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Party Behaviour in Scotland
Eve Hepburn
University of Edinburgh
Paper presented at the annual Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP)
conference, University of Edinburgh, 12-14 September 2014
1. Introduction
This paper examines the territorialisation of party behaviour in Scotland since
devolution, and in particular the ‘contagion effect’ of the national question on the
positions of Scotland’s political parties. It is argued that the traditional class-based
understandings of party competition have limited application in Scottish politics
unless they are considered in tandem with the strength, and often pre-eminence, of a
territorial dimension (in similarity to Quebec and many other substate nations where
territorial concerns and demands for self-government are central). Yet, far from
constituting a divisive cleavage between parties in Scotland, we argue that the
national question has become more of a valence issue in Scottish politics, whereby no
party would dare to speak against the political empowerment of the Scottish nation.
Instead, parties have adopted a range of positions in favour of increased territorial
autonomy, including support for fiscal autonomy, the creation of a cosmopolitan
Scottish identity, and increased control over welfare and social services. With all of
the bluster between the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ campaigns in the independence referendum
in 2014, it would be easy to ignore the fact that, in terms of a national yardstick, all of
the parties in Scotland are moving in the same direction: towards greater selfdetermination. This has not always been the case. The ‘national question’ has often
proved a divisive issue in Scottish politics, with the leading British mainstream parties
– the Labour Party and the Conservative Party – taking (often bitterly) opposing
positions to Scottish ‘home rule’ at different points in time.
Why has the national question become a valence issue in Scottish politics,
endorsed by all and sundry? We argue that there has been an important territorial
contagion effect in Scottish politics, especially since devolution, whereby the main
catalyst of contagion during this period – the SNP – has encouraged other parties to
take stronger territorial stances. Again, this has not always been the case. Arguably
the Labour Party in Scotland held the title of territorial contagion ‘catalyst’ during the
1980s and 1990s when it encouraged other parties in Scotland to support demands for
devolution. However, with the attainment of devolution (or at least an initial
settlement thereof), Labour has struggled to articulate its new territorial position. The
SNP has instead picked up the gauntlet, with the help of a new devolved Scottish
political arena to air its concerns, in its quest for greater Scottish self-determination.
The SNP’s demands for independence, undergirded by the threat it has posed as the
minority – and then the majority – government in Scotland, has catalysed other parties
to offer greater powers for Scotland in a bid to undermine secessionist claims. This
now means that all parties in Scotland are claiming to stand up for Scottish interests
and to demand greater powers for Scotland. In fact, some commentators have argued
that the fate of the United Kingdom depends less on the independence strategy of the
SNP and more on its indirect influence on other parties, whereby UK parties’ ability
to transform themselves into more Scottish creatures, to avoid being seen as the
puppets of Westminster, and their commitment to taking the devolution process of
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constitutional renewal more seriously are the issues that will make or break the
independence referendum in September 2014 (McLeish and Brown, 2012).
This paper therefore seeks to understand the electoral calculus underlying the
stance that Scottish parties take with respect to the ‘national question’. Following on
from this research group’s broader theoretical framework, it employs the concepts of
‘issue ownership’ and ‘contagion’ to understand how the territorial dimension
structures party competition in Scotland. Based on this issue ownership perspective,
our general hypothesis is that Scottish parties need to take a position on the national
question and its various dimensions – including the constitutional issue, national
identity and territorial interests – in addition to projecting an image of competence to
win over the electorate. While the SNP – as the main nationalist party in Scotland –
may be the ‘owner’ of the national question issue and the contagion ‘catalyst’
affecting the positions of other parties on this issue, it will also face competition from
other parties in presenting itself as the most ‘Scottish’ party representing Scotland’s
interests. Therefore, the SNP’s success in eliciting a territorial contagion effect on
other parties may undermine its ownership claim and ‘unique selling point’ in being
an autonomy-seeking party. Our hypotheses are therefore as follows: H1 Nationalist
parties ‘own’ the national question in substate politics. H2 Nationalist parties have a
contagion effect on other parties in the substate party system, which are obliged to
take stronger positions on the national question. H3 The national question has become
a multiple-ordering dimension, which supersedes and structures other cleavages –
class, post-materialism – in the substate party system.
This analysis draws on a mixed-methods empirical analysis of Scottish party
positions on the national question. The first source of information comes from a
content analysis of political party manifestos for Scotland, which reveal how parties
portray their political orientations to voters during elections. For this we used a
specially adapted coding scheme to measure the issue profile of substate and
statewide parties on the national question. The coding scheme captures the main
dimensions of the national question as conceptualised in the theoretical framework,
including: the constitutional issue, identity (language and cosmopolitanism) and
territorial interests (social, economic and supranational). The party manifestos of the
two most recent Scottish and UK elections were selected: the 2010 UK general
election (including the manifestos of the SNP, UK Labour Party, UK Conservative
Party and the UK Liberal Democrats) and the 2011 Scottish parliamentary election
(including the manifestos of the SNP, Scottish Labour Party, Scottish Conservative
and Unionist Party and Scottish Liberal Democrats). Thus a total of 8 manifestos –
covering substate and state parties – were subject to analysis. The coding procedure
included the division of each manifesto into ‘quasi sentences’, each representing an
argument expressed by a sentence or part of it, and assigning each quasi-sentence to
(a) an exclusive ‘issue salience’ category and (b) an exclusive directional category to
determine the relative positioning of parties on substate issues. This enabled us to
determine the salience and positioning of parties on each of the dimensions and subdimensions of the national question: (1) the constitution; (2) language; (3)
cosmopolitanism; (4) social policy; (5) economic policy; and (6) supranationalism.
The second source of data comes in the form of semi-structured elite
interviews with senior party officials. The interviews, which were based on a series of
questions organized around the three themes of the national question – the
constitutional issue, the identity issue and territorial interests – were asked
consistently of each participant involved. They provided us with a valuable source of
‘insider information’ not captured in official manifestos. The interviews allowed us to
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compare what was said by politicians in a one-on-one setting with what the party
officially states in its election manifestos. Interviews were conducted in November
2012 with at least 2 members from the four most important parties on each level of
government in Scotland. This included Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs)
for the SNP, Scottish Labour Party, Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party and
Scottish Liberal Democrats; in addition to Scottish Members of (the UK) Parliament
for the SNP and the UK Labour Party, for a total of twelve interviews.
The paper begins with an overview of party politics in Scotland, with a
particular focus on the tug-of-war between the Scottish Labour Party (SLP) and the
Scottish National Party (SNP) on the territorial and class dimensions of party
competition in their bid to become Scotland’s dominant party. It then considers the
various dimensions of the ‘territorial contagion’ effect in the period under study, and
introduces the data used to measure the effects of this contagion. The empirical meat
of the paper is then presented: an analysis of how political parties compete on the
three principal dimensions of the ‘national question’ in Scottish politics: (1) the
constitutional dimension; (2) the identity dimension (including positions on language
and cosmopolitanism); and (3) the regional interests dimension (including social
policy, economic policy and supranational policy). Finally, the paper will examine the
multi-level dimension of party politics in Scotland, and in particular how the
territorial dimension has moved to becoming a more a consensual ‘valence issue’
between parties in Scotland, and more of a schism between Scottish and UK parties in
the sense of a classical ‘centre-periphery’ cleavage.
2. Overview of the ‘National Question’ in Scottish Politics
Over a century of embattled constitutional politics in Scotland reached tipping point
in the year 2014: the year of Scotland’s first (but possibly not last) referendum on
breaking away from the UK state. For some, the proposition of secession during a
period of economic recession and global interdependence is an unnatural and
distracting one: the real focus should be on bread-and-butter politics and improving
the quality of people’s lives. For others, independence is the answer to economic
stagnation and social inequality, as it would allow Scotland to carve out its own
distinctive policy programme to address the values, needs and interests of its people.
Scotland’s political parties, which have spearheaded these opposing ‘unionist’ and
‘nationalist’ positons, have long been aware that the ‘national question’ has been
intrinsically tied up with the traditional ‘social class’ cleavage in Scottish politics.
Any party that wishes to gain some votes at the polls cannot take a position on one
issue without thinking through the implications for the other. And due to the strong
link between Scottish identity and state welfarism (McEwen, 2002; Beland and
Lecours, 2005) the party that is able to successfully fuse issues of self-determination
with socioeconomic matters is likely to gain the upper hand in Scottish politics.
Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, it was the Labour
Party in Scotland which deftly navigated its way through the territorial-socioeconomic
nexus of party competition to best represent the attitudes and values of Scottish
voters. The Labour Party had been ‘Scotland’s party’ since the steep decline of the
Conservatives in the 1960s. This became especially apparent during the UK Thatcher
governments of 1979-90, when Scots voted consistently for Labour. On the class
cleavage, Labour was indomitably centre-left (at least until the creation of New
Labour), taking a progressive and redistributive stance on socio-economic issues. This
resonated strongly with a Scottish electorate whose national identity was somewhat
predicated on (the myth of) egalitarianism (McCrone, 1992; Brown et al 1998).
