporality.84 In essence what Winnicott proposes the
therapist do in relation to the patient’s words and experiences parallels that which the
reader must do with the text: patiently and non-reactively absorb the words in a way that
does not rob them of their potential meanings. The capacity he is describing here is one
of creativity—one that takes time to master but once achieved is accomplished without
reference to time.85
Lastly, the patient’s “encompassing” of the “known” (Line 21) is a curious way of
describing one of the consequences of unimpeded time, in that knowledge is typically
conceived of conceptually as an object being seen (KNOWING IS SEEING) or possessed
(KNOWING IS GRASPING). To encompass involves encircling or surrounding a
persons or things on all sides, often with the intent of protection.86 This depiction calls
attention to the abstract quality of transitional space in which objects are less concrete
and thus cannot be fully engaged with (e.g., seen, felt, heard, etc.) but rather only loosely
contained at a distance. The idea of protecting knowledge (as conceived as an object)
could be thought of as parallel to the child-subject’s stance toward a transitional object
(e.g., the intense hanging on to the first “not me” possession). That is, the transitional
84
The shear effort required to read Lines 14 and 15 aloud poignantly demonstrates the ability of the text to
transmit a sense of time by seeming to slow it down.
85
Paradoxically, the intense focus on time in this section simultaneously calls attention to the timelessness
of transitional space. Part of the “natural process” that is interrupted by interpretation is the atemporal state
of primary experience. In this way interpretation can be said to attempt to create or impose time into a state
where is cannot exist. In this way TIME IS AN IMPEDIMENT might be proposed to describe the blocking
of the creative processes that function in transitional space.
86
Encompass, v. 1. To encircle as a ring or girdle; to surround, bound on all sides. 2. a. Of persons: To
surround, form a circle about, whether for protection, in attendance, or with hostile intent.
122
object is protected not only for the purpose of the emotional comfort and security it
brings as a representation of the caregiver as a physical entity, but also importantly for
what it symbolizes in terms of the more mature knowledge and related psychological
functions that the caregiver possesses. In this way the child could be said to cling tightly
and guard the transitional object for its potential as a link to the more mature adult world
of reality.
Text and Analysis, Lines 22-25
22.
23.
24.
25.
By contrast with this comes the interpretative work which the analyst must do
and which distinguishes analysis from self-analysis.
This interpreting by the analyst, if it is to have effect, must be related to the
patient's ability to place the analyst outside the area of subjective phenomena.
What is then involved is the patient's ability to use the analyst, which is the
subject of this paper.
In teaching, as in the feeding of a child, the capacity to use objects is taken for
granted, but in our work it is necessary for us to be concerned with the
development and the establishment of the capacity to use objects and to
recognize a patient's inability to use objects, where this is a fact.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
This paragraph qualifies earlier statements that seemed to question the utility of
interpretation. Here Winnicott is on the surface aligning with mainstream technique and
the view of interpretation as a cornerstone of the psychoanalytic endeavor. A main
theoretical statement of the paper comes in Lines 23 and 24, and it is communicated
without fanfare or the use of technical language. Though not detailing the processes
involved in the “ability to place the analyst outside the area of subjective phenomena”
and how “to use the analyst” the ideas would likely evoke associations to certain core
123
metapsychological viewpoints. In general a PS1 and PS2 perspective places the area of
subjective phenomena in the psychic realm of primary narcissism, a contained pre-object
world associated with the libidinal investment in the ego or self.87 A PS3 view would
characterize this area as related to the paranoid-schizoid position and associated with
projective and introjective processes of a mostly fragmented and incohesive ego. The
area in PS3 is not completely objectless as in PS1 and PS2, though objects (self and
other) have not yet attained whole status.
The last sentence in this section draws an analogy between the capacity to use the
therapist and the processes of teaching and feeding, two ideas that could easily be linked
with psychoanalytic theorizing of the day. In relation to feeding, the breast in PS3 is a
central construct and is related to part-objects of infancy and the processes of the
paranoid-schizoid position. The breast is significant for its designation as the first object
which the infant imbues with anthropomorphic and functional qualities such as loving
and hating, feeding and poisoning, giving and withholding, etc. Teaching or the
educational quality of therapy could be tied to the child technique of Anna Freud and
more generally to the importance of ego functions in PS2. In particular the focus on the
ego a mediator of reality-based thinking and the need to bolster its adaptational qualities
could come to mind.
87
Moore and Fine (1990) note that narcissistic processes were around this time becoming more associated
with self-esteem (e.g., with the work of Kohut and Kernberg) which includes the capacity for selfregulation. Modern developmental constructs related to affect-regulation draw heavily on the conception of
the self as in or not in control (see Metaphors of Self in Appendix E).
124
Basic Meanings of Transformational Concepts
Not Applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
The motion of objects as existing in the internal space of the self versus the
external space of the analyst forms the semantic basis for Winnicott’s key theoretical
statement in Line 23 and 24. The Locational Self (see Appendix E) is used to characterize
the process of “self-analysis” (Line 22) that is described here.88 Implied in the portrayal
of “self-analysis” is the notion that the psychic processes relegated to the objectless
spaces of narcissism are of limited or no benefit, specifically in terms of the organism’s
quest to acquire more mature forms of functioning. Sensorimotor experiences of infancy
that result in the SELF IS A CONTAINER metaphor are drawn on to call attention to this
self-contained or separate psychological state. In this configuration that which exists in
the space of the self is under the control of the self, while phenomena outside this locale
are beyond its influence. In this way, the subject can only remove that which exists in
self-space, which cannot be the object itself but only a perception of the object. Later,
Winnicott will posit that this removal of the representation of the object from the
88
The metaphors of the self in English as posited by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) focus largely on two
paradigms that depict the quality of its character: the control of the self and the existence of multiple selves.
An important implication of the first construction is that once under control, the self (analogous with person
or subject) is ostensibly more free to function in different ways (e.g., act, be acted upon, feel, etc.).Though
utilizing both renditions of the self, Winnicott’s overall conception highlights aspects of the Essential Self
Metaphor over those that focus on its control (The Physical Object Self). In his view it is “compliance” by
the False Self—not the self’s status as being in or out of control—that is the impediment to True Self
functioning. In the formulation false self compliance is ultimately related to attempts to protect the true
self, though it also leads to its unnecessary isolation in auto-contained realms of object relating.
125
subjective space creates the capacity for objectivity, which is also related to finding the
true self and externality itself.
The Internal Causation Metaphor of the Self (Appendix E) sheds further light on
this key theoretical statement and also provides the conceptual foundation for other
processes involved in object usage that will soon be described. The conceptual metaphor
SELF CONTROL IS FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT highlights the need of a
self to displace obstructionary objects as a means of achieving control. In this case the
self’s narcissistically imbued idea of the object can be viewed as threatening a sense of
control, which is in turn related to distorting the view of the true self and also preventing
the capacity for objectivity. Objectivity or reality-based thinking is achieved with the
finding of the external object in what is considered space external to the self, as depicted
in the infant’s first “not me” possession of a transitional object.89
A preliminary conceptual account of the key theoretical statement and later
accounts of object usage using Metaphors of Self is:
The Self Is A Container
•
The self resides in psychic space
The True Self Is The Subject or Essence
•
•
•
89
True Self represents a pure vantage point that reveals reality as reflected in the
organism’s essence
In contrast, the False Self is reactionary and does not fit the essence
False Self compliance can lead to distorted view of reality and isolation
In Winnicott’s depiction this technically occurs in transitional space which is neither completely external
nor internal. However, conceptually transitional space can be said to be more external to completely
internal space characterized by early narcissistic processes.
126
The True Self Is Hidden In Subjective (Narcissistic) Space
•
•
•
In infancy the True Self in the process of being (first) found in “no time”
Later the True Self becomes hidden or protected by the False Self
Contact with the False Self causes time to begin
Perceptions In Narcissistic Space Are Distortions And Obstacles
•
•
“Seeing” (knowing) is unidimensional and confined to subjective space
Distorted perceptions prevent movement toward external (shared) space
Removing Obstacles Is Being Able to See From Both Inside And Outside
•
•
•
Broader perceptual vantage point allows for objectivity or reality
Objectivity or reality as multi-dimensional awareness
Multi-dimensional awareness is seeing from multiple vantage points at once
Removing Obstacles Is Being Able To Move Into Other Space
•
•
Wider space allows for moving into other object space
Freedom of contact with other objects expands space and vantage point
Finding Other (“Not Me”) Objects in Other Space Is Finding Reality and True Self
•
•
•
Internal contact with external elucidates and transforms elements of both
Reality as blend of internal and external, self and other, time and no time
Finding reality also involves blending of past and present: every genuine
encounter with the other reflects first “finding” of the True Self in infinite time
Commentary
The paragraph lays out the basic technical argument for the paper: The capacity
to use the therapist is a foundational element of the treatment process, and the quality of
the therapist’s technique either will or will not produce therapeutic-developmental
advancement.90 Winnicott communicates this fact in both obvious and subtle ways. After
calling into question its apparent usefulness in the last paragraph, he concedes that
interpretation is inevitable but implies that its value must be judged not on how well it
90
The word “use” occurs three times in Line 25, reinforcing the repetitive quality of basic infant caretaking
(e.g., holding, feeding, changing) and the therapeutic relationship (e.g., listening, containing, interpreting).
127
makes sense to the therapist or a theory, but rather on how well it allows the client to
utilize the treatment process by tapping into elements of their true self. In particular, by
positing interpretation by another subject as that which sets psychoanalysis apart from
“self-analysis” (Line 22)—a solipsistic and ultimately inauthentic act by the patient—the
text is covertly prompting the reader to consider aspects of interpretation that might be
prone to similar fates in the auto-contained space of the therapist. In other words, an
interpretation that does not transcend the psychic space that is cut-off from the therapist’s
own subjecthood reinforces in the patient the therapist’s status as a subjective object in
the patient’s narcissistic space. Thus, in order “to place the analyst outside the area of
subjective phenomena” (Line 23), the raw elements which form the foundation of
interpretations must similarly evolve beyond the realm associated with object relating and
achieve the status of object usage. This points to the importance of viewing interpretation
as part and parcel of the therapist’s own psychic transformational processes, and not as
somehow disconnected from that which is transpiring for the patient. One implication is
that because basic elements of clinical technique mirror that of development, they must
seek to reinforce those naturally occurring processes that lead toward psychic
advancement. In broad terms, Winnicottian technique seeks to make available those
aspects of the therapist (and technique) that reflect essential or true self status.
Text and Analysis, Lines 26-40
26.
27.
It is in the analysis of the borderline type of case that one has the chance to
observe the delicate phenomena that give pointers to an understanding of truly
schizophrenic states.
By the term 'a borderline case' I mean the kind of case in which the core of the
patient's disturbance is psychotic, but the patient has enough psychoneurotic
organization always to be able to present psychoneurosis or psychosomatic
128
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
disorder when the central psychotic anxiety threatens to break through in crude
form.
In such cases the psychoanalyst may collude for years with the patient's need to
be psychoneurotic (as opposed to mad) and to be treated as psychoneurotic.
The analysis goes well, and everyone is pleased.
The only drawback is that the analysis never ends.
It can be terminated, and the patient may even mobilize a psychoneurotic false
self for the purpose of finishing and expressing gratitude.
But, in fact, the patient knows that there has been no change in the underlying
(psychotic) state and that the analyst and the patient have succeeded in
colluding to bring about a failure.
Even this failure may have value if both analyst and patient acknowledge the
failure.91
The patient is older and the opportunities for death by accident or disease have
increased, so that actual suicide may be avoided.
Moreover, it has been fun while it lasted.
If psychoanalysis could be a way of life, then such a treatment might be said to
have done what it was supposed to do.
But psychoanalysis is no way of life.
We all hope our patients will finish with us and forget us, and that they will find
living itself to be the therapy that makes sense.
Although we write papers about these borderline cases we are inwardly troubled
when the madness that is there remains undiscovered and unmet.
I have tried to state this in a broader way in a paper on classification.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
Whereas the previous put forth the rationale upon which successful technique
should be judged (e.g., whether it leads to a reality-based view of the therapist as real and
separate), this paragraph is a broad statement on personality organization in the context of
treatment viability and expectations. In particular Winnicott calls attention to the tenuous
nature of successfully treating borderline personality and the ways patients and therapists
cope with its often ultimate ineffectiveness. Kernberg (1968) outlined the various
positions both from a PS1 and PS2 on the analyzability of those considered in the
91
“It is not a very great thing to fail in psychoanalysis. The awful thing is to go on with psychoanalysis
after it has failed” (Quoted from Rodman, 2003, p. 210).
129
borderline range of personality functioning, similarly calling attention to the challenges
of modifying such ingrained character organizations. In what amounts to process similar
to that of the false self, Kernberg provides an account of the core defensive processes that
impede successful treatment.92 In particular, in his schema compromise formation (in the
borderline situation based on acting out), like Winnicott’s false self processes, inhibits
regression and the formation of a neurotic transference.
Winnicott’s reference in Line 27 to the “core” psychotic nature of a borderline
personality organization comes directly from Bion’s 1957 paper, Differentiation of
Psychotic and Non-Psychotic Personalities. In contraindication to PS1 and PS2, Bion
posits that psychotic personalities do contain neurotic elements (including reality testing)
that are less obvious because they are split-off via projective identification processes.93
Also, unlike other PS3 depictions Bion views all personalities as passing through both the
paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, albeit it in different fashions. In general,
viewing the personality as containing neurotic, borderline, and psychotic elements would
indeed seem to make the process of treatment more complex, as Winnicott is suggesting.
92
“Many patients with borderline personality organization do not tolerate the regression within a
psychoanalytic treatment, not only because of their ego weakness and their proneness to develop
transference psychosis, but also, and very predominantly, because the acting out of their instinctual
conflicts within the transference gratifies their pathological needs and blocks further analytic progress.
What appears on the surface as a process of repetitive "working through" is in reality a quite stable
compromise formation centered in acting out of the transference within the therapeutic relationship”
(Kernberg, 1968).
93
“…I do not think real progress with psychotic patients is likely to take place until due weight is given to the
nature of the divergence between the psychotic and non-psychotic personality, and in particular the role of
projective identification in the psychotic part of the personality as a substitute for regression in the neurotic part
of the personality. The patient's destructive attacks on his ego and the substitution of projective identification for
repression and introjection must be worked through. Further, I consider that this holds true for the severe
neurotic, in whom I believe there is a psychotic personality concealed by neurosis as the neurotic personality is
screened by psychosis in the psychotic, that has to be laid bare and dealt with” (Bion,1957).
130
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concept
Not Applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphor
The term “borderline” (Line 26) is a metaphorical description of those psychic
processes and the personality organizations that lay in the territory between neurosis and
psychosis.94 It draws conceptually on the primary metaphors STATES ARE LOCATION,
THINKING IS MOVING and THE MIND IS A BODY to account for the shifts in
mental states as associated categories of psychic functioning.95 From these configurations
we get such statements as: “He’s regressing into psychosis” or “The patient’s object
relations indicate she is in the neurotic range of functioning.” In this context to “collude”
(Line 28) essentially means to perceive the patient as occupying an incorrect space, while
in reality a more significant part of the personality (the psychotic part) is hidden or
“undiscovered” (Line 39). To be able to “meet” (Line 39) another’s madness requires that
both are present and accounted for in the same psychic space.
These metaphorical constructions of the mind have important implications for
clinical theory and the extent to which they reveal the embodied nature of thought and
language. For example, Bion’s (1957) and other Kleinians’ more subjective depictions of
objects clearly demonstrate the ubiquity of spatial metaphors in the depiction of psychic
processes. The vicissitudes of objects via projective and introjective processes are
described from the experiential standpoint of the subject, rendering them more concrete
94
95
Moore and Fine (1990) relate that the term was introduced by Robert Knight (1953).
Klein’s depiction of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive “positions” similarly draw on these spatial
metaphors of the mind.
131
and real. Because objects are conceived of in their more embodied versus disembodied
form, they call attention to the somatic-conceptual foundations on which metaphors are
based. Though criticized for conflating subjective and objective phenomena, the account
is clearly in line with the empirically founded stance of “experientialism” (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999).96 Winnicott’s utilization of words that reflect basic human ontology (e.g.,
object, use, holding) in abstract his characterizations of psychic processes similarly
reflect the embodied nature thought and language.
Commentary
This paragraph is the most straightforward so far, in that the literal uses of words
communicate the intended meanings. This directness parallels a central statement about
therapy and how it is to be viewed in the context of broader experiences. For Winnicott
therapy should be a mutative process that brings practical outcomes that serve the client
versus a ritualistic “way of life” (Line 38) that may not really change anything. He is
proposing honesty between the parties in this regard, valuing it over any illusions that
would minimize a failure of therapy to live up to its promises.97 In this regard in Line 38
96
These criticisms of PS3 are reminiscent of debates in psychoanalysis surrounding metapsychology versus
clinical theory, as well as related differences between objective science and subjective experience. It also
calls attention to questions of epistemology, which has important implications for clinical practice. One
quandary created by the findings of modern metaphor theory (e.g., “experientialism”) is that it blurs the
lines between subject and objective truth, the literal and the figurative, and thought and language (see
Appendix A for implications of modern metaphor theory on the human sciences).
97
His experiences of having had many patients commit suicide may be relevant here. His editor and patient
Masud Khan would take his life in 1989. Rodman (2003) suggests that Winnicott was likely not able to
directly communicate his inability to help Khan, likely resulting in the “awful” situation of continuing
analysis despite its failure. The bitter manner in which the therapy eventually did end supports this
hypothesis.
132
he utilizes the metaphor LIFE IS THERAPY to make his point that life itself, not therapy,
is ultimately the impetus for transformation.
Text and Analysis, Lines 41-46
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
It is perhaps necessary to prevaricate a little longer to give my own view on the
difference between object-relating and object-usage.
In object-relating the subject allows certain alterations in the self to take place,
of a kind that has caused us to invent the term cathexis.
The object has become meaningful.
Projection mechanisms and identifications have been operating, and the subject
is depleted to the extent that something of the subject is found in the object,
though enriched by feeling.
Accompanying these changes is some degree of physical involvement (however
slight) towards excitement, in the direction of the functional climax of an
orgasm.
(In this context I deliberately omit reference to the very important aspect of
relating that is an exercise in cross-identifications. This must be omitted here
because it belongs to a phase of development that is subsequent to and not prior
to the phase of development with which I am concerned in this paper, that is to
say, the move from self-containment and relating to subjective objects into the
realm of object-usage).
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
In general the subject’s encounter with an object in PS1 involves the instinctual
process of attaining satisfaction via the aim as indicated by a particular erotogenic zone.
As mentioned earlier the nature of the object has no importance other than its ability to
provide pleasure, though early object relations do form a template for later attractions and
substitutions. In PS2 the status of object relating as a function of the instinctual process
becomes secondary to revealing ways the subject uniquely interacts with the object,
especially the ego defense mechanisms that are called upon in the larger process of
personality formation. In neither PS1 nor PS2 is there anything equivalent to a
133
“depletion” of the self that is mentioned in Line 44, which is in line with Freud’s original
economic viewpoint and the related depiction of cathexis as a utilizing only free or
available psychic energy.98 Also, the overall characterization is from an objective
standpoint, not accounting for the quality of change that might be occurring for the
subject.
Line 44 relates a hallmark PS3 proposition on the effects of projective
identification on the subject.99 Unlike PS1 and PS2, this depiction implies that the energy
transferred in object relating is taken from the self and necessarily involves splitting (of
the self) and a change it its state. Also, like other PS3 theorizing descriptions of psychic
processes do not simply provide an objective account, but also take into consideration the
subjective state of the self that results from projective and incorporative processes (e.g.,
“feeling” and “excitement”).
Basic Meaning of “Cathexis”
Cathexis is a psychoanalytically-derived word translated in the Standard Edition
from the German “Besetzung” and is most closely associated with the word “occupation”
in English (Moore and Fine, 1990). Cathexis is a concentration of psychic energy on
some particular person, thing, idea or aspect of the self. It generally describes the
attraction and interest psychic energy has to objects.
98
99
In other words, psychic energy can only be added and not diminished from the organism.
Both Klein and later Bion were instrumental in pointing out how projective processes inherently lead to
fragmented self (Hinshelwood, 1991). Though Winnicott does not distinguish here, Bion (1959, 1962) had
posited two forms of projective identification: “normal” and “abnormal” (Hinshelwood, 1991). Normal
would imply a simple communication of a state of mind, whereas abnormal is an attempt to getting rid of a
painful state by injecting it into someone else, in part to control the object.
134
Related Conceptual Metaphors
Winnicott returns to the idea of object relating, here providing an account of what
occurs within the subject when an object is encountered. He does this by using the
Essential Self Metaphor (see Appendix E) in which the self is depicted as three potential
entities. In English the Essential Self Metaphor is necessary in order to account for any
depiction of a self relating to or reflecting on itself. Winnicott sets up a dual self system
here—a subject and a self—to describe the interaction and relationship between the two
when projective processes are operating. Here the subject is deemed in control of the self
in that it “allows alterations to take place” (Line 42), which Winnicott associates with the
transfer of energy in the process of cathexis. The resulting depletion of the self by the
projective identification process can be characterized using elements of the EventStructure Metaphor:
PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION IS DEPLETION OF THE SELF
The Mind Is A Body
•
The subject, self and objects exist in a bodily container
States Are Locations
•
Paranoid-Schizoid (PS) space = anxiety, dread, persecution
•
Depressive (D) space = empathy, concern, love and hate
Changes Are Movements
•
Intrusion into and from object and self; also, to and from PS and D
Causes Are Forces
•
Projection and introjection as based on Death Instinct; energy from self is
expelled
135
Causation Is Forced Movement
•
Part of self evacuated or “depleted” by projection; the ego is split
Actions Are Self Propelled Movements
•
Self expels objects associated with painful feelings; part of ego then thought to
reside in object
Purposes Are Destinations
•
Projective material reaching/arriving at the object, both for communication and
for evacuation of painful feelings; identification occurs
Means Are Paths
•
Projection and introjection are necessary parts of the path to (ego) development
Commentary
The depiction of the self in the context of projective and introjective processes
generally summarizes an important component of PS3 theorizing that sets it apart from
PS1 and PS2. Among other things it demonstrates how conceptual vantage points (inner
versus outer or subjective versus objective) can reveal the various qualities of similar
psychic processes. It shows also the ubiquity of conceptual metaphors and how important
notions of mind and self are built on very basic depictions of a body as existing in space.
The above conceptual mapping points to how theorizing utilizes existing conceptual
structure to elaborate ideas, such as the tripartite version of the self in the Essential Self
Metaphor. Winnicott will utilize this split nature of the self in his broader characterization
of object usage.
136
Text and Analysis, Lines 47-50
47.
48.
49.
50.
Object-relating is an experience of the subject that can be described in terms of
the subject as an isolate.
When I speak of the use of an object, however, I take object-relating for
granted, and add new features that involve the nature and the behaviour of the
object.
For instance, the object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense
of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections.
It is this, I think, that makes for the world of difference that exists between
relating and usage.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
This paragraph provides an account of object relating from the point of view of
the experiencing subject. In Line 48 the “subject as an isolate” points to the PS1 and PS2
depiction of the objectless state of primary narcissism from which it must emerge to
encounter a shared reality of separate subjects. In its original sense, projection is a
defense mechanism which involves identifying in the external world the source of an
intolerable feeling or thought of a subject.100 Projective mechanisms are viewed as
diminishing the capacity for accurately perceiving objective reality, in part because they
are involved in the ego’s process of distinguishing between subjective and objective
phenomena. Differences in theory regarding projection basically involve the timing of its
emergence and its ultimate impact on differentiating internal and external reality. Anna
Freud’s view is generally representative of PS2, which posits the ego as responsible for
deciphering reality despite the presence of projective and introjective mechanisms. In
100
Freud first conceived of projection in relation to paranoia and later in phobias (Moore & Fine, 1990). Its
complementary mechanism, introjection, related to the oral instinct, is depicted as part of the same overall
process. Abraham connected projection with the phantasy of expelling something anally, an idea that Klein
would utilize in her theorizing (Hinshelwood, 1991).
137
contrast, PS3 views projection and introjection as the very processes that determine
internal and external reality.101
Basic Meaning of “Projection”
To project (verb) involves externalizing a thought or image so that it appears to have an
objective reality.102
Related Conceptual Metaphors
Projection is a key construct used in the psychoanalytic conception of psychic
processes and is related to other ubiquitous mechanisms such as displacement and
transference of psychic energy. It is also critical in the “embodied mind” (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999), in that mappings from a source to target domain involve the transfer
(e.g., projection) of conceptual material based on bodily experiences (e.g., KNOWING IS
SEEING in which knowing something seeing that something). As such all conceptual
metaphors can be thought of as representative of (in one way or another) and related to
the psychoanalytic concept of projection, as it is perhaps the most fundamental process
involved in the meaning making process and of ontology itself. Among other things, the
metaphorical basis of projection in particular and perception in general points to how
101
See Hinshelwood (1991) for a detailed description of the various uses of projection in Kleinian theory.
Broadly, they are: 1) to describe general perceptual capacity; 2) involvement with expulsion of conflict; 3)
relation to identity; and; 4) relation to translocation of the ego into other objects.
102
Contemporary definition of project (verb): 1) To calculate how big something will become in the future
using information that is available now (forecast, predict); 2) To stick out past the edge of a surface or
something; 3) To send an image to a screen or other surface; 4) To give people an idea that someone or
something has particular qualities; 5) To imagine that an emotion you feel is also being felt by someone
else, especially without realizing you are doing this; 6) To plan something; 7) To throw something.
138
dependent humans are on conceptions of our bodily natures to impart reasoning about
reality.
One question that arises in the discussion of projection from the various
psychoanalytic models involves the role it plays in the objective perception of reality.
Along those lines, how might modern metaphor theory account for the semantic rationale
upon which the models base its usage? In its more literal and original usage by Freud as
the transfer of unwanted feelings or ideas into the external world (e.g., as in paranoia),
projection is related to PROJECTION IS EVACUATION, PROJECTION IS
MOVEMENT, and PROJECTION IS DISTORTED SEEING (e.g., “not seeing”
correctly). These constructions are loosely based on the Event-Structure Metaphors
(Appendix C) CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS and CASUES ARE FORCES, in which
projection is the means by which undesirable elements of the psyche are transported into
external objects. The vicissitudes related to projection lead to an inaccurate view of
reality, related to the primary metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING.
While conceptions of projection within PS3 can include the more classical notions
above, in its more expanded use come PROJECTION IS FEELING (e.g., via
identification and incorporation of projected material), PROJECTION IS SEEING (e.g.,
that which perceives objects versus that which only distorts them), and PROJECTION IS
THE MOVEMENT (SPLITTING) OF THE EGO INTO OTHER OBJECTS (e.g., the
notion that psychic transfer necessarily involves ego transfer). This last distinction of
projection as the vehicle through which the ego is transported into another’s space creates
a complication in the clear perception of “the nature and behaviour of the object” of Line
48. That is, comprehending the essential nature of an object requires a conceptual vantage
139
point which transcends the unidirectional (e.g., self or ego-suffused) and atemporal (e.g.,
no time = no space, no separate object, no movement, etc.) views of object relational
space. In other words, accurate perception involves the absence of self in other objects
(e.g., ACCURATE PERCEPTION IS A LOSS OF SELF) and a conception of
multidimensional time that brings into focus the movement of elements of the self into
other objects (e.g., TIME IS THE CREATION OF SPACE, TIME IS MOVEMENT IN
SPACE (INTO AND OUT OF SELF-SPACE), MOVEMENT IS THE SEPARATION
OF SELF AND OBJECT). In general, the PS3 view of ego-splitting involved in
perception points to larger questions of the dual nature of reality.
As evidenced above, projection is the key process involved in the apperception of
reality. Among other things it calls attention to the way ego structure is built into the
organism’s conception of itself and the external world. It simultaneously points to the
limitations of language and its propensity to conceive of reality as necessarily split or
dual in nature (e.g., subject-object, time-no time, space-no space, etc). It brings into focus
the existential question reminiscent of Winnicott’s emerging infant: Do we create reality
or is it always there creating us? Additionally, just what do our mature perceptual
systems, based essentially on our embodied nature, reveal about reality? For example, do
they simply impose and reinforce a false separation of the self from other objects and
externality itself by reifying the concrete (e.g., bodily) over the ephemeral? Along those
lines, Is the embodied mind and its elaboration in language a culprit in creating the
illusion of a dual world or can it be deconstructed and used to reach beyond the material?
140
Commentary
The paragraph is further laying the foundation for the more complete rendition of
object usage. Specifically, Winnicott is saying that the idea he is proposing is not
associated with purely subjective interpretations of reality, but rather with selfdifferentiated phenomena in which two subjects exist. In Line 49 “take for granted”
might be a subtle way of reinforcing an earlier statement relating an overemphasis in
psychoanalysis on narcissistic processes, while simultaneously conveying that certain
aspects of the post-symbiotic world (e.g., of other subjects of equal status) he is
describing have been undervalued or neglected. This language can also be read as
downplaying or diminishing object relating, thereby bolstering the importance of object
usage.103 For Winnicott psychic phenomena are ultimately judged on how well they allow
for the more authentic contact with reality, always taking into account the bidirectional
interplay between internal and external elements.104 There is a sense in his writing that
the attainment of reality or truth must intentionally—and often seemingly
overzealously—involve not only recognition of the other, but the inclusion of a distinctly
separate subject to make it complete.105 In this way psychic differentiation for Winnicott
103
Based on the use of “take for granted” as applied to a person—to neglect or not reciprocate in kind.
Accordingly, the realm of object relating is depicted as a neglected space, rather bleak and desolate. As
such the space in which the isolated subject resides is filled only with illusions (“bundle of projections”
Line 49).
104
The balance he attempts to strike between self and other in the context of spontaneity, genuineness, and
the shared recognition of reality is a precarious one. While on the one hand he portrays authentic existence
as deeply individual (e.g., a subject unique creative capacity, spontaneous gestures, capacity to be alone)
and ultimately hidden from even the experiencing subject (e.g., True Self), on the other there is always the
sense that these processes require another subject’s complementary reinforcement of such (presumably)
subjective givens to reach full elaboration.
105
Winnicott’s need to have others accept his “spontaneous gestures” comes to mind here (Goldman,
1993). Not feeling understood and valued as a separate “subject” was a personal and professional area of
sensitivity that coincidentally played out in his presentation of this very paper to the New York
141
somewhat paradoxically involves the taking in of something foreign to create that which
is genuinely subjective. In cognitive linguistic terms the bringing together of
unquantifiable elements from one domain to another to produce something unique is
associated with the processes of conceptual blending and less with conceptual
metaphor.106
Text and Analysis, Lines 51-52
51.
52.
If I am right in this, then it follows that discussion of the subject of relating is a
much easier exercise for analysts than is the discussion of usage, since relating
may be examined as a phenomenon of the subject, and psychoanalysis always
likes to be able to eliminate all factors that are environmental, except in so far as
the environment can be thought of in terms of projective mechanisms.
But in examining usage there is no escape; the analyst must take into account
the nature of the object, not as a projection, but as a thing in itself.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
The central statement here is related to the range or scope of psychic phenomena
taken into consideration in theorizing and in practice. Winnicott essentially accuses that
the field has chosen the solitary subject as the main focus of investigation, in part because
it more readily allows for theoretical coherence and ease of explication. Even when
external factors are considered it is done so in a way that part of the subject suffuses
Psychoanalytic Society. Interestingly, despite his apparent yearnings to be accommodating and taken
seriously Winnicott was often accused of misrepresenting others’ characterizations of ideas in his writing,
suggesting insensitivity and even overt rejection of others as professionals and as individual “subjects.”
106
Metaphor can be said to be less imaginative than conceptual blending in that it is involved with drawing
parallels between existing and established associations (e.g., this is that—LOVE IS A JOURNEY).
Essentially nothing new comes into being, but rather elements are transferred from one conceptual domain
to another. Blending involves incorporating indeterminate aspects of two or more phenomena that results in
a possibly infinite emergent conceptual outcomes. In other words, the qualities that become associative and
meaningful are not determined until they are put together in a subject’s mind in a unique act of creation.
