Download Neglected Affinities: Max Weber and Georg Simmel

Neglected Affinities: Max Weber and Georg Simmel
Author(s): Jim Faught
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Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jun., 1985), pp. 155-174
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Jim Faught
NeglectedafEnities:Max Weber
and GeorgSimmel*
ABSTRACT
Most commentarieson the historyof sociologyhave pointed out
that Weberand Simmeldevelopedstrikinglydivergentsociologies.
Although there are undeniable differencesin their views, the
neglect of important affinitiesin their writings on political and
economic rationalization has contributed to an unproductive
distancingof these major figuresin twentiethcentury sociology.
The identificationof neglectedaffinitiesraisesquestionsabout:the
reasons for the divergent reception of Weber and Simmel into
Americansociology;the way the historyof sociologyoftenhas been
written,and; the developmentof sociology.
INTRODUCTION
Max Weber and Georg Simmel are generallyregardedas the two
most significant contributors to early twentieth-centuryGerman
sociologicalthought. Despite the range of their influence,especially
Weber's,on the subsequentdevelopmentof sociology,relativelylittle
scholarlyworkhas examinedthe relationshipbetweentheirperspectives. The following discussion is an attempt to identify affinities
betweenWeber'sand Simmel'sresponsesto theoreticalquestionsthat
were centralto theircontributionsto the disciplineof sociology.Since
commentatorsalmost invariably emphasize discrepanciesbetween
Weber'sand Simmel'sperspectives,the discussionof affinitiesin their
writingsis presentedas a correctiveto the prevailingtendencyin the
historyof sociologicalthought.
Althougha comparisonof Weberand Simmelis long overdue,and
on the surfaceseems worthdoing, thereare two specificreasonsthat
justify this analysis.First, thereare the possibleinsightsto be gained
from seeing a scholar's writings as embeddedwithin a context of
discoursethat sets forthwhat is consideredproblematicand, hence,
needing furtherdiscussion. In the instance of Weber, studies of his
TheBrittsh
Journalof SociologyVolume
XXXVI Number
2
156
JimFaught
intellectual 'conversations'with Marx,1 Burckhardt2and Rickert3
have served to clarifyhis positionon importantissues. Likewise,an
analysisof Weber'sand Simmel'sresponsesto questionsbearingon
the groundingof sociologicalinquiryoffersthe possibilityof broadening our understandingof each man'sthought.This seemsall the more
promisingsince their mutualregard4for the other'saccomplishment
was augmentedby personalassociation,which gave an occasionfor
furtheringtheir understandingof issues in dispute.
The present study also has potential value for clarifying the
developmentof Americansociologicalthought. The introductionof
Weber's and Simmel's ideas into American sociology took place
through what have been identified as two dominant sociological
schools.5Simmelenteredby way of the effortsof Smalland Park(and
Burgess)as representativeof the iChicagoSchool',while Weberwas
presentedthroughParsons'stranslationof the Protestant
Ethicandthe
Spiritof Capitalism
and interpretationsof his generalsociology.If some
of the divergence between the sociologies of Park and Parsons is
attributableto the influenceof Simmeland Weberrespectively,then
this would suggest that to the extent that affinitiesbetween their
writingsexistedthey eitherwere not recognizedor weredismissedas
insubstantial.Should fundamentalcorrespondencesbetweenWeber
and Simmelbe identified,this would supportthe hypothesisthat one
reasonfor the diversityand developmentof Americansociologyis a
selectivereadingof Weberand Simmel,one that has ignoredpointsof
agreement.6
Simply stated, this paper attempts to verify the absence of
systematic,comparativeanalysesof Weberand Simmel,to describe
certain afEnitiesthat exist in their studies of the rationalizationof
politicaland economiclife that suggestthe need for furtherresearch
on this question,and to identifysomeof the implicationsof the neglect
of these afEnitiesfor the developrnentof Americansociologyand for
the way that historiesof sociologyare written.
THE STATUS OF WEBER-SIMMELRESEARCH
A reviewof the literatureon the historyof sociologicalthoughtwill
quickly verify that the relationshipbetween Weber'sand Simmel's
perspectivehas receivedscantattention.This is evidentas earlyas the
publicationof Parkand Burgess'sIntroduction
totheScience
of Sociology,7
which among other things served as an important vehicle for
introducing European writings in the cultural sciences to two
generations of American sociologists. In light of the extensive
literatureon Webertoday,it is instructiveto note that he is referenced
only threetimesby Parkand Burgess;two referencesare bibliographic
and the third, a one sentence commenton his distinctionbetween
Max Weber
andGeorg
Simmel
Neglected
affinities:
157
factual and normative statements. By contrast, a more extensive
treatmentof Simmel includes nine selectionsfrom his writingsand
numerous references throughout the text. In Parsons's highly
influential interpretation of European sociological thought, The
Weber's conceptuallegacy is analyzed in
Structure
of SocialAction,8
several chapters: numbering nearly 200 pages, while Simmel is
excluded from considerationin one paragraph.If nothing else, the
extremelydivergent receptionof Simmel and Weber is one of the
curiositiesof early twentieth-centuryAmericansociology.
More recently, Martindale9has directly compared Weber and
Simmel by discussing how each incorporatedelements from neoKantianphilosophy.Nisbetl° does not compareWeberand Simmel,
but he does indicatehow they individuallyrespondedto 'unit ideas'.
Othersll are eithersilenton the Weber-Simmelrelationshipor briefly
note their neo-Kantianheritage,their pluralism,or their interestin
the issue of societalconflict.Coserl2indicatesthat Simmel'sinfluence
on Weber is 'easily traced' and goes on to identify some of these
influences,includingthe comparabilityof formsand ideal types, the
place of money in a rationalized economy and the problem of
assigningmeaningin an historicalcontext.
The gap in our understandingof conceptual linkages between
Weberand Simmelhas promptedFrisbyto remarkthat
In particular,further re-examinationof Simmel's social theory
would have to confront Simmel's relationshipto Max Weber,
whose work has tended to completely overshadow Simmel's,
despite the fact that Weberprobablyowed much to Simmel.This
would have to avoid the trap of evaluatingSimmel merely as a
precursorof Weber and neglectinghim as a social theoristin his
own right. It would have to investigateboth writer'sattemptsto
establish sociology as an independentdiscipline after both had
emergedout of other disciplines,their establishmentof a frameworkforsociologyand the developmentof its basiccategories,their
respectivecritiquesof Marxismand their, in some ways, parallel
developmentof a pessimisticphilosophyof history.l3
As Frisby'sstatementmakes clear, the presentconditionof WeberSimmelscholarshipis not unlikethat of a decadeago when Levinel4
encourageda systematicstudy of the mutualinfluenceof Weberand
Simmelas a meansof comingto an understandingof the development
of sociology.Since that injunction,analysesof Weberhave continued
to multiply,thoseof Simmelhave increasedslightlyand thoseof their
reciprocalinfluenceremainnotablein their absence.