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On the territorial dimension, otherwise known as the ‘national question’,
Labour’s position was far less consistent. Labour moved from a position of outright
hostility to Scottish self-government to supporting some form of Home Rule, and
swithered back and forward thereafter (Keating and Bleiman, 1979; Hepburn, 2010).
As one former Scottish Labour MSP stated ‘since the inception of the Labour Party at
the start of the last century, Labour’s position on home rule or devolution has
changed. It has been very confused, hesitant, ambiguous, ambivalent, and at some
points, nearly nonexistent’ (interview, 16 November 2012). Throughout the twentieth
century the Labour Party experienced divisions within its own ranks on how best to
address the national question (Geekie and Levy, 1989). This was most evident in the
first failed devolution referendum in 1979 when the UK Labour Party – the reluctant
instigator of the plebiscite – was embarrassingly split on the issue (Newell, 1998). But
the course that it finally set upon from the 1980s onwards – support for a devolved
assembly that received the extensive backing of civic society - was the one that would
increasingly receive the broadest support amongst the Scottish electorate. Labour was
rewarded in the polls: taking an average of 40-45% per cent of votes in Scotland in
general elections from 1983 to 1997. However, despite Scotland’s political
predisposition towards the Labour Party, this support was insufficient to make a
difference in UK elections and a series of Conservative governments were returned to
Westminster 1979-1992. When Labour finally clawed back the reins of power in the
1997 general election and implemented its commitment to devolution, a large
majority of Scots voted in favour of the proposal for a Scottish Parliament in 1997
(Trench, 2007; Mitchell, 2009; Jeffery and Mitchell, 2010; Keating, 2010).
However, during the Scottish Labour Party’s early years in coalition
government with the Scottish Liberal Democrats in the new Scottish Parliament, from
1999-2003 and 2003-7, its stance on both the social class cleavage and the national
question began to change. On the former, pressures from Tony Blair’s modernising
UK ‘New Labour’ Party were felt within the Scottish leadership, and the Scottish
branch began to edge to the centre (Bradbury, 2006). This was particularly evident in
the party’s support for the creation of public private partnerships (PPPs) in healthcare
– which many saw as a worrying move towards privatisation and a lurch to the right
(Hassan and Shaw, 2012). On the territorial issue, the Scottish Labour Party was
committed to stalling the issue: devolution had been achieved and the party had no
desire for further powers for Holyrood (see analysis of interviews with Labour MSPs
in Hepburn, 2010). This was the first of number of strategic mistakes that the Labour
Party in Scotland made, which enabled the rise of the more staunchly socialdemocratic, independence-seeking Scottish National Party.
The SNP had been a peripheral party in Scottish politics for most of its life.
Established in 1934, the SNP achieved its first electoral breakthrough into UK politics
in October 1974 when it won 30% of the vote and 11 of Scotland’s 72 seats in the UK
Parliament. The nationalist ‘threat’ led directly to Labour’s proposal for the
devolution referendum in 1979; however after the embarrassing failure of the
plebiscite – in which the SNP ran a separate campaign from Labour and only 51.6%
Scots voted in favour with a turnout of 63.8% (less than constitutionally required) –
the ‘national question’ was wiped off the UK Government’s agenda with the election
of Margaret Thatcher’s centralising Conservative Party later that year. While the
1980s and early 1990s were a period of consolidation for the Labour Party in Scotland
– which had engaged in the cross-party Scottish Constitutional Commission to create
a blueprint for a Scottish Parliament – the SNP’s self-exclusion from these activities
seemed small-minded and petty. The SNP entered a wilderness period, achieving 114
14% of the vote in UK general elections in the 1980s, while the Labour Party solidly
continued to gain around 43% of the vote in Scotland.
The SNP’s decision to support the creation of a Scottish Parliament in a crossparty ‘Yes’ campaign with Labour, the Liberal Democrats, Greens and other civic and
political organisations, gave the party the life support it so desperately needed. It was
able to present itself as a team-player working in the best interests of Scotland.
However, it was really the creation of the Scottish Parliament itself that marked the
real ascent of the SNP to power. In the first elections of 1999, the SNP became
official opposition to the Labour-Liberal Democrat government, which gave it a
platform and mouthpiece for independence that it had previously only dreamed of.
During the early days of devolution, the SNP also underwent an extensive degree of
professionalization and centralisation of party structures (Mitchell, Bennie and Johns,
2011). Ideologically, it showed itself during First Minister’s Questions to sit to the left
of the Labour-Liberal Democrat government, especially on the issue of privatisation
of public services. And on the territorial dimension, the SNP began to portray its goal
of independence as less one of secession from the UK and more one of the natural
extension of devolution. In other words, the SNP was making its bid to outmanoeuvre the Scottish Labour Party on both the class and territorial dimensions of
party competition, by cleaving its positions more closely with the centre-left, proautonomy views of the electorate.
When the SNP formed a minority government in the Scottish Parliament in
2007, political commentators were aghast. The mixed PR electoral system had been
designed so as to prevent the dominance of one party and to engender coalition.
Certainly, the 2007-11 SNP government was marked by the need for cooperation with
other parties – in particular the Scottish Conservatives – to implement its agenda.
However, while the SNP continued and radically expanded the distinctive centre-left
policies that the previous Labour-LibDem government had introduced (such as…),
thereby positioning itself as the protector of social democracy in Scotland, the SNP
was initially unable to achieve traction on its territorial aims. Its bid to hold a
referendum on independence was defeated in the Parliament: the SNP government
simply did not have the votes. As such, it pushed the territorial issue onto the
backburner and focussed instead on its responsibilities of competent government. In
this the SNP was successful, and was rewarded at the polls in 2011. Studies have
shown the support for the SNP’s landslide victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections
was not on the back of the territorial dimension or a desire for independence; it was
based on the fact that the SNP seemed to be doing a good job in government (Johns et
al 2012). However, this did not stop the SNP from pushing its territorial agenda. In
2012, and this time with a strong majority in the Scottish Parliament, it achieved its
aim of passing a bill to hold an independence referendum, and it set the date for the
plebiscite in 2014. Thus the SNP had drawn a political battlefield on the future of
Scotland underpinned by a two-year long campaign – the longest in British history.
3. Issue Ownership and the Contagion Effect
As aforementioned, we believe that the national question has become a valence issue
in the sense that there is now general agreement between political parties on the
direction of policies. And as we hypothesised, whoever ‘owns’ the issue of the
national question has the potential to have a contagion effect on other parties.
However, that potential is circumscribed by two conditions. First, the owner of the
national question must have sufficient electoral strength or ‘party system relevance’ in
Sartori’s (1976) terms, to constitute a sufficient threat to other political actors in that
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system. Second, contagion is most likely to occur when other parties are seen to be
weak on the issue of territory, in particular when they are viewed as beholden to
central-state interests (for a full theory of territorial contagion, see Hepburn, 2014a).
So let us begin by examining the main players involved in contagion: the
owners and catalysts of the national question, and the targets of the territorial
contagion effect. To begin with, we hypothesise that the main nationalist party will be
the ‘owner’ of the national question and will have a contagious effect on the territorial
stances of other parties. In Scotland, the main nationalist party is the Scottish National
Party (SNP), who has rapidly increased its electoral ‘threat’ to other parties since
devolution, initially becoming official opposition (1999-2007), then forming a
minority government (2007-11) and then a majority government (2011-). It is
important to note that, unlike Quebec, the SNP does not face a nationalist challenger
in Scotland: the SNP is the only party proclaiming to be nationalist. However, it is not
the only party seeking independence. Two smaller parties – the Scottish Green Party
and the Scottish Socialists – have also made independence a policy aim, though for
very different reasons. While the Greens believe independence would enable Scotland
to improve the welfare system and its environmental record, the Socialists wish to see
an independent Scotland implement sweeping redistributive reforms. But as CoConvenor of the Scottish Greens, Patrick Harvie, has said, ‘agreeing on independence
doesn’t mean we’ll ever agree [with the SNP’s position] on the oil industry, the roadbuilding programme or the future of the Corporation tax’ (Harvie, 2014: 22).
However, despite supporting independence, the Greens and Socialists have had
insufficient party-system relevance (polling between 3-7% of the vote in Scottish
parliamentary elections 1999-2011) to have a contagion effect like the SNP.
Yet while the Scottish National Party (SNP) may constitute the main catalyst
of territorial contagion in today’s independence referendum-fuelled politics, this was
not always the case. During the 1980s and 1990s, one could argue that Labour’s
leadership of the Scottish Constitutional Convention and support for devolution had
an impact on the positions of other parties in Scotland, encouraging them to
collectively put their weight behind the creation of a Scottish Parliament in 1997,
even despite their contrasting constitutional aims (independence for the SNP, Scottish
Greens and Scottish Socialists; and federalism for the Scottish Liberal Democrats). To
this end, Scottish Labour played the part of ‘catalyst’ of the territorial contagion effect
– rallying support around a loosely left-of-centre autonomy-seeking project.
