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Working Paper Series: No. 1
Bolivia Case Study:
an interpretative summary
Prepared by
Steve Wiggins
Alexander Schejtman & George Gray
drawing on the work of
Wilson Jiménez
Rodney Pereira
Julio Prudencio
Carlos Toranzo
Copyright © Steve Wiggins, Alexander Schejtman, & George Gray, April 2006
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Abstract
This essay addresses the question of why Bolivia has witnessed zero growth of per capita
incomes over the second half of the twentieth century while other Latin American countries
have seen their incomes roughly double over this period.
The answer would seem to point to politics and distributional coalitions, given the
persistence of a development pattern based on natural resource extraction throughout three
different institutional models -- liberal 1900–1952, nationalized 1952–1985, and mixed 1985–
2005. In each case, the dominant distributional coalition changed property rights allowing
rent-seeking and political capture of key economic institutions.
Four sets of research questions concerning macro, meso and micro level processes are
posed, that might help understand both Bolivia’s current predicament and contribute to
thinking of institutional change, economic growth and poverty reduction.
Table of Contents
Bolivian economic history from 1950
The background
The 1952 revolution
Bolivia under the military
The new democracy of 1982
Interpreting history: why so little growth?
Summarising: Bolivia’s challenges
Research issues arising
References
Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
Bolivian economic history from 1950
The background
Bolivia is a large country, larger than France and Spain combined. It is landlocked and
relatively remote from the rest of the world, isolated to the west by the slopes of the Andes
and to the east by the vast distances from the centre of South America to the Atlantic coast
of Brazil. Physically, the country is diverse, with one third of the land in the highlands
where landscapes vary between very high plateaux (altiplano) at 4,000 metres or more,
mountain chains, and intermontane valleys. The rest of the country is made up of tropical
lowlands consisting variously of the parched scrub of the Chaco in the south-east, the great
plains (llanos) of the Beni where extensive grasslands prevail, and the tropical forests of the
Amazon basin to the north and north-west.
Two points stand out from the physical geography: one is that the country is rich in natural
resources. There are farm lands of almost every ecological niche imaginable, plus mineral
deposits ⎯ with silver and tin to the fore ⎯ in a geologically varied land that range from
metals in the highlands to oil and gas deposits in the lowlands. The other point is the
difficulty of movement and hence cost of transport owing to both the large distances and
the difficult topography of the highlands.
Despite the size of the country, the population is still small ⎯ barely 9 million. Moreover,
they are concentrated: three-quarters live in the one third of the country that is highland;
while roughly two-thirds of the population live in towns and cities.
To understand the way that the economy and society has developed, we need to go back to
the C16 and C17 when the Spanish colonisers arrived in the southern part of what had
been the Inca empire. The Spanish arrived first in the highlands. They were looking first
and foremost for precious metals and in Potosí they found a mountain of silver. The
indigenous population were summarily recruited to extract the ore that was shipped back to
Spain where the wealth was dissipated in military adventures, cathedrals and the legendary
bureaucracy of the Spanish empire. Little of this wealth was reinvested in Bolivia.
Outside of the mining camps, the land was repartitioned to Spanish conquistadores in large
estates to which the indigenous population was tied. The estates included areas for the
indigenous population to cultivate their crops of potatoes, quinoa, wheat and barley as well
as to graze their herds of sheep, goats, alpaca and llama ⎯ largely for subsistence ⎯ in
return for corvée labour on the central farm of the landowner. Even the core of the estate
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Steve Wiggins, Alexander Schejtman & George Gray
was farmed extensively, largely to produce food crops that could feed the landowner and
retainers, and to sell small surpluses to the mining camps. The landowners reportedly
usually lived in nearby towns, preferring the urban life of the gentleman to that of the rural
lord: they showed little interest in agricultural improvement and developing their
properties. In particular, there were few if any cash crops that could withstand the costs of
transport to the world market from the mountainous fastnesses of Bolivia.
The society that developed on the basis of this economy was deeply divided between the
Spanish occupiers and their descendents, and the local indigenous population. The latter
were dispossessed of their land and recruited as cheap labour. Language and ethnicity
became the principle dividing lines of the population. This point should perhaps not be
exaggerated: social snobbery notwithstanding, the two groups did intermarry, so that a large
fraction of Bolivians today are typically described as ‘mestizo’. Nevertheless, social status
has long been associated with speaking Spanish and having a light skin. 1
The colonial economy changed little when Bolivia became independent in 1825. The local
elites merely cut their ties to the Spanish crown and continued to run the country along the
lines long established. The late C19 brought two developments. One was the integration of
Bolivia into world trading circuits, and with that the accompanying construction of
railways. The other was the beginning of tin mining, the ores being found fortuitously close
to the now waning stocks of silver. The world market for tin was buoyant. But once again,
the mineral wealth was taken largely by three mine owners, some of whom lived fabulously
wealthy lifestyles in place such as the Côte d’Azur. Meanwhile back in Bolivia, the miners
⎯ again recruited from the downtrodden indigenous population ⎯ sweated in dire
conditions for meagre wages. Little of the mineral wealth was reinvested in Bolivian
agriculture or industry.
The 1930s saw a major shock to the comfortable world of the ruling tin-mining and estateowning oligarchy of Bolivia: the Chaco War with Paraguay. Bolivia lost the war and with it
a large swathe of territory. The fighting was largely done by the put-upon indigenous
soldiers, most from the highlands, who found themselves fighting in strange conditions
The repression of local identity is very old in Bolivia, dating back to Inca times when the
conquering Inca tried to impose Quechua on their empire. They were largely
successful, except for the case of the Aymara who have obstinately hung on their
language through the disapproval of Incas, Spanish and independent Bolivian elites. In
the last decade or so, the Aymara have taken to showing their identity with a pride not
seen for centuries as the social and political evolution of Bolivia has at last given them
the space and freedom to do so without ridicule.
1
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Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
and suffered heavy losses. The obscenity of this conflict, provoked in part by a scramble
for land believed ⎯ wrongly as it turned out ⎯ to cover oil fields, and sustained by the
rhetoric of rampant nationalism was not lost on the participants. Junior officers were
typically drawn from the mestizo middle class of the towns and the cities who could see the
inequalities and injustices that the war made so very clear. A generation went home
determined to change matters.