This is not to say that scholarsare unawareof the personaland
intellectualrelationshipbetweenWeberand Simmel,for many have
noted the developmentof similarthemesin theirstudies.It is difficult
in this respectto accountfor the currentneglectof the Weber-Simmel
158
JimFaught
relationship,althoughin partit simplymay be due to the dismissalof
Simmel'sworkas 'formal'sociology,which by definitionis incompatible with Weber'ssocial action theory.l5
Contraryto the prevailingtendency,severalrecentstudies(without
elaborating)do identifysome correspondencebetweenWeber'sand
Simmel'sperspectives.Levinel6notes that Simmelprovidedinsights
into the constructionof ideal types, the use of verstehen
and the
characterof rationalizationthat wereeventuallyto appearin Weber's
studies of historicalcivilizations.In her biographyMarianneWeber
also calls attentionto Weber'sappreciationof Simmel'sanalysisofthe
conceptof understanding.Honigsheiml7points to the importanceof
Simmel'sobservationon the resemblanceof developmentsin science
and capitalismas each underwentan intensiverationalization.
Mitzmanl8has offeredsome of the most penetratingcomrnentson
the linkage between the thought of Weberand Simmel.He regards
the complementarityof theirideas on reificationof modernsocietyas
crucialfor understandingimportantWeberianthemes,l9particularly
the historicalsignificanceof the denial of emotional and aesthetic
gratification,20which of course is central to Weber's vision of
developmentalprocesses in western civilization. The idea of the
increasingdominationof objectiveforcesover subjectiveconsciousness is anothertheme that weaves throughthe core of Weber'sand
Simmels studies.21Also, both authorshold, what have been termed
in Simmel's case, a tragic view of culture.22And, finally although
Weber raised objections to Simmel's psychologizing,the latter is
attributed to have provided an intellectual stimulus for Weber's
notionof interpretiveunderstanding.23
It is worthrepeatingthat none
of these observationsreceivessystematicanalysis,althoughMitzman
providesa more extendeddiscussionthan others.
In what follows I do not attempt to demonstratethat Simmel
developedan interpretivesociology, certainlynot in the sense that
Weberdid in his methodological
writings.The pointto be emphasizedis
that there are elements within Simmel's perspective that are
consistentwith Weber'sconceptionof voluntarism.In addition,it is
hypothesizedthat the integrationof Simmel into early American
sociology,to the extent that it occurred,involveda selectiveresponse
tohis writings.Those elementsof his analysesthat weremoreor less
consistentwith Robert Park's interest in studying a multitude of
everydayactivitiesand also provedfruitfulfor stimulatinginsightsinto
themeaningof socialrealitywereaccepted.Others,less consistentwith
theiChicagoSchool'paradigmas constructedby Park,wererejected.
What intriguedParkabout Simmelwere his insightfulanalysesof
frequentlyignoredlife processesthat ultimatelyhad becomecrystallized into social forms. Park found Simmel's general sociology
(historicalsociology)and partsof his philosophicalsociologyvaluable
fordeveloping his own theoreticalstrategy within the context of
Neglected
affnities:Max Weber
andGeorg
Simmel
159
Americanpragmatism.However,he dismissedsociologicalformalism
in favor of the analysis of social roles that were conceived as
continuouslyopen to interpretationand revision.
THE RATIONALIZATIONOF POLITICALAND ECONOMICLIFE
As notedabove,most commentatorshaveeitheralludedto correspondences betweenWeberand Simmelwithoutelaboratingon them, or
have classifiedtheirtheoreticalperspectivesas incompatible.The task
at hand, then, is to identify points of congruencethat would be
acceptedas credibleevidenceof an, as yet, undocumentedcompatibility betweentheir perspectives.As a preliminarystatementon the
degreeof affinitythat existsbetweenthe ideasof Weberand Simmel,I
will examine some points of similaritiesin their conceptionsof the
rationalizationof politicaland economiclife.
Weberwas undoubtedlymore interestedand involvedin contemporarypolitics than Simmel.Yet, each was aware that the development of the modernbureaucraticstate createda foundationon which
the general populace could be more effiectivelyreduced to mass
politicalsubservience.
The political context of modernsociety, for Simmel,is shaped by
the perpetualtensionbetweenthe individualand the mass. Although
the internaland externalconditionsfor mass behaviorare not unique
to modern history, the process of urbanization, the increasing
penetrationof a money economy into all spheres of life and the
standardization of production have made expressions of mass
behaviour more visible, if not more commonplace.According to
Simmel, a mass arises when there is an exclusiveconcernwith the
shared characteristicsof its individual components. Under these
circumstances,only those personal attributescommon with others
and, hence, those which are least developedare relevantfrom the
perspectiveof the mass.24Fromthis view, a personbecomespartof a
mass only to the extent that the characteristicsof the total personare
ignored.
An importantpoliticalconsequencefollowingfrom the emergence
of a mass is the denial of personalresponsibilityand a corresponding susceptibilityto a varietyof appealsthat otherwisewould not be
credible.5 Because individualsordinarilycommit only part of their
selvesin massbehavior- that whichis indistinguishablefromothersthe mass can easily be dominatedby a single individualwho injects
his entirepersonalityinto the activity.The implicationof this line of
reasoningis that masses arise not from the manipulationof leaders
who play upon unconsciousdesires, but from the segmentationof
society, which often precludesor at least impedes a more complete
partlclpatlonln everycay lte.
.
.
.
.
.
160
Jim Waught
Weber'saccountof mass action,in contrast,is morelikelythan not
to emphasizethe extraordinaryattributesof leadersthat enablethem
to make charismaticappealsto their followers.26
While acknowledging this point, it shouldalso be noted that the experienceof charisma
is rooted in a social psychologicaldependencybetween leader and
followers. The followers must accept - that is, recognize - the
charismaticcharacter of the leader's words and deeds; it is not
imposedon them. In this respect)Weber'sstatementson the natureof
charismaare not inconsistentwith Simmel'sconceptionof the nature
of the mass, since recognizingthe extraordinarycharacteristicsof a
leader is partiallycontingentupon the absence of distinguishingor
exemplarycharacteristicsamongthe masses.Fromthis argumentwe
might anticipatethat in de-individualizedsocieties the incidenceof
charismatic appeals would increase, even though the traditional
religiousand mythicbasesof such experienceshave been undermined
by secularscience and bureaucraticrationality.