142
qualities of the environment (e.g., projection processes). In terms of how this myopic
viewpoint played out in clinical theory, Winnicott asserted that the object-analyst as a
“thing in itself” (Line 52) had been seemingly ignored. For example, in Freud’s original
conception, the analyst was somewhat illusory figure that served as a repository for the
patient’s displaced feelings and thoughts for early childhood figures. Though the eventual
goal of treatment was to be able to view and relate to the therapist as a real person, this
representation of the analyst (e.g., transference) was reinforced by technique (e.g., “blank
screen” and rules such as abstinence). As in PS2 that followed, Freud would come to
view the ego as the psychic structure which ultimately allows the subject to perceive
reality.107 PS2 technique sought to align the therapist with the ego’s adaptive functions,
though the conception of the therapist as a subject was for the most part non-existent.
Metaphors such as the “analyzing instrument” (Fleming & Benedek, 1983) highlight a
more technical view of the therapist, who is portrayed as valuable for mechanistic versus
personal qualities.108
PS3’s view of reality is more mutable and subjective, based primarily on the
processes of projection and introjection. The external world in the paranoid-schizoid
position is more distorted as it is perceived through the veil of persecutory anxieties.
107
One of the dilemmas of this and other conceptions of reality in psychoanalysis is how the ego or mind—
an entity comprised of built-in structure as shaped by uniquely subjective processes such as projection,
fantasy, identification, conflict, etc.—is able to come to accurately represent that which exists in the world.
Resulting stances in psychoanalysis range from viewing reality as necessarily subjective and relative based
on the inherent nature of our minds, to positing a fixed world or concrete object that can objectively known
by the removal of self-distorting elements (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973). The finding of modern cognitive
science reveal that “experientialism”— which is neither completely subjective nor objective—best
describes human epistemology (see Appendix A for overview findings of cognitive linguistic with
implications for the human sciences).
108
The construct “analyzing instrument” is attributed to Otto Isakower. From this one could conceive of
THE THERAPIST IS A MACHINE.
143
With the attainment of the depressive position the fear for the survival of the self
becomes a concern for the fully recognized loved object, which is now sought to be
incorporated. The accurate appraisal of the external world comes about as incorporation
of good objects increases and projection of fearful objects decreases. In general, like PS1
and PS2, the subjective qualities of the analyst are themselves not viewed as important
vis-á-vis the accurate perception of reality.
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
The therapist’s need to take into consideration the “nature of the object” (Line
52) as a “thing in itself” points to long-held notions of essences in philosophy. In this
conception what is considered most innate or inherent is what is deemed true or real.
Winnicott’s discussion of the essence of objects follows the Essential Self Metaphor
(e.g., “I just wasn’t I myself that day”) in which the object is divided into parts which
delineate its real and unreal qualities.109 As mentioned, the False Self is an obstacle that
prevents the manifestation of the True Self and thus keeps hidden the essential quality of
the individual (THE FALSE SELF IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO (FINDING) THE TRUE
SELF). For Winnicott a related barrier to seeing an object’s essence is the inability or
unwillingness to transcend the solipsistic realm of object relating, pointing to the “ease”
109
This and other metaphors of the self work conceptually because any object is a subject from its own
vantage point (e.g., in relation to other objects).
144
(Line 52)—and perhaps even joy—in existing in “isolated” (Line 47) states. It can be
posited, then, that the false self colludes to maintain such modes of functioning by
“eliminating” (Line 51) the possibility for a more genuine association with the
environment and by tapping into the inherent desire to be alone.110 In Line 52 Winnicott
seems to imply that like the patient the therapist must work to “escape” the inclination to
remain in isolated states, which is reinforced by viewing externality as simply a function
of “projections” and not as manifestations of that which is real.111 One broader
implication is that when therapy does not to a sufficient degree take into account the
bidirectional field of reality (e.g., mutual recognition of “shared reality” as evidenced
through separate subjecthood), it reinforces the tendency in both the patient and therapist
to remain in isolated realms of existence. An implied and complicating factor that is that
one achieved, states of mind reflective of object usage do not function completely
separate from those of associated with object relating; rather, they forever exist in
dialectical tension and are mutually reinforcing.
110
In The Capacity to Be Alone (1958) Winnicott writes that there is an aspect of solitude that is—like
object usage—a development milestone fostered by the presence of a reliable object. Therefore, modes of
solitude associated with the realm of object relating might be viewed as under-developed attempts to
establish a genuine tie to an object. Developmental maturation involves the introjection of a reliable object
which from that point on exists as part of the subject, creating a permanent dyadic psychic space and buffer
against existential (versus external and concrete) loneliness. To Winnicott the capacity to be alone occurs
not in complete solitude but rather in another’s presence, one whose characteristics as a separate subject are
taken into account. From this perspective could be posited LONELINESS IS UNITY, in which the
essential qualities of both subject and object are enlivened in each other’s presence. In the therapeutic realm
such states are utilized in the service of remediation or growth in patients who possess this ability, and
strived for in situations where the capacity to be alone is absent. In the context of Winnicott’s larger
theoretical configuration, it can be said that pre- object usage modes of solitude in the therapist are
recruited by the patient’s False Self to create the illusion of psychic unity.
111
In other words to view externality as exclusively a function of projection eliminates the possibility of
considering more experiential ways of knowing, importantly ones that require a wider conceptual vantage
point that takes into account both subject and object. In this way projection keeps separate modes of
experience that require a move beyond self-referential reasoning.
145
Commentary
This short paragraph is on the surface a proposal to expand the therapeutic field
of inquiry to include elements of externality that had to that point been ignored in
theorizing. By considering the nature or essence of objects Winnicott is also attempting to
integrate a traditional philosophical conception of the self into a psychoanalytic model of
the mind. The exercise calls attention to the complex and multi-dimensional processes
involved in perception. In this instance the implication is that in object usage the subject
and the object are required to view each other from a conceptual vantage point in which
the shared versus “isolated” existence of each is accepted. However, implicit in
apprehending the essential nature of an object as a “thing in itself” requires an acceptance
of both its externality as well as its independent or intrapsychic existence. In other words,
while the accurate apprehension of the nature of an object requires viewing qualities that
transcend simple projection material, it does not negate the fact that intrapsychic
processes (related to and including object relating states) continue to be part of one’s
essence. So, it seems that an inherent “new feature” that characterizes the perceptual
capacity in object usage is the ability to accept (e.g., “take for granted”) the subject’s
more internal existence while also simultaneously transcending it by considering its
externally manifested or shared qualities.
This complexity points in part to the limitations language imposes in our
conception of essences, in that the inherent qualities of a self are viewed spatially and
thus conceptually separate from its more external traits (e.g., the hidden quality
Winnicott’s True Self). In general the embodied mind promotes a conception that nothing
external to the self is able to infringe on its essence, thus reinforcing an inherent split in
146
the self (e.g., Multiple Self Metaphor). An implication is that the self as an observer is
conditioned from early in life to view reality from conceptual vantage points that segment
and reify space in a way limits a more fluid and multidirectional field of inquiry.
Therefore, Winnicott’s decision to utilize conceptions of mind and causality based on the
Essential Self Metaphor in a way limits a broader depiction of objects by setting-up a
conceptual space that is segmented and inhabited by impenetrable elements,
paradoxically reminiscent of realms of object relating.112
Text and Analysis, Lines 53-56
53.
54.
55.
For the time being may I leave it at that, that relating can be described in terms
of the individual subject, and that usage cannot be described except in terms of
acceptance of the object's independent existence, its property of having been
there all the time?
You will see that it is just these problems that concern us when we look at the
area which I have tried to draw attention to in my work on what I have called
transitional phenomena.
But this change does not come about automatically, by maturational process
alone. 56. It is this detail that I am concerned with.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
Winnicott here summarizes his proposition distinguishing between the realms of
object relating and object usage. The word “acceptance” (Line 53) would seem to convey
the notion that this process is under the control of the individual subject, though he will
112
This is due in large part to the dilemma inherent in our conceptual systems as limited by our embodied
nature. In other words, to call attention to qualities that are not “essential” or readily observable in an object
(e.g., mental attributes or processes) requires a splitting of the self into component parts, precisely because
we have no other way of conceiving such phenomena outside the perspective that it (the object) and we
inhabit containers that exist in some determinable space. Winnicott’s construct of transitional space can be
generally viewed as an attempt to transcend embodied notions of space and time. In a similar way the self’s
attainment of object usage status will be shown to rely on defying certain reified notions of space and time.
147
soon make the point that the nature and behavior of the object directly influences the
subject’s capacity to make this transition. Though external phenomena are considered in
PS1, PS2, and PS3, the attainment of objective reality is depicted more as an internal
process (based on “maturational processes” Line 55) than on that which occurs outside
the auto-contained environment of the self or ego. In terms of his introduction of the
element of time in this paragraph, readers familiar with his paper on the transitional
object would notice a similar application of the idea that time exists and functions
differently based on the conceptual vantage point of the subject.
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
As discussed previously Winnicott’s conception of transitional space is that
which links realms of auto-contained and bidirectional states of mind. In Line 53
Winnicott adds to it the concept of time (it is used twice) and draws attention to common
logic asserting that objects existing in the present must necessarily have a history in the
past, even if they were not perceived by the subject. In the context of his larger depiction,
the human conception of time is inherently related to the attainment of object usage in
that it requires more than a unidirectional vantage point of reality.113 Viewed in this way
transitional space can be conceived as the initiator of time—TRANSITIONAL SPACE
113
The inherent categories of past, present, and future allow for the flow of information, causality, etc. to
and from three distinct vantage points.
148
IS THE CREATOR OF TIME—because by allowing for the recognition of the object it
is simultaneously creating the existence of time (see Metaphors of Time in Appendix F
for the ubiquity of objects in our understanding of time). In other words, time requires the
presence of at least one other recognizable and separate object for it to function. One
important purpose of transitional space is to connect mental states associated with “no
time” with that of “time.” Transformation from object relating to object usage, then, is
involved with the simultaneous creation of a separate object and time:
State 1 (“No Time”) Object Relating
•
Isolated subject exists in auto-contained space without time
Intermediate State (“Suspended Time”)
•
Represented as transitional space and path between states of mind114
State 2 (“Time”) Object Usage
•
Subject recognizes object in bidirectional space and time is created
Commentary
This section more explicitly introduces the element of time into the depiction of
object usage through the idea of transitional space. It calls attention to the dependence
our conceptual systems have on objects as a way of understanding everyday ideas such as
time and ways Winnicott utilizes certain built-in conceptual limitations to draw key
theoretical conclusions. What will be increasingly shown throughout the analysis is his
114
Conceived of in this way transitional space is a psychic connector of time and space reminiscent of
wormholes in physics. A wormhole is a hypothetical construct in which dimensions of time and space are
thought to be traversed instantly (See pp. 264-265 in Greene, 2003).
149
propensity to manipulate foundational and seemingly reified metaphors in a way that
transcends embodied reasoning, prompting the reader to consider more transcendent
views of reality. Further examples and discussion of time will be forthcoming in the
analysis.
Text and Analysis, Lines 57-58
57.
58.
In clinical terms: two babies are feeding at the breast; one is feeding on the self
in the form of projections, and the other is feeding on (using) milk from a
woman's breast.
Mothers, like analysts, can be good or not good enough; some can and some
cannot carry her baby over from relating to usage.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
The basic analogy in this paragraph is between breastfeeding and therapy.
Breastfeeding in PS1 and PS2 is more strictly involved with satisfying instinctual needs,
which in therapy are designed not to be generally gratified. It is the therapist’s alignment
with the more mature ego functions of the patient that forms the basis of the therapeutic
alliance. In PS3 the breast represents the infant’s first part-object which becomes imbued
with positive or negative attributes based on how it is at the moment perceived to be
“good” or “bad.” 115 Like PS1 and PS2, therapy from a PS3 perspective would not be
conceived as associated with the early caregiving relationship. Its primary function is the
115
Part-objects exist in the paranoid-schizoid realm, and the infant conceives of the object’s nature and
intention based on somatic experiences and sensations. However, as a part-object the breast is significant
more for what it represents emotionally than for its actual physical characteristics.
150
reduction of anxiety using deep interpretations which included the more aggressive and
hostile elements of the transference.116
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
By depicting therapy as synonymous with a breastfeeding and a caregiving
relationship—the primary source of the earliest sensorimotor experiences that form the
basis of our conceptual systems—a multitude of metaphors are implicated. In terms of the
provision of emotional nutrients in Line 57, one could conceive THERAPY IS
BREASTFEEDING, THE ANALYST IS A MOTHER, and THE PATIENT IS AN
INFANT. Conceived in this way the quality of that which is provided depends on the
contents of the treatment-breast and is loosely speaking accomplished through the
metaphor EATING IS ACQUIRING IDEAS (see Metaphors of Mind Appendix D).117
Here the implication is that projections fuel an auto-contained cycle in which potential
nutrients from the outside are banned and the organism is forced to eat itself. From this
116
The emphasis on the negative transference and in interpreting what is considered the most elemental
unconscious psychic material in PS3 are two of the main factors that set it apart from PS1 and PS2. In child
therapy, detractors from early on equated these Kleinan “deep” interpretations that called attention to
negative transference as harsh and unnecessary. Hinshelwood (1991) points out that Classical technique
was designed to maintain a degree of positive transference and thus focused interpretations on instinctual
impulses that occurred in the preconscious state.
117
Actually, in Winnicott’s conception it is not knowledge per se that is acquired but rather the psychic
capacity for self-other differentiation, which is a crucial ontological achievement. Nevertheless, the
implication seems to be that symbolism comes into being with the onset of object usage, in that it requires
the ability to conceive of more than one separately existing object.
151
can be conceived OBJECT REALTING IS CANABILISM and THE SELF IS
NOXIOUS. In Line 58 Winnicott portrays the therapist’s capabilities using the EventStructure Metaphor (see Appendix C) in which change or causation is associated with
forced movement (“carry over” in Line 58) through space. THE ANALYST IS A
VEHICLE describes this general function whose quality as “good” or “not good enough”
will determine the ultimate success or failure in reaching object usage status.
Commentary
Drawing an analogy between the early infant-mother caregiving environment and
therapy opens up novel ways of conceiving the overall treatment process. It shifts from a
unidirectional, mechanistic and experience-distant focus one that is bidirectional,
relational, and more experience-near. In general Winnicott’s ontological metaphors of
early life can prompt the reader to consider more elemental aspects of their own
experience. Because the foundations of all metaphors on which we base ontology and
reasoning are formed in infancy and early childhood, Winnicott’s constructs of
transformation and their unique depiction of infant experience also provide insights into
how built-in neurological structure interacts with the environment to create our
conceptual-metaphorical systems of thought. Though the outcome of this process has
been found to create primary metaphors based on our embodied nature that are universal
across individuals and cultures, each subject’s biopsychosocial experience and status
shapes preferred styles of conceptualizing experience. It here that psychoanalysis in
general and Winnicott’s ontological constructs of infancy in particular might begin to fill-
152
in the gap and provide a more varied and nuanced account of how universal metaphors
are elaborated in the lives of individual subjects.118
Text and Analysis, Lines 59-60
59.
60.
I would like to put in a reminder here that the essential feature in the concept of
transitional objects and phenomena (according to my presentation of the
subject) is the paradox, and the acceptance of the paradox: the baby creates the
object but the object was there waiting to be created and to become a cathected
object.
I tried to draw attention to this aspect of transitional phenomena by claiming
that in the rules of the game we all know that we will never challenge the baby
to elicit an answer to the question: did you create that or did you find it?
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
The paradox of the baby is a depiction of the child’s first encounter with the first
fully recognized object. It is a hypothetical statement about the nature of psychic
processes at work surrounding this event. In general cathexis is used in all three models
to represent the status of psychic energy relative to other objects. Though itself not a
force, cathexis denotes the intensity of a subject’s emotional investment in an object. As
such it is a necessary component in the process of recognizing the self in relation to other
objects. As mentioned, the general characterization of this process for PS1 is a result of
the frustration of instincts and for PS2 the maturation of ego capacities that allow for a
more accurate understanding of the self in relation to other objects (e.g., object
118
The individualization of metaphor and universal symbols has from the beginning been a prime quest of
psychoanalysis (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). Clinical work from this framework is essentially an
examination and deconstruction of a patient’s embodied metaphorical system as it exists vis-á-vis
experiences with other embodied objects.
153
constancy). Overall the language used to depict the onset of self-other differentiation is
more scientific and reminiscent of Freud’s metapsychological depiction of the human
mind. It can be generally characterized as experience-distant, since the conceptual
vantage point lay outside the psychic space which is being described.
The achievement of reality status is in Kleinan terms synonymous with the
depressive position and the transformation of part-objects into a unified whole. The
infant’s subjective view of the whole object signifies a coming together of love and hate
in the form of concern for the object’s survival and well-being. It is the absence of the
distorting influence of projective processes, designed mainly to keep the infant safe in the
paranoid-schizoid position, which ultimately allows the object to be experienced in a new
way. In the depressive position introjection of “good objects” replaces the projection of
“bad objects” as the central mode of experience. Similar to PS1 and PS2 the linguistic
depiction in PS3 of these and other psychic processes utilize metapsychological
constructs, but also infuse them with a subjective or phenomenological account. Klein’s
writing is rife with depictions that posit how affective and conceptual elements of
projective and introjective processes are experienced by the infant.119 The vantage point
shifts from inside and outside the conceptual space in which the psychic processes occur,
119
See Hinshelwood (1991, pp. 440-444) for an excellent discussion on Klein’s blending of
metapsychological and phenomenological accounts of psychic processes and also on the “mind-body
problem” (pp. 350-353). In general the dilemma surrounds the conceptual vantage point from which
psychic phenomena are viewed and the corresponding language used to depict subjective and objective
phenomena. Modern metaphor theory sheds some light here, demonstrating that all Western conceptions of
the mind are in fact metaphorically determined and based on our experience of inhabiting a body. In other
words what we consider objective reality is necessarily suffused with embodied-subjective elements
(Lakoff and Johnson’s “experientialism”). Hinshelwood aptly characterizes Klein’s attempt to bridge the
gap between the biological and psychological through ideas such as unconscious phantasy as “the science
of the subjective.” He also points out that Klein’s use of different words to distinguish between
phenomenological and metapsychological processes (e.g., “incorporation” as the subjective experience of
“introjection”).
154
requiring the reader to identify with aspects of experience of both the subject and the
object.120
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
The paradox of the baby is associated with the elements of time and creation, and
with it Winnicott makes a key theoretical point and larger ontological statement. He
linguistically draws on the ubiquitous human experience of objects existing (or not
existing) in space to depict the experience of encountering reality. Utilizing the same
structure of time in relation to states of mind as previously evidenced, here Winnicott
infuses the element of objects and space to provide an account of the onset of realitybased thinking:
Time 1 – Subject View (SV)
•
•
120
No object or object cathexis; self-cathexis or energetic “occupation” of self;
desolate space
No time exists
Additionally, these shifting vantage points from inside and outside objects abundant in Klein’s use of
language create an experience akin to early infant life. In particular the experience parallels the infant’s
early exploration process involving objects (e.g., the nipple, toys, parts of their own body, etc.) which are
the first organizers of psychic and physical life. It is from sensorimotor interaction with these objects that
forms the basis of a conceptual metaphorical system of thought.
155
Time 1 – Object View (OV)
•
•
•
Subject and object exist in occupied but separate (psychic) space
Subject as cathected or non-cathected object
Time exists
Time 2 – Subject View (SV)
•
•
•
Recognition of object; cathexis or “occupation” of object
Blending of Time 1 (SV) and Time 1 (OV) = creation or finding of object and time
Subject “enhanced” by object
Time 2 – Object View (OV)
•
•
•
Subject joins object time and object space
Reduction of object space via “occupation”
Object experiences being found (not created) by subject
The paradox of the infant provides a hypothetical depiction of what can be
conceived of as a timeless (pre-time) and objectless (pre-object) space. Because
conceptual metaphors depend on objects as existing in space for all of its foundational
semantic structure, including a description of time, Winnicott’s account of this realm of
the subjective object as existing in transitional space essentially provides a first hand
account of the birth of symbolism and metaphor itself. In this way it supplements
conceptual metaphor theory by providing a context from which one can speculate on the
qualitative effect this experience has on an emerging conceptual system. A number of
questions come to mind: For example, what if anything in the distinctive nature of this
first encounter with an object contributes to the quality of one’s unique conceptualmetaphorical system of thinking and experiencing the world? Do objects, space, and time
themselves become imbued with subjective shades of meaning that will go on to
influence the manner in which conceptual metaphors are utilized in thought and
communication? If so, how might these unique qualities be revealed in a more empirical
156
analysis of a text or speech? How can psychoanalysis aid in this effort, in that it is
inherently and deeply involved in the deconstruction of psychosomatic experience as
revealed through language? These and other questions would seem to require a more
thorough analysis using the tools of modern cognitive science as applied to uniquely
experienced early sensorimotor experiences.
Commentary
The use of paradox is characteristic of Winnicott’s both provocative and playful
style of relating his clinical findings. He sets up in Line 61 a mental space of a ritual or
“game” in which there are agreed upon protocols which prompt the reader to consider the
absurdity of not following the “rules.” Among other things it evokes a humorous image
of the infant child being questioned by an investigator about the psychic events that just
transpired. The sudden presence of the object here has criminal overtones, with the child
needing to “come clean” with the details of its origins. One could imagine an awe-struck
child trying to comprehend the enormity of what has just transpired while being asked to
articulate something ineffable. For Winnicott this is perhaps the most crucial time in
development because the manner in which these experiences are integrated become
templates of relating, both to external objects and between the true and false self. In a
parallel way he is demonstrating the non-intrusive quality and corresponding freeness of
space that must occur in treatment for objects to become usable. The constriction of space
created by unnecessary impingement (such as premature or untimely interpretations that
derail the natural integration of psychic events) brings to mind conceptual metaphors
157
such as IMPINGEMENT IS A RESTRICTOR OF (POTENTIAL) SPACE, THE
THERAPIST IS AN INTERROGATOR, and PREMATURE KNOWLEDGE IS
DESTRUCTIVE.
Text and Analysis, Lines 61-66
61. I am now ready to go straight to the statement of my thesis.
62. It seems I am afraid to get there, as if I fear that once the thesis is stated the
purpose of my communication is at an end, because it is so very simple.
63. To use an object the subject must have developed a capacity to use objects.
64. This is part of the change to the reality principle.
65. This capacity cannot be said to be inborn, nor can its development in an
individual be taken for granted.
66. The development of a capacity to use an object is another example of the
maturational process as something that depends on a facilitating environment.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
A key statement in this section is that the psychological attainment of reality
status requires the presence of certain psychic capacities whose growth to full
development is dependent on the quality of the environment. As discussed, to this point
psychoanalytic theorizing focused less on the specific nature of the environment as a
contributor to the developing infant and more on the built-in structure of the ego as the
mechanism by which the self and environment are differentiated. According to PS1 and
PS2 what is important at the earliest stages of development is the ego’s capacity to
differentiate between pain and pleasure. The nature of the environment is important in
only a very broad sense—mainly in its ability to satisfy instinctual urges. How the
environment or caregiver experienced and processed the emotional needs was generally
not identified. PS3 similarly accounts for the attainment of reality-based thinking as
158
mostly biologically determined. However, though specific responses by caregivers were
not laid out by Klein, the implication was that the ability of the environment to contain
emotions was important. Bion’s construct of the “container” (1959) and “reverie” (1962)
more fully elaborated the function of the caregiver-therapist as an emotional repository
and facilitator in the integration of emotions.
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
Winnicott declares that his central argument in the paper (Line 63) is a statement
about the relationship between using and the ability to use objects in the world. In typical
fashion he deconstructs and rearranges what is ordinarily considered a straightforward
event or process, compelling the reader to consider alternative relationships between
basic ontological concepts. For example, in Line 63 the verb “use” and the noun
“capacity” are presented in a way that the skills and mechanisms that make up the ability
must be taken into consideration. That is, the typical employment of “use” presupposes
the aptitude to perform the tasks which comprise the utilization of an instrument or
object: USING IS BEING ABLE TO USE. For example, “She is using a pencil” implies
the ability to grasp, hold, and manipulate the pencil into order to produce words on a
piece of paper. The skills which go into performing the action are implied by virtue of
engaging in or completing the very action. Because “use” is so central to our embodied
nature (e.g., humans as contained objects manipulating and interacting with other
159
objects), it subsumes the most basic elements of human ontology. However, in doing so it
also points to the distance language creates in the reader from the more basic
sensorimotor elements that comprise everyday actions, disguising the more elemental
processes that underlie basic existence. Therefore, it can be said that Winnicott’s
particular employment of “use” and “capacity” in Line 63 points to the reification of
language and its tendency to disconnect us from our basic nature of being. In doing so
this construction also importantly prompts the reader to look backward in time to the
more essential and embodied nature of basic concepts and experience. Specifically, the
word “capacity” has the effect of halting the forward conceptual movement inherent in
the present tense “use.”121
Winnicott produces this backward perspective by indirectly drawing on our
conceptual metaphors of time (see Moving Time Metaphor in Appendix F). Specifically,
in the Moving Time Metaphor the past is conceptualized as moving away, the present as
moving through (or directly past), and the future as moving toward an observer. As
living, embodied beings existing in the time-space continuum humans are conceptualized
as objects moving toward the future (e.g., “I’m on my way to old age”) and away from
the past (e.g., “That memory is behind me). So, by calling attention to the a priori
capacities that form the basis for successfully “using” an object, Winnicott creates the
effect of slowing the natural forward progression associated with time and space. The
reader is forced to go backwards in time to catch up to the past where the determinative
processes for the capacity for object usage exist (e.g., a survivable and responsive
121
That is, implicit in capacity is notion of having learned something at a previous point in time. Use, as a
present tense verb or noun, implies inherently possessing that capacity to perform an action or function in
current time.
160
caregiving environment).122 In a clinical sense this slowing of time can be linked to the
open, free-flowing and unimpinged psychic space on which psychoanalysis depends. It is
within this space that the patient has the opportunity to either rediscover or create new
embodied foundations of experience on which object usage rests. For the therapist this
exercise requires a continual navigation of time and space (e.g., analytic space as present
elaboration of early caregiving environment) and the consideration of therapeutic
interactions not only as outcomes of past events and capacities, but also as future causes
of yet to transpire relational events. The following figure summarizes the terms “use”
and “capacity” in relation to time:
122
The lines immediately preceding the central statement of the paper (61 and 62) also reinforce the
slowing down of time. Specifically, the allusion to fear evokes the experience of time standing still in the
face of impending danger. Also, the characteristic Winnicottian reluctance to arrive (“get there” in Line 61)
at any static location is here put into the service of creating a sense of elongated time. Read as continuation
of the last paragraph (e.g., the paradox of the baby and time), the fear at reaching a conclusion in Line 61
similarly reflects the apprehension with which the infant fully recognizes and embraces the object as other.
In other words, though it marks the beginning of existing in a world of other subjects, it also signifies the
“end” (Line 62) of a timeless state that is more closely associated with bodily transcendence and eternity.
161
Time -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present
Past
Space
Behind
Concepts
In, Around
Capacity
(Acquired Skill)
In Front Of
Use/Capacity
(Performed Skill)
No Capacity
Capacity to Use =
Future Use
No Performance
Therapy Primary Object Used
Discovery of Self
via Other
Future
No Future Use
Therapist Used
Future Use
Re-discovery of Self
via Other
Continual Re-discovery of
Self via Others
Primary Object Not Used (1) Therapist Not Used
No Discovery of Self
Impingement/Isolation
Non-Survival
Therapist as Subjective Object
Countertransference Pull
to Impingement/Isolation
Primary Object Not Used (2) New Response by Therapist
No Use = Object
Relating
Others as Subjective
Objects
Others as Neglectful
or Persecuting Objects
Object Usage
(Same as Above)
Survival
Helpful Objects
(Same as Above)
“First” Discovery/Creation
of Self
Continued Discovery/
Creation of Self via Others
Figure 6. Use and Capacity in Relation to Time
162
Commentary
Related to the above outline of time in relation to the capacity to use objects is
the question of innate versus environmental influence (Lines 65 and 66) in developing the
requisite symbolic capability to accurately perceive reality. Winnicott makes the case that
a certain kind of milieu (Line 66, a “facilitating environment”) is necessary to foster the
cognitive maturation needed for object usage. This assertion has important implications
and parallels for conceptual metaphor theory. Specifically, humans’ built-in conceptualneurological systems depend on experiences with the environment to activate the
processes that eventually set down our core conceptual templates based on metaphor
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). It is from this group of primary conceptual metaphors that
correlations with similar phenomena are made. However, similar to PS1, PS2, and PS3
conceptual metaphor theory assumes an adequately responsive environment in which the
earliest sensorimotor experiences become linked with ideas and words. In other words, it
does not take into account the variability in the environment’s capacity (e.g., stimulation,
responsiveness, “fit,” etc.) to meet the emerging needs of the infant, which, among other
things, has implications for how experiences based on embodied metaphor are integrated
into the infant’s emerging perceptual system.
What Winnicott is stressing in terms of the quality of the environment the
requisite factor in acquiring reality-based thinking has implications for both
psychoanalytic and conceptual metaphoric accounts of symbolic development. Indeed,
modern developmental research has shown that the responsiveness of the environment
affects the quality of the developing infant’s representational systems, as characterized in
attachment-related constructs such as “mindsharing”, “reflective function” and
163
“mentalization” (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Palombo, 2006).123 When such
systems do not form adequately arrests can occur impacting a potentially wide range of
developmental functions, related to the inability to match internal representations based
on conceptual metaphor with external phenomena. The disconnection of internal systems
of representation and external reality is clearly seen in psychosis where there is a
complete collapse of one’s symbolic system. In general, metaphor theory has not as yet
begun to distinguish the quality of the early sensorimotor environment as a factor in
metaphor formation. It is here that psychoanalytic accounts of the early caregiving
environment and modern infant development might fill the gap in conceptual metaphor
theory.
Text and Analysis, Lines 67-68
67.
68.
In the sequence one can say that first there is object-relating, then in the end
there is object-use; in between, however, is the most difficult thing, perhaps, in
human development; or, the most irksome of all the early failures that come for
mending.
This thing that there is in between relating and use is the subject's placing of the
object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control, that is, the subject's
perception of the object as an external phenomenon, not as a projective entity, in
fact recognition of it as an entity in its own right.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
Previous sections have outlined the various models’ characterization of object
relating and object usage, as well as the function and purpose of projection as a
123
There have also been object relational accounts of uniquely configured symbolic systems in the
childhood psychoses and autistic disorders that have interesting implications for the embodied foundations
of conceptual metaphor theory. In general, Bick’s “skin container” (1968), Tustin’s (1972) “black hole”
and Meltzer’s (1975) “adhesive identification” are constructs that generally seek to describe the experience
of one’s body as symbolically perceived vis-à-vis other objects in space.
164
mechanism of the ego. A direct account such as the one provided by Winnicott in Line 68
of what occurs “between” states associated with object relating and objects usage is not
found in any of the three models. However, all psychoanalytic accounts would generally
agree that the transformation of narcissism involves a shift to a wider and more inclusive
conceptual vantage point in which objects are viewed as separate and having their own
volition and existence.
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
The statement outlining the subject’s ability to place the object outside its own
control as a key process in the shift from object relating to object usage recruits
conceptual data from Metaphors of Mind (Appendix D) and Metaphors of Self (Appendix
E). As discussed, Metaphors of Self involve the characterization of the self as a physical
object or container whose character is metaphorically determined by virtue of its:
1. location in space;
2. possession of itself and other objects, and;
3. control of itself or other objects.
These three main factors, based directly on early sensorimotor experiences related
to our physical embodiment, are used to draw analogies with the non-physical or psychic
phenomena we call self. The status of the self on these measures results in its depiction
as:
165
1. in or out of control;
2. having an objective or non-objective viewpoint;
3. having multiple parts or roles, and;
4. revealing or not revealing its core essence.124
Winnicott’s key statement in Line 68 is most related to the self’s control (#1) and
conceptual vantage point (#2), though these characteristics in themselves do not account
for the complete idea.
