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The economic crisis and political participation among
young people
A multilevel analysis of political participation in 23 European democracies
Ådne Hindenes
Master thesis at the Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
May 23, spring 2016
Word count: 33 020
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The economic crisis and political participation among
young people
A multilevel analysis of political participation in 23 European democracies
Ådne Hindenes
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Copyright: Ådne Hindenes
Year: 2016
The economic crisis and political participation among young people
Ådne Hindenes
Word count: 33 020
http://www.duo.uio.no
Print: Copy Cat Forskningsparken, Oslo
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Abstract
This thesis studies two distinct dimensions of political participation, elite-directed
and elite-challenging political participation among young people in the wake of the
2008 economic crisis. The two forms of political participation are based upon the
classical concepts of Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979) conventional and unconventional
political participation. The research question that is studied in this analysis is: Do
changes in economic and social conditions affect the degree and type of political
participation that young people engage in? I test two different theories, the civic
voluntarism model and grievance theory. Both of the theories use resources to explain the political participation of individuals. The research question is answered
through linear multilevel analysis of two rounds of the European Social Survey from
2008 and 2010. The analysis finds that there is an age gap in political participation,
but that this age gap is between older individuals and the rest of the population.
The main finding of the thesis is that resources are a prerequisite for both forms of
political participation. This indicates support for the civic voluntarism model.
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Preface
A master thesis is a milestone in 25 years of curiosity and search for knowledge. Many
people have contributed to this search and deserve thanks for their contributions. First and
foremost I would like to thank my thesis advisor Johannes Bergh. Without your good advice
and our many interesting discussions the quality of this thesis would not have been nearly
as good as it is today. I would also like to thank everyone at the Institute for Social Studies
for providing a great and inspiring working environment. As a student I have been lucky to
be able to take part in the academic community that is ISF. I would also like to thank the
politics seminar at ISF for comments and advice on an early draft of this thesis. My sister,
assistant Professor Hanne Fjelde, deserves credit for reading and commenting on a draft of
the thesis.
A saying goes, behind every man there is a strong woman, and I am no different. To my
fiancée, Marianne, thanks for putting up with me for the last year. I am grateful for your
emotional support and comments on my scholarly arguments throughout the years. Although
there have been some ups and downs, you have been solid as a rock by my side. Without
you I don´t know if this thesis would have been completed.
Some people have been there for a longer time and has provided support no matter what.
Thanks to my mother Lisa, my father Per and my other siblings for providing an environment
where curiosity could thrive and where knowledge about society and the world in general is
valued. This thesis is a result of the support you have provided over the years.
Throughout my academic journey at the University of Oslo, especially Karl Bjurstrøm,
Erlend Langøren, Mads Motrøen and Morten Werring deserve special thanks. Without the
discussions on problems in society, lunches and late nights at Blindern this author would
have had a life filled with less fun and comfort.
All errors and shortcomings are of course my own.
Ådne Hindenes
Oslo, 20th of May 2016
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Contents
1 Introduction
1
2 Key concepts and theory
6
2.1
The literature on political participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
2.2
What is political participation?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
2.3
Who are young people? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
2.4
What is political trust? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
2.5
Economic insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
2.6
Why European countries?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
2.7
Age and political participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
2.8
Political trust and participation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
2.9
Economic conditions and political participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
2.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24
3 Methodology and research design
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3.1
Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
25
3.2
A note on index creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28
3.3
Dependent variables: Political participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
29
3.4
Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
3.4.1
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
3.4.2
Political trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.4.3
Economic insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.4.4
Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Quantitative analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.5.1
Why multilevel analysis?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.5.2
Assumptions of a multilevel model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Treatment of missing data and summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.5
3.6
4 Analysis
4.1
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Bivariate relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43
4.1.1
Are there age differences in political participation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4.1.2
Do differences in trust affect political participation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47
4.1.3
Does economic insecurity affect the political participation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4.2
Multilevel models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 Political participation among young people
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5.1
Summary of findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.2
Implications and limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.3
Further research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Bibliography
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Appendices
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List of Tables
3.1
Countries included in the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.2
Correlation between different types of political participation 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.3
Correlation between different types of political participation 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.4
Factor analysis of different aspects of trust 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.5
Factor analysis of different aspects of trust 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.6
Summary statistics ESS 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.7
Summary statistics ESS 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4.1
Mean values of different types of political participation by age (young) in 2008 . . . . . . . .
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4.2
Mean values of different types of political participation by age (old) in 2008 . . . . . . . . . .
44
4.3
Mean values of different types of political participation by age (young) in 2010 . . . . . . . .
44
4.4
Mean values of different types of political participation by age (old) in 2010 . . . . . . . . . .
44
4.5
Bivariate correlation between political participation and trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4.6
Multilevel regression with Elite-directed participation as dependent variable, 2008
. . . . . .
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4.7
Multilevel regression with elite-directed as dependent variable, 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4.8
Multilevel regression with elite-challenging participation as dependent variable, 2008 . . . . .
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4.9
Multilevel regression with elite-challenging as dependent variable, 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.1
Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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A.1 Correlation between different aspects of trust 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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A.2 Correlation between different aspects of trust 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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A.3 Summary statistics of all variables 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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A.4 Summary statistics
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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A.5 VIF-values for independent variables (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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A.6 VIF-values for independent variables (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
96
B.1 Mean values of different types of political participation by age within each country.
. . . . .
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B.2 Correlations of aspects of trust and different types of political participation by country . . . .
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List of Figures
3.1
Formative and reflective indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28
3.2
Illustration of an hierarchal structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39
4.1
Scatterplot Elite-directed political participation vs. economic insecurity 2008 . . . . . . . . .
53
4.2
Scatterplot Elite-challenging political participation vs. economic insecurity 2008
. . . . . . .
55
4.3
Interaction effect between age (young) and trust in political authorities
. . . . . . . . . . . .
64
4.4
Interaction effect between age (young) and trust in political authorities
. . . . . . . . . . . .
69
4.5
Interaction effect between age (young) and change in youth unemployment rates and between
4.6
age (young) and real GDP growth rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
74
Interaction effect between age (young) and unemployment status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
79
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1
Introduction
Over the last century a lot of attention has been given to political participation in comparative
political science. During the last decades researchers have focused on the declining and
stagnant electoral turnout. A broader perspective is taken in the literature on political
action. This literature studies both conventional political participation like voter turnout,
and unconventional political participation like protest participation (see Barnes, Kaase et. al.
1979). This thesis will study political participation from the latter perspective. Can factors
connected to the recent economic crisis contribute to explaining differing levels of political
participation among young people in Europe? The 2008 economic crisis brought with it
economic insecurity and perhaps challenged the trust of the citizens in their governments.
Few studies have studied political action in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis1 . A group
that has been affected a lot by the crisis is young people. As far as this author knows, there
are few or no publications that study political action in this group in the aftermath of the
economic crisis. This thesis intends to fill this gap in the research literature.
There are several trends that show that conventional forms of political participation has
been in decline. Firstly, turnout in general elections is stagnant or in decline across established
democracies (See Dalton 1996; Franklin 2004; Dalton 2014). Secondly, since the 1950´s party
membership has been in decline across Europe. Fewer people are there to give a voice to
the people when decisions are made in the parties. Lastly, party identification is also in a
downward spiral (Dalton et al. 2011: 10). A group that is especially affected by these trends
are young people. This age group shows the lowest levels in turnout, party membership and
party identification (See Franklin 2004; Dalton et al. 2013; Milner 2010). The decline in
conventional forms of political participation may indicate that young people are indifferent
to this kind of politics.
Yet, if we look beyond electoral turnout, it may be that young people participate in new
and alternative ways. First, the youngest cohorts partakes more in web petitions through
1 Notable exceptions are Hooghe and Marien (2013) and Kern, Marien and Hooghe (2015).
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social media sites, like Facebook, than older cohorts. Though some critics say that these
petitions are not to be regarded as political activity per se as they concern topics that are
not normally viewed as political (Milner 2010: 71). Second, we see a rise of protest movements
across the globe, suggesting a rise in alternative forms of participation among young people
There are several examples of this in Europe during the last five years, like the 15th of
May-movement in Spain which protested against austerity measures. Another example is
the London riots of 2011 where disenfranchised youths protested against the government
by starting a riot. A final example is the anti-immigrant protests taking place in many
German cities today. The rise in these alternative forms of participation may indicate that
young people engage in different kinds of political activities instead of taking part in the
conventional forms of political participation.
The contrast between conventional and unconventional forms of political participation
with respect to youths is interesting and warrants further study. Specifically, we do not
know much about what may explain the shift from conventional to unconventional forms of
participation. Adressing this gap, this thesis will study political participation among youths
in Europe. More specifically it will explore the following research question:
Do changes in economic and social conditions affect the degree and type of political
participation that young people engage in?
This question will be answered through a multilevel analysis of survey data from the European
Social Survey (ESS). Data from 2008 and 2010 are used to compare participation before and
after the economic crisis hits. The economic crisis was a shock which created worsening
economic conditions, including higher youth unemployment. A multilevel approach is best
suited taking into concideration the research question and the nature of the data. The
hieratical structure is well suited for a multilevel analysis. The research question also points
towards using multilevel analysis as there is an assumption that if there are any variations
in individual participation these will reflect the aggregate level economic or social situations.
What is political participation? Verba and Nie (1972) defines political participation as
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any activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action either directly by
affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies. Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979) defines unconventional
political participation as “elite-challenging” activities such as demonstrations, petitions, boycotts, political strikes, occupations, street blockades and even violence against property and
people in pursuit of political goals. Conventional forms of participation are “elite-directed”.
These are the legitimate pathways of citizen involvement in politics, which are sanctioned
and encouraged by the elites and by the rules of a democratic regime. Such as electoral participation, political meetings, campaigns, canvassing, et cetera. Dalton (2014: 54) shows that
unconventional participation has become as widesperad as many forms of conventional forms
of participation. Therefore I will use the terms elite-challenging and elite-directed forms of
political participation. Both Inglehart (1977) and Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979: 524) predicted
a decline in elite-directed participation and a corresponding rise in elite-challenging forms
of participation. Both Inglehart (1997) and Norris (2002) show evidence for the hypothesis
presented by Inglehart (1977) and Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979). Both their studies show that
unconventional forms of political participation are replacing conventional forms of political
participation among young people. From this I derive the first hypothesis that will be tested
in this analysis:
Young individuals are more engaged in elite-challenging forms of political participation than in elite-directed political participation when compared to adults.
On the other hand crisis of democracy theory predicts that that there will be a gradual
and widespread process of civic disengagement. This is due to an erosion of democracy with
declining rates in all kinds of participation (Putnam 2001: 4). Milner (2010) refutes the claims
of Inglehart (1997) and Norris (2002) on empirical grounds. The difference between those
who are young and those who are not is far too small to justify the claim that unconventional
participation is substituting conventional participation. This hypothesis will test if there are
differences between young people and adults after the crisis. It is important to know if there
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are differences in the aftermath in order for the research question to be of interest.
In the aftermath of the crisis there were many protests against governments across Europe.
This suggests that there is a level of distrust among the citizens. There are two main ways
to view the relationship between trust and political participation. The first view assumes
that citizens need political trust in order to participate in politics. Almond and Verba (1963)
claim to show that a positive attitude towards the political system increases the likelihood
of political participation, while a negative attitude leads to alienation from political activity.
The second view states that distrust in the political system can serve as an incentive and
motivator for elite-challenging political activity. Rosavallon (2008) claims that a critical
outlook towards authority is necessary in liberal democracy and that this distrust in authority
can motivate political participation. The basic premise of both these theories is that the way
in which the respondents evaluate the political system will affect their willingness to act
politically. This attiudional change is of importance when trying to explain variations in
political participaton among young people. From this I derive a second hypothesis:
Low levels of trust in the political system leads to high levels of elite-challenging
political participation among young people.
The economic crisis has brought along with it an environment of economical and political
instability in many European countries. Summons of state leaders in Europe addressing the
crisis have become commonplace during the years since the crisis erupted. Maslow (1943)
pyramid of needs is a way to explain human behaviour from a psychological perspective.
There are 5 levels in Maslow´s pyramid and each constitutes human needs. Each of the
needs at the foundation of the pyramid needs to be covered in order to care about the
needs at the top. For example, a person needs physical and economic safety in order to
care about securing self-realization. Inglehart (1977) uses Maslow´s pyramid of needs in
order to explain the rise of post-materialism and the spread of elite-challenging political
participation across the globe. The idea of Inglehart (1977) is that in post-modern societies
the populations basic security and economic needs are covered, so they can think about
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self-actualization and take part in elite-challenging political activity. However, the political
and economic situation in the aftermath of the 2008 recession might indicate the opposite
of Inglehart´s (1977) predictions. The predictions of Inglehart (1977) rest on the fact that
elite-challenging political activity should rise in an environment with physical and economic
stability, where the citizen´s basic needs are covered. The economic crisis lead to job losses
and many people experienced economic insecurity. This has also led to the rise of protest
movements like the 15th of May-movement this as a response to economic insecurity. The
assumptions of Inglehart (1977) can be tied to the civic voluntarism model of Verba et al.
(1995). This theory assumes that participation is dependent on the personal resources of the
individual, the attiudes that encourage participaiton and connections to groups who ask one
to participate (Dalton 2014: 64). The contrast to the model is found in grievance theory
which predicts that a lack of resources can function as an incentive for political participation
(Gamson 1968). From this I derive a third hypothesis:
Economic insecurity in European countries has brought with it elite-challenging
political participation among young people.
In the next chapter I will define and delimit key concepts and discuss theory related to
political participation. In chapter three I will discuss the method and research design of this
thesis. Chapter four will present the results from the empirical analysis and in chapter five
I will discuss the implications of the results from the empirical analysis.
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2
Key concepts and theory
In this chapter I define and delimit key concepts related to the subject of this thesis. I will
also present theory related to the substitution hypothesis, political participation and trust
and political participation and the economy. However, I will first present a review of the
literature on political action.
2.1
The literature on political participation
The literature on political participation is broad and has a long history. Some of the literature
is descriptive in nature, while other parts of the literature seeks to explain the variations in
participation.2 A debate within the literature has been if there is a trend upwards or downwards in turnout levels. Dalton (2014) shows a trend with declining and stagnant political
participation across western democracies since the 1960´s. Blais (2007: 624) shows that there
has been a mean downward trend in both established and new democracies from 1970 until
2004. Explanations of variations in political participation can be tied to different analytical
levels. The micro level (individual explanations), the meso level (social and political context)
and the macro level (institutional explanations) (Aardal 2001: 23- 24). Studies have shown
that variations in electoral participation can be tied to traits of the individual . These types
of explanations often focus on the social and economic background of the individual (see
Lipset 1960; Verba, Nie & Kim 1978). The trait of the individuals are resources that can
prepare and motivate the individual for taking part in political activities. Dahl (1961) was
the first to use the term political resources. According to him political resources are all types
of traits that can be used in order to influence society (Strømnes 1993: 44-49). The civic
voluntarism model which I discuss later on in this chapter is reliant on political resources.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980: 102) provide evidence to show that the level of education
influences the level of political participation. The higher the level of education, the higher the
probability of taking part in elections. This finding is confirmed in Dalton (2014: 65), who
2 For a broad review of the literature up until year 2000, see Aardal (2001) chapter 1.
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argues that education taps personal resources that are strongly linked with participation.
Self-interest among voters is used in rational choice theory to explain variations in electoral
turnout. Downs (1957) claims that if the advantages for the individual voter outweighs the
cost of voting, then the voter will take part in the election. If not, the voter will stay at
home. The rational choice theory has motivated numerous studies of economic voting. In
this research tradition voters either vote according to their pocketbook or they vote according
to the national economic situation (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007: 519). A problem with
models that use strict rational assumptions is that it is not rational to vote as the advantages
selfdom outweigh the costs, yet a majority of people still vote. This is referred to as the
paradox of voting. In order to try solving the paradox of voting some researchers have added
some expressive aspects to the rational model. Riker & Ordeshook (1968) add civic duty to
the model in order to explain why people still vote when it is not rational. Edlin, Gelman
& Kaplan (2007) explains the same paradox by adding social preferences as the explanatory
factor. With this logic it is rational to vote due to the good feeling the voters get by improving
the well-being of others. Blais, Young & Lapp (2000: 183) claim that civic duty should be
viewed as a competing explanation to rational choice. Voting can also be viewed as an
expressive action. Teorell & Westholm (1999) are proponents of this view. They compare a
model with strict rational assumptions to a model where voting is viewed as an expressive
action and find that the expressive model is better at predicting turnout than the rational
model.
Other explanations focus on social and political contextual factors to explain electoral
behaviour. These explanations have a longstanding history in political science. In Norway
Rokkan & Valen (1962) are one of the classical contributors to this tradition. They provide
evidence to show that geographical variations in electoral turnout and party membership can
be tied to different social and economic properties and historical experiences.
Campbell (1966) shows that the political frame of an election has a large impact on the
turnout in said election. If there are small perceived differences between the political parties,
the election will have a low intensity. Low intensity leads to low participation, while high
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intensity leads to high participation. Both Blais et al. (2000) and Franklin (2004:162) put
an emphasis on the character of the election. When the electorate feels that the election is a
close one where they can have an impact on the result, they will participate. Fieldhouse et
al. (2007) confirms that the closeness of the contest make a significant difference in turnout
through the use of a multilevel analysis of data from the European Social Survey. In the same
analysis they found that the overall turnout level of the country impacts the participation of
young people. This can explain to us why voter turnout varies in between countries.
The institutional context may also explain variations in political participation. Lijphart
(2000: 318) connects the larges differences in political participation to the institutional framework, i.e. the different regulations for taking part in democracy. Fornos, Power and Garand
(2004) find that the stronger the sanctions the greater the impact of compulsory voting legislation. However, they do not specify the effect of enforcement as such. The electoral system
may also have an impact on the levels of participation. A traditional thesis is that systems
with proportional representation will generate larger voter turnout than a majoritarian system (Lijphart 1999). This can be explained by the fact that people in a proportionate system
are less estranged from the political system due to the fact that their vote will not be thrown
away even though they vote for a small political party (Rach 2000:102). However, according
to Blais and Aarts (2006) this view should be challenged. Having many parties in a party
system (a feature of most PR-systems) decreases voter turnout as the probability of your
vote having a decisive impact on the election remains extremely small.