Beyondtheiranalysesof transitorymass and charismaticphenomena, Weberand Simmelalso providedcomplementarydiscussionsof
the social and politicalimpactof stabilizedethicalcodesof action.In
the case of Weber, his comparative analyses of world religions
identifiedan underlyingconnectionbetweendifferentreligiousand
ethicalbeliefsand the politicalcommunity.In the Occidentthe nexus
betweenreligionandpoliticswasmanifestin Christianity's
conceptionof
'this worldly' activity, which contributedto the fabricationof a
universalcode of ethics with other-worldlysanctificationthat was
consideredapplicableto all people,regardlessof timeor place.Weber
arguedthat althoughlocal traditionsand status arrangementsoften
enduredfor centuries,the tendency of the Judeo-Christianethical
traditionwas to advocatea conceptionof equalityunderan objective
systemof constraints.This, of course, meant that Judeo-Christian
ethicsleft open the possibilityof changingthe worldso as to bringthe
politicalcommunityinto closerconformitywith a standardthat had
beensanctifiedby religioustraditions.The positive attitudetoward
interventionin everydaylife intrinsicto this perspectivewas unlike,
say, Confucianismwhich committeditself to a pacifisticaccommodationto the naturaland social world.27Since Weber hypothesized
thatsocial change normallyoccurs as a result of imposition(aftera
clash of interests) or from the mass acceptance of a charismatic
message,he concludedthat Confucianethics impededopportunities
foralteringthe existingsocialstructure.If changeoccurredwithirlthe
Confucian
system,it was througha prudent,pragmaticmasteryof the
worldthat took into accountthe inevitableorderof things.This view
of the social order was reinforcedby a negative attitude toward
individualliberties, a basically arbitrarylaw and the absence of
.
.
.
.
ratlona specla .lzatlon.
A somewhat similar set of conditions existed in India) where
Neglected
affinities:
Max Weber
andGeorg
Simmel
161
philosophicaland religious thought was largely 'indifferentto the
actualitiesof the world.'28Forexample,Hinduismdefinedan orderin
which humans are fixed within their social positionsand individual
effortis useless for attainingsalvationin anotherworld.29If humans
are located in such a purely deterministicuniverse, then political
action is bound to be devalued as a method of coping with the
circumstancesof everydaylife.
Simmel'sanalysisof the universalizingtendencyof Christianethic
exists only in scatteredfragmentsthroughhis writings.But, on the
whole, it is consistentwith Weber'sconclusions.As is often the case,
Simmelrelied on a spacialmetaphorto conveyhis conceptionof the
relationshipof the humancommunityto divinepowers.He contended
that the featureof the Christiancode of ethicsthat ensuredits efficacy
in this worldwas its definitionof the relationshipof man to God. The
highly personal and, hence, potentiallycapriciousaction of divine
beingsin primitivereligionsmade it difEcultto establisha standardized set of rules.30In contrast,Christianssaw their God as distant
from the mundaneaffairsof everydaylife and demandingrigorous
conformityto articulatedstandards.
Relatedto the standardizationof ethicsis Simmel'scontentionthat
as normative codes become more objective and set apart from
personalconsiderations,it is possible for a society to become more
brutaland repressive.Underthis conditionindividualsmayno longer
appeal to customfor restraintof force. Instead, they find themselves
left to their own devices for defence against the threats of others.
Simmel added that objectivity makes it possible for the ruler to
'soothethe conscience'by claimingto be actingfor the totalityrather
than expressingpersonalinterests.Weber,too, saw the chance that
bureaucraticorganizations,the pinnacleof rationalobjectivity,could
be used for personalgoals. This was a dilemmathat modernsociety
was forcedto submitto, since bureaucracywas also the most effective
means of exercisingforce within a collectivity.AlthoughWeberand
Simmelidentifiedthe benefitsthat accrueto a largerproportionof the
population as a result of the shift from personal rulership to
bureaucraticdomination,each was anxious (althoughthis is more
subdued in Simmel) about the potential for the more efficient
suppressionof the individualin modernsociety.
In his political writings Simmel distinguishedbetween objective
and subjectiverule. Subjective,or personal,rule always involvesan
elementof reciprocity,since even underrepressivecircumstancesthe
powerfulmust take account of the unique historyor personalityof
thosesubjectto rule. Simmelcontendedthat followersfindit easierto
identifywith such a rulerand to locate themselveswithin the context
of rulingdecisions.Today, by contrast,'the person'is separated'from
his achievement'and objectivesubordinationis deetnedacceptable.3l
The possibilityof an impersonal,detachedjudgment is contingent
162
Jim Faught
upon disregardingor
minimizingthose featuresthat make
a
differentfrom another.To be
objectiveis to deny that which isperson
distinctiveof ourselves,with the
hope that the resultingsocial most
will be more predictableand
order
This judgment reflects congruentwith societalwide interests.
general attitude toward the
dynamicsof modernsocietySimmel's
and
hints
at what some commentators
have referredto as his tragic
view
of
culture.32
His understandingof
culturesingles out a common
human
predicament,
but one which is
probablymorevisiblein
oflabour. Under these democraticsocietieswith an intensedivision
conditionsit is easier to clearly
'tragicambiguity'of all social
perceive
formations;that is, the obligationofthe
individual
with distinctlypersonal
valuesto submitto the demandsan
thegroup.This is
of
particularlymanifestin the outcome
of democratic
elections.
It appearsnonsensicalthat
a
which he holds to be false, onlyman subjectshimselfto an opinion
while, followingfromthe very becauseothershold it to be truepremiseof the election,everyone
these others has the same right
of
and the same value as he
does.33
Simmel
adds that the 'autonomous'
harmonized'
but 'in principle'are individualand societyare 'often
'irreconcilable.'34
Whileindividuals
may
strainto assertwhat is
personally
valuable,they find these ends
suppressed
by majoritydecisions.
In Simmel'sview
individualsare
restraints
of a social order.Weber, never entirelycommittedto the
conflict
and change in any social too, describedthe persistenceof
order,even thoughsome
for
historicallyspecificreasons,may
societies,
moreeffectivelycontrol
Thus,
at least theoretically,
dissent.
Weber
possibility
that an exemplaryindividualand Simmel leave open the
may,underany circumstances,
set
in motion social change
that
eventually
results in a new social
order.
Ofparticular importance
for
regulation
is his discussion of theSimmel's conception of political
process of liberation. Here, he
attempted
to respondto the question,
to
restraint
possiblein humansocieties? what extentis freedomfrom
Ironically,
the historicalrecord
shows
that liberationoften
manifests
itself
in
the
liberated
attempt by the
group to bring others under
Hence,
libertyshouldbe conceivedas a its newly acquiredpower.35
transitionalphenomenonthat
tends
toward subordinationor
superordination.
Liberty is always
vulnerable
to the exercisepowerby
those
who
want
to protectexisting
liberties
as well as those who claim
they want to extendthem.
Simmel
did not presumethat
While
humans have a will to power, he
suggest
that poweris an enduring
did
formof sociation.One may
freedom,
but domination is often
speak
of
its practical expression.
writes,
Simmel
Max Weber
andGeorg
Szmmel
Neglected
affinitzes:
163
the quest for freedom and the attainment of freedom- in the
various,negativeand positivesenseof this word- at the same time
the quest for dominationand
has, as its correlateor corxsequence,
the attainmentof domination.36
However,Simmeldid holdout the possibilityforthe emergenceof a
Such an
less oppressiveformof superordinationand subordination.37
arrangementof power would require shifting positions within the
structureof dominationso that the opportunityfor participationin
the ruling hierarchy is within the realm of possibility for those
interested.He did not entertainthe questionof whetherthis would
consistentlyresult in a rule by the few.
