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Lecture Summary
– Realism –
What is realism?
It is a very old political thought, having origin in 400 BC with Thucidides, who explain the
Peloponnesian war, that is to say the war between Sparta and Athens. Other relevant scholars
from this school of thought are: Otto Von Bismarck, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes,
Clausewitz, Hans Morgenthau, Henri Kissinger, Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz,...
World politics are driven by competitive self-interest.
Realism is a tradition of international theory centered upon 5 propositions:
1. The international system is anarchic.

There is no actor above states capable of regulating their interactions; states
must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than it being
dictated to them by some higher controlling entity.

The international system exists in a state of constant antagonism
2. States are the most important actors.
3. All states within the system are unitary, rational actors

States tend to pursue self-interest.

Groups strive to attain as many resources as possible
4. The primary concern of all states is survival.

States build up military to survive, which may lead to a security dilemma
5. It is in the nature of men to look for their interest, men are greedy
Realists believe that humankind is not inherently benevolent, but rather looking for its own
interest.
States employ the rational model of decision making by obtaining and acting upon complete
and accurate information. The state is sovereign and guided by a national interest defined in
terms of power.
Classical realism
Classical realism is marked by the lack of evolution. History is a sequence of cause and
effect, whose course can be analysed and understood by intellectual effort. Morality is the
product of power.
Thomas Hobbes, an english political thinker from the 17th century, wrote a famous book,
called the Leviathan. He believed that, to avoid the state of nature (total anarchy, the war of
all against all), people should accept an absolute state, the Leviathan. L’état de nature est un
état de la « guerre de tous contre tous » (Bellum omnium contra omnes) et l’homme « un loup
pour l’homme » (homo homini lupus)
Individuals have desires and appetites. Their regulation will determine what is good and what
is bad, no God. God has nothing to do with politics, it is a matter of civil power. Human kind
is also able to make rational choices and to choose order than chaos, through a social contract.
The reason suggests is to seek peace between states; when peace cannot be had, to use all of
the advantages of war.
Auteur des Éléments de la loi naturelle et politique en 1640, du Citoyen (De Cive) en 1641 et
du Léviathan en 1651, Thomas Hobbes est l'un des premiers philosophescontractualistes qui
tente de refonder la légitimité du pouvoir des dirigeants sur autre chose que la religion ou la
tradition. Son projet est de fonder l'ordre politique sur un pacte entre les individus, afin de
faire de l'homme un acteur décisif dans l'édification de son propre monde social et politique.
Sa réflexion politique est fondée sur son anthropologie, qui fait de l'homme un être mû
principalement par la crainte et le désir. Il doit ainsi sortir de l'état primitif et fonder un état
artificiel sur les bases de la raison : c'est le passage de l'état de nature à l'état civil.
Clausewitz, a German military from 19th century, believed that "War is merely the
continuation of policy by other means." Forces driving the course of war in Clausewitz's
view are 1) violent emotion 2) the interplay of chance and probability and 3) political
calculations driven by reason. . All else being equal, the course of war will tend to favor the
party with the stronger emotional and political motivations. Clausewitz conceived of war as a
political, social, and military phenomenon which might — depending on circumstances —
involve the entire population of a nation at war. He coined the notion of fog of war, that is say
the lack of information on the ennemy’s moves.
If two parties feel reciprocal hostility, only a desire to wait for a better moment before acting
can restrain them. In fact, in a conflicting situation, inaction cannot be considered by the
concept of balance of power, one will want to dominate the other one if he has the possibility
(this does not means that soldiers are combating all the time; in numerous conflicts, only a
very small part of the time is occupied by military action and it is not an anomaly.) The
balance is the result of combined effects of aim and strength. Only when the issue is unsure,
for example if both protagonists have the same forces, peace is possible. The principle of
polarity means that interests of each side are opposed and each one aims at victory. It is a zero
sum game, one lose if the other one win.
“War is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very
worst. War has to be a mix between force and intellect, but force has to be stronger than
intellect. Force can empirically lead the intellect and is limited only by factors inherent to war
empirical factors. War is cruel and sharp, but for Clausewitz, civilized nations are less cruel,
even if moderation on the ground is not accepted (being logically stupid).Civilized nations are
less cruel thanks to their social conditions and their relations between them. But war comes
from passion and even civilized people can be dominated by passion instead of mind. The two
motives for which war is conduct are: hostile feelings and hostile intentions.
War is not a rational act, or at least not merely, even between civilized nations. War is
influenced, in its conduction, by emotions. The degree of emotionality do not depend on