Both Labour and the SNP, as Scotland’s two leading parties with the greatest
potential for ‘territorial contagion’, now compete on centre-left, pro-autonomy
platforms. This underlines the fact that party competition in Scotland tends to take
place on the left side of the ideological spectrum. Four out of the five main parties in
the Scottish Parliament may be classified as ‘centre-left’ (Labour, SNP, Scottish
Greens and the Liberal Democrats) than centre-right (Conservatives). Because of the
centre-left consensus, party positions on social issues in Scotland often converge.
However, the national question has had a more complex effect on party politics. Let
us know consider who the other ‘targets’ of territorial contagion might be.
The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party (SCUP) has separate origins in
Scotland, and was an independent party until 1965. When the Labour Party was
vehemently opposed to Home Rule in the 1920s and 1940s, the SCUP was actually in
favour of administrative devolution, and it was the first UK party to make a
commitment to a (weak) form of devolution (Mitchell, 1998; Chaney, 2013).
However, during its integration – some may say absorption – into the UK
Conservative Party, the SCUP abandoned any commitment to home rule for Scotland
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and maintained a strongly unionist – some would say unitarist – position (Hepburn,
2010). This was particularly evident under Thatcher’s leadership of the party from
1975, when the party came to be perceived as an English, anti-Scottish Party
(Seawright, 1996, 2004). The party was opposed to the activities of the Scottish
Constitutional Convention in the 1980s and 1990s, and it voted against Scottish
devolution in both referendums in 1979 and 1997. This was not a wise strategic
decision amongst an increasingly pro-devolution Scottish public. The Conservatives
lost all of their seats in Scotland in the 1997 general elections, forcing the party to
hold an internal review that led to the decision to secure greater organisational
autonomy for the party and to advance a policy position of supporting the Scottish
Parliament (see Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2011; Convery, 2013).
In contrast, the Scottish Liberal Democrats have always supported Scottish
Home Rule and decentralisation as part of their federalist agenda. And because the
UK Liberal Democrats are a federal organisation, the Scottish branch has always
exercised a substantial degree of autonomy over policy programmes. This has led the
Scottish LibDems to move considerably to the left of their UK brethren on many
social policy issues, and often at times to the left of Labour and the SNP. Like the
SNP (and also the Conservatives) the party benefitted considerably from devolution,
and it became junior government coalition partner to Labour in the first two sessions
of Scottish Parliament, from 1999-2003 and 2003-7. During this period, the LibDems
spearheaded several distinctive public policies for Scotland, including the introduction
of free care for the elderly, and during the SNP administrations from 2007 onwards it
has also played an important role in pushing for more socially-minded policies, for
instance on extending free childcare provision for pre-schoolers (Keating, 2010).
Having provided an overview of the Scottish party system and the main
political players in Scotland – be they potential catalysts or targets of territorial
contagion – let us know shift our attention to the period under study (2010-2014) to
examine in detail the effect of the national question on Scottish party behaviour.
4. The Constitutional Issue
According to one of our Scottish Labour Party interviewees, ‘there isn’t really any
ideological divide apart from the constitution’ (interview, 13 November 2012).
Throughout the postwar period, but in the years since the SNP took power especially,
all of the major parties in Scotland have been at pains to emphasise their differences
on whether or not Scotland’s constitutional future should be that of independent
statehood. This independence-unionism cleavage has been strengthened during the
two-year long campaigns in advance of the independence referendum in 2014,
whereby unionist parties have put their differences behind them to collectively
endorse a ‘no’ outcome while the SNP and the Green Party have campaigned for a
‘yes’ vote – resulting in a very black-and-white perspective on constitutional politics.
However, this cleavage on the constitutional issue is ‘greyer’ and more
nuanced than party rhetoric makes out and when the actual positions of parties are
looked at. Far from constituting a clear division between anti- and pro-independence
supporters, there are a range of constitutional solutions proposed by the parties for
self-determination. To begin with, the SNP has always advocated ‘degrees of
independence for Scotland within larger political frameworks’ (Hepburn, 2009: 190).
This has involved articulating a vision of independence within the British Empire,
then the Commonwealth, then the European Union, and now within the ‘social union’
of the British Isles. The SNP’s interpretation of independence is far from the
nineteenth century understanding of sovereignty. Instead, the SNP has been forced to
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recognise its interdependence – not only on a global or European stage, but also
within the United Kingdom. To that end, SNP leader Alex Salmond has stressed the
continuation of a ‘social union’ between the people of Scotland and the rest of the UK
(rUK) in a post-independence scenario (BBC, 12 July 2013)1. Indeed, in emphasising
that that an independent Scotland could remain part of the United Kingdom, the SNP
has stressed several ‘unions’ with rUK in its vision of independence, including the
social union, a currency union (keeping the pound sterling), and a monarchic union
(keeping the Queen as head of state) in addition to the partnership it would continue
with the UK within the European Union and NATO. As one SNP MSP has argued,
‘after independence, Scotland, assuming there is a yes vote, would probably, with the
rest of the UK, be the two most integrated countries anywhere in the world’
(interview, 21 November 2012). Commentators have described this ‘unionist’
nationalist position as ‘independence-lite’ while critics have argued that this has been
‘part of the SNP agenda, you know, “don’t scare the horses: we’re still going to be
part of Britain”’ (interview with Scottish Labour Party MSP, 13 November 2012).
While the SNP has been at pains to emphasise that independence won’t really
be a big step away from the current devolved settlement, and that Scottish people will
still maintain the same cultural, social, economic and monetary links to the rest of the
UK, its competitors in the Scottish party system have been moving onto the same
terrain. The parties supporting the ‘no’ campaign have argued that their constitutional
proposals would also move beyond the devolution settlement but would allow
Scotland to continue its strong partnership with the UK. According to one Scottish
Labour MSP, ‘our view is “we’re better together”. That is not, however, a defence of
the status quo. It’s certainly not really a defence of the Union, and the way it’s
presented as it was signed in 1707. It is a defence of devolution, of a strong Scottish
Parliament in a devolved UK… I would like to see a greater degree of autonomy all
around’ (interview, 15 November, 2012). Thus, while Labour in the early days of
devolution refused to even consider granting the Scottish Parliament any more powers
(see interviews with Labour MSPs conducted in Hepburn, 2010), Labour has done a
sharp u-turn in response to the SNP’s entry into government in 2007. This first
manifested itself in the creation of the ‘Calman’ Commission on Scottish Devolution
in 2008, which was supported by Labour, the LibDems and the Conservatives (and
not the SNP), whose recommendations for Scotland’s future – including more powers
over revenue-raising and capital-borrowing – were included in the Scotland Act 2014
(see Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2009).
But Scottish Labour has realised that Calman does not go far enough for
Scottish voters. The problem is, it is often unclear to Scots – both within and outwith
the party – exactly what Labour is promising for Scotland in the event of a no vote.
As one Scottish Labour MSP said in response to the question ‘could you describe
your party’s position on what Scotland’s relationship should be with the rest of the
UK’, his answer was ‘I don’t know! I don’t know what it is! (interview, 13
November, 2012). Another former Scottish Labour MSP described his party as having
‘completely lost the plot on the constitutional issue post-1999’ (interview, 16
November 2012). The Scottish Labour Party attempted to address such concerns when
it established a Devolution Commission in 2012, which recommended a raft of new
powers, including making the Scottish Parliament indissoluble, increasing powers
over income tax and assuming control over housing benefits (Scottish Labour, 2014).2
1
2
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-23287920
http://www.scottishlabour.org.uk/campaigns/entry/devolution-commission
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However, there is evidence that some party members wish to move beyond this
position of an empowered devolved settlement. One Scottish Labour MSP said that
‘in the long run [devolution] starts to become difficult when you have one part of the
country [England] that is not devolved in any way…that’s why I’m kind of attracted
to federalism’ (interview, 15 November, 2012). Another Scottish Labour MSP
admitted that ‘I am not entirely optimistic about the Commission, as someone who
would want substantially more powers for the Scottish Parliament’ (interview, 13
November 2012). It is quite unsurprising – given Labour’s reticence on the
constitutional issue – that a group of Labour MSP broke from the party line to come
out in favour of independence. ‘Labour for Independence’ was formed in 2012 in
response to polls that approximately 30% of Labour voters in Scotland favour
independence, and is firmly in the ‘yes’ camp on the referendum.3
No similar organisation has broken away from the Scottish Conservative and
Unionist Party (SCUP). While Labour and the SNP are both competing for the same
broad electoral base – pro-autonomy, centre-left – the SCUP has a different following.
Out of all the parties, it considers itself to be the most ‘unionist’ and most in favour of
a strong, United Kingdom (Aughey, 2011). According to one SCUP MSP, ‘we believe
that Scotland has been very well served by being part of the Union of Nations of the
UK’ (interview, 14 November, 2012). However, the party has also – grudgingly –
supported the Scottish Parliament, since its radical u-turn on the constitutional issue
after its electoral pummelling in 1997. It appears that support for devolution is
strategic rather than principled. In the early days, it needed to win back Scottish
voters. In the present climate, it needs to take on the SNP: ‘the acid test of the transfer
of powers to the Scottish Parliament has been a political judgement as to what would
be the best way to stop the SNP from progressing further’ (interview with SCUP
MSP, 14 November, 2012). This is a clear indication of ‘contagion’ from the SNP. In
response, the SCUP – in similarity to Scottish Labour – supported the UK Calman
Commission and then held its own party Commission on the Future Governance of
Scotland. The SCUP commission’s recommendations went even further than
Labour’s, proposing full powers over income tax, shared VAT receipts and control
over housing benefit and attendance allowance (SCUP, 2014).4 Some members of the
party wish to take this a step forward and create a federal UK, which would ‘create a
much more stable constitutional settlement than what we currently have. We are
constantly having this debate about more powers, more powers, more powers. You
can’t go on doing that forever’ (interview, 20 November 2012).