Yet, the literature on political participation does not only study voter behaviour. A
broader perspective is taken in the literature on political action, which in addition to studying
voter behaviour studies a wide range of different political activities like demonstrations,
signing petitions and party membership. These types of studies focus on individuals or groups
as a unit of observation rather than on protests or campaigns. This research tradition relates
protest activity to socio-demographic, attitudinal and other characteristics of the respondents
to investigate the predictors for participation in different forms of protest (Rucht 2007: 712)
A seminal work in this body of literature is Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979) “Political action: Mass
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Participation in Five Western Democracies”. They separate political participation into two
distinct dimensions, unconventional political participation like taking part in a demonstration
and conventional political participation like taking part in an election. The former is defined
by being “elite-challenging” and the latter is defined by being “elite-directed”. Today the
terms unconventional and conventional political participation seem a bit out of date as more
and more people are taking part in so called unconventional political participation. A series
of survey research has supported an increasing likelihood of using protest as a form of political
participation (Jennings, van Deth et al. 1990; Norris 2002; Dalton 2002, 2004). Put in the
words of Fuchs (1991) protest has become a “normal” part of politics. However, the terms
elite-challenging and elite-directed political participation still make sense as one is controlled
by the grassroots while the other is controlled by the elite.
Having presented some of the classic perspectives on political participation, I define and
delimit key concepts in this thesis and discuss theory related to elite directed and elite
challenging political participation below.
2.2
What is political participation?
In the research literature the definition of political participation has been discussed for a long
time. According to Schumpeter (1942) and Sartori (1987) the role of citizens in the political
process is limited to that of voting their leaders in and out of office. This is in line with what
can be labelled as a “liberal” model of democracy. This definition of political participation is
very thin and leaves very little to be studied empirically (Teorell 2006: 788).
A broader definition, which I will use in this thesis was coined by Verba and Nie (1972).
According to them political participation is: “those activities by private citizens that (...)
aim at influencing the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel
or by affecting the choices made by government personnel” (Verba and Nie 1972). This
is a definition, which is used widely throughout the literature on political participation.
Although critics, like Bell (1974) and Huntington and Wilson (1976), have claimed that the
9
research on political participation was lacking a wider perspective with regard to the goal of
democratization.
The Verba and Nie (1972) definition adds an important aspect to the concept of political
participation. This is the “aim of influencing the government” which opens up for a wide
array of different political activities which have this as a goal. Participation in this definition is viewed as a instrumental act aimed at making the political system respond to their
wishes (Teorell 2006: 789). According to Verba (1996) political participation is: “a means
by which governing officials are informed of the preferences and the needs of the public and
are induced to respond to those preferences and needs”. This can be called a responsive
model of democracy. The most important contribution of Verba and Nie at the time was to
add other varieties of citizen activities that could be conducive to responsiveness, in other
words political participation “beyond voting and campaign activity” (Verba and Nie 1972:
2). However, they still kept to the notion that political participation was a indirect action
towards the policy outcome (Teorell 2006: 789).
What constitutes political activity? The boundary between political and non-political
activity is not necessarily clear. Voluntary organizations that normally are not considered
political can be an important linkage into political life. They can act as a platform for
learning skills, organizational and communication, that are transferable to into politics. Or
they can function as a recruitment platform for political organizations. The members of
such non-political organizations are exposed to politics through these organizations (Verba,
Schlozman and Brady 1995: 40). What separates these types of activities from political
activity is, however, the aim. Political activity aims at influencing the government (Verba et
al. 1995: 42).
Many works in the field of political participation has a limited focus on what is considered
political participation. Often the focus has been on the act of voting, as this is quite easy to
measure through surveys and gives the possibility of checking the turnout against the actual
voter register. In this thesis I look at political participation more broadly. An important
distinction is between the classical concepts of conventional political participation and uncon-
10
ventional political participation. Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979) defines unconventional political
participation as “elite-challenging” activities such as demonstrations, petitions, boycotts, political strikes, occupations, street blockades and even violence against property and people in
pursuit of political goals. Conventional forms of participation are “elite-directed”. These are
the legitimate pathways of citizen involvement in politics, which are sanctioned and encouraged by the elites and by the rules of a democratic regime. Such as electoral participation,
political meetings, campaigns, canvassing, et cetera. A criticism of this definition is that
what is viewed as conventional and unconventional political participation varies with time
and place. What we today view as conventional participation in a liberal democracy, might
not have been viewed this way 50 years ago (Verba et al. 1995: 47). That is the case with
many of the types of activities that earlier was called unconventional political participation.
An example of this is the use of petitions today compared with 50 years ago. Due to technological advances the use of petitions has grown as it is much easier than before to use this type
of participation due to the internet. Petitions have now become a widespread form of political
participation (Fuchs 1991) and hence it can no longer be called unconventional. Therefore
this thesis will use the terms “elite-directed ” activities and “elite-challenging” activities.
The rise of the Internet also challenges the definition of Barnes, Kaase et. al. (1979).
How should one characterize participation through the Internet? It can be viewed as elitechallenging political participation as it is a big challenge to the power of the elite. The
Internet created a public space for a true deliberative democracy (Margolis 2007: 769).
Blogs and other social medias clearly challenges the power of the media as a gatekeeper of
opinions as any person today controls his or her printing press. Government officials have a
hard time hiding their mistakes because the next day it could be posted online (Margolis and
Moreno-Riaño 2007: 769). However, the Internet can also be viewed as elite-directed political
participation. The elite also use the Internet and social medias as a way to communicate
with and to organize their supporters. For example Barak Obamas first presidential campaign
created MyBo as a platform to organize and energize their voluntaries (Dalton 2014: 58). This
inspired parties accross the globe to create similar web platforms. Social media platforms,
11
like Twitter and Facebook is also used as means for party movements to communicate with
the voters (Dalton 2014: 58). A third way of viewing the Internet and social medias is as
a tool that enables both elite-directed political participation and elite-challenging political
participation. This thesis has the latter view of the Internet and social medias as it enables
both forms of political participation providing an easy way to organize and get messages
through.
2.3
Who are young people?
The main interest of this thesis is political participation among young people. In order to
study this phenomenon the concept of young people has to be defined. This is not an easy
task as the concept of young people does not have a clear cut definition over time. Due to
changes in modern society it has become increasingly harder to define. Furlong (2013) defines
young people as the socially constructed intermediary phase that stands between childhood
and adulthood. It cannot be defined chronologically as a stage that can be tied to specific
age ranges or to specific activities. Some tie it to the age of maturity. However, the age of
maturity can differ from country to country. Others tie it to when people start to work, but
this is becoming increasingly difficult. Because of increasing opportunities to get an higher
education people tend to study longer before they start working (Furlong 2013: 3). Different
governmental bodies have tried to define the concept through tying it to the age of a person.
The Norwegian government defined it as the group between the ages of 12 to 26 (NOU 2011:
20). According to the United Nations, young people are defined as the group between the
ages of fifteen to twenty-four (UN 1981). The African Union defined young people as the
generational group fifteen to thirty-five (UN 2008).
As among the governmental bodies there are different definitions in the research literature
of who are to be considered young. Some researchers like Norris (2003: 11) define young
people as the generational group from eighteen to twenty-nine. Others like Fieldhouse et
al. (2007) define young people as the generational group from eighteen to twenty-four. The
12
people between the ages of 15 and 17 are excluded as they cannot take part in an election.
In this thesis young people will be defined as Norris (2003) defines it. This because I test
some of the theoretical assumptions of Norris (2003) on new data and because this definition
will also give a larger N to draw inference from. The latter point is significant because young
people are often underrepresented in surveys like the ESS.
2.4
What is political trust?
Over the years there have been many different attempts at creating a definition of political
trust, but no clear consensus has been reached.3 The main disagreement in the debate on
political trust is about how many levels or objects of trust there are (Bergh 2004: 370).
David Easton (1965) separates trust into diffuse and specific trust. Easton (1965) views
specific trust as satisfaction with the government’s performance and policies, while diffuse
trust is viewed as peoples satisfaction with the political system. He argues that there are
three objects of trust: 1) the authorities, 2) the regime and 3) the political community
(Easton 1968: 172). Gamson (1968) uses Easton´s ideas to develop his own theory of Power
and Discontent. According to Gamson (1968: 49-50) trust may be directed at four different
levels: 1) the incumbent authorities, 2) the political institutions of a regime, 3) the public
philosophy of a regime and 4) the political community. While Pippa Norris (1999) separates
her concept of political trust into five different levels of political trust. Both Miller (1974)
and Citrin (1974) focus on two levels of political trust: 1) the incumbent political authorities
and 2) the political institutions.
Bergh (2004) argues, with support from survey evidence, that in empirical research one
should distinguish between two levels of trust: 1) trust in the political authorities and 2)
trust in institutions. He argues that it is hard for the democratic citizens to distinguish
fine masked concepts such as Norris (1999) political trust-concept. However, such additional
levels of trust can be useful in theoretical discussions (Bergh 2004: 371). I find Bergh (2004)
3 For a broad review of the classical literature on political trust, see Bergh (2004).
13
argument to be compelling and therefore I will use his definition of political trust in my
thesis.
2.5
Economic insecurity
Economic insecurity is a term which has been frequently used in the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis and the ensuing state debt crisis. All though it has been used by many authors
and experts the concept has not been defined with precision. In the research literature there
have been a multitude of definitions of what economic insecurity is, but no consensus has
been reached (Bossert and D‘Ambrosio 2013). According to Osberg (2010: 3) economic insecurity is “the anxiety produced by the lack of economic safety – i.e. by an inability to obtain
protection against subjectively significant potential economic losses.” Jacobs (2007: 1) understands economic insecurity as “the intersection between ‘perceived’ and ‘actual’ downside
risk”. While Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009: 198) define economic insecurity “as uncertainty
about the material conditions that may prevail in the future. This insecurity may generate stress and anxiety in the people concerned, and make it harder for families to invest in
education and housing”.
Bossert and D‘Ambrosio (2013) provides a sythesis of the above definitions in order to
create a theoretical concept. They define economic insecurity as “the anxiety produced by
the possible exposure to adverse economic events and by the anticipation of the difficulty
to recover from them” (Bossert and D‘Ambrosio 2013: 1018). This definition involves past,
present and future. The individual is insecure about the future, and this expectation produces
anxiety in an individual. The resources we have today are important in determining what we
can rely on in case of a future adverse event. The past plays a role in shaping the confidence
in which we meet adverse events (Bossert and D‘Ambrosio 2013: 1018).
2.6
Why European countries?
Other cases could have been used in this analysis. Inglehart (1997) use the World Values Survey that includes countries from the entire globe. However there are reasons why European
14
countries are chosen as cases in this analysis. Firstly, Europe has countries with high GDPs
and highly educated populations. This gives a good posibility for comparasin. Secondly,
many European countries were hit hard by the 2008 economic crisis and are still suffering
due to its effects. This makes it possible to study the effects of change in economic insecurity
on political participation among young people. As there are countries like Greece which were
struck quite hard by the crisis and countries like Germany which got through the crisis quite
well. Lastly, the data available through the European Social Survey is of high quality.
2.7
Age and political participation
A prediction from Ronald Inglehart´s seminal work “The silent revolution : changing values
and political styles among Western publics“ (1977) states that elite-directed forms of participation like electoral participation and party membership, are in decline while there is a
corresponding rise of elite-challenging forms of participation such as participation in demonstrations and signing petitions. In their classic book on political action, Barnes, Kaase et al.
(1979: 524) also predict this spread of unconventional forms of political participation and
describe the trend through cross-sectional data.
Inglehart (1997) provides evidence for the hypothesis through the use of longitudinal data
from the World Values Survey. The book describes a trend with stagnant or falling electoral
participation throughout the western world. The parties are losing their grip on the electorate
and their membership rate is falling. The membership of political parties are about half of
what it was only a couple of years ago (Inglehart 1997: 307). Parry et al. (1992: 234) in
a study of political participation in Britain found that 40 percent of those drawn towards
so-called “direct action” were under 29 years of age. This was the only form of participation
where the youngest cohort was overrepresented.
Earlier studies have shown a positive relationship between post-materialism and elitechallenging participation (Inglehart 1979: 378-379). Inglehart (1997) show growing levels
of mass participation. This is in stark contrast to the stagnant or falling levels of elite-
15
directed participation. The World Values Survey shows several trends that give insight
into why the mass participation is on the rise. There is an increasing interest in politics,
indicated by several measures. Rising numbers of respondents say that they are interested
when asked directly and they say that they discuss politics. This paradox can be explained
by the fact that there are two distinct processes going on: elite-directed participation and
elite-challenging participation (Inglehart 1997: 308).
The rise of the political parties in the 20th century can be tied to class and economy,
while the trend we are seeing now can be tied to a shift in focus towards the issues that are
linked to culture and life quality. In addition to this the younger generations are more postmaterialistic, thus they are less acceptant of the authority of the political parties (Inglehart
1997: 309). Post-materialist have a greater probability of taking part in elite-challenging activities than materialists. This is due to the fact that the post-materialist have grown up in
a society without war and with economic safety. Therefore they view survival as inevitable,
and they spend more time on activities that lead to self-fulfilment, like politics. Inglehart
claims that this has led to a trend with growing levels of elite challenging political activity,
especially among the younger generations (Inglehart 1997: 312). Norris (2002) confirms the
findings of Inglehart (1997), elite challenging forms of political participation especially among
the younger generations is becoming more widespread. Contrary to the popular belief that
engagement in the population is dying, the trend is going towards a development, change
and reinvention of engagement (Norris 2002: 4). The studies show that a growth in this
type of participation is taking place. Elite-challenging participation is not only a trend of
the 60s and 70s like some experts have claimed. Instead an increasing part of the population
are taking part in elite-challenging activities (Norris 2002: 196-197). Many forms of elitechallenging activities, like petitions, demonstrations and boycotts are quite widespread and
have grown more popular over the last 20 years. This type of political participation is especially widespread among well educated in public sector in post-industrial societies (Norris
2002: 211). This is echoed in Quintelier´s (2007) study of political participation in Europe
and in Canada. She finds that young people are more likely to take part in activities like
16
demonstrations, petitions and boycotts. There are significant differences in the sample between young and old (Quintelier 2007: 176). Marien, Hoooghe and Quintelier (2010: 205)
also find high levels of elite-challenging political participation among youths.4 According to
Inglehart (1997) and Norris (2003), democratic institutions have become less legitimate over
time as a consequence of declining rates of elite-directed participation. They claim that the
elite-directed participation is being replaced by elite-challenging participation.
Putnam (1995) is one of the main proponents of the so-called “crisis of democracy”-school.
This school claims that young people are more politically disengaged than previous generations and that if something is not done we can not hope for more engagement in this group.
Young people tend to be generally less engaged in political activity and are on average less
consistently involved in politics than earlier generations (Snell 2010: 260). A more nuanced
view is found in Milner (2010). He does not think that young people are less engaged than
previous generations. However, according to Milner (2010) it is very hard to find compelling
evidence for the substitution hypothesis of Inglehart (1997). He claims that the substitution
hypothesis is wrong both on empirical and methodological grounds. The difference in the
data is too small to claim that a substitution between the two forms of political participation is taking place. 50 per cent of the respondents vote, while 28 per cent take part in
elite-challenging activities. It is likely that some of these 28 per cent that are taking part in
elite-challenging activities are also among the 50 per cent that vote. On the other hand elitechallenging political activity could still be replacing elite-directed political activities. As the
28 per cent that take part in elite-challenging activities could be growing and replacing the 50
per cent that vote. Empirically Milner (2010) backs up his claims with survey evidence from
the International association for evaluation of educational achievement.5 This survey shows
that the respondents, with the exception of the US, have not had a change in values and
that the youths in the Nordic countries have the least diversity in their participation. This
4 The analysis is run on data from the 2004-round of the ISSP survey.
5 The respondents of this survey are school children aged 14 years old in 28 countries (CIVED).
17
is contrary to the expectations that Inglehart presents. The value change is not happening
and in the Nordics where the value change should be most present the types of participation
are the least diversified (Milner 2010: 20).
Milners (2010) view is challenged by more recent events. Across Europe and in the world
in general there has been a rise in protest activities since the economic crisis. In May
of 2011 an anti-austerity movement mobilized demonstrations across Spain. Young people
were overrepresented in the organization and participation in these protests (The Guardian
2014). There have been almost daily protests against the austerity measures and the Greek
politicians ever since the financial crisis of 2008. Also here young people were overrepresented.
In the fall of 2011 there were riots in London and other major cities in the UK. These riots
started due to the social conditions among the minority population in these cities. The
protesters here were poor, young men of minority backgrounds.
In the introduction I introduced a hypothesis about age and political participation. It is
as follows:
Young individuals are more engaged in elite-challenging forms of political participation than in elite-directed political participation when compared to adults.
This is in line with Ingleharts (1997) and Norris´ (2002) views of the relationship between
age and political participation. However, the financial crisis poses an interesting test for this
hypothesis. As there is an expectation of a stronger effect as the crisis has had consequences
for young people especially.
2.8
Political trust and participation
The economic crisis has brought along protests against governments and this implies a level of
distrust. Therefore the 2008 financial crises provide a good context to look at the relationship
between trust and political participation. Trust has been put forward as an explanation for
the levels of political participation by many authors.6 There are two ways to view the
6 For a broad discussion on the subject see Hooghe and Marien (2013).
18
relationship between trust and political participation. One is to look at trust as a condition
for all political participation. This suggest that trust in the political system is a condition
for both elite-directed and elite-challenging political activities. Another way to view this
relationship is to look at a lack of trust as a condition for individuals to abandon elitedirected activities and choose to take part in elite-challenging activities instead (Levi and
Stroker 2000). The former perspective states that trust is needed in order to take part in
political activities, no matter which form. Almond and Verba (1963: 27) claims that in order
to become an active participant in politics the individual has to have a positive attitude
towards the political system. Negative attitudes towards the political system leads to a
rejection and this contributes to erode the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the democratic
system. This leads to democratic instability over time (Almond and Verba 1963: 22). This
is in line with a thinking that political participation requires resources.
The latter perspective presents arguments that distrust in the political system can serve as
an incentive and motivator for political participation. When the government and the political
system as a whole are viewed as untrustworthy citizens may want to intervene through elitechallenging activity (Hooghe and Marien 2013: 133). This line of thinking was first brought
forward in Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979) work on political action where they presented the
distinction between conventional and unconventional political participation.
“Conventional participation is a manifestation of support for the political order (...)
The presence of dissent in democratic societies is often indicated by unconventional
modes of action” (Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979: 444).
There is an expectation that citizens with low levels of trust to a greater extent than others
take part in elite-challenging activities that often are goal oriented. The causes are specific
and are placed outside the political system (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995). Norris (1999)
claims that the citizens more critical outlook towards the political system should not be
viewed as a symptom of alienation from the political system. Rather it should be viewed
as a symptom of the growth of a new generation with critical citizens. Rosavallon (2008)
19
takes this point even further claiming that a lack of trust is an important part of the liberal
constitutional system. In a modern, liberal democracy it is not expected that the citizens
should blindly trust political authority. It is however expected that they should be critical
of the actions of the governments and politicians. A more extreme version of this presented
by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001:5) who claim that distrust is a incentive for all types of
political participation. These arguments echoe the view of some of the classic literature on
social movement participation, especially grievance theory, that focuses on the motivating
role of distrust on political participation. Gamson (1968: 46-47) argues that a high level
of trust in authorities implies lack of necessity of influencing them. According to Craig
and Maggiotto (1981) there is no need to become active in politics without having major
grievances towards the system.