Winnicott’s main proposition—that the subject’s placement of the object outside
its area of omnipotent control as a means of gaining the capacity to accurately perceive
reality—cannot be captured by any one conceptual metaphor. The semantic foundation
on which the complete depiction is based combines aspects of Metaphors of Self and
Metaphors of Mind. Specifically, from the Metaphors of Self are recruited CAUSING
THE SELF TO ACT IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT, SELF
CONTROL IS BEING IN ONE’S NORMAL LOCATION, and aspects of the Objective
Standpoint Metaphor (see Appendix D). Viewed from these perspectives, the self’s
action, as evidenced by movement of the object outside self-contained space, is made
possible because it originates in an area where the self is in control (of itself and
especially the object). However, in this configuration the status of the self as in control
(versus not in control) is not the important point being made, but rather what is
accomplished through the use of the self’s control (of another object). The significant
outcome of this process is that reality-based thinking is born, largely due to the influence
124
Seen in this way our metaphors used to describe the self are rather limited in scope and depth. Other
conceptual metaphorical configurations are required to achieve the richness which is usually ascribed to the
concept of the self, especially in disciplines such as psychoanalysis where it is multifaceted and central to
the depiction of psychic functioning.
166
exerted by the self to remove the object to an external position that represents objectivity
(see The Objective Standpoint Metaphor of Self in Appendix E).125 This idea of removing
something to gain understanding is based on the Metaphor of Mind THINKING IS
PERCEIVING and its submappings Knowing Is Seeing and Impediments To Knowledge
Are Impediments To Vision (e.g., “Her judgment is no longer clouded by cultish
thinking,” or “I think see can finally see the light”).
A closer examination of the typical conceptual foundation on which Metaphors of
Self are based will reveal that Winnicott makes a subtle but important shift in causeeffect relationship that leads to a novel way of depicting the onset of reality-based
thinking. As mentioned, being in control or in possession of oneself or another object in a
space that is equated with the self’s typical location contributes to gaining knowledge of
the object. For example, KNOWING IS SEEING, SEEING IS TOUCHING,
UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, and RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES all
point to how physical proximity is crucial in having the influence required to perform the
necessary actions that lead to gaining an understanding of the object. In Winnicott’s
schema, however, it is the relinquishment of control of the object by virtue of removing it
from close proximity that ultimately leads to an accurate understanding of it. In other
words, the omnipotence that once held the object captive as part of the self in object
relational space is put into service as the main vehicle with which the object is
transported into transitional space. Upon arrival the object undergoes a transformation
125
A splitting of the self is implied here though not explicitly stated by Winnicott. Specifically, the object
(minus its self-projected attributes) assumes a position in externality that is synonymous with objective
thinking. That the self reaches this same position simultaneously would seem to indicate that at least some
portion of the self is also transported. In terms of conceptual metaphors, The Scattered Self and Getting
Outside Yourself (Appendix E) reflects the idea that the objective interpretation of reality requires the
translocation of portions of the self into multiple conceptual vantage points.
167
which includes it becoming beyond the control of the subject, while simultaneously
viewed as separate and knowable as a “thing in itself.”
That omnipotence is responsible for bringing about the circumstances under
which an object is allowed to exist in its true essence is somewhat paradoxical, in that the
word is typically associated with control and the creation of objects in the image of its
creator.126 However, because omnipotence is representative of thinking itself in object
relational states of mind it must be incorporated in any account that seeks to posit the
transcendence of that state. In psychoanalysis omnipotence is generally related to an
overvaluation of one’s thought processes vis-à-vis reality. As such it has connotations to
irrational or delusional thinking, gratuitous wish fulfillment, narcissism, and destruction.
Here, however, its use is generative and the means by which rational thinking is actually
born.
Winnicott’s unique utilization of omnipotence also calls attention to the
developmental enfolding of thought, that with the attainment of object usage becomes
from that point forward a dialectic between unidirectional and bidirectional states of
mind. In particular, his depiction reveals how omnipotent thinking as it occurs in the
unidirectional and auto-contained state of object relating becomes transformed and usable
for perceiving other points of view in bidirectional and non-contained states of mind.
Viewed from this perspective, omnipotent elements of thinking in actuality form the
foundation of more mature thought.127
126
Omnipotence (n), 1b. As an attribute of God, or of a person: the fact or quality of having unlimited or
infinite power. Also: the fact or quality of having great power or strength.
127
In other words, self-contained, unidirectional and all-powerful aspects of omnipotent thinking that rule
in the realm of object relational space do not completely disappear (see Line 91 for non-destruction of
168
To summarize, the underlying metaphors which comprise the overall idea of
omnipotence in relation to the attainment of reality-based thinking are OMNIPOTENCE
IS RELINGUSIHING CONTROL, OMNIPOTENCE IS A GENERATIVE USE OF
CONTROL, THE BIRTH OF REALITY IS AN OMNIPOTENT ACT OF SELF
CONTROL, UNDERSTANDING IS LETTING GO, and KNOWING IS NOT SEEING.
From this can be proposed the following schema:
The Paradox of Omnipotent Control in the Acquisition of Reality-Based Thinking
State 1 – Object Relating
•
•
•
•
Object is undifferentiated and has no unique qualities (omnipotent thinking)
Subject omnipotently controls object in self-contained space by making it part of
the self
Subject knows or understands object by virtue of its close proximity in confined
space
Object is, however, obstacle to seeing or knowing beyond self-contained space
Intermediate State – Transitional Space
•
•
•
Subject utilizes omnipotence to move object outside self space into transitional
space
Wider or infinite space allows for new “seeing” to occur
“Not seeing” in old ways leads to more accurate view (KNOWING IS NOT
SEEING)128
projection material). They can be said to form the basis for a multitude of psychic functions that necessarily
require drawing on more primordial elements of pre-subject existence, for the specific purpose of adapting
to and optimally functioning in states associated with multiple subjects. Assertiveness, courage, selfcontrol, and genuineness (self-coherence or self-congruity) are just a few processes that recruit omnipotent
forces to accomplish their tasks in object usage states of mind. To Winnicott this generative primordial
force is related to destruction, which forms the “unconscious backcloth” (Line 155) that underpins human
existence.
128
In an interesting parallel from mythology that has an association with psychoanalysis, Oedipus puts out
his own eyes upon realizing his wife Jacosta is his mother. Besides the more obvious symbolic connection
with guilt, morality, and the general difficulty accepting (“seeing”) a harsh truth, this act also points to the
requisite and corresponding embodied effect that is part and parcel of integrating any profound idea. In
other words, poignant psychological events are necessarily registered physically, involuntarily or at times
self-imposed. In a related way, “not seeing” will be shown in the next section to involve the metaphorical
destruction of a part of the self not as attempt to cope with a reality, but the very process that discovers it.
169
•
Paradox of omnipotence: Omnipotent act of relinquishing control and distancing
object leads to true understanding and birth of object (reality-based thinking)
State 2 – Object Usage
•
•
•
•
Object arrives in object usage space
Object no longer under control of subject and no longer exists in subject’s image
Omnipotence is transformed and usable for perception in multi-subject states
Subject accurately perceives object as separate and real
Commentary
As evidenced above, the key statement in Line 68 on the transformation of
narcissism is unique for its utilization of omnipotence as a generative concept in the
attainment of object usage. This sentence also indicative of hallmark Winnicottian and
British Object Relations style in providing a subjective account of an important psychic
process. In both instances the effect on the reader is to concretize and bring closer the
abstract elements that are typically used in the depiction of psychological change. For
example, by using “subject” (Line 68) instead of “ego” here and throughout the text,
Winnicott creates a mental space in which the reader can more easily identify with the
phenomena that is being portrayed. In general the word subject is conceptually more
closely associated with human versus mechanistic attributes of the patient and therapist.
In clinical terms this language promotes, among other things, the drawing of conceptual
parallels between two equal human entities. In doing so it reinforces the idea of object
usage as representing the birth of reality for the hitherto underdeveloped subject via the
more mature subjecthood of the other.
170
Text and Analysis, Lines 69-83
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
This change (from relating to use) means that the subject destroys the object.
From here it could be argued by an armchair philosopher that there is therefore
no such thing in practice as the use of an object; if the object be external, then
the object is destroyed by the subject.
Should the philosopher come out of his chair and sit on the floor with his
patient, however, he will find that there is an intermediate position.
In other words, he will find that after 'subject relates to object' comes 'subject
destroys object' (as it becomes external); and then may come 'object survives
destruction by the subject'.
But there may or may not be survival.
A new feature thus arrives in the theory of object-relating.
The subject says to the object: ‘I destroyed you,’ and the object is there to
receive the communication.
From now on the subject says: ‘Hullo object!’ ‘I destroyed you.’
‘I love you.’
'You have value for me because of your survival of my destruction of you.'
'While I am loving you I am all the time destroying you in (unconscious)
fantasy'.
Here fantasy begins for the individual.
The subject can now use the object that has survived.
It is important to note that it is not only that the subject destroys the object
because the object is placed outside the area of omnipotent control.
It is equally significant to state this the other way round and to say that it is the
destruction of the object that places the object outside the area of the subject's
omnipotent control.
In these ways the object develops its own autonomy and life, and (if it survives)
contributes in to the subject, according to its own properties.
171
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
This paragraph posits destruction as the direct means by which transformation
occurs from states associated with object relating to those that reflect object usage. In
utilizing destruction in this manner Winnicott is proposing a novel way of
conceptualizing the attainment of reality-based thinking, and in the process positions his
theory as distinct from the three main models under consideration. The introduction to the
idea of destruction in Line 69 is both abrupt and definitive: the preceding text gives no
indication of its relevance, though in one short sentence it is deemed the central process
involved in using an object.129 The remainder of the paragraph goes to great length to
concretize (e.g., the subject’s dialogue with the object) what is a rather complex
proposition regarding intrapsychic phenomena.
Though likely not as provocative to adherents and readers familiar with PS3
ideas, for others the effect was shown to be dramatic. Specifically, in terms of PS1 and
PS2, the critiques from respondents to his presentation of the paper The Use of an Object
at the New York Psychoanalytic Society provide an excellent historical account of how
these ideas were received from within a different school of thought. Goldman (1993)
cites accounts that outline the effect of that Winnicott’s idiosyncratic use of language had
on the audience in depicting this important shift in development. First, he notes that
though Edith Jacobson concurred that aggression can have a generative value, she
questioned with the constructs of destruction and survival as ways to describe the
129
In general much of the paper to this point has a meandering quality. It has consisted of a very broad
outline of Winnicott’s ideas vis-à-vis psychoanalysis, but in typical fashion he had yet to really make a
clear point or arrived at the core of his argument. Even Line 63—the proclaimed “thesis” of the paper—on
the surface says little and is anti-climactic. In the context of this sudden and definitive statement on
destruction, one might view the intended or unintended function of the preceding text as lulling the reader
into a disarmed state from which to receive this current statement on destruction.
172
transformation from narcissistic states of mind. Goldman goes on to say that, as Samuel
Ritvo commented, the ability to perceive objects as separate from oneself is more
effectively conceptualized as the “functional capacity of the ego to tolerate the qualities
of delay and lack of gratification, and their accompanying anxiety reduction” (quoted
from Milrod, 1968, p. 4). Bernard Fine also questioned the use of destruction (as well as
other terms such as “use”) as gratuitous and as ignoring any reference to psychoanalytic
theory that came before it. Goldman quotes various statements that challenged the need
or validity of using the idea of destruction as the process by which the object becomes
separate. Among other things Fine generally posited that it is libidinal elements (not
destruction) that join the patient with the therapist and that allow for the containment and
transformation of aggression that leads to separate subject recognition. To summarize,
Goldman (1993) writes:
Jacobson, Ritvo, and Fine were obviously somewhat bewildered by Winnicott’s
formulations. They were put off by his personal use of language. They felt that
many of his ideas were just another way of stating what could be better described
using the vocabulary of narcissistic identifications, libidinal economy, and the
functional capacities of the ego. Winnicott’s central proposition regarding the
destruction of the object in unconscious fantasy as a prelude to its use seemed to
them perplexing, extreme, and unwarranted (p. 209).130
In contrast to PS1 and PS2, the construct of destruction is a cornerstone of
Kleinian theory. It is related in general to the death instinct and more specifically to the
superego’s aggression directed toward the individual.131 Destruction and the death
130
The respondents’ difficulty with the language reveals significant philosophical differences that underpin
the models: ego psychology’s affinity to a stiff and mechanical rationality synonymous with the
Enlightenment thought and Winnicott’s more intuitive and experience-based style reminiscent of
Romanticism.
131
Klein attributed the guilt and remorse she observed patients as young as two years old to manifestations
of the superego. In Freud’s theory, however, the superego did not form until after the Oedipus complex at
173
instinct are also associated with the states of fusion and defusion between loving and
aggressive impulses. In states of defusion the tendency is to project aggressive impulses
aimed at the self onto other objects. Among other things defusion creates feelings of
paranoia toward the object and a distortion of the organism’s ability to accurately
perceive objects. Klein’s construct of envy and the attack on a life-giving good object is
an example of destruction in action, which is related to splitting and the overall inability
to contain states of the inherent ambivalence involved in loving an object.
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
In the configuration put forth in this paragraph, destruction is posited as the
process by which the narcissistic perception of the object which maintains it and the yet
to be born subject in the realm of object relating is removed. Whereas in PS3 destruction
is a manifestation of the death instinct, a harsh superego and an overall state of defusion
(which includes a distorted view of reality), for Winnicott the implication is that
destruction becomes the main vehicle through which the subject is able to attain realitybased thinking and the capacity to love. From these ideas come DESTRUCTION IS
MOVEMENT OF THE OBJECT OUTSIDE NARCISSISTIC SPACE, DESTRUCTION
IS THE BIRTH OF REALITY, and DESTRUCTION IS LOVE.
around four or five years of age. Kernberg’s (1969) critique of Kleinian theory (see Appendix N) includes
the ego psychology refutation of the death instinct.
174
The idea of unconscious fantasy as a repository for the transmuted aggression
associated with the destruction of the subjective object is also novel. In Winnicott’s
depiction destruction is directly responsible for the spawning of fantasy itself—
DESTRUCTION IS THE BIRTH OF FANTASY. It is within the holding area of fantasy
that aggressive elements that might otherwise cause an imbalance or instinctual defusion
when encountering objects are contained. As a psychic space unconscious fantasy not
only maintains a degree of separation between aggressive and loving impulses, but it is
also the area in which the two are joined (see Line 78). As such it is reflective of the
dialectical elements of love and hate (ambivalence) that are inherent to human existence.
Using Winnicott’s sequential characterization as outlined in Line 71, the following
scheme can be posited with respect to destruction and survival of the object:
Subject Relates to Object
•
•
Diffuse and unintegrated aggression in omnipotent space
Concrete depiction of objects: good or bad, loving or hating, etc.
Subject Destroys Object
•
•
Aggression/destruction consolidated and used to remove object from omnipotent
space
Object removed from a suspended to a tangible state of existence
Object Survives Destruction
•
•
Destruction paradoxically leads to birth of both reality and fantasy
Ability to love and hate object at the same time (ambivalence) begins
Subject Uses Object
•
Fusion of erotic and aggressive impulses leads to capacity to use objects
175
Commentary
Destruction is presented in the text in a way that creates an effect paralleling the
experience of the emerging subject. In particular, it evokes in the reader the experience of
being caught off guard which could be conceived as reminiscent of the subject’s reaction
to the sudden shift in consciousness that comes with object usage. Winnicott’s
paradoxical and unconventional employment of destruction as a creator of something
positive also evokes in the reader a sense of novelty and surprise that might be viewed as
akin to the experience of the subject during the birth of reality. The sudden appearance of
destruction in Line 69—with no prior warning or preparation in the text—is reminiscent
of the astonishment that the subject likely experiences when the object is vacated from
narcissistic space and a “new vision” of reality occurs. As alluded to above, the
meandering quality of the text and the absence of clear and definitive conclusions have to
this point been effective in laying the groundwork for this dramatic effect.
Besides the element of surprise and the atypical use of destruction described
above, a dramatic effect is also created in this paragraph by the rather mundane and anticlimatic way this crucial statement can be seen as presented. That is, there is an element
of understatement in the way destruction is abruptly inserted in the text, as if the reader
should not really question its presence and atypical usage. Nevertheless, the word
destruction does conjure images related to the observable effects (e.g., ruins, fragments,
disorder) of powerful forces whose presence is anything but unnoticeable. Read in this
way Winnicott’s seemingly unobtrusive insertion of destruction points towards its less
obvious though important function as a contributor to creative processes (e.g., as that
which eliminates or makes room for something new). This portrayal reveals the
176
generative qualities destruction and aggression (e.g., motility) that often go unnoticed in
every creative or transformational event.132 Viewed from this perspective, destruction is
in actuality quite an ordinary and expectable part of all creation and transformation. In
general, the juxtaposition of less noticed elements of destruction with its more obvious
effects widens the conceptual range from which meaning can be drawn, revealing both its
apparent and more subtle implications.133
Text and Analysis, Lines 84-88
84.
In other words, because of the survival of the object, the subject may now have
started to live a life in the world of objects, and so the subject stands to gain
immeasurably; but the price has to be paid in acceptance of the ongoing
destruction in unconscious fantasy relative to object-relating.
85. Let me repeat.
86. This is a position that can only be arrived at by the individual in early stages of
emotional growth through the actual survival of cathected objects that are at the
time in process of becoming destroyed because real, becoming real because
destroyed (being destructible and expendable).
87. From now on, this stage having been reached, projective mechanisms assist in
the act of noticing what is there, but are not the reason why the object is there.
88. In my opinion this is a departure from orthodox psychoanalytic theory, which
tends to think of external reality only in terms of the individual's projective
mechanisms.
132
In biology metamorphosis is a hormonal process which involves the permanent destruction of
morphological structures at the larval stage which result in the transformation into more mature life forms
(e.g., tadpole to frog, caterpillar to butterfly). In literature and mythology metamorphosis has a long history
as a transformational process, turning divine beings or humans into plants, animals, or inanimate objects.
133
The positioning of destruction in this paper calls to mind questions related to Winnicott’s relationship
with his own aggressive qualities. As pointed out he struggled all his life with asserting himself in a way
that left him feeling a sense of individuality and power, without damaging those who received his
communications. Therefore, if the introduction of destruction is viewed as being delayed, disguised or
downplayed, this could simply reflect his typical ambivalence or anxiety about making such an important
self-assertion (or more generally “arriving” at a conclusion). It could also point the utilization of this
uncertainty to indirectly but distinctly draw attention to the centrality of aggressive elements in creation by
understating its arrival on the scene. It is this opaque quality of his writing that is likely most perplexing
and frustrating to some and revealing and rewarding to others.
177
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
In this section Winnicott sharpens his position on projection as a process in
apprehending objects in the external world. The quality of the object most important to its
being usable is its ability to survive, especially during a crucial window of time (Line 86)
in which destruction is intimately involved in the creation of reality. The key shift that
distinguishes his proposition from the other three models is that for Winnicott projection
is only partially responsible for achieving reality-based thinking status (Line 87). In his
depiction projection is ontologically limited in its ability to account for a full description
of the birth of reality and its implications. In his schema, as set forth in Line 81,
projection is more a structural mechanism of perception (“noticing what is there”) than
an interpreter of the larger questions of existence (“why the object is there”) that come
into being once the organism is transported from the solipsistic space of subjective
objects. Exactly what psychic process is responsible for pondering existence is not
speculated on here, though the idea of the true self as reflecting the essence of one’s
being comes to mind.
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related conceptual metaphors
Winnicott again draws on embodied notions of time to provide an account of a
rather abstract psychic process. Line 86 frames the temporal elements and how they are
to be perceived in order to accurately view what is occurring psychically. First, the
178
process under consideration must occur at an “early stage” of human development (e.g.,
TIME IS A LOCATION that must be traversed). Second, it is within a more
circumscribed moment of time that the psychic elements he has outlined come together to
create reality (e.g., TIME IS A SPACE in which the objects of destruction and reality
intermingle). By honing in on the precise moment in which the transformation to reality
occurs, Winnicott creates the effect of slowing or expanding time in order to more fully
appreciate the complexity of what is occurring.134 This effect contributes to revealing not
only the confluence of elements that go into the creation of reality, but also the potential
and inherent dangers present when powerful instinctual forces are fully exposed during
their crucial task of transforming a more primitive state of being. Viewed from this
perspective, “ordinary” time can be said to mask the underlying destruction and risk
inherent in all processes of transformation. Survival of the object at this crucial moment
is paramount and necessary for carrying the subject over to object usage status, because
the destructive elements at work require an intensity that necessarily heightens the
organism’s sensitivity to its own power.135 In temporal terms, the quality of time
complements the intensity that is present in this act of creation, in that it can be said to
134
Line 86 contains 46 words which reinforces a sense of elongated time. The phrase “at the time in
process of becoming destroyed because real, becoming real because destroyed” contributes to this
expansion of time by revealing the bi-directionality of causes and events. Conceptually it requires creating
a mental space in which elements of destruction and reality are infused. Performing this operation
necessitates more time than a more straightforward unidirectional account (e.g., destruction as creating
reality or reality as evidence of destruction). Also, the use of “process” (connoting something started in the
past and continuing in the present) and the repetition of “becoming” (the present progressive form that
communicates a range of present time) also elicit a sense of drawn out time. In general the phrase requires
the reader to traverse a larger conceptual area (e.g., TIME IS SPACE) that is synonymous with passing
time.
135
The implication is that the subject must “not see” and be insulated from fully recognizing the primordial
power it possesses. The subject is not capable of interpreting a breakdown (lack of survival) in this process
to a cause other than itself, because it is still exists in the symbiotic realm of a unified subjective object.
179
become magnified and suspended in a way that allows for the optimal incorporation and
assimilation of a new psychic structure. The following schema summarizes the effect and
use of time in relation to destruction and the attainment of objective perception:
Ordinary Time
•
•
•
Reality is attained without respect to destruction
Destruction as “hidden” in time
The object is real because it is perceived or seen (KNOWING IS SEEING)
Expanded Time
•
•
•
Exposes core destructive elements in the birth of reality
Slowed or elongated time“reveals” destruction inherent in all change
The object is real because destroyed, destroyed because real (KNOWING IS
SEEING AND NOT SEEING)136
The relationship of reality and destruction is another theme put forth in this
section that exposes elements of Winnicottian style with implications for conceptual
metaphor. As discussed, the effect created by the quality of the text contributes to a
consideration of the underlying forces at play in the birth of reality. The wider conceptual
space created via the juxtaposition of reality and destruction reveals elements of each that
both complement and negate one another, creating a dialectical tension promoting a more
nuanced view of this important ontological event. In general, by putting together in
mental space basic conceptual elements of destruction and reality, qualities of each that
are not ordinarily evident are exposed; in particular, generative qualities of destruction
and undetectable or unnoticed aspects of reality.
136
Expanded time allows for a wider conceptual vantage point from which elements of the destroyed
(psychic) material that were either eliminated or altered must be taken into consideration. Thus, this
necessitates “not seeing” that which was originally present and “seeing” that which emerges from the
transformation.
180
One way these less noticeable qualities of destruction and reality are revealed is
through the work of the primary metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. In this embodied
construction that is ubiquitous to human existence, that which is known (e.g., reality) is
typically equated with what can be concretely apprehended visually. However, by
positing destruction as an element involved in gaining the capacity to perceive that which
is real, qualities of reality that are attained by “not seeing” are exposed. Specifically,
because destruction eliminates or alters the material quality of an object—which
necessarily causes it to disappear or at the vey least be changed substantially—it prompts
the reader to consider elements of the object which are no longer perceptible. From this
can be posited KNOWING IS NOT SEEING, whereby that which once existed but has
been altered or eliminated by destruction must necessarily not be available to visual
awareness (e.g., the amorphous quality of the object as symbiotically merged with the
subject, among other things). Overall this construction points to how developmental
progression can be conceived as not only the addition new psychic elements, but also the
transformation of old ones in a way that can be conceived of as losing a capacity that was
once present and functional.137 The following schema represents the conceptual elements
related to reality with respect to seeing in Winnicott’s depiction of object usage:
137
This discussion shows the relative limitation of any one primary conceptual metaphor in accounting for
more complex and abstract psychic phenomena. In other words, KNOWING IS SEEING or KNOWING IS
NOT SEEING provide only a narrow depiction of what is a broader process. As alluded to above, one way
of conceiving perception in object usage states is not only as the sudden ability to “see” versus “not see”
something that is present (e.g., a real and separate object), but rather a shift in the quality of perception
(e.g., “seeing”) that leads to novel conceptualizations.
181
Reality Is Seeing and Not Seeing In Ordinary and Expanded Time
Knowing Is Seeing That That Which Is Presently Visible In Ordinary Time
(e.g., object as concrete and separate from self)
• Knowing Is Not Seeing That Which Once Existed But Was Abolished Or Altered
In Expanded Time (e.g., object as formless part of self)
•
This calling of attention to the less than obvious qualities of destruction and
reality is also promoted in a more general way by their juxtaposition in the text
reminiscent of Line 86 (e.g., “in process of becoming destroyed because real, becoming
real because destroyed”). Conceptually the juxtaposition invokes in the reader a
movement of time which is unorthodox but revealing of the ontological processes under
consideration.
As discussed, in the Moving Time Metaphor (Appendix F) time is typically
viewed as moving in a unidirectional fashion in relation to an object-observer in space:
behind and away representing what we conceive of as “past,” in front of and toward
which is connoted with the “future,” and passing directly by or through as the “present.”
However, by invoking elements of the object that span dimensions of time (e.g., the
object as currently existing as a function of its past destruction whose elements are no
longer visible but still relevant), the subject-reader as object in space is forced to
simultaneously “move” in opposite directions (“back” to the past and “forward” to the
present) in order to encompass the full description of the object’s current existence. In
doing so the subject must itself (e.g., its embodied mind) expand or stretch out to create a
vantage point which allows for this bidirectional conceptual movement to occur.
Among other things this exercise creates an existential tension by prompting the
reader to consider moving beyond embodied notions of experience, in which the mind as
a container (object) is conceived as only able to move in one direction and exist in one
182
location at a time. The text thus requires the reader to challenge the human conceptual
bias (based on our embodied form and mind) which necessarily views time as spatially
segmented (past, present, and future) and unidirectionally flowing (moving either away,
through, or toward). In one way performing this exercise of transcending time and space
is reminiscent of the experience of the subject as it is in the process of being born into the
realm of object usage and reality. Overall, Winnicott’s continual depiction of the timeless
and space less qualities of key transformation processes expose both the possibilities and
the limitations imposed by our embodied metaphorical systems in comprehending more
abstract psychic processes.
Commentary
The juxtaposition of destruction and reality in Winnicott’s account of object
usage is reminiscent of his style of invoking semantic qualities of words that typically go
unnoticed in ordinary conversation or writing. As outlined above the depictions draw on
conventional conceptual metaphors to uncover these less than obvious meanings.
However, conceptual metaphors only go so far in accounting for the complexity of the
rather abstract psychic processes being described. As evidenced above, an exclusively
conceptual metaphorical explanation requires including in the submapping metaphors
that are diametrically opposed to primary metaphors on which meaning is presumably
based (e.g., the idea that “not seeing” is related to acquiring knowledge).
This points to the limitations of conceptual metaphor and the need to consider
conceptual blending as a tool for establishing the semantic roots of more imaginative and
abstract ideas. In certain important ways, Winnicott’s style is more reminiscent of
conceptual blending in that he is continually brining together ideas that on the surface
183
appear diametrically opposed, though when combined extract qualities of each that have
been seemingly dormant and waiting to be uncovered.138 In this way the process of
conceptual blending is reminiscent of transitional phenomena, in that latent psychic
elements are brought to life from their suspended state in multi-dimensional and timeless
space under certain optimal conditions created by the environment.139
Text and Analysis, Lines 89-94
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
I have now nearly made my whole statement.
Not quite, however, because it is not possible for me to take for granted an
acceptance of the fact that the first impulse in the subject's relation to the object
(objectively perceived, not subjective) is destructive.
The central postulate in this thesis is that whereas the subject does not destroy
the subjective object (projection material), destruction turns up and becomes a
central feature in so far as the object is objectively perceived, has autonomy,
and belongs to 'shared' reality.
This is the difficult part of my thesis, at least for me.
It is generally understood that the reality principle involves the individual in
anger and reactive destruction, but my thesis is that the destruction plays its part
in making the reality, placing the object outside the self.
For this to happen, favourable conditions are necessary.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
Here Winnicott returns to the themes of projection and the reality principle and
positions these ideas vis-à-vis destruction, making a subtle but important distinction with
138
These implications of conceptual blending are reminiscent of the quantum physicist-philosopher David
Bohm’s (2003) notion of the material world as simultaneously existing in latent and manifest states. In his
conception the primary source of reality derives from the “implicate order,” which holds in “enfolded” or
hidden states the multi-dimensional and timeless qualities of particles, energy, and consciousness. What we
as embodied organisms are typically able to conceive is the “explicate order,” which is “unfolded” or made
manifest to our uniquely human senses. Conceptual blending suggests that certain combinations of ideas
joined together in mental space extract from the implicate order qualities that most often go unnoticed in
typical realms of embodied perception.
139
For transitional phenomena vis-à-vis object usage the condition required is one of survival of and lack of
impingement by the object. In conceptual blending it is the ability to hold in mental space both similar and
dissimilar qualities of ideas that allow for the emergence of novel understandings of each.
184
respect to the function and timing of destruction in the process of object usage.
Specifically, he equates the destruction associated with attainment of the reality-based
thinking in PS1, PS2, and PS3 as a byproduct (Line 93) of recognizing a world that is not
narcissistically motivated. In these characterizations destruction is only a derivative of the
frustration involved in coming to terms with reality, itself having no direct influence on
the creation or nature of that reality. Alternatively, in his depiction destruction is
generative and a key element which leads to the actual making of reality, not by
obliterating reality or the means by which it is created (projection) but by simply placing
the object outside the area of omnipotence. This construction is reminiscent of past
depictions of destruction as akin to motility and its broader tendency toward integration
and health. Overall, by positing destruction as generative and by moving it to later in the
process (post-object relating) he is making an important distinction between his theory
and others of the day.
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
A primary construction in this depiction involves destruction as it is related to the
object, projection material, and reality. One central metaphor that can be derived from the
account is DESTRUCTION IS MOVEMENT, in which destructive force is used not to
eliminate the object but rather to displace it into an area (transitional space) where it can
185
be transformed.140 In this way the projection material in the realm of object relating is not
really eliminated, which allows it to aid the subject in recognizing (not creating) objects
in the world of “shared reality” (Line 91).
Commentary
The main alteration to theory that Winnicott makes in this section is: (a) changing
the nature of destruction from non-generative (e.g., a reaction of frustration) to generative
in a core developmental process, and; (b) changing the function of destruction from that
which eliminates by virtue of damaging or obliterating object material, to a more affectneutral transporter of the object into transformative space. These novel characterizations
of destruction have significant implications for clinical work, in that they promote a more
focused and nuanced characterization of the psychological processes involved in the
patient’s utilization of the treatment situation. In other words, it requires a wider
conceptual vantage point from which to consider semantic qualities of clinical terms
(e.g., destruction, projection, reality) that ordinarily have the tendency to become reified
in the clinical process and its depiction in writing.
Text and Analysis, Lines 95-105
95.
96.
140
This is simply a matter of examining the reality principle under high power.
As I see it, we are familiar with the change whereby projection mechanisms
enable the subject to take cognizance of the object, without projection
mechanisms being the reason for the object's existence.
Winnicott will later in the paper make a distinction between this process of destruction and
“annihilation” (Line 142) which he conceives of as akin to “no hope.” From this perspective, then, can be
posited DESTRUCTION IS HOPE.
186
97.
At the point of development that is under survey the subject is creating the
object in the sense of finding externality itself, and it has to be added that this
experience depends on the object's capacity to survive.
98. (It is important that this means 'not retaliate'.)
99. If it is in an analysis that these matters are taking place, then the analyst, the
analytic technique, and the analytic setting all come in as surviving or not
surviving the patient's destructive attacks.
100. This destructive activity is the patient's attempt to place the analyst outside the
area of omnipotent control, that is, out in the world.
101. Without the experience of maximum destructiveness (object not protected) the
subject never places the analyst outside and therefore can never do more than
experience a kind of self-analysis, using the analyst as a projection of a part of
the self.
102. In terms of feeding, the patient, then, can only feed on the self and cannot use
the breast for getting fat.
103. The patient may even enjoy the analytic experience but will not fundamentally
change.