One party that has staunchly defended the federal model has been the Scottish
Liberal Democrats. One Scottish LibDem MSP described the position as ‘in favour of
a federal UK in what we call “home rule in a federal UK”. What we want to have is
permanent powers here, rather than powers on loan, which we currently have, which
would make the Scottish Parliament a much more equal partner with the UK’
(interview, 14 November 2012). However, the problem for a federal solution,
continues the MSP is that ‘we don’t know what England will do’. This is a big
gamble, and one reason why federalism has not featured largely in the independence
campaigns in 2012-14, despite members of all three unionist parties – as described
above – supporting this constitutional option. Instead, the Scottish LibDems have also
focussed their energy on proposing additional powers for the devolved Scottish
Parliament through an emphasis on the terminology of ‘Home Rule’. Thus the
3
http://www.labourforindy.com/
http://www.scottishconservatives.com/2014/06/strathclyde-commission-scotland-full-powers-incometax/
4
9
Scottish LibDems also supported the Calman Commission and created a party ‘Home
Rule and Community Rule Commission’ to examine the best options for Scotland.
Prior to the Labour and Conservative commissions, the LibDem Commission
recommended the creation of a federal UK structure, with the Scottish Parliament
gaining powers over almost all income tax, capital gains tax and air passenger duty
(Scottish Liberal Democrats, 2012).5
Thus, the three pro-UK parties have proposed variations on considerably
enhancing the Scottish parliament’s powers, especially with regard to its fiscal
autonomy. This led to the leaders of the Scottish Labour, LibDem and Conservative
parties agreeing to a declaration of more powers for the Scottish Parliament, stating
that: ‘The Scottish Labour Party, the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party and the
Scottish Liberal Democrats have each produced our own visions of the new powers
which the Scottish Parliament needs. We shall put those visions before the Scottish
people at the next general election and all three parties guarantee to start delivering
more powers for the Scottish Parliament as swiftly as possible in 2015. This
commitment will deliver a stronger Scottish Parliament in a stronger United
Kingdom’ (BBC, 5 August 2014).6 The declaration was later signed by the leaders of
the UK Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. However, critics –
including the SNP and civic society leaders – have voiced concerns that these
proposals will not be implemented if the referendum fails. These concerns were
heightened following the publication of a public opinion poll by the ESRC Centre for
Constitutional Change at the University of Edinburgh and Cardiff University that
indicated that ‘the English are keen to punish the Scots for flirting with – or in the
case of a Yes vote, achieving – independence’, including reducing current levels of
public spending on Scotland (Scotsman, 20 August 2014).7
One source of pressure, to stall implementation of any further transfers of
power to the Scottish Parliament, may come from Scottish MPs. Scotland’s
representatives in Westminster have historically had an uncomfortable relationship
with devolution to Edinburgh, as it directly leads to the reduction in their own power
in London. As one Scottish Labour MSP insinuated, ‘there has to be a bit of a tradeoff when it comes to more powers for the Scottish Parliament, because if you want
more powers for the Scottish Parliament, there’s bound to be some consequences for
Westminster…[Labour MPs] would be nervous about too many extra powers for the
Scottish Parliament because it would come off, in one way or another, it would affect
their influence in Scotland and so it’s hard to argue for more Scottish influence in
Westminster while you’re simultaneously arguing for more power for the Scottish
Parliament’ (interview, 13 November 2013). Despite this, some senior Labour Party
officials promised more fiscal powers for Scotland than the Scottish Labour leader
Johann Lamont had done. One Scottish Labour MSP found it ‘paradoxical the way
some leading Westminster figures are making more progressive statements on it than
some of the Scottish Parliament leaders’ (interview, 13 November 2012) while a
Scottish MP for Labour retorted that ‘in the past it was the other way round, MPs
were accused of wanting less devolution of MSPs’ (interview, 15 November 2012).
In any case, it is clear that the independence referendum has resulted in a
‘contagion boost’ on the national question, with all of the pro-UK parties vying to
promise more powers for the Scottish Parliament in the event of a no vote. However,
given that the SNP has sought to moderate its position on independence that
5
http://scotlibdems.org.uk/homerule
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28654142
7
http://www.scotsman.com/news/leader-comment-english-opinion-on-independence-1-3514693
6
10
promising that Scotland would retain its cultural, economic and social links with the
rest of the UK in the event of a yes vote, it could be argued that the constitutional
issue – far from being the biggest division on Scottish politics – has in many ways
become a valence issue, with all parties now arguing for greater constitutional powers.
5. Identity
5a. Cosmopolitanism
Scottish parties have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus on their construction
of the Scottish nation as an open, plural and multicultural place to live. While Scottish
identity remains a central aspect of the national question, there are fewer cultural
associations with a ‘Scottish’ identity than many other substate nations (Hamilton,
1990; Calder, 1994; McCrone, 1992; Brown et al 1998). Moreover, numerous studies
have shown that Scots are comfortable holding multiple identities – Scottish, British,
European – which are far from mutually exclusive (Moreno, 2005).
The SNP has been a staunch defender of a multicultural Scotland, whereby
newcomers to Scotland are seen to make up the ‘tartan tapestry’ of Scottish culture
(see Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). The SNP Government set out its vision of a
cosmopolitan Scotland in a Race Equality Statement in 2008, as a place that
‘embraces diversity whilst also fostering a sense of common purpose and goals’ and
which supports multiculturalism and pluralism as way of creating ‘a strong, fair and
inclusive national identity’ (Scottish Government, 2008: 1, 8). The SNP is also a
strong advocate of increasing levels of immigration to Scotland – which is a unique
position in the increasingly restrictive UK political landscape (see Hepburn, 2014b).
The rationale for this is economic as well as cultural: the SNP wishes to increase
immigration to grow Scotland’s economy and population as well as benefit from the
cultural enrichment that this brings (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). These positive
attitudes towards integration were confirmed in the manifesto analysis and interviews.
As one SNP MSP put it, ‘at a political level, we are always very keen to emphasize
that this is a civic nationalist party, rather than an ethnic nationalist party; we are
based on the community. Communities evolve; people come into communities and
become part of communities, rather than it being based on some kind of strange ideal
of what it means to be ethnically Scottish’ (interview, 21 November 2012).
This position has received broad support across the political spectrum in
Scotland. The Scottish Labour Party and Scottish Liberal Democrats, who were in
coalition government in the early years of devolution, preceded the SNP government
in their desire to foster a plural, multicultural Scotland through their ‘One Scotland,
Many Cultures’ campaign that was launched in 2002. This campaign – which was
intended to combat racism in Scotland – sought to emphasise how Scotland was a
place of many cultures that enriched people’s lives (Scottish Executive, 2002). The
Labour-Dem government launched a related policy programme in 2004, Fresh Talent
whose focus was on attracting immigrants to Scotland. This initiative represented
Scotland as a land of immigrants, built on mutual respect for cultural differences
(Scottish Executive, 2005; for a fuller analysis of Scotland’s approach to immigrant
integration, see Hepburn 2014c). Again, this desire to foster an inclusive nation that
celebrates cultural differences as part of the Scottish identity landscape was confirmed
in the data analysis. As one Labour MSP said, ‘I think we should be a multicultural
society. … it’s one area where Labour and the SNP have actually sung from the same
song sheet. I think there’s been a general willingness to talk about multiculturalism
rather than, you know, I think a lot of people in England have been very negative
about multiculturalism and see it as the opposite of integration… I think we are quite
11
strong politically in terms of respecting different cultures and religions’ (interview, 13
November 2012). Similarly, an MSP for the Scottish Liberal Democrats thought that
‘on the whole, we all have good story to tell, we are a welcoming and encouraging
country and that’s what we have to work very hard on’ (interview, 14 November
2012). Meanwhile, the SCUP – while not directly employing the terminology of
multiculturalism – have given their implicit support for the creation of an inclusive,
plural and tolerant nation. As one MSP revealed ‘I would say that Scots have been
demonstratively a more tolerant nation than England. I think that one of the things we
bring to the Union is that tolerance’ (interview with SCUP MSP, 14 November 2012).