The 1952 revolution
Clamour for reform mounted in the 1940s when there were some short-lived attempts to
overthrow the old order, but finally succeeded in 1952. The miners, organised in militant
unions and armed, provided the muscle; the urban intellectuals, the ideas and political
organisation. The result was a genuine revolution that saw a new party, the Movimiento
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), assume power led by a generation of young idealists
with varying degrees of socialist leanings; and backed by well-organised miners. They were
soon joined by peasant leaders, as the indigenous farmers took the opportunity to invade
the lands of their owners, to repudiate labour services and to reclaim their ancestral lands.
The MNR government saw through some dramatic changes to economic organisation
equal to those on the political front. The mines were nationalised, the oligarchs
expropriated, to form a large corporation, Comibol. The land invasions were sanctioned by
a land reform act (1953) that granted land to the tiller, and at stroke dispossessed the
landed aristocracy.
Economically the MNR government promoted state industries based on importsubstitution with protection from imports, and directed the banking system to make credit
available cheaply for this investment in such industries. They also promoted the settlement
of the lowlands, seeing in the lightly-populated green spaces to the north and east of the
highlands, lands that could assuage land hunger amongst the peasantry. Land reform may
have changed ownership rights, but it did not create extra land for a population that was
growing. Roads were built to connect the main cities to settlement zones lower down the
slopes of the Andes and on to the plains; Santa Cruz, the long-isolated centre for the
Eastern lowlands was finally connected by a good road to Cochabamba and La Paz. The
settlement schemes never achieved their aim of freeing up land in the highlands, but still
many tens of thousands of highland families made the journey to take up land in the
lowlands. This was one of the motors of subsequent booms in agricultural production in
these previously neglected areas.
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Steve Wiggins, Alexander Schejtman & George Gray
The MNR government ran into macro-economic problems as the state spent beyond its
means and economic crisis sapped the energies of the new leaders. By the early 1960s the
Revolution had lost its impetus. A coup toppled the democratic government in 1964, and
Bolivia entered eighteen years of largely military rule.
Bolivia under the military
The military regimes ⎯ and there were no less than thirteen different military rulers who
arrived in power by coups ⎯ were by and large conservative but variously nationalist,
populist, corporatist, and eventually criminal (the narco regime of Garcia Meza). They
preserved many of the state companies and structures set up by the Revolution, but drained
them of radical intent.
They enshrined the idea that serious economic endeavour was linked to state favour ⎯ in
the allocation of rights to land (in the lowlands) and prospecting for minerals, oil and gas;
in gaining tax exemptions or import protection; and in gaining access to subsidised credit.
Small coteries formed around the regimes that lobbied for such favour: a good case of
‘crony capitalism’. New elites emerged: the old landlords of the highlands were gone, but a
new class of large-scale commercial farmer in the eastern lowlands (the Oriente) rose to
form a determined interest group. These were not the settlers from the highlands, but the
landowners in the once-sleepy east who now realized that, thanks to the new roads, they
were sitting on land that could earn well with modest investment. Oil and gas interests
flourished, again in the eastern lowlands.
The 1970s saw an economic boom as world commodity prices briefly soared. The fields of
the Oriente were covered in the ‘white gold’ of cotton. But towards the end of the decade,
the prices fell back. Meanwhile, the state in common with neighbouring countries
borrowed heavily on world markets on the strength of a booming economy so that by
1980, Bolivia was saddled with foreign debt of more than US$27 billion, and debt servicing
equivalent to one third of export earnings. Only one new activity prospered, and that was
coca growing. By the early 1980s Bolivia was awash with narco dollars. The traffickers were
dangerously close to the executive.
Coca could not save the economy, however. By the early 1980s the military were exhausted,
discredited by their authoritarian rule and by connections to the traffickers, and faced by
numerous economic problems. This included the virtual collapse of tin mining as world
prices plummeted. In 1982 they retired and elections were held for a new democratic
regime.
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Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
Figure 1 illustrates some of the features of economic growth of this and subsequent
periods.
The new democracy of 1982
The government that entered in 1982 leaned towards to the left. Within a year or so it was
embroiled in hyper-inflation and other macro-economic ills that led to the government
falling in 1985. The regime that took over after elections grasped the nettle of stabilisation
and economic liberalisation of international trade, product and financial markets. The
results were as impressive as they were fairly quick to appear. Within a year, the economy
was stabilised and began to grow.
Figure 1: Bolivia GDP per capita growth and terms of trade
Source: Kaufmann et al. 2002
The macro-economic changes of the second half of the 1980s were to be followed up a
series of more profound reforms in the early 1990s ⎯ some of which have an institutional
character. Box 1 lists some the main changes brought in.
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Box 1: The reforms of the early and mid-1990s
Privatisation of state enterprises: through ‘capitalisation’ in which private investors take a 50%
stake, the rest being in the public realm with the workers and a pensions fund. Affects electricity,
telecommunications, hydrocarbons, water and transport sectors. This includes the 1996
Hydrocarbons Law that devolved the development of oil and gas field from the state company,
YPFB, to private companies.
Education
Fiscal: VAT and income tax introduced
Pensions: a pay-as-you go systems converted to capital funds. Later the idea of the Bonosl, a
programme that delivers a pension to all over 65 years.
Decentralisation: 1995 Law, transfers resources and responsibilities to the 314 municipalities,
plus the funds freed under HIPC II
Popular participation: 1994 Law
Civil service: the 1990 SAFCO law intended to improve financial administration and controls;
and the 1992 PSDC programme intended to establish a core of 2,500 professional and neutral
civil servants
Judiciary:
Customs
Social programmes streamlined
Banking: laws affecting commercial banking and the Central Bank
Sources: World Bank 2005, Kaufmann et al. 2002, Klasen et al. 2004
The 1990s saw many positive outcomes. The economy grew in most years at rates of 4–
5%, poverty fell by six percentage points, and government was able to expand its spending
on education and health with resulting improvements in these dimensions of welfare.
The motors of growth in Bolivia, however were narrowly based. They included the oil and
gas industries and large-scale commercial farming in the Oriente centred on Santa Cruz,
with soya beans as the boom crop replacing previous fields of cotton. While these activities
helped stabilise the economy with prolific export earnings, they did not generate
commensurate levels of employment, and arguably had relatively few linkages to the rest of
the Bolivian economy. Moreover both sectors were in the eastern lowlands, with political
ramifications as civic leaders of Santa Cruz pressed for more autonomy from the
centralised administration of distant La Paz.