Hooghe and Marien (2013: 146) through use of survey data show that those citizens who
trust and have knowledge of the political system are likely to take part in elite-directed forms
of participation. This is in line with the theory of Almond and Verba (1963). In addition
Hooghe and Marien (2013: 146) show that distrusting citizens are more likely to participate in
a whole range of elite-challenging political activities. This lends supports the claim of Norris
(1999) and Rosavallon (2008) that low levels of political trust does not imply an alienation
from the political system, but rather indicate a trend towards different forms of interactions
between the citizen and the political system.
In chapter 1 I presented a hypothesis about the relationship discussed above. The hypothesis is as follows:
Low levels of trust in the political system leads to high levels of elite-challenging
political participation among young people.
This hypothesis is in line with the perspective presented by Gamson (1968), Barnes and
Kaase et al. (1979) and Norris (1999). These authors focus on the motivating effect of
distrust and how distrust leads to a focus on different types of interactions with the political
system.
20
2.9
Economic conditions and political participation
The economic crisis brought about large changes in the economic conditions in many European countries. Hence it presents a good opportunity to look at the relationship between
economic conditions and political participation among young people. It is not clear how
economic conditions contribute to differing levels and types of political participation among
young people. There are two main theories that predict what economic conditions do to political participation: grievance theory and the civic voluntarism model .7 The grievance theory
predicts that a lack of resources will have a motivating effect on the political participation
of citizens (Gamson 1968). In the civic voluntarism model it is expected that the political
participation of citizens is dependent on the resources available. A lack of resources gives a
lower likelihood for political participation (Verba et al. 1995).
Grievance theory gives valuable insight into the relationship between economic hardship
and political participation. Gamson (1968) predicts that grievances are a strong incentive
for collective action and for elite-challenging participation if the grievances are translated
into political aims. According to the theory, poverty, economic deprivation and other adverse
living conditions should stimulate protest activity. Klandermans et al. (2001: 42) defines
grievances as “feelings of dissatisfaction with important aspects of life such as living standard,
income, employment etc”. According to Klandermans (2001: 271) grievances are socially
constructed.
“Collective action frames are sets of beliefs that serve to create a state of mind in
which participation appears meaningful” (Klandermans 1997: 17).
The frames consist of three parts: injustice, identity, and agency (Gamson 1992). Klandermans (2001: 272) specify these frames:
“Injustice specifies a sense of outrage about the way authorities is treating a social
problem. Identity specifies a common “we”, a group or a social category that feels
7 For a review of the literature see Dalton (2014).
21
deprived and angry, and a “they”, authorities that are to blame for the situation the
group is in. Agency is the perceived opportunities, the belief that collective action
can successfully change the situation”.
In addition to being a contextual predictor of protest activity, grievance theory can also be
an explanation of individual protest behaviour. Protest is viewed as a response to societal
problems and citizen dissatisfaction. The theory argues that when social conditions change it
causes people to experience a relative deprivation that again causes the likelihood of protest
and rebellion to increase significantly (Gurr 1968: 1104). The idea of grievance theory is
that personal or collective dissatisfaction and grievances acts as an incentive for political
participation in general and particularly elite-challenging participation.
The contrast to the grievance theory is found in the civic voluntarism model. The basic
premise of this model is that political participation is dependent on the individuals access to
resources (Verba et al. 1995).
“In this model grievances are seen as ubiquitous and thus the key question is whether
aggrieved groups have the resources to mobilize. Such resources include money,
time, technical infrastructure, expertise and so on” (Klandermans 2001: 272).
McCarthy and Zald (1976) use organizational theory and concepts such as social movement
sector and industry, and movement entrepreneurs in their attempt to theorize about resource
mobilization by social movements. Their resource mobilization by movement organizations
creates a vicious circle. In this circle one needs resources to maintain the structures that
one needed to mobilize those resources. Buechler (1993) criticizes the resource mobilization
model for having an instrumental outlook on protest behaviour. However, the idea that
participation requires some resources has been followed up in the civic voluntarism model.
In the model it is expected that a person who has resources, like time, money and civic skills
to be active in politics, will use these resources to become more active in politics (Berinsky
22
2002). According to Verba et al. (1995: 271) citizens will become more likely to participate,
but also more efficient when they do participate when the resources of money and time are
brought together with civic skills.
Both Inglehart (1997) and Norris (2002) use the theoretical assumptions of the civic
voluntarism model in their research. The model can be related to Maslow´s (1943) pyramid
of needs where the most basic needs must be covered in order for an individual to care about
self-actualisation. This means that needs related to security and economy must be covered
in order to care about taking part in political activities. Kern et al. (2015) evaluate these
theories through the use of survey data. Their results indicate that both theories might have
some hold, though under different conditions. In times with good economic conditions it
lends support to the civic voluntarism model. This suggests that in good economic times
resources are necessary in order to participate. However, in times with economic shocks,
like the economic crisis the study indicates that grievance theory might have some hold.
This indicates that when the living conditions of the population worsen drastically there is
a corresponding rise in “elite-challenging” activities.
The last hypothesis presented in chapter 1 is tied to the above discussion. It states the
following:
Economic insecurity in European countries has brought with it elite-challenging
political participation among young people.
This is in line with the grievance perspective presented by Gamson (1965) and Gurr (1968)
who claim that grievances, i.e. economic insecurity functions as an incentive for political
action. It is also contrary to the view of Inglehart (1997) and Norris (2002) who both claim
that resources are a necessity for political participation.
23
2.10
Summary
In this chapter I presented the general literature on political participation. This was done in
order to provide context to the discussion later in the chapter. I have defined and delimited
four central terms: political participation, young people, political trust and economic insecurity. This was done in order to give a theoretical definition of the four terms. I discussed
why study European countries. The relationship between age and political participation was
discussed and tied this to hypothesis 1 which was presented in chapter 1. This to see if there
is still an age difference in political participation. I discussed theory regarding trust and political participation and also tied this to my second hypothesis presented in chapter 1. This
because trust or distrust has been put forward as a resource which can affect political participation among young people In the last section I discussed theory regarding the economy and
political participation and tied this discussion to my third hypothesis presented in chapter 1.
This hypothesis gives room to see if the economic insecurity affects the political participation
of young people in Europe. Together the three hypothesis will provide an opertunity to study
the research question.
24
3
Methodology and research design
This chapter will describe the data, the methodological approach and the research design of
this thesis. First I present the data used to conduct this analysis and discuss the reliability
and validity of this data. Second I present the indicators I use in the analysis both on
the individual level and on the country level. Finally I discuss why a multilevel statistical
approach is the most effective and best way to provide answers to the research question.
3.1
Data sources
The data used to address the research question is a combination of the European Social Survey (henceforth referred to as the ESS) and country level indicators collected from the World
Bank. The ESS is a large cross-national survey of populations in European countries. It
measures the attitudes, beliefs and behavioural patterns of the populations in the countries
taking part in the ESS. The survey employs a random probability sampling. The survey is
conducted through hour-long face-to-face interviews, which includes questions on a variety
of topics repeated from the previous rounds of the survey. The universe of the survey is
all persons 15 years of age and above that resides within a private household, regardless of
nationality, citizenship, language and legal status (European Social Survey 2014a). In the
analysis the respondents below the age of 18 are removed due to the fact that these respondents cannot take part in elections. The real GDP growth rate and the youth unemployment
figures are obtained from the World Bank. This is due to large amounts of missing values on
these variables in the ESS 2010-round. In order to secure that the same operationalization
is used I obtained the 2008 variables from the World Bank as well.
The number of countries that take part in the ESS differ between each round of the survey.
In the 2008-round 31 countries took part in the survey. While in the 2010-round 27 countries
took part in the ESS (ESS 2015). However, in the analysis 23 countries are included. The
selection of the countries is done by the following two criteria. The Freedom House Index is
used in order to exclude countries that are unfree. The second criterium is that the country
25
has to be included in both the 2008- and 2010-rounds of the ESS.8 This contributes to insure
that the results are comparable. In 2008 there were 42089 respondents in the 23 countries
which are analysed. Due to missing values the number of respondents in the analysis is
reduced to 39097. This is a reduction in the number of respondents in the analysis of 7,1
percent. In 2010 there were 42685 respondents in the 23 countries that are included in the
analysis. Due to missing values the number of respondents in the analysis is reduced to
39462. This is a reduction in the number of respondents in the analysis of 7,5 percent.
To assess the validity of the data one has to look at the sampling methodology. The ESS
employs a random probability sampling from the population in European countries 15 years
or older. Both the 2008 and 2010- rounds of the ESS has a high response rate for a survey
and insures that the non-response rate is not a threat to the validity if the respondents do
not systematically differ from the non-respondents (Couper and De Leeuw 2003: 165). This
is hard to evaluate, but in order to ensure that a possible bias does not impact the results a
design weight will be applied. The design weight is used in order to correct for bias in the
sample design in the individual countries. In some countries certain groups have a greater
chance of being picked and therefore the design weight is applied to correct for this selection
probability bias (ESS 2014b). To assess the reliability of a data set that one has not taken
part in developing is challenging, but there is some information which can shed light on the
reliability of the data. Random measurement errors is a threat against the reliability of the
data (Hellevik 2002: 184 - 186). The large sample in the ESS should reduce the chance for
random measurement errors affecting the results. Another threat to the reliability is the
consistency of the field work and the founding of the survey (Hellevik 2002: 184 - 186). The
central committee of the ESS imposes strict and consistent methods of fieldwork and it is well
founded (Kittilson 2007: 882). This should reduce the possible threat against the reliability.
From this I conclude that the ESS has a high degree of reliability in the data.
8 Israel is included in both data sets and is rated as free by Freedom house, but is excluded as it is not a part of the European
continent.
26
Table 3.1: Countries included in the analysis
Country
Freedom house index
2008 and 2010
Included
Austria
x
Belgium
x
x
x
Switzerland
x
x
x
Cyprus
x
x
x
Czech Republic
x
x
x
Germany
x
x
x
Denmark
x
x
x
Estonia
x
x
x
Spain
x
x
x
Finland
x
x
x
France
x
x
x
United Kingdom
x
x
x
Greece
x
x
x
Croatia
x
x
x
Hungary
x
x
x
Ireland
x
x
x
Israel
x
x
Lithuania
x
Latvia
x
Netherlands
x
x
x
Norway
x
x
x
Poland
x
x
x
Portugal
x
x
x
Romania
x
Russian Federation
x
Sweden
x
x
x
Slovenia
x
x
x
Slovakia
x
x
x
Turkey
x
Ukraine
x
27
3.2
A note on index creation
Figure 3.1: Formative and reflective indices
Source: http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt221d.htm
In this thesis I have to create indices in order to measure some key concepts. Indices can be
reflective or formative in nature. In a reflective index causality flows from the latent construct
to the indicator. This means that all items in such an index should be positively correlated.
In a formative index causality flows in the opposite direction, from the indicator to the
construct. This means that there are no assumptions about the patterns of intercorrelation
between the items in the index (Coltman, Devinneym, Midgley and Venaik 2008: 1250).
Both of these two types of indices are illustrated in the figure above.
How does one decide when an index is reflective and when it is formative? There are different theoretical and empirical considerations that researchers have to make when creating
indices. Coltman et al. (2008) suggest three theoretical considerations a researcher should
make when creating an index. First, the nature of the construct has to be discussed. In the
case of a reflective model the latent construct exists, while in the case of a formative model
the construct is formed. Second, the direction of the causality between items and latent
construct has to be considered. In the case of a reflective model the causality flows from the
construct to the items, while in a formative model it is the opposite. Third, the characteristics of the items used to measure the construct. In a reflective model items are manifested by
the construct, while in a formative model items define the construct. Researchers should also
make empirical considerations. For example looking at the item intercorrelation is one empir-
28
ical consideration. Reflective models should have high positive intercorrelations between the
items. While formative models can have any pattern of intercorrelation, but should possess
the same directional relationship (Coltman et al. 2008: 1252). These considerations will be
discussed in the next section when operationalization’s of the indices are discussed.
3.3
Dependent variables: Political participation
In chapter two of this thesis a theoretical definition of what political participation was presented. In this section I will operationalize this theoretical definition. First a short recap of
the theoretical definition. Verba and Nie (1972) define all activities that directly or indirectly
are aimed at affecting the political process as political participation. Barnes, Kaase et al.
(1979) dichotomy of unconventional and conventional political participation is important in
this thesis. Unconventional political activity is activities that are elite-challenging in nature.
While conventional political participation is activities that are elite-directed in nature. As
unconventional forms of participation have become more widespread this thesis will use the
terms elite-directed and elite-challenging.
Elite-directed participation is measured through an index of three variables which are
related to party and electoral activity which are controlled by the elite. These are: partymembership, electoral participation and worked voluntary in a political party or political
action group. Elite-challenging participation is measured through an index of variables connected to protest participation. The index consists of the following variables: boycott of
products, demonstration and signing petitions. The variables in these indices are chosen due
to theoretical considerations. In the case of elite-directed participation other variables in the
ESS could have been added in addition to those that are already in the index. A variable
such as “wearing campaign buttons in the last twelve months” could have been used. However, the other variables in this index require much more resources than wearing a campaign
button and therefore I have chosen to exclude this variable. In the case of elite-challenging
participation, there are no other variables in the ESS-data that can be used to operationalize
29
this concept.
Both the index of elite-directed participation and the index of elite-challenging participation are formative indices. There are several reasons for this. In both instances the constructs
(elite-directed and elite-challenging participation) are formed by the different items of political participation. The causality of the indices in both instances flows from the items of
political participation to the constructs of elite-directed participation and elite-challenging
participation. The different items of political participation contribute to define the constructs
of elite-directed and elite-challenging participation. This means that the sum of the questions
measure actual political participation. The intercorrelations are shown below and indicates
weak intercorrelations. However, as stated previously in the case of formative indices the
intercorrelation does not have to have a specific pattern. All of this points towards that the
indices of political participation are formative in nature.
Party membership, work in a party/action group, boycotts, demonstrations and signing
petitions are derived from the same question in the ESS. The question is the following:
“There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from
going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you...”.
Electoral participation is derived from the following question in the ESS: “Some people don’t
vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election
in [month/year]?”. Both of the indices are on the individual level. The indices are both coded
with values from 0-3, i.e. the number of activities the respondent has engaged in.
Table 3.2: Correlation between different types of political participation 2008
Vote
Work in party
Member of party
Petition
Demonstration
Boycott
Vote
Work in party
Member of party
Petition
Demonstration
Boycott
1
0.073
0.095
0.105
0.053
0.084
0.073
1
0.442
0.144
0.182
0.109
0.095
0.442
1
0.073
0.075
0.052
0.105
0.144
0.073
1
0.280
0.335
0.053
0.182
0.075
0.280
1
0.182
0.084
0.109
0.052
0.335
0.182
1
Does the operationalization measure what I want to measure, elite-directed and elitechallenging political participation? Can measurement errors occur in the analysis? This can
30
Table 3.3: Correlation between different types of political participation 2010
Vote
Work in party
Member of party
Petition
Demonstration
Boycott
Vote
Work in party
Member of party
Petition
Demonstration
Boycott
1
0.075
0.100
0.097
0.051
0.083
0.075
1
0.447
0.161
0.193
0.108
0.100
0.447
1
0.088
0.086
0.051
0.097
0.161
0.088
1
0.277
0.322
0.051
0.193
0.086
0.277
1
0.202
0.083
0.108
0.051
0.322
0.202
1
be discussed through the concepts of reliability and validity. Reliability can be defined as the
occurrence of random measurement errors. In other words how accurately the measurements
are (Hellevik 2002: 184-186). The questions asked about political participation in the ESS
are closed questions with fixed alternatives. All respondents are given the same question and
the same fixed alternatives. Therefore, there is no reason to expect that the survey should
create anything else than minimal unsystematic variation between the respondents. One
possible challenge to the reliability is the fact that all questions are coded by the interviewer.
This could bring about some possible biases due to coding mistakes. The fact that the
alternative answers to the questions are fixed contributes to reducing the risk of coding
mistakes. Summing up, there is reason to expect that the operationalization of trust has a
high degree of reliability. This means that the variation in political participation between
the individuals in most of the cases are due to actual, substantial variations in political
participation and not due to the characteristics in the collection of the data.
Measurement validity (concept validity) is defined as the absence of systematic measurement errors and to what degree the operationalization captures different aspects of the theoretical concept (Adcock and Collier 2001: 531; Hellevik 2002: 51-52). One way that systematic measurement errors can occur is if the question asked is leading in nature. In my
opinion the questions that are asked to measure the different aspects of political participation are neutral in nature and I cannot see how the phrasing of the question should lead to
a bias in the respondents answer. Another way systematic measurement errors can occur is
if the question only focuses on some aspects of the theoretical concept. The question asks
about a broad range of different political activities. The elite-challenging political partic31
ipation variable could be a possible challenge to this as only three measures are included
in the ESS which measures this concept. A third possible challenge to the measurement
validity is the fact that participation is self-reported. This can lead to possible bias. As for
example voter turnout can be over reported in a survey like this. However, this is a normal
operationalization in the research literature also when using other data sets and it is hard
to find the range of activities included her in any other data set. Examples of studies using
these types of variables to operationalize politcal participation are Inglehart (1997), Norris
(2002;2003), Hooghe and Marien (2013) and Kern et al. (2015). Therefore I concude that
the operationalization of political participation has a high degree of measurement validity.
3.4
Independent variables
In this section I will present the independent variables of the thesis both on the country level
and the individual level and the controls for variables that have previously been shown to be
associated with political participation of different types.
3.4.1
Age
This is one of the most important explanatory variables in the thesis. The variable is on
the individual level. In section 2.2 I presented a theoretical definition of what it means to
be young. Furlong (2013) defines youth as “the intermediary phase between childhood and
adulthood”. This is not a clear cut definition as it is hard to decide what this intermediate
age is which we need in order to study this group. In this thesis young people are the people
between 18-29 years old. This is in line with the Norris (2003) definition.
In this analysis age is coded into two different dummies, age (young) and age (old). This
is done as the interest of this thesis is to see if there is a difference between young people and
adults as defined in section 2.2. In age (young) the respondents between 30-59 and 60+ are
coded with the value zero and the young respondents aged between 18-29 years are coded
with the value one. In the other dummy, age (old), the young respondents between 18-29 and
the middle-aged group 30-59 and over and are coded with the value zero and the middel-aged
32
are between 30-59 years and are coded with the value 1.
Both of these dummies are derived from the variable “age of the respondent (calculated)”
which is included in both the 2008 and 2010-rounds of the ESS. This variable is calculated
from the year of birth of the respondent. The question asked is the following: “And in
what year were you born?”. Both the lack of a fixed alternative and the calculation of
the age opens up for possible coding mistakes. This could challenge the reliability of the
measurement. However, the likelihood of a coding mistake is considered to be small due
to the rigorous methodological demands of the ESS. Despite the possible challenges to the
reliability of the measure, I conclude that the age dummies have a high degree of reliability.