It is interesting to note that, while the cosmopolitan dimension of the national
question has clearly become a valence issue in Scotland, with all of the parties
endorsing the vision of a plural, multicultural Scotland that supports increased
immigration, the views of their UK counterparts couldn’t be more different. The UK
Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties have all rejected the
multiculturalist model of immigrant integration, blaming it for the creation of
segregated communities living ‘parallel lives’ in the UK (Blair, 2006; Cameron,
2011). Instead, the UK parties have proposed a more assimilationist approach towards
immigrant integration, emphasising coercive civic integration (and in particular,
compulsory requirements for immigrants to demonstrate their adoption of British
values and fluency in the English language to gain entry and avoid deportation),
community cohesion (depicted as ‘communities getting on together), shared values
and common citizenship (see Lewis and Craig, 2014; Hepburn, 2014c). Thus, while
the multiculturalist model has become a valence issue in Scotland, the coercive civic
integration model has become a valence issue in UK politics. Scottish parties view
this assimilationist approach as alien, with one Scottish Labour MSP stating, ‘I think
that’s one of the good things because we’re not criticising multiculturalism, I think the
danger in England is that “integration” comes to mean “assimilation”. I don’t think we
have that view of integration here’ (interview, 13 November 2012).
5b. Language
Unlike Quebec, the issue of language plays a very minor role in Scottish debates
about the national question. This is because the most prominent minority language in
Scotland – Gaelic – is only spoken by about 1% of the population, with the majority
of Gaelic-speakers concentrated in the western isles and the north-west Highlands
(Paterson et al, 2014). For most Scots, especially those living in the ‘central belt’, the
Gaelic language is as foreign to them as Flemish or Basque. As such, ‘Gaelic does not
serve as a talisman of Scottish national identity’ (McLeod, 2001: 7) unlike many other
nationalist movements in Europe and North America. Furthermore, Gaelic is only one
language or ‘dialect’ amongst many in Scotland. Others, which have been given far
less prominent in policymaking and are not recognised as official languages, include
Doric (spoken in the north-east) and Scots or ‘Lallans’ (spoken in the south).
The issue of language constitutes a valence issue in Scottish politics. The
general attitude amongst all parties is that Gaelic should be recognised and protected;
however, it should not be imposed upon the Scottish population. Out of all the parties,
the SNP is probably the most pro-Gaelic (even through the official recognition of
Gaelic as one of Scotland’s languages was passed by the Labour-LibDem government
in 2005). Gaelic provides a signifier of Scotland’s cultural distinctiveness for some
members of the SNP. However, the party’s general approach has been very cautious.
When asked whether he thought that the Gaelic language should be strengthened in
Scotland, he diplomatically replied that ‘It depends what you mean by “strengthened”.
12
Gaelic is a language that is indigenous to Scotland and is something that is part of our
heritage and plays a role in our culture. It is hard to say that it is any near as
significant as French is in Quebec because it is not something that is on the lips of
everyone every day. But it is something that is uniquely Scottish and it doesn’t belong
to any other country. The level of importance that we place on it, it’s up to people’
(interview, 21 November, 2012).
Another SNP MSP recognised that ‘there are criticisms that we put too many
resources in. Don’t force-feed a diet of Gaelic to people, but I think it has to be
available (interview, 12 November, 2012). This commitment to the Gaelic language
being ‘available’ is reflective of the SNP’s general stance: it supports the Gaelic
language (as it must respond to concerns of its Gaelic-speaking supporters) however it
does not believe that Gaelic should be imposed as Scotland’s national language
(unlike, say, Wales), as this would encounter widespread public opposition. One
former Scottish Labour MSP confides that ‘The SNP, by the very nature of their
Scottishness, is more inclined to be involved [in promoting Gaelic] now. But to be
fair, they haven’t really pushed Gaelic that much further, either’ (interview, 16
November, 2012). Indeed, the SNP recognises that Gaelic is one language among
many, and is quite foreign to some Scots. Other party members believe that
Scotland’s other ‘dialects’ should be strengthened: ‘I absolutely think that that
language needs to be fostered. But I also do live in a Scots speaking part of Scotland
and probably the richest vein of Scot speakers left in Scotland. I think that should be
important to nurture too and give kids pride in their language because when I was at
school, we were corrected when we spoke in Scots in the classroom’ (interview with
SNP MP, 15 November 2012).
Scotland’s other parties also believe that Gaelic is an important, constituent
part of Scotland’s culture. However, few argue that Gaelic is central to identity. One
Scottish Liberal Democrat MSP summed this up when he said that, ‘I think that those
who want to strengthen it should absolutely get on and strengthen it. But Gaelic is not
the only language in Scotland. We have lots of dialects and I think we should
celebrate them all. I think it’s very disappointing that the Scottish government
concentrates only on Gaelic and suggests that only Gaelic matters. Actually I think
that Doric in the Northeast, the Shetland dialect in my part of the world, and others
around the country have the role that they want to play in our country’ (interview, 14
November, 2012). A Scottish Labour MSP reiterated the same view: ‘People should
not be excluded from using it as a language. I think it’s reasonable that there’s some
access to Gaelic-medium education, but I would be dubious about a massive increase.
It is just not remotely the same as the French/English issue in Quebec’ (interview, 15
November, 2012). Meanwhile, another Scottish Labour MSP made the point that
‘Gaelic is very much a marginal thing in Scotland… the second language is probably
not Gaelic but more something like Polish’ (interview, 13 November, 2012).
Finally, the SCUP are probably the least supportive of promoting Gaelic as a
Scottish language than the other parties. However, they still acknowledge the place of
Gaelic in Scotland’s culture and history. As one SCUP MSP put it, ‘whilst I don’t
wish to see it die because, I mean, in parts of Scotland it has a very natural heritage,
there are other languages – Doric for example – in Scotland which are dying’
(interview, 14 November 2012). However, the Conservatives are also the most
concerned about the amount of money being spent on protecting Gaelic – including
establishing bilingual road signs in part of the country with no Gaelic heritage –
during a period of economic recession. As the SCUP MSP continued, ‘I am not
against it – strengthening [Gaelic] naturally – I just don’t think it should be artificially
13
strengthened. It’s potentially a colossal waste of money’ (ibid). So while language is a
valence issue in Scotland – no party is opposed to strengthening Gaelic and there is
support across all parties that other dialects should be acknowledged and protected –
there are some differences over the degree to which funds should be spent on Gaelic.
6. Regional Interests
6a. Supranational Interests
While European integration once provided a bone of contention between parties in
Scotland – most notably with the Conservatives being pro-economic integration but
hostile to political and social integration, and the centre-left parties such as Labour,
the SNP and LibDems strongly supporting the social dimension – in the current
period of study there was more consensus on supranational issues (for a detailed
analysis of Scottish party responses to European integration, see Hepburn, 2006,
2010). All of the parties have become increasingly critical of the lack of political
accountability in the European Union and have become wary of the European single
currency. However, none of the parties in Scotland wishes to exit the EU and
withdraw their membership (unlike some of the UK parties). Instead, European
integration is still viewed as a generally positive development for Scotland. The only
real divide on the European issue is whether parties want Scotland to have its own
seat on the European Council as a small independent member-state (SNP), or if
Scottish interests are best represented through being part of a large, powerful
member-state (the rest) (see Bulmer et al 2006; Jeffery, 2005; Hepburn, 2010).
The SNP moved to a position of supporting European integration in the late
1980s, which coincided with the period of structural funding reform, and Jacques
Delors’ compelling vision of a ‘social Europe’. The SNP also adopted its position of
‘independence in Europe’ in 1988, whereby Europe was portrayed as an external
economic and political framework for Scottish independence that in a way could
replace the structure of the UK. However, the SNP’s position on Europe become more
cautious in the early 2000s, and moved to open criticism by the end of that decade
(see Hepburn, 2008, 2010, 2011). During the period of analysis, the SNP took the
position of ‘critical friend’ of Europe. One SNP MP put it this way: ‘We’ve been very
keen to work with our neighbours. We’re very pro-democratic Europe and procooperative Europe. Many folk in the SNP have a problem with the current
integrationist direction of travel…there were many other people in the SNP who had
problems with the Lisbon Treaty and the way in which it was never really put to any
kind of democratic mandate’ (interview, 15 November 2012).
As well as criticising the lack of democratic accountability in the EU and the
weakness of European parliamentarians, the SNP has been scathing of the Common
Fisheries Policy and its consequences for the Scottish fishing industry: ‘the fisheries
management over the past three decades has been catastrophic for the communities I
represent. It just hasn’t worked’ (ibid). On the issue of the single currency, while the
SNP was once wholly in favour of adopting the ‘Euro’ (albeit subject to referendum),
the party did a u-turn after the Euro currency crisis and it now favours keeping the
pound sterling currency. As an SNP MSP put it, ‘It takes us back to about 1997 with
the Labour Government. They said they would join the euro when the economic
conditions were right. Our view is much the same, except our analysis was that the
economic conditions were right for Scotland’ (interview, 21 November 2012).
Scottish Labour’s position isn’t too dissimilar from the SNP. It also wishes to
see a reformed Europe with more democratic governance, however it does not wish to
pull its membership. As one Scottish Labour MSP intimated, ‘No doubt, the EU has
14
been a good thing for both for the UK and for Scotland. In the early days of Europe,
Scotland did very well in terms of things like European Structural Funds. That’s less
true now simply because of how Europe is meant to work…we’ve seen less of the
benefit in recent years, but there’s no doubt in my mind that Europe is a good thing. I
think that were Scotland to become independent, I do accept that one way or another
we would be likely to remain in the EU, if that’s what we wanted. All the major
parties in Scotland do want that’ (interview, 15 November 2012). This view was
echoed by another Scottish Labour MSP who stated, ‘as far as it is going, I’m not
particularly supporting it going a lot further and I’m not enthusiastic in the present
circumstances about joining the euro, and I think that’s probably got a degree of
consensus in Scotland, including the SNP. But I am comfortable with where Europe
has got to’ (interview, 13 November, 2012). Scottish Labour’s position has clearly
become much more critical since its peak in pro-Europeanism in the mid-1990s.