Simmelrepeatedlyarguedthat the originsof inequalitiesof power
reside in the differencesbetween individuals.None the less, these
personal forms of power are increasingly superseded by more
permanentstructuresthatmay be less reflectiveof personalattributes.38
The sourceof this changein the organizationof poweris an advanced
divisionof labor, a processthat lies outside the personalinterestsof
any individual. In this context, Simmel proposed that in modern
societyone'spositionlargelydefinesthe rangeof choicesavailableto a
person. There is little reason to expect these circumstancesto be
altered since 'for the majority of men, coercion probably is an
irreplaceablesupportand cohesionof the inner and outer life.'39
Parallelto the notionof objectificationin Simmelis Weber'sidea of
rationalization. In Weber's political writings the theme of the
dominanceof objective conditions over subjectivemotives is most
evidentin the analysisof bureaucracyas a type of socialorganization
based on legal-rationalprinciples.By referringto certainelementsof
Weber's concept of bureaucracyit should be possible to verify the
comparabilityof his general position with Simmel's statementson
O DJ
ectlhcatlon.
As a preliminary point it is important to note that Weber
emphasizedthat a distinctionshould be made betweenbureaucratic
dominationand inequality that results from the unintendedconsequences of a free market. In his view, the latter may be purely
accidental.Domination,in contrast,occursonly throughthe intended
action of an individual, whether representingpersonalinterestsor
those of a class.
.
.
,>
.
Domination
will thus meanthe situationin whichthe manifestedwill
(command)of the ruleror rulersis meantto influencethe conductof
one or moreothers(the ruled)and actuallydoes influenceit in such
a way that their conduct to a socially relevantdegreeoccursas if
the ruledhad made the contentof the commandthe maximof their
conductfor its very own sake.40
Jim Faught
164
The
responseof the subjectto
command,even thoughthe the rulerestablishesthe validityof the
subjectmay be actingmerely
As dominationis
out of
legitimated,
conformityis moreor less assuredhabit.
the ruler's command is
since
implied within the content
of the roles of
subordinates.
Although Weber wanted to
maintaina clear analytic
betweenmarketforcesand
distinction
most historical cases of domination,he also made the point that
have their
conditions.4lSpecifically,domination
he indicated that the roots in economic
oftenexertsa 'determining'
economic
influenceon the structureof structure
Itwould not seem
domination.
ofcapital for an unreasonableto argue,then, that the requirement
orderly,
influentialin shaping the peaceful market may have been more
growth of bureaucracy,
nation
state,thanwerethe varied
including the
of
specificrulers.As economic monetary,powerand statusinterests
profits,
the stateorganizedto organizationwas rationalizedto insure
insurea
market
relations.Both politicaland contextof stabilityforextensive
economiclife werebeing
toan objectiverule in
subjected
which
desires
of the individual werethe particular(usually non-rational)
reinterpretedwithin an objectified
process.
Bureaucracyis a form of
administrativedomination
according
to rational principles
organized
procedures
found in capitalisticcorrespondingto those calculative
markets. Typical of
organizations
is the divisionof tasks
and assignmentof bureaucratic
to
officesin which an
responsibilities
individualmakes
abstract
norms.42Contrastingly,other decisionswith referenceto
forms of domination fuse
personal
and impersonalduties
inclined
to believe that their in such a way that individualsare
positions are personal
erosion
of subjectivitythat takes
property.The
place within the objectified
cratic
environmentwas obvious to Weber
bureauprebendalistic
practicesof feudalismthat when contrastedwith the
made personalprivilegea
right
of position.
Bureaucracies,
with
separation
of ofEces,hierarchical theiroccupationalspecialization,
to
specific
cases and the distinctionarrangements,applicationof rules
betweenofficeand person,tend
be
themost durable and
to
effective
form of domination.
trac
ltlonalStlCpractlces may
Although
perslst ln varlous gulses, t
fundamentally
ney are
incompatible
with
bureaucraticrule since it depends
upon
rationallycalculableoutcomes
basedon universalnorms.
bureaucratic
Since
principlesare technically
subjective
rule, they tend to level or superiorto all othermodesof
devalue fc)rmsof association
organized
on those non-rational
principles.
Despite
the extensive
objectificationof the politicalorder
acceptance
of legal-rational
and the
principlesof
for
a
contemporarybelief in progressorganizationas the foundation
through secular rationality,
Weber
and Simmel were not
could
solve human problems.convincedthat rationalorganizations
Both arguedthat humans
are usually
*
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Neglected
affinities:
Max Weber
andGeorg
Simmel
165
frustratedin their effortsto achieve preconceivedends. Simmel,for
instance, contendedthat all activity is ultimatelyin tensionwith its
opposite - e.g., individualism versus socialism - and success in
pursuinga goal undercutsthe conditionsthat made its realization
possible. Human achievementsare, at best, relative and may well
have consequencesentirelydifferentfromthose anticipated.43
Weber's
studies of the fate of religious ethics in 'this world' certainlylend
supportto Simmel'sjudgment.
As Weber did before him, Simmel described the process of
rationalizationas the conversionof conditionsinto means that are
entwinedin an expandingweb of associations.Simmel, too, underscoredhow rationalizationrequiredthe atrophyof emotionin social
relationshipsin order to create the conditionsfor 'calculablesocial
relationships.'44
In the courseof westerncivilization,this transformationhad beenmostapparentin economiclife, but it was by no means
restrictedto it. The entirerangeof humanactivityhad been suffused
with the principleof calculationand, as a consequence,an individual's
values were no longer considered valid standards for judgment.
Processand functionweighedmoreheavilyon contemporaryscalesof
justice than did unique personalattributes.
While recognizingthe negative consequencesthat result from the
objectificationof life, Simmel still held that human freedom is
expanded when personal subordinationis replaced by objective
dependency, if only because subordinationis limited to specific
roles.45Historically,personalfreedombecamepossiblewhenpersonal
obligationand paymentsin kindwererelacedby moneypayments.As
Simmel says, 'It is not the bond as such, but being bound to a
particularmasterthat representsthe real antipodeof freedom.'46
The
quiescent implications of this view were never acknowledgedin
Simmel's writings and stand in stark contrast to Weber's chilling
vision of the 'ironcage' of rationalizationas the potentialnegationof
human freedom.
Althoughthe rationalization(or objectification)of life is apparent
in most realms of human activity, it receives its most visible and
practicalexpressionin the reorganizationof economicactivity. It is
here, in modern economies, that lawlike regularitiesrenderhuman
productsexpressiblein termsof a price.47Barterand personalvalues
find little room to sustain themselvesunder conditionsthat demand
increasinglysophisticatedmeansof calculatingcosts. Underlyingthe
entiremarketsystemis the contract,a relationshipthat may be taken
as the archetypeof objectification.For comparativepurposes, the
decisive element of Simmel's conception of the contract is its
definition as a constructed rule which, owing to interpersonal
agreement,becomes as 'objectivenorm above both parties.'48The
power of the contractis evident when partiesof unequalstatus feel
bound by an agreementon the conditionsof exchange,even though
166
Jim Faught
one could unilaterallydemand and receive compliance from the
other(s).