104. And if the analyst is a subjective phenomenon, what about waste-disposal?
105. A further statement is needed in terms of output.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
In this section Winnicott provides the rationale and means by which his depiction
of destruction and reality can be understood. Overall, this is accomplished by proposing a
separate stage in the process of attaining reality which is moved ahead in time (post
object-relating) and which corresponds to a different quality of perception. He uses a
foundational construct of psychoanalysis, the reality principle, from which to elaborate
his conclusion. In particular, he posits that the elements demonstrating his
characterization of the birth of reality in relation to destruction are contained within this
well known idea, though the means of perception for conceptualizing it must be altered or
put “under high power” (Line 95). In other words, examined more closely one realizes
that the perception that was used to simply recognize the external world in object
relational states (projection) shifts in function to an interpreter of reality (e.g., “why” the
187
object is there) in states associated with object usage. The shift in the quality of
perception required by the reader to view this process from an external perspective is
associated with that which is occurring for the subject internally. That is, from the
perspective of the reader the putting “under high power” required to comprehend the
experience of the subject corresponds to the increased psychic intensity (e.g., “maximum
destructiveness”) at work in the subject while acquiring this new quality of perception.
Thus, the “shared reality” (Line 91) that is an outcome of this process for the subject is
thus experienced vicariously by the reader vis-à-vis the experience created in the text.
According to Winnicott, the level of force that is required to make this significant
change (e.g., not just destructiveness but “maximum destructiveness”) is commensurate
with what he deems as the dramatic psychic modification taking place. Here the intensity
of destructiveness is equivalent to the expanded level of perception that must be reached
in order to attain object usage status (e.g., the ability to incorporate subjective-objective,
inner-outer, and past-present elements of perception). This shift in perception—which
importantly allows for a new epistemic stance (e.g., subject as “interpreter” of why the
object is there)—can be viewed as synonymous with the “birth” of reality, because the
ability to interpret or make meaning is itself a “creative” act. That is, interpretation
connotes making clear or explicit something that was unformed or hidden, both qualities
attributable to creation and birth. This new quality of perception allows the subject entry
into the world of “shared reality” in which bidirectional vantage points for viewing
existence now exist (e.g., subjective-objective, inner-outer, past-present, etc.). From this
point forward subjective perceptions of external reality are suffused with those of
188
considered “objective” (e.g., shared), forming a dialectical tension which comprises what
we conceive of as experience.141
The required survivability of the object to aid in this transformation of perception
on the surface seems patently obvious, though upon closer examination reveals
ontological insights that can go unnoticed. Survival in the sense used by Winnicott is
more akin to mutability, or the object’s capacity to transform itself into a vehicle that will
carry over subject to object usage status. In particular, the object must allow itself to be
seen as both similar and dissimilar to the emerging subject, in a way that is conducive to
imparting a wider and more abstract quality of perception.
The object is uniquely suited to this task since at this point in development the
object is nearest to representing inner and outer reality—that is, it exists on the cusp of
both as positioned in transitional space. As such it is viewed by the subject as
representing qualities that simultaneously subsume and go beyond its currently known
dimensions of time and space (e.g., me-not me, inner-outer, past present, etc.). The
object’s status as a separate physical entity enhances its power, in that it bears the closest
resemblance to that which potentially exists beyond the isolated space of which the
subject is still a part. In this way the object provides the first tangible evidence for the
existence of something apart from the self, and as such it must consummate the process
by allowing the subject to utilize its (the object’s) unique position in reality.
In Line 98 Winnicott states that the function of the object as a transporter or
talisman in the process of object usage is achieved by surviving and “not retaliating” to
the “maximum destructiveness” occurring within the subject. How the object is to be
141
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) would characterize this epistemic stance as “experientialism.”
189
represented by the subject would also seem to require that it be seen as both omnipresent
and nonexistent—reflecting the emerging quality of perception by the subject at this point
in the transformational process. Perhaps a better characterization is that the object needs
to exist in a suspended state available for “unfoldment” or revelation into external reality
when required. The object’s appearance needs to occur precisely at the time that
corresponds with the subject’s emergence from an omnipotent state. More specifically, it
must be viewed as vicariously in statu nascendi or in the process of being born with the
subject. In this way the object can provide a temporary but crucial mirror into which the
subject projects the raw psychic material associated with object relating while
introjecting latent capacities akin to object usage.
What the overall construction suggests is that though the object does not overtly
demonstrate mutability (e.g., it does not “do” anything other than exist and allow the self
to reflect), it becomes viewed by the subject as simultaneously in the process of psychic
transformation. This is possible because the subject still (partially) filters reality via an
object relational state of mind in which the self and object are unified; therefore, what the
self is in the process of experiencing vis-à-vis the birth of reality is viewed as coming
both from within and from without. From the object’s perspective this process can be
viewed as a re-experiencing via the emerging subject that which has already occurred in
its own development (if it has gone well). These reactions can be viewed through the
various lenses of countertransference, revealing points of vulnerability and strength that
play a role in its ability to be portrayed the subject as surviving.142
142
The general assumption is that the object has attained object usage status. One issue not addressed in the
paper is whether an uninitiated object can carry over the subject into a state that it has not experienced.
190
Basic meaning of transformational concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
The idea that psychic change involves the movement of an object into a new
space where it can transformed is communicated using metaphors of embodiment related
to force and its effects on the subject and object. In terms of the intensity required to
carry the subject over to object usage, Winnicott uses MAXIMAL
DESTRUCTIVENESS IS OBJECT VULNERABILITY to connote the quality of force
needed to render the object mutable (e.g., putting it in a state or condition to be used) and
ultimately movable out of omnipotent space. As discussed above this process is
importantly related to the enhancement of perceptual capacity—MAXIMAL
DESTRCUTIVENESS IS EXPANDED PERCEPTUAL CAPACITY, in which
vulnerability is synonymous with exposing similar and dissimilar qualities of the object
that are utilized for psychic advancement. From the perspective of the emerging subject
the object is necessarily viewed as weakened but not destroyed, in a way that allows
certain aspects of the object to be incorporated and thus assumed. From this follows
SURVIVAL IS MUTABILITY whereby the object allows itself to change (e.g., be
available in accordance to the needs of the emerging subject). According to Winnicott
this is a most crucial period in which the object must never be conceived as striking back,
expressed as SURVIVAL IS NOT RETALIATING.
An analogy drawn in the last sentences of this section (Lines 102 and 103) again
uses breastfeeding to put into context the implications of these processes in the treatment
191
process. In therapy as in development, an un-differentiated object that does not move
beyond object relational space cannot reap the “nutritional” benefits of the world of
shared understandings. As outlined earlier, OBJECT RELATING IS CANNIBALISM
reflects the idea that in such states nothing completely separate from the subject can be
incorporated for psychic advancement, because nothing can be conceived as existing
outside this auto-contained realm. In Line 102 the subject’s lack of capacity for “getting
fat” because it can only “feed on the self” conjures a Dantesque figure that, emaciated and
tortured in the realm of Hell, perpetually eats itself (and its own “waste disposal”) in a
futile attempt to survive.143
Commentary
Winnicott’s utilization of the most basic ontological concepts (e.g., use, object,
holding, destruction, etc.) to depict psychic transformation points to both the possibility
and limitation of embodied conceptual metaphor as a tool for describing human ontology.
As has been pointed out, most if not all psychic constructions utilize THE MIND IS A
BODY, whereby psychological changes are necessarily viewed as involving the forced
movement of objects in hypothetical space. In this section a main idea is that a higher
level of force (“maximum destructiveness”) is required to achieve the state of mind
associated with a separate self and reality-based thinking (e.g., by removing the object
from omnipotent space).
143
In Dante’s schema of divine retribution the subject would be suffering in corporeal form the symbolic
effects of his or her own unique sin. In Winnicott’s depiction the devastating consequences of being stuck
in the world of object relating are derived from no fault of the subject, but rather from a deficit in the
environment or caregiver.
192
Though novel and employed in a way that seems to reveal a valid psychic truth,
the construction also points to the rather concrete nature of embodied metaphors as a
source for depicting psychological experience. It is reminiscent of the primary metaphor
MORE IS UP, where a qualitative change in an object or force is made by simply adding
more of the same elements to an existing form to characterize its transformation.144
Embodied metaphorical constructions such as these are inherently limiting and can render
a hollow depiction of psychic experience.145 These constructions are highly
circumscribed (e.g., this is “only” that—more is only up, similarity is only closeness,
etc.) and encapsulated (e.g., auto-contained and self-reinforcing) packages of information
that necessarily exclude features of experience that do not fit the tightly constructed
schema. For example, when attempting to depict phenomena that intrinsically challenges
the boundaries of these more concrete either/or formulas (e.g., when more is less,
destruction is creative, perception is not seeing, etc.), the writer can be forced to resort to
linguistic tactics that have the effect of seeming to favor “style” or “cleverness” over
content, especially in scientific or technical writing. Among the risks of pushing the
limits of existing conceptual structures through idiosyncratic language include confusion,
incoherence, hyperbole, and ultimately misunderstanding.146
144
Among the many related examples in psychoanalysis of using spatial metaphors to depict psychic
experience is “depth.” That is, the validity or primacy of a psychic event is measured by its perceived
location with respect to a surface barrier, which among others forms PSYCHIC IMPORTANCE IS DEPTH
and CURATIVE INTERPREATIONS ARE DEEP. Time as a location in space is also used as a criterion to
depict the significance of a psychic event or process, whereby depth becomes synonymous with that which
occurs earlier (e.g., “behind”) in development.
145
For example, just what exactly the difference is between the destruction that Winnicott used throughout
most of the paper and this extreme form (“maximum”) is, like many of his concepts, not forthcoming.
146
Misunderstanding is a common reaction to Winnicott’s writing, as evidenced by the earlier discussion of
the American ego psychologists’ response to the language in this paper. One of the many questions raised
193
One central question inherent in determining the ultimate validity and utility of
conceptual metaphor falls into what is commonly called the mind-body problem—that is,
to what extent do we view our built-in neurological structures based on metaphor as the
ultimate judge in terms of the nature and validity of reality? Or, put another way, does
perceptual structure reveal the true nature of tangible objects in the world or does it create
them in its own image? According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), modern developmental
science shows that the perception of something as the basic color of objects is not exactly
objective, but rather a product of our brain’s interaction with elements in the natural
environment (e.g., wave lengths, electromagnetic radiation).
Therefore, the capacity for our biologically-based conceptual systems to
accurately account for the more ephemeral phenomena of the mind would seem even
more daunting. Indeed, in the realm in which psychic transformations occur time and
space are even less bound by the rules of embodied reality, which necessarily puts into
question the ultimate utility of conceptual metaphor as a tool for depicting most if not all
psychological phenomena. While in one way reflecting the inevitability of our embodied
status—and making the most of using it to comprehend both physical and psychological
reality—embodied conceptual metaphor can be also thought of as the a posteriori
introduction of time and space in an attempt to conceive of that which exists beyond
those realms. By reflecting what is the most tangible and readily observable forms
with respect to motivations for Winnicott’s writing style is whether it was a genuine attempt to understand
the complexity of ideas or a “playfully” provocative, iconoclastic, or outright aggressive way to call
attention to the superiority of his ideas. In different ways uncovered in the review of Winnicott’s life and in
this analysis, it is perhaps best understood as a combination of both. In any event his style reveals the
inherent limitations of language to describe the ineffable.
194
associated with living, embodied metaphor reinforces a limited vantage point of
experience which only accounts for a small portion of human experience.
Text and Analysis, Lines 106-117
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
In psychoanalytic practice the positive changes that come about in this area
can be profound.
They do not depend on interpretative work.
They do depend on the analyst's survival of the attacks, which includes the
idea of absence of a change to retaliation.
These attacks may be very difficult for the analyst to stand, especially when
they are expressed in terms of delusion or through manipulation which makes
the analyst actually do things that are technically bad.
(I refer to such a thing as unreliability at moments when reliability is all that
matters, as well as to survival in terms of keeping alive and the absence of the
quality of retaliation).
The analyst feels like interpreting, but this can spoil the process and for the
patient can seem like a kind of self-defence, the analyst parrying the patient's
attack.
Better to wait till after the phase is over, and then discuss with the patient
what has been happening.
This is surely legitimate, for as analyst one has one's own needs; but verbal
interpretation at this point is not the essential feature and brings its own
dangers.
The essential feature is the analyst's survival and the intactness of the
psychoanalytic technique.
Imagine how traumatic can be the actual death of the analyst when this kind of
work is in process, although even the actual death of the analyst is not as bad
as the development in the analyst of a change towards retaliation.
These risks simply must be taken by the patient.
Usually the analyst lives through these phases of movement in the
transference, and after each phase there comes reward in terms of love,
reinforced by the fact of the backcloth of unconscious destruction.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
Winnicott returns to technical questions related to his schema of object usage,
especially related to interpretation and the managing of countertransference. Though his
195
overall position on recognizing the importance of countertransference is generally similar
to other extant models (see Counter-transference, 1960), he does make some subtle
distinctions in terms of the meanings associated with receiving and responding to
transference associated with the birth of subjectivity. For the most part
countertransference in PS1 and PS2 at the time was viewed as the therapist’s response to
the patient’s transference, as fueled by the therapist’s own unconscious identifications
and wishes. Recommended technique in response to such feelings were introspection,
empathy, and neutrality, though it was accepted that judgment could nevertheless remain
impaired and acting out could occur under powerful psychic pressure. With some
exceptions (see Lewis, 1992 for discussion of Harold Searles’ work that anticipated the
relational movement) at this time countertransference was still mostly thought to be a
hindrance to neutrality and insight versus a tool for understanding.147 With respect to
technique, PS1 and PS2 models generally used interpretation more carefully than PS3,
interpreting from surface to depth and thus respecting the patient’s defenses and character
structure (Kernberg, 1969).
A significant shift in the nature and managing of countertransference came about
in the British School in the late 1940’s and into the 1950’s.148 According to Hinshelwood
147
As mentioned, alterations in PS2 technique with borderline patients were under way which included
viewing more primitive defenses such as projective identification as contributing to a keener understanding
of the patient’s experience. However, more poignant shifts in views of countertransference in ego
psychology would begin in the 1970’s with Kohut’s (1971, 1977) more elaborated psychology of the self.
148
According to Wolstein (1983) the roots of a more interpersonal versus a purely id view of the treatment
situation that would have implications for countertransference began even earlier in the history of
psychoanalysis—in the 1920’s with Ferenzi, Reich, and Rank. Soon after the interpersonalist views of
Sullivan, Horney, and Thompson would further the focus on the here and now interactions between patient
and therapist, viewing countertransference as not simply as the patient’s irrational distortions of past
relationships but also current ruptures based on the therapist’s humanness.
196
(1988) by the time Winnicott wrote his paper on object usage, countertransference had
expanded in meaning to include:
1. “normal countertransference” or the process of receiving and identifying with
feeling states (patient’s projections) via introjection and then re-projecting these
states in the form of interpretation;
2. a specific non-neurotic response to the patient as an accurate indicator of a
psychic events (Heimann, 1950);
3.
“normal projective identification” or the transmission of feeling states that are not
considered pathological as put forth by Little (1951), Money-Kryle (1956), and
Bion (1959);
4. similar to #3, the analyst as “maternal container” in which communications in the
form of projective identification are registered and optimally contained and
responded to in ways that reduce anxiety and foster psychic integration.
These views generally corresponded to a more active and a deeper interpretation of
transference material, which was one notion Winnicott was challenging in this section.
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
A host of embodied conceptual metaphors are contained in this more technical
section, centered mainly on interpretation, survival, and reliability in the treatment
setting. With respect to the therapist’s stance vis-à-vis destructive attacks related to the
197
birth of subjectivity, SURVIVAL IS THE ABSENCE OF RETALIATION describes the
quality of response that must be somehow transmitted to the patient. If and when a
defensive reaction does occur it is posited by Winnicott as RETALIATION IS
COLUSION WITH A DELUSIONAL THOUGHT, in which the therapist misperceives
the generative elements of destruction for its more damaging qualities and uses. A
common form that retaliation takes is verbal interpretation, which corresponds to
INTERPRETATION IS SELF-DEFENSE, INTERPRETATION IS ROTTEN FOOD
(e.g., Line 111 “spoiling the process”) and RETALIATION IS UNRELIABILITY. If
retaliation is communicated to the patient it is thought to be more horrific than dying—
RETALIATION IS BEYOND DEATH, while survival or non-retaliation is synonymous
with love—SURVIVAL AND NON-RETALIATION IS LOVE. Moving forward a
dialectical tension or fusion between love and aggression is kept in balance via a
“backcloth of unconscious destruction” (Line 117), which might be conceived as
DESTRUCTION IS THE MAINTENANCE OF LOVE.
Commentary
This section generally deals with certain themes that had occupied Winnicott’s
writing for some decades. In particular, the managing of countertransference reactions
with respect to powerful forces associated with destruction and primitive emotional states
were dealt with in Hate in the Counter-transference (1949), Metapsychological and
Clinical Aspects of Regression Within the Psychoanalytic Set-Up (1954), and Fear of
Breakdown (1963) to name but a few. Besides purely technical implications, these
writings reveal Winnicott’s ongoing struggles with how aggressive elements of his
198
experience could be integrated into his personhood. For example, the idea that verbal
interpretation can at times be ineffective or even “dangerous” (Line 113) points to
worries about his effects on others that likely began early in his caregiving experience
with a depressed mother for whom he came to feel responsible. The larger theme of
“doing” versus “not-doing” (or “being”)—both in terms of fear of damaging others and
also possibly related to male and female aspects of his sexual identity—also seem
relevant here. Another idea is the experience of dread and annihilation that can occur in
the process of carrying over a more disturbed patient into a collective realm of reality.
Winnicott generally paints a picture of patient and therapist together (but in separate
ways) needing to “risk” (Line 116) arriving at the brink of death in order to achieve their
respective tasks.149
Text and Analysis, Lines 118-130
118.
119.
120.
121.
149
It appears to me that the idea of a developmental phase involving survival of
object does affect the theory of the roots of aggression.
It is no good saying that a baby of a few days old envies the breast.
It is legitimate, however, to say that at whatever age a baby begins to allow
the breast an external position (outside the area of projection) then this means
that destruction of the breast has become a feature.
I mean the actual impulse to destroy.
Rodman (2003) notes that Winnicott lost many patients to suicide, and his writings are replete with the
experience of coping with patients who can (emotionally or physically) “kill” their therapist. It was these
patients for whom he believed regression to dependency was the only solution (e.g., worth the “risk”). One
such patient coincidentally committed suicide while he was recovering from a heart attack he suffered in
New York after the presentation of the paper on object usage. Another was Margaret Little who was
reported to have physically attacked him during a psychotic episode (he was also known to hold her hand in
regressed moments). Rodman suggests that Winnicott (like others doing similar work) displayed a strand of
omnipotence that took the form of believing that he was uniquely suited to treat highly disturbed patients in
psychoanalysis, revealing a capacity to also “risk” others’ lives for his theoretical convictions.
199
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
It is an important part of what a mother does, to be the first person to take the
baby through this first version of the many that will be encountered, of attack
that is survived.
This is the right moment in the child's development, because of the child's
relative feebleness, so that destruction can fairly easily be survived.
Even so it is a very tricky matter; it is only too easy for a mother to react
moralistically when her baby bites and hurts.
But this language involving the breast is jargon.
The whole area of development and of management is involved in which
adaptation is related to dependence, apart, that is, from the important detail of
relating to the breast.
It will be seen that, although destruction is the word I am using, this actual
destruction belongs to the object's failure to survive.
Without this failure, destruction remains potential.
The word 'destruction' is needed, not because of the baby's impulse to destroy,
but because of the object's liability not to survive.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
In this section Winnicott directly contrasts his ideas on object usage with key
elements of Kleinian theory, in particular the meaning of the breast as both a physical and
emotional object in the context of aggressive energy. In PS3 the breast represents the
child’s first contact with the figure of the mother. As a part-object existing in the
paranoid-schizoid position the breast is given meaning beyond its pure physical
functionality, based on the infant’s still immature cognitive capacities associated with
broadly “good” or “bad” feeling states. As synonymous with a source of life and a “good
object,” it is according to Klein inherently endowed to be an object of destructive
attack.150 The infant uses projective and introjective mechanisms to interact with objects
like the breast, and as such it becomes an extension of the underdeveloped ego. It is not
150
The prevalence of “primary envy” and the need to destroy good objects is viewed as innate in PS3
thought (Hinshelwood, 1988). A distinction is made, however, between this element of envy from that
which is in response to the object’s perceived withholding of something good for itself. In other words,
primary envy is the endowed instinctual stance toward “goodness” in general, not an a posteriori feeling
state that arises from the perceived intention of the object.
200
until attainment of the depressive position that objects are considered separate and thus in
need of protection. It is with this idea that Winnicott’s depiction of removing the object
(e.g., breast) from an omnipotent position more closely resonates.
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
With respect to object relationships in the earliest stages of infancy, Winnicott
depicts the breast as both similar to other objects and unique in the infant’s emotional and
perceptual experience. Like other objects the breast must eventually be viewed as outside
the purview of narcissistic control (Line 120), conveyed in DESTRUCTION IS
REMOVAL OF THE BREAST FROM OMNIPOTENT SPACE. However, unlike most
other objects the breast can actually experience physical aggression via breast-feeding
(Line 121) characterized by DESTRUCTION OF THE BREAST IS THE ACUTAL
IMPLUSE TO DESTROY. Along with its physical properties and nutritional function,
the breast is imbued with meanings via psychological mechanisms (e.g., projection and
introjection) associated with pre-differentiated states. Though he does not deny the
existence of “inborn aggression” (Line 139) as present in the earliest stages of
development (e.g., paranoid-schizoid position), Winnicott does seem to draw the line
characterizing these impulses as akin to envy (Line 119). He generally views the more
significant processes as occurring on the cusp of emerging emotional states (e.g., from PS
201
to D), when more primitive psychic elements are transformed into mature psychic
structure.
For Winnicott the key event in attaining the depressive position is the ability of
the caregiver to survive, marking the birth of concern (“ruth”) in which objects are
viewed as separate and in need of protection. It is only in cases of non-survival or
retaliation that “actual” destruction (Line 121) becomes a feature of emotional (versus
physical) strivings for meeting a need. In this way (ACTUAL) DESTRCUTION IS THE
OBJECT’S FAILURE TO SURVIVE, whereby the object’s response (not the behavior
itself) determines how the action will be characterized by the infant.151 When survival
and adequate “adaptation” (Line 127) do occur, the destructive energy assumes a
secondary position and is felt by the infant as nothing out of the ordinary (e.g., intention,
liveliness, motility, assertion, being, etc). In this way destruction becomes part of the
“backcloth” of experience and exists from this point forward in a suspended state,
conveyed by SURVIVAL IS POTENTIAL DESTRUCTION. Potential here has a dual
meaning—both as “ready” to respond with “actual” destruction (if retaliation or nonsurvival occurs) and as the availability or reserve of unused generative energy.
From the above description emerge two primary developmental pathways with
respect to the organism’s striving toward the achievement of separate self status and
reality-based thinking vis-à-vis the breast:
151
According to Winnicott (1963) the object’s failure to survive would be related to “primitive agonies”
that form the basis for later “fears of breakdown” such as falling forever or returning to an unintegrated
state (e.g., “going to pieces”).
202
Pathway 1 – Successful Object Usage Outcome
•
Aggressive/destructive energy in the form of motility (a neutral force) manifests
physically via events such as sucking, biting, etc.
•
Caregiver-object does not retaliate (Survival)
•
Generative aggressive/destructive energy as motility or assertion becomes
primary modality for encountering objects (e.g., understanding their nature,
intentions, and accurate position with respect to dependency needs)
•
“Potential” generative energy becomes the primary modality available for
relating to objects
•
Non-generative (“actual”) aggressive/destructive energy in the form of physical
or emotional acts designed to obliterate or annihilate objects or reality become
secondary (relegated to unconscious fantasy)
•
“Potential” non-generative energy (e.g., “actual destruction”) relegated to
background, though “ready” to be triggered if retaliation, non-survival, or
extreme trauma occurs
Pathway 2 – Unsuccessful Object Usage Outcome
•
Aggressive/destructive energy in the form of motility (a neutral force) manifests
physically via events such as sucking, biting, etc.
•
Caregiver-object retaliates (No Survival)
•
Non-generative (“actual”) aggressive/destructive energy in the form of physical
or emotional acts designed to obliterate or annihilate objects or reality becomes
primary modality for encountering objects
•
“Potential” non-generative energy becomes primary modality for relating to
objects; objects more prone or “ready” to be viewed as persecutory, rejecting,
retaliatory, etc.
•
Generative aggressive/destructive energy as motility or assertion is not actualized
and thus mainly reinforces or fuels manifestation of “actual” destructiveness
•
“Potential” generative energy is not an available modality for relating to objects;
requires repeated experiences of object’s survival under “maximum
destructiveness” to ascend to a more primary position
203
Commentary
This section has important implications for how clinicians conceptualize more
disturbed patients’ strivings for more integrated and reality-based states of mind. In
particular, it proposes one way of characterizing and responding to those primitive
psychic elements that are associated with aggressive energy. What Winnicott seems to be
recommending is a more cautious and passive stance at certain moments when a patient is
more regressed, paralleling the unintegrated state of early infancy when “being” must be
met with an un-impinged but contained posture. Following the American interpersonalist
tradition of Sullivan and in line with contemporaries such as Kernberg and Kohut who
were beginning to conceptualize borderline and narcissistic phenomena in novel ways,
Winnicott’s idea of object usage represented a shift from more traditional ways (PS1,
PS2) of viewing aggression and countertransference phenomena. In general certain of the
ideas in this paper would portend the “relational turn” in psychoanalysis that would begin
to flower after his death (Mills, 2005).
In terms of specific technique Winnicott left many gaps in his theorizing,
presumably not interested or not capable of pinning down in more specific ways
examples of his constructs in action. For example, he does not address exactly when (if at
all) the therapist is to begin to demonstrate separate self qualities that presumably must
enter into the equation in the process of object usage. In a similar way is left out just what
from the therapist’s position (beyond the broad process of “collusion”) leads to an
inability to survive or a propensity to retaliate, and what can be done to counteract such
tendencies. The broad gaps in theorizing are not surprising and can be seen as part and
parcel of his personality and writing-intellectual style. The lack of details in terms of
204
applicability would seem to question its viability as a specific clinical approach versus an
idiosyncratic style that was uniquely suited to his temperament and professional milieu.
Text and Analysis, Lines 131-139
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
The way of looking at things that belongs to my presentation of this paper
makes possible a new approach to the whole subject of the roots of
aggression.
For instance, it is not necessary to give inborn aggression more than that
which is its due in company with everything else that is inborn.
Undoubtedly inborn aggression must be variable in a quantitative sense in the
same way that everything else that is inherited is variable as between
individuals.
The variations in inborn aggression are slight as compared with the total
inheritance of that which can lead to aggressiveness.
By contrast, the variations are great that arise out of the differences in the
experiences of various newborn babies according to whether they are or are
not seen through this very difficult phase.
Such variations in the field of experience are indeed immense.
Moreover, the babies that have been seen through this phase well are likely to
be more aggressive clinically than the ones who have not been seen through
the phase well, and for whom aggression is not something that can be
encompassed (become ego-syntonic), or can be retained only in the form of a
liability to be the object of attack.
This involves a rewriting of the theory of the roots of aggression since most of
that which has already been written by analysts has been formulated without
reference to that which is being discussed in this paper.
The assumption is always there, in orthodox theory, that aggression is reactive
to the encounter with the reality principle, whereas here it is the destructive
drive that creates the quality of externality.
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
Here Winnicott makes a case for viewing the environment as significantly more
critical to development than inherited biology, especially with respect to aggression and
destructive energy. Though acknowledging that variability in “inborn aggression” (Line
132) exists among infants, the quality of the caregiving environment potentially plays a
205
larger role in ultimately determining the extent to which generative and non-generative
forms of aggression become manifest. Like the previous section the primary distinction
being made is with Kleinian theory, which at this time viewed aggression and sadism as a
manifestation of the death instinct and the primary factor in overall development
(Hinshelwood, 1988). Generally, in PS3 aggressive instincts and related behaviors (e.g.,
biting, sucking) are the main vehicle for exploring the world in the earliest stages of
development in the paranoid-schizoid position. As such objects become imbued with
persecutory qualities that must be met with protective maneuvers (e.g., attack, expulsion,
etc), creating a self-reinforcing process that creates danger in the very attempts to mange
it. Besides its effects on the perception of objects, instinctual aggression also influences
the self in the form schizoid states of mind that attempt to cope with the threat of
annihilation that is believed to come from within (e.g., because of the aggressive instincts
and behaviors themselves). These schizoid processes are designed to protect the ego by
splitting it into parts that can be segregated (e.g., “good” from “bad”) and projected into
other objects (e.g., projective identification) for protection. Overall the fusion of
instinctual aggression with instinctual love occurs with arrival of the depressive position,
though in general PS3 does not specifically describe the attributes of the environment that
must be functioning for this transformation to occur.152
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
152
Overall the quality of the caregiving environment is implied in Kleinian theory; specifically, the ability
of the caregiver to allow the infant to successfully pass through the pain (e.g., guilt, remorse) associated
with the depressive position. Mainly, the caregiver must allow the infant to make “reparation” for the
perceived attacks that characterized the earliest states of mind.
206
Related Conceptual Metaphors
The idea that each infant is born temperamentally equipped with a quantifiable
level of aggressive potential is conveyed in INBORN AGGRESSION IS VARIABLE. A
play on words in Line 134 involving heritability forms INHERITANCE IS
ENVIRONMENT, in which a word typically used to convey the genetic transmission of
physical or psychological attributes becomes synonymous with the infant’s caregiving
setting. Along those same lines, the notion that the quality and level of aggression present
is a function not of biology but of the response or adaptation by the caregiver is
communicated in POTENTIAL VARIABLITY IN AGRESSION IS
ENVIRONMENTAL. In terms of how aggression comes to be regulated and tied with
libidinal forces in the service of healthy development comes INSTINCTUAL FUSION IS
ENCOMPASSED AGGRESSION and UNFUSED AGGRESSION IS POTENTIAL
(ACTUAL) DESTRUCTION. These un-fused states are akin to the aforementioned
Pathway 2 (Unsuccessful Object Usage Outcome), a scenario in which uncontained
aggression leads to modes of functioning that put the organism in the continuous position
of warding off assumed persecutors using “actual” destruction.153 In Line 137 the
distinction between healthy and unhealthy aggression is conveyed in CLINICAL
AGGRESSION IS GENERATIVE.
153
Akin to identification with the aggressor, the subject attempts to neutralize aggression by outwardly
manifesting the internal relationship with the persecutory object. The “actual” destructive maneuvers are
misguided attempts to move the object outside omnipotent control. As such, the object is paradoxically
both the primary source of pain and its only hope for amelioration.
207
Commentary
Among other things this section calls attention to foundational ideas of Klein on
which many if not all of Winnicott’s theoretical constructs are based. Though in ways
highly original, the context from which ideas such as object usage emerged cannot be
detached from its ultimate meaning and importance. In general, the above juxtaposition
of ideas such as “environmental” and “biological,” and previously cited combinations
like “destruction” and “perception,” point to the dialectic nature of ideas that emerged
from Winnicott’s decades-long exposure to PS3 ideas. In one sense, within Kleinian
theory and in Klein herself Winnicott found a tangible and survivable “object” with
which to engage both his clinical ideas as well as his personal strivings for independence
and recognition.
The elemental and solid nature of Klein’s constructs such as “destruction,”
“envy,” “splitting,” and “incorporation”—and the related ubiquity of visceral words used
to describe these processes like “attack,” “bite,” and “evacuate” —provided highly
suitable conditions for juxtaposing Winnicott’s more ethereal ideas and temperament.
Not surprisingly, Klein’s personality paralleled the more solid and forcefulness nature of
her constructs, which additionally provided Winnicott the continual embodiment of the
ideas with which to grapple professionally and personally. In retrospect, it is also
significant that certain cornerstone Kleinian concepts related to destruction, reparation,
and overall human corporality would touch so closely to the heart of Winnicott’s life
story. While serendipitous it is also a testament to the explanatory power and validity of
the constructs. It is hard to imagine what form Winnicott’s ideas would have taken had
they been nurtured in a different professional milieu. For example, would there have even
208
existed ideas such as “transitional object,” “holding environment,” and “playing” if not
for Kleinian ideas related to “position,” “phantasy,” and the infant’s aggressive nature in
the context of an anthropomorphized mind? If these Winnicottian ideas would have been
forthcoming regardless of his professional milieu, just how different would their
meanings be?