The Scottish LibDems have followed a similar trajectory: while they once
unconditionally supported European integration and the creation of a federal Europe,
they are also – like the SNP and Scottish Labour – more cautious now. As one
Scottish LibDem MSP argued, ‘overall, it has been a very successful institution, if
you take off the recent and past experiences that have been chaotic. But it does
actually pose a challenge for Scotland and the United Kingdom and even for proEuropeans like myself about, if there is a requirement for fiscal and political control
in tandem and what does that mean because of the EU? It’s quite a challenge for us.
So pro-Europeans are going through a reflection period trying to assess, if you’re not
in the euro, where do you stand? The future is still within Europe. People suggesting
withdrawal are just not living in the real world’ (interview, 14 November, 2012) The
Scottish LibDems have clearly been going through a period of soul-searching on their
support for European integration, which has become a serious electoral handicap.
Less so the SCUP, who have always been critical of the non-single market
aspects of European integration. One SCUP MSP’s views are fairly representative of
those of the party: ‘I’m just one of those who believe that we have joined an economic
union, not a political union, and that the broader interference of the European Union
in all other aspects of national sovereignty has been unhealthy’ (interview, 14
November 2012). But this more critical view does not mean that the Scottish
Conservatives want to leave the EU: ‘I don’t think I favour pulling out. It’s one of
these issues where I would like to find some sort of middle ground, where … in effect
we are already halfway there. We’re members of the EU, but we’re not part of the
eurozone. I think that would be the best place for us to be, as part of a free trade area,
but not part of this ever-closer political union’ (interview, 20 November, 2012).
Thus European integration has become a valence issue in Scottish politics,
with all parties moving towards the Conservatives’ more cautious and critical
position, but still remaining broadly positive about the benefits that the EU offers
Scotland and seeking to maintain full membership. This contrasts sharply with
political debates taking place south of the border, where there is a strong strain of
anti-Europeanism – evident in sections of the UK Conservative Party and the United
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) – and where the traditionally more proEuropean parties – Labour and the LibDems – have also become more hostile to many
aspects of integration. Scottish parties are very much aware of the different tone to
European debates in England. As one former Labour MP and MSP stated: ‘I am a big
fan of Europe. I don’t like the drift of anti-Europeanism that we see in Westminster,
the danger that the Labour Party could be a bit opportunistic on that’ (interview, 16
November 2012). Another Scottish Labour MP pointed out that ‘the little England
15
aspect we do get, amongst some of those in England, doesn’t apply in the same way
[in Scotland]’ (interview 15 November 2012). Finally, the SNP is scathing of UK
parties’ anti-Europeanism, and in that context seeks to position itself as much more
sympathetic towards integration: ‘The UK government has mercilessly used it
[Europe] as a bogeyman. You get all these stories of straight bananas and stuff.’
(interview with SNP MSP, 12 November 2012). The SNP’s desire to distance itself
from the UK government’s position on Europe is very similar to its strategy on
multiculturalism and immigration, seeking to present Scotland as a much more open,
progressive, outward-looking and tolerant nation than Britain/England.
6b. Social Interests
In similarity to Quebec, the Scottish model of governance is characterised by a
commitment to universalism in public services and an interventionist state (Keating
2007, 2010; Mooney et al 2006). Owing to the fact that party competition takes place
on the left of the political spectrum (with four parties out of five considering
themselves as centre-left), Scottish parties tend to adopt a more social-democratic and
welfarist approach to social policy. This tendency is even acknowledged by the
Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, the only self-professed centre-right party in
Scotland, which proclaims to be more to the ‘centre’ on many social issues than the
‘right’ like its UK counterparts. As one SCUP MSP admitted, ‘Undoubtedly it’s
[Scotland’s] more social democratic than in England and you see that in the makeup
of Parliament and in the way the debates go’ (interview, 20 November 2012).
The two parties battling it out to be the ‘protector’ of a Scottish social model
are the SNP and the Scottish Labour Party. And since New Labour’s move to the
centre(-right) and its openness to the partial privatisation of public services, the SNP
appear to be winning that argument in the period under analysis. As part of the ‘yes’
campaign, a group was set up by the Jimmy Reid Foundation called ‘the Common
Weal’, whose programme was broadly endorsed by the SNP. ‘I think we have a
different ethos around the common weal. And I make no apologies for using a Scots
word, because I don’t know an English word for it’ (interview with SNP MP, 15
November 2014). The closest word may be something akin to ‘egalitarianism’, with
an emphasis on equal opportunity, inclusion, sustainability and a strong welfare state.
The common weal has been defined as ‘a distinctively Scottish version of the type of
society that has been achieved in the Nordic area’ (Reid Foundation, 2013). In
particular, the social-democratic Nordic approach to social development has been
contrasted with the market-driven approach of the UK Government.
According to one SNP MSP, there is fertile ground for developing a common
weal project in Scotland: ‘All issues have a more left-liberal consensus in the Scottish
Parliament than in the UK Parliament. We have an unusual political party system in
that the two main parties draw on centre-left social democratic traditions. Obviously,
in Parliament, I’m going to be at pains to point how the Labour party that defied that
tradition in terms of their actual policy program, but it’s fair enough to say that they
are embedded in that tradition. In many ways, we sit more to the left certainly’
(interview, 21 November 2012). The SNP made a particular point of trying to replace
Labour as the protector of working-class interests when Scottish Labour leader Johnn
Lamont made a statement in which she was seen to be criticising the welfare state. In
a radical policy u-turn she committed the party to ending the provision of free
universal benefits in Scotland such as free prescriptions, free care for the elderly and
free tuition fees, which she viewed as ‘wrong’ and ‘unaffordable’ (Independent, 26
16
September 2012).8 This created significant tensions within the party. As one Scottish
Labour MSP admitted, ‘Labour’s got a problem there because we’ve opened up the
possibility of reviewing these things [like universal benefits] and if we come to any
sort of conclusions we can be accused of abolishing all these things, which probably
we would do in practice…although universal entitlements tend to be associated with
the left, to some degree, equally you can criticise them from a sort of redistributionist
point of view’ (interview, 13 November 2012). The media frenzy following Lamont’s
admission that she would seek to review universal benefits indicates, however, that
these are equated with a strong welfare state that is tied to Scottish values. In
response, the SNP criticised Lamont’s plans to destroy Scotland’s ‘shared social
bonds’ (Independent, 26 September 2012) and instead emphasised its leftist
commitment to more generous welfare provisions, a higher minimum wage,
renationalisation of the Royal Mail and the creation of workers’ councils (Scottish
Government, 2013).
In addition to vying with the Scottish Labour Party on who is best placed to
protect the Scottish social model of egalitarianism and the common weal, the SNP
have also been competing with the UK parties on social issues. For instance, the SNP
have argued that independence is the only way to ‘protect’ the British welfare state,
and in particular the National Health Service (NHS) from the privatisation plans of
UK parties (Salmond, 2014: 12). The SNP has also strongly criticised the UK
Government’s ‘austerity cuts’ to social benefits, and has vowed to undo all of these
policies in an independent Scotland. The SNP’s competitors have acknowledged that
this is a powerful strategy: ‘bits of the welfare state seem to be disappearing and that’s
a big issue in this campaign and I think that the SNP is going to run very strongly on
the welfare cuts’ (interview with Scottish Labour MSP, 13 November 2012).
However, the SNP has not been alone in its criticism of the UK parties.
Scottish Labour has also vowed to end the austerity cuts of the Conservative-Liberal
Coalition in Westminster. As one Scottish Labour MSP admitted, ‘I think the place
where we as Labour politicians feel the most frustration around the division between
devolved and reserved [powers] is that those areas of the tax and welfare system. For
example, it is our responsibility to deal with homelessness. We have passed some
fairly radical homelessness legislation in Scotland but the practicalities of moving
people from homelessness to sustainable tenancies involve benefits’ (interview, 15
November, 2012). As such, Scottish Labour seeks to gain control over social security
and housing benefits for the Scottish Parliament, to ensure a more progressive and
equitable approach housing that is in line with Scottish policy. As Scottish Labour
Party leader Johann Lamond admits, ‘mostly we just disagree [with the SNP] on the
best way to achieve common aims’ (Lamont, 2014: 17). In this sense, there is
evidence that while the ‘social model’ in Scotland is largely a valence issue (with only
moderate dissent from the Conservatives), it has become a strong cleavage between
Scottish and UK parties, with the former seeking to protect Scotland from a ruthless
market-driven approach to social development.