An increasedrate of exchange,of course, is commonplaceunder
rational capitalism, and its consequencesreverberatethrough the
socialorder.Interactionin all spheresof humanactivity,followingthe
rationaleof economic exchange, becomes less 'directlyreciprocal',
that is, interactiondoes not focus on objectsintendcdspecificallyfor
partiesinvolvedin the exchange.49Hence relationshipsbecomemore
objectiveand tend to be perceivedas havingan existenceindependent
of the personsengagedin interaction.It shouldbe notedthat Simmel
was not entirelydistressedabout the expansionof objectifiedsocial
relations.After all, 'man is the objective
animal,'at least in the sense
that he is able to reflectupon and respondto thingsoutsidehimself.
Furthermore,the capacity to respondto objectiveconditionsmakes
possible a world with diminishedconflicts,since humans may then
acknowledgethat life is more than a zero-sumgame.
Purposiveactiontakesits purestformin a moneyeconomyin which
individualsconsciouslypursueclearlyspecifiedends that are quantitativelycomparable.In a bartereconomyvalue is intrinsicallylinked
to personalcharacteristics,while in a moneyeconomythe individual
is only indirectlylinked to the determinationof value. Despite the
growingdistanceof individualsfromthe assignmentof value, Simmel
emphasizedthat all rational economicexchangedepends upon the
existenceof a community.The communityacts as a thirdpartyto all
exchanges and guarantees the relative value of currency.50As a
consequence, an ostensibly private exchange becomes a public
matter.For this reason Simmelconcludedthat
It seems clear to me that the basis and the sociologicalrepresentative of the relationbetweenobjectsand money is the relationship
between economicallyactive individuals and the central power
which issues and guaranteesthe currency.5l
Moneyenables individualsto build upon and expand the range of
communityactivities since, in its capacity as a symbol, it may
representdiversegroupsand relationshipsin a commonarena.52
Similarly, an advanced money economy also tends to level or
underminethe power of closed status groups that historicallyhave
achievedexclusive control over resourceson non-rationalgrounds.
Hence,at least initially, a money economyencouragesa fluidityof
exchangethat integratessociety. In Simmel'sview, the objectivity
andcomplexityof money economies,on balance,are not inimicalto
theextension of human freedom, since under these circumstances
individualsbecome detached from the will of specific persons and
havethe opportunityto select associations from a vast array of
similarlyindependentpersons.
Weber, too, was acutely aware of the manifoldconsequencesthat
Neglected
affinities:
Max Weber
andGeorgSimmel
167
arisewith the adventof a widelyacceptedmoneyeconomy.Although
he did not grantexclusivepriorityor influenceto the growthof money
economiesin guiding the developmentof westerncivilization,Weber
did recognizethe tendency of monetaryexchangeto dissolve social
relationships founded on other principles. This conclusion was
apparent even as early as his perceptiveessay on the social and
economicconditionsof agriculturalworkersin East Elbia. In the late
nineteenthcentury,the strongestremnantof the Germanlandholding
nobility,located in East Elbia, found itself increasinglybeing drawn
into participationin a worldmarketin whichits cereals,potatoesand
livestock were in demand. To maintain a semblance of their
competitive position, these large landholders had an economic
incentiveto intensifyproduction,dismiss all but the most necessary
residentlaborand institutepaymentin wages ratherthan in kind. In
effect, the institutionalizationof'commercial principles'was also a
means of saving their status.53 But in carrying out this policy
landowners altered their relationshipwith peasants and made it
possible for the latter to become less politically submissive. In
describingthe change Weberwrites
All that is being claimedis that a securecommonbond of interest
tied labourer and landlord into a relation where patriarchal
direction of the communal economy was effective,whereas the
displacementof this relationthroughmoney-wagesabolishedthe
commoninterestand renderedsuch directionineffective.54
Weber'sexafninationof the relationshipof employerand laborerin
this case demonstratedthe interpenetrationof economicand political
forces. That is, the status and political standingof the East Elbian
nobilitywas contingentuponan abilityto maintaina secureeconomic
base. When this was disturbed by uncompetitive practices, its
disproportionateinfluencein national political affairsbecamequestionable. Furthermore, the economic solution to this problem
exacerbated the difEcult condition by underminingthe laborer's
householdas a result of the institutionalizationof intensiveagricultural methods.The culturalimpactof the change to wage labor was
an increasingsense of freedomon the partof laborers,evenwhen they
might have been economicallybetteroff to have acceptedpaymentin
kind for their work.
As Simmel,Webersaw that an expandedmoneyeconomycould be
a conditionoffreedom,but only what mightbe calledformalfreedom,
since economicrationalityis concernedonly with technicallyefficient
meansfor achievingprofitand is not a substantiveend in itself.In his
view, the pursuit of purely rational economic ends may, in fact,
inadvertentlydestroythe social, culturaland politicalconditionsthat
supportunimpededeconomicexchang. Weber,as Simmel,claimed
that the rationalizationof the market(and moneywas a conditionof
*
A
Jim Faught
168
an advanced market) led to an
increasing depersonalizationof
economicrelations.As a methodological
the scope of his analysisof moneyand strictureeachrefusedto limit
the
relationsand instead advocateda more marketto purelyeconomic
causes and consequencesof economic complexdescriptionof the
The rationalizationof economic action.
activity
featuresof modernsocieties. For Weber is one of the distinctive
and
rationalizationmeant the emergenceof a Simmel,the processof
calculativeprinciplethat
came to be applied in all forms of
social relationships.Traditional
routineswere unable to withstand the
with the adoption of this principle. practicalsuccess associated
city,where freedomand indifferenceThis was most apparentin the
were synthesizedin a way that
madeit seem that humanfreedomwas
intrinsicallydependentupon
thecompleteerosionof
non-calculative
sawthis as one of the dilemmasof socialties. Weberand Simmel
temperedtheir enthusiasmfor the modernsociety, a dilemmathat
expansionof individualchoice.
Theirambivalencewas compounded
by an awarenessthat increased
civicindifferenceand the
underminingof traditionalintermediate
socialgroupsalso made domination
potentiallymore extensive.
IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE HISTORYOF
SOCIOLOGICALTHOUGHT
Weber'sand Simmel's substantive
studies were oriented toward
examining
the causes and consequencesof the
rationalization(or
objectification)
of social action. Their accounts
of
regulation,
particularlypoliticaland economic,in the institutional
modernworld
are
closelycomplementary.Each called
attention
to
how
becomes
crystallizedinto patternsthat appearto have socialaction
a dynamicof
their
own. Accordingto theiranalyses,the
outcome
of
the
rationalization
of life for human freedom is a
central
problem
for
modern
societies.