Text and Analysis, Lines 140-155
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
Let me look for a moment at the exact place of this attack and survival in the
hierarchy of relationships.
More primitive and quite different is annihilation.
Annihilation means 'no hope'; cathexis withers up because no result completes
the reflex to produce conditioning.
Attack in anger relative to the encounter with the reality principle is a more
sophisticated concept, postdating the destruction that I postulate here.
In the destruction of the object to which I am referring there is no anger.
There could be said to be joy at the object's survival.
From this moment, or arising out of this phase, the object is in fantasy always
being destroyed.
This quality of 'always being destroyed' makes the reality of the surviving
object felt as such, strengthens the feeling tone, and contributes to object
constancy.
The object can now be used.
I wish to conclude with a note on using and usage.
By 'use' I do not mean 'exploitation'.
As analysts, we know what it is like to be used, which means that we can see
the end of the treatment, be it several years away.
Many of our patients come with this problem already solved—they can use
objects and they can use us and can use analysis, just as they have used their
parents and their siblings and their homes.
However, there are many patients who need us to be able to give them a
capacity to use us.
In meeting the needs of such patients, we shall need to know what I am saying
here about our survival of their destructiveness.
A backcloth of unconscious destruction of the analyst is set up and we survive
it or, alternatively, we shall become involved in yet another analysis
interminable.
209
Theoretical-Contextual Meaning
In this final section, Winnicott positions object usage in relation to PS1 and PS2
characterizations of similar phenomena. In general, the psychic processes associated with
object usage are conceptualized as occurring before those related to the reality principle.
In particular, the destructive energy that is utilized to counteract narcissistic thinking in
Winnicott’s schema is qualitatively different from that which reacts to the realization that
the self is diminished in relation to the true omnipotence of reality. In other words, the
“attack in anger” (Line 143) is a response to (e.g., “cathexis”) an already separated and
thus “reflexive” world, whereas Winnicottian “destruction” is at this phase of
development is the very force that is in the process of creating self-object differentiation.
Thus, it is not (generative) destruction but rather “annihilation” (Line 141) that more
accurately represents that which is diametrically opposed to the reactionary “anger” upon
first meeting reality, in that annihilation is associated with the actual obliteration of the
very force (cathexis) that is required to engage or enliven objects. Annihilation thus
reinforces an objectless world in which no reflexivity (e.g., “conditioning”) exists.
Basic Meaning of Transformational Concepts
Not applicable.
Related Conceptual Metaphors
Winnicott uses RELATIONSHIPS ARE HIERARCHIES to categorize the nature
and qualities of the states of mind associated with object relating, object usage, and the
reality principle. DESTRUCTION IS HOPE IN OBJECT USAGE STATES and
210
ANNIHILATION IS NO HOPE IN OBJECT RELATING STATES generally
characterize the quality of aggressive energy as it exists in different psychic reams of
existence. In drawing comparisons with similar phenomena of PS1 and PS2, Winnicott
uses ANNIHILATION ELIMINATES CATHEXIS and ANNIHILATION IS
OBJECTLESSNESS to distinguish his conception of destruction from its more typical
connotations (e.g., as having no generative qualities). He makes the case for the
usefulness of destruction by drawing on DESTRUCTION IS JOY, DESTRUCTION IN
FANTASY IS CREATION IN REALITY, and DESTRUCTION IS PERCEPTION (e.g.,
in that it provides “feeling tone” and “object constancy”). To further distinguish elements
of object usage he proposes ATTACK IN ANGER IS POST-OBJECT RELATING
ACTIVITY, essentially moving forward in time the processes commonly associated with
the reality principle. Finally, he uses PERPETUAL THERAPY IS THE ABSENCE OF
AN UNCONSCIOUS BACKCLOTH OF DESTRUCTION to make a larger point that
the inability to transport or relegate actual destructive energy to unconscious fantasy
leads to the inevitable necessity to enact “actual destruction” which results in “analysis
interminable” (Line 155).
Commentary
As related above, the final section draws some distinct conclusions with respect
to how Winnicott positions object usage within psychoanalytic metapsychology. There
are also less obvious implications with respect to the experience of the therapist and the
related quest to survive under the conditions put forth in the paper. Specifically, the
introduction of two words—“annihilation” and “exploitation”—call attention not only to
211
the internal and external manifestation of object-relational mind states of the patient, but
also corresponding countertransference phenomena that can be revealed in the therapist.
One way of looking at what Winnicott has been suggesting throughout the paper is the
propensity to respond to primitive states of mind with “no hope” (annihilation) on one
hand or with exploitative maneuvers (e.g., ill-timed or self-defensive interpretation) on
the other, both of which miss the mark in terms of creating the necessary conditions for
psychic advancement. Though not explicit in the formulation, the clinical stance that
seems to best fit is that which hovers in-between these seemingly opposing states, in the
transitional realm in which time, space, and objects (as we know them) do not exist. One
implication is that any overt maneuver that is designed to, say, encourage, motivate, or
impart hope, removes the therapist from the transformative position in transitional space.
That is, by assuming the status of a real object the therapist is co-opting the creative
process that must proceed from the emerging subject. For Winnicott this is a core
consequence of prematurely inserting a quality of reality that cannot yet be integrated by
the patient, leading to a paradoxically objectless and “hopeless” state reminiscent of
annihilation.154
The above discussion leaves unanswered questions more relevant to modern
views of technique; mainly, just when and how, if at all, is the subjecthood of therapist
introduced into the process, especially if the object usage status is not forthcoming
despite the requisite “survival” (non-retaliation) by the therapist? As has been clear
throughout the analysis, Winnicott is a master at transporting his reader to brink of an
apparent certainty, only to stop short of completely “arriving” at a definite conclusion.
154
The implication is that premature introduction of an object leads not to annihilation or removal of the
object, but a “withering” of the mechanistic impulse and desire to attach to objects (cathexis).
212
The reader is left to fill-in the many gaps by drawing on their own developmental
histories, their clinical experiences, and the experiences created by the reading of the text.
One way to attempt to answer the question of subjecthood is to use the tools and
implications of cognitive linguistics that have been examined to this point. In a broad
sense it could be posited that, akin to embodied metaphor, Winnicott expressly uses the
“raw” material of our extant conceptual systems and related language to lay down the
general foundation of his clinical arguments. In doing so he both concretizes and vivifies
psychic experience through pushing to the limits (e.g., through novel constructions and
language using metaphor) the meanings that can be garnered from our embodied vantage
points. What is left over (e.g., the definite conclusions that are not drawn), then, can be
thought of as beyond the capacity of circumscribed metaphorical considerations, which
requires the process of conceptual blending to reveal the answers. As such, this requires a
uniquely individual interaction in mental space (e.g., Winnicott’s transitional space) with
the words and ideas of the text, in the continuous context of external encounters with
patients whose individuality imposes nuances of meaning with implications for
technique. Like conceptual blending, this leaves open infinite possibilities as to when and
how the subjecthood of the therapist is made manifest, both intentionally and
unintentionally (based on the unique perception of the patient as a consequence of the
“emerging” meanings generated from the encounter). This would seem to necessarily
require the employment of techniques that would on the surface contradict the tenets and
formulas put forth in this paper (e.g., untimely interpretation, appearing to not survive,
etc.). Subjecthood, like any other psychic experience, must be continually reborn in the
context of other subjects—established selves and those in statu nascendi—in transitional
213
space, and thus cannot be confined to formulas that by their very nature reinforce the
imposition of actual time and actual space.155
155
Like most other practioners Winnicott likely saw the majority of his patients for relatively few sessions.
This would indicate that he by necessity employed more active techniques that revealed his subjecthood
than the ones put forth in this paper. Indeed, his editor Masud Khan recounted: “I am afraid you are
misinformed in so far as you say that Winnicott did not do brief or focal therapy with adults. He did, and in
a variety of ways. For example, I sent him a number of cases whom he only saw three or four times in
three-hour sessions, and who did extremely well. The irony is that in fact Winnicott's long single
consultations or a few consultations with adults were much more therapeutically effective than his
published very long treatments” (Gustafson & Howard, 1983). Taken at face value, this raises the question
as to whether the imposition of time constraints actually freed Winnicott up in ways that revealed more of
his subjecthood (e.g., spontaneity, playfulness, etc.) and whether long treatments pulled him in the direction
of losing enlivening parts of his self, reminiscent of the quality of attachment to his mother.
214
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Overview
The findings of the preceding textual analysis will be organized and discussed
with respect to the key objectives of the study. The outline will consist of:
1. A list of the revealed conceptual metaphors associated with key concepts
in The Use of an Object;
2. An overview of the revealed conceptual metaphors vis-à-vis three of
Lakoff and Johnson’s ontological categories on which philosophy is
based—the mind, the self, and time;156
3. A brief review of the revealed conceptual metaphors with respect to the
historicity of related concepts within psychoanalysis;
4. A commentary on the employment of notable style characteristics that
enhance or detract from implied meanings;
5. Proposed correspondences between key events in Winnicott’s early
development and the nature, function, and utilization of the revealed
conceptual metaphors;
6. A general evaluation of the methodology and its implications for
conceptual research; and,
7. Implications of the findings for clinical practice.
Revealed Conceptual Metaphors
Appendix O outlines the revealed conceptual metaphors that underlie the main
ideas associated with the text The Use of an Object. They are presented in an inventory
156
Philosophy in the Flesh includes two additional categories: events and causes (causality) and morality.
Causes and events are generally incorporated into the individual sections on mind, self, and time. The
analysis of the primary text The Use of an Object did not reveal constructs germane to morality and thus it
will not be addressed here.
215
format, with section headings loosely chosen based on the conceptual correspondence to
an idea or set of ideas. The metaphors cover a wide range conceptually, and many are
employed in different ways depending on the context and the subject matter under
consideration. It is evident from the list that there are a variety of ways that the
underlying conceptual metaphors from a given text can be configured and shown to relate
to different ideas. Though there was no attempt to systematize each revealed metaphor
via a complete mapping (e.g., a full account of conceptual origins from which the
particular construction derives), each section on outlining basic Winnicottian ontology
will provide a more detailed review of the key concepts’ relationship to more basic
conceptual categories (e.g., mind, self, and time).
Winnicott’s Ontology of the Mind
The textual analysis revealed that like all other Western conceptions of mental
functioning, Winnicott draws on the basic formula in which the mind is depicted as akin
to a physical body (e.g., container) that exists in a determinable space. In Lakoff and
Johnson’s (1999) prototype THE MIND IS A BODY, thought processes are conceived as
movements (THINKING IS MOVING) and reason is the force (REASON IS A FORCE)
that directs thinking/movement from one location to another. Locations represent ideas
(IDEAS ARE LOCATIONS) that are arrived at via thought’s movement through space.
Truth or reality, then, is depicted as arriving at or inhabiting a space that corresponds to
an accurate application of reason, notably involving utilizing factual statements or
216
words.157 However, though certain basic elements of traditional philosophical depictions
of mind are implied in Winnicott’s schema, he reconfigures others on inherited
psychoanalytic assumptions—primarily via Freud and Klein—as well his own novel
conceptual formulations. In general, like most if not all psychoanalytic theoreticians, his
depiction of mental processes is an amalgamation of traditional Western philosophy and
psychoanalytic models of the mind.
The analysis revealed that the two central tenets that sets Winnicott’s conceptual
style apart from prototypical Western notions of mind and reason: (a) The employment of
factors (aggression and destruction) other than pure reason to account for psychic forces,
and; (b) The positing of an intermediate area (transitional space) that serves to, among
other things, transform or convert primitive psychic material (e.g., ideas) into more
mature forms.
That factors other than reason—like instincts and drives which are related to
physical, emotional, and unconscious processes—are posited as mental forces is derived
from Classical psychoanalytic theory, while the conception of a separate psychological
realm (transitional space) wherein key processes of transformation occur was a construct
proposed by Winnicott in 1951. In general, Winnicott had used the idea of transitional
space as new lens through which extant psychoanalytic ideas (e.g., reality-based though,
symbolism, fantasy, part-objects, omnipotence) were re-examined, subjecting them to the
157
In general, Western thought is built on truth conditional semantics which holds that words inherently
possess “objective senses” that correspond to referents in the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). It follows
that applying the correct words (e.g., factual statements)—whose essence reflects an objective reality—
leads to “truth” and hence meaning. In this view, then, meaning is disconnected from anything subjective or
based on the experience of inhabiting a body or having a human mind. Rather, truth is arrived at by tapping
into a transcendent reason (via “factual” words, statements, propositions, etc.) that exists somehow apart
from the experiencing subject.
217
timeless and space-less quality of that realm to expand their meanings. In a similar way,
in the current paper under consideration transitional space was shown to play a key role
in understanding the relationship between object relating and object usage—in particular,
the interrelationship between those processes that result in the transformation to
subjecthood (e.g., TRANSFORMATION IS THE CREATION OF TIME AND A
SEPARATE OBJECT IN TRANSITIONAL SPACE).
In psychoanalysis the idea found to most closely resemble the basic elements of
Western Metaphors of Mind and its relationship to reason is Freud’s structural model
e.g., (id, ego, and superego). However, in this conception it is not reason per se but rather
instinctual elements (e.g., libido and aggression) and related energy—whose elaboration
is made manifest physically via the erotogentic zones—that act as psychological forces in
the mind (see Appendix K for Structural Point of View Metaphors). Each psychic
structure is essentially a configuration representing an established mode of processing
mental activity and is hypothetically depicted as existing in (vertical) space with respect
to consciousness (e.g., topography). Reason in this conception is a function of the
(mostly) conscious ego, whose primary task is to adapt the organism to the realities of the
environment. So, in contrast to prototypical Western thought, in psychoanalysis reason is
not a given but a developmental achievement whose status is not viewed as disembodied
and transcendent, but rather based processes that involve biology (e.g., physicality and
emotionality). In important ways, then, Winnicottian ontology is built on this a priori
assumption of an embodied subject whose reasoning ability is associated with experience
as revealed through pre-established structures of mind and brain, analogous to
218
“experientialism” and the findings of modern cognitive science (Lakoff & Johnson,
1999).158
In terms of the history of concepts, Winnicott inherited from psychoanalysis a
model of the mind that had already challenged certain key notions of traditional Western
thought (e.g., mental forces as not related to emotion and biology, reason as disembodied
and based solely on conscious thought). From the British School he was additionally
exposed to ideas that similarly stretched the limits of traditional philosophy. Specifically,
under the direct and indirect influence of Klein he would consider an alternative nature
and function of aggressive energy with respect to the mind. Specifically, Klein viewed
aggression as a separate instinct and force that was intimately involved in the earliest
development of the child. She took literally Freud’s death instinct and demonstrated how
the management and consolidation of destructive elements of the personality is a
significant developmental achievement. Among other findings relevant for Winnicott’s
formulations of the mind Klein demonstrated the inherent tendency of the ego to split
itself to ward off perceived attacks, as depicted in the phenomenon of projective
identification. The ego’s bifurcate capacity (e.g., simultaneously existing in two locations
at the same time) along with associated modes of psychic functioning (e.g., paranoid-
158
An inherent and related finding of cognitive science that confirms the basic tenets of psychoanalysis is
the mostly unconscious nature of thought and reason, coined by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) as the
“cognitive unconscious.” A corollary of the “embodied mind,” it points to how our reasoning ability is
organized around a pre-established structure that perceives certain recurrent forms and patterns within
sensory phenomena based on the experience of inhabiting a body. As has been pointed out, traditional
notions of reason focus on the more conscious and analytical aspects of reason akin to what is now known
as “left brain” processes. The cognitive unconscious and its relationship to reasoning can be thought of as
the synchronization of both right hemisphere (e.g., unconscious, non-verbal, symbolism, pattern/form
recognition, unity of phenomena) and left hemisphere (e.g., conscious, verbal, analytical, differentiation of
phenomena) modes of perceiving reality (Schiffer, 1998). From a neurological standpoint, then, the
attainment of object usage status (e.g., entering the world of “shared” reality) can be similarly thought of as
the successful integration of the mind-brain’s bifurcate modes of experiencing reality, which reveals the
more comprehensive qualities of reason.
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schizoid, depressive) that are similarly capable of transcending space and time, would be
among the key ideas inherent in his formula of object usage.159
Alternative Forces
In Winnicott’s basic schema of the mind aggression and destruction were
established as the primary psychic elements that exert force on the psychological system
(see Appendix O for complete list of metaphors utilizing aggression and destruction). In
contrast to traditional Western philosophy, wherein REASON IS A FORCE that
metaphorically travels (MOVEMENT IS THINKING) along a path to and from locales
representative of ideas (IDEAS ARE LOCATIONS), for Winnicott AGGRESSION IS A
FORCE and DESTRCUTION IS A FORCE160 characterize the impetus that propels
motion within and between psychic locations that correspond to states of mind
(LOCATIONS ARE STATES OF MIND), that may or may not contain reason. It is the
particular “reasoned” or “reasonless” state of mind (e.g., object usage or object relating)
that imparts the quality and characteristics of ideas (STATES OF MIND ARE IDEAS)
that are manifest at any point in time. The quality of thinking that this paper was most
concerned with involved the patient’s ability to perceive a shared and objectively-based
159
An idea imbedded in object relation theory that Winnicott was exposed to is the notion that modes of
experience (via “positions”) transcend fixed points of time (past, present, future) and space (self, other,
environmental ground). Conceptually this requires a shift from unidirectional (e.g., past present future) and uni-dimensional (e.g., space as segmented and auto-contained within a self and an object)
patterns of cause and effect to multi-faceted ones. Thus, any proposition with respect to psychic causality
must take into account these frameworks, which challenges traditional paradigms of Western thought (and
conventional thinking). For example, it raised the possibility that a psychic phenomenon is not simply an
effect of an antecedent cause existing a circumscribed space (e.g., within only the self or only another
object), but also a cause of a yet to be experienced effect in an opposing object (or an effect occurring
simultaneously in both objects).
160
In his formulation the two are generally interchangeable, though destruction is connoted as more a
manifestation of aggression in action.
220
reality, the ability to perceive one’s subjecthood as separate from others, and the ability to
derive generative psychological experiences via a relationship with an object. As such, in
conceptual terms, arriving at a concrete “location”— synonymous with prescribed ideas
(e.g., universal or disembodied “truths” as derived by reason alone) — is less significant
than the mode of experience that is imparted by the ascendant state of mind.161 This
appears to partly explain Winnicott’s seeming reluctance to reach definite conclusions as
depicted via “arriving” at concrete conceptual locales in space. That is, implicit in his
model is the notion that modes of functioning (as dictated by states of mind implicit in
the idea of psychic “positions”) transcend space and time and thus always exist in a state
of “potential” activation.
In Winnicott’s schema representing mental functioning it was found that the three
primary “locations” that represent states of mind are: (a) Object Relating; (b) Transitional
Space, and; (c) Object Usage. In general, object relating is associated with omnipotent
and narcissistic thought processes, the lack of perceptual differentiation between self and
other objects (e.g., subjective object status), and the absence of time. In contrast, an
object usage state of mind is associated with the capacity for rational thought which leads
to shared perceptions of reality, which coincides with self-other differentiation (e.g.,
separate self status) and the presence of time. Transitional space is the locational and
161
For Winnicott because reason is not “built-in” to our hardware but is rather a developmental
achievement—synonymous with the attainment of an object usage state of mind—it therefore cannot be
posited as the force which drives the conceptual system. That much of our psychic existence rests on
irrational and unconscious forces that at times fly in the face of reason was key discovery of Freud and
implicit in all psychoanalytic theorizing. Modern developmental theory additionally shows that certain
neurological deficits can markedly impact reasoning ability. Traditional Western philosophy—and to
certain degree modern conceptual metaphor theory—do not explicitly consider: 1) how reasoning is a
general developmental capacity and exists on a continuum from person to person, and; 2) how other factors
(e.g., anxiety, self-concept, motivation, etc.) impede on the correct application of reasoning from situation
to situation.
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conceptual bridge that connects the previous two psychic regions and is generally
involved in the transformation of raw psychic material (e.g., unidirectional, defuse, and
non-intentional) into more mature forms (e.g., multidirectional, fused, and purposeful). In
general, it is the successful integration of object relating and object usage states of mind
in the transitional realm that characterizes Winnicott’s primary statement on
development. It was shown that two of the extant psychoanalytic constructs that are both
drawn upon and subsumed under this proposed schema of mind is Freudian “fusion” and
Kleinian “positions.”
A brief comparison of the revealed schema of Winnicottian conception of mind
with that of traditional Western philosophy is:
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Traditional Western Philosophy
Winnicottian Ontology
THE MIND IS A BODY
THE MIND IS A BODY
Thinking Is Moving
Thinking is Moving
Towards locales that represent ideas
Movement reflects quality of a state of mind
Ideas Are Locations
Locations Are States of Mind
Ideas “things in themselves”
status
Locations represent truth or untruth
reality
Ideas emerge from embodied-conceptual
Reason Is a Force
Aggression/Destruction Is a Force
A priori existence of reason
forces
Reason as developmental achievement;
may or may not lead to reason
Reason from disembodied/transcendent
fusion processes
processes
Reason as outcome of successful instinctual
Fusion involves physical and emotional
Rational Thought Is Inherent Ability to
Tap Into Universal Reason (Reality)
Rational Thought Is Acquired Ability To
View Reality from Multiple Vantage Points
Based on truth conditions; correct
application of words whose “senses”
match transcendent reality
Based on quality of state of mind; words
reflect embodied-metaphorical status
that may or may not match shared reality
Time and space segmented, reified,
universal to all subjects
subject
Time and space fluid and based on
emergent qualities of unique embodied
Reality is tapping into disembodied
self via reason
Reality is the discovery and re-discovery of
other subjects in Transitional Space
Locations represent modes of experiencing
Figure 7. Comparison of Winnicottian Conception of Mind
& Traditional Western Philosophy
The construct of transitional space was revealed as the cornerstone upon which
Winnicottian ontology is based. Though it came to integrate and expand many of his
preceding constructs, it is in The Use of an Object that transitional space reaches its full
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potential. In particular, it is in this paper that it becomes directly associated with linking
states of mind associated with pre- and post-subject psychic existence, a crucial part of
Winnicott’s last and most comprehensive statement on human psychology. Specifically,
transitional space was shown to be associated with the process by which primitive
psychic elements are transformed in more mature forms, which provided a deeper and
more conceptually expansive account of a crucial developmental milestone. It was also
shown to be intimately involved in the conception of mind and its relationship to other
key existential elements: time, space, self, and cause and effect. As such, it was found to
be important not only for how it contributes to psychic development and transformation,
but also for what it reveals about the human conceptual system based on embodied
metaphor. That is, transitional space and its processes fill-in a gap in metaphor theory by
providing the framework for a more subjective and experience-near depiction of the birth
of conceptual metaphor (e.g., the conflation of learning that occurs in infancy vis-à-vis
sensorimotor experiences with objects).
In general transitional space was shown to derive its conceptual significance from
its simultaneous presence in what is ordinarily considered opposing realms of existence.
Because is borders space, time, and the material (e.g., body) and ethereal (e.g., mind,
soul), it comes to assume divergent qualities that represent a vast range of conceptual
possibilities. In this way it is more akin to conceptual blending than conceptual metaphor,
in that takes from the raw existential elements obvious and less than obvious qualities
from which to transform them into novel forms. Though the attainment of object usage
can be thought of as representing certain more circumscribed and universal
transformations of mind (e.g., reality-testing and separate subject status), it also marks the
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onset of a limitless and unique capacity to create novel meanings based a wider
conceptual vantage point. Having consolidated realms of object relating and object usage,
the analysis showed how these new emergent capacities are demonstrated in everyday
qualities such as self-assertion, empathy, and courage, to name a few.
Another key finding of the analysis is that aggression and destruction are the
primary forces that drive psychic momentum in Winnicott’s model of the mind. As
discussed, with respect to traditional philosophy aggression/destruction replaces reason as
the primary energy that puts in motion the mechanisms of thought. In terms of
psychoanalytic conceptions of mind, Winnicott’s formula makes the following alteration
to extant theory: 1) the nature of aggression/destruction shifts from non-generative (e.g.,
a reaction of frustration associated with the onset of reality), and 2) the specific function
of aggression/destruction with respect to attaining reality-based thinking and separate
object status shifts from that which eliminates or damages object material, to a more
affect-neutral transporter of the object into transformative space (e.g., DESTRUCTION
IS THE MOVEMENT OF THE OBEJCT OUTSIDE NARCISSISTIC SPACE).
It was further discovered that from Kleinian thought Winnicott inherited the idea
that aggression is not simply an impulsive reaction associated with the onset of realitybased thought, but that it is a multi-faceted force or energy that serves various purposes
within the system of mind. Specifically, Klein believed that aggressive forces (e.g., death
instinct) are as relevant as libidinal ones and thus contribute to the motivation to relate to
objects (e.g., AGGRESSION IS BINDING). Thus, while providing the motivation to
form connections with objects, aggressive forces and their vicissitudes (e.g., sadism) by
their very nature simultaneously interfere with the libido’s smooth progression to full
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potentiality (e.g., PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION IS DEPLETION OF THE SELF).
The most limiting aspect of aggression with respect to development for Klein is the
correspondent anxiety created by the infant’s recognition of its destructive nature and
potential. While Winnicott would accept the presence and inherent nature of aggression,
he would propose that specific environmental factors (e.g., primarily the provision of care
and state of mind of caregiver) influence the level and potentially debilitating effects of
aggression and anxiety on development. For example, ENVIRONMENT IS
IMPINGEMENT and ENVIRONMENT IS NOXIOUS characterize how external factors
play a role in how the infant pre-maturely comes to perceive the “actual” aggressive
aspects of their being. MOTHER IS A CONTAINER and MOTHER IS EMOTIONAL
NOURISHMENT are among the conceptual metaphors that depict how the environment
comes to successfully fuse primitive aggression into its more functional forms (FUSION
IS THE CREATION OF GENERATIVE AGGRESSION). In this case the infant is
allowed to discover in a more time-sensitive way its “generative” qualities of aggression,
while its “actual” forms are suspended in time (e.g., in unconscious fantasy) and only
realized as “potential” under extreme circumstances (POTENTIAL VARIABLITY IN
AGRESSION IS ENVIRONMENTAL).
Apart from including environmental factors in the formulation of a mental
schema, it was found that Winnicott more than any other theorist directly connects
aggressive/destructive energy with generative forces and the ultimate advancement into
mature modes of psychic functioning. The analysis showed that this is accomplished by
drawing on the often less than obvious semantic connotations associated with these
concepts. For example, AGRESSION IS SELFISH, AGGRESSION IS DEATH, and
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AGGRESSION IS DEFENSIVE were found to underlie conventional Western
conceptualizations of aggression, even though aggression/destruction is a on a biological
level primary means by which organisms undergo transformation (e.g., metamorphosis)
related to advanced development. Winnicott implicitly draws on these associations in
such constructions as AGGRESSION IS GENERATIVE ENERGY, AGGRESSION IS
SELF-ASSERTION, DESTRUCTION IS THE MAINTENANCE OF LOVE, and
DESTRUCTION IS HOPE. In general, in Winnicott’s schema opposing qualities of ideas
like aggression or destruction are simultaneously posited by setting up a third space
which transcends typical either or conceptions of ideas and the notion of positions which
similarly allows for a more fluid and less regimented depicted of the minds states and
processes.
Possible Developmental Connections with respect to the Conception of Mind
The two primary elements which characterize Winnicott’s schema of the mind—
the positing of aggression and destruction as forces and an intermediate realm which
transforms basic psychic qualities into more mature forms—can be examined
conceptually with respect to key experiences in early development. As outlined, from a
dynamic perspective early object relationships in the context of his immediate caregiving
environment (e.g., mother’s depression and related proneness to overstimulation) and
oedipal elements (e.g., father’s prohibitions against his masculinity) were found to be
themes of influence that can be applied to understanding his emergent conceptual style.
Though little is known of the specific content of his two analyses, the presumption is that
his ideas of psychoanalysis were being formulated in the context of an examination of his
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early family experiences and the related impact on his modes of perceiving basic
ontological categories such as sense of self, the mind, time, and causality. Like all
students of psychoanalysis, the introduction to its core concepts is not simply a cognitive
exercise, but also one that involves experiential learning or “remembering” the past via
the current therapeutic relationship. From the perspective of conceptual metaphor, then,
psychoanalytic training provided an examination and recapitulation of the “conflation” of
learning (e.g., sensorimotor experiences in the context of inhabiting a physical body) that
formed the basis for his unique conception of primary conceptual metaphors. It is from
these early experiences that the foundations of his unique conception of human
psychology can be further examined, thus filling-in a gap in modern metaphor theory by
providing a more subjective account of the origins of metaphor.
That aggression and destruction would become the primary forces on which
Winnicott’s model of the mind are calls to mind certain more obvious interpretations as
well as those of a more subtle nature. The apparent depressive qualities of his mother and
the prohibitive nature of his father likely played an important role in how aggression
came to be conceived in his theorizing. A simple and straightforward explanation is that
by significantly expanding the meaning of aggression to include generative qualities,
Winnicott was giving a purpose and meaning to an emotion that he seemingly spent most
of his life avoiding, or at the very least struggling to integrate into his personality.162
Beginning with the experience/memory of being weaned by his mother prematurely, it
seems he came to view normative strivings for survival (e.g., feeding) and intimacy as
162
Kleinian notions of aggression that pervaded the British School, as well as the actual bitter
contentiousness that played out between its members, provided Winnicott the ample fodder with which to
engage his aggression.
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overbearing and potentially damaging. Prohibitive aspects of his father’s personality
appears to have at the very least reinforced the notion that anger or intense emotionality
was potentially hurtful to those around him, as evidenced by being sent to boarding
school for the rather benign offense of saying “drat.”163 In general, overvaluing
aggression may have simply served to indirectly express in words and theorizing what he
could not do in reality, while simultaneously assigning it a positive purpose in
development.
A related but more subtle interpretation is that aggression/destruction in
Winnicott’s model of mind provided an indirect way to continue his role an emotional
“provocateur” that seems to have begun in his earliest caregiving environment. As
pointed out, his tendency to challenge conventional thought via his conceptual and
writing style is well-known (e.g., Fogel’s “anti-theory” and Newman’s “noncompliance). Similarly, the manner in which he altered meanings and uses of basic
ontological concepts (e.g., “object,” “hold,” “use,” “destroy”), as well as the way
seemingly dissimilar elements in his conceptual constructions were combined to reveal
novel associations (e.g., THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS, LONLINESS IS UNITY,
DESTRUCTION IS LOVE), are testaments to this provocative stance towards objects
and ideas.
As pointed out in the analysis a related trait of this tendency is the manner in
which his writing conveys meanings not only by pure semantics, but by also creating an
163
According to Rodman (2003) the extent to which his father’s overt and subtle admonitions with respect
to aggression (or apparently any extreme demonstration of emotion other than “playful” joking or sarcasm)
were responses to his mother’s depressive states (e.g., attempts to protect her from overstimulation) or
contributive or causative of those states is not clear. In any event, it is difficult to see how the combination
of factors would not to some extent be interpreted by a young child as somehow associated with
questioning basic dependency needs.
229
experience that is akin to the idea under consideration.164 Creating experiences fits with
the need to “enliven” objects (e.g., “diversify the objects agreeably”) and thus benignly
render them more malleable and, importantly, never absolute (e.g., stagnant, reified). In
this way concepts that depict states of mind derive “life” from always changing based on
context (e.g., “positions” or realms of experience) in a way that corresponds to his role
vis-à-vis his earliest object relationship—to keep his mother alive by rendering her
malleable in an attempt to prevent her from complete stagnation or lifelessness (e.g.,
becoming a “dead tree’).165
Winnicott’s positioning of transitional space as the mechanism by which primary
psychic elements are transformed by means of altering our typical conceptions of time,
space, and objects can also be viewed through the lens of his early developmental
experiences.166 As theoretical concepts go transitional space is stylistically more
reminiscent of a mystic’s characterizations of ethereal realms of existence than of
concretized portrayals of mind by science (e.g., THE MIND IS A BODY, THE MIND IS
164
Conveying meaning by virtue of experience versus reason points to early influences of his family’s
Wesleyan faith (Hoffman, 2004). In general, this idea is linked to traditionally feminine modes of
perception (e.g., “being” versus “doing,” right-brain versus left brain, unconscious soul versus animating
spirit, etc.) which are reminiscent of pre-verbal object relating realms of experience. Meaning here is
derived from more purely somatic experience vis-à-vis symbols, which is more akin to the foundations of
conceptual metaphor. This tendency in his writing may also be a remnant of his object relational stance
toward his mother—that is, not being able to reach a depressed object through words but only through
gestures designed to enliven through experience.