The measurement validity of age (young) and age (old) is considered to be high. As they
capture the concept and they present an opportunity to study differences in between the
young people and adults. There is also little reason to believe that the question asked in the
“year of birth”-variable to be leading in any way.
3.4.2
Political trust
This explanatory variable is at the individual level. Bergh (2004) separates trust into two
distinct levels: trust in political authorities and trust in institutions. Trust in political authorities is a political/economic evaluation of the governments, a party or politicians performance.
While trust in political institutions is a trust towards the institutions of the political system
as a whole. All variables in the two trust indices are based on the following question from
the European Social Survey: “Using this card please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you
personally trust each of the institutions I read out”. The scale is from zero to ten, were zero
is “no trust at all” and ten is “complete trust”. The scale is the same for the satisfaction with
the democratic system, but here 0 is “extremely dissatisfied” and 10 is “extremely satisfied”
(ESS 2014b).
In the two tables below factor analysis of different aspects of trust in the 2008 and 2010
data is pretested. The loadings in the case of both the factor analysis indicates two factors.
The loadings in factor one indicates that trust in parliament, trust in the legal system and
33
satisfaction with the democratic system together form a concept. Therefore trust in political
institutions will be operationalized through an index that consists of: trust in the parliament,
trust in the judicial system and satisfaction with the democratic system. All the variables in
this index are related to institutions of a democracy and as such it will be called institutional
trust. The strong loadings in factor two in both table 3.3 and table 3.4 indicates that trust
in politicians and trust in political parties form a concept. Therefore, trust in the authorities
will be operationalized through an index consisting of two variables: trust in political parties
and trust in politicians.
Table 3.4: Factor analysis of different aspects of trust 2008
Factor 1
Factor 2
0.69
0.80
0.70
0.16
0.19
0.21
−0.03
0.00
0.83
0.75
Parliament
Legal system
Democratic system
Politicians
Parties
Table 3.5: Factor analysis of different aspects of trust 2010
Factor 1
Factor 2
0.59
0.87
0.64
0.12
0.12
0.32
−0.08
0.05
0.87
0.83
Parliament
Legal system
Democratic system
Politicians
Parties
There are several facts that point toward the trust index as reflective in nature. First,
trust is a latent construct that already exists. It does not need to be formed unlike the political participation constructs. Second, the causality in the model flows from the construct of
trust to the items which asks about trust in different institutions and the political authorities.
Third, the items are dependent on the construct in order to be understood. Fourth, the intercorrelations shows strong positive relationships between the items9 . This clearly indicates
that the trust index is reflective in nature.
All respondents in the ESS are given the same questions and alternatives. This means that
9 Two
tables with correlations between different aspects of trust confirm this. These are included in the appendices.
34
the answers will vary in an unsystematic manner. The alternative answers to the questions
included in both indices are fixed. As previously explained this reduces the risk of coding
mistakes. Therefore I conclude that the two trust indices are of high reliability. In my opinion
the questions asked about trust are not leading in nature and should not bring about biases
in the respondents answer. A possible challenge to the validity of the indices is that there are
limited questions asked about political trust in the survey and due to this fact it could be said
that the indices only represent a small aspect of the concept of political trust. For example
I could not find a good variable to measure the trust in government part of the theoretical
definition of trust in political authorities. Despite this I would say that the two variables
included in the index are good measurements of the concept as they give an indication of how
the citizens evaluate the performance of the politicians and the politcal parties. I argue that
the variables included in the trust in institutions index cover the concept they are supposed
to operationalize. The variables included in both indecies are theoretically related to the
concepts they are supposed to cover and due to the fact that they load strongly together in
the factor analysis presented above. Therefore I conclude that the two indices of trust have
a high degree of measurement validity.
3.4.3
Economic insecurity
Real GDP growth rate
is added as an independent variable. The variable is on the country
level. In chapter two I presented a theoretical definition of economic insecurity. The real
GDP growth rate is added as a part of the operationalization of economic insecurity.
GDP (Gross domestic product) is an indicator of the economic activities of a country
or a region. It reflects the total value of all goods and services produced less the value of
goods and services used for immediate consumption in their production. It gives information
about the size and performance of the economy. The real GDP growth rate is an indicator
of the health of the economy. When the real GDP rate grows strongly, employment is likely
increasing as companies hire more workers and people have more money to spend. When
the real GDP rate is shrinking employment usually declines and people have less money to
35
spend. The real GDP growth rates are at market prices, percentage change on previous year
GDP. It is adjusted for inflation in order to see if the economy actually has grown over the
course of the year. The growth rates are presented in percentages (World bank 2016a). Real
growth rate GDP is added from to the dataset from the World Bank due to a large amount
of missing values in the variable already included in the ESS.
The real GDP growth rate is obtained from the World Bank both in 2008 and in 2010.
Therefore I expect that the calculations will be consistent in both datasets. The calculations
also represent a threat towards the reliability as they are done by humans and this opens
up the possibility of unsystematic measurement error. However, the World Bank has clear
standards and methodology for creating these types of indicators. Therefore, I conclude that
the measure of GDP is of high reliability. The real GDP growth rate is a part of measuring
economic insecurity. It gives an indication of how the economy has developed from one year
to another. It does not cover the entire concept of economic insecurity. However, together
with the change in the youth unemployment rate and unemployment status it is a valid
indicator for economic insecurity.
Change in the youth unemployment rate
is one of the main explanatory variables. This
variable is on the country level. In section 2.6 I presented a theoretical definition of economic
insecurity. Change in the youth unemployment rate is added in order to operationalize economic insecurity. It is expected that individuals will react to a change in the unemployment
rate either with increased political participation or with
This variable shows the difference between the youth unemployment rate the year the
survey is conducted and the youth unemployment rate two years back for persons in the
economically active population between ages 15-24. This means that the change in the youth
unemployment rate for 2008 is the difference between the youth unemployment rate in 2008
and in 2006. Employed persons are all persons aged 15 and over that during the reference
week worked at least one hour for pay or profit, or who were absent from such work (World
Bank 2016b). This variable is added on to the data set from the World Bank. General
36
unemployment could have been used as a indicator. However, youth unemployment is a
better measure as the main interest of this thesis is political participation among young
people.
Unemployment status
of the respondent is added as an independent variable. This variable
is on the individual level. This variable is added to operationalize economic insecurity. The
variable is coded as a dichotomous variable in the analysis. The question used to operationalize unemployment is the following: “which of these descriptions applies to what you have been
doing for the last 7 days?”. There are seven alternative categories for main activities. Here
unemployed (not looking for a job), unemployed (looking for a job) and permanently sick
or disabled are coded as 1, while all other activities (employed, education, military service
and housework) are coded as 0. This due to the fact that there is an expectation that the
respondents that answer the activities that are coded as 1 will lack resources due to the
employment relation they have.
3.4.4
Controls
Gender is also added as a control as it has previously been found to have an effect on political
participation. Burns et al. (2001) provides evidence to show that men are more prone to take
part in elite-directed forms of participation than women. While Stolle and Hoogue (2011)
shows that women are more prone to take part in elite-challenging forms of participation.
Gender is a variable in the ESS which is coded zero (men) and one(women).
Level of education is also added as earlier studies have shown that the level of education
has an impact on the level of political participation. Wolfinger and Rosenstone in their
classical work “Who votes?” from 1980 were one of the first to provide evidence of the
positive relationship between the level of education and the level of political participation.
There is an education variable in the ESS, this variable is coded in accordance with IAEAstandards (ESS 2014b). However, in the analysis it will be coded in the following way:
primary education (1), secondary education (2) and tertiary education (3).
37
Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) show that religion plays an important role in determining
the level of political participation. Therefore religion is added as a control variable. It is
expected that having a religious belonging will lead to lower levels of elite-directed political participation and higher levels of elite-challenging political participation. Religion is a
variable in the ESS and is derived from the following question: “Have you ever considered
yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?” It is coded in the following
way: zero (no) and one (yes).
3.5
Quantitative analysis
I use a quantitative approach to study political participation among young people in Europe.
In a quantitative approach we abstract from particular instances to seek general description
or to test causal hypotheses (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 3). In this case the goal is the
former of the two. A qualitative approach could have been used to study the phenomenon of
political participation among youths. In a qualitative approach the goal would be to study
a small number of observations to get an in depth understanding of a phenomenon (King et
al. 1994: 4). An example of a good qualitative study of political participation among young
people is Ødegård (2009) who studies political participation among young people in Norway.
This illustrates the point of King et al. (1994: 5) that neither quantitative nor qualitative
research is superior to the other. The differences between the two are stylistic and are
methodologically and substantively unimportant (King et al. 1994: 4) I use a quantitative
approach due to the fact that I wish to study political participation among young people in
the whole of Europe. The goal here is generalizability across many countries. Due to the
large N a quantitative approach is suited better for this purpose.
3.5.1
Why multilevel analysis?
This thesis will use a multilevel statistical approach to answer the research question. It is
possible to use other approaches, but there are several reasons why multilevel analysis is the
38
Figure 3.2: Illustration of an hierarchal structure
Source: Created by the author.
best approach in this instance.
First the research question of the thesis suggests using multilevel analysis. The research
question includes predictors on the individual and the country level. When dealing with this
type of information multilevel modelling is the best way to handle the data. The multilevel
model provides a coherent model that at the same time incorporates both individual- and
group-level models. It is possible to use other models when trying to deal with this type
of information. One way is to run a classical regression with predictors on both levels.
A problem with this approach is that it does not correct for differences between countries
beyond what is included in the predictors. An alternative to this is to apply a regression with
country-dummies. However this would create severe problems of collinearity in the model
(Gelman and Hill 2009: 8).
Second the European Social Survey has an inherent multilevel structure. This means
that the data is collected with a hierarchal structure, where individuals are clustered within
countries. Statistical theory, both sampling-theory and Bayesian, says that inference should
include the factors used in the design of data collection. This way of modelling data is a
direct way to include indicators for clusters at all levels of a design. Another way to handle
this type of data could be to apply least square or maximum likelihood regression. However,
to apply either of these regression types would create problems of overfitting (Gelman and
Hill 2009: 7). When a model is overfit it can cause regression coefficients, p-values and Rsquared to be misleading. An overfit model is too complicated for the data available. The
regression then becomes tailored to fit the specific sample, rather than reflecting the overall
population (Frost 2015).
39
3.5.2
Assumptions of a multilevel model
As with all statistical models, multilevel models, rely on a number of assumptions. The
assumptions of a linear multilevel model build on the same assumptions as a ordinary least
square model, but there are some differences as the model is more complex. The assumptions
are: linearity, normality, homoscedasticity and independence of observations. Linear multilevel regression needs the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent
variables to be linear. This means that the function forms have to be linear at each level.
Another assumption when applying linear multilevel regression is that there has to be little
or no multicollinearity. Multicollinearity happens when the independent variables are not independent from each other (Snijders and Bosker 2012: 153). As we can see from correlations
between the different independent variables and from the squared VIF-values this is not a
problem in model 1-3. However, in model 4 there are some issues with multicollinearity due
to the inclusion of the interaction terms.10 The variables affected by multicollinearity are age
(young), the interaction between age (young)*trust in political authorities and the interaction
between age (young)*trust in institutions. Some authors claim that this can be a problem
due to an inflation in the standard errors and the p-values. One common, but misguided
remedy for this is excluding the interaction terms which cause multicollinearity (Fox 1991:
15). Robert J. Friedrich (1982) defends the addition of interaction terms despite the risks
of the standard errors and p-values being affected by multicollinearity. Bambor, Clark and
Golder (2006) argues that much of the concern about multicollinearity in models including
interaction terms has been overstated. Even if there is high multicollinearity the standard
errors are still the “true” standard errors, the high multicollinearity simply implies a lack of
information. They argue that the danger of inferential errors due to excluding constitutive
terms from the model outweigh any possible benefits (Bambor et al. 2006: 70). Therefore I
will include the interaction terms despite the threat of multicollinearity. Some of the assumptions are tied to the residuals. First, the level one residuals and the level two residuals have
to be uncorrelated. This is a part of the independence assumption and is also referred to as
10 The correlation tables and the tables with the squared VIF-values are included in appendix A 2.
40
lack of autocorrelation. As this analysis uses cross-sectional data this assumption is already
met. Second, in order to apply a linear multilevel regression there is an assumption of normality. This means that the residuals at level-one and the level-two random coefficients have
to be normally distributed. Lastly, there is the homoscedasticity assumption. This means
that the residuals at level-one has to have a constant variance and the level-two random
coefficients has to have a constant covariance matrix (Snijders and Bosker 2012: 153). In
order to test these assumptions I have run residual diagnostics as recommended by Joop Hox
(2002: 22-27). All of the assumptions for the estimated multilevel models appear to be met
to a sufficient degree.
3.6
Treatment of missing data and summary statistics
Units with missing values only constitutes a problem in the analysis if the missing values are
not randomly distributed (Little and Rubin 2002). As illustrated in the section on the data
sources, there is not a lot of missing data in the ESS 2008 and 2010-rounds. However, the
missing data can still pose a problem if it is not randomly distributed. The documentation
from both rounds of the ESS indicates that there are no questions which led to a large amount
of missing values. Therefore it is assumed that individuals with missing values are randomly
distributed and they are therefore excluded from the analysis using listewise deletion.
Table 3.6: Summary statistics ESS 2008
Variable
Mean Std. Dev. Min.
Elite-directed
0.842
0.583
0
Elite-challenging
0.451
0.746
0
Trust in institutions
5.033
2.268
0
Trust in political authorities
3.501
2.251
0
Gender
0.525
0.499
0
Religion
0.384
0.486
0
Education
0.934
0.995
0
Age (young)
0.17
0.376
0
Age (old)
0.297
0.457
0
Unemployment status
0.159
0.366
0
Real GDP growth rate
1.539
2.273
-2.8
Change in youth unemployment rate
-2.1
4.068
-12.8
41
Max.
3
3
10
10
1
1
3
1
1
1
6.5
6.7
N
39097
39097
39097
39097
39097
39097
39097
39097
39097
39097
39097
39097
Table 3.7: Summary statistics ESS 2010
Variable
Mean Std. Dev. Min.
Elite-directed
0.823
0.578
0
Elite-challenging
0.412
0.722
0
Trust in institutions
4.864
2.294
0
Trust in political authorities
3.235
2.296
0
Gender
0.528
0.499
0
Religion
0.384
0.486
0
Education
1.389
0.951
0
Age(young)
0.166
0.373
0
Age(old)
0.312
0.463
0
Unemployment status
0.174
0.379
0
Change in real GDP growth rate
1.51
2.466
-5.479
Change in youth unemployment rate 7.585
5.269
-0.6
Max.
3
3
10
10
1
1
3
1
1
1
5.989
20.9
N
39462
39462
39462
39462
39462
39462
39462
39462
39462
39462
39462
39462
In table 3.5 and 3.6 I present summary statistics for the 2008- and 2010-data. Elitedirected political participation has a high mean in both tables, but a lower variance. This
is due to the inclusion of electoral participation in the index. Elite-challenging political
participation, on the other hand has a low mean in both years, but a high variance. This is
due to the fact that fewer people take part in elite-challenging political participation than
in elite-directed political participaiton. As we can see from the tables the scale of change in
the youth unemployment rate changes quite a lot between the two years, this is due to the
impact of the financial crisis. The same degree of change is not observable in the real GDP
growth rate variable.
In this chapter I have discussed the methodology and the research design of this thesis.
In the next chapter I will start the empirical analysis and testing of the hypothesis that have
been presented.
42
4
Analysis
In this chapter, I present the results of several types of analyses. As explained earlier the main
form of analysis in this thesis are multilevel models. However, I start with some bivariate
analyses. This in order to scrape at the surface and get a look at what the relationships
between the two dependent variables and the different explanatory variables looks like. Before
I start with the empirical analysis a short recap of the research question and the hypotheses
is due. The research question of the thesis is:
Do changes in economic and social conditions affect the degree and type of political
participation that young people engage in?
There are three hypothesis which will be tested in the analysis. These are:
1.
Young individuals are more engaged in elite-challenging forms of political participation
than in elite-directed political participation when compared to adults.
2.
Low levels of trust in the political system leads to high levels of elite-challenging political
participation among young people.
3.
Economic insecurity in European countries has brought with it elite-challenging political
participation among young people.
4.1
Bivariate relationships
In this section I will do a preliminary bivariate analysis in order to get a glance at the form
and the type of relationship between the two dependent variables and age, trust, youth unemployment and real GDP-growth rate. A bivariate analysis gives us a measure the association
between two variables. This measure helps us understand the possible relationship between
the two variables. There are different forms of bivariate analysis. One form of bivariate
analysis is to check the central tendency (mean, median or mode) of a variable by another
43
variable. Another type of analysis is a correlation between two variables either in the form
of a correlation table or in the form of a scatterplot. The scatterplot is a good way to graphically assess the relationship between two variables. While a correlation table gives us values
to assess the strength and direction of the relationship.
4.1.1
Are there age differences in political participation?
The relationship between age and political participation has as previously stated been a
question of a long scholarly debate. The findings of Inglehart (1997) and Norris (2003)
indicates a rise in elite-challenging political participation with a corresponding fall in elitedirected political participation. Below I present four tables with mean values of elite-directed
participation and elite-challenging participation for two different age-dummies. The scale of
both the elite-directed participation and elite-challenging participation variable is 0-3.
Table 4.1: Mean values of different types of political participation by age (young) in 2008
Elite-directed
Elite-challenging
30+
.87
.42
18-29
.58
.46
Table 4.2: Mean values of different types of political participation by age (old) in 2008
Elite-directed
Elite-challenging
18-59
.78
.50
60+
.93
.30
Table 4.3: Mean values of different types of political participation by age (young) in 2010
Elite-directed
Elite-challenging
30+
.86
.39
18-29
.57
.43
Table 4.4: Mean values of different types of political participation by age (old) in 2010
Elite-directed
Elite-challenging
18-59
.76
.45
60+
.91
.29
The mean values presented above are quite interesting. They present a picture which is
44
a bit mixed. On the one hand they indicate an age gap in political participation as both
the findings of Inglehart (1997) and Norris (2003) indicates. As is observable from tables 4.1
and 4.3 the differences in elite-directed political participation is quite large. The difference
between those in the age 18-29 and those over 30 is 0.29. The difference in 2010 is still 0.29.