Despitehis tragicview of culture,Simmel
was
at
times
more
optimistic
about the ultimateprospectsfor human
freedom
than
was
Weber.55
In their analyses, both were
sensitive
to
the
external
constraints
on social action and the fact that
individualsmust make
choices
even when they do not control most
impinge
upon them. In this regard, both of the conditionsthat
recognizedthe historical
significance
of domination in bringing about
the distributionof
opportunltles
Wltnln a socla orcer.
Thehistoryof sociologyis repletewith
commentariesthatassertthe
existence
of antinomiesin the writingof Weber
the
most part, neglectingaffinitiesin their and Simmel,while,for
contrast,
I have arguedthat the affinitiesinsubstantiveanalyses. In
Weberand Simmelare
demonstrably
significant,even while acknowledging
importantdifferences
in their perspectives. A
recognition
of
their
parallel and
comparable
developmentof a concept of rationalization
has several
andGeorg
Simmel
Max Weber
afDinities:
Neglected
169
implicationsfor constructinghistoriesof sociologicalthought.
( I ) At the very least, the presentstudysuggeststhe need forfurther
investigation of several points of agreement between Weber alld
Simmel. Until now, the classificationof Simmel as a sociological
formalist has mitigated against a thorough examination of any
intellectualafEnitieshe may have sharedwith Weber'sproblematic.
The use of broadlyinclusivecategories,such as idealist,positivistor
evolutionist,is certainlya legitimatedevicefororganizinga vast array
of intellectual history. But classificationproceduresunfortunately
may intrude into analyses and impede our grasp of comparative
similarities that exist in the writings of individuals identified as
exemplarsof differentmodes of thought.
(2) Although histories of sociological thought have little to say
aboutafEnitiesbetweenWeberand Simmel,one of the morepuzzling
of SocialAction.56
omissionsof this sort occursin Parsons'TheStructure
In his interpretationof the convergencein sociologicalthoughtin the
early decades of the twentieth century, Parsonsexplicitly excluded
Simmelfromconsiderationforreasonsthat remainunclear.If Simmel
had been included in Parson's account of the convergence of
sociologicalthought, he might have been encouragedto place more
weight on other elements of the action frame of reference,e.g., the
often critical role of 'conditions'in shaping the outcome of social
action.57Levine58notes that Parsonsprepareda drafton Simmelto
of SocialAction,but this part of
be includedin the text of TheStructure
the analysiswas omittedin the publishedwork.Whateverelse may be
attributedto this decision, it undoubtedlyhas influencedthe way in
which Simmel'ssociologyhas been receivedin the USA.
(3) SimmelfirstenteredAmericansociologythroughthe writingsof
the Chicago School. The pragmaticapproachto the study of society
typical of this 'school' engendereda willingnessto select elements
from a varietyof perspectives.RobertParkwas an exemplarof this
type of eclecticism,and extractedfromSimmelonly those ideas most
compatibleto the empiricalstudy of the multiplepatternsof urban
life. Parkdid not considerSimmel'sformalisma barrierto sociological
insights. Park'sflexibilityon this count was probablyrelatedto his
lackof interestin technicalscholarlydisputesand to his desireto push
ahead with sociologicalresearch.The partial inclusionof Simmel's
ideas into Park'ssociologicalperspectivesenjoinshistoriesof sociological thought to be more consciousof the selectiveborrowingthat
takes place across intellectual disciplines and between apparently
incompatibleperspectives.
(4) SinceParsonsand Parkwerestronglyinfluencedby the German
sociologicaltraditionthroughthe writingsof Weberand Simmel,and
since importantafEnitiesin their writingshave been identified,this
would suggest there is a need to reconsider the nature of the
differencesbetweenPark'sand Parsons'sperspectives.This would be
170
JzmFaught
especiallypertinentto Parsons'swritingsbeforethe
publicationof The
SocialSystem.59
A study of Park and Parsons,in this respect,
could
contributeto a betterunderstandingof the developmentof
American
sociologyin the first half of this century.
SELECTIVEINATTENTIONAND SOCIOLOGICAL
THOUGHT
In order to justify the status of sociologyas an
and place it on equal footing with economics, academicdiscipline
politicalscience and
law, Americansociologistsroutinelyhave turned
to their
predecessorsfor ideas to organize their conceptual European
RobertParkand TalcottParsonsexemplifiedthis attitudeframeworks.
by
constructsfromthe Germansociologicaltraditionthatwere deriving
pivotalin
thedevelopmentof theirown theoreticalperspectives.
Park's
conceptionof society and social interactionwas drawn from
his reviewof
Simmel'swritings,while Parsons'analytictheoryof action
incorporatedelements from Weber'sdefinitionof social
action. Despite the
advancein sociologicaltheoryand researchthat may be
attributedto
thisintellectualexchange, their selective
borrowingfrom Weber and
Simmeldid contribute to the failure to perceive
affinitiesin the
writingsof these two major figures of twentieth-century
sociology.
Their selectivityin this respectalso is the sourceofGerman
someof
the differences between Parkian and Parsonian
sociology.
For
example,Park's reading of Simmel often came to be
expressed
through
his student'sstudiesof communityand
andconflict and accommodationin urban occupationalsettings,
environments.
reading
of Weber was manifestin his effort to constructaParsons's
analytic
theoryand studiesof the institutionalregulationof general
action.
An interest in Simmel's sociology predatedPark's
arrival
at
University
of Chicagoin 1915.Severalof his essaysalreadyhad the
translated
by Albion Small and publishedin the American been
Journalof
Sociology.
But Park focused this interest by selecting elements
from
Simmel's
sociology that were amenableto a researchprogramthat
conceived
the city as a sociologicallaboratory.As a
consequence,an
important
segment of researchin the Parkiantraditiongravitated
toward
the study of types of social relationsand processesof
group
contact
that were commonto city life. Urban research,so
conceived,
required
extensiveparticipantobservationand data collectionon a
scale
unlike that typical of Germansociology.
Parsons'encounterwith Europeansociology,particularly
Weber's
writings,
was guided by a quite differentpurpose.He
presupposed
that
if sociology was to become a science, it first
had to
agreement
on a unifiedanalytictheory.Afterexaminingthe reach
writings
of
Marshall,Pareto, Durkheimand Weber, Parsonsconcluded
that
these
authorshad achieveda theoreticalconvergenceon a
voluntaristic
Neglectedaffnities:Max WeberandGeorgSimmel
171
theory of action; however, in this conceptionhe relied heavily on
Weber'sdefinitionof social actionand his conceptionof legitimacyas
a basis of social stability. Parsons's action theory and his later
discussionof the 'socialsystem'were intendedto providean analytic
frameworkfor the study of all formsof social organization,ranging
fromtwo persongroups to inter-societalnetworks.In his own work,
Parsonswas inclinedeither to elaborateon his analytictheoryor to
examinesocial organizationat a high level of abstraction.