165
Rodman (2003) notes that in his 1949 paper Reparation in Respect of Mother’s Organized Defense
against Depression, it is posited that the child’s depression can simply be a reflection of the mother’s
condition. In addition, the child’s reparative efforts to relieve the mother’s condition correspond to the
perceived lack of effort or ability on her part, which can be thought of as attempt to expand (e.g., “enliven”
or make more malleable) her emotional and conceptual stance toward that particular state of mind.
166
The significant finding of the function of transitional space with respect to time is discussed under
Metaphors of Time.
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A COMPUTER).167 Despite its outward depiction, like all psychoanalytic concepts it can
be thought of emerging from deeper levels the psyche as the subject’s unique conception
of the processes of mind by which various experiences seek to become organized and
integrated. Though not as overtly “provocative” in the sense of directly challenging or
shifting the meaning of extant psychoanalytic concepts, transitional space is somewhat
elusive and difficult to pin down with absolutes which—like his association of aggression
and destruction to infancy—can nevertheless render the same effect.168 Generally, in
contrast to ramifications related to “keeping alive” an emotionally fragile mother via the
generative energy associated with aggression, transitional space as a means of connecting
states of mind (e.g., object relating and object usage) call to mind the broader need to
“bind” or “fuse” disparate qualities of experience. In this way, besides bridging aspects of
time and space which leads to revealing a shared reality, transitional space can also be
posited as the means by which both parents (as represented by masculine and feminine
ways of being) became organized into his personality.
167
The findings of quantum mechanics have for some time, however, challenged certain traditional
dichotomies between the “hard” (e.g., physics, biology) and “soft” (e.g., psychology, philosophy) sciences.
Among the relevant implications is that consciousness, like all matter and energy, is less predicable and
definable by our concretized or embodied notions of minds (e.g., THE MIND IS A CONTAINER, TIME
IS (UNIDIRECTIONAL) MOVEMENT THROUGH SPACE). Thus, that consciousness is capable of
transcending what is ordinarily thought of as impenetrable barriers (e.g., time, space, objects, etc) supports
the potential validity of ideas like transitional space, as well as core concepts from psychoanalysis (e.g.,
transference, projection, incorporation) which similarly involve the dispersal of mind through time and
space.
168
That is, while the more overt use of words such as aggression or destruction in describing infancy is an
example of one method of “provocation,” another is to depict constructs (like transitional space) in a way
that leaves significant gaps that can be similarly frustrating, especially to those keen on the strict
systematization of ideas. Both stylistic qualities, however, have a similar effect of expanding the more
conventional limits of language and reason by: 1) tapping into less obvious meanings of extant words, and;
2) allowing conceptual space within which both novel and extant meanings are not directly imposed, but
rather emerge spontaneously in the mind of the reader. For Winnicott the “experience” of creating meaning
is always something very personal which must not be intruded upon by reified notions of words or reality.
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A related finding was that Winnicott (1966) did explore ways of depicting reality
that represented traditionally feminine and masculine styles of experience, more
generally “being” versus “doing.” His hypothesis was that the personality has a tendency
to “split” or dissociate characteristic qualities along the lines of male and female modes
of perception. Though never explicitly assigning these gender-based ways of knowing to
his proposed states of mind, certain parallels do exist with implications for the conceptual
origin and relationship between transitional space and the object relating-object usage
dialectic of thought. That is, object relating as the timeless and spaceless realm where
symbolism, formlessness, and a more purely somatic connection (e.g., grounding) with
the environment reigns is generally associated with the feminine essence of “being.” In
contrast, the masculine realms can be generally thought of as sharing certain qualities
with object usage states, especially the creation of “reality” and the corresponding
capacity to employ a more disembodied mind/reason to depict experience. One quality of
masculine modes of perception involve creating “forms” based on more concrete notions
of space and time (e.g., THE MIND IS A BODY, THINKING IS MOVEMENT, etc.) to
represent experience. From this point forward in development, experience (e.g., thoughts,
feelings, behaviors) can be thought of as the moment to moment relative status of the
relationship between object relating and object usage states of mind.
Taking the above hypotheses at face value, it follows that part of what goes into
the conceptual foundation of any psychoanalytic construct of transformation is the
subject’s experience and interpretation of the processes that go into integrating disparate
mind states in the context of the unique qualities of primary love objects. For Winnicott,
then, transitional space reveals something of the nature of his stance towards what each
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parent came to represent psychically, as well as the ultimate “solution” to reconcile any
incongruities. In this way one task of his own transitional processes was to make meaning
of the relational style that each parent represented vis-à-vis meeting dependency needs.
Among other things this would have had to take into account the over-stimulating and
“deadening” effects of his innate strivings on his mother, in combination with his father’s
over-powering (e.g., personal “flare” and civic importance as coupled with a
prohibitive/sarcastic nature) and aloof stance with respect to his emerging masculinity.
That the general quality of transitional space is more ethereal and less absolute on the one
hand suggests an inability to concretize in “form” that which was responsible for carrying
him over into a world of shared reality. In this way it is a shadow of something that
Winnicott could not fully realize in more conscious and tangible ways. On the other hand
the quality of transitional space could also represent more ineffable forms of knowing,
whose power lay not in creating form but in its expansiveness and ability to transcend all
dichotomies of more concrete experience (e.g., form, no-form, time, no-time, space, nospace, etc.)—be they reflected via the idiosyncrasies of parental personality or in the
nature of reality itself. In this way, transitional space as a concept of transformation
shares much in common conceptual blending, in that it utilizes embodied notions of form
to ultimately go beyond form to create meaning.
Winnicott’s Ontology of the Self
The analysis outlined how the prototypical Western Metaphors of Self (Appendix
E) involve the characterization of the self as a physical object or container (THE SELF IS
A CONTAINER) whose character is metaphorically determined by virtue of its: (a)
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location in space; (b) possession of itself other objects, and; (c) control of itself or other
objects. Like other conceptual metaphors, the Metaphors of Self derive from the quality
of early sensorimotor experiences as perceived from inhabiting a physical body. From
these experiences the self becomes conceptualized as:
1. in or out of control (of itself);
2. possessing an objective or non-objective viewpoint;
3. possessing multiple parts and roles, and;
4. manifesting or not manifesting its core essence.
The analysis determined that Winnicott mainly utilizes the Essential Self
Metaphor—as reflected in his construct of the True and False Self—though aspects of the
others assist in determining the capacity to reveal the self’s “essential” quality (e.g., being
“in control” contributes to essential self functioning). It also showed how language
reflecting our embodiment limits the conception of the self by imposing structures related
to space (e.g., containers) and movement (e.g., unidirectional and from locations
representative of objects). One noted implication is that as observers—both of our own
self and others’—we are conditioned from early in life to conceptualize certain qualities
of objects (e.g., one’s “essence”) as existing in some hypothetical space that is autocontained and presumably impenetrable by outside forces (e.g., Winnicott’s True Self). It
was posited that this view does not always necessarily reveal the actual quality of objects,
but rather the inherent split nature of the self as a function of the embodied mind.
With respect to the transformations involved in the shift from object relating to
object usage states of mind, FEEDING ON THE SELF (“ME”) IS NOXIOUS and
FEEDING ON THE NUTRITIOUS OTHER (“NOT ME”) IS HEALTHY were found to
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reflect the need of separate object to derive generative experiences. In terms of the
conceptual positioning of the self vis-à-vis reams of experience, THE TRUE SELF IS
HIDDEN IN SUBJECTIVE (NARCISSISTIC) SPACE and THE FALSE SELF IS AN
IMPEDIMENT TO FINDING THE TRUE SELF revealed a variation on the Internal
Causation Metaphor and the Locational Self Metaphor (Appendix E). In Winnicott’s
conceptualization, the unstated implication is that the True Self is not in control in that is
not able on its own to move outside subjective space (e.g., object relating realm), which
is not its “normal” location. The False Self contributes to keeping it hidden, in an effort to
protect the True Self from external danger. Also, an indirect manifestation of the True
Self’s capacity to be found is contained LONLINESS IS UNITY (from The Capacity to
Be Alone), a developmental achievement whereby actual solitude is attained only in the
presence of a separate subject.
Winnicott’s conception of self was also found to be related to the perception of
reality vis-à-vis the psychic mechanism of projection. In particular, the analysis showed
that the ability to accurately perceive the “nature” or “essential” quality of other objects
requires a shift in perception that moves the self into a wider conceptual vantage point. It
displayed how the timeless, spaceless, and unidirectional qualities of object relating space
limit the self to myopic views of other objects. This idea was posited metaphorically as
ACCURATE PERCEPTION IS A LOSS OF SELF to describe how psychic maturation
inherently involves discarding those aspects of perception that cling to the need to occupy
a space that is more auto-contained (e.g., self suffused with object) and atemporal (e.g.,
no-time as leading to no differentiation or separate object). In general, it was found that
accurate perception involves the absence of the “object relating self,” which allows for
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the emergence of time and thus movement between distinguishable positions occupied by
separate objects (e.g., TIME IS MOVEMENT IN SPACE—INTO AND OUT OF SELFSPACE and MOVEMENT IS THE SEPARATION OF SELF AND OBJECT). Overall,
the creation of time and separate object space underpin the birth of reality, which for
Winnicott is the simultaneous discovery of one’s subjecthood via that of the other.
Possible Developmental Connections with respect to Conceptions of Self
Overall the self is not a primary construct and is mostly implied in many of the
processes described in The Use of an Object. Its implications do reveal, however, a core
tenet of Winnicottian ontology that pervades much of his writing; mainly, his predilection
for characterizing subjecthood utilizing the Essential Self Metaphor. For Winnicott one’s
essence via the True Self is reminiscent of universal conceptions of the soul as the core of
the individual, whose presence is not always evident but is nevertheless a guiding force
and associated with unconscious qualities of mind. As such, his conceptions of the self
can be seen through the lens of his Wesleyan upbringing, a Protestant faith that views
humans as inherently good via their creation in God’s image and naturally endowed
toward positive maturation (Hoffman, 2004).169 The idea of innate goodness corresponds
to the findings demonstrating the generative qualities of aggression, which Winnicott
depicts as a “life force” and thus related to one’s essential qualities reminiscent of the
True Self. As such, one’s goodness as reflected in the True Self can be thought of as
existing in a state of potential activation—ready to both experience its own essential
169
As a contrast, Hoffman (2003) cites Fairbairn’s Scottish Calvinistic roots—based on a sense of humans
as more separated from God through their intrinsic depravity and “bondage to sin”—as related to the innate
tendency of the infant mind to be attracted to “bad” objects.
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nature and to make itself known to other subjects. With respect to the transformation
involved in object usage, the initial discovery of the self as it emerges from object
relating realms of experience can be thought of as the individual’s first of potentially
innumerable encounters with the Essential Self throughout life. For Winnicott, the nature
of the environment (e.g., survival, adaptation, holding) and the processes of the mind
(e.g., mind states based on object relating and object usage) are mutually reinforcing and
together determine the extent to which one’s essence is revealed both to the individual
and to the world.
Besides the influence that religious faith likely played in Winnicott’s depiction of
the self, family dynamics also shed light on the foundation of this conceptual choice.
Highlighting the idea that there exists an essential part of the self (e.g., the True Self)
may simply reflect a general need to erect an impenetrable barrier that he viewed as
protecting him from painful memories associated with meeting dependency needs. As a
quality of existence that remains pure and beyond the forces of “impingement,” the True
Self stands in direct contrast to the False Self which must bear the brunt of coping with
reality in part by protecting the True Self from harm. In Winnicott’s case, his relational
tendencies characterized as “enlivening through provocation” can be thought of as
constituting a part of his False Self, in that they comprised an adaptational element of
“compliance” for survival. Thus, emphasizing the existence of an Essential Self as that
part that remained unscathed by painful events may have served as a way to make
meaning of his modes of relating, while also detaching himself from their less than
desirable qualities and ramifications. As discussed, Winnicott would struggle his whole
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life with sorting out the “genuine” qualities of the individual with those that are learned
reactions based on the need to comply with the demands of one’s environment.170
The last finding with respect to the Winnicottian conception of the self is the
apparent undervalued depiction of the self as in or not in control (e.g., The Locational
Self) in favor of one based on essences (e.g., The Essential Self). Though both
characterizations of the self derive from traditional philosophy, the analysis revealed that
the Locational Self is more akin to modern psychology and science while the Essential
Self is more utilized in more speculative and non-empirical renditions reality. Indeed, the
Locational Self was found to be in line with the perceptual, organizational, and
adaptational qualities of the ego in PS1 and PS2 (e.g., THE EGO IS SELF, THE EGO IS
A REGULATOR, THE EGO IS ADAPTATION), as well as modern developmental
constructs like affect regulation. In terms of the more experiential foundations of
Winnicott’s conceptual style, it would appear on the surface that there were
circumstances in his life that could have easily fostered a need to view the self from the
perspective of in or out of control. For example, there is considerable evidence that a
significant underlying tone in his family was one of prohibition: against overt forms of
comportment (e.g., saying “drat”) as well more subtle ones related to not over-burdening
170
One of the many related questions is the extent to which Winnicott’s lighthearted and playful qualities
associated with provocation were not simply reactions to the need to enliven, but also essential or
“genuine” personality traits. If viewed as a manifestation of his temperamental style, the quality of his
early caregiving relationship can be seen as reinforcing that which was already present and waiting to be
come to life in some form. Nevertheless, despite its origin, there are numerous examples in his personal
letters and interviews with contemporaries that aspects of this particular relational quality was at least
somewhat associated with his being perpetually disappointed by others (and thus possibly seen by him as
an undesirable or troublesome trait). For Winnicott this mainly took the form of viewing others as either
rejecting or not understanding the nature of his “spontaneous gestures.” It is possible, then, that what he
viewed as authentic overtures for connection were suffused with provocative qualities that were
experienced as over-stimulating or intrusive, paradoxically creating a sense of “impingement” and
correspondingly a detached or “deadened” quality (e.g., like his mother) in others.
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his depressed mother. Perhaps most revealing in this regard was his memory of being
weaned early because his mother’s apparent erotic stimulation.171 Also, in terms of
professional experience, he likely saw in his pediatric practice scores of children who
displayed chronic dysregulated states that impacted their development. Indeed, he wrote
fairly considerably on “anti-social” aspects of the personality which take the form of an
incapacity to match one’s emotional and behavior states with the expectations of the
environment. Questions remain as to what may have mediated the seemingly conspicuous
exclusion the Locational Self in his ontology, as well as how were issues of control vis-àvis were incorporated in the concept of the self.
In terms of environmental influence there is evidence that despite certain
prohibitions with respect to emotionality there existed in the Winnicott family a sense of
allowing individual members freedom to explore and possess differentiating
characteristics. For example, Clare Winnicott (1989) noted that Donald’s father was
religious but for the most part left him to his own devices in terms of determining its
ultimate truth. This stance is in line with the tenets of the family’s Wesleyan faith, which
was reflective of a more “experiential” versus “reasoned” way of knowing God (Kent,
2003). The general tone is that the individual is free and responsible to discover reality
through self-initiated action rather than compliance to set of demands. Wesleyanism’s
idea of one’s inherent ability to advance spiritually through self-initiated experience—not
by the imposition of control of structures that would limit freedom—would find its way
into Winnicott’s conception of the child as possessing an innate ability to mature
171
Whether this was an actual event or an example of selective memory is not clear. In the context of later
struggles with asserting himself, being “genuinely” known to others, and questions of his masculinity,
positing himself as possessing the capacity to “excite” in an erotic way may have among other things
served to bolster a general sense of personal disempowerment.
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responsibly and adapt to the conditions of the environment (Hoffman, 2004). Among the
many concepts that reinforce the idea of how the child can benefit from the environment
through adaptation without losing part of the self is the idea “going on being.” Overall, it
is possible that in the Essential Self Metaphor Winnicott found an affinity with aspects of
his early experience in which developmental advancement was measured not only by the
ability to maintain control in the face of environmental demands (e.g., False Self
compliance), but also in the ability to adapt to it without relinquishing fundamental parts
of the self.
The Winnicottian self is generally charged with discovery of reality (and itself)
through experience rather than through the rational application auto-regulation. Control,
then, is less important in his schema and can be thought of as implicit in the larger
process of adaptation, rather than vital to it (e.g., CONTROL IS ADAPTATION).
Though control does show up as part of adaptation his model via False Self compliance
(e.g., CONTROL IS COMPLIANCE), the natural tendency of the essential or True Self
is to engage the environment through “spontaneous gestures,” which inherently involves
abandoning a certain measure of control (TRUE SELF-EXPERIENCE IS A LOSS OF
CONTROL) in order to fully experience the environment and itself. For Winnicott, the
ultimate success or failure of adaptation (especially in adulthood) is tied not to
compliance, but rather to how consistently one’s essence can reveal itself when
encountered with circumstances presented by the environment—both ones that restrict
the self’s essence by not “surviving” as well as ones that do “survive” and thus more
easily allow the True Self’s presence. In general, the ultimate survival of the True Self,
then, is not a function of altering itself (ADAPTATION IS ALTERATION) in order to
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manifest compliance (ALTERATION IS REVEALING A CONTROLLED SELF), but
rather by making itself known in its full essence (ADAPTATION IS REVEALING
CONTROLLED AND UNCONTROLLED ASPECTS OF SELF) despite the
(controlling/surviving) quality of the environment.
The risk of self-exposure, then, is a main element that distinguishes the True Self
from False Self functioning. Specifically, for Winnicott the willingness to risk True Self
exposure (e.g., via “spontaneous gestures”) always takes precedence over remaining safe
(but separate) via control. In this way the schema is empowering, in that it reveals how
the individual is capable of managing the elements of control that are inevitable in
relating to others. With respect to the self and its correspondent relational stances vis-àvis control, the two main options are: (a) the False Self stance in which the self perceives
itself as needing to match the expectations of the environment, represented by
CONTROL IS COMPLIANCE and COMPLIANCE IS SURVIVAL, and; (b) True Self
stance in which alterations to the self are not viewed as directly necessary for survival,
but rather only part of a larger process of experiencing reality as in CONTROL IS
ADAPTATION and ADAPTATION IS RISKING (TRUE) SELF-EXPOSURE. The
overall goal of the True Self is the extent to which it can allow itself to be known (TRUE
SELF SURVIVAL IS BEING KNOWN regardless of the qualities (e.g., expectations) of
the environment.172
172
While shifting how the self views control in the context of meeting dependency needs can be simply
another way Winnicott avoids an inevitable reality, it also reveals a subtle distinction about the implications
of one’s relational stance with respect to self-risk. That is, risking non-compliance via not being in control
is associated with punishment, disapproval, or abandonment, while the risk of not revealing the essential
part of one’s self can be thought of as associated with non-existence, in a way a more dreadful proposition.
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Finally, on the surface Winnicott’s personality characteristics would also seem to
possess the qualities that would minimize the tendency to view the self primarily in terms
of in or out of control. However, besides the more benign “playful” and sarcastic qualities
of his personality that are often highlighted, biographers have put forth ample evidence
that he was in actuality keenly attuned to the self’s experiences with control. As noted he
has been portrayed as intensely independent, overtly and passively defiant, and having a
tendency to rebel against any hint of convention (Kahr, 1996; Newman; Rodman, 2003,
1995). These traits point to the more manic qualities of his personality, which are further
revealed in certain ritualistic displays of self-invincibility. For example, Rodman (2003)
recounts that Winnicott was known to drive his car with his head out of the roof and, until
very late in life, ride his bicycle steering with his feet on the handlebars! These
tendencies can be viewed as revealing on the one hand his independent spirit in the face
of convention, and on the other a more serious oversensitivity to control.173
Winnicott’s Ontology of Time
The results of the analysis reveal that Winnicott’s use of time in the depiction of
the transformational phenomena surrounding object usage is crucial for a complete
understanding. Perhaps more than the ontological implications with respect to the mind
and self, his explicit and implicit utilization of time distinguishes his conceptual style
173
Winnicott’s membership paper The Manic Defense (1935) is perhaps revealing of his curiosity with
matters that were close to home. It generally reinforces Klein’s idea of mania as a normal reaction to the
onset of depressive position, whereby the importance of a good object is denied or not immediately
accepted due to dependency fears (e.g., the pain that is part and parcel of love). In his own development,
the fragility of his mother may have strengthened this natural hesitancy to renounce the importance of
needed objects. With respect to control, manic defenses attempt to master the influence exerted by the
loved object by denying the need itself (and thus a portion of reality). One of the paradoxes of mania is that
the extreme measures employed to flee from control (and the correspondent “perceived” danger associated
with it) usually take the form of being out of control and thus risking “actual” danger.
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from other psychoanalytic writers. While utilizing notions of time inherited from both
Western philosophy and psychoanalysis (e.g., time as movement through space), the
construct of transitional space was shown to allow for a broader conception of time (e.g.,
TRANSITIONAL SPACE IS SUSPENDED TIME, TRANSITIONAL SPACE IS THE
CREATOR OF TIME), while also revealing the limitations of purely rational
components of language to describe the more complex processes of the mind (e.g., the
“no-time” quality of object relating states). Indeed, the findings showed that The Use of
an Object conveys meaning as much by the experience created by reading the text as it
does by relying on the logical consistency of the concepts and ideas, confirming Ogden’s
(2001) appraisal of a key characteristic of Winnicottian style. Time was one such
construct whose nature and function with respect to psychic development was built on the
experiences of reading the text, and there were examples of how the arrangement and
quantity of words contributed to conveying important ideas.
An additional finding in the analysis was how experiences evoked in reading the
text with respect to time and related processes reflected the clinical idea of parallel
process. That is, the feelings associated with the words corresponded to how the infant
and caregiver might encounter the transformation from object relating to object usage,
which also provides an account of that which occurs in treatment when dealing issues of
“survival.” In this way the text was shown to be able to reflect the transformative
processes involved in the concepts by creating a correspondent experience in the reader.
Time was found to be a crucial component that was evoked in order to convey what is
involved in the passage from primitive states of mind associated with object relating to
more mature ones akin to object usage. Along those lines, besides the impact these
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stylistic qualities have on the conceptual foundations and ultimate utility of theoretical
constructs (e.g., metapsychology), there were also cited implications related to practice
(e.g., clinical theory). One clinical example was the how the sense of elongated time
evoked in the text paralleled the quality of patience required by the therapist to allow the
natural processes of the transference to unfold.
The notion of time—in particular the ability of the mind to transcend certain
conventional limitations related to it for understanding theoretical concepts and the
meaning of a patient’s behavioral functioning—was also linked to the cognitive process
of conceptual blending. The ability of an ordinary reader to understand the message
behind the “The Bypass” (Appendix I) was shown to reflect the same capacities of mind
incorporated by clinicians in the understanding of core psychoanalytic constructs in
reading and in practice. In particular it was suggested that ideas such as transference in
which current thoughts and behaviors reflect events from the past are alive in the
patient’s current functioning draw on conceptual blending processes. In the context of the
“birth” of subjectivity and the ability for the patient to view the “nature” of objects as
“things in themselves” inherent in the attainment of object usage, time was shown to be
involved in the newly formed capacities of perception. A core implication in The Use of
an Object is that the vantage point of the therapist must at once incorporate and transcend
conventional notions of time in order to be the vehicle which carries the patient over to
object usage. That is, the therapist needs to mirror transitional space itself by “hovering”
in between the states of mind associated with time and no-time (e.g., REALITY IS
SEEING AND NOT SEEING IN ORDINARY AND EXPANDED TIME).
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Possible Developmental Connections with respect to Conception of Time
The general expansiveness of time created by the birth of reality via object usage
can be viewed as reflecting characteristic ways Winnicott attempted to make meaning of
important developmental experiences. Transitional space is at the core of his time
schema, in that it represents the hypothetical area in which time itself is born and from
which all elements of time (e.g., time-no-time, ordinary-expanded time) are perceived.
Besides the aforementioned functions that transitional space may have served vis-à-vis
understanding and integrating elements of each parent’s personality, its general function
can also be thought of as another way of experiencing his reality-environment in ways
that coincide with his distinctive style of engagement. That this aspect of perception (e.g.,
experiencing multi-directional time) was viewed by Winnicott as a key component of his
ontology suggests that it possibly assumed an important position in his more personal
meaning-making processes; in particular, how it served to make sense of a world in
which he assumed responsibility for the “survival” of others via the mechanism of
enlivening.
The ability to perceive time in a multi-dimensional way was referenced as a key
process associated with object usage and also a primary function of our inherent
cognitive capacities via conceptual blending. Though modern cognitive science has
shown that Western conceptions of time are based primary on embodiment (e.g., Time Is
Space), conceptual blending reveals our capacity to transcend certain built-in forms when
conceiving both everyday scenarios (e.g., “The Bypass”) as well as more abstract ideas
associated with theory (e.g., “The Infant is Ruthless”). That is, we routinely “break the
laws” of embodiment and CMT, especially when creating novel and more abstract ideas
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via imagination. These cognitive capacities were posited as intimately involved in how
each subject encounters and makes meaning of events of early development, both at the
time of experiencing them (e.g., early conflation of learning) as well as later via longterm memory. In Winnicott’s case his unique conception of the birth of subjecthood
similarly draws on the perceptual capacities associated with time—in particular the
necessity of the presence of a “surviving” object that imparts a sense to time to the
emerging infant-subject. A sense of time is also evident in the characteristic relational
stance of “enlivening through provocation,” in which repeated attempts to stimulate his
dependent objects perhaps reflect his own need to stay alive by continually creating a
sense of time. That is, the animation of objects (e.g., going from a state of objectlessness
to object status) can be thought of as re-creating the birth of reality and of time.
The analysis showed that transitional phenomena is depicted as existing in multidimensional space, connecting realms associated with object relating (“no-time”) and
object usage (“time”) states of mind. Besides ushering in the ability to reason, to
accurately perceive a shared reality, and to differentiate the nascent self from others,
implicit in the attainment of object usage via transitional space is the ability to perceive
time from a wider conceptual vantage point—that is, to occupy a position in which
ordinary (e.g., uni-directional) and expanded (e.g., multi-directional) forms are of time
are considered. As mentioned, the characteristic Winnicottian relational stance of
“enlivening” similarly involves transcending conventional notions of time, in that an
implication of brining to life is imparting sense of time. Part of his stance required
perceiving objects as deadened, depleted, or isolated, which is synonymous with placing
them into a space associated with non-existence and thus no-time. Enlivening, then, can
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be thought of not only as a way of creating time but also reversing time—sending the
object back in time to a point when life (or liveliness) existed. Among other things, the
process reveals how time is intimately involved in gratification (e.g., the “doing” and
“undoing” of time via objects) and need to maintain object ties.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Review of the Methodology
The methodology for this study incorporated elements of modern cognitive
linguistics (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) and psychoanalytic conceptual research
(Atwood & Stolorow, 1992; Dreher, 2000). The main purpose of the linguistic portion of
the analysis was to elucidate the metaphorical foundations on which object is built,
primarily using Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) theory of conceptual (embodied)
metaphors. Though conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003) was not utilized as
a primary tool of analysis, an overview was provided and it was cited as supplementing
CMT, especially when dealing with novel and more abstract ideas. The historical
overview of The Use of an Object with respect to Classical Freudian theory (PS1) Ego
Psychology (PS2), and Kleinian theory (PS3) utilized the primary metaphors of CMT to
draw conceptual distinctions between the transformational ideas under consideration. The
developmental implications or possible connections between Winnicott’s family
dynamics and the unique configuration of ontology with respect to mind, self, and time
were mainly from a point of view in line with Atwood and Stolorow’s (1992) historicalsubjective theorist.
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The main benefits of combining methodological principles from different fields of
study involved the ability to draw on multifaceted viewpoints from which to examine the
conceptual origins of the constructs of transformation. The psychoanalytic and cognitivelinguistic modes of textual analysis were found to be complementary in important ways,
together allowing for both a more comprehensive and in depth view that could not have
been accomplished separately. In particular, the more experience-near and account of
early object relationships filled-in a noticeable gap in CMT and BT, by providing a
depiction of the early (infancy) conflation of learning on which all conceptual metaphor
is based. In this study the combined approach allowed for distinguishing Winnicott’s
conceptual style with extant theoretical viewpoints, in part by using his inherited
relational stance of “emotional provocateur” as a way to reveal the foundations of his
ontology. The methodology demonstrated not only how primary embodied metaphors
form the basis for thought and reason, but also how each individual imbues metaphors
with shades of meaning based on their own experience.
One of the ways metaphor theory was found to supplement psychoanalysis as a
methodology is that systematizes basic qualities of thought and language based on
empirical findings from everyday speech. It is able to provide a basic conceptual
framework from which more nuanced meanings are derived. That the main findings of
modern cognitive science (e.g., the embodiment of mind, the unconscious nature of
thought, and the metaphorical basis of abstract concepts) confirm the basic tenets of
psychoanalysis allowed for a relatively smooth application of their respective modes of
analysis and principles. Cognitive science was shown to have validated what has been
long understood by psychoanalytic clinicians: that the nature of reason is not
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transcendent, but rather the outcome of biopsychosocial processes as elaborated via
metaphor or symbolism. In particular, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) primary ontological
stance of “experientialism” confirms how the embodied mind uses metaphor to make
meaning of itself and its larger reality.
Implications for Social Work
The findings of the study provide an alternative way to conceive how constructs
that guide practice are taught, understood, and used by clinical social work clinicians.
The analysis showed that the logic on which concepts rely, as well as the linguistic style
with which they are presented, are influenced by the interrelationship of built-in patterns
of conceptual reasoning and the nature of key developmental events. Because metaphor
involves the activation of neural structure that is established in infancy, it constitutes one
way of revealing the nature of early object relationships on which psychoanalytic therapy
depends. Though individual experiences and unique ways of knowing do not allow
clinicians to transcend cognitive structure, categories of thought are imbued with
distinctive shades of meaning which can provide a wide and varied range of conceptions
about the client, themselves, and the overall treatment situation. Winnicott’s unique
writing and conceptual style show that experiences cannot be divorced from the concepts
themselves and as such need to be taken into account in the teaching, understanding and
utilization of his ideas. Overall, the incorporation of conceptual metaphor in the context
of developmental-historical influences can provide both a more accurate and richer
depiction of concepts of transformation and the treatment process.
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Conceptual metaphor theory demonstrated that Winnicott’s constructs of
transformation mainly draw their semantic rationale from the paradigms of both
traditional Western philosophy and psychoanalysis. Even his most novel concept,
transitional phenomena, was shown to depend on inherited conceptual structure from
each tradition. In this regard, the study showed that a more complete understanding of
clinical concepts can be aided by distinguishing ways in which they correspond to and
deviate from larger conceptual categories based on culture, time, and the tenets from
within a particular field of study. It was also revealed that though clinical concepts rely
heavily on our sensorimotor existence via metaphor, their more abstract nature and
function can require a wider vantage point which inherently “breaks the rules” of
embodiment (e.g., KNOWING IS SEEING AND NOT SEEING). In general finding
ways to incorporate into the teaching process a depiction of how clinical ideas are related
to embodiment, as well as how they evolve over time and represent both inherited and
new ways of thinking can augment their understanding and use.
In terms of the historical positioning of Winnicott vis-à-vis other models of
psychoanalysis, the findings suggest that his ideas and style of communicating them
foreshadowed the modern “relational turn” in psychoanalysis. The nature of his clinical
constructs highlighted an “experiential field of psychic experience” (Fogel, 1992), which
shifted the conceptual vantage point of mental causality from one that is more internally
contained to one that is bidirectional and dependent on the mutually influential processes
of separate subjects. The idea of object usage demonstrated that the qualities and
techniques of the therapist must be viewed from the perspective of their perceived effects
on the patient, not simply as detached ideas or processes in themselves. Throughout
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Winnicott’s writing is the notion that what ultimately constitutes the meaning of
therapeutic events must be shared between client and therapist. In a similar way his
writing style reflects the intersubjective nature of reality in that an important way it
communicates meaning is the way it creates experience in the reader—understanding is
always a dialogue between embodied subjects who are in the process creating reality by
discovering qualities of their own self via the other. Lastly, his writing and conceptual
style reflect the “linguist turn” of the 20th century by demonstrating both the possibilities
and limitations of language in expressing the nature of reality.