But by the late 1990s, Bolivia ran into problems. The financial crises of Asia and Russia
raised the cost of foreign borrowing, the problems of Argentina and Brazil depressed
demand for Bolivian exports and turned the exchange rates against Bolivia, El Niño events
hit farm output, social security reforms proved more costly than expected, and the
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Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
eradication of coca that in the late 1980s made up almost 6% of GDP depressed output.
Consequently, Bolivian economic growth has fallen to almost nothing. That has led to
unemployment and a rise in poverty; as well as to a political crisis that has seen one
government in the 2000s forced out of power by popular protest, and another collapse as
the President resigned in protest at the difficulty of governing the country.
Interpreting history: why so little growth?
The painful facts are these. In 1950, Bolivia was the second poorest country in Latin
America. In the intervening half century real income levels are estimated to have fallen
slightly. In comparison, other Latin American countries have seen their incomes per capita
roughly double over this period. Figure 2 shows the way in which all periods of growth of
incomes have been offset by periods of sharp economic decline.
Figure 2: Real incomes and investment in Bolivia, 1950 to 2000
21
3200
3100
19
3000
Real GDP/cap
17
Investment/GDP
15
2900
2800
13
2700
c
2600
11
2500
9
2400
7
2300
5
2200
1950
1952
1954 1956
1958
1960 1962
1964
1966 1968
1970
1972 1974
1976 1978
1980
1982 1984
1986
1988 1990
1992
1994 1996
1998
2000
Source: data from Penn World Tables
It might not be so bad that Bolivia remained a poor country, were the resources and wealth
of the country distributed so that all live in a degree of admittedly frugal welfare. But this is
not the case: inequality has been and remains extremely high ⎯ estimates of Gini
coefficient are 0.50 and counting ⎯ so that the lot of a large fraction of Bolivians is abject
poverty. By any standards this is an appalling record and a social tragedy for poor
Bolivians.
But it is not as though the people of Bolivia have not tried to foster economic growth and
develop their country. On the contrary, the Revolution of 1952 and later the reforms
undertaken in political and economic spheres from 1982 onwards demonstrate a demand
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Steve Wiggins, Alexander Schejtman & George Gray
for change, an ability to implement apparently radical changes in political regimes, and
considerable organisational energies to try and make change effective.
Yet the economic record is, as noted, dire.
In looking at the explanations of low economic growth, most economic analyses note the
low rates of investment in the economy ⎯ 14% or less in recent years, linked to low rates
of domestic savings ⎯ at 10% or less in recent times. Growth has come with increases in
the labour force, with little capital deepening or improvements in productivity.
But of course this merely begs the question: why so little investment? The World Bank cite
a portmanteau of underlying ills, thus:
(1) macroeconomic mismanagement; (2) trade policies; (3) taxation; (4) political
instability; (5) weak institutions; (6) infrastructure; (7) financial sector weaknesses;
(8) investment climate; (9) deficient entrepreneurship/labour/skills; (10) education;
(11) geography; (12) ethnic conflicts; (13) non-diversified economic structure, and
(14) external factors. (World Bank 2005, 24)
Some of these look as much symptoms as causes. The IMF has come to firmer
conclusions:
… the root causes of low trend growth in Bolivia are poor infrastructure, poor
institutions and government services, and fear of instability. The main insight of the
more recent studies is that the political and social roots of these problems are
deeper than recognized in the previous literature.
(IMF 2005, p. 13; cited in World Bank 2005, 24/25)
Once again, the four factors cited all beg the question of ‘yes, but why?’
Peering into deeper causes reveals different perspectives. For the Bank (2005), a critical
factor is lack of investor confidence arising from fears over property rights. In support of
this, two cases are cited. One concerns the controversies over water privatisations in
Cochabamba and La Paz where in both cases the government has rescinded private
concessions to foreign-owned companies. The other is the case of the new proposed law
on hydrocarbons that gives the state more say over operations by private companies, veto
rights to indigenous groups over prospecting and drilling on their lands, and a new tax
regime. There are also uncertainties that apply to the legal ownership of some farms in the
Oriente.
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Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
A different vision is that of UNDP (PNUD 2005). This focuses on the structure of the
economy, where so much is produced by a few sets of activities in the formal sector ⎯
where the large-scale farms and the oil and gas concerns are prominent; while so many are
employed at low productivity in the diverse activities of a large informal sector consisting
of petty trading, artisan manufacturing, and smallholder farming. For UNDP, the key is
fostering the growth of the latter by freeing the limitations it faces. These include
uncertainty over changeable public policy, missing institutions and market failures ⎯ credit
access being a prime example, and the prevailing lack of trust of participants in other
economic actors other than members of their families.
Implicit in this argument is that the informal sector, that contains the bulk of the
workforce, has the potential to produce, grow and become a great deal more productive
than it currently is. But to alter the constraints faced implies some fundamental changes in
the way the political system operates, requires institutional innovations, and a way of
changing social attitudes: a tall order, perhaps.
Klasen et al. (2004) share some of the concerns of UNDP. They note the need to activate
the economy across a wider spectrum than currently pertains. Gas revenues can be used to
finance investments in other sectors, including highland agriculture, unpromising though
that sector may be. Tax reform and deregulation of the urban labour market are
recommended. Rural-urban migration should be encouraged, looking to realise the
potential of the small towns as growth points. Above all, they argue, economic growth will
not solve social and political issues: these need to be addressed directly, with deep reforms
to remedy the equally deep and longstanding inequalities, including redistribution of assets.
One thing that all analyses agree on is that the governance of Bolivia is dire and either at
least a major factor or the very root of economic problems. The form of democracy
instituted since 1982 barely functions. The parties have weak policy programmes and
compete on the basis of promises of patronage to supporters. Worse, none of the main
parties has been able to command a clear majority (the December 2005 elections excepted),
so that coalitions need to be built based on trading favours. Ministerial posts are spread
across claimants from the parties in the coalition, and most civil service posts are in the
power of the party bosses. The system produces a patrimonial state that makes poor use of
state funds, provides public goods badly, and generates unpredictable policies; within a
context of repeated political crises that have their origins in a general lack of trust in
government and a sense that government is illegitimate.
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Although the state is in many respects weak, it is able to reward supporters of the parties in
power, and provide ⎯ although perhaps in haphazard fashion ⎯ benefits to some largescale business interests.
It is easy to construct an explanation for economic failure. Put simply, the combination of
poor delivery of public services; inconsistent policy; and weak formal institutions, above all
in property rights and the rule of law ⎯ produces a rotten environment for business.
But did not the reforms of the 1990s intend to address many of these problems? Yes, they
did. But the reforms
were limited by, at least, four factors:
(i) most reforms were not fully implemented (e.g., fiscal consolidation);
(ii) the reforms did not extend to the investment climate for private sector
activities;
(iii) institutional reforms (e.g., enforcement of contracts, customs) began late, have
not been vigorously pursued, and take longer to complete; and
(iv) some reforms led to new distortions (e.g., pension). (World Bank 2005, 23)
Those parts of the package that could be implemented and controlled by relatively small
groups of talented bureaucrats, with political backing, seem to have worked well ⎯
macroeconomic stabilisation in particular has been achieved. Those parts requiring more
extensive change have stumbled.
Box 2: Change and persistence in Bolivian history
Dr George Gray M. and his team at UNDP distinguish between patterns and models:
Bolivia exhibits a series of enduring patterns, even though the model in which the pattern
is reproduced may change quite dramatically.
So, for example, the dominant historical pattern of economic growth is that of exploiting
the rich natural resources of Bolivia; while the models of private ownership by oligarchs,
state enterprises, foreign companies and a new generation of local bourgeoisie have
changed almost by the decade.
Patterns
that Varying models and manifestations
persist and reemerge
The paternal state
MNR, the military (both left and right wing), the post-1982
democracy ⎯ all centralised, paternal
Exception: since the early 1990s, new ventures in participation
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and decentralisation to municipalities
A dual economy Oligarchs ⎯ the tin barons of the first half of the C20
of
State corporations ⎯ Comibol ex 1952, YPFB
(a)
Natural
Foreign companies ⎯ Standard Oil, Gulf, Petrobras, BG, etc.
resource enclaves
National bourgeoisie ⎯ the large-scale farmers of the Oriente
Tin from the 1900s to the 1970s, coca in the 1970s and 1980s,
cotton in the 1970s, soybeans in the 1990s, oil from the 1930s,
gas in the 1990s
(b)
Subsistence Smallholder farming
and survival
Small-scale manufacturing and commerce
Entrenched
differences, by:
(a) Region
The highlands ⎯ close to seat of government, heavily populated,
the scenes of the deepest social divisions, economic inequality
and misery
The lowlands ⎯ a less divisive history, control by local elites,
distrust of distant central government ⎯ and yet reproducing
pronounced inequalities social and economic
(b) Social group
Persistent inequality, yet changing identities:
•
Class ⎯ peasants & workers versus the bourgeoisie,
•
Sector ⎯ miners and peasants,
•
Region ⎯ the camba-kolla divide between lowlanders and
highlanders, and
•
Ethnicity ⎯ mestizos versus indigenes (Aymara, Guaraní,
Quechua, etc.)
Source: PNUD 2005
The results over a half century have been overall failure: yet both in time and space, by
sector and social group, the panorama is hugely varied. Variation, of course, must be true in
almost countries throughout history. 2 Perhaps then the great frustration in Bolivia seems to
the inability of the country to harness its successes, to expand and replicate them for the
greater good of the economy and society.
Indeed, it would not be difficult to construct a Darwinian hypothesis that sees
economic, social and political success as a matter of selecting from the variety of
experiences seen.
2
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The role of institutions in Bolivian economic history
What are issues that have arisen with economic institutions? Perhaps two points stand
out.
One concerns property rights. During the last fifty years there have been repeated
episodes where rights have been in doubt. On land, the reform of 1953 gave rise to a
situation where many smallholders possessed the land, but did not have titles or legal
backing for their plots. Arguably this impeded a land market and prevented holdings from
being mortgaged or pledged as collateral. But the point is contested: informal norms on
access to land in highland communities have been respected, and land has been transferred
as and when it has been to the advantage of those concerned. More recently, there are
disputes over the status of land in the eastern lowlands where some large farmers have
taken over land; while the relationship between indigenous communities of Guaraní and
other ethno-linguistic groups to their ancestral lands held and used under collective tenure
is not always clear in the eyes of the state.
Rights over factories and equipment have also been put in doubt. Different governments
have nationalised enterprises and later privatised them, and most recently attempted to
reassert public control over sensitive sectors such as water provision and the oil and gas
fields. As noted, the World Bank sees recent doubts over these rights as deterring investors,
and especially foreign capital. While a plausible argument, it is not clear that rates of
investment were any better before the recent controversies over water and hydrocarbon
fields.
The second point concerns transaction costs and associated market failures. For some
observers, and notably UNDP, the failure to raise output and productivity in the informal
sector is a key issue. Much of the problem can be seen as one of lack of information ⎯ on
markets, techniques, possible alliances in industrial organisation, and above all, on the
character and competence of potential partners in the supply chain. Exacerbating this has
been chronic uncertainty. Some of this has been almost inevitable: small and weak
economies such as that of Bolivia are highly vulnerable to events on world markets and
natural hazards such as droughts. But equally, the policy environment has been
unpredictable; and above all, government has been more of a hindrance than a help. Public
goods have been provided poorly, while attempts are regulation have been heavy-handed
and applied unpredictably, and often with a view to milking semi-legal enterprises that by
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Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
their status are always likely to be in contravention of one or other rule. As the UNDP
(PNUD 2005) notes ruefully, small-scale businesses have come together strongly and
effectively when defending themselves against the depredations of state operatives ⎯ but
seem unable to take this co-operation forward into the realm of production.
For UNDP, the consequence of this state of affairs has not only been to put a brake on
informal enterprises, but also to distort their efforts towards activities with quick turn-over
and against those with longer-term pay-offs. Trading ⎯ including dealing in contraband
imports ⎯ prospers, manufacturing is repressed.
Again, while these arguments are plausible, it is difficult to test them. So many
disadvantages face the informal sector that attributing problems to any one set of factors is
difficult.
There is an intriguing hypothesis on economic institutions arising from history. Bolivia’s
economy, and certainly the formal side of it and those sectors generating exports, has
always been based on large-scale enterprises. These, by and large, require few institutions to
function. Comibol, for example, as a huge state conglomerate with monopoly powers over
the mining sector, only needed the legal authority to operate as Comibol ⎯ something that
the government could provide literally at the stroke of a pen. From then on, almost all
transactions were internal to the corporation so that questions that might in other cases be
ones of co-ordination within markets, were converted into the rather more tractable
questions of hierarchical organisation. 3 Similar, if less dramatically clear cut cases, apply to
the oil and gas corporations, and perhaps even to the large-scale farms of the Oriente. The
state’s role in establishing economic institutions or underwriting and fostering them has not
been a priority: once the property rights to land, mineral deposits, and oil and gas fields
have been awarded; or monopoly rights to trade have been issued, then there has been little
demand for the state to do more.
Indeed it might be argued that the state-led and corporatist approaches to the economy
that characterised Bolivian economic management through until 1985 ⎯ and that have
arguably persisted in muted and veiled forms thereafter ⎯ have detracted public attention
from the issue of bolstering the economic institutions necessary to run a market economy,
and certainly one that is broad-based with reasonably level playing fields for all.
Of course, as a state monopoly it didn’t much matter if Comibol was inefficient in its
internal organisation: it was not under threat from competition and governments would
not allow it to go bankrupt.
3
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Steve Wiggins, Alexander Schejtman & George Gray
Box 3: Deeper roots of institutional stunting ⎯ the case of hacienda
The rural estate or hacienda dominated the rural economy and society of western and highland
Bolivia before the 1952 Revolution and subsequent land reform.
The way in which production was organised, using indented or corvée labour on the central estate,
impeded industrialisation not only in terms of restricting the domestic market for manufactured
goods, but also in terms of not allowing for the development of business skills amongst the peones
(workers/peasants).
This stands in marked contrast to other countries that, at the time they began their
industrialisation, had a large mass of small and medium-scale farms that both constituted a
demand for products from the factories and who also were used to running small businesses.
The interesting question here is to what extent this historical legacy locked the rural communities
into a under-development of both entrepreneurial capacity and the institutions to allow smallscale businesses to flourish ⎯ or whether in the half-century since land reform, these deficits
have been made up.
Source: Alexander Schejtman
The story of political institutions, however, is one that captures the attention and
imagination of many authors. Despite the apparent lack of theory about political
institutions as institutions, the dominant argument concerns the failure to establish a state
and society that is ruled by laws that are impersonal, universal and perceived to be fair.
(Prats 2003) To put it crudely, Bolivian society and politics have been forged by groups
that, once in power, have had little or no respect for the rights, however minimal, of others.
Rules and norms are manipulated blatantly in favour of supporters, and twisted against the
opposition. Thus no-one in the political, social and economic spheres, can trust the future
unless they can be sure that they are well placed with the ruling group at any given time.
This might not matter had Bolivia seen a stable political configuration, where whether just
or not, the key actors, vested interests, and biases in the system were well-established and
predictable. On the contrary, Bolivia has seen rapid turnover of governments ⎯ more than
25 in a half century (Kaufmann et al. 2002), with at least four regimes of government ⎯
the old oligarchy, the MNR revolutionaries, military dictatorships and the re-establishment
of democracy. 4
Hence Bolivia has had a combination of highly personalised government, but within a
context of great instability, so that personal alliances forged under any one regime have had
to be frequently reconstructed under the subsequent ones. For businesses one response to
Conceivably the government of Morales that has just begun could see a fifth phase:
most Bolivians hope for this, and this is why they voted for Evo.
4
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Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
such a scenario has been to keep contacts with potential power holders, another has been
to form defensive alliances to ward off threats, and a third ⎯ there must be others ⎯ has
been to establish mechanisms that allow one rapidly to curry favour with whoever has
come to power. The general pattern is that large-scale enterprises have cultivated their
access to the corridors of power, while smaller businesses have formed defensive
associations. Indeed, a prominent and recurrent feature of Bolivian political life has been
the formation of unions (sindicatos) in all spheres of life to represent and defend particular
interests ⎯ see Box 4.
Box 4: Rural unions ⎯ the case of the sindicatos
An unusual feature of Bolivia is the degree throughout society of the formation of
unions around occupations. There is nothing remarkable about this for manufacturing
and mining; but in Bolivia the experience was repeated amongst the smallholders of the
highlands after the Revolution.
Once the land invasions of 1952 and 1953 were underway, the MNR sought to build its
base amongst the campesinos in the same way that the miners and other groups were
organised ⎯ in formal trades unions. Hence under the MNR a strong network of
federated unions developed in the highlands. The unions however saw their role as
similar to that of the miners: a fighting force to defend interests and demand their rights
⎯ in the case of the campesinos, their rights to their ancestral lands. Politically the
sindicatos were on the left.
The peasant unions did not then prioritise economic issues: they did not see themselves
as incipient co-operatives, looking to improve marketing, to secure inputs or access
credit.
The subsequent history of the rural unions is that they the subject of attempts to co-opt
them by the conservative military regimes ⎯ the Pacto Campesino-Militar ⎯ in patriotic
alliances that stressed supposedly ‘traditional’ and conservative values. This gave the
military a counter-force to the militant miners. This worked for a while, but the military
were intolerant of what they saw as dissent, repressed it (1974) and alienated the union
leaders.
In the 1980s the unions re-emerged, but this time looking to ally themselves with the
development efforts funded by the donors and the NGOS. One new protest emerged at
this time: that of the coca growers ⎯ mainly in the Chapare ⎯ in opposition to attempts
to eradicate the crop. 5
In the last decade, the unions have fallen into disrepute in some areas, such as parts of
the Altiplano (Norte, Potosí): they have been seen by the peasantry as vehicles for
political advancement by ambitious local leaders that do little for the peasants
themselves. There are now reports from communities in the Altiplano Norte that many
village elders now ignore the union structures, and proudly wearing longstanding Aymara
costume (the union leader would more likely wear the clothes of a mestizo or cholo),
5
In these structures a young leader cut his political teeth. His name? Evo Morales.
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Steve Wiggins, Alexander Schejtman & George Gray
represent themselves as leaders of ayllus ⎯ the centuries-old form of organisation of the
Aymara. Another development has been the formation of producer organisations with
an economic agenda ⎯ the Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas (OECA) that are grouped
under a a national co-ordiinating body, CIOEC.
These changes have seen open conflict between the OECAs and the unions when the
latter, in pursuit of national protest have blocked roads, to the detriment of OECA
members who are trying to get their milk to the cities.
All these developments are woven in with the new experiences of decentralised
government at municipal level where local elections bring into competition leaders with
identities and identifications as distinct as union leaders, traditional elders, and smallscale business leaders.
Unions in other areas ⎯ central Cochabamba, for example ⎯ have adapted to the new
local democratisation and are active participants in the municipal governments.
Sources: Alexander Schejtman, Fairfield 2004, Urioste 2005, Whitehead & Gray M. 2004
One constant in the political field, however, is perhaps a cultural legacy. The state in
Bolivia is weak. It struggles to run an administration that effectively provides public goods.
It rarely is able to formulate and implement policy programmes that are coherent, focused
and strategic. It is chronically incapable of running the country according to the rule of law
(‘estado de derecho’). And it cannot even ensure its own survival: most administrations
have been wretchedly short-lived, and even within the short time span of most
governments, the rotation of ministers has been high.
Yet despite these manifestations of a weak state, all manner of actors and organisations in
Bolivia demonstrate an enduring pattern of belief in strong central government, with the
state in a highly paternal role to the population. The state has still been seen as the main
hope for improvement by petitioners and claimants. So we see an apparent paradox: almost
every protest movement in Bolivia begins by noting the many flaws of the current
administration, yet still presents demands on the state where the implicit assumption is
that somehow the state can deliver.
This would be illogical, were it not that, despite its evident weaknesses, the state has indeed
been able to offer valuable favours ⎯ in allocating rights to natural resources, in
distributing opportunities to take rents through permits and licences, by offering jobs to
the unemployed within the state bureaucracy, and otherwise by the patterns of its
admittedly limited public spending.
So this then completes a miserable feedback loop: a weak state is actually encouraged to be
particularistic so as to have something to offer to supporters and petitioners in the
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Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
immediate future. But by doing so, the state ensures that in the not-so-long term it not only
remains chronically weak, but also loses legitimacy in the eyes of the majority ⎯ and
thereby more or less condemns any administration running the system to a swift fall, and
often in the midst of chaotic events ⎯ strikes, road blocks, uprisings, military coups, etc. 6
On the basis of these notes, an overall hypothesis that explains Bolivia’s extraordinarily
poor economic record in institutional terms can be constructed ⎯ as set out in Box 5.
Box 5: Economic failure and institutions ⎯ an extreme case
In broad terms, low economic growth in Bolivia ⎯ at least for the last thirty years ⎯ is closely
associated with low levels of investment. But why has there been such a reluctance to invest?
A highly unequal society is reflected in economic dualism in which a small number of large
enterprises produce a substantial fraction of GDP and generate the bulk of export earnings.
The large enterprises seek from the state two things: rights to resources ⎯ minerals, oil and gas
fields, agricultural land; and a series of rent-generating favours ⎯ protection from imports, tax
exemptions, control of the entry of competitors, etc. As far as economic institutions are
concerned, the demand is for property rights ⎯ and highly particular ones at that, and for little
else.
Consequently the state is under no pressure from large enterprise to develop institutions to
reduce transactions costs, or to foster economic co-operation.
Large-scale enterprise, operating along the lines typically described as ‘crony capitalism’, has to
invest energies in cultivating links to political leaders and senior civil servants to ensure that their
demands are heard.
The cost of this is unusually high in Bolivia since administrations, and indeed political regimes,
are very short-lived. Hence business repeatedly has to recreate connections and faces chronic
uncertainty over the future actions of the state.
Hence large-scale enterprise is reluctant to invest.
Meanwhile, the informal sector thus finds itself operating in an economic landscape where the
best opportunities have been cherry-picked by the large corporations; and where the institutions
that would allow a vigorous and broad-based market to operate effectively are absent.
Hence informal enterprises lack the means to invest, and in any case, face the same chronic
uncertainty as larger businesses, and hence invest little.
This may explain low investment and low growth, to some degree. Unfortunately, it is not a
hypothesis can easily be tested. Critical variables ⎯ time and energy invested in political
connections, perceptions of uncertainty ⎯ cannot be observed. Moreover, the processes
outlined operate in complex systems that depend on highly contextual and changing sets of
conditioning variables.
Moreover, the explanation raises other important questions. For example:
Why has the informal sector, particularly under democracy where the many votes it commands
should count, not demanded that the state help create the necessary institutions for economic
As can be seen in this part of the argument, separating the ‘state’ from the
administration in power is not simple. This in itself may be another manifestation of
political failure.
6
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Steve Wiggins, Alexander Schejtman & George Gray
growth?
Why has not an elite composed of crony capitalists and a political dictatorship managed to create
long-lived control of the state, with accompanying economic growth that gives it a patina of
legitimacy ⎯in the way seen in several fast-growing Asian states?
Not all observers are gloomy over the evolution of the political system. There are those ⎯
such as Whitehead & Gary Molina 2004 ⎯ who see long-term changes in Bolivia, and
who believe that there are forces of democratisation and participation that are about to
break, once and for all, the chains of history within the current generation. This optimism
is based on the working through of the laws of popular participation and decentralisation
where there are signs that, after a decade, the fruits of broad-based democracy are coming
to the fore. Associated with this is the confident re-assertion of the rights of some of the
most marginalised communities of Bolivia. While in the short run this may make for yet
more political instability, it is in the longer run perhaps the only way that deep-seated
wounds of persistent inequality in Bolivia will ever be healed.
Summarising: Bolivia’s challenges
Although there is a temptation to think of Bolivia as a case study about how Washington
Consensus policies ‘failed’ over the past 15 or more years, this must be resisted, for at least
three reasons.
First, the assumption that a wave of ‘second generation’ institutional reforms actually held
sway in Bolivia must be revisited. Although laws were passed, decrees enacted, and
bureaucracies rearranged, the Bolivian reforms were hampered by serious problems in
implementation. 7 Few institutional reforms actually outlived governmental change ⎯ the
exceptions are capitalization reform of 1993, popular participation reform of 1994 and the
education reform of 1993. Most other reforms withered or were watered down by
successive legislative, administrative or policy changes.
Second, even those reforms that did survive governmental change should probably not be
evaluated as ‘Washington Consensus’ reforms, in the sense of representing homogeneous
recipes imported from Washington-based institutions. In fact, both Capitalization and
See George Gray Molina, Ernesnto Perez de Rada and Wilson Jiménez (1999) and
George Gray Molina and Gonzalo Chávez (2005).
7
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Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
Participation, may have succeeded precisely because they adapted to local informal
institutions, existing political practice and popular expectations. 8 9
Third, ‘second-generation’ reforms enacted in the 1980s and 1990s are only starting to have
a cumulative effect over social and political institutions and economic growth. Perhaps
more important than the neo-liberal reforms of August 1985 (Decree 21060), is the
collapse of tin mineral prices in October of 1985. This relates to a longer economic cycle
that encompasses a number of path-dependent institutions ⎯ both state and non-state—
that survive despite being dysfunctional to current economic conditions. 10
If Bolivia is not a failed case of policy reformism, what is it a case of? We would argue
Bolivia is a case of path dependence of formal and informal economic and social institutions
that have outlived their usefulness in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty.
Many of the institutions built around 18th and 19thth century silver mining and 20th century
tin mining are part of the current patchwork of formal and informal institutions ⎯ even 20
years after the collapse of the tin mining economy, 50 years after the National Revolution
and close to a 100 years after the collapse of the silver mining. Bolivian institutions
designed to secure property rights around tin mining concessions, to overcome the longrun costs of being landlocked and geographically diverse, and promote patrimonial and
clientelistic forms of social and political inclusion, have outlived their usefulness. Ironically,
as the Bolivian economy veers towards higher dependence on natural gas and returns to
popular forms of broad-based governance this institutional memory seems more relevant
than ever.
We believe the Bolivian case can provide insights into the mechanics of institutional path
dependence in societies marked by profound social change. Ethnic, class and regional
cleavages make the task all the more interesting and relevant to multi-cultural comparative
research. The Bolivian case is in one sense a natural experiment for hypotheses on
distributional conflict, institutional change and economic growth. It is characterized both
by a history of long-term fundamental political change emerging from the National
Capitalization is currently under political heat, despite delivering a gas-rich economy
for the next few decades.
8
9
See Carol Graham (1997) and Merilee Grindle (1999).
10
See Laurence Whitehead and George Gray Molina (2003).
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Steve Wiggins, Alexander Schejtman & George Gray
Revolution of 1952 and is also characterized by more recent economic and social change
since 1985, that has changed the nature of distributional conflict in the political arena.
Research issues arising
We suggest four sets of research questions which might help understand both Bolivia´s
current predicament and also advance on the comparative agenda of institutional change,
economic growth and poverty reduction. They are framed as macro, meso and micro level
research questions.
First, to the extent that Bolivia´s National Revolution of 1952 changed the long-term
nature of distributional coalitions ⎯ the same tin-based economy under different
institutional rules ⎯ it provides a natural experiment of how institutional change affected
the trajectory of economic growth and poverty reduction over time. In particular, it
provides a case for analyzing the macro effects of three different institutional models ⎯
liberal 1900–1952, nationalized 1952–1985, and mixed 1985–2005 ⎯ under the same
underlying development pattern based on natural resource extraction with little value
added. To a certain extent, radical changes in the institutional model do not seem to make a
difference in average economic growth between 1950 and 2005 (average per capita growth
is zero, in this period). Why is this so? And, what consequences does this have for the
institutional trajectory that locks in impoverishing growth? The answer would seem to
point to politics and distributional coalitions discussed by Acemoglu et al.
To the extent that the dominant distributional coalition changed property rights three times
in 50 years, allowed rent-seeking and political capture of key economic institutions, it
sustained an economic status quo of half a century. Interestingly, the same cannot be said
of political and social change which show significant improvements over the second half of
the twentieth century. Paradoxically, many of these positive effects might derive precisely
from the same distributional coalition that maintained the economic status quo, albeit with
a 20 or 30 year lag ⎯ once the changes brought about by agrarian reform, nationalization
of mines and other measures had a chance to institutionalize. It is possible that many of the
achievements in social and economic progress of the 1980s and 1990s emerged thanks to
long term processes of institutional accumulation from social and economic institutions set
into motion 20 or 30 years earlier.
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Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
This contrast between model and pattern might be framed as a macro hypothesis on the
determinants of economic growth and poverty reduction in Bolivia. It suggests that both formal
and informal institutions are functional over the long run to a distributional coalition anchored
on a single development pattern. If Bolivia does not change either the dominant naturalresource-based distributional coalition, or its dependence on natural resource extraction
altogether, it is unlikely to escape the trajectory of zero per capita growth witnessed over the
second half of the twentieth century.
Second, and at the meso level, Bolivia provides an interesting experiment in how economic
organizations and institutions such as agrarian unions, mining unions and different forms
of social capital travel over time and space. With the collapse of the mining sector in 1985,
massive migration from the highlands to capital cities, coca-growing centres in the Chapare
valley, and agro-industrial production in the Santa Cruz lowlands resulted in an interesting
institutional mix. Thousands of miner and agrarian unions relocated in the Chapare, Santa
Cruz and El Alto with very different economic outcomes. To the extent that we are able to
track how organizations transplanted from tin-mining to coca farming, soybean agroindustrial production and a massive informal sector in the highland cities, we can analyse
the path dependence of a certain organisational form and a certain political logic over
different economic activities.
It is no secret that Bolivians readily form social and economic associations. A recent study
focusing on social capital in El Alto, suggests that while social capital has been readily
translated into neighbourhood and self-help functions, the very same social capital does not
seem to facilitate economic or productive activities linked to risk-taking, technological
adoption or market activities. Why is this? One hypothesis points to the limits of miner
union associations transplanted to export-oriented wood manufacturing, organic agriculture
or leather processing, which may be simply dysfunctional. The phrase ‘solidarios pero
solitarios’ (united in solidarity, yet solitary) emerges in the cross-examination of such
initiatives. Again, path dependence in meso-level organisation would seem to contribute to
long term lock-in to impoverishing growth.
A meso level hypothesis on association, social capital and organisational characteristics of
different types of economic activities can be tested empirically by looking more closely into the
economic activities of Aymara mining migrants in lowland Santa Cruz, coca-growing Chapare
and the highland city of El Alto. All three regions were recipients of massive highland migration
in the 1980s, and all three can be tracked geographically to the point of identifying the impact of
institutional adaptation to different economic environments. The impact of association and
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Steve Wiggins, Alexander Schejtman & George Gray
social capital also has obvious implications over current social and political affairs in Bolivia,
particularly after the election of Evo Morales, the country´s first Aymara (and migrant) president.
Third, more micro level analysis focusing on household level analysis might reveal
additional insight into the dynamics of institutional change, economic growth and poverty
reduction in Bolivia. Recent studies suggest that from being pro-poor, economic growth in
Bolivia has led to an absolute increase in the number of poor over time and a slight
increase in income and consumption-based inequality. Micro-level analysis leads to a more
detailed discussion of institutions that smoothen idiosyncratic and systemic risk over time.
Household diversification strategies that fill in holes in the insurance safety net, explain
both why household-based economies are resilient to many types of exogenous shocks, but
also why it is extremely difficult to transform household based economic networks into risk
adopting, competitive, entrepreneurial initiatives.
Most of the existing literature in Bolivia has focused on these consumption and income
smoothing strategies on their own, without linking the discussion back to the meso and
macro level hypotheses discussed above. Studies on micro-credit and micro-finance have
come closest to examining the linkages between risk, institutions and growth, but have
often focused on the supply side of the equation ⎯ i.e. the profitability of micro-credit
institutions, their growth, etc. — rather than on the poor themselves. Perhaps a focus on
different types of linkages between tradeable and non-tradeable sector activities might help
understand how the micro story of institutional incentives and obstacles fits into the larger
story.
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Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative summary
A micro level hypothesis might unravel why and how household-based economies in Bolivia
diversify but do not specialise, thus sustaining a massive urban informal sector below the poverty
line. The way to unravel this question is to compare household-based producers in tradeable
sectors (such as export chains), vis-à-vis household based producers in non-tradeable sectors
(such as urban commerce or transportation services). The contrast will start to answer why and
how institutions can create incentives for risk adoption, technological adoption and overall
market competitiveness. This type of analysis can also be framed within the meso and macro
level hypotheses discussed above.
Finally, a fourth set of questions operates at both a practical and meta-hypothetical level.
Explanations of Bolivia’s economic plight are, if anything, over-determined. That is to say,
there are too many plausible candidates to explain what has happened. The enormous
challenge facing scholars is then to pick their way through all the plausible factors, to
isolate those that drive the system ⎯ while recognising, of course, that perhaps the system
only works the way it does owing to the multiplicity of factors in play at any given time. It
is small wonder, then, that a definitive explanation and diagnosis for Bolivia escapes the
many impressive researchers who have examined the country.
How, then, may we shed useful light on this? One strategy is that of internal comparisons,
through time and space ⎯ overall the story may be one of failure, but that is not true at all
times, in all regions, and in all sectors. Indeed, a strong paradox of contemporary Bolivia is
that there are boom sectors and regions. So what exactly is the difference between the
booming soya bean sector and the stagnation seen in other parts of the economy?
Comparative case studies could be highly instructive. For example, comparing the supply
chain for some highland farm production with soya or other commodities from the eastern
lowlands. UNDP (PNUD 2005) has had adopted an approach along these lines with some
success. This might be developed more formally, with an explicit focus on the institutional
elements of the supply chains.
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Steve Wiggins, Alexander Schejtman & George Gray
References
Fairfield, Tasha (2004) ‘The politics of livestock sector policy and the rural poor in Bolivia’,
Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative Working Paper No 15, FAO, Roma, July 2004
Kaufmann, Daniel, Massimo Mastruzzi & Diego Zavaleta, (2002) ‘Sustained
Macroeconomic Reforms, Tepid Growth: A Governance Puzzle in Bolivia?’, The World
Bank, Draft, February, 2002
Klasen, Stephan, Melanie Grosse, Rainer Thiele, Jann Lay, Julius Spatz & Manfred Wiebelt,
(2004) ‘A Country Case Study on Bolivia’, “Operationalising Pro- Poor Growth”, A joint
initiative of AFD, BMZ (GTZ, KfW Development Bank), DFID, and the World Bank,
October, 2004
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (2004) ‘Bolivia’s Political Party
System and the Incentives for Pro-Poor Reform’. Assessment Report and Program
Recommendations, October 2004, The National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs, Washington DC
PNUD (2005) ‘La economía más allá del gas’, Human Development Report, La Paz, Bolivia,
Sept 2005
Prats i Català, Joan (2003) ‘El progreso no es lo que era: fundamentos instituticionales para
un país en riesgo’, Prats, Joan et al., 2003, El desarrollo posible, las instituticiones necesarias,
Institut Internacional de Governabilitat, Barcelona & Plural editores, La Paz, Bolivia
Urioste, Miguel (2005) ‘Los nietos de la reforma agrarian’, draft text, Fundación Tierra, La
Paz, Bolivia
Whitehead, Laurence & George Gray-Molina (2004) ‘Political capabilities over the long
run’, Peter Houtzager and Mick Moore (eds.), Changing Paths. International development and the
new politics of inclusion, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
World Bank, 2000, ‘Bolivia. From Patronage to a Professional State. Bolivia Institutional
and Governance Review’, Report No 20115–B, World Bank, Washington DC
World Bank, 2005, ‘Bolivia Country Economic Memorandum. Policies to Improve Growth
and Employment’, Report No. 32233-BO, July 20, 2005, Washington DC
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List of IPPG Paper Series
IPPG Working Paper Series
IPPG WP 1:
Wiggins, S. et al. (2006) Bolivia Case Study: an interpretative
summary
IPPG Briefings
IPPG Briefing 1:
Leftwich, A. (2006) What are ‘institutions’?
IPPG Programme
The Research Programme Consortium on Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth,
known as the ‘IPPG Programme’ was launched in September 2005. This five year programme
is funded by the Department for International Development of the Government of the
United Kingdom, and is led by the Development Studies Institute at the London School of
Economics and Political Science.
The IPPG Programme consortium has been formed by the following organisations, with the
lead researchers named –
•
African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), Kenya – Professor Olu Ajakaiye (Research
Director)
•
Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS), India – Bipul Chatterjee (Director)
•
Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Senegal – Professor
Adebayo Olukoshi (Executive Secretary) and Dr Ebrima Sall (Research Director)
•
Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics & Political Science, UK –
Professor John Harriss (Professor of Development Studies) and Dr Kunal Sen (of the University
of East Anglia)
•
Latin American Centre for Rural Development (Rimisp), Chile – Dr Alexander Schejtman
(Senior Research Fellow)
•
Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, UK - Dr Junior Davis (Principal
Economist), Professor Paul Hare (Professor of Economics, Heriot Watt University, Edinburgh),
Professor John Morton (Associate Research Director - Social Sciences) and Ms Felicity Proctor
(Director, Programme Development)
•
Overseas Development Institute, UK – Dr Steve Wiggins and Dr Dirk Willem te Velde (Research
Fellows)
•
University of York, UK, Department of Politics – Dr Adrian Leftwich
Contact IPPG Programme Office
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Postal ddress:
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