On the basisof the affinitiesbetweenWeberand Simmelidentified
in this paper,it appearsthat had Parsonsgiven Simmelmoreserious
considerationin developinghis voluntaristictheoryof action or had
Park been more aware of Weber'sconceptionof society, American
sociologymightwell have establisheda foundationfor a morecritical
perspectivetoward social institutions.For instance, Parsonswould
have foundit difficultto constructhis theoryof actionwithoutgiving
greateremphasisto the influenceof externalconditions,and thereby
reduce the significanceaccorded to the normativeorganizationof
action. By disregardingthe affinitiesbetweenWeberand Simmel,it
was not as difficultfor Parsonsto reducethe importanceof material
conditions in his analytic theory, even though Weber himself had
clearly accented the salience of materialconditionsin his studies of
religiousethics.SinceWeberand Simmelemphasizedthe constricting
effects of rational, objectifiedstructures,a perspectivedrawn from
both wouldhave been morelikelyto assigngreaterprominenceto the
problemof increasingentropyin contemporarysocieties.This notion
also would have provided an impetus in American sociology for
comparativehistoricalresearch.Finally, the selective channelingof
Weberand Simmel into differentresearchtraditionsdiminishedthe
impactof theircomplementaryinsightsinto institutionalconflictand
dominationin highly rationalizedsocieties.
In contrastto the conventionalseparationof Weberand Simmelin
American sociology, an alternative interpretationwould use the
affinitiesin their writings, affinitiesthat seem to push sociological
inquiry toward a comparative, historically informed sociological
analysis of political and economic structures,and the capacity of
humansto controlthem.The absenceof a strongresearchtraditionof
this sort in the 1960s and 1970s made it difficult for American
sociology to make sense of such diverse observationsas: (1) the
increasingcontrolof economicproductionby large corporations;(2)
the psychological ambivalence arising from the distance between
traditionalbeliefsaboutAmericanpluralismand the concentrationof
politicaldecision makingin the nation state; (3) thejuxtapositionof
affluenceand inequality,and (4) the generaldistrustof institutional
regulationby many young people. Ahistoricalsurvey research,or
sociologicalinvestigationsof a single setting, or analytic theoriesof
'strain'and 'disequilibrium'werenot persuasivein accountingforthe
172
JimFaught
experiencedmalaise. Theory and
researchseemed to ignore those
experiencesthat harshlyintrudedon
peoplewho had come to expect
economic progressand political
civility.
In this relative theoretical
vacuum,sociologistsbeganto
search
for
alternativeperspectivesthat
grantedmoreattentionto the
incongruityand precariousness
of
existence.Marxianinterpretations
wereonly the mostvisible social
aries of the quest for a
renewedtheoreticalfoundationfor beneficiUpon reflection,it may be
sociology.
a greaterunderstandingof proposedthatthe possibilityof achieving
contemporarysocietywas present,
unexamined,in the writings
though
of Weberand Simmel.
in their perspectives
Becauseaffinities
remained
undiscussed,our
their individual writings
of
often bore the stampunderstanding
of conventional
interpretationsas transmitted
sociology.None the less, if the through Parkian and Parsonian
affinities identified in this paper
constitutean acceptable
interpretation
of Weber's and Simmel's
ideas,then it wouldseem that
they
could
form
the basisfora theoryof
socialorganizationthat could
conceptualize
the
lifeentailed in the dual
ambiguityof social
andat the same time processof constructingmeaningful'worlds'
experiencingthe structuralconstraint
forms.The Parsonian
of
interpretationsof Weber and the these
interpretations
Parkian
of Simmel have not
proved
contemporary
sociologists,as is reflectedin theentirely acceptable to
alternative
theories. However, the affinities continuingsearchfor
between Weber and
Simmel
providea point of departurethat
may well offersociologyan
as
yet unconsideredperspective,
one that
traditions
that permeateour conceptionsbuildsuponelementsof two
of social life.
Jim Faught
Department
of Sociolocy
LoyolaMarymount
University
NOTES
*would
I like to thank
HenryKarielfor
his
comments
on a previousdraftof this
paper,
and reviewers of the BJS
for
suggestions
on a laterdraft.Researchfor
the
paper
was supportedby the Reason
Foundation,
while subsequentrewriting
benefitted
froma CollegeTeachersFellowship
from the National Endowment
for
the
Humanities.
1.
Norman Birnbaum, 'Conflicting
Interpretations
of the Riseof
bIarx
and Weber', BritishCapitalism:
Journalof
Sociology,
1953,4, pp. 125-41. Benjamin
Nelson,
'Weber's ProtestantEthic: Its
Origins,
Wanderings,and Foreseeable
Futures'
in Glockand Hammond,
Beyond
the
Classics?,
New York,Harper& Row,
1973,
pp. 71-130, attempts to
place
Weber's
historical research within a
broader
context, one which deemphasizes
his allegedcontinuingdebate
with
the'ghostof Marx.'
2.Reinhard Bendix, 'Max
Weber
and
JacobBurckhardt,'American
ological
Review,1965,30, pp. 176-84.Soci3.
ThomasBurger,MaxWsber's
Theoy
of
Concept
Formation,
Durham,Duke University
Press, 1976.
Neglected
affnities:Max Weber
andGeorg
Simmel
173
4. Weber's evaluation of Simmel's wood, The Dorsey Press, 1974; Roscoe
scholarshipis exemplifiedin his relent- C. Hinkle, FoundingTheoryof American
less effortto securea universityposition Sociology,
1881-1915,
Boston,Routledge&
for him. See Marianne Weber, Max Kegan Paul, 1980;Daniel W. Rossides,
andNatureofSociological
Theory,
Weber:A Biography,New York, John TheHistory
Wiley, 1975, p. 358; Paul Honigsheim, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1978;Julien
On Max Weber,New York, The Free Freund,'GermanSociologyin the Time
Press, 1968, pp. 9 and 13. Marianne of Max Weber'in Bottomoreand Nisbet,
Weber, op. cit., p. 252, also notes that A Historyof Sociological
Analysis,New
Simmel'sPhilosophy
of Moneywas one of York,Basic Books, 1978,pp. 149-86.
the firstbooksthat Weberchose to read
12. Lewis A. Coser, Mastersof Socioafter sufEcientlyrecoveringfrom a pro- logicalThought,
New York,HarcourtBrace
longedillnessto returnto a morerigorous Jovanovich,1971.
scholarlyroutine.
13. David Flisby, Sociological
Impres5. EdwardA. Tiryakian,'The Signi- sionism,London, Heinemann, 1981, p.
ficanceof Schoolsin the Developmentof 165.
Sociology'in Snizek,Millerand Fuhrman,
14. Donald Levine, 'Introduction'in
Contemporary
Issuesin Theory
andResearch: Simmel,OnIndividuality
andSocialForms,
A Metasociological
Perspective,
Westport, Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
GreenwoodPress, 1979,pp. 211-33.