An implication related to the “linguistic turn” in psychoanalysis involves the
positioning constructs of transformation within a developmental-historical context as way
of revealing the socially-constructed nature of reality. This study showed the importance
of viewing “truths” that come to be accepted in a theory or clinical modality as
subjectively and historically situated. Viewing constructs of transformation from the
vantage point of the subjective-historical theorist reinforces for the clinician-learner an
examination of the similar processes underway in shaping their own unique conception
and uses of clinical ideas. Providing a developmental account of the writer from which a
clinical paradigm derives demonstrates the how experiences and ideas relevant to
therapeutic knowledge and skill originate and are elaborated over time. It shows that the
causative factors attributed to transformation are always suffused with subjective
qualities, experiences, and perceptions of a particular therapist and patient at a point in
time. Taking seriously the subjective quality of accepted clinical “truths” also mitigates
against the more limiting aspects of idealization, which can take the form of mimicking a
general approach or technique. Indeed, the idealization of theorists, instructors, or any
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other more advanced clinician is synonymous with early stages of learning and must be
transcended in the successful development of the professional self (Ronnestad &
Skovholt, 2003).
The study also demonstrated that an analysis of constructs through the lens of the
subjective-historical theorist reveals the conceptual origins of metaphor and distinctive
ways of viewing reality. Though Winnicott’s concepts of transformation resonate with
most clinicians, they in part reflect attempts at “solutions” to intrapsychic dilemmas that
are uniquely his own and as such should be viewed as limited to his experience.174 Part of
what they represent is an interpretation of early developmental experiences—in
particular, the roles he imagined himself to be playing vis-à-vis his primary dependency
objects. In general, certain personality components he came to value as signs of
emotional health were in part reactions to the particular challenges his family dynamics
presented. Though proven over time to be of clinical value, a lack of a subjectivedevelopmental context combined with the apparently clear-cut nature of the concepts can
lead to overly simplistic applications of the ideas. Some common examples encountered
in the survey of the literature include the overly broad application of ideas such as
“playing,” “holding,” or “transitional object” to the therapeutic relationship (or any
relationship or setting) without considering their more nuanced meanings.
174
In general taking into consideration those elements of clinical ideas that often go unexamined is a key
component of conceptual research. Understanding theoretical or clinical concepts requires differentiating
between what Dreher (2000) calls explicit and implicit aspects of theories. The explicit perspective reflects
how a theory or concept is more publically expressed in writing and in discourse. The implicit view
involves how the ideas exist only in the therapist’s mind and how they influence practical actions. Implicit
phenomena, according to Dreher, are not put into words, not discussed, and are not intersubjectively
accessible. It is this aspect of Winnicott’s theory, as well as all models, that should be taken into
consideration when engaging and using the ideas.
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A closely related implication involves how learning clinical constructs or
techniques in isolation of an objective historical account can contribute to an
unsophisticated or inaccurate view of the ideas themselves. In Winnicott’s case, the
combination of (until recently) limited historical accounts of his life and a related
rendering of his constructs of transformation in their most global form can lead to making
faulty assumptions. With respect to how he is portrayed in the literature when aspects of
his life are included, most encountered in the research for this study have followed
closely Clare Winnicott’s (1989) depiction of an idyllic family setting in Psychoanalytic
Explorations. As such, readers not familiar with the details of Winnicott’s life seem to
conflate presumed qualities of his personality and his constructs of transformation. That
is, to many he is narrowly viewed as embodying the apparently positive, straightforward
and commonsensical nature of his ideas (e.g., “playing,” “spontaneous gestures,”
“space,” “holding,” etc).175 As outlined in the study such a view belies an underlying
complexity of both the concepts and Winnicott himself. In certain ways more than other
writers, the nature of his persona and the conceptual style with which his ideas are
expressed seem to be open to a wide variety of viewpoints by the clinician-reader.
Though in one way a testament to the value and usefulness of the ideas, this study
showed that clinicians can be ultimately best served if they are viewed in context of the
175
One common example of seeing Winnicott in a narrowly benign way is how he is often characterized as
somewhat of a passive victim with respect to his colleagues in the contentious atmosphere of the British
Society. In most portrayals he is viewed as objectively “independent” and beyond the fray, despite similarly
strong and unexamined opinions of his own. An uncritical reader can readily view him as being summarily
rejected by the Anna Freud and Melanie Klein groups, contributing to certain idealized view of him as
eccentric, intellectually detached, or not really needing collegial validation. While in ways valid and
reflecting the strict adherence to theoretical models that characterized that particular professional milieu,
most portrays do not specifically take into account ways his style of relating contributed to not being
accepted or understood. These views mask the deep need he did likely possess for recognition and the ways
he may have contributed to thwarting his ideas being more fully accepted.
254
historical-subjective theorist (Atwood & Stolorow, 1993). In this vein, utilizing more
comprehensive biographies such as Rodman’s (2003) can go a long way in providing a
more accurate view of the writer and the ideas.
Limitations of the Study
The validity of the findings is generally limited by the single-rater design of the
textual analysis. As the study demonstrated, even though thought emerges in a universal
fashion based on human embodiment each person imbues the emergent metaphors with a
unique conceptual quality. This conceptual “bias” can influence the way a metaphorical
construction and its implications are depicted. Utilizing a design with multiple raters is
one way that differences in metaphoricity can be either reconciled or noted in the analysis
(Pragglejazz Group, 2007), providing a potentially richer depiction of the language
processes at work in everyday speech and writing.
Though the goal of the current study was not to determine the metaphorical status
of each word or expression in ordinary speech (e.g., “He’s running out of gas”), which
itself can render different opinions among raters in analyzing certain constructions, it did
present a different set of challenges for a single-rater. One challenge was that the nature
of analysis called for deconstructing the conceptual rationale on which abstract constructs
of theory are based, whose links to basic categories of thought can vary based on usage in
the text. That is, while determining the basic conceptual rationale of the key constructs
using primary (embodied) metaphors is straightforward, each concept’s more nuanced
meanings and relationship to other ideas is complex and would likely render a potential
range of interpretations. For example, that Winnicott’s AGGRESSION IS A FORCE
255
draws from The Mind Is A Body, Thinking Is Moving, and Ideas Are Locations would
likely not be in question. However, other more extended interpretations like
AGGRESSION IS INTEGRATION, DESTRUCTION IS THE MAINTENANCE OF
LOVE, and SURVIVAL IS POTENTIAL DESTRUCTION may be viewed differently,
based on both linguistic grounds as well as theoretical ones.
Possible Future Directions
Potential applications of the combined psychoanalytic-cognitive linguistic model
of inquiry are considerable. In the realm of quantitative research, the analysis of therapy
sessions could be enhanced by mining transcripts for not only explicit uses of metaphor
(e.g., “I’m feeling down today” or “I think therapy is on the right track”), but also for the
more foundational elements of meaning that are embedded in the ways both the patient
and therapist thinks. Because deconstructing meanings is essentially at the heart of
therapy and the transformation process, the model can provide another way of
understanding the therapeutic process and the elements of it that are (or are not) change
producing. More closely examining the semantic foundations of language as a function of
metaphorical thought might assist in determining the nature of impasses, or how
meanings within the therapeutic dyad come to be mutually inaccessible as a function of
reified ways of thinking, speaking, and ultimately relating. Along those lines,
manifestations of the core elements associated with transformation in the treatment
setting—transference and countertransference—might be examined from the viewpoint
of CMT and BT, potentially elucidating how these processes are related to the conflation
of learning that forms the basis for metaphor. This would generally involve examining
256
how early object relationships and subsequent modes of relating are kept alive via one’s
conceptual style and nuanced understanding of reality (e.g., mind, self, time, causation)
as expressed through language.
A related research application could be examining the emergent conceptual
quality of thought and language from the point of view of particular developmental
phenomena—in general, how key life events shape the quality of one’s conceptual
system vis-à-vis metaphor. As this study demonstrated, Winnicott’s relational stance of
“enlivening through provocation” was associated with meeting dependency needs in the
context of a primary object viewed as existing on the edge of survival. The quality of the
experience was shown to be transmitted conceptually in the way primary metaphors are
conceived and utilized in the construction of reality. A particular investigative area might
be to determine the extent to which the nature of early object relationships (e.g.,
attachment, responsiveness, environmental “fit”) influences one’s nuanced conceptual
repertoire as viewed through metaphor.176 Indeed, chronic deprivation and other more
overt forms of trauma are known to have an impact on the ability to organize experience
via the symbolic elaboration of experience (e.g., reflective functioning), an idea with
direct implications for metaphor. It is possible that examining language use from a CMT
or BT perspective might reveal ways to detect or better understand the nature of early
developmental experience. One could conceive of devising a conceptual-metaphorical
inventory based on correlating particular experiences with larger ontological viewpoints,
176
The Adult Attachment Interview (Crittenden, 1998; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1996) is an example of
connecting early developmental experiences related to the caregiving environment with adult
representational schemas. From the perspective of CMT and this study, these schemas can be viewed as
emerging from the “conflation of learning” as elaborated in one’s unique conception and use of embodied
(primary) metaphor.
257
collected from analyzing ordinary speech (e.g., interviews), writing samples, or through
more controlled experimental designs. In terms of research and practice, these profiles
might used to better understanding one’s practicing style as well as the way one uniquely
conceptualizes basic theoretical concepts.
In terms of conceptual research there are ample opportunities to apply the tools of
modern cognitive linguistics to psychoanalysis. In line with a key impetus for this study,
a more systematized analysis of the basic ideas on which psychoanalysis rests could be
done from a CMT or BT perspective. Rappaport’s (1951, 1959) outline of the
foundations of metapsychology was one such attempt, though it lacked the empirical
findings based on conceptual metaphor. Akin to Lakoff and Johnson’s analysis of core
Western philosophical concepts in Philosophy in the Flesh, one can imagine the
application of the similar linguistic tools to psychoanalysis as a body of knowledge. Such
work might entail the foundational or “Classical” concepts and proceed historically
through their various elaborations within the different models or across historical time
periods. Similar to the analysis in this study, the basic ontological categories of mind,
self, causation, and time could be used as ways to deconstruct concepts and show their
level of conceptual coherence. Another possible application could be incorporating
elements of CMT or BT into dictionaries of theoretical terms, where the conceptual
“etymology” of constructs or ideas could be demonstrated for their semantic rationale and
historical context.
These same methodological tools that can be utilized in research could similarly
be employed in the teaching and learning of clinical concepts. Applying the CMT or BT
to the often abstract nature of metapyschological constructs can help learners deconstruct
258
the basic foundations of the ideas on which their clinical practice rests. It can assist in
understanding how the meaning of theoretical constructs draw on established Western
notions of ontology (e.g., mind, self, causation, time) as well as parallel views from
within the field of study itself (e.g., psychoanalytic derivatives). Along those same lines,
clinical supervision in which session transcripts are used could also utilize aspects of
CMT or BT to clarify the therapist’s rationale for understanding the therapeutic process
using the concepts of psychoanalysis. The model might also be used to more
systematically uncover the meanings behind recurrent expressions, themes, or ideas that
seem to be relevant to the treatment process. As the textual analysis demonstrated, the
model is capable of going beyond simply defining the embodied rationale on which
notions of treatment are based (e.g., THERAPY IS A JOURNEY, IMPASSES ARE
OBSTACLES ON A PATH, LOVE IS A PATIENT), which in certain ways adds little in
the way of uncovering deeper subjective meanings behind those constructions. Indeed,
the combined model is suited to use these more basic conceptual categories based on
metaphor to arrive at more abstract and nuanced understandings, a key goal in the
teaching and learning of psychoanalytic concepts.
259
APPENDIX A
KEY FINDINGS OF MODERN COGNITVE LINGUISTICS WITH IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE HUMAN SCIENCES
(From Lakoff and Johnson, 1999)
260
Empirical Findings of Cognitive Linguistics With Respect To Rational Philosophy
1. The mind is inherently embodied:
a)
Reason is not disembodied but comes about by virtue of the human
brain, body, and bodily experience;
b)
Reason (via our cognitive systems) is built on the same neural and
cognitive mechanisms that allow us to move, see, perceive, etc;
c)
Reason is evolutionary and builds on—not replaces—the basic forms
of perceptual and motor inference present in “lower” animals;
d)
Thus, reason is thus not “universal” or “transcendent” but based on
everyday bodily functioning.
2. Thought is mostly unconscious:
a)
Reason is not completely conscious, but mostly unconscious.
3. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical:
a)
Reason is not purely literal, but largely metaphorical and
imaginative;
b)
Reason is not dispassionate, but emotionally engaged.
Implications for Human Sciences
1. There is no “Cartesian dualistic person” whose mind is separate from body;
2. There is no “Kantian radically autonomous person” whose transcendent reason and
absolute freedom can dictate what is moral or immoral;
3. There is no “utilitarian person” for whom rationality is economic rationality. The
maximization of utility does not exist;
4. There is no “phenomenological person” whose introspection alone can discover
everything about the mind and experience. We do not have direct conscious access to
the operation of the cognitive unconscious, and therefore must supplement enquiry
with empirical research;
261
5. There is no “poststructuralist person” whose subjecthood is completely decentered
and for whom all meaning is arbitrary, totally relative, and purely historically
contingent, unconstrained by body and brain;
6. There is no “Fregan person” (e.g., analytic philosophy) for whom thought is separate
from the body. That is, there is no real person whose embodiment plays no role in
meaning, whose meaning is purely objective and defined by the external world, and
whose language can fit the external world with no significant role played by mind,
brain, or body. Because a vast range of our concepts are metaphorical, meaning is not
entirely literal and the classical correspondence theory of truth is false;
7. There is no “computational person” whose mind is like computer software and can
derive meaning from taking meaningless symbols as input, manipulating them by
rule, and give meaningless symbols as output. The neural structures of the brain
produce conceptual systems and linguistic structures that cannot be adequately
accounted for by formal systems that only manipulate symbols;
8. There is no “Chomskyan person” for whom language is pure syntax, pure form
insulated from and independent of all meaning, context, perception, emotion,
memory, attention, action, and the dynamic nature of communication. Language is
not a totally genetic innovation, as it contains aspects of evolution-derived sensory,
motor, and other neural systems present in lower animals.
262
APPENDIX B
PRIMARY CONCEPTUAL (EMBODIED) METAPHORS
(From Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 50-54)
263
Primary Metaphors
AFFECTION IS WARMTH
Subjective Judgment: Affection
Sensorimotor Domain: Temperature
Example: “They greeted me warmly.”
Primary Experience: Feeling warm while being held affectionately
IMPORTANT IS BIG
Subjective Judgment: Importance
Sensorimotor Domain: Size
Example: “Tomorrow is a big day.”
Primary Experience: As a child, finding that big things, e.g., parents, are important and
can exert major forces on you and dominate your visual experience
HAPPY IS UP
Subjective Judgment: Happiness
Sensorimotor Domain: Bodily orientation
Example: “I’m feeling up today.”
Primary Experience: Feeling happy and energetic and having an upright posture
(correlation between affective state and posture)
INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS
Subjective Judgment: Intimacy
Sensorimotor Domain: Being physically close
Example: “We’ve been close for years, but we’re beginning to drift apart.”
Primary Experience: Being physically close to people you are intimate with
BAD IS STINKY
Subjective Judgment: Evaluation
Sensorimotor Domain: Smell
Example: “This movie stinks.”
Primary Experience: Being repelled by foul-smelling objects (correlation between
evaluative and olfactory experience)
DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS
Subjective Judgment: Difficulty
Sensorimotor Domain: Muscular exertion
Example: “She’s weighed down by responsibilities.”
Primary Experience: The discomfort or disabling effect of lifting or carrying heavy
objects
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MORE IS UP
Subjective Judgment: Quantity
Sensorimotor Domain: Vertical Orientation
Example: “Prices are high.”
Primary Experience: Observing rise and fall of levels of piles and fluids as more is added
or subtracted
CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS
Subjective Judgment: Perception of kinds
Sensorimotor Domain: Space
Example: “Are tomatoes in the fruit or vegetable category?”
Primary Experience: Observing that things that go together tend to be in the same
bounded region (correlation between common location and common properties,
functions, or origins.
SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS
Subjective Judgment: Similarity
Sensorimotor Domain: Proximity in space
Example: “These colors aren’t quite the same, but they’re close”
Primary Experience: Observing similar objects clustered together (flowers, trees, rocks,
buildings, dishes)
LINEAR SCALES ARE PATHS
Subjective Judgment: Degree
Sensorimotor Domain: Motion
Example: “John’s intelligence goes way beyond Bill’s”
Primary Experience: Observing the amount of progress made by an object in motion
(correlation between motion and scalar notion of degree)
ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE
Subjective Judgment: Abstract unifying relationships
Sensorimotor Domain: Experience of physical objects
Example: “How do the pieces of this theory fit together?”
Primary Experience: Interacting with complex objects and attending to their structure
(correlation between observing part-whole structure and forming cognitive
representations of logical relationships)
HELP IS SUPPORT
Subjective Judgment: Assistance
Sensorimotor Domain: Physical
Example: “Support your local charities”
Primary Experience: Observing that some entities and people require physical support in
order to continue functioning
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TIME IS MOTION
Subjective Judgment: The passage of time
Sensorimotor Domain: Motion
Example: “Time flies”
Primary Experience: Experiencing the passage of time as one moves or observes motion
STATES ARE LOCATIONS
Subjective Judgment: A subjective state
Sensorimotor Domain: Being in a bounded region in space
Example: “I’m close to being in a depression and the next thing that goes wrong will send
me over the edge”
Primary Experience: Experiencing a certain state as correlated with a certain location
(e.g., being cool under a tree, feeling secure in bed)
CHANGE IS MOTION
Subjective Judgment: Experiencing a change of state
Sensorimotor Domain: Moving
Example: “My car has gone from bad to worse lately”
Primary Experience: Experiencing the change of state that goes with the change of
location as you move
ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOTIONS
Subjective Judgment: Action
Sensorimotor Domain: Moving your body through space
Example: “I’m moving right along on the project”
Primary Experience: The common action of moving yourself through space, especially in
the early years of life
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS
Subjective Judgment: Achieving a purpose
Sensorimotor Domain: Reaching a destination
Example: “He’ll ultimately be successful, but he isn’t there yet”
Primary Experience: Reaching destinations throughout everyday life and thereby
achieving purposes (e.g., if you want a drink, you have to go to the water cooler)
PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS
Subjective Judgment: Achieving a purpose
Sensorimotor Domain: Object manipulation
Example: “I saw an opportunity for success and grabbed it”
Primary Experience: Grasping a desired object (correlation between satisfaction and
holding a desired physical object)
266
CAUSES ARE PHYSICAL FORCES
Subjective Judgment: Achieving results
Sensorimotor Domain: Exertion of force
Example: “They pushed the bill through Congress
Primary Experience: Achieving results be exerting forces on physical objects to move or
change them
RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES
Subjective Judgment: An interpersonal relationship
Sensorimotor Domain: Being in an enclosure
Example: “We’ve been in a close relationship for years, but it’s beginning to seem
confining”
Primary Experience: Living in the same enclosed physical space with the people you are
most closely related to
CONTROL IS UP
Subjective Judgment: Being in control
Sensorimotor Domain: Vertical orientation
Example: “Don’t worry! I’m on top of the situation”
Primary Experience: Finding that it is easier to control another person or exert force on
an object from above, where you have gravity working with you
KNOWING IS SEEING
Subjective Judgment: Knowledge
Sensorimotor Domain: Vision
Example: “I see what you mean”
Primary Experience: Getting information about an object by grasping and manipulating it
SEEING IS TOUCHING
Subjective Judgment: Visual perception
Sensorimotor Domain: Touch
Example: “She picked my face out of the crowd”
Primary Experience: Correlation between the visual and tactile exploration of objects
267
APPENDIX C
METAPHORS OF EVENTS AND CAUSES
(From Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 170-234)
268
Metaphors of Events and Causes
The Location Event-Structure Metaphor
States Are Locations (Interiors of bounded regions in space)
Changes Are Movements (Into or out of bounded regions)
Causes Are Forces
Causation Is Forced Movement (From one location to another)
Actions Are Self Propelled Movements
Purposes Are Destinations
Means Are Paths (To destinations)
Difficulties Are Impediments to Motion
Freedom of Action Is the Lack of Impediments to Motions
External Events Are Large, Moving Objects (That exert force)
Long-Term, Purposeful Activities Are Journeys
Examples:
The patient has not been in a good place emotionally (States as locations).
His depression is lifting (Moving from one place to another).
The intensity of the session pushed her to the brink (Forced movement).
He brought himself out of his grief (Self-propelled motions).
The couple’s goal seems to be a long way off (Purposes as destinations).
They are trying to work through the impasse (Difficulties as impediments to motion).
She’s casting off the chains of an unhealthy relationship (Freedom due to lack of
impediments).
The patient, in an upbeat mood, stated “Things seem to be really going with me” (Force
exerted by large objects)
Therapy is moving slowly but seems to be on the right track (Activities are journeys).
The Object Event-Structure Metaphor
Attributes Are Possessions
Changes Are Movements Of Possessions (Acquisitions or losses)
Causation Is Transfer Of Possessions (Giving or taking)
Purposes Are Desired Objects
Achieving a Purpose Is Acquiring A Desired Object
Achieving A Purpose Is Getting Something To Eat
Trying To Achieve A Purpose Is Hunting
Trying To Achieve A Purpose Is Fishing
Trying To Achieve A Purpose Is Agriculture
269
Examples:
He has a severe depression. (Attribute as a possession)
The dread seems to have suddenly left him. (Change as loss—motion from)
The medication gave him tremors. (Change as acquisition—motion to)
She kept getting close to the memory, but it remained just out of her grasp. (Purpose as
acquiring an object)
After having been chronically rejected, the patient savored the opportunity to display her
talents. (Purpose as eating)
They are shooting for termination within the year. (Purpose as hunting)
She believed him to be fishing for a compliment. (Purpose as fishing)
The therapist tried to convince the patient of the potential fruits of their labor. (Purpose as
agriculture)
Duality
Larry’s in trouble (States are Locations)
Larry has trouble (Attributes Are Possessions)
270
APPENDIX D
METAPHORS OF MIND
(From Lakoff and Johnson, pp. 235-266)
271
Metaphors of Mind
THE MIND IS A BODY
Thinking Is Physical Functioning
Ideas Are Entities with an Independent Existence
Thinking Of An Idea Is Functioning Physically With
Respect To An Independent Existing Entity
THINKING IS MOVING
The Mind Is A Body
Thinking Is Moving
Ideas Are Locations
Reason Is A Force
Rational Thought Is Motion That Is Direct, Deliberate,
Step-By-Step, And In Accord With The Force Of Reason
Being Unable To Think Is Being Unable To Move
A Line Of Thought Is A Path
Thinking About X Is Moving In The Area Of X
Communicating Is Guiding
Understanding Is Following
Rethinking Is Going Over The Path Again
Examples:
Her mind was racing. (Thinking as motion)
Where are you in your decision to continue treatment? (Idea as location)
The social history led her to the conclusion that biology played a role in the patient’s
depression. (Reason as a force)
His thoughts seemed irrational, as if going in circles. (Rational thought as direct path to
locale)
He had a hard time following the patient’s narrative. (Communication/understanding as
guiding)
I thought we should run this by him again. (Rethinking as retaking path)
THINKING IS PERCEIVING
The Mind Is A Body
Thinking Is Perceiving
Ideas Are Things Perceived
Knowing Is Seeing
Communication Is Showing
Attempting To Gain Knowledge Is Searching
Becoming Aware Is Noticing
272
An Aid To Knowing Is A Light Source
Being Able To Know Is Being Able To See
Being Ignorant Is Being Unable To See
Impediments To Knowledge Are Impediments To Vision
Deception Is Purposely Impeding Vision
Knowing From A “Perspective” Is Seeing From A Point Of View
Explaining In Detail Is Drawing A Picture
Directing Attention Is Pointing
Paying Attention Is Looking At
Being Receptive Is Hearing
Taking Seriously Is Listening
Sensing Is Smelling
Emotional Reaction Is Feeling
Personal Preference Is Taste
Examples:
I think I see what you mean. (Thinking as perceiving, seeing)
They don’t appreciate being kept in the dark. (Communicating as showing)
She is blind to her husband’s infidelity. (Being ignorant as unable to see)
It seems like they are just not hearing you. (Being receptive to an idea as hearing)
Something about that story just doesn’t smell right. (Sensing as smelling)
THINKING IS OBJECT MANIPULATION
The Mind Is A Body
Thinking Is Object Manipulation
Ideas Are Manipulable Objects
Communicating Is Sending
Understanding Is Grasping
Inability To Understand Is Inability To Grasp
Memory Is A Storehouse
Remembering Is Retrieval (Or Recall)
The Structure Of An Idea Is The Structure Of An Object
Analyzing Ideas Is Taking Apart Objects
Examples:
We’ll have to toss that idea around. (Thinking as object manipulation)
She can’t seem to get her feelings across to her therapist. (Communication as sending)
That interpretation went right past me. (Understanding as grasping)
There seems to be many sides to his countertransference. (Ideas as physical objects)
The professor deconstructed the concept of binding. (Analyzing as taking apart objects)
273
ACQUIRING IDEAS IS EATING
A Well-Functioning Mind Is A Healthy Body
Ideas Are Food
Acquiring Ideas Is Eating
Interest In Ideas Is Appetite For Food
Good Ideas Are Healthful Food
Helpful Ideas Are Nutritious Foods
Bad Ideas Are Harmful Foods
Disturbing Ideas Are Disgusting Foods
Interesting, Pleasurable, Ideas Are Appetizing Foods
Uninteresting Ideas Are Flavorless Foods
Testing The Nature Of Ideas Is Smelling Or Tasting
Considering Is Chewing
Accepting Is Swallowing
Fully Comprehending Is Digesting
Ideas That Are Incomprehensible Are Indigestible
Preparing Ideas To Be Understood Is Food Preparation
Communicating Is Feeding
Substantial Ideas Are Meat
Examples:
She has always had an appetite for learning. (Ideas as food & interests in ideas as
appetite)
That idea is crap. (Bad or untruthful ideas as unhealthy or harmful food)
I’ll have to chew on that for a while. (Considering as chewing)
She said it felt as though he just rammed that proposal down her throat. (Accepting is
swallowing; comprehending as digesting)
That statement left a bad taste in my mouth. (Incomprehensible ideas as indigestible)
The student thought he should be spoon-fed the ideas. (Communication is feeding)
What a juicy story. (Substantial ideas as meat)
THE MIND IS A MACHINE
The Mind Is A Machine
Ideas Are Products Of The Machine
Thinking Is The Automated Step-By-Step Assembly Of Thoughts
Normal Thought Is Normal Operation Of The Machine
Inability To Think Is A Failure Of The Machine To Function
274
APPENDIX E
METAPHORS OF SELF
(From Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, pp. 267-289)
275
Metaphors of Self
The Basic Subject-Self Metaphor Schema
The Whole Person
People and Entities
A Person
A Person or Thing
A Relationship
The Subject
A Self
The Subject-Self Relationship
The Physical Object Self
SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT CONTROL
A Person
A Physical Object
Control
Noncontrol
The Subject
The Self
Control Of Self By Subject
Noncontrol Of Self By Subject
The Internal Causation Metaphor
SELF CONTROL IS FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT
A Person
A Physical Object
Forced Movement
Lack Of Forced Movement
The Subject
The Self
Control Of Self By Subject
Noncontrol Of Self By Subject
BODY CONTROL IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT
A Person
A Physical Object
Forced Movement
Lack Of Forced Movement
Examples:
I lifted my arm. (Caused my arm to rise)
The Subject
The Body (Instance Of Self)
Control Of Body By Subject
Noncontrol Of Body By Subject
276
I dragged myself out of bed.
He picked himself up off the ground.
CAUSING THE SELF TO ACT IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT
A Person
A Physical Object
Forced Movement
Lack Of Forced Movement
The Subject
The Self
Subject’s Causing Self To Act
Failing To Cause The Self To Act
Examples:
He’s pushing himself too hard.
They won’t budge on that proposal.
When will she stop sitting on the fence and make a decision?
SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT POSSESSION
A Person
A Physical Object
Possession
Loss Of Possession
The Subject
The Self
Control Of Self
Loss Of Control Of Self
Examples:
She lost herself in ecstasy.
He does not have a handle on himself.
The therapist suggested that I need to get a grasp on the situation.
TAKING CONTROL OF ANOTHER’S SELF IS TAKING
ANOTHER’S POSSESSION
A Person
A Physical Object
Possession
Loss Of Possession
Some Other Person
Taking Possession
A Subject
A Self
Control Of Self
Loss Of Control Of Self
Some Other Subject
Taking Control Of Self
Examples:
The batter really got into (took possession) the pitcher’s head.
That was the whiskey talking (controlling self) yesterday, not me.
277
The Locational Self
SELF CONTROL IS BEING IN ONE’S NORMAL LOCATION
A Person
Normal Location
Being In A Normal Location
Not Being In A Normal Location
The Subject
The Self
Being In Control Of Self
Not Being In Control Of Self
The Subject
The Self
Control Of Subject By Self
Out Of Control Of The Self
THE SELF AS CONTAINER
A Person
A Container
Located in Container
Not Located In Container
Examples:
I was beside myself. (Outside self = out of normal control of self)
She was really out to lunch during that presentation.
Is he out of his mind?
SELF CONTROL AS BEING ON THE GROUND
A Person
Being On The Ground
Not Being On The Ground
Being High
The Subject
Being In Control Of The Self
Not Being In Control Of Self
Euphoria
Examples:
She really has her feet on the ground.
He seemed to be floating off during the lecture.
My head is in the clouds.
278
The Scattered Self
ATTENTIONAL SELF CONTROL IS HAVING THE SELF TOGETHER
A Person
A Unified Container
The Container Fragmented
Located In One Place
Not Located In One Place
The Subject
The Normal Self
The Scattered Self
Normal Attentional Control
Lack Of Attentional Control
Examples:
Pull yourself together man!
When is that dissertator going to get it together?
She’s all over the place.
Getting Outside Yourself
The Objective Standpoint Metaphor
A Person
A Container
Seeing From Inside
Seeing From Outside
The Subject
The Self
Subjective Knowledge
Objective Knowledge
Examples:
They need to take a good look at themselves in the mirror.
He better watch what he does.
You need to step outside yourself.
The Social Self Metaphor
One Person
Another Person
Evaluative Social Relationship
Examples:
Subject and Self as Adversaries:
She’s conflicted over the decision.
He’s his own worst enemy.
The Subject
The Self
Evaluative Subject-Self Relationship
279
She is at war with herself over whom to choose.
Subject as Parent and the Self as Child:
She is really good at pampering herself.
I need to wean myself from sweets.
He needs to learn how to mother himself every once in a while.
Subject and Self as Friends:
I need to be a better friend to myself.
I like myself.
I like hanging out with myself.
Subject and Self as Interlocutors:
I convinced myself to quit smoking.
I debated with myself over whether to go to the party.
I had a talk with myself about the poor performance.
Subject as Caretaker of Self:
He takes good care of himself.
She nursed herself back to health.
You should be kind to yourself.
Subject as Master, Self as Servant:
I’m disappointed in myself.
I made myself do the long reading.
I told myself that I needed to study more.
The Subject is obligated to meet the standards of the Self:
Be true to yourself.
I let myself down.
You are betraying yourself.
The Multiple Selves Metaphor
A Person
Other People
Their Social Roles
Being In The Same Place As
Being In Different Places
The Subject
Selves
The Values Attached To The Roles
Having The Same Value As
Having Different Values
280
Examples:
My artist self keeps gnawing at my scientific self.
The gambler in me says let’s take a chance.
She is trying to get back to her spiritual self.
The Essential Self Metaphor
Person 1
Person 2
Person 3
The Subject, With The Essence
Self 1, The Real Self (Fits The Essence)
Self 2, Not Real Self (Doesn’t Fit Essence)
Constraint: The Values Of The Subject Are The Values Of Self 1
Examples:
The Inner Self: Self 1 (Real Self) is hidden inside Self 2, the Outer Self, because the
Real Self is fragile and shy and does not want anyone to know he is there, or both.