6c. Economic Interests
While there is general agreement that Scotland is a more left-of-centre country, which
is reflected in the more progressive and universalist approach to social policies in the
Scottish Parliament and amongst Scottish parties, there is perhaps less consensus on
8
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/scottish-labour-plans-to-end-free-universal-benefits8176116.html
17
the economic dimension of the ‘Scottish model of governance’. This is because, while
the SNP proclaims to be a broadly centre-left social democratic party, this is mainly
evident in its social policies. On economic policies, the SNP embraces a more marketoriented approach that some commentators have described as ‘flirting with economic
liberalism’ (The Spectator, 23 September 2013).9 For instance, the SNP supports
lower levels of corporation tax ‘to counterbalance the pull of London and the SouthEast’, increasing private sector investment (especially into renewable energy), cutting
air passenger duty, reducing national insurance contributions and diversifying the
business base (Scottish Government, 2013).10 In that sense, the SNP’s economic
position is closer to the Scottish Conservative Party, which commends the SNP’s
‘willingness to be more entrepreneurial with respect to business’ (interview with
SCUP MSP, 14 November 2012). This was clear during the SNP’s first government
2007-11, when it relied heavily on the Conservative Party to support its budget, and
both parties found agreement on many economic policy and taxation issues. One SNP
MSP sought to describe the party’s ideology with regard to socioeconomic policy: ‘I
understand it as a kind of amalgamation of Robert Burns and Adam Smith, kind of
good economics and prudent business ally to a social conscience. So we’re left of
centre, but were not anti-business’ (interview, 12 November, 2012).
Meanwhile, the Scottish Labour Party has vigorously attacked the SNP’s
economic policy, portraying SNP leader Alex Salmond as a ‘tax-cutting friend of big
business’ (BBC, 21 March 2014). Instead, Labour has articulated a more
interventionist approach with regards to the economy, emphasising its commitment to
taxing banker’s bonuses, ending tax cuts for hedge funds, introducing a new 50 pence
top rate of income tax, fairer labour market rules and an extension of the living wage
to more public sector agencies (Scottish Labour Party, 2014).11 The economic
division between Labour and the SNP is echoed in the two parties’ bases of support –
while Labour relies heavily on trade union funding, the SNP has been able to entice
donations from wealthy benefactors and courts businesses in Scotland (see Hassan
and Shaw, 2011; Mitchell, Bennie and Johns, 2011).
However, the main debates on economic policy in Scotland during the period
of analysis have been linked to the constitutional question. As one Scottish Labour
MSP maintained, ‘in terms of more powers for the Parliament, the economic area is
probably the key area that people are talking about. And a lot of the debate is around
fiscal powers’ (interview, 13 November 2013). While the SNP seeks full fiscal control
in an independent Scottish state, the pro-UK parties, as we saw above, are all
suggesting various degree of fiscal autonomy for a devolved Scottish Parliament. As
another Scottish Labour MSP stated, ‘Our party’s position is that Scotland is stronger
as part of that larger national unit and a lot of the arguments for that are economic.
They are around the pooling of both risk and opportunity’ (interview, 15 November
2012). The Scottish Conservatives and Liberal Democrats both agree – as part of their
collective ‘Better Together’ campaign – that Scotland’s economy would be better
protected as part of the Union, benefitting from the ‘UK’s economic strength, stability
and international reputation’ (Better Together, 2014).12
Perhaps the most heated battle in the economic debate around the national
question has been the SNP’s proposition that Scotland will be able to continue using
the pound sterling as its currency after independence. As an SNP MSP explains,
9
http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-week/leading-article/9082521/the-scottish-play/
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/2439/downloads
11
http://www.scottishlabour.org.uk/campaigns/entry/together-we-can
12
http://b.3cdn.net/better/24c7a4e844ef0eb433_ycm6i5qz6.pdf
10
18
‘given the current economic conditions, we think it would be best to stay in a poundzone for at least ten years and as with all decisions and under independence it will be
something that we can review and take a decision that is right for Scotland over that
period. It is interesting to note that the Republic of Ireland got independence in 1922
and then printed their own pound sterling and use the pound sterling right up until
1979, then had an independent currency and then went with the euro. Those are the
three options that are open to an independent Scotland’ (interview, 21 November
2012). Yet the pro-UK parties, including the Chancellor of the UK Exchequer, have
vehemently denied this possibility that Scotland can share a currency union with rUK
as it would expose the rUK to ‘unacceptable risks’ (Better Together, 2014).
However, despite these disagreements over the currency of an independent
Scotland, and the extent to which the Scottish government should court the business
community to grow the economy, some politicians believe that there are less
economic divisions between Scottish parties than the rhetoric suggests: ‘the general
approach is a bit more social-democratic, there’s probably more consensus around the
deficit reduction is going too far too fast, that kind of thing, there’s probably a
consensus around that in the Parliament and probably more hostility to the coalition
government’ (interview, 13 November 2013). Furthermore, there are certainly other
areas of consensus amongst Scottish parties on economic issues – for instance, putting
immigration at the centre of Scotland’s economic development policy (Scottish
Government, 2008). However, in general, the economic dimension of the national
question – in addition to the constitutional issue, and indeed probably because it has
been so intricately linked with the constitutional issue – provides a source of
contestation and disagreement between Scotland’s political parties.
7. Multi-level Dimension
The primary focus of this paper so far has been on the impact of the national question
on party behaviour in Scotland. Our next question is: what has been the impact of the
Scottish question on multi-level politics in the UK? In particular, has the SNP had a
contagion effect on UK parties in addition to other Scottish parties? Do we see a
reinforcement of a territorial cleavage between the UK ‘centre’ and the Scottish
‘periphery’? Moreover, if some aspects of the national question have become a
valence issue in Scotland, with all parties agreeing on the direction that certain
territorial policies should take, what effect has that had on multi-level politics?
Based on the data collected, we would argue that there has been a
strengthening of the centre-periphery cleavage on the national question, with Scottish
and UK parties (regardless of their political persuasion) taking opposite sides. In
particular, there have been occasions when Scottish parties from across the
ideological spectrum have acted as a ‘territorial bloc’ in defence of Scottish interests
against the UK Government/UK parties. Putting this into historical context, this was
particularly notable during the campaigns that led up to the creation of the Scottish
Parliament. Many scholars have argued that Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative
government in London – which was so despised by Scots – was primarily responsible
for uniting the nationalist movement (in particular in overcoming divisions between
Labour and the SNP) in their end goal of achieving devolution (Nairn, 2003;
McEwen, 2006; Beland and Lecours, 2005; Hepburn 2006). Similarly, with respect to
David Cameron’s Conservative-Liberal parliament, there is clear evidence of
agreement between the SNP and Labour in criticising London’s welfare policies
(Hepburn, 2010b). In both cases, this ‘defence’ of Scottish values and interests
19
brought together parties from across the ‘constitutional divide’ in addition to civil
society organisations.
Yet even putting aside SNP-Labour opposition to Conservative(-Liberal)
governments in Westminster, there have been several other occasions when Scottish
parties – including the Conservatives – have acted as a territorial bloc against UK
parties in their defence of distinct Scottish needs and interests. We witnessed earlier in
this discussion how all of Scotland’s parties have supported increased levels of
immigration to Scotland in addition to the need to foster an open, tolerant and plural
society that is respectful of different cultures – which lies in sharp contrast to the
increasingly restrictive immigration and integration policies being endorsed by all of
the major UK parties. We also saw that on social policy, there has been a great deal of
consensus amongst Scottish parties on the need to protect Scotland’s distinct policy
style and emphasis on welfarism and universalism from the marketization measures
being pursued in Whitehall – something that unites the SNP, LibDems and Labour,
with the Scottish Conservatives kicking up much less fuss than they do in London.
Clearly, then, when Scottish parties believe that their distinct Scottish interests are
under threat from measures taken in London (such as social benefits), or when there is
a particular policy that would clearly favour Scotland (such as immigration), there
seems to be agreement on the need to present a united front against Westminster. And
despite their divisions on some issues, it appears that some of the SNP’s competitors
might think that having the nationalists in power in Edinburgh may be the best way to
get Scotland’s interests heard in London. As one Scottish Liberal Democrat MSP
astonishingly intimated, ‘while I might not agree with a nationalist government in
Edinburgh on issues, there is no question that they make a Scottish argument. I don’t
think there’s been a time when Scottish issues haven’t been more understood at the
top of government than now’ (interview, 14 November, 2012).
8. Conclusion
We set out the hypothesis at the start of this paper that parties in Scotland must take a
stance on the national question, which has become a primary dimension of party
competition. Moreover, we hypothesised that there has been a territorial ‘contagion’
effect in Scotland, and that the catalyst of contagion is also the ‘owner’ of the
nationalist question, which we assumed was the leading nationalist party operating in
the territory – the Scottish National Party. To what extent have these expectations
been met in the analysis of the interviews and manifestos data?