1974,pp. ix-lxv.
6. Henrika Kuklick, 'Restructuring
15. Simmelhas also beencriticizedfor
the Past:Towardan Appreciationof the an intuitionistic-aesthetic
attitudetoward
Social Context of Social Science,' Soci- social phenomenaand for an unsystemologicalQuarterly,
1980,21, pp. 5-21, has atic method of analysis. CharlesDavid
calledattentionto how interpretations
of Axelrod,Studiesin Intellectual
Breakthrough;
classic texts may be used to justify a Freud,Simmel,
Buber,Amherst,University
particulartheoreticalperspective.That of Massachusetts
Press,1979and Murray
S. Davis, 'Georg Simmel and the AesCarefullytailoredversionsof the past thetics of Social Reaiity,' SocialForces,
are used to defendthe claimsof rival 1973, 51, pp. 320-9 have examinedthe
intellectual schools to disciplinary valueof such methods,to the extent they
supremacy,and are retailedto show are presentin Simmel'swritings.Since
the inevitabilityof their triumph. . . this paper arguesfor the correpondence
Hence, in their approachesto such of parts of Weber'sand Simmel'spersclassics as Durkheim's Elementarypectives,a pointthat is usuallydenied,it
Formsof Religious
Life,all sociological is ironic that an early commentatoron
schools have found anticipatory Weber'stheoryof capitalistdevelopment
an aesthetic
formulationsof their own distinctive chargedhim with constructing
history
of
capitalism.
See
the
reference
in
theories.
Talcott Parsons,'Capitalismin Recent
Kuklick,ibid., p. 9.
GermanLiterature:Sombartand Weber
7. Chicago, University of Chicago (Conclusion),'Journal
of Political Economy,
Press, 1921.
1929, 37, p. 50 to Young's characteriz8. New York,The Free Press, 1937. ation of Weber'sperspective.
9. Don Martindale, TheNatureand
16. Op.cit., 1971,p. xlv.
Types of SociologicalTheory, Boston,
17. Op.cit., 1968,p. 131.
HoughtonMifilin, 1960.
18. Arthur Mitzman, The Iron Cage,
10. RobertA. Nisbet, TheSociological New York,AlfredA. Knopf,1970;Arthur
Tradition,
New York,Basic Books, 1966. Mitzman,Sociology
andEstrangement,
New
11. See Ronald Fletcher, TheMaking York,AlfredA. Knopf, 1973.
of Sociology,London, Michael Joseph,
19. Mitzman,op.cit., 1970,p. 4, note;
1971; GeofEreyHawthorn,EnlightenmentMitzman,op.cit., 1973,p. 9.
andDespair,London,CambridgeUniver20. Mitzman,op.cit., 1973,p. 32.
sity Press, 1976;Jonathan H. Turner,
21. Mitzman,op.cit., 1970,p. 176and
TheStructure
of Sociological
Theory,
Home- p. 275.
iS,
174
22. Ibid.,p. 209, note.
23. See MarianneWeber,op.cit., pp
311-13, and Freund,op.cit., p. 93.
24. Georg Simmel, The Sociologyof
GeorgSimmel,edited by Kurt H. Wolff,
New York,The Free Press, 1950,p. 32.
25. Ibid.,p. 36.
26. Max Weber,Economy
andSociety,
3
vols, editedby GuentherRothand Claus
Wittich, New York, BedminsterPress,
1968,pp. 241-5.
27. Max Weber,TheReligionof China,
Glencoe,The Free Press, 1951,p. 169.
28. Max Weber,TheReligionof India,
New York,The FreePress,1958,p. 162.
29. Op.cit., p. 332.
30. Simmel,1950,op.cit.,p. 223.
31. Ibid.,p. 251. The natureof scientificwork,accordingto Simmel,was also
experiencingchange as scholarshipbecame more specializedand labor was
divided accordingto disciplinaryboundaries.As a consequence,the correspondencebetweensubjectivityand objective
scientific facts diminished, and there
arose a greaterrelianceon the observationsof others.This dependencymakes
scientific output seem more objective.
See Georg Simmel, The Philosophy
of
Money,London, Routledgeand Kegan
Paul, 1978,pp. 456-7.
32. See Georg Simmel, TheConflict
in
ModernCultureand OtherEssays,New
York,TeachersCollegePress, 1968,pp.
27-46.
33. Simmel,1950,op.cit.,p. 248.
34. Ibid.,p. 249.
35. Ibid.,pp. 273-5.
36. Ibid.,p. 282.
37. Ibid.,p. 285.
38. Ibid.,p. 292.
39. Ibid.,p. 299.
40. Weber,1968,op.cit.,p. 946.
41. Ibid.,p. 941.
42. Ibid.,p. 956.
43. Simmel,1978,op.cit., p. 166.
44. Ibid.,p. 431.
45. Ibid.,p. 335.
46. Ibid.,p. 299. Since the pursuitof
societal goals depends on hierarchy,
Simmelregardssomeformof superordinationand subordination
as indispensable.
JimFaught
As a methodof compensationhe argued
that humans should strive to eliminate
'those psychologicalconsequencesthat
makesuch relationshipsabhorrent.'See
Simmel,1978,op.cit., p. 336.
47. Simmel,1950,op.cit., p. 263.
48. Ibid.,p. 264.
49. Simmel,1978,op.cit., p. 457.
50. Ibid.,p.177.
51. Ibid.,p. 177.
52. Ibid.,p. 129.
53. MaxWeber,'Developmental
Tendencies in the Situationof East Elbian
Rural Labourers,'Economy
and Society,
1979 [1894], 8, p. 180.
54. Ibid.,p. 190.
55. The dark side of Weber'sunderstandingof the futureof westerncivilizationis ignoredby thosewhosee the ultimate triumphof reason. See Benjamin
Nelson, 'Dialogs Across the Centuries:
Weber,Marx,Hegel, Luther,'in Weiss,
The Origins of Modern Consciousness,
Detroit, Wayne State UniversityPress,
1965,p. 160.
56. Op.cit.
57. JefEreyAlexander, 'Formal and
SubstantiveVoluntarismin the Workof
TalcottParsons:A Theoreticaland Ideological Reinterpretation,'
American
SociologicalReview,1978, 43, p. 182, argues
that Parsons' reliance on Weber was
pivotal in developing a voluntaristic
theoryof action.
symbolicactionalwaysoccurswithin
a conditionalenvironmentof material
factswhichproducespressurefor the
pursuit of efficientmeans. The key
intellectualfigurein this finalelement
of Parsons' theoreticalsynthesis is
Weber, who outlined a method for
carryingforwardMarx's materialist
concernswithoutthelatter'sexclusive
emphasison instrumentalism.
58. Donald N. Levine, Ellwood B.
Carter and Eleanor Miller Gorman,
'Simmel'sInfluenceon AmericanSociology,' 2 parts, American Journalof Sociology,1976,81, p. 820.
59. Glencoe,The Free Press, 1951.