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On "Proving" God's Existence (Deductive Arguments)
Deductive arguments are intended to establish conclusively (to entail) the truth of the conclusion.
What is desired is an argument in which:
(1) the argument form is valid;
(2) the argument’s premises are all true;
(3) the premises are known (or can be shown) to be true;
(4) we initially have greater confidence in the truth of the premises than in the truth of the
conclusion;
(5) there is a clear and relevant connection between the premises and the conclusion.
We must distinguish three questions: (1) Is there a sound deductive argument for God's
existence? (2) Has anyone discovered a sound deductive argument for God's existence? (3) Can
one persuade someone else that he / she has discovered such an argument?
Cosmological Arguments
All forms of the cosmological argument begin with the existence of the universe (or some part of
it) and attempt to establish the existence of a necessary Being or First Cause as the ultimate
explanation for the universe.
A Thomist Cosmological Argument (St. Thomas Aquinas):
A contingent entity is something that might not have existed; its existence is not necessary
(logically or ontologically).
1. A contingent being exists.
2. This contingent being has a cause of its existence.
3. The cause of its existence is something other than itself.
4. What causes this contingent being to exist must be a member of a set of causes that contains
only contingent beings or of a set that contains at least one noncontingent (necessary) being.
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5. A member of a set that contains only contingent beings cannot cause this contingent being to
exist.
6. Therefore, what causes this contingent being to exist must be a member of the set that
contains at least one noncontingent (necessary) being.
7. Therefore, a necessary being exists.
[Based on M. Peterson, et al., Reason and Religious Belief, 5th ed., (Oxford
University Press, 2013) p. 90]
Crucial issues:
1. Does the following question have an answer? "Why is there something instead of nothing?"
Many atheists claim there is no answer to the question -- the universe simply exists, and that is
all.
Theists claim that even if you are able to explain the existence of each member of the set of
contingent beings by reference to other members of the set, you still need an explanation for why
there are any contingent beings at all. If you recognize the question as legitimate and significant,
you are on the way to some form of theism. If not, no cosmological argument is likely to be
persuasive.
2 Which of the following is more plausible (or less implausible)?
a.) There is an eternal uncreated Being, who depends upon nothing apart from himself,
and who brings into existence everything else that exists.
b.) The earliest antecedents of the universe (whatever they are) simply appear and begin
to exist, apart from any previously existing material and without any prior cause.
c.) The earliest antecedents of the universe (whatever they are) are eternal and have
always existed without being caused by anything else.
d.) We simply cannot know whether (a), (b) or (c) is more reasonable; agnosticism
concerning whether the universe has a cause is the best option.
If any of (b), (c), or (d) is regarded by someone to be at least as plausible as (a), then he or she
will probably not find any version of the cosmological argument persuasive.
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The Kalam Cosmological Argument:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
[William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, God? A Debate Between a
Christian and an Atheist (Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 5]
Premise 1 appeals to the Principle of Causation -- every contingent being or event has a cause. If
this can apply to the universe as a whole, the premise is plausible.
Premise 2 is defended by (1) arguing that an actual infinite (as opposed to a potential infinite) in
the real world is impossible, since applying the concept to real entities results in absurdities; (2)
arguing that even if one accepts the notion of an actual infinite, it is impossible to traverse an
actual infinite; and (3) recent developments in cosmology supporting the hypothesis that the
universe had a beginning (Big Bang cosmology).
Actual infinite: An actual infinite is a determinate totality, or a determinate whole actually
possessing an infinite number of members. It is "a set considered as a completed totality with an
actual infinite number of members". An actually infinite set is characterized by:
(i) denumerability with the set of natural numbers.
(ii) one-to-one correspondence with a proper subset of itself.
Potential infinite : A potential infinite increases its number through time by successively adding
new members to that series (n+1). Thus, it is actually a finite, but always increasing, series.
Crucial issue:
Is it really unreasonable to believe that an actual infinite does exist in the real world?
The dispute between B. Craig and W. Sinnott-Armstrong over the Kalam Argument concerns
(among other things) the status of numbers. Sinnott-Armstrong claims that there are actual
infinites in the real world – “there is an infinite number of real numbers between one and two”
(God? p. 42). Thus, there is nothing inherently problematic about the idea of there being an
actual infinite number of prior states to the world (viz. the universe has no beginning). Craig
counters by saying that Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection is based upon a “Platonist” view of
numbers which assumes that numbers actually exist as “mind-independent things” (p. 57). So
the plausibility of premise 2 depends, in part, upon one’s view of the ontology of numbers.
(Craig apparently rejects what he regards as a “Platonist” view of numbers, but he does not
explain what he believes about the ontological status of numbers.)
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