In table 4.2 and table 4.4 I use a different age-dummy, the people 60 and above has the
high value. The age gap in participation that we saw in table 4.1 and 4.3 repeats itself in
table 4.2 and in table 4.4. In both 2008 and 2010 the difference in elite-directed political
participation between those between 18-59 and those over 60 is 0.15 in favour of those over
60. This indicates that the people 60 and above to a larger extent take part in elite-directed
political activities than those below 60. The gap in elite-challenging participation in table
4.1 and table 4.3 is a small one. The difference in the mean value is 0.03 in both 2008 and
2010 in the favour of those between 18 and 29. In table 4.2 and table 4.4 the difference
in elite-challenging political participation is larger than in table 4.1 and table 4.3. In 2008
the difference between those between 18-59 and those 60 and above is 0.2 in favour of those
between 18-59. In 2010 the gap is reduced to 0.16, still in favour of those between 18-59.
This indicates that there might be a age gap in participation.
On the other hand, both types of political participation decreases from 2008 until 2010.
This might indicate that the elite-challenging political participation is not on a continuous
rise. However, the differences of the mean values from 2008 and 2010 are quite small and it
is important to remember that they are of two different samples. The age-gap is still present
and has not changed from 2008 until 2010 which indicates that the age gap is quite constant
despite the fall in participation. Summing up, there is an age gap in elite-directed political
participation. The young respondents participate less than the two older groups in both 2008
and 2010. There is also a small age gap in elite-challenging political participation in both
2008 and 2010. The age gap between the young and the two older groups in elite-challenging
political participation is almost non-existing. However, the gap between the old and the
other two groups in elite-challenging political participation is quite large. This indicates that
the older respondents are less likely to take part in elite-challenging political activities.
45
An important point of this thesis is to look at differences between countries. Hence I have
calculated mean values of different types of political participation by age within each country
in table 5.611 . There is quite a lot of variation between the countries in the mean values of
political participation by age. The following countries stand out with high mean values on
elite-directed political participation both by age (young) and age (old): Cyprus, Denmark,
Sweden. Cyprus most probably stands out due to their voting rules.
12
The interesting
part is that there is still an age gap in Cyprus in elite-directed political participation. Both
Sweden and Denmark have had constant high levels of turnout for decades (Pintor, Gratschew
and Sulivan 2002: 79). The following countries stand out with low values on elite-directed
political participation: Switzerland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Portugal.
The following countries stand out with high values on elite-challenging political participation: Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway and Sweden. Switzerland probably
stands out due to its use of petitions in its direct democracy. However, there is something
interesting in Switzerland. There is a reverse age gap when compared to the other countries. Here the older respondents to a larger extent than the young respondents take part in
elite-challenging political activities. A possible explanation of this reverse age gap might be
the way the direct democracy works. In Switzerland petitions are used in order to force referendums on certain laws13 . Elite-challenging participation (low values): Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal. Summing up hypothesis one receives initial support
from this bivariate analysis. However, further multivariate analysis is needed in order to
confirm the hypothesis.
11 Due to the size of table 5.6 it is presented in the appedices.
12 Their voting rules make taking part in elections mandatory. As such Cyprus gains high values on this variable (Gratschew 2004).
13 There are two forms of petitions that can force referendums in Swiss laws. An optional referendum requires 50.000 signatures and is
in oposition to a proposed law. A federal popular initiative requires 100.000 signatures and can only be used to amend the constitution
(The Swiss Authorities online 2016).
46
4.1.2
Do differences in trust affect political participation?
In chapter two I discussed the theoretical relationship between trust and political participation. The discussion led to the formulation of hypothesis two. Below I present a first
bivariate analysis of the relationship between trust and political participation.
Table 4.5: Bivariate correlation between political participation and trust
2008
2010
Elite-directed Elite-challenging Elite-directed Elite-challenging
Trust in institutions
.10**
.10**
.10**
.10**
Trust in political authorities
.15**
.10**
.15**
.08**
Note: Significance levels ( p < .05 = *; p < .01 = **).
The strongest correlation is the correlation between trust in political authorities and elitedirected political participation. This indicates that the respondents trust in political parties
and politicians is a factor when choosing to vote, being member of and working for parties.
The pearson´s r for elite-directed political participation and trust in political authorities is
.15 for both the 2008 and 2010 data. This relation has a moderate strength. The correlation
between elite-directed participation and institutional trust is weaker. Here the pearson´s r
coefficient is .10 for 2008 and .10 for 2010. The direction of the relationships indicates that
trust is a prerequisite for elite-directed political participation. It also indicates that trust in
political authorities is more important than trust in institutions. This does not go against
the expectations of hypothesis 2.
The correlation between trust in political authorities and elite-challenging political participation is positive, but weak in both the 2008 and 2010 data. The pearson´s r is .10 in 2008
and .08 in 2010. The correlation between trust in institutions and elite-challenging political
participation is also positive, but weak in both the datasets. The pearson´s r is .10 in 2008
and .10 in 2010. The positive direction of the relationship signals that trust is also a prerequisite for elite-challenging political participation. It also shows that trust in institutions
is more important than trust in political authorities in explaining elite-challenging political
participation. That trust is a prerequisite for elite-challenging political participation goes
against the idea of hypothesis 2 that lack of trust is an incentive for elite-challenging political
47
activity. However, this is not enough to reject hypothesis 2 as it needs to be tested through
an interaction which will be introduced in a multivariate model later on in the chapter.
From table 5.7 we can see that the correlation between trust in institutions and elitedirected political participation is weaker than the correlation between trust in political authorities14 . There are some countries that stand out with stronger correlations. Cyprus has a
significant, positive and moderate correlation between trust in institutions and elite-directed
political participation with a pearson´s r coefficient of .17 in 2008 and .13 in 2010. This
means that elite-directed political participation to some extent is dependent on trust in institutions. When comparing the two years there is a weakening of the relationship between 2008
and 2010. This means that the trust in institutions is less important in explaining the elitedirected political participation in Cyprus in 2010 than in 200815 . Estonia has a significant,
positive and moderately strong relationship between trust in institutions and elite-directed
political participation in both 2008 and in 2010. The pearson´s r is the strongest in the
2008-data with .21, while it is a bit weaker in the 2010-data with .17. This indicates that
trust in institutions explains more of the elite-directed political participation than in other
countries. Here we also see a decline in the importance of trust in institutions as an explanatory factor between 2008 and 2010. In Croatia there is an increase in the importance
of trust in institutions as an explanatory factor for elite-directed political participation. The
strength of the pearson´s r coefficient increases from .07 in 2008 to .20 in 2010, both coefficients are significant. This shows that trust in institutions explains more of the elite-directed
political participation in 2010 than in 2008. In the Netherlands there is a positive moderate
relationship. The strength is about the same in 2008 (.14) and in 2010 (.15). This means
that the importance of trust in institutions as an explanatory factor remains stable between
the two years. The correlation between trust in institutions and elite-directed political participation in Hungary is an interesting case. The correlation goes from being insignificant
in 2008 to being strongly significant in 2010. However, the more interesting fact is that the
14 Due to the size of the table it is presented in the apendices.
15 As previously stated Cyprus has manditory voting and this could impact the results.
48
relation between the two variables changes direction. In 2008 there is a weak and negative
relation between trust in institutions and elite-directed political participation. While in 2010
there is a moderate positive relation between the two variables. Although the relation in
the 2008-data is insignificant this is quite interesting. It indicates that trust in institutions
grows in importance as an explanatory variable for elite-directed political participation in
Hungary. It also implies that something might have changed in Hungary between the two
surveys. From trust in institutions having an insignificant, but very weak negative impact on
elite-directed political participation in 2008 to trust in institutions motivating elite-directed
political activities in 2010. There are no significant negative relationships between trust in
institutions and elite-directed political participation. This suggests that there has been an
overall increase in trust towards institutions which has a motivating effect on elite-directed
political participation.
The correlation between trust in political authorities and elite-directed political participation is the strongest in both years, but also her some countries stand out with stronger
correlations than others. Bulgaria has a significant, positive and moderate correlation in both
2008 and 2010. The pearson´s r is the same in both years with .21. This suggests that the
importance of trust in political authorities in explaining elite-directed political participation
remains stable between 2008 and 2010 in Bulgaria. This is also the strongest correlation
of all the countries in both years. This means that trust in political authorities explains
more of the elite-directed political participation in Bulgaria than in the other countries in
both samples. Estonia has a significant, moderate and positive correlation between the two
variables in both years. The correlation in 2008 is .21 and in 2010 the correlation is .18. The
strength of the correlation decreases between 2008 and 2010. This indicates that trust in political authorities explains less in 2010 than in 2008 in Estonia. However, the correlation in
Estonia is still stronger than the overall correlation in table 4.5. The Netherlands also stand
out from the rest of the countries. The correlation between trust in political authorities and
elite-directed political participation is significant, positive and moderate with a pearson´s r
coefficient of .18 in both years. This shows that the importance of trust in political author-
49
ities as an explanation of elite-directed political activities remains stable between 2008 and
2010. Norway also stands out with a correlation that is stronger than the overall correlation presented in table 4.5. The relation is significant, positive and moderate in 2008 with
a pearson´s r coefficient of .18. This is stronger than the overall correlation in that year.
And suggests that trust in political authorities explains more of the elite-directed political
activity in Norway than in Europe as a whole in 2008. However, the relationship weakens
between 2008 and 2010. The relationship is still significant and positive, but the pearson´s r
coefficient is now .14. This implies that trust in political authorities explains less of the elitedirected political activity in Norway in 2010 than in 2008 and that it explains less of than
in Europe as a whole. There are no countries with negative relationships between trust in
political authorities and elite-directed political participation. Summing up, trust in political
authorities has a motivating effect on elite-directed political activities and it explains more
of elite-directed activity than trust in institutions.
As explained previously the relationship between trust in institutions and elite-challenging
political participation is significant and positive in Europe as a whole in both 2008 and in
201016 . However, there are some countries that stand out from this trend. Greece is a country
that was hit hard by the economic crisis. Here the relationship between trust in institutions
and elite-challenging political participation is significant and negative in both 2008 and in
2010. In 2008 the pearson´s r is -.14. This indicates that rising trust in institutions leads to
lower elite-challenging political participation. This is in line with the grievance perspective
where distrust is viewed as an incentive for elite-challenging political participation. In 2010
the pearson´s r coefficient is -.10. This suggests that trust in institutions explains less of
the elite-challenging political participation. However, it still gives support to the grievance
perspective. Another country that was hit hard by the financial crisis is Spain. Also here the
distrust has a motivating impact on elite-challenging political participation. The relationship
is significant and negative in both 2008 and in 2010. Also here the pearson´s r is weaker in
2010 than in 2008 which implies that trust in institutions explains less of the elite-challenging
16 See table 4.5 on page 47.
50
activity in 2010 than in 2008. In Slovakia the same trend is present. There is a significant
and negative relationship between trust in institutions and the relationship weakens between
2008 and 2010. Finland and France are examples of the opposite. Here the relationship is
significant, negative and weak, but the strength of the relationship grows between 2008 and
2010. Ireland is an interesting case to look at. In 2008 the relationship between trust in
institutions and elite-challenging political participation is significant, negative and weak. In
2008 distrust appears to explain some of the elite-challenging political participation. However,
in 2010 the relationship is significant, positive and weak. This might indicate that there has
been a shift in Ireland between the two years. From support of the motivating effect of
distrust on elite-challenging political participation to support of the motivating effect of
trust on elite-challenging political participation. But, it could also be that there is only
a difference in the samples and not in the Irish public. Overall the data indicates that
there is a difference in the relationship between trust in institutions and elite-challenging
political participation between the countries that were hit hard by the economic crisis and
those countries that were not hit that hard. The countries that were affected by the crisis
the most give indications of support for the motivating effect of distrust in institutions on
elite-challenging political participation. This finding goes against the finding in table 4.5 and
is in line with the expectations of hypothesis 2. While overall the trend is support for the
motivating effect of trust in institutions on elite-challenging political participation.
The relationship between trust in political authorities and elite-challenging political participation is weaker overall than the relationship between trust in institutions and elitechallenging political participation. However, also this relationship is significant and positive
for Europe as a whole. Also here there are some countries that stand out from the overall
trend. In Slovakia there is a significant, negative and weak relationship between trust in
political authorities and elite-challenging political participation in both 2008 and in 2010.
This means that distrust in politicians and political parties can explain some of the elitechallenging political participation. In Ireland the relationship also here changes direction
from a negative to a positive relationship between 2008 and 2010. In 2008 the relationship
51
is significant, negative and weak and suggests a support for the motivating effect of distrust
on elite-challenging political participation. However, in 2010 the relationship is insignificant,
very weak and positive. In Croatia there is a significant, negative and relationship between
trust in political authorities and elite-challenging political participation in both 2008 and in
2010. This implies that distrust in parties and politicians to some extent can explain the level
of political participation. In Finland there is a significant, negative and weak relationship in
2010. Both the direction and significance level changes from 2008. This indicates that there
is a growing distrust in politicians in Finland and that this contributes to explaining the
elite-challenging political participation here to some extent. Overall the comparison between
the correlations in each country to some extent paints a picture where distrust in political
authorities can motivate elite-challenging political participation. While in most countries
trust in political authorities contribute to explaining the level of political participation.
4.1.3
Does economic insecurity affect the political participation?
In this section I look at the relation between economic insecurity and different types of
political participation. To access this relationship I have created four scatterplots of the
bivariate relation between a aggregated version of the two political participation indices and
real GDP growth rate.
52
Figure 4.1: Scatterplot Elite-directed political participation vs. economic insecurity 2008
In the graph on the upper left in figure 4.1 the relation between elite-directed political
participation and real GDP growth rates from 2008 is evaluated. The fitted line indicates
that there is almost no relationship between the two variables. The trend in the graph is
confirmed by the insignificant correlation coefficient, the direction is negative. There are
two clear outliers in the graph, Estonia and Cyprus. Estonia has low values on both the
real GDP growth rate and elite-challenging political participation. Cyprus has high levels
on both real GDP growth rate and on elite-directed political participation. The relationship
between elite-directed political participation and change in the youth unemployment rate
in 2008 is evaluated in the graph on the upper right in figure 4.1. The observations are
spread out in the graph. From the fitted line we can observe a very weak positive relation
between change in the youth unemployment rate and elite-directed political participation.
However, the correlation coefficient indicates that the relationship is insignificant. Poland is
an outlier here with a drop in youth unemployment of around 14 percent and a relatively
low elite-directed political participation. The correlations between indicators of economic
53
insecurity on the country level and elite-directed political participation are very weak and
insignificant in 2008. The direction of both the correlation between real GDP growth rate
and elite-directed political participation and youth unemployment and elite-directed political
participation is in line with what would be expected from grievance theory. However, as the
correlations are insignificant this is probably due to coincidence.
In the graph on the bottom left in figure 4.1 the relationship between elite-directed political
participation and real GDP growth rates from 2010 is evaluated. The relationship appears
to be negative, however the fitted line indicates that there is little to no relationship between
the two variables. The correlation coefficient between elite-directed political participation
and real GDP growth rates confirms this as it is insignificant and extremely weak. This
is in line with the results from the same graph from 2008. There are two distinct outliers
among the observations, Greece and Sweden. The financial situation of Greece explains their
outlier status. However, Sweden has an unusually high value on both political participation
and the real GDP growth rate. With the exception of Greece and Sweden the observations
are quite clustered together in the plot. When we compare the plot from 2008 with the
plot from 2010 we can see that the value of Greece, Ireland and Spain has shrunk. For
example Greece has shrunk from .9 to .8 on the political participation scale. This might
indicate less faith in elite-directed political participation in these countries. This would be
logical as they were hit quite hard by the crisis. The graph on the bottom right in figure 4.1
looks at the relationship between elite-directed political participation and change in youth
unemployment rates. The fitted line indicates a negative and weak relationship between the
two variables. The correlation coefficient confirms the direction of the relationship, but it
also indicates that the relationship is insignificant. The graph on the bottom right indicates
that there is no relationship between elite-directed political participation and elite-directed
political participation. This confirms the pattern from 2008. The correlation between elitedirected political participation and change in youth unemployment rate in 2010 is weak and
negative. This indicates that low levels of youth unemployment will give high levels of elitedirected political activity. This indicates that you need resources in order to participate and
54
supports the civil voluntarism model. This would indicate that the citizens in the countries
that are hardest hit with job loss are leaving the elite-directed forms of political participation
as a reaction to the economic situation. Summing up the graphs in figure 4.1 indicate that
economic insecurity on the country level has little impact on elite-directed forms of political
activities. A possible explanation of this could be that the economic conditions on the country
level are too abstract for the citizens to react to.
Figure 4.2: Scatterplot Elite-challenging political participation vs. economic insecurity 2008
In figure 4.2 on the upper left the relationship between elite-challenging political participation and real GDP growth rates from 2008 are plotted out. The fitted line indicates a
moderate and negative relationship between the two variables. The fitted line also indicates
a linear relationship between the two variables. This is confirmed by the correlation coefficient which indicates that the relationship is also significant. There is a clear outlier in
the plot. Estonia has a negative real GDP growth rate, but has one of the lowest rates of
political participation as well. The negative real GDP rate should give a high value on elitechallenging political participation. On the upper right, in figure 4.2, the relationship between
55
elite-challenging political participation and change in youth unemployment is evaluated. The
fitted line indicates a linear relationship. It also looks to be a moderate positive relationship
between the two variables. The correlation coefficient between elite-challenging political participation and change in youth unemployment rate confirms that the relationship is moderate,
positive and that it is significant. Poland, Sweden, Spain and Ireland are outliers. Poland
has a large fall in the youth unemployment rate and a low level of elite-challenging political participation. The fall in the youth unemployment rate in Poland is almost 15 percent.
Sweden stands out with a high value on elite-challenging political participation. While both
Spain and Ireland stands out with a growth in the youth unemployment rate. The 2008data indicates that economic insecurity on the country level might trigger elite-challenging
political participation. From the graph on the upper left we can see that a rise in the real
GDP growth rate gives a correspondent fall in the elite-challenging political participation.
In the graph on the upper left we can see that a rise in the youth unemployment rate gives
a corresponding rise in elite-challenging political participation. This indicates that a lack of
resources can motivate people to take part in elite-challenging political activities. Both of
these graphs are in line with what is the expectations from grievance theory. It also gives
support to the expectations in hypothesis 3. This is an interesting finding as it is not what
is to be expected if one views the civic voluntarism model and grievance theory as theories
dependent on the economic circumstance.