civilization but on conflicting interests and the length of conflict. Methods of warfare, that
avoid savagery, come from the intellect. But there is no logical limit to savagery. However,
means has to be proportionate to the end. Strength being wasted is contrary to any statecraft
principle; then the abstract world of ideas has to be connected to the real world.
War is an act of policy. Only when war is complete, absolute in its violence, war is
governed by the laws of its own nature and not anymore by policy. But generally, the
settings imposed by the policy predetermine the way war is conducted. However, war is
a pulsation of violence, varying in strength and speed, but always long enough to be
influenced on its course and its goals by a superior intelligence. Then policy can continue
to influence war. In that view, war is a true political instrument, a continuation of
political intercourse, carried out with other means. Simply, war requires special means
in order that the trend and design chosen by the policy are not inconsistent with the
means. More war is related to passion, more it will let military matters dominate
political war conduction. But all war can be considered acts of policy and never
something completely autonomous. “the more powerful and inspiring the motives for
war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede
the outbreak, the closer will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will
be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely the military aims and the political
objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be.”
Hans Morgenthau, a scholar from 20th century, emphasized in his book Politics
among nations, published in 1948 redefined political realism (the context is important). For
Morgenthau, foreign policy is not about motives and ideology of statesmen, but about
interest. Ideology is only a tool to disguise other interests.
A good foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits, for the state. Morality is
undermined and determined by the interest of the state, but is important to keep restraint. The
concept of interest is defined in terms of power. Power enables a rational order, the control of
man over man. It is given by a large territory, a large population, a national feeling, quality of
governance, a strong economy. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a
particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. Power saves us from the moral
excess and political folly. The aim of politics is domination.
Finally, Morgenthau believed in balance of power, that is to say, an equilibrium between
nation, peace, when military capabilities are distributed so that no one state is strong
enough to dominate all others. Balance of power is inevitable within a society of sovereign
nations; When an occurrence is appearing within the system, the system tend to adapt to
retrieve equilibrium. At the goal is equilibrium but also preservation of the system, then the
equilibrium will be found again when one will be not strong enough to destroy the others.
Antagonism and pultiplicity are the main patterns for a balance of power (check and balance).
Bandwagoning for weak nations or status quo may be good ways to protect themselves.
No permanent enemies and no permanent friends. Stability has been at the price of continuous
warfare in Europe.
Ex: African balance of power
Neorealism or structural realism
Neorealism is a theory of international relations first outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his
1979
book “Theory
of
International
Politics”.
Structuralists
believe
that structural constraints will determine behaviour in international relations, not
anymore human nature (strategy, egoism, or motivation). The anarchic order is still
prevalent, no supranational force, every sovereign state is formally equal in this system. States
are assumed at a minimum to want to ensure their own survival as this is a prerequisite to
pursue other goals. Because states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, there
is a lack of trust between states which requires them to be on guard against relative losses of
power which could enable other states to threaten their survival. This lack of trust, based on
uncertainty, is called the security dilemma.
In 2000, when many analysts believed that realism ended with the end of the cold war, Waltz
argued the contrary. He believed it is not the development of institutions or of democracy that
would end the balance of power between states. Do democracies are really more peaceful? Do
institutions are strong enough to stop war? As for Kant, The natural state is the state of war.
Fukuyama: anarchy can brong peace, not necessarily peace, thanks to democracy.
Stephn Walt developed the 'balance of threat' theory. According to balance of threat theory,
states' alliance behavior is determined by the threat they perceive from other states. Walt
contends that states will generally balance by allying against a perceived threat, although very
weak states are more likely to bandwagon with the rising threat in order to protect their own
security. He points to the example the alliance patterns of European states before and
during World War I and World War II, when nations with a significantly greater combined
power allied against the recognized threat of German expansionism.
Walt identifies four criteria states use to evaluate the threat posed by another state: its
aggregate strength (size, population, and economic capabilities), its geographical proximity,
its offensive capabilities, and its offensive intentions. Walt argues that the more other states
view a rising state as possessing these qualities, the more likely they are to view it as a threat
and balance against it.