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Ethics
Bernard Williams – Interlude: Relativism (from Morality)
Notes
Relativism
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Williams takes relativism to be “possibly the most absurd view to have been
advanced even in moral philosophy”.
In its vulgar form, it consists in three propositions:
1. “Right” means “right for a given society”
2. This is to be understood in functionalist1 terms
3. It is therefore wrong to criticise the values of another society.
This is patently inconsistent, because (3) has a non-relative sense not allowed by
(1).
In an example about our reaction to human sacrifice amongst the Ashanti,
Williams note a subtle shift from what is “right amongst the Ashanti” to “the
Ashanti were right”.
All that is allowed on the principles of relativism is that it’s functionally valuable
for us not to interfere. However:1. This isn’t what’s meant, and
2. It is highly dubious
Non-interference and tolerance are non-relative principles.
Williams now asks what is a society?
1. If it is defined by it values, then many functionalist propositions become
tautologies. Eg. if a group is defined by its values, then it needs to retain its
values to survive2.
2. If it is equivalent to people plus descendants, then many functionalist
propositions will be false. Forgetting the Welsh language isn’t lethal!
Williams admits that some beliefs or practices “define” a culture or society so
that discouragement may lead to major change in that society, or in it becoming
hopeless.
Such propositions, when true, are important for deciding what to do, but they
don’t make the decision automatic (ie. no automatic “keep out”).
Williams gives examples of societies involved in moral conflict (Nazi Germany,
Ashanti society against the majority in Ghana). We want to know the moral
decision process in concrete cases of either conflict or control. Functionalist
propositions provide no answers.
Questions may arise whether a particular group is a society or just a subgroup
within a society to which it is integrally related (eg. blacks in the US).
The central confusion of relativism is that the fact of difference does not imply a
non-relative principle of attitude (non-intervention).
If societies have different moral outlooks, part of these differences will be
attitudes to other societies.
Universalisation applies to all moralities, which are seen to apply not just to the
tribe but to persons as such.
Moral motivations are internalised and can’t just be dropped when an agent
happens to be in a foreign society.
“There is no disputing taste” doesn’t apply to morality, and more than “do in
Rome”, which is little more than a principle of etiquette.
It’s a platitude that exposure to other cultures will show up our chauvinism, but:1. Sometimes we may realise a trait as not being a moral matter at all.
What is functionalism in this context?
So, the group-name is not a rigid designator!
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Ethics
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Bernard Williams – Interlude: Relativism (from Morality)
Notes
2. At other times we may realise genuine differences in the moral situation (eg.
institutional polygamy isn’t the same thing as seedy bigamy in our society.
It is psychologically and morally implausible to think that adaptive reactions are
the only correct ones. There is no a priori demand to accept inhuman practices.
Williams gives the example of the genuine horror of the conquistadors (“a morally
unpretentious collection of bravos”) at Indian human sacrifice. This wasn’t
parochial or self-righteous, but indicated that they treated the Indians as human
beings rather than animals.
“Every society has its own standards” is a useful maxim of social study, but what
is one supposed to do when confronted with some abomination? The response that
you “had no right to be there” is no excuse for inaction, just as it would be no
excuse on the part of a burglar who failed to prevent a murder on the grounds that
he was trespassing.
Williams doesn’t deny that many have interfered when they should have kept out
(and that their intervention has been more brutal than the practices they stopped).
However, he does claim that it can’t be a consequence of the nature of morality
that there ought to be non-intervention or that we have rationally to accept what
we find in other cultures.
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