Our first main finding is that the SNP has been the successful ‘owner’ of
several dimensions of the national question. In particular, the SNP has – during the
period of analysis – led on the issues of constitutional change, language,
cosmopolitanism, and social policy. Taking these sub-categories separately, we saw
that the SNP’s demands for independence directly encouraged other parties in
Scotland to adopt stronger territorial autonomy demands, in particular eliciting a
commitment from all three pro-UK parties – Scottish Labour, the Scottish
Conservatives and the Scottish Liberal Democrats – to guarantee enhanced powers for
the Scottish Parliament in the event of a ‘no’ vote in the referendum. Given that these
three parties only decided to make this commitment in 2014, months before the
plebiscite on referendum, indicates that the independence referendum has had a
‘contagion boost’ on the constitutional issue, with all other parties seeking to
strengthen their constitutional demands to own the issue and undermine the SNP’s
claims to have Scotland’s best interests at heart in its constitutional proposals. While
the constitutional issue has provided the greatest source of contestation between
20
Scottish parties – especially since the referendum campaign has pitted the ‘yes’ side
for independence against the ‘no’ side for remaining in the UK – when one looks in
greater detail at the parties’ constitutional policies, there is actually less differences
between them than one might expect. The SNP has advanced a vision of
‘independence-lite’ that retains most of the unions that Scotland currently shares with
the rUK, whilst the Better Together camp have all supported enhanced powers for the
Scottish Parliament, with all three parties considering federalism as an option for
constitutionally consolidating Scottish self-determination without leaving the UK.
On the issue of language, while it was the Scottish Labour-Liberal Democrat
government that passed the landmark legislation on recognising Gaelic as an official
language in 2005, it is currently the SNP which ‘leads’ on the issue of Gaelic
language protection. However, the issue of language protection is not central to the
national question in Scotland, whereby only a tiny percentage of the population of
Scotland speak Gaelic, and many others speak other regional dialects. As one Scottish
Labour MSP admitted, ‘the SNP would be quite supportive of the Gaelic, but we can’t
really criticise that or be very enthusiastic about it. It is still very marginal so language
in that sense is not so important’ (interview, 13 November 2012). In any case, the
issue of language is a valence one in Scotland, with all parties supporting the
protection of the language (and indeed other dialects), though with slight
disagreement on the amount of money that should be dedicated to that plight.
Equally, on the issue of cosmopolitanism, the SNP are also leading on this
dimension of the national question. Even though the Scottish multiculturalist
approach was initiated by the Scottish Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition government
with the launch of the ‘One Scotland, Many Cultures’ campaign, the SNP has built on
and significantly extended this approach to integration, most notably in its race
equality statement and its position on immigration. The SNP has sought to encourage
the creation of a plural, multicultural Scottish identity that all newcomers to Scotland
can share, thereby highlighting its impeccably civic nationalist credentials. This has
received the strong support of all of Scotland’s parties. Equally, the SNP have –
building upon the previous Lab-LibDem government’s Fresh Talent initiative –
argued that Scotland must have increased levels of integration to satisfy labour market
demand and to offset population aging and decline. Again, none of the parties have
disagreed with this position (unlike parties in Westminster), with even the
Conservatives proclaiming that ‘I think that Scotland has benefited overall from
immigrant communities wherever they have come from. I think where we have an
expanding economy and skill needs, yeah, of course we should bring people in. We
have plenty of space!’ (interview, 20 November, 2012).
The social dimension is the one that the SNP has faced the greatest
competition over ‘issue ownership’. The Scottish Labour Party, as examined in an
earlier section of this paper, once held the lead over this issue by presenting itself as
the party with Scotland’s best social interests at heart. However, with criticisms of the
Labour Party lurching to the centre(-right) under Tony Blair’s government (although
certainly to a lesser extent in Scotland than in England), and with Scottish Labour’s
recent difficulties in explaining its withdrawal of commitment to universalism, the
SNP has sought to portray itself as the party to the left of Labour. This has involved
promises to protect Scotland’s social model from threats of marketization and
privatisation emanating from Westminster. Indeed, the SNP has presented its position
as seeking to protect the ‘British welfare state’ – in particular the NHS and social
benefits – from a government in London that is bent on privatising off public services
in the UK. The SNP’s opponents – especially those whose ‘parent parties’ are not
21
currently in government in Westminster – have had a difficult time criticising this
position. Indeed, one could speculate that there is a broad consensus in Scotland over
a generally welfarist, interventionist state in social matters, with broad support for
maintaining public services such as healthcare and education free at the point of use.
Even the Conservatives have a more moderate position on social policy than their UK
counterparts, for instance with current SCUP leader Ruth Davidson identifying the
Scottish Government’s recent legislation on Equal Marriage as the ‘highlight of her
year’ (Davidson, Holyrood, 2014: xx).
What of the other dimensions of the national question that we have looked at?
Has the SNP also owned these issues? On the economic dimension, it appears that the
Scottish Labour Party has – and continues to – lead on this aspect of the national
question. The SNP’s proposed tax cuts for business have concerned and sometimes
alienated many Labour voters who would otherwise for the SNP. Scottish Labour has
also committed itself to the economic dimension of the Scottish model of governance
– in increasing the top rate of income tax and taxing bankers bonuses – even if it is
having difficulty positioning itself on the social dimension. Finally, with respect to the
supranational dimension, it is surprising to find that – as a consistently stalwart critic
of various aspects of European integration – it is probably the Conservative Party’s
position to which other parties have moved. All of the parties in Scotland, but most
notably the SNP, have moved from very pro-European positions in the 1990s, to more
cautious and sceptical approaches.
The positions of Scotland’s parties on the various dimensions of the national
question have been summarised in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Scottish/UK Party Positions on the National Question
SCOTTISH/UK PARTIES
SNP
(1) Constitutional issue
(2) Identity
Cosmopolitanism
Language
Owner, stable
position on
Independence
Now Owner:
Promulticultural
and proimmigration
Now Owner.
Gaelic is fairly,
but not hugely
important
Lab
LibDem
Con
Clear contagion
& change in
position:
Calman to devo
max in Scotland
(both Scottish
& UK parties)
Clear contagion
& change in
position:
Calman to
federalism in
Scotland
(both Scottish
& UK parties)
Clear contagion
& change in
position:
Calman to devo
max
Previous owner:
Promulticultural
and proimmigration
(valence)
Previous owner:
Promulticultural
and proimmigration
(valence)
Moderately promulticultural
and proimmigration
(valence)
UK party is
more restrictive
on immigration
and antimulticultural
Previous owner:
Moderate
support for
Gaelic
(valence)
UK party is
more restrictive
on immigration
and antimulticultural
Previous owner:
Moderate
support for
Gaelic
(valence)
22
(both Scottish
& UK parties)
UK party is
more restrictive
on immigration
and antimulticultural
Moderate
support for
Gaelic, critical
of funds
allocated
(valence)
(3) Regional
Interests
Supranational
Social
Economic
Multi-level dimension
No UK party
position
No UK party
position
Generally proEU but
increasingly
critical
(valence)
Generally proEU but
increasingly
critical
(valence)
Generally proEU but
increasingly
critical
(valence)
Claims
ownership: ProScottish social
model (left)
For UK party,
much more
critical
Claims
ownership: ProScottish social
model (left)
For UK party,
much more
critical
Pro-Scottish
social model
(left)
UK party split
on EU
membership
Moderately
resistant to
social model
(centre-right)
UK party more
open to
marketisation
Claims
ownership: proworker (left)
UK party more
open to
marketisation
More open to
business model
(right)
UK party
supports
marketisation
More open to
business model
(right)
For UK party,
more open to
business
Opposition to
UK policies
(especially
social model
and welfare,
Europe,
immigration)
UK party open
to business
UK party open
to business
Hamstrung (in
coalition
government)
but divergence
on immigration,
multicultural,
welfare and
social model,
Europe
Hamstrung (in
coalition govt)
but divergence
on immigration,
multicultural,
Europe
Departs from
social model,
pro-business
(right)
Opposition to
UK policies
(especially
immigration,
multicultural,
welfare and
social model,
Europe)
No UK party
position
Generally proEU but
increasingly
critical
(owner?)
One question that we have sought to answer in this research project is: has the
‘contagion effect’ on the national question been an advantage or a disadvantage for
the catalysts of contagion – the nationalist parties. Do nationalist parties benefit from
other parties taking up the mantle of the national question and moving onto ‘their
ground’ as it were? Or does this present a threat to nationalist parties, as others may
seek to replace them as the main defender of territorial interests? In the Scottish case,
we can – under the period of analysis – answer that territorial contagion has had
positive results for the SNP. The electoral threat posed by the SNP to other parties, its
‘party-system relevance’ as the governing party, and its legislation on holding a
referendum on independence have galvanised all parties in Scotland to take the
national question seriously and to propose various constitutional alternatives to
secession, whereby the end result should be a more powerful Scottish Parliament.
Even in the case of a ‘no’ vote in the referendum, this may not necessarily hurt the
SNP politically or electorally. As one former Scottish Labour MSP indicated, ‘To me,
what the unionist parties don’t appreciate is that if they want a decisive victory, a
55/45 [result] would not be a decisive victory and any closer would be quite
23
calamitous for them. I think Salmond sees that; I don’t think he expects to win’
(interview, 16 November 2012). However, if the independence referendum is
unsuccessful by a wide margin, then we may see the case of a ‘contagion drain’ as
happened in Quebec following the failed 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association,
when the national question was wiped off the political agenda in Quebec and Canada.
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