She won’t reveal her real self to anyone.
I retreated into myself after that disappointment.
His cordiality is just a façade.
The External Real Self (Real Me): Self 2, who is awful in some way, is hidden inside
Self 1, the Real Self, who is quite nice. But when the Real Self lets its guard down, the
Awful Self comes out.
I’m just not myself today.
That wasn’t the real me talking yesterday.
She finally showed the real Sally.
The True Self: All his life, the Subject has been inhibiting Self 2, which is incompatible
with the Subject’s Essence. Self 1, which is compatible with the Subject’s Essence, is
somewhere unknown, and the Subject is trying to find his “true” Self, the one compatible
with his Essence, with who he really is.
She’s getting in touch with herself.
I’m searching for my true self.
She’s found herself as a social worker.
281
APPENDIX F
METAPHORS OF TIME
(From Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, pp. 137-169)
282
Metaphors of Time
The Time Orientation Metaphor
The Location Of The Observer
The Space In Front Of the Observer
The Space Behind The Observer
The Present
The Future
The Past
Embodiment and the Time Orientation Metaphor:
What we will encounter in the future is ahead of us.
What we are encountering in the present is where we are.
What we encountered in the past is behind us.
The Moving Time Metaphor
Objects
The Motion Of Objects
Past The Observer
Times
The “Passage” Of Time
Embodiment and the Time Orientation Metaphor:
What we will encounter in the future is moving toward us.
What we are encountering now is moving by (passing) us.
What we encountered in the past has moved past us.
Combination: The Time Orientation and Moving Time Metaphor
The Location Of The Observer
The Space In Front of the Observer
The Space Behind The Observer
Objects
The Motion Of Objects
(Past The Observer)
The Present
The Future
The Past
Times
The “Passage” Of Time
The Moving Observer Metaphor
Locations On Observer’s Path Of Motion
The Motion Of The Observer
The Distance Moved By The Observer
Times
The “Passage” of Time
The Amount Of Time “Passed”
283
Embodiment and the Moving Time Metaphor:
What we will encounter in the future is what we are moving towards.
What we are encountering now is what we are moving by.
What we encountered in the past is what we moved past.
Combination: The Moving Observer and Time Orientation Metaphor
The Location Of The Observer
The Space In Front Of The Observer
The Space Behind The Observer
Locations On The Observer’s Path Of Motion
The Motion Of The Observer
The Distance Moved By The Observer
The Present
The Future
The Past
Times
The “Passage” Of Time
The Amount Of Time “Passed”
284
APPENDIX G
THE EMBODIED MIND’S CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT: NINE MYTHS
ABOUT HUMAN REASON FROM TRADTIONAL PHILOSOPHY
(From Lakoff and Johnson, 1999)
285
1. Reality comes divided up into categories that exist independently of the specific
properties of human minds, brains, or bodies.
2. The world has a rational structure: The relationships among categories in the world are
characterized by a transcendent or universal reason, which is independent of any
peculiarities of human minds, brains, and bodies.
3. The concepts used by mind-, brain-, and body-free reason correctly characterize the
mind-, brain-, and body-free categories of reality.
4. Human reason is the capacity of the human mind to use transcendent reason, or at least
a portion of it. Human reason may be performed by the human brain, but the structure of
human reason is defined by transcendent reason, independent of human bodies or brains.
Thus, the structure of human reason is disembodied.
5. Human concepts are the concepts of transcendent reason. They are therefore defined
independent of human brains or bodies, and so they too are disembodied.
6. Human concepts therefore characterize the objective categories of mind-, brain-, and
body-free reality. That is, the world has a unique, fixed category structure, and we all
know it and use it when we are reasoning correctly.
7. What makes us essentially human is our capacity for disembodied reason.
8. Since transcendent reason is culture-free, what makes us essentially human is not our
capacity for culture or for interpersonal relations.
9. Since reason is disembodied, what makes us essentially human is not our relation to
the material world. Our essential humanness has nothing to do with our connection to
nature or to art to music or to anything of the senses.
286
APPENDIX H
THE SURGEON IS A BUTCHER BLEND
(Reproduced from Grady, Coulson & Oakley, 1999)
287
GENERIC SPACE
Agent
Sharp Instrument
Work space
Procedure
(Goal/Means)
Role: Surgeon
Role: Butcher
Identity of Surgeon
Role: Patient
MENTAL
SPACE
Input # 1
Role: Commodity
MENTAL
SPACE
Identity of Patient
Scalpel
Cleaver
Operating Room
Abattoir
Goal: Healing
Goal: Serving Flesh
Means: Surgery
Means: Butchery
Identity of Surgeon Role Butcher
Identity of Patient Role Patient (Person)
Cleaver? Scalpel? Unspecified
Operating Room
Goal: Healing
Means: Butchery
Meaning: INCOMPETENCE
BLENDED SPACE
Input # 2
288
APPENDIX I
“THE BYPASS” BLEND
(From, Fauconnier and Turner, 2002)
289
Ad from Education Excellence Partnership Website, 2001.
290
APPENDIX J
“THE INFANT IS RUTHLESS” BLEND
291
GENERIC SPACE
Agent
Emotion
Cultural Beliefs/Expectations
Related Embodied Metaphors
Intention/Goal
Infant 1
INPUT
1
Infant 2
Love
Hate
Loves instinctively
Does not hate
(Or hates only reactively)
LOVE IS WARM
LOVE IS SOFT
LOVE IS CLOSE
HATE IS COLD
HATE IS HARD
HATE IS DISTANT
Love attracts and binds
Hate distances and repels
Infant inherent capacity for love and hate
Attention called to expanded qualities of (presumably) opposing forces:
Erotic aspects of aggression
HATE IS LOVE - “I hate (really love) you”
HATE IS HOT - “She’s hot under the collar”
Aggressive aspects of love
LOVE IS WAR - “He conquered her”
LOVE IS VORACIOUS - “I love her to death”
Implied Blended Meanings: Aggression is generative (means by which
accurate perception of separate and lovable object occurs) as a function of the
transformation (“fusion”) of love and hate in transitional (e.g., blended) space
BLENDED SPACE
INPUT
2
292
APPENDIX K
RAPPAPORT AND GILL’S (1959) METAPSYCHOLOGICAL POINTS OF VIEW
AND ASSUMPTIONS WITH RELATED CONCEPTUAL AND
PSYCHOANALYTICALLY-DERIVED METAPHORS
293
1. The Dynamic Point of View (Forces)
Definition: The dynamic point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of
any psychological phenomenon include propositions concerning the psychological forces
involved in the phenomenon.
Assumptions: (a) There are psychological forces; (b) Psychological forces are defined by
direction and magnitude; (c) The effect of simultaneously acting psychological forces
may be the simple resultant work of each of these forces; (d) The effect of simultaneously
acting psychological forces may not be the simple resultant work of each of these forces.
Related Conceptual Metaphors: Causes Are Forces, Change Is Movement, Purposes Are
Destinations, The Mind Is a Body, Thinking Is Moving
Psychoanalytic-Derived Metaphors: Drives Are Forces, Affects Are Forces, Instincts Are
Forces, Forces Are Pleasure-Seeking, Forces Are Pain/Anxiety Avoidant, Forces Are
Object-Seeking, Forces Seek Equilibrium, Fusion Is the Equilibrium of Forces
2. The Economic Point of View (Energy)
Definition: The economic point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of
any psychological phenomenon include propositions concerning the psychological energy
involved in the phenomenon.
Assumptions: (a) There are psychological energies; (b) Psychological energy follow a
law of conservation; (c) Psychological energies are subject to transformations, which
increase or decrease entropic tendency.
Related Conceptual Metaphors: Causes Are Forces (which act on energy), Change is
Motion, Similarity Is Closeness, More Is Up, Less Is Less Is Down,
Psychoanalytic-Derived Metaphors: Energy Is Quantity, Cathexis Is Energetic Attraction
To Objects, Fusion Is Binding (Binding Is Close), Defusion Is Scattering (Defusion Is Far
Away)
3. The Structural Point of View (Id, Ego, Superego)
Definition: The structural point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of
any psychological phenomenon include propositions concerning the abiding
psychological configurations (structures) involved in the phenomenon.
Assumptions: (a) There are psychological structures; (b) Structures are configurations of
a slow rate of change; (c) Structures are configurations within which, between which, and
by means of which mental processes take place; (d) structures are hierarchically ordered.
294
Related Conceptual Metaphors: States Are Locations, The Mind Is A Body, Change Is
Motion
Psychoanalytic-Derived Metaphors: The Id Is The Location Of Instinctual Energy, The Id
Is Pleasure Seeking, The Ego Is The Location Of Organized Activity, The Ego Is A
Regulator, The Ego Is Adaptation, The Ego Is The Self, The Superego Is The Location of
Internalized Of Parental Attitudes, The Superego Is Conscience, Change Is The
Movement Of Forces/Energy From One Location To Another
4. The Genetic Point of View (Individual History)
Definition: The genetic point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of any
psychological phenomenon include propositions concerning its psychological origin and
development.
Assumptions: (a) All psychological phenomenon have a psychological origin and
development; (b) All psychological phenomena originate in innate givens, which mature
according to an epigenetic ground plan; (c) The earlier forms of a psychological
phenomenon, though superseded by later forms, remain potentially active; (d) At the
point of psychological history the totality of potentially active earlier forms codetermines
all subsequent psychological phenomena.
Related Conceptual Metaphors: Change Is Motion, Lack Of Motion Is No-Change, Time
Is Movement, Time Is Location (Behind Is Past, In Front Of Is Future, Beside Is Present)
Psychoanalytic-Derived Metaphors: Transference Is Enactment Of Past In Present,
Repetition Is Attempt To Master Past, Behavior Is Attempt to Maintain (Past) Object Ties
5. The Adaptive Point of View (Person-Environmental Fit)
Definition: The adaptive point of view demands that the psychoanalytic explanation of
any psychological phenomenon include propositions concerning its relationship to the
environment.
Assumptions: (a) There exist states of adaptiveness and processes of adaptation at every
point of life; (b) The processes (autoplastic and/or alloplastic) adaptation maintain,
restore, and improve the existing states of adaptiveness and thereby ensure survival; (c)
Man adapts to his society—both to the physical and human environments which are its
products; (d) Adaptation relationships are mutual; man and environment adapt to each
other.
Related Conceptual Metaphors: Relationships Are Enclosures, Similarity Is Closeness,
Health Is Balance
Psychoanalytic-Derived Metaphors: Adaption Is Health, Adaptation Is Survival, Internal
Object Relationships Are Attempts To Maximize Adaptation With External Objects
295
APPENDIX L
WINNICOTT’S “THE TREE”
(From Rodman, 2003)
296
“The Tree”
Someone touched the hem of my garment
Someone, someone, someone
I had much virtue to give
I was the source of virtue
the grape of the vine of the wine
I could have loved a woman
Mary, Mary, Mary
There was not time for loving
I must be about my father’s business
There were publicans and sinners
The poor we had always with us
There were those sick of palsy
and the blind and the maimed
and widows bereft and grieving
women wailing for their children
fathers with prodigal sons
prostitutes drawing their own water
from deep wells in the hot sun
Mother is below weeping
weeping
weeping
Thus I knew her
Once stretched out on her lap
as now on dead tree
I learned to make her smile
to stem her tears
to undo her guilt
to cure her inward death
To enliven her was my living
So she became wife, mother, home
The carpenter enjoyed his craft
Children came and loved and were loved
Suffer little children to come unto me
Now mother is weeping
She must weep
The sins of the whole world weigh less than this
Woman’s heaviness
O Glastonbury
297
Must I bring even these thorns to flower?
even this dead tree to leaf?
How, in agony
Held by dead wood that has no need of me
By the cruelty of the nail’s hatred
of gravity’s inexorable and heartless
pull
I thirst
No garment now
No hem to be touched
It is I who need virtue
Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani?
It is I who die
I who die
I die
I
298
APPENDIX M
TENETS OF EMPIRICAL VERSUS CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS
(From Dreher, 2000)
299
Empirical Research
1. Empirical research in psychoanalysis involves all those research activities that claim to
generate and integrate relevant empirical evidence for psychoanalytic theory. (Evidence
is interpreted broadly here, more broadly than, for instance, the term “datum”, which
usually has a technical meaning and often designates a quantitative measurement, which
again results from the operationalization of a concept).
2. Empirical research means all classical case studies produced on a clinicalpsychoanalytic basis—that is, those that have as their basis of evidence the analytic
situation between analysand and analyst. The analyst himself processes the data and
organizes them.
3. Empirical research also refers to research activities where the basis of evidence
comprises only a segment of the analytic situation—for example, tape transcripts—and to
activities where other persons participating in the research organize the data in a systemic
way (e.g., recent quantitative psychotherapy research). Here researchers go beyond their
original data by collecting further empirical data—for example, questionnaires or
frequencies from coding systems.
4. Similar procedures exist in research relevant to psychoanalysis, where empirical data
are imported from neighboring disciplines—for example, psychology, medicine, or
ethnology.
Conceptual Research
1. Conceptual research involves whether the concepts used and the statements derived
from them are logically consistent and compatible with other theoretical statements. Such
examinations of logical consistency would include formal concept analyses, which are
common today in the cognitive sciences.
2. Conceptual research is concerned with the analysis of the use of a concept within a
defined conceptual field—as in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy—that is, with the rules of
its use in a specific scientific or practical context; this type of research is commonly
referred to as the “(philosophical) analysis of concepts.”
3. Conceptual research in psychoanalysis attempts to widen the narrow framework of a
clarification of concepts solely determined by logic and is thus more closely related to the
(philosophical) analysis of the use of a concept. It has as its focus the central concepts of
psychoanalysis (e.g., trauma or transference). Its main concern is the optimal clarification
of such concepts while taking into account the latest developments in psychoanalytic
research, whereby historical development of a concept and its current use in clinical
practice are not neglected.
300
APPENDIX N
EGO PSYCHOLOGY’S CRITIQUE OF KLEINIAN THEORY
(From Kernberg, 1969)
301
Ego Psychology’s Critique of Kleinian Theory and Technique
Regarding Kleinian Theory
1. The concept of an inborn death instinct, and the concept of such death instinct as
being the crucial determinant of anxiety, are rejected as an unwarranted extension of
Freud's speculative hypothesis regarding a death instinct, and as a dogmatic statement not
backed by any convincing facts.
2. The concept of an innate knowledge of the genitals of both sexes and of sexual
intercourse is rejected on the basis of lack of evidence for such inborn knowledge and the
contradiction between such elaborate knowledge and the very immature quality of
psychic functioning in the first few months of life.
3. Melanie Klein's lack of consideration of biological development, both anatomical
and physiological, on the one hand, and psychical on the other hand, is criticized as a
general feature of her theory of early development. The stress on constitutional and
instinctual factors in her theories, matched with neglect of epigenetic development, is
seen as a pseudo-biological orientation.
4. The 'pushing back' of intrapsychic development, especially that of complex
relationships between oedipal and pre-oedipal conflicts, into the first few months of life,
appears unjustifiable from the viewpoint of the clinical evidence presented. The cases of
children analysed from the age of 2 years old on, in which early oedipal material can be
found, and relationships between pregenital and genital conflicts, may present a
regressive pregenital expression of genital conflicts, a 'retroactive' colouring of early
experiences with later material; direct observation of children in the first year of life
provides evidence regarding a capacity for anxiety, depression, and probable fantasy
formation, but not of the complexity and kind which Kleinian authors accept as facts.
5. Ego-psychological authors criticize the neglect of environmental factors in Kleinian
writing, in spite of lip service given to the importance of these factors.
6. Strong criticism is expressed of the lack of consideration of structural differentiation
within both ego and superego formation, and the relative neglect of development within
all psychic instances. How 'internal objects' are integrated into ego and superego, how
later developments differ from earlier ones, how progression, fixation and regression
determine an individualized history of psychological development, are neglected within
Kleinian formulation.
7. The lack of differentiation of normal from pathological development is criticized,
with the implicit equalization of development of neurotic, borderline, and psychotic
personality development. Clinically this is reflected in the neglect of differential
psychopathology, and of the relationship between diagnosis and treatment.
302
8. The vagueness and ambiguity of Kleinian terminology is criticized as a major
stumbling-block preventing clarification of Kleinian theory itself, of internal
inconsistencies within that theory, and of the possible relationships between that theory
and the mainstream of psychoanalysis.
Regarding Kleinian Technique
1. The application of the same, non-modified psychoanalytic technique to patients with
all levels of severity of illness, from neurotics to psychopaths and schizophrenics (Segal,
1967), in itself the consequence of the neglect of descriptive psychopathology by
Kleinian authors, is criticized from the viewpoint of overwhelming clinical experience
indicating that psychotic patients and a good number of borderline conditions and
antisocial personality structures do not respond well to the psychoanalytic approach.
2. The relative neglect of reality in the understanding of the psychoanalytic situation
has been criticized, and the related overextension of the concept of transference. This
criticism and the following three on this list are especially important regarding the
opening phases of a Kleinian analysis.
3. Ego-psychological authors criticize the neglect by Kleinians of the defensive
organization of the patient, especially the natural structuring of defences in the early
phases of analysis. The premature, 'deep' interpretations of unconscious fantasy and
transference manifestations bypassing the defensive structure create the danger of an
intellectual indoctrination of patients, in contrast to the natural upsurge of deep,
unconscious material when the defences against it are resolved through interpretation.
4. The lack of deepening of the analytic relationship as a consequence of interpreting
the same constellation of primitive conflicts again and again, from the beginning of the
analysis on, has been pointed out as a consequence of premature transference
interpretations and the neglect of advanced ego defences, and especially of the patient's
character structure.
5. The combination of a peculiar use of terms related to infantile development, the
consistently active behaviour of the analyst, the atmosphere of certainty within which
interpretations are given, may determine a special analytic situation as part of some
Kleinian analyses in which the patient submits his productions and language to an
indoctrinating effect thus, in appearances, confirming the analyst's theories by
associations centering on those theories and the language associated with them.
Let us now examine the aspects of Kleinian theory and technique which have been
accepted and integrated into the mainstream of psychoanalysis. Some of these aspects
have already been mentioned or implicitly acknowledged as part of the ego-psychological
critique of the Kleinian orientation.
303
Accepted and Integrated Theory
1. The importance of early object relations both in normal and in pathological
development has been generally accepted. The importance of the development of a
potential for depressive reaction in the first year of life, and of its fundamental
importance for future development, is also generally accepted. The simultaneous
development of narcissism and object relationships in contrast to the older model of an
objectless stage of development is a definite feature of recent psychoanalytic thinking
(van der Waals, 1965).
2. The importance of the defensive constellations described by Kleinians as paranoidschizoid, depressive, and manic has been acknowledged by authors of the egopsychological orientation working with borderline and psychotic patients. Although
neglect of later defensive operations (such as repression, reaction formation, and other
related defences of the fully developed ego) within the Kleinian orientation, and overemphasis on pregenital conflicts (as the conflicts underlying the defensive operations
described in the Kleinian 'positions') are criticized by ego-psychological authors,
selective use of the new understandings of early defensive operations provided by the
Kleinian orientation has improved the overall diagnostic and therapeutic armamentarium
of psychoanalysis (Kernberg, 1966, 1967).
3. The importance of aggression in early development is now generally accepted,
although not with the overriding emphasis that Melanie Klein gave to it.
4. There is a general tendency to accept early superego formation, probably starting
from the second year of life on, and the importance of early superego structures on early
and later psychic development (Jacobson, 1964).
5. The relationships between early genital development and pregenital conflicts, and
the influence of pregenital factors on the sexual development of both sexes and on the
pathological sexual developments in severe character pathology, have been integrated by
many non-Kleinian authors. The presence of oedipal conflicts from the second or third
year on has been acknowledged by ego-psychological child analysts (A. Freud, 1951).
Accepted and Integrated Technique
1. The application of classical psychoanalytic technique to children is a generally
acknowledged, major contribution of Melanie Klein. Geleerd's acceptance of Klein's
viewpoints regarding the Anna Freud–Melanie Klein controversy of the 1920s probably
reflects the general attitude of many non-Kleinian child analysts. There is a growing
consensus that children are able to develop full-blown transference neuroses (Harley,
1966).
304
2. There is an increasing technical utilization of the new understandings regarding
early defensive operations provided by Melanie Klein and her followers. This is
especially reflected in the interpretation of splitting of ego states as a defence, in the
understanding of negative therapeutic reaction as a possible consequence of unconscious
envy, in the focus on projective identification and its relationship to counter-transference,
and in the interpretation of omnipotence and devaluation as narcissistic defences
(Kernberg, 1968); (Searles, 1963); (Winnicott, 1962).
3. The understanding (if not necessarily management through interpretation) of the
above-mentioned mechanisms and other early defensive operations as the predominant
problems in the transference development of borderline and psychotic patients has
contributed to the increasing diagnostic refinement and therapeutic hopefulness regarding
these previously considered unapproachable forms of psychopathology. In this regard, the
interest of Searles and other workers from the Sullivanian influenced group in Kleinian
concepts is an indirect indication of the relevance of these concepts for the work with
regressed patients. In general, the fact that psychotic patients do present transference
reactions, a transference psychosis in contrast to the transference neurosis of less
regressed patients, is quite generally accepted now (Zetzel, 1967).
4. The focus on regressive features and the activation of early defensive operations in
the opening phase of psychoanalysis has been acknowledged as an important contribution
from the Kleinian orientation. Zetzel's acceptance that such early determinants of ego
development are activated in the opening phase is relevant here.
305
APPENDIX O
REVEALED CONCEPTUAL (EMBODIED) METAPHORS
306
LIST OF REVEALED CONCEPUTAL METAPHORS
PAGE
1. Winnicottian Ontology
Aggression
AGGRESSION IS SELF-ASSERTION………………………………..……………......65
AGGRESSION IS PURPOSEFUL ACTION………………………………...………....65
AGGRESSION IS GENERATIVE ENERGY………………………………….……….65
FUSION IS THE CREATION OF GENERATIVE AGGRESSION………………..…..66
.
AGGRESSION IS BINDING………………………….………………………….……..72
AGGRESSION IS INTEGRATION………………………………….………….……....72
INBORN AGGRESSION IS VARIABLE…………………………………………..…206
POTENTIAL VARIABLITY IN AGRESSION IS ENVIRONMENTAL………….…206
CLINICAL AGGRESSION IS GENERATIVE………………………………………..206
Annihilation
ANNIHILATION IS NO HOPE IN OBJECT RELATING STATES…………………210
ANNIHILATION IS THE ELIMINATION OF CATHEXIS………………………….210
ANNIHILATION IS OBJECTLESSNESS…………………………………………….210
Destruction
DESTRUCTION IS MOVEMENT OF THE OBJECT OUTSIDE NARCISSISTIC
SPACE…..…………………………………………….………………..……………....173
DESTRUCTION IS THE BIRTH OF REALITY……………………………………...173
307
DESTRUCTION IS LOVE……………………..……….……………………….…….173
DESTRUCTION IS THE BIRTH OF FANTASY………………………….…………174
MAXIMAL DESTRUCTIVENESS IS OBJECT VULNERABILITY….…………….190
MAXIMAL DESTRCUTIVENESS IS EXPANDED PERCEPTUAL
CAPACITY………………………………………………………………………….…190
DESTRUCTION IS THE MAINTENANCE OF LOVE………………………………197
DESTRUCTION IS REMOVAL OF THE BREAST FROM OMNIPOTENT
SPACE………………………………………………………………………………….200
DESTRUCTION OF THE BREAST IS THE ACUTAL IMPLUSE TO DESTROY…200
(ACTUAL) DESTRCUTION IS THE OBJECT’S FAILURE TO SURVIVE………...201
DESTRUCTION IS HOPE IN OBJECT USAGE STATES…………………….……..209
DESTRUCTION IS JOY……………………………………………………………….210
DESTRUCTION IN FANTASY IS CREATION IN REALITY………………………210
DESTRUCTION IS PERCEPTION……………………………………………………210
Environment
INHERITANCE IS ENVIRONMENT……………………………...………………….206
ENVIRONMENT IS IMPINGEMENT…………………………………….…….…….225
ENVIRONMENT IS NOXIOUS……………………………………………...………..225
Fusion
FUSION IS THE CREATION OF GENERATIVE AGGRESSION……………………66
UNFUSED AGGRESSION IS POTENTIAL (ACTUAL) DESTRUCTION………….202
INSTINCTUAL FUSION IS ENCOMPASSED AGGRESSION……………………..202
308
Mother
MOTHER IS ENVIRONMENT………………………………………………..……….72
MOTHER IS EMOTIONAL NOURISHMENT……………………………..…………72
MOTHER IS A BODILY ORGAN……………………………………………………..72
MOTHER IS A CONTAINER………………………………………………………….72
MOTHER IS SPACE……………………………………………………………………73
MOTHER IS OBJECT……………………………………………………….……….…73
MOTHER IS SUPPORT…………..……………………………………..…….…….….74
MOTHER IS WARMTH……………………………………………………….…….….74
MOTHER IS EMOTIONAL NOURISHMENT…………………………….…………..74
MOTHER IS IMPINGEMENT…………………………………………………….……74
MOTHER IS NOXIOUS…………………………………………………………….…..74
MOTHER IS METAPHOR…………………………………………………………..….76
Object Relating
OBJECT RELATING IS CANNIBALISM……………………....………..…………..191
ATTACK IN ANGER IS POST-OBJECT RELATING ACTIVITY………………….210
Omnipotence
OMNIPOTENCE IS RELINGUISHING CONTROL……………………………..…..168
OMNIPOTENCE IS A GENERATIVE USE OF CONTROL…………………………168
THE BIRTH OF REALITY IS AN OMNIPOTENT ACT OF SELF CONTROL…….168
309
Perception
HOLDING IS UNDERSTANDING……………………………………….…….……..74
PERCEPTIONS IN NARCISSISTIC SPACE ARE DISTORTIONS AND
OBSTACLES……………………………………………………………….…….…....125
REMOVING OBSTACLES IS BEING ABLE TO SEE FROM BOTH INSIDE
AND OUTSIDE……………..………………………………………………………....126
REMOVING OBSTACLES IS BEING ABLE TO MOVE INTO OTHER SPACE….126
FINDING OTHER (“NOT ME”) OBJECTS IN OTHER SPACE IS FINDING
REALITY AND TRUE SELF…………………………………………………….…....126
ACCURATE PERCEPTION IS A LOSS OF SELF……………………………..….…139
USING IS BEING ABLE TO USE…………………………………………………….158
UNDERSTANDING IS LETTING GO………………………………………………..168
Reality
POSSESSION OF TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS IS REALITY………….…………..…74
KNOWING IS NOT SEEING…………………………………………………….……179
KNOWING IS SEEING AND NOT SEEING…………………………………….…...179
REALITY IS SEEING AND NOT SEEING IN ORDINARY AND EXPANDED
TIME……………………………………………………………………………………180
KNOWING IS SEEING THAT WHICH IS PRESENTLY VISIBLE IN ORDINARY
TIME……………...…………………………………………………………………….180
KNOWING IS NOT SEEING THAT WHICH ONCE EXISTED BUT WAS
ABOLISHED OR ALTERED IN EXPANDED TIME………………………………..181
Retaliation
RETALIATION IS COLUSION WITH A DELUSIONAL THOUGHT……………..197
310
RETALIATION IS UNRELIABILITY………………………………………………..197
RETALIATION IS BEYOND DEATH……………………………………………….197
Self
FEEDING ON THE SELF (“ME”) IS NOXIOUS……………………………………...74
FEEDING ON THE NUTRITIOUS OTHER (“NOT ME”) IS HEALTHY……………74
FINDING THE TRUE SELF IS FINDING THE EXTERNAL WORLD……….…….111
THE TRUE SELF IS HIDDEN IN SUBJECTIVE (NARCISSISTIC) SPACE……….125
MOVEMENT IS THE SEPARATION OF SELF AND OBJECT……………….……139
THE FALSE SELF IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO (FINDING) THE TRUE SELF………143
THE SELF IS NOXIOUS……………………………………………………….…..….149
LONLINESS IS UNITY………………………………………………………….…….229
Survival
SURVIVAL IS DIGESTION…………………………………………..…………..……74
SURVIVAL IS MUTABILITY………………………………………………..……….190
SURVIVAL IS NOT RETALIATING………………………………………….…..….190
SURVIVAL AND NON-RETALIATION IS LOVE………………………………..…197
SURVIVAL IS POTENTIAL DESTRUCTION…………………………………….…201
Therapy
INTERPRETATIONS ARE IMPEDIMENTS…………………………………….…..119
LIFE IS THERAPY……………………………………………………………………131
311
THERAPY IS BREASTFEEDING………………………………………………...….150
THE ANALYST IS A MOTHER…………………………………………………...…150
.
THE PATIENT IS AN INFANT…………………………………………………..…..150
THE ANALYST IS A VEHICLE…………………………………………………..….151
THE THERAPIST IS AN INTERROGATOR……………………….…………….….157
PREMATURE KNOWLEDGE IS DESTRUCTIVE…………….……………………157
IMPINGEMENT IS A RESTRICTOR OF (POTENTIAL) SPACE………………….157
RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES……………………………………………..166
INTERPRETATION IS SELF-DEFENSE…………………………………………….197
INTERPRETATION IS ROTTEN FOOD……………………………………………..197
RELATIONSHIPS ARE HIERARCHIES………………………………….…….……209
PERPETUAL THERAPY IS THE ABSENCE OF AN UNCONSCIOUS
BACKCLOTH OF DESTRUCTION…………………………..…………..……….….210
Time
TIME IS AN IMPEDIMENT……………………………………………………….…121
TIME IS THE CREATION OF SPACE………………………………………………139
TIME IS MOVEMENT IN SPACE (INTO AND OUT OF SELF-SPACE).…………139
Transitional Space
TRANSITIONAL SPACE IS THE CREATOR OF TIME……………………………147
TRANSITIONAL SPACE IS SUSPENDED TIME…………………….……………..148
TRANSITIONAL SPACE IS THE PATH BETWEEN STATES OF MIND…………148
TRANSFORMATION IS THE SIMULTANEOUS CREATION OF TIME AND A
312
SEPARATE OBJECT IN TRANSITIONAL SPACE………………………………….217
2. General Psychoanalytic
AGGRESSION IS SELFISH…………………………………………………………….65
AGGRESSION IS DEATH……………………………………………………………...65
AGGRESSION IS DESTRUCTION…………………………………………………….65
AGGRESSION IS DEFENSIVE.………………………………………..………………65
FUSION IS BALANCE………………………………………………………………….65
DEFUSION IS IMBALANCE.………………………………………………...………..65
BALANCE IS HEALTH.……………………………………………………………......66
FUSION IS THE CREATION OF GENERATIVE AGGRESSION…………………... 66
DEVELOPMENT IS A PATH…………………………………………………….….…98
TRANSFERENCE IS A JOURNEY……………………………………………….…..119
PROJECTION IS EVACUATION………………………………………………..……138
PROJECTION IS MOVEMENT………………………………………………….……138
PROJECTION IS DISTORTED SEEING…………………………………………......138
THE THERAPIST IS A MACHINE…………………………………………….…..…142
PSYCHIC IMPORTANCE IS DEPTH…………………………………………….…..192
CURATIVE INTERPREATIONS ARE DEEP………………………………………..192
3. Kleinian Model
PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION IS DEPLETION OF THE SELF.…….……...…...133
PROJECTION IS FEELING………………..……………………………..……...……138
PROJECTION IS SEEING……………………………………….………….…….…..138
313
PROJECTION IS THE MOVEMENT (SPLITTING) OF THE EGO INTO OTHER
OBJECTS…………………………………………………..………………….….….....138
4. Positivistic Science View
A FACT (SYMPTOM) IS THE PRODUCT OF CAUSES…….……………………….44
CAUSES CREATE FACTS………………………………………………………….….44
5. Hermeneutic View
MEANINGS ARE CAUSES…………………………………………………………….45
MEANINGS ARE FORCES…………………………………………………………….45
6. General
AGGRESSION IS SELFISH……………………………………………………..……...65
AGGRESSION IS DEATH…………………………………………………….………..65
AGGRESSION IS DESTRUCTION…………………………………………….………65
AGGRESSION IS DEFENSIVE……………………………………………….………..65
314
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