In figure 4.2, the scatterplot on the bottom left looks at the relationship between elitechallenging political participation and the real GDP growth rate in 2010. From the fitted
line we can observe that the relationship between elite-challenging political participation and
the real GDP growth rate appears to be negative and moderate. This is confirmed by the
correlation coefficient which also informs us that the relationship is significant. The fitted
line also indicates that the relationship is linear. There are some cases with values that stand
out. Greece has a clear fall in the real GDP growth rate. With a fall of over 5 percent
it stands out, but the value on the elite-challenging political participation is higher than
expected when the relationship is positive. Sweden stands out with both a high value on the
56
elite-challenging political participation and with a high real GDP growth rate. Poland and
Slovakia have high real GDP growth rates, but they have quite low rates of elite-challenging
political participation. Most of the countries are clustered around 0 percent on the real
GDP growth rate. The scatterplot on the bottom right evaluates the relationship between
elite-challenging political participation and the change in youth unemployment rates from
2010. The fitted line indicates that there is a moderate and negative relationship between
the two variables. The correlation coefficient has is significant. This confirms what the
fitted line indicated. The fitted line also shows that the relationship is linear. Spain is an
outlier with high values on elite-challenging political participation and a strong growth in the
youth unemployment rate. This is interesting as this is what would be expected if economic
insecurity fuelled elite-challenging political participation like in 2008. The correlations have
changed direction since 2008 and they have grown in strength as well. In 2010 a low real GDP
growth rate indicates a low value on elite-challenging political participation. While a growth
in the youth unemployment rate gives lower elite-challenging political participation. This
indicates that rising economic insecurity has negative impact on elite-challenging political
participation in 2010. It supports the idea that citizens need resources in order to participate
which is in line with the civic voluntarism model. This challenges the idea in hypothesis 3
that economic insecurity gives rising levels of elite-challenging political participation among
young people. However, the graphs are not a test of hypothesis 3 as this requires a interaction
between the two economic insecurity variables with age (young) to test.
The general trend that we can observe from the scatterplots is that the correlation between elite-challenging political participation and the two economy variables is stronger than
the correlation between elite-directed political participation and the two economy variables.
The relationship between elite-directed political participation and economic insecurity on
the country level is generally weak or non-existing. While the relationship between elitechallenging political participation and the two economic insecurity variables is generally moderate. However, the scatterplots gives an unclear picture of what the relationship between
elite-challenging political participation is. On the one hand, the 2008-data I find support for
57
a grievance relationship between the elite-challenging political participation and economic
insecurity. This lends support to hypothesis 3 and suggests that the citizens turn to elitechallenging political participation when in economic desperation. On the other hand, in 2010
I find support for the civic voluntarism model. As the relationship between elite-challenging
political participation and the real GDP growth rate is positive. While the relationship between elite-challenging political participation and change in the youth unemployment rate
is negative. This challenges the idea in hypothesis 3 and suggests that the citizens are dependent on resources in order to take part in elite-challenging political participation. As
previously stated this does not mean that hypothesis 3 can be thrown away as it needs to be
tested through an interaction.
I have now looked at the different bivariate relationships. This is done in order to look
at the relations between the dependent variables and the different independent variables. In
the next section I develop the multilevel models which will be used to study the different
hypotheses that were presented earlier.
58
4.2
Multilevel models
Below are four tables with multilevel regressions from two years, 2008 and 2010, with two
different dependent variables, elite-directed political participation and elite-challenging political participation. The baseline model (model 0), this means that the model is empty
with the exception of the dependent variable. This model is created in order to get a model
to compare the results with. Model 1 consists of the dependent variable, age(young) and
age(old) which are two of the main explanatory variables. In addition gender, education and
religion are added as control variables. These variables are added in order to control for variables which have been shown to affect political participation in earlier studies17 . Age(young)
and age(old) are dummy variables with 18-29 year olds and 60+ as the high values. Model
2 consists of a dependent variable, age(young), age(old), unemployment, trust in political
authorities and trust in institutions. The two trust variables added in model 2 are different
aspects of trust and are of importance when I am going to evaluate hypothesis 2. While
unemployment on the individual level is important when looking at hypothesis 3. Model 3
includes real GDP growth rate and change in youth unemployment in addition to the aforementioned variables. I include these in order to look at economic performance variables on
the country level, these are of importance when we assess hypothesis 3. Model 4 includes
interactions between age(young) and the other independent variables in conjugation with the
aforementioned variables. The interactions between age (young) and trust in institutions, and
age (young) and trust in political authorities are added to evaluate hypothesis 2. The two
interactions between age (young) and real GDP growth rate, and age (young) and change in
youth unemployment rates are added to look at how country level indicators of economic insecurity among young people affect the political participation. While the interaction between
age (young) and unemployment status is added in order to evaluate the effect of a individual
level indicator of economic insecurity among young people on political participation. All of
the last three interactions are added in order to test hypothesis 3.18
17 See
the discussion in section 3.4.4 for a justification of why these variables are controlled for.
18 I have run multilevel binomic logistic regresions with alternative dependent variables to check the robustness of the results. Overall
the results of the logistic regresions were in line with the findings from the linear multilevel regresions.
59
Table 4.6: Multilevel regression with Elite-directed participation as dependent variable, 2008
(0)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Elite-directed Elite-directed Elite-directed Elite-directed Elite-directed
Age(Young)
-.274∗∗∗
-.281∗∗∗
-.281∗∗∗
-.227∗∗∗
(.021)
(.022)
(.022)
(.043)
Age(old)
.111∗∗∗
.102∗∗∗
.102∗∗∗
.101∗∗∗
(.014)
(.014)
(.0136)
(.014)
Gender
Education
Religion
-.045∗∗∗
(.009)
.097∗∗∗
(.007)
-.038∗∗∗
(.008)
0.089∗∗∗
(.007)
-.038∗∗∗
(.008)
.089∗∗∗
(.007)
-.038∗∗∗
(.008)
.088∗∗∗
(.007)
-.0697∗∗∗
(.017)
-.060∗∗∗
(.017)
-.051∗∗∗
(.010)
-.060∗∗∗
(.017)
-.051∗∗∗
(.010)
-.059∗∗∗
(.016)
-.054∗∗∗
(.012)
.034∗∗∗
(.003)
-.004
(.004)
.034∗∗∗
(.003)
-.004
(.004)
.039∗∗∗
(.003)
-.005
(.004)
.008
(.020)
.007
(.010)
.007
(.021)
.007
(.011)
Unemployment
Trust in political authorities
Trust in institutions
Real GDP growt rate
Change youth unemployment
-.023∗∗∗
(.007)
.004
(.006)
age(young)_trustpa
age(young)_trustinst
age(young)_unemp
.010
(.020)
.001
(.009)
age(young)_unra
age(young)_grgdp
Constant
SD(Constant)
SD(Residual)
Observations
Groups
AIC
BIC
ICC
.849∗∗∗
(.026)
.122
(.018)
.574
(.012)
39097
23
67375.0
67400.7
.042
.827∗∗∗
(.037)
.142
(.023)
.554
(.011)
39097
23
64638.0
64706.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
60
.739∗∗∗
(.046)
.132
(.022)
.550
(.011)
39097
23
64082.4
64176.7
.742∗∗∗
(.051)
.130
(.021)
.550
(.011)
39097
23
64085.9
64197.4
.004
(.015)
.733∗∗∗
(.053)
.130
(.020)
.550
(.011)
39097
23
64051.4
64205.8
Table 4.6 presents results from a multilevel analysis of the 2008 round of the ESS with
elite-directed political participation as the dependent variable. The interclass correlation
(ICC) value is .042 and this indicates that the country level contributes 4,2 per cent of the
variance. This is quite low, but there is no clear rule that says how high the value of the
ICC has to be in order to use multilevel analysis. The low ICC-value is in line with what we
saw in the bivariate graphs between elite-directed political participation and country level
variables connected to economic insecurity. The country level explains very little of the elitedirected political participation. Model 1 includes age(young), age(old), gender, education
and religion into the model. The direction of gender is as expected for elite-directed political
participation, men participate more than women. Education has a positive impact on elitedirected participation which is in line with the findings of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980).
Having a religious belonging leads to lower levels of elite-directed political participation.
From the coefficient of age (young) we can observe that citizens in the age group between
18-29 years old to a lesser extent than the age groups of 30-59 years and 60+ take part in elitedirected political participation. This is in line with the previous research in the field which
found that young people are less involved in elite-directed political participation than adults
(Norris 2003). This finding indicates that there is a age gap between young people and adults.
Where adults are more engaged in elite-directed forms of political participation than young
people. The coefficient of age (old) indicates that the group that is 60 years and older take
part in elite-directed forms of political participation to a significantly larger extent than the
two groups below the age of 60. This indicates that there is also a age gap between the group
that is 30-59 years old and the group that is 60 years and older. The likelihood of taking part
in elite-directed political participation increases with age. Simply put, the older you get the
more you participate in elite-directed forms of political participation. This finding is in line
with what Norris (2003) found in her study. It also gives some initial support for hypothesis 1.
However, this model alone does not test hypothesis 1 as this requires a comparison between
elite-directed political participation and elite-challenging political participation. It is not
clear what type of trend this represents. Since this study does not look at longitudinal data,
61
it is not possible to say if this is a result of a generational trend or if it is related to the life
cycle of the respondent.
In model 2 unemployment, trust in political authorities and trust in institutions are added
to the model. It now consists of these variables in addition to the variables included in the
previous model. These are added to the model to see if individual grievances and the degree
of trust affects the citizens participation in elite-directed political activities. A units increase
in trust in political authorities leads to a increase in elite-directed political participation, all
other variables held constant. Trust in political authorities appears to have a motivating
effect on elite-directed political participation. This indicates that trust in politicians and
political parties is needed in order to participate in elite-directed forms of political activities.
This is not unexpected as the people who do have trust in the political elites also should be
expected to have propensities towards more elite-directed forms of political participation. The
direction of the relationship between trust in institutions and elite-directed forms of political
activities appears to be negative. This would indicate that if a citizen has trust in institutions
this would lead to a rejection of elite-directed forms of political participation. However, the
relationship between the two variables is insignificant. If it were significant this finding
would be interesting as it would suggest that growing trust in societal institutions would lead
to a decrease in elite-directed political participation. That trust in political authorities is
required for taking part in elite-directed forms of political participation is in line with the
findings of Almond and Verba (1963: 27). It also challenges the position of Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse (2001). They claim that distrust is a motivating factor for both elite-directed
and elite-challenging forms of political participation. This is quite interesting as it indicates
support for a civic voluntarism perspective of trust when it comes to elite-directed political
participation. This finding does not go against hypothesis 2 as this hypothesis is concerned
with elite-challenging political participation. The results indicates that the unemployed take
part in elite-directed political participation to a lesser extent than other groups. On the one
hand this appears to be in line with what one would expect to see if the civic voluntarism
model explained political participation. According to Verba et. al. (1995) a individual needs
62
resources to participate in political activities. On the other hand Gurr (1968) argues that
when social conditions change that causes people to experience a relative deprivation that
causes the likelihood of protest and rebellion to increase. If this is the case one would not
expect it to motivate elite directed political participation. However, it is expected that this
would motivate elite challenging political participation. This will be looked at below.
In model 3, two country level variables, real GDP growth rate and change in youth unemployment, are added to the regression. None of these variables are significant when added
to the regression. Despite this the direction of these two variables is interesting. An increase
in real GDP growth rate will give a increase in elite-directed political participation. This
indicates that growth in the economy will be associated with a growth in elite-directed political participation. An increase in the youth unemployment rate is associated with growth in
elite-directed political participation. The individual level variables still have the same values
and the same significance level and direction.
In model 4, I add five different interaction terms to the regression in addition to the variables added in the previous models. Out of the five interaction terms only one is significant.
This is the interaction between age (young) and trust in political authorities. Bambor et
al. (2006) suggests using margin plots to evaluate interaction terms as the coefficient in
a regression only gives a snapshot of what the relationship looks like, while a margin plot
can show what the relationship looks like for a range of values. Therefore I have created a
margins plot that illustrates the interaction term between age (young) and trust in political
authorities.
63
Figure 4.3: Interaction effect between age (young) and trust in political authorities
Figure 4.3 serves to illustrate that the age-effects are conditioned by the trust in political
authorities in 2008.19 We can clearly see that the marginal effect of age increases as we move
along the horizontal axis, from low levels of trust in political authorities to high levels of trust
in political authorities. The interaction indicates that there is a difference in elite-directed
political particpation by age for different levels of trust. Trust matters more for the political
participation of adults than for young people. As we can see in the graph from the increasing
difference in political participation. For low levels of trust there are much smaller differences
in political participation between the two groups than for high levels of trust. This is in line
with the expectations of Almond and Verba (1963) as they expect trust to be a motivator
for elite-directed political participation. This is the expected type of relationship between
trust in politcial authorities and elite-directed political participation. It also illustrates the
age gap in political participation.
19 The
figure shows marginal effects controlled for the other variables in the regression.
64
Table 4.7: Multilevel regression with elite-directed as dependent variable, 2010
(0)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Elite-directed Elite-directed Elite-directed Elite-directed
Age(young)
-.238∗∗∗
-.246∗∗∗
-.246∗∗∗
(.021)
(.021)
(.021)
Age(old)
.128∗∗∗
.113∗∗∗
.113∗∗∗
(.012)
(.011)
(.011)
Gender
Education
Religion
-.057∗∗∗
(.009)
.086∗∗∗
(.007)
-.051∗∗∗
(.009)
.077∗∗∗
(.007)
-.051∗∗∗
(.009)
.077∗∗∗
(.007)
-.051∗∗∗
(.008)
.077∗∗∗
(.007)
-.071∗∗∗
(.013)
-.060∗∗∗
(.012)
-.061∗∗∗
(.015)
-.060∗∗∗
(.012)
-.062∗∗∗
(.015)
-.060∗∗∗
(.012)
-.060∗∗∗
(.015)
.034∗∗∗
(.002)
.0003
(.004)
.034∗∗∗
(.002)
.0003
(.004)
.036∗∗∗
(.002)
.0006
(.004)
-.011
(.008)
-.0004
(.003)
-.013∗
(.007)
-.0004
(.003)
Unemployment
Trust in political authorities
Trust in institutions
Real GDP growth rate
Change youth unemployment
-.012∗
(.006)
-.003
(.007)
age(young)_trustpa
age(young)_trustinst
age(young)_unemp
-.012
(.022)
-.0002
(.003)
age(young)_unra
age(young)_grgdp
Constant
SD(Constant)
SD(Residual)
Observations
Groups
AIC
BIC
ICC
(4)
Elite-directed
-.207∗∗∗
(.057)
.113∗∗∗
(.011)
.830∗∗∗
(.022)
.100
(.011)
.570
(.012)
39462
23
67458.8
67484.6
.03
.773∗∗∗
(.027)
.091
(.012)
.552
(.011)
39462
23
64861.0
64929.7
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
65
.681∗∗∗
(.030)
.086
(.013)
.547
(.011)
39462
23
64191.9
64286.3
.702∗∗∗
(.034)
.082
(.010)
.547
(.011)
39462
23
64194.1
64305.6
.012
(.010)
.697∗∗∗
(.034)
.082
(.014)
.547
(.011)
39462
23
64177.3
64331.8
Table 4.7 presents results from a multilevel analysis of the 2010-round of the ESS with
elite-directed political participation as the dependent variable. The interclass correlation
(ICC) value is .03 and this indicates that the country level contributes 3 percent of the
variance. This is about 1 percent lower than in the 2008-data. This indicates that the
country level explains less in 2010 than in 2008. This is in line with the bivariate graphs
depicting the relationship between the country level indicators of economic insecurity and
elite-directed political participation. Which indicated that there is no relationship between
the country level variables and the dependent variable. The null model only includes the
dependent variable. Here the constant is positive and significant with a value of .815. This
does not say anything as there are no predicators in the model.
Model 1 includes age (young), age (old), gender, education and religion into the regression.
The significance and direction of the control variables is as expected from theory. Men are
more likely to participate in elite-directed political activities than women, all other variables
held constant. The strength of the relationship is a bit stronger than in 2008. The higher
the education of the respondent is, the more likely it is that the respondent will participate
in elite-directed activities. The strength of the relationship is a bit weaker than in 2008.
Religious respondents participate less than non-religious respondents in elite-directed political
participation. The strength of the relationship is a bit stronger than in 2008. The direction
and significance of all three relationships is the same as in 2008. When we go from adult (0)
to young (1) on age(young) elite-directed political participation decreases, all other variables
held constant. This is significant on the one per cent level. This means that the respondents
between 18 to 29 participate less than the adults in the 30+ age group. The direction and
significance of age (young) is the same as we observed in 2008. However, the strength of the
relationship has weakened to some extent. This indicates that the age gap in elite-directed
political participation between the young people and adults is still present, but to a smaller
degree than in 2008. The elite-directed political participation increases when moving from
18-59 (0) to 60+(1) on age(old), all other variables held constant. This means that the
respondents that are 60 years and over participate more than the respondents that are under
66
60 years old in elite-directed political activities. The direction and significance level is in
line with what was observed in the 2008-data. However, the strength of the relationship
increases from 2008 till 2010. This indicates that the age gap in elite-directed participation
between those under 60 and those over 60 is still prescient, and it is growing. What we can
infer from this is that there are clear age gaps in elite-directed political participation. Young
respondents between 18-29 years participate significantly less than respondents over 30 years.
And the respondents under the age of 60 participate less than respondents over the age of
60 in elite-directed activities. This means that elite-directed participation increases with
rising age. The age gap is in line with what we would expect if hypothesis 1 was confirmed.
However, I need to compare this finding to the findings on elite-challenging participation in
order to test this hypothesis.
Model 2 includes the above mentioned variables, individual level unemployment and two
measures for political trust. When going from having a job to being unemployed there is a
significant decrease in elite-directed political participation, all other variables held constant.
The significance level and the direction of the relationship is the same as was observed in
the 2008-data. However, the strength of the relationship increases. This means that not
having a job decreases the elite-directed political participation. This indicates support for
a civic voluntarism view on the individual level as it appears that becoming unemployed
decreases elite-directed political participation. It appears that one needs resources in order to
participate in elite directed political activities. Which is in line with what Verba et. al. (1995)
claim. A units increase in trust in political authorities leads to a increase in elite-directed
political participation, all other variables held constant. This means that higher trust in
political parties and politicians leads to higher levels of elite-directed political participation.
The direction, strength and significance level of the relationship is in line with what was
observed in the 2008-data. This lends support to the idea that trust in political authorities
has a motivating effect on elite-directed political participation. Trust in institutions is not
significant, but has the same direction as trust in political authorities. The direction of
trust in institutions is a change from 2008 as it previously had a negative direction. All of
67
the independent variables and the control variables from the previous models have the same
direction, strength and significance level as before.
In model 3 the country level variable are added to the regression. These are: real GDP
growth rate and change in youth unemployment rate. The direction of the real GDP growth
rate is negative. Which means that a increase in the real GDP growth rate leads to a decrease
in political participation. The direction of real GDP growth rate is the opposite of what was
observed in the 2008-data. The strength has also increased a bit. However, the coefficient
is still not significant. The direction of the change in youth unemployment rate variable is
negative which is in line with what we saw in the 2008-data. Which means that a rise in
the change in youth unemployment rate leads to a decrease in political participation. The
strength of the relationship is also much weaker. However, the change in youth unemployment
rate is still insignificant. The individual level independent variables and control variables
still have the same values and the same significance level. The results from the two previous
models indicate that real GDP growth rate and change youth unemployment does not have
an significant effect on elite-directed political participation. This strengthens the findings
from the 2008 data and indicates that individual level variables have more of an impact on
elite-directed political participation.
In model 4 I add different interactions between age(young) and the different independent
variables. This is in order to start testing the last two hypothesis. The individual level
variables still have the same strength, direction and significance level. The significance level
of the real GDP growth rate has changed in this model and it is now significant. The strength
and direction is still the same. One units increase in the real GDP growth rate leads to a
decrease in elite-directed political participation. The change in youth unemployment rate
variable is still not significant. Of the five interaction terms only one of them is significant.
This is the interaction between age(young) and trust in political authorities. This interaction
term was also significant in the 2008-data. However, the significance level has changed from
the .01-level to the .10-level. The interaction term still indicates a negative relationship as it
did in 2008. The strength of the relationship has also decreased from 2008. Below I present
68
a margins plot of the interaction term, as suggested by Bambor et al. (2006).
Figure 4.4: Interaction effect between age (young) and trust in political authorities
Figure 4.4 illustrates the effect of age (young) conditioned by trust in political authorities
on elite-directed political participaiton in 2010.20 Going from an adult to a young person
there is a fall in political participation and the difference increaces by the level of trust.
Young people with a low degree of trust in political participation have a lower degree of
political participation than adults with low degrees of trust in political authorities. The age
gap is still present, but it appears to be larger than in 2008.
20 The
figure shows marginal effects controlled for the other variables in the regression.
69
Table 4.8: Multilevel regression with elite-challenging participation as dependent variable, 2008
(0)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Elite chall. Elite chall. Elite chall. Elite chall. Elite chall.
Age(Young)
-.023
-.024
-.024
.008
(.021)
(.020)
(.020)
(.052)
Age(old)
-.131∗∗∗
-.137∗∗∗
-.137∗∗∗
-.137∗∗∗
(.019)
(.020)
(.020)
(.020)
Gender
Education
Religion
.041∗∗
(.019)
.145∗∗∗
(.013)
.048∗∗∗
(.019)
.145∗∗∗
(.014)
.048∗∗∗
(.019)
.144∗∗∗
(.014)
.048∗∗
(.019)
.145∗∗∗
(.013)
.064∗∗∗
(.021)
.061∗∗∗
(.020)
-.066∗∗∗
(.016)
.061∗∗∗
(.020)
-.066∗∗∗
(.016)
.061∗∗∗
(.020)
-.061∗∗∗
(.015)
.006
(.004)
-.014∗∗
(.006)
.006
(.004)
-.014∗∗
(.006)
.005
(.004)
-.012∗∗
(.005)
-.048
(.040)
.001
(.015)
-.043
(.040)
.004
(.015)
Unemployment
Trust in political authorities
Trust in institutions
Real GDP growth rate
Change youth unemployment
age(young)_trustpa
.007
(.007)
-.008
(.010)
age(young)_trustinst
age(young)_unemp
-0.0368
(0.0262)
-.013∗∗
(.005)
age(young)_unra
age(young)_grgdp
Constant
SD(Constant)
SD(Residual)
Observations
Groups
AIC
BIC
ICC
.437∗∗∗
(.053)
.249
(.023)
.706
(.032)
39097
23
83487.5
83513.2
.11
.291∗∗∗
(.047)
.264
(.034)
.693
(.032)
39097
23
82077.3
82145.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
70
.349∗∗∗
(.055)
.269
(.034)
.692
(.032)
39097
23
82004.9
82099.2
.428∗∗∗
(.081)
.244
(.039)
.692
(.032)
39097
23
82004.4
82115.9
-.024∗∗∗
(.009)
.422∗∗∗
(.082)
.244
(.039)
.692
(.032)
39097
23
81989.4
82143.7
In table 4.8 results from multilevel analysis of the 2008 round of the ESS with elitechallenging political participation as the dependent variable are presented. The interclass
correlation (ICC) value is .11 and this indicates that the country level stands for 11 per
cent of the variance. This is in line with what we saw in the bivariate graphs between
elite-challenging political participation and country level variables connected to economic
insecurity. The null model only includes the dependent variable. Here the constant is positive
and significant with a value of .424. This does not say anything as there are no predicators
in the model.
In model 1 age(young), age(old), gender, education and religion is added to the regression.
Age (young) is not significant and it has a negative direction. If it was significant this
would indicate that going from 30+(0) to 18-29 (1) would decrease elite-challenging political
participation. This is not what was expected and it gives some support to the idea of Millner
(2010). The difference between the young people and the group in the middle appears
to be negligible. Age (old) is significant and the direction is negative. When going from
18-59 (0) to 60+(1) the elite-challenging political participation decreases, holding all other
variables constant. This indicates that elite-challenging political participation has a curve
linear relationship with age. The group between 18-29 take part in the elite-challenging
political participation to a larger extent than the group over 60. So does the middle-aged
group between 30 to 59, who take part in elite-challenging political participation to a larger
extent than those 60 and older. There is really no significant difference between the young
people and the middle group. Although there is a age gap in elite-challenging political
participation. It is not between the young and the adults. It is between those below and
above 60. This indicates that those below 60 have a larger likelihood of taking part in
elite-challenging activities than those above 60. It confirms the findings from the bivariate
analysis. All of the control variables have significance levels and the direction that is expected
from theory. Gender is significant and has a positive direction. This means that women take
part in elite-directed political participation to a larger extent than men. One units rise
in education leads to a rise in elite-directed political participation, all other variables held
71
constant. The higher the educational level of a respondent has the more he or she participates
through elite-challenging political activities. This is in line with the theoretical expectations
as rising levels of education gives higher degrees of elite-directed political participation. Elitechallenging political participation increases with having a religious belonging. This is in line
with the theoretical expectations.
In model 2 trust in political authorities, trust in institutions and unemployment is added
in addition to the variables already included in the regression. Unemployment has a significant impact on elite-challenging political participation. When going from employed to
unemployed there is a decrease in elite-challenging political participation, all other variables
held constant. This might indicate that loosing resource has a negative impact on elitechallenging political participation. This is in line with the civic voluntarism model and goes
against the predictions of grievance theory. However, this only looks at the individual level
factors and it could be that adding interactions gives another picture. So it is to early to
conclude about hypothesis three. There is a positive relationship between trust in political
authorities and elite-challenging political participation. The direction is the same as with
elite-directed political participation. However, the relationship between the two is insignificant. Trust in institutions and elite-challenging political participation has a negative and
significant relationship. One units increase in institutional trust gives a decrease in elite challenging political participation, all other variables held constant. This indicates that a lack
of trust in societal institutions could drive and motivate elite-challenging political activities.
This is in line with the findings of Hooghe and Marien (2013). This type of relationship is
what is expected in hypothesis two. However, the hypothesis is not tested until model 4.
In model 3 I look at how country level indicators affect elite-challenging political participation. All individual level indicators have the same direction and have the same significance
level as in the previous models. Real GDP growth rate has a negative relationship. One
units growth in the real GDP growth rate would lead to a fall in elite-challenging political
participation. However, the relationship is not significant. Change in youth unemployment
rate has a very weak positive effect on elite-challenging political participation. One units
72
growth in the youth unemployment rate would lead to an increase in elite- challenging political participation. However, it is not significant. This model presents some interesting
findings when it comes to hypothesis 3. It appears that country level variables of economic
insecurity does not have a significant impact on elite-challenging political participation. This
might indicate that there is no relationship there. However, before the hypothesis can be
rejected I need to look at a model with interactions to evaluate this.
In model 4 I include all of the same variables as in the previous model, but here I include interactions for each of the independent variables with age (young). The individual
level indicators still have the same direction and are all still significant. The value of age
(young) drops to some extent, but this is due to the fact that it is included in all the interactions. The country level indicators still have the same direction, strength and they are not
significant. Only two of the interactions are significant. These are the interactions between
age(young)*real GDP growth rate and age(young)*change in youth unemployment rate. The
interaction between age(young) and change in youth unemployment rate is negative. The
interaction between age (young) and real GDP growth rate is also negative. This confounds
the picture on the one hand a increase in youth unemployment rate indicates economic hardship and this leads to lower political participation among young people. On the other hand
a increase in real GDP growth rate which indicates economic growth leads to a decrease in
political participation. An interesting finding is that the interactions between both the interactions between trust and elite-challenging political participation are insignificant. In both
table 12 and 13 the interaction between trust in political authorities and elite-challenging
political participation are significant. This is in contrast to what I expected beforehand and
indicates that there might not be hold for hypothesis 2 in the data.
73
Figure 4.5: Interaction effect between age (young) and change in youth unemployment rates and between
age (young) and real GDP growth rate
In figure 4.5 I present two graphs.21 The one on the left illustrates the negative effect of
age (young) decreases with rising real GDP growth rates. Young people living in a country
with a low growth rate in the real GDP tend to participate more in elite-challenging political
participation than young people in countries with high growth rates in the real GDP. This
supports a grievance perspective on political participation among young people. However, an
important thing to point out is that the interaction is not significant for the lowest values of
the real GDP rate. This can be observed from the crossing lines in the marginal effects graph.
The figure to the right shows that political participation among young people falls with a
growing change in the youth unemployment rates. This indicates that young people living
in a country with a decrease in the youth unemployment rate participate in elite-challenging
political participation to a larger extent than young people living in a country with a increase
in the youth unemployment rate. Overall I conclude that this is a null finding. We can´t say
if the grievance perspective or the civic voluntarism resives support.
21 The
figures show marginal effects controlled for the other variables in the regression.
74
Table 4.9: Multilevel regression with elite-challenging as dependent variable, 2010
(0)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Elite chall. Elite chall. Elite chall. Elite chall. Elite chall.
Age(young)
-.005
-.006
-.006
-.062
(.018)
(.018)
(.018)
(.049)
Age(old)
-.076∗∗∗
-.084∗∗∗
-.084∗∗∗
-.082∗∗∗
(.016)
(.015)
(.015)
(.015)
Gender
Education
Religion
.008
(.016)
.146∗∗∗
(.011)
.013
(.016)
.145∗∗∗
(.011)
.013
(.016)
.145∗∗∗
(.011)
.012
(.016)
.146∗∗∗
(.011)
.046∗∗
(.020)
.043∗∗
(.019)
-.053∗∗∗
(.011)
.043∗∗
(.019)
-.053∗∗∗
(.011)
.042∗∗
(.019)
-.037∗∗∗
(.012)
.001
(.004)
-.010∗
(.005)
.001
(.004)
-.010∗
(.005)
.002
(.004)
-.012∗∗
(.005)
.014
(.014)
-.016∗∗
(.007)
.013
(.013)
-.017∗∗
(.008)
Unemployment
Trust in political authorities
Trust in institutions
Real GDP growth rate
Change youth unemployment
age(young)_trustpa
-.005
(.005)
.010
(.009)
age(young)_trustinst
-.080∗∗∗
(.020)
.004
(.003)
age(young)_unemp
age(young)_unra
age(young)_grgdp
Constant
SD(Constant)
SD(Residual)
Observations
Groups
AIC
BIC
Observations
.415∗∗∗
(.047)
.221
(.019)
.693
(.031)
39462
23
82698.8
82724.5
.09
.213∗∗∗
(.033)
.208
(.019)
.678
(.030)
39462
23
80906.1
80974.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
75
.269∗∗∗
(.050)
.214
(.020)
.677
(.029)
39462
23
80855.3
80949.8
.367∗∗∗
(.069)
.192
(.020)
.677
(.029)
39462
23
80854.3
80965.9
.005
(.008)
.377∗∗∗
(.071)
.192
(.020)
.676
(.029)
39462
23
80842.6
80997.1
In table 4.9 results from multilevel analysis of the 2010 round of the ESS with elitechallenging political participation as the dependent variable are presented. The interclass
correlation (ICC) value is .09 and this indicates that the country level stands for 9 per cent of
the variance. This is in line with what we saw in the bivariate graphs between elite-challenging
political participation and country level variables connected to economic insecurity. The null
model only includes the dependent variable. Here the constant is positive and significant
with a value of .404. This does not say anything as there are no predicators in the model.
In table 4.9 elite-challenging political participation is the dependent variable and the 2010data is analysed. In model 1 age (young) is not significant and it is negative. Although there
is a small difference between those under 30 and those over 30 in favour of those under,
as can be observed from the bivariate analysis. The direction and significance level is the
same as in the 2008-data. However, the strength has decreased between the two years. Age
(old) is significant and negative. Going from under 60 to 60 and above 60 the value of elitechallenging political participation decreases, all other variables held constant. The direction
and significance level of the relationship is the same as in 2008. However, also here the
strength of the relationship has decreased. This echoes Milner´s (2010) predictions, is only a
small difference between those that are young people and those that are in the middle group.
There is still an age gap in elite-challenging political participation between those 60 years
and older and those below the age of 60. Where those below take part in elite-challenging
political activities to a larger extent than those above. Gender is not significant in this
model, but it does have the expected direction. This is a difference between the 2008 and
2010-data. Education is significant on the one per cent level. One units increase in education
gives a rise in elite-challenging political participation, all other variables held constant. The
strength, direction and the significance level is in line with what was observed in the 2008data. Religion is significant on the five per cent level. When you go from not having a
religious belonging to having one there is a rise in elite-challenging political participation.
The direction is in line with the findings from 2008, but both the strength and the significance
level decreases between the two years.
76
In model 2 unemployment, trust in political authorities and trust in institutions are added
to the regression in addition to the variables already included. Unemployment is significant
on the one per cent level. When going from having an employment relation to being unemployed there is a fall in elite-challenging political participation, all other variables held
constant. Unemployment is a indicator of economic insecurity on the individual level and
this indicates that a lack of resources does not incentivize elite-challenging political participation. Both the direction of the relationship and the significance level is in line with what
was observed in the 2008-data. However, the strength of the relationship decreases between
the two years. Trust in political authorities is not significant and has a very weak effect
on political participation. The direction and the lack of significance is in line with what
the results from 2008 indicate. Trust in institutions is significant on the ten percent level.
When the trust in societal institutions increases with one unit the elite-challenging political
participation decreases, all other variables held constant. This means that having trust in
societal institutions disincentives participation in elite-challenging political activities. This
suggests support for a grievance perspective. The direction of the relationship is the same as
in 2008. The strength of the relationship and the significance level decreases between the two
years. This indicates that the relationship is weaker in 2010 than in 2008, contrary to what
is expected. The other individual level independent variables still have the same direction,
strength and significant levels as in the previous models. The results in model 2 show the
same pattern as in model 2 in table 4.8.
In model 3 country level variables are added to the regression in addition to the individual
level variables already included. This is to check if the economic conditions in a country
affect the elite-challenging political participation. Real GDP growth rate is not significant,
but the direction indicates that growth in the GDP gives higher rates of elite-challenging
political participation. This is in line with what was observed in the 2008-data. Change in
the youth unemployment rate is significant on the five percent level. The direction of the
relationship is negative. One units growth in the youth unemployment rate gives a fall in elite
challenging political participation. This means that the higher the youth unemployment rate
77
is, the lower the elite-challenging political participation will be. This indicates that resources
is a prerequisite for elite-challenging political participation. This is in line with the civic
voluntarism model and gives a indication that hypothesis 3 might be rejected. However,
first we need to test it through adding interactions in model 4. The significant relationship
between change in youth unemployment and elite-challenging political participation is a
difference between the 2010 and 2008 results. The relationship also changes direction and
increases in strength between the two years. The individual level independent variables and
the control variables still have the same direction, strength and significance level as in the
previous models.
In model 4 I add several interactions in order to test hypothesis two and hypothesis three.
The interaction between trust in political authorities and elite-challenging political participation is insignificant as it was in the 2008-data. The same goes for the interaction between trust
in institutions and elite-challenging political participation. As there is no significant relationship between the trust-interactions and elite-challenging political participation hypothesis 2
has be rejected. The interaction between age (young) and unemployment status is significant
on the one percent level. The interaction has a negative direction. This means that going
from having a employment status to being unemployed gives a decrease in elite-challenging
political participation among young people. The significance level and the strength of the
interaction is a difference from the 2008-data. There is no significant relationship between
the other economic insecurity interactions and elite-challenging political participation. This
is a change from 2008 as both these indicators were significant then.
78
Figure 4.6: Interaction effect between age (young) and unemployment status
Figure 4.6 illustrates the negative effect of age (young) when going from employed to
unemployed.22 Young people who are employed participate in elite-challenging political participation to a larger extent than young people who are unemployed, controlled for other
variables. This indicates that a lack of resources among young people gives lower levels of
elite-challenging political participation. This is the opposite of what is expected in hypothesis
three. There is almost no difference in participation among the young people and adults who
have a job or equivalent status. However, young people that are unemployed are less likely
to participate than adults who are unemployed. This indicates that three has to be rejected
as there is an opposite relationship between economic insecurity and participation. However,
the finding is still interesting as it might immply that young people that lack resources are
more affected by this than adults that lack resources.
22 The
figure shows marginal effects controlled for the other variables in the regression.
79
5
Political participation among young people
The aim of this thesis has been to evaluate if changes in economic and social conditions
affect the degree and type of political participation among young people. The 2008 economic
crisis in Europe offered an opportunity to do this in a time of great change in the dependent
variables. To investigate this I use two alternative theoretical frameworks from the literature:
the civic voluntarism model and the grievance model. The civic voluntarism model assumes
that resources is a prerequisite for all forms of political participation. In this perspective trust
provides a motivation for political participation of both types. Economic security also gives
a motivation for both types of political activities as it enables the citizens to mobilize the
resources required to participate in political activities. The contrast is found in the grievance
model assumes that a lack of resources can be a motivator for political participation. A lack
of trust here is viewed as an incentive to take part in political participation. And a lack of
economic security is a motivating factor for elite-challenging political activity.
5.1
Summary of findings
Hypothesis one receives partial support as there is a age gap in political participation. There
is a clear age gap in political participation in both 2008 and in 2010. The young people
participate to a lesser extent in elite-directed forms of political participation than the rest
of the population. While they participate in elite-challenging political participation than
those over 60. The reason it only receives partial support is that the age gap is different
than what was expected. Both in 2008 and in 2010 the group between 30-59 takes part
in elite-challenging political participation to a the same extent as the respondents between
18-29 years old. This was not what was expected in advance of the analysis. As the findings
of Norris (2003) and Inglehart (1997) indicated that there is a age gap in elite-challenging
political participation between young people and adults. The findings in my analysis is in
conflict with the finding of Norris (2003) and Inglehart (1997). And it indicates that there
might be some truth to the statement of Milner (2010) that there really is no difference
80
between those in that are middle aged and the young people.
There is evidence to suggest that a lack of trust in institutions can motivate elite-challenging
political participation in the population overall. This is interesting and is in line with what
Hooghe and Marien (2013) found in their analysis of the relationship. This indicates that
trust is not needed to take part in elite-challenging political participation. Hypothesis 2 is
rejected as there is no evidence in my analysis that lack of trust among young people does
motivate elite-challenging political activity. As there is no significant relationship between
trust and elite-challenging political participation among young people. This also indicates
that young people are different from the rest of the population as their participation in
elite-challenging political activities most likely is not motivated by a lack of trust.
Before the analysis I assumed that the financial crisis and the economic insecurity created due to the crisis would create a mobilization around elite-challenging forms of political
participation among young people. The analysis showed that this was not so and hypothesis
3 was rejected. There is a negative relationship between the interaction between age and
change in youth unemployment and elite-challenging political participation in the 2008-data.
In the 2010-data there is also a negative relationship between the interaction between age and
unemployment status and elite-challenging political participation. This indicates that lack
of resources among young people gives lower rates of political participation. This is in line
with the predictions of the civic voluntarism model which predicts that political participation
requires resources like time and money. The results indicates that being unemployed, which
is a situation where a citizen lacks resources, leads to less political participation. This is in
line with the predictions of Inglehart (1997). The results go against the predictions of Kern
et al. (2015) which predicts support for the grievance theory in 2010. It should be pointed
out that Kern et al. (2015) in a time series shows overall support for the civic voluntarism
model, however they also run a individual cross section analysis for 2010 and this indicates
support for the grievance perspective. It could be that there are different explanations for
young people and the rest of the population, but the results from model 2-3 indicates that
the civic voluntarism perspective holds for the rest of the population as well. The most
81
Table 5.1: Findings
Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 3
Age gap in political participation
Trust and political participation conditioned on age
Economic insecurity and political participation conditioned on age
Support
Partial
Rejected
Rejected
likely explanation of the differing results is that the dependent indicator that I use is two
indices, while Kern et al. (2015) uses individual measurements of political participation.
In my oppinion the indecies are broader and better indicators of political participation in
general. This because they include more information and captures the concept better than
the individual measures of political participation.
5.2
Implications and limitations
For several decades, comparative political scientists have spent a large amount of time studying the importance of different economic and social variables on the political participation
of the individual. The main finding of this thesis is the support for an age gap in political
participation. However, the age gap does not take the expected form. The young people and
the middle aged people participate to a larger extent than the people 60 years and older.
This could indicate that elite-challenging political participation is becoming more widespread
in the entire population in Europe. As this is a cross-sectional study it is not possible to
generalize outside the two years of study.
Of the two competing theories: the civic voluntarism model and grievance theory. The
data from both years indicates overall support for the civic voluntarism model among young
people. Implicated this means that the resources of the individual appear to be a prerequisite
for political participation. Young individuals that are employed are more likely to participate
than those that are unemployed in 2010. Young individuals in the countries with a decrease
in the youth unemployment rate participate in elite-challenging political activity to a larger
extent than the people in countries with a increase in the rate in 2008. On the other hand
82
the young individuals in countries with a decrease in the real GDP growth rate participate
in elite-challenging political participation to a larger extent than those in countries with a
increase in the real GDP growth rates. However, the overall results indicates that economic
insecurity does not incentivize elite-challenging political participation among young people.
The implication is that the civic voluntarism model applies to young individuals as well.
A study of this magnitude of course has its limitations. The operationalization of the
dependent variables, especially elite-directed political participation, could be vulnerable to
bias. This due to the fact that the fact that the European Social Survey relies on selfreported data. This could lead to a over reporting of participation in for example elections.
This could be a challenge to the measurement validity of the study. However, there is little
to be done about this if we want to measure the wide array of types of political participation
that is available through the ESS. There are some limitations to the possible scope of this
study. The fact that the ESS is a cross-sectional data set limits the generalizability and to
the possible causality of the relationship between different forms of political participation.
It is not possible to determine causality from a cross-sectional data set. This requires a
different type of data. The generalizability is also limited due to the data. I have tested if
the grievance theory or the civic voluntarism model can explain political participation in 23
European democracies in 2008 and in 2010. To some extent we can say that the results are
valid for the countries included in dataset at the time of the two surveys. We cannot say if
this finding is valid over time in Europe as we do not have a time series.
5.3
Further research
In this thesis I have evaluated if the grievance theory can explain different forms of political
participation among young people in Europe. The study of political participation among
young people as a group and how economic insecurity affects this was my main theoretical
objective. I concluded that the civic voluntarism model, and not grievance theory explains
participation in different forms of political participation among young people. Although this
study concluded this the effect of economic and social conditions on political participation
83
among young people should be studied further.
One possible approach to study this relationship further is to data which includes time as
a factor. This could be done through looking at all the rounds included in the ESS from 2002
until 2014. A study of the relationship over time could give insight into if the relationship
is constant or if it changes with time. This would give us a larger area of generalizability.
Another possible approach is to use register data to study the effect of economic conditions
on electoral participation among young people. As the Norwegian electoral roll is being
digitalized this gives unique possibilities as it would open up the possibility of looking at
causality between economic conditions and electoral participation. It limits the study to
Norway and to one form of political participation. But, the possibility of looking at causal
relationships outweighs any possible disadvantages.
There are many possible ways to forward the research agenda on political participation
among young people and the suggestions that I have listed above are not complete. My
study gives insight into the effect of economic and social factors on political participation
among young people. It indicates support for the notion that resources are required in order
to participate also among young people. My hope is that this thesis has contributed in
some way to giving a better insight into the relationship between resources and political
participation among young people.
84
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91
Teorell, Jan & Anders Westholm (1999). “Att bestämma sig för att vara med och bestämma:
Om varför vi röstar – allt mindre”, i Valdeltagande i förändring: Demokratiutredningens
forskarvolym XII, SOU 1999:132, ss 137-204.
Teorell, Jan (2006): “Political participation and three theories of democracy: A research
inventory and agenda”. European Journal of Political Research 45:787–810
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in-turmoil-five-years-of-economic-crisis [Reading date: 25.09.2015].
’Political rights.’ https://www.ch.ch/en/political-rights/ [Reading date: 30.03.2016].
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’Youth definition’ <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/youth-definition.pdf>
[Reading date: 10.09.2015].
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and social equality. New York: Harper and Row.
Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie & J. Kim (1978): Participation and Political Equality: A
Seven Nation Comparison. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Verba, Sidney; Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry E. Brady (1995): Voice and Equality:
Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Verba , Sydney. (1996): “The Citizen as Respondent:Sample Surveys and American Democracy,” American political Science Review 90:1-7.
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’Real GDP growth rate’ http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=1
[Reading date: 15.01.2016].
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[Reading date: 17.01.2016].
92
Appendices
A
Appendix to chapter 3
A.1
Descriptive statistics
Table A.1: Correlation between different aspects of trust 2008
Parliament
Legal system
Politicians
Democratic system
1
0.662
0.755
0.592
0.662
1
0.618
0.544
0.755
0.618
1
0.559
0.592
0.544
0.559
1
Parliament
Legal system
Politicians
Democratic system
Table A.2: Correlation between different aspects of trust 2010
Parliament
Legal system
Politicians
Democratic system
Parties
Parliament
Legal system
Politicians
Democratic system
Parties
1
0.671
0.770
0.581
0.744
0.671
1
0.618
0.556
0.598
0.770
0.618
1
0.559
0.888
0.581
0.556
0.559
1
0.547
0.744
0.598
0.888
0.547
1
93
Table A.3: Summary statistics of all variables 2008
Variable
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
trstprl
6.4
13.196
0
99
trstlgl
6.804
12.533
0
99
trstplt
4.814
10.858
0
99
trstprt
5.266
12.367
0
99
vote
0.79
0.408
0
1
wrkprty
0.036
0.187
0
1
sgnptit
0.219
0.414
0
1
pbldmn
0.059
0.236
0
1
bctprd
0.155
0.362
0
1
mmbprty
0.05
0.217
0
1
stfdem
7.843
15.019
0
99
rlgblg
1.404
0.643
1
9
c_grgdp_2008
1.571
2.308
-2.8
6.5
c_unra1524_2006 16.949
6.492
6.600
30.1
c_unra1524_2008 14.827
5.413
5.3
24.6
Ind_polcon
0.827
0.584
0
3
Ind_polchl
0.432
0.736
0
3
dif_trust
5.035
2.267
0
10
spes_trust
3.47
2.259
0
10
gender
0.537
0.499
0
1
rel
0.377
0.485
0
1
agea
49.064
17.872
18
123
age1
0.17
0.375
0
1
age3
0.523
0.499
0
1
edu
0.917
0.986
0
3
age2
0.307
0.461
0
1
c_unra1524_dif
-2.123
4.109
-12.8
6.7
unemp
0.163
0.37
0
1
94
N
41973
41973
41973
41973
39376
41883
41807
41876
41825
41861
41973
41973
41973
41973
41973
41939
41889
39931
40985
41956
41804
41973
41973
41973
41914
41973
41973
41951
Table A.4: Summary statistics
Variable
Mean Std. Dev. Min.
trstprl
6.063
13.314
0
trstlgl
6.954
13.402
0
trstplt
4.714
11.476
0
trstprt
5.106
12.811
0
vote
0.774
0.419
0
wrkprty
0.035
0.183
0
sgnptit
0.194
0.395
0
pbldmn
0.058
0.233
0
bctprd
0.145
0.352
0
mmbprty
0.044
0.205
0
stfdem
7.748
15.394
0
agea
51.46
46.26
18
c_unra1524_2008 14.672
5.293
5.3
c_unra1524_2010 22.332
8.752
7.9
c_grgdp_2010
1.513
2.435
-5.479
Ind_polcon
0.807
0.58
0
Ind_polchl
0.395
0.711
0
dif_trust
4.863
2.297
0
spes_trust
3.203
2.302
0
age1
0.168
0.374
0
age3
0.511
0.5
0
gender
0.538
0.499
0
rel
0.379
0.485
0
edu
1.361
0.949
0
age2
0.323
0.468
0
c_unra1524_dif
7.66
5.283
-0.6
unemp
0.178
0.382
0
95
Max.
99
99
99
99
1
1
1
1
1
1
99
999
24.6
41.6
5.989
3
3
10
10
1
1
1
1
3
1
20.9
1
N
42685
42685
42685
42685
40196
42599
42530
42593
42515
42603
42685
42685
42685
42685
42685
42652
42606
40444
41622
42599
42599
42664
42550
42485
42685
42685
42586
A.2 Collinearity analysis
Table A.5: VIF-values for independent variables
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
Model 3
Age (young)
1.05(.91) 1.05(.90) 1.05 (.91)
Age (old)
1.06(.89) 1.07(.88) 1.07(.88)
Gender
1.00(.99) 1.02(.96) 1.02(.96)
Education
1.01(.97) 1.02(.95) 1.03(.94)
Religion
1.02(.96) 1.02(.95) 1.04(.92)
Unemployment
1.02(.95) 1.03(.95)
Trust in political authorities
1.36(.54) 1.36(.54)
Trust in institutions
1.36(.54) 1.38(.53)
Real GDP growth rate
1.44(.48)
Change in youth unemployment
1.42(.50)
Age(young)*Spesific trust
Age(young)* Institutional trust
Age(young)* Unemployment
Age(young)*Real GDP growth rate
Age(young)*Change in youth unemp
(2008)
Model 4
2.92(.12)
1.07(.87)
1.02(.96)
1.03(.94)
1.04(.92)
1.12(.79)
1.49(.45)
1.50(.44)
1.58(.40)
1.59(.40)
2.62(.15)
3.55(.07)
1.18(.72)
1.80(.34)
1.71(.31)
Table A.6: VIF-values for independent variables
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
Model 3
Age (young)
1.05(.91) 1.05(.90) 1.05 (.90)
Age (old)
1.08(.86) 1.10(.83) 1.10(.83)
Gender
1.00(.99) 1.02(.97) 1.02(.97)
Education
1.03(.94) 1.05(.90) 1.05(.90)
Religion
1.02(.97) 1.02(.97) 1.04(.93)
Unemployment
1.03(.94) 1.04(.93)
Trust in political authorities
1.36(.54) 1.37(.53)
Trust in institutions
1.37(.54) 1.37(.53)
Real GDP growth rate
1.10(.83)
Change in youth unemployment
1.06(.89)
Age(young)*Spesific trust
Age(young)* Institutional trust
Age(young)* Unemployment
Age(young)*Real GDP growth rate
Age(young)*Change in youth unemp
(2010)
Model 4
3.23(.10)
1.10(.82)
1.02(.97)
1.06(.89)
1.04(.93)
1.14(.77)
1.50(.45)
1.49(.45)
1.20(.70)
1.17(.73)
2.49(.16)
3.42(.08)
1.22(.67)
1.38(.53)
1.93(.27)
96
B
B.1
Appendix to chapter 4
Bivariate relationships
Table B.1: Mean values of different types of political participation by age within each country.
2008
2010
Age1
Age2
Age1
Age2
30+ 18-29 18-59 60+ 30+ 18-29 18-59 60+
ED .99
.76
.94
.96
.97
.86
.95
.97
Belgium
EC .44
.56
.50
.29
.37
.34
.41
.27
ED .85
.41
.76
.89
.87
.61
.78
.91
Bulgaria
EC .13
.15
.16
.05
.12
.17
.16
.09
ED .70
.42
.59
.87
.71
.33
.56
.83
Switzerland
EC .74
.64
.78
.53
.66
.56
.68
.55
ED 1.16
.90
1.06 1.28 1.05
.59
.90
1.07
Cyprus
EC .15
.11
.14
.15
.17
.15
.20
.10
ED .68
.34
.60
.76
.70
.47
.60
.82
Czech rep.
EC .27
.27
.29
.20
.30
.30
.33
.26
ED .90
.52
.82
.91
.88
.65
.79
.95
Germany
EC .68
.70
.75
.48
.69
.60
.72
.55
ED 1.09
.78
1.03 1.12 1.03
.57
.92
1.09
Denmark
EC .63
.76
.73
.37
.61
.69
.68
.41
ED .70
.51
.65
.71
.77
.51
.69
.77
Estonia
EC .15
.21
.18
.08
.18
.22
.22
.12
ED .82
.66
.78
.80
.88
.53
.78
.92
Spain
EC .41
.46
.49
.16
.56
.56
.62
.37
ED .97
.45
.83
1.05 .93
.5
.77
1.01
Finland
EC .61
.84
.74
.33
.58
.80
.75
.39
ED .82
.51
.74
.89
.76
.36
.63
.86
France
EC .75
.76
.83
.48
.75
.76
.84
.58
ED .80
.37
.66
.97
.80
.43
.67
.89
Great Britain
EC .68
.57
.69
.56
.52
.40
.51
.48
ED .99
.81
.93
1.03 .85
.66
.78
.92
Greece
EC .24
.32
.27
.14
.24
.40
.34
.13
ED .95
.77
.90
.93
.91
.49
.83
.85
Croatia
EC .39
.66
.52
.19
.37
.46
.46
.28
ED .83
.51
.75
.81
.77
.65
.75
.77
Hungary
EC .17
.11
.17
.10
.12
.12
.12
.10
ED .90
.46
.78
1.05 .82
.42
.66
.95
Ireland
EC .50
.47
.51
.26
.29
.31
.32
.23
ED .95
.66
.88
1.02 .93
.77
.87
.99
Netherlands
EC .35
.39
.41
.19
.37
.48
.46
.23
ED .99
.59
.89
1.08 .99
.70
.89
1.09
Norway
EC .64
.85
.73
.41
.64
.70
.70
.51
ED .78
.64
.75
.15
.78
.49
.67
.82
Poland
EC .15
.13
.70
.07
.16
.25
.21
.11
ED .75
.42
.69
.77
.80
.49
.70
.84
Portugal
EC .10
.19
.17
.03
.10
.17
.15
.06
ED 1.02
.71
.93
1.09 1.03
.89
.96
1.11
Sweden
EC .89
1.00
.96
.75
.74
.94
.84
.65
ED .86
.64
.78
.91
.81
.48
.69
.88
Slovenia
EC .14
.21
.18
.06
.16
.17
.19
.12
ED .84
.55
.78
.86
.78
.67
.74
.81
Slovakia
EC .26
.28
.29
.18
.28
.37
.33
.23
97
Table B.2: Correlations of aspects of trust and different types of political participation by country
2008
2010
Trust in inst. Trust in political auth. Trust in inst. Trust in political auth.
ED
-.02
.41
-.007
.11**
Belgium
EC
.06*
.03
.08**
.07**
ED
.14**
.21**
.11**
.21**
Bulgaria
EC
.004
.02
.01
.04
ED
.09**
.14**
.03
.08**
Switzerland
EC
.04
.03
-.02
-.05*
ED
.17**
.16**
.13**
.16**
Cyprus
EC
.07*
.04
-.02
.05
ED
.07**
.14**
.08**
.16**
Czech rep.
EC
.02
.05*
-.02
.01
ED
.11**
.13**
.10**
.11**
Germany
EC
.01
.01
.03*
.02
ED
.06*
.11**
.05*
.10**
Denmark
EC
-.05*
.002
-.06*
-.03
ED
.21**
.21**
.17**
.18**
Estonia
EC
.10**
.08**
.05*
.02
ED
-.01
.10**
-.01
.10**
Spain
EC
-.10**
.03
-.07**
.02
ED
.08**
.16**
.11**
.12**
Finland
EC
-.002
.01
-.06**
-.09**
ED
-.02
.10**
.04
.15**
France
EC
-.06**
-.03
-.07**
-.04
ED
.07**
.10**
.14**
.15**
UK
EC
-.004
-.04
.03
.04
ED
-.01
.04
-.001
.08**
Greece
EC
-.14**
-.03
-.10**
-.00
ED
.07**
.12**
.20**
.16**
Croatia
EC
-.05
-.07*
.02
-.08**
ED
-.02
.06*
.18**
.21**
Hungary
EC
-.03
-.04
.01
.03
ED
-.03
.06**
.11**
.15**
Ireland
EC
-.08**
-.11**
.05**
.02
ED
.14**
.18**
.15**
.18**
NL
EC
.07**
.03
.06*
.02
ED
.06*
.18**
.12**
.14**
Norway
EC
.05
.03
.02
.02
ED
.11**
.12**
.07**
.15**
Poland
EC
.02
.04
.00
-.01
ED
.01
.06**
.002
.09**
Portugal
EC
.07**
.05*
.02
.06**
ED
.07**
.13**
.03
.14**
Sweden
EC
.003
.05*
-.04
-.02
ED
.08**
.16**
.11**
0.15**
Slovenia
EC
.02
.01
.01
.01
ED
-.01
.09**
.03
0.06**
Slovakia
EC
-.09**
-.06*
-.04
-.06*
Note: Significance levels ( p < .05 = *; p < .01 = **).
98
All of the analysis have been done in STATA. The do-file and the ESS-questionaire are too
large to include here. By contacting me via email: [email protected] I can send the
do-file, the datasets and the questionaire for ESS 2008 and 2010.
99