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Communication Quarterly Vol. 59, No. 5, November–December 2011, pp. 603–624 Adam Ferguson’s Civil Society and the Rhetorical Functions of (In)Civility in United States Senate Debate Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Christopher R. Darr This article offers a theoretical examination of civility within the modern U.S. Senate (USS), grounding the contemporary literature—which conceives of civility as a set of standards for public argument—in the notion of civil society as espoused by Adam Ferguson. Ferguson’s theory of civil society suggests that civility within deliberative bodies should be weighed against other factors, including the antagonistic nature of debate and the morality (in a utilitarian sense) of its participants and outcomes. The essay concludes with examples of how critics might apply this perspective to USS debate to reveal the rhetorical functions of (in)civility. Keywords: Adam Ferguson; Civil Society; Civility; Rhetoric; Senate Scholars and political insiders have both registered concerns about the alleged incivility of U.S. congressional debate, including lack of compromise and its detrimental effects on policymaking (Evans & Oleszek, 1998; Hart, 1989; Jamieson, 1997; Loomis, 2000; Ornstein, 1997; Pell, 1997; Senate Historical Office [SHO], 2003a; Sinclair, 1989; Uslaner, 1991, 1993, 2000). More broadly, incivility has been associated with the constraint of open dialogue (Arnett, 2001; Carter, 1998; Meyer, 2000; Sinopoli, 1995) and blatant disrespect for participants in public discourse (Arnett & Arneson, 1999; Carter, 1998; Uslaner, 1993). Former Senator Claiborne Pell, for instance, claimed that the U.S. Senate (USS) has ‘‘become so partisan and so personal in our attacks upon each other that we can no longer effectively work together in the national interest’’ (p. 147). Others concurred that incivility is so rampant in our public Christopher R. Darr (Ph.D., Purdue University, 2004) is an assistant professor of Communication Arts in the Department of Humanities at Indiana University Kokomo. Correspondence: Christopher R. Darr, Department of Humanities, Indiana University Kokomo, 2300 S. Washington St., P.O. Box 9003, Kokomo, IN 46904–9003; E-mail: [email protected] ISSN 0146-3373 print/1746-4102 online # 2011 Eastern Communication Association DOI: 10.1080/01463373.2011.614208 604 C. R. Darr Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 dialogue as to make true deliberation difficult, if not impossible (see Crowley, 2006; Loomis, 2000; Uslaner 1993). Perhaps it is Ivie (2008) who put the problem most dramatically when he argued that when we engage in rhetoric that demonizes or dehumanizes others, ‘‘democracy is lost’’ (p. 454). Yet, although scholars, participants, and observers seem to agree that our political discourse has become less civil in recent decades, there is some confusion about exactly what civility is. Stephen Carter (1998) addressed this lack of clarity by noting the following: [S]ome people . . . think of manners. Others think of proper standards of moral conduct, or a set of standards for conducting public argument. Still others think of willing participation in the institutions that enable our democracy to thrive, what has come to be known as the movement for civic renewal. (p. 13) In other words, at least three concepts are involved in discussions of the problem: civic virtue (the ethical role that ought to be played by members of society who engage in public life), civility (the standards of argument or public discussion), and civil society (the larger background of liberal democracy that enables public spheres to thrive). Moreover, much of this discussion myopically focuses on manners and politeness while ignoring the larger notion of civil society. Therefore, the major purpose of this essay is to improve our understanding of the problem of incivility by situating this slippery concept—specifically, as embodied in the USS—squarely within the broader notion of civil society. Civility is currently conceptualized by members of the USS and by its observers as a set of standards for conducting public argument; and, although there is value in this approach, I argue that these ‘‘rules of civility’’ need to be more clearly grounded in the notion of civil society in order that we might more fully assess specific rhetorical tactics thought to be uncivil and, therefore, ‘‘bad for debate.’’ Moreover, although much of the current literature confounds or altogether ignores the connection between civility and civil society, the latter can be traced back at least as far as the Enlightenment; and, as Hauser (1998) pointed out, to Greek and Roman conceptions of rhetoric as well. I aim to address this issue by recontextualizing the modern view of civility within Adam Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil society, which understands civil society as created by inherently antagonistic human beings who desire peaceful solutions and are enabled to achieve them by rule-bound deliberative bodies and the participation of a moral citizenry. To meet these ends, this essay first explores Ferguson’s theory of civil society, then grounds the more recent literature on civility within this paradigm. Finally, I provide examples from several recent USS debates to show how this refiguring can provide an alternative vantage point from which to assess USS rhetoric in terms of its alleged incivility. Adam Ferguson and Civil Society Like incivility, the concept of civil society has recently received great scholarly attention (see Agosta, 2007; Dutta-Bergman, 2005a, 2005b; Hands, 2006; Keane, 2003). Hauser (1998) traced the development of civil society to Enlightenment thinkers Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Communication Quarterly 605 who began to theorize and reflect on ‘‘economic, political, and moral relations’’ (p. 25). Foley and Edwards (1998) essentially agreed, placing the concept more specifically within the Scottish Enlightenment—particularly, the work of Adam Smith. The current notion of civil society, they argued, has roots in the dawn of the liberal state, and came about as the result of efforts to rethink the roles of citizens within the modern state (see also Gawthrop & Waldo, 1984). Broadly speaking, the Scottish Enlightenment has been characterized as an intellectual movement aiming to critique and analyze society in the name of progress (Broadie, 2003), with its ultimate aim being the ‘‘improvement, not only of human knowledge but also of the environment in which men [sic] lived and worked’’ (Daiches, 1986, p. 5; see also Fleischacker, 2003; Jack, 1989). As a colleague of Adam Smith, David Hume, and other Scottish thinkers, Adam Ferguson aimed to reform society by studying its history and functioning to provide a model for moral leadership so that government might be improved (Jack, 1989).1 In his treatise, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, originally published in 1767, Ferguson (1767=2000) put forth a theory of civil society that is grounded in at least three basic principles, each of which is discussed in turn: (a) Human beings are social creatures with a basic drive for antagonism and conflict; (b) we are driven toward perfection, which results in the rule of law and the creation of sophisticated, rulebound deliberative bodies; and (c) societies that ‘‘advance’’ to become ‘‘civil’’ are made up of and create citizens who engage in moral behavior. My goal is to explore these key aspects of Ferguson’s notion of civil society in order to contribute to a clearer understanding of civility as a set of argumentative norms, particularly within deliberative bodies like the USS. The Drive for Antagonism The first principle of civil societies explored by Ferguson (1767=2000) is our dual nature as communal, yet antagonistic, beings: Humans are ‘‘disposed to opposition, as well as to concert’’ (p. 31); and, thus, form groups, societies, and ultimately nations to satisfy our basic needs. We are drawn together, yet at the same time we seek opposition and conflict; or, more precisely, because of our need for safety, we form communities—communities that are marked as much by union as by separation.2 Because of our penchant for violence against one another, we congregate to protect ourselves from ourselves. However, our congregation is not solely based on fear—it is also based on affection for one another and our genuine desire to be with others. Although civil societies arose out of the need for protection from ‘‘rude’’ nations who prefer to settle problems with war and violence (see Ferguson, 1767=2000, pp. 123–144), the antagonistic motive still exists. Indeed, it is always present, as people are ‘‘disposed to opposition, and to employ the forces of [their] nature against an equal antagonist’’ (p. 35). This drive is so strong, Ferguson argued, that it exists outside of any material object: ‘‘We place ourselves in opposition, and quarrel under the denominations of faction and party, without any material subject of controversy’’ 606 C. R. Darr (p. 32). Once we are safe from external harm, he said, we turn our antagonism on ourselves. However, the key to civil societies is that this antagonistic motive becomes refined and pacified. Civil societies deliberate, rather than using violence, to settle their differences. Disagreement is prominent and debate is robust, but it is tempered by rules—rules that arise from our drive toward perfection. Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 The Drive for Perfection According to Ferguson (1767=2000), humans create civil societies to perfect our antagonistic drive. Civil society is the ultimate form of human congress, he argued, in that it allows us to exercise our natural need for conflict without violence, due to the introduction of laws and rules that govern our behavior. Laws serve to civilize nations by allowing for and creating justice (by, among other things, creating conditions of equality), by restraining some of our more foul motives (like greed, avarice, and revenge), and by establishing clear guidelines for interaction with others. Laws reinforce societal relations and create order, peace, and stability. In terms of deliberation and public discourse, civil societies for Ferguson (1767= 2000) are marked by robust legislative bodies—bodies marked by rules of order and the rule of law. Such bodies, he said, have evolved from the ‘‘primitive’’ councils and ruling bodies of ‘‘rude’’ nations (p. 129), and help to create justice by allowing for the vigorous discussion of problems and solutions. Thus, in civil societies, we see a perfecting of our drive toward conflict in that dissent and disagreement become a nonviolent form of conflict resolution guided by norms that allow for healthy participation by civic-minded members of the society. As Ferguson put it, humankind ‘‘would enter, if not restrained by the laws of civil society, on a scene of violence or meanness,’’ which would be ‘‘more vile and contemptible, than that of any animal which inherits the earth’’ (p. 18). Civil society is a normative force—the laws and norms of advanced society keep us from acting violently or rudely, and the rules and traditions of legislative bodies allow for robust debate and the nonviolent solution of problems. Civility, then, is a quality of nations that includes many things, such as the nonviolent, rule-bound deliberation of public problems, which in ‘‘uncivil’’ nations would be settled violently.3 Ferguson (1767=2000) did not discuss specific behaviors and actions that constitute civility in the way that much of the modern literature does (where civility is a set of enumerated argumentative standards for public debate), but his conception of civil society clearly emphasized the importance of rules and norms in public discourse. Moreover, Ferguson did not approach civility—in the modern sense of mannerly, respectful language—as an end in and of itself. Ferguson was concerned with the broader concept of productive, nonviolent cooperation, where modern observers (as shown momentarily) largely conceptualize civil argumentative standards as being, by definition, productive rhetorical practices. Ferguson was concerned with the pragmatic functioning of legislatures, and did not get bogged down in specific rules or norms, implicitly suggesting that the overall productivity of the legislative body is more important than the details of any particular discursive event. Communication Quarterly 607 The Role of a Moral Citizenry Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Although the first two principles (antagonism and perfection) are described by Ferguson (1767=2000) as having led to the creation of civil societies, a third principle can be seen as both contributing to and resulting from civil societies. Ferguson saw morality (which focuses on justice in particular) as an individual quality that is nurtured by society. This characteristic is cultivated, in part, by the constant deliberation that is a natural and important part of civil society. Moreover, our sense of morality becomes refined through our drive to perfect conflict, and should be marked by the principle of utility: [T]o abstain from harm is the great law of natural justice; to diffuse happiness is the law of morality; and when we censure the conferring a favour on one or a few at the expence of many, we refer to public utility, as the great object at which the actions of men should be aimed. (p. 56) In other words, civil societies are those in which the actions of society’s members are aimed at the greater good. Such behavior is the mark of civil societies, as well as moral individuals, as personal and group happiness are a mutual proposition: ‘‘If the public good be the principal object with individuals, it is likewise true, that the happiness of individuals is the great end of civil society’’ (p. 87); and, of course, the public good is achieved at least partly through the exercise of public deliberation in rule-bound assemblies. Furthermore, moral citizens enjoy both the freedoms and the constraints of civil society. They enjoy property rights and freedom from government oppression, but are also constrained from acting immorally and in specific ways that violate the law. Again, although Ferguson (1767=2000) did not enumerate specific behaviors in terms of civility and argumentative norms, he did emphasize the importance of rules and restraint. For instance, he discussed the need for citizens to temper their own individual desires for the betterment of society: [M]an is, by nature, the member of a community; and when considered in this capacity, the individual appears to be no longer made for himself. He must forego his happiness and his freedom, where these interfere with the good of society. He is only part of a whole. (p. 86) Moreover, democracy requires virtue, whereas despotism thrives on corruption (p. 109). Therefore, civil societies are both made from and contribute to the molding of virtuous individuals. Thus far, we have seen that, for Ferguson (1767=2000), the natural state of humanity lies in our desire to disagree and to argue. Civil societies arise from our natural compulsion to seek the company and cooperation of others and our desire for justice and nonviolence, which are attained through the rule of law. The rules of civil society, which vary from nation to nation, help us to avoid violence and cruelty. In terms of deliberative bodies, the advanced institutions of civil societies are characterized by robust debate and discussion that is rule-bound and, therefore, ‘‘civilized.’’ Although Ferguson’s notion of civil society does not specifically address civility in terms of standards for public argument, it does describe a scene in which civil discourse ought 608 C. R. Darr to flourish. It suggests that argument in civil societies encourages peaceful, rather than violent, solutions and processes; and that opponents in public arguments ought to follow the governing rules of society at large, as well as the rules and norms of the specific institution in which the argument takes place. Overall, Ferguson portrayed deliberation in civil societies as antagonistic, yet peaceful, and as grounded in rules. These rules are, according to Ferguson, what keeps argument ‘‘civil.’’ Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Contemporary Conceptions of Civility: Standards for Public Argument Although Ferguson (1767=2000) stopped short of enumerating specific rules that would promote civil public discourse, he did suggest that an accounting of civility in the modern USS should take into account (a) the antagonistic nature of humankind, as well as its deliberative bodies; (b) the USS’s rules and norms; and (c) the morality of its participants and its actions. In keeping with the Scottish Enlightenment project of reforming and improving human institutions (Broadie, 2003; Daiches, 1986; Fleischacker, 2003; Jack, 1989), Ferguson’s analysis of civil society provides a fitting backdrop against which to evaluate USS rhetoric. In this part of the essay, I briefly outline several themes in the modern civility literature and show how these themes can be grounded in Ferguson’s (1767=2000) three principles of civil society. The literature on civility is broad and interdisciplinary in nature4, and its various proponents certainly have differing assumptions and goals.5 This diversity can be positive but, in terms of the USS, may lead to some confusion. My purpose here is to show how this disparate body of work can be drawn together under the larger umbrella of civil society, thus clarifying how these standards for argument might be applied to USS rhetoric. In so doing, I also argue that the modern literature may lead to faulty conclusions about the quality of USS debate: By conceptualizing civility as a set of rules, this literature encourages observers to focus on the minutia of debate, where Ferguson’s perspective promotes a broader view that ultimately asks whether debate is productive, as well as what kinds of pragmatic benefits are to be had by engaging in (in)civility. The modern literature coalesces around five themes: Civil discourse (a) encourages continuing debate and discussion, (b) expresses or demonstrates the value of compromise, (c) relies on reasoned argument, (d) is respectful, and (e) follows prescribed rules and precedents. Civil Discourse Encourages Continuing Debate and Discussion Several scholars conceptualize civility in terms of how participants in public discourse approach the idea of public discussion itself. Carter (1998) argued that civil discourse is an ongoing, mutually beneficial process. Sinopoli (1995) concluded that a ‘‘mutual concern’’ for others is paramount (p. 618). Likewise, Bone, Griffin, and Scholz (2008) contended that When rhetors speak from a place of invitation, of civility, and a respect for a Western view of democracy, they cannot pretend that they journey alone, that others are unworthy or without voice, or that their view is the only ‘‘right’’ view. (p. 448) Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Communication Quarterly 609 Similarly, Arnett and Arneson (1999) theorized that the primary characteristic of civility is that it keeps channels of communication open, rather than closed. Civility is grounded in a concern with other points of view in a way that encourages others to participate in public discussion. Political scientists, including Loomis (2000) and Uslaner (1993), have argued that civility requires senators to actively seek opposing viewpoints so that debate is a productive exchange of ideas. According to these perspectives, any behavior that encourages debate is civil, including the use of humor to reduce tensions (Jamieson, 1997; Uslaner, 1993) and actively paying attention and listening (Forni, 2002). In contrast, uncivil discourse serves to end debate or stifle discussion. Specific behaviors that constitute incivility include ignoring, excluding, silencing, threatening, or intimidating others (Cortina et al., 2002; Pearson, Andersson, & Porath, 2000); interrupting or monopolizing (Gonthier, 2002); insults, aggression, humiliation, shouting, and invective (Benson, 1996); aggressive metaphors or hateful language (Carter, 1998); and ‘‘in your face’’ communication (Arnett & Arneson, 1999, p. 286). Other behaviors specific to the USS include obstructionist tactics like filibusters (Binder & Smith, 1997), holds and the blocking of nominations (Loomis, 2000; Uslaner, 2000), ‘‘hostage-taking’’ (in which a senator holds up nominations or legislation until some demand is met; Loomis, 2000, p. 5), and other procedural tools that stall or end debate (Kassebaum, 1988). Uncivil discourse also includes threats to engage in any of these tactics (Loomis, 2000; Uslaner, 1993). Smith (1988) labeled these types of tactics ‘‘porcupine power’’—power based on a senator’s ability to disrupt or bog down the legislative process (p. 58). These particular rules or admonitions are congruent with Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil societies in which deliberative bodies use peaceful, orderly means to discuss and solve problems. However, notice that these writers have a more restrictive view of aggression than Ferguson: Ferguson referred most directly to physical violence, whereas contemporary writers opposed verbal aggression as well. For them— particularly Arnett and Arneson (1999), Benson (1996), and Carter (1998)—an overly aggressive style is to be avoided. Ferguson made no mention of such tactics in argumentation (or any specific tactics for that matter), but is in agreement with these writers that deliberation in and of itself is good for societies. Ferguson’s notion of civil society—particularly with its emphasis on our antagonistic nature and the importance of rules for tempering our aggressiveness—implies disapproval of attempts to stifle deliberation or to abuse rules to short-circuit the argumentative process, suggesting that tactics like the filibuster might do more harm than good, which would be in accordance with the views of many modern political scientists (see Alter & McGranahan, 2000; Fisk & Chemerinsky, 1997; Rohde & Shepsle, 2007; Wawro & Schickler, 2006). However, Ferguson’s perspective allows for a more robust dissent, perhaps even to the point of verbal aggression. Moreover, his utilitarian view of morality would suggest that harsh rhetoric directed toward one’s opponents is not necessarily harmful if such tactics help to pass legislation that is beneficial to the common good.6 Observers of the USS should take these factors into account and should, thus, be wary of labeling an aggressive argument or argumentative style as uncivil. Robust deliberation requires antagonism 610 C. R. Darr and the rigorous analysis of opposing positions. There does come a point, however, when extreme antagonism creates a setting in which discourse is stifled and true incivility occurs.7 The task for critics of the USS is to discern between aggressive, yet fair, argumentation and true incivility that stifles debate. Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Civil Discourse Expresses or Demonstrates the Value of Compromise According to Uslaner (1993), a willingness to compromise and to seek consensus are essential to civility. Civil discourse is not dogmatic or dismissive of other points of view, but actively seeks other perspectives (Arnett & Arneson, 1999). One important aspect of this cooperative dimension is bipartisanship, which indicates a willingness to get along with members of opposing political parties (Ornstein, 1997). Former Senator J. James Exon (1997) acknowledged the relationship of bipartisanship to civility when he complained that partisanship and competition have replaced civility and compromise. Specific behaviors that create civility include acknowledging the legitimacy of opposing points of view (Sinopoli, 1995), expressing belief in reciprocity and bipartisanship (Uslaner, 1991), and exhibiting a willingness to meet others on equal terms (Meyer, 2000). In contrast, the object of uncivil discourse is not mutual agreement and satisfaction, but victory: Verbal confrontation (Uslaner, 1991) and self-promotion (Loomis, 2000) replace compromise. Former Senator Howell Heflin (1997), for example, characterized incivility in terms of the ‘‘demonization of those with whom we disagree’’ (p. 79). This demonization can have serious consequences for democratic debate, as Ivie (2008) argued: ‘‘When politics reduces to hostility and contestation degenerates into warfare against an evil or otherwise dehumanized and despised internal and=or external enemy, democracy is lost, at least for the moment, however long that moment may last’’ (p. 454). Similarly, Pell (1997) lamented the polarization of issues that ‘‘accentuat[es] extremes’’ (p. 146). Former Senator Gary Hart (1989) denounced ‘‘orthodoxy,’’ or what he described as ‘‘a sense on the part of some that they possess a body of truth . . . that not only makes those who disagree with them wrong, but despised in the bargain’’ (p. A23). Observers and insiders agree that one cannot engage in civil debate without recognizing other perspectives as legitimate. Therefore, ideological demonization (Benson, 1996; Heflin, 1997, Ivie, 2008), unwillingness to compromise (Meyer, 2000), expressed disdain for others’ ideas (Gonthier, 2002), appeals to purely partisan goals (Evans & Oleszek, 1998), verbal confrontation (Uslaner, 1991), contentiousness (Loomis, 2000), and accentuating extremes (Pell, 1997) are all uncivil behaviors. Here we see another point of departure from Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil society. Whereas these authors are rightly concerned with the problems created when public debate becomes an act of demonization or marginalization, Ferguson’s view cautions observers not to be too quick to characterize confrontational rhetoric as uncivil. Observers should certainly be wary of those who seek to demonize others, but to argue that one’s own view is morally correct or that another position is ethically wrong does not necessarily violate standards of civil society, as Ferguson Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Communication Quarterly 611 encouraged participants in deliberative bodies to consider morality directly. Participants and observers should look at such arguments in context to determine if they go too far—arguments about the morality (or immorality) of positions should be made, but they can be taken to extremes that cripple the possibility for compromise and mutually beneficial solutions to problems. Appeals to morality should be balanced with the need to hear opposing views to create vibrant debate. Furthermore, although Ferguson (1767=2000) did not specifically mention compromise, he was clearly interested in solutions that are mutually beneficial, as seen in his utilitarian view of morality. One could argue that Ferguson would approve of compromise, as compromise in the USS—when successful—typically results in broader support for a given piece of legislation than would otherwise be achieved. However, observers of the USS must be careful not to conflate popularity with justice: Broad support for a bill, treaty, or nominee does not necessarily translate into the improvement of the public welfare. In short, as with the analysis of rhetoric in terms of whether it contributes to continuing discourse, critics should ask not simply whether rhetoric is partisan or confrontational (for such rhetoric is inevitable and not necessarily counterproductive), but whether antagonism is taken to extremes that are detrimental to the functioning of the institution and to public discourse in general. Civil Discourse Relies on Reasoned Debate Meyer (2000) argued that participants in democracies are obligated to dissuade others of flawed ideas and proposals through ‘‘rational public dialogue’’ (p. 73). Carter (1998) agreed, contending that civility demands the criticism of ideas in a constructive fashion. Constructive criticism focuses on problems or issues and avoids personal attacks, including name-calling (Forni, 2002). Attig (as cited in SHO, 2003b, pp. 54–55) elaborated, claiming that criticism of senators is acceptable, so long as that criticism is not ‘‘unkind’’ or ‘‘uncomplimentary.’’ Former Senators William Cohen (1997) and Mike Mansfield (1998) claimed that the issue is not necessarily whether arguments are logically valid or invalid, but whether individuals take the time to explain their positions: In civil debate, senators explain their reasoning and evidence, and lay out their arguments for others to criticize. To say that discourse is civil when it relies on reasoned debate is to assert that criticism should focus on ideas, problems, or issues, rather than people (Carter, 1998; Forni, 2002; Meyer, 2000; SHO, 2003a, 2003b). In contrast, uncivil discourse rejects reasoned debate in several ways. First, uncivil discourse attacks people instead of criticizing ideas. Senator Robert C. Byrd (1995) differentiated personal attacks from reasoned debate of policies and ideas when he said, ‘‘I can state that he [another senator] is mistaken in his facts; I can state that he is in error. I can do all these things without assaulting his character by calling him a liar, by saying that he lies’’ (p. S18965). Uslaner (2000) concurred, and included accusations that a senator has deceived constituents and charges of dishonesty as examples of uncivil behavior. Other examples of personal attacks include questioning motives (Caro, 2002) and using insults (SHO, 2003b). Whereas these writers seem to condemn all ad hominem arguments, others are not so quick to dismiss them. Walton (1989), for Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 612 C. R. Darr example, cautioned that questions about character, personal conduct, and motives are often relevant to issues being debated; therefore, ad hominem arguments that focus on these issues are not fallacious. Overt emotional appeals have also been criticized as uncivil. Byrd (1995) denounced emotionally charged outbursts as ‘‘emotional strip-tease’’ (p. S18966), whereas Matthews (1960) referred to such tactics as ‘‘unnecessary unpleasantness’’ (p. 98). Benson (1996) criticized displays of anger, whereas Arnett (2001) decried the use of any tactic designed to arouse the fears of an audience. Nonverbal behaviors are seen as an important dimension of incivility because they can indicate a rejection of reasoned argument in favor of emotional appeals. Pell (1997), for instance, noted that a rancorous tone is an indication of incivility and a refusal to get along with others, whereas Caro (2002) characterized shouting or yelling as uncivil and ‘‘unsenatorial’’ (p. 293). Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil society provides for the necessary problematizing of this particular theme in the civility literature. The notion of using reason and evidence to make one’s argument is not at issue. However, the contention that strong emotional appeals necessarily detract from the quality of deliberation is quite troublesome. According to Ferguson, civil societies encourage robust debate; and, although he did not specifically mention emotional appeals, his view can be assumed to recognize the potential validity of emotional arguments and emotional delivery, as long as these tactics contribute to the quality of the overall deliberation. One cannot simply assume—as Arnett (2001), Benson (1996), Byrd (1995), Caro (2002), Matthews (1960), and Pell (1997) seem to do—that emotional displays automatically stifle debate or short-circuit the process of reason and, therefore, constitute incivility. In fact, argumentation scholars have routinely questioned the bifurcation of reason and emotion, including Gilbert (1994), Wallace (1963), and Walton (1989, 1992). Walzer (2004), for example, claimed that reason and passion are ‘‘always entangled in practice’’ (p. 126), whereas Ehninger and Brockriede (1963) argued that emotional appeals are ‘‘not only appropriately considered as a part of the instrument of proof employed in argumentation, but a necessary part’’ (162). Positioning the concept of civility within Ferguson’s notion of civil society amplifies this latter position— Ferguson advocated robust debate on moral issues, which would be difficult to imagine without some level of pathos. Those who wish to study civility in the USS must once again look to context of the debate and to the issues under consideration before judging a particular tactic to be uncivil. Moreover, we should be suspicious of arguments that attempt to dismiss emotional appeals outright. Civil Discourse is Respectful Arnett and Arneson (1999), Carter (1998), and Uslaner (1993) argued that respect is an important element of civility, and must be demonstrated both verbally and nonverbally. Along these lines, Forni (2002) recommended specific behaviors that demonstrate respect, including acknowledging others, showing respect for others’ opinions, and ‘‘speak [ing] kindly’’ (p. 61). Civil discourse incorporates a moderate volume, uses Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Communication Quarterly 613 respectful body language (turning toward one’s interlocutor, etc.), and avoids unkind words regarding identity (Forni, 2002). Senators can express respect in other ways as well. Matthews (1959) noted that ‘‘ ‘buttering-up’ the opposition by extending unsolicited compliments’’ is a long-standing tradition thought by senators to pay off in the form of legislative results (p. 1070). In addition, it is important that senators use proper titles and parliamentary language (Loomis, 2000). In contrast, uncivil discourse is disrespectful. Rudeness, in general, has been characterized as disrespectful and, thus, uncivil (Carter, 1998; Meyer, 2000), whereas demonstrating disrespect specifically for other senators, the USS, or the president are especially frowned on within the institution (SHO, 2003a). Byrd (1995), for example, argued that, ‘‘for a senator to make reference on the Senate floor to any president, Democrat or Republican, as ‘this guy’ is to show an utter disrespect for the office of the presidency itself’’ (p. S18965). Disparaging remarks exhibit disrespect (Pell, 1997), as do ‘‘personal animosities’’ (Cohen, 1997, p. 46). Reframing these issues in terms of Ferguson’s (1767=2000) perspective reveals the need to carefully distinguish between mere impoliteness and true incivility. Although politeness does seem to foster cooperation and make compromise and collaboration more likely, observers of the USS must distinguish among true politeness, rote adherence to pedantic rules, and artificial expressions of respect. For instance, as Matthews (1959) unintentionally suggested, much of the politeness expressed in USS debate is self-serving and artificial. Moreover, one could argue that the use of polite phrases, such as ‘‘my distinguished colleague’’ and ‘‘the gentleman=lady,’’ lose their sincerity and effectiveness when overused. They become mere ritual, rather than sincere expressions of respect. Therefore, whereas insiders like Byrd (1995) and Attig (as cited in SHO, 2003b) would argue that such practices create an environment conducive to civility and to the passage of quality legislation, Ferguson’s perspective requires us to think more critically about such discursive practices and to ask whether they truly contribute to the functioning of civil society by keeping debate robust and by helping to achieve moral ends, not just whether rules and conventions are blindly followed. Civil Discourse Follows Prescribed Rules and Precedents Ferguson’s (1767=2000) second principle of civil society—humans strive for perfection and, therefore, create law- and rule-bound societies and institutions—is clearly on display in the modern USS. There are several very specific rules, norms, and precedents that govern USS debate, including Rule XIX. According to Rule XIX, proper debate procedure requires a senator who desires to speak to rise and address the Presiding Officer, and to proceed only after the Presiding Officer recognizes him or her (Senate Committee on Rules and Administration [SCRA], 2003). Senators are forbidden from interrupting others, and ‘‘no senator in debate shall, directly or indirectly, by any form of words impute to another senator or to other senators any conduct or motive unworthy or unbecoming a senator’’ (SCRA, 2003, pp. 2–3). Another important rule is Rule XXII, introduced in 1917, which essentially formalized Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 614 C. R. Darr the rules for filibusters by requiring a two-thirds majority to end debate; this threshold was reduced to three-fifths in 1975 (SCRA, 2003). Other conventions are also thought to contribute to civility in the USS. For example, senators must refer to others in the third person (‘‘the senator from Delaware,’’ etc.; Oleszek, 1984; Riddick, 2003). Senators are not expected to use the terms ‘‘you’’ or ‘‘I’’ in debate (SHO, 2003b, pp. 28–29), and often engage in excessive praise—or ‘‘buttering-up’’—of one another (Matthews, 1959, p. 1070). Remarks (as well as questions) are to be addressed to the Presiding Officer (‘‘Mister’’ or ‘‘Madam President’’), rather than directly to other senators (Caro, 2002; Matthews, 1960; Oleszek, 1984; Riddick, 2003). In this view, any violation of USS rules and precedents governing debate can be seen as a violation of civility. For example, using the word ‘‘you’’ in reference to another senator violates the norm of verbal impersonality (SHO, 2003b, pp. 28–29). Remarks that embarrass or insult other senators are discouraged (Matthews, 1960, pp. 98–99), as is unparliamentary language (Butler & Wolff, 1995) and heckling or applause (Uslaner, 1991). Although the civility literature clearly suggests that such specific behaviors are to be avoided, some critics of congressional debate caution against taking too narrow a view of congressional oratory. For example, Sheckels (2000) argued that a narrow focus on the formalities of congressional speeches may result in critics overlooking broader qualities of the debate; and, as noted by Schuetz (1986), these formalities—lionized in the civility literature—are targeted toward legislators’ colleagues, not the additional audiences of constituents and the media. Moreover, Ferguson’s (1767=2000) view of civil society raises several questions regarding these conventions. Although Ferguson (1767=2000) clearly preferred rule-bound deliberative bodies, arguing that they are one of the hallmarks of civil societies, his perspective left open the possibility that rules may be too restrictive. Rules can be manipulated to stifle debate, thus violating Ferguson’s important principle of robust deliberation. Moreover, rules can be invoked in ways that prevent the common good from being achieved. One need only recall the civil rights debates of the 1960s and the Southern Democrats’ use of the filibuster in an attempt to prevent the passage of key anti-discrimination legislation to see how rules can be manipulated to oppose or prevent positive social change (see Binder & Smith, 1997; Murphy, 1995). Thus, although in an overall sense rules do contribute to orderly, nonviolent dissent and debate, they can become counterproductive to the functioning of civil society. Critics should, as always, take rule violations in context. Civility as a Set of Norms The contemporary civility literature can be organized around five themes, which essentially constitute five standards for civil public discourse. Political scientists, former senators, and many communication scholars seem to agree that public debate should follow these standards, but I have attempted to show that this proscriptive approach is problematic when viewed through the lens of Ferguson’s (1767=2000) Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Communication Quarterly 615 civil society. The communication literature on congressional debate—sparse though it may be—serves as a further caution against critics becoming too caught up in rules and norms as fitting standards for judging USS rhetoric. For instance, Sheckels (2000) argued that those who study modern congressional debate often overlook much of its ‘‘rhetorical richness’’ by applying narrow standards (e.g., the question of ‘‘effectiveness’’; p. 13). More to the point of incivility, in his discussion of Supreme Court confirmations, Parry-Giles (2006) argued that critics sometimes ‘‘mistakenly deflect attention from the power and impact of this process to its procedures and lack of civility’’ (p. 3). Consistent with Sheckels (2000) and Parry-Giles (2006), I have attempted to reorient the burgeoning literature on civility by grounding it in Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil society, thus avoiding a myopic, rule-oriented approach to studying civility in the USS. More specifically, I have argued that such a move leads to a problematic view of these standards and of several of the specific behaviors mentioned. This refiguring raises questions about context and rhetorical impact—critics cannot simply look for rule violations, respectful language, or references to bipartisanship in order to determine if USS debate is civil. We must critically examine the larger rhetorical moves constituted by these disparate elements. Indeed, from this perspective, judging whether debate is civil is not the ultimate goal of criticism—a Fergusonian perspective on civil society leads us to ask not just if the rules of civility are followed, but if and how the practice of (in)civility contributes to robust debate and achieves moral ends because deliberative bodies exist and function for pragmatic purposes. Although these conclusions may be subjective, they are necessary if we are to better comprehend whether debates are truly civil and—more important—whether they lead to productive, moral ends. In the next part of this essay, I point to three recent USS debates to exemplify how scholars might apply both the modern literature on civility and Ferguson’s concept of civil society to assess the quality of USS rhetoric. The Rhetorical Functions of (In)Civility In this section of the essay, I apply the standards for civil discourse to three USS debates to show (a) how (in)civility functions rhetorically and (b) how critics might make judgments about the role of civility in USS discourse.8 My intention is not to engage in a full-blown rhetorical criticism here, but to show how these standards, as grounded in Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil society, might lead to such criticism and to a better understanding of the rhetorical functions of (in)civility in USS debate. Incivility: Demonizing the Opposition or Questioning Ethos? The contemporary civility literature