Download Document

A sequential model of bargaining in
logic programming
Wu CHEN, Dongmo ZHANG, Maonian WU
Frontiers of Computer Science, 2015, 9(3):474–484
Problems & Ideas
• Problems of logic-based sequential models of bargaining
– most of the existing work has a limitation on reasoning power.
– The procedures of the models based on argumentation or logic
programs normally lack of necessary game-theoretic properties.
• Ideas: a new sequential model of bargaining
– specify the procedure of bargaining reasoning in logic programming.
– define its game-theoretic properties.
Main Contributions
• Different from the existing logic-based bargaining models, the inference of
the bargaining procedure is based on abductive reasoning.
• The bargaining procedure converges to a Nash equilibrium if each agent
makes rational offers/counter-offers in each round.
• The bargaining procedure satisfies a number of desirable properties, such as
mutual commitment, individual rationality, satisfactoriness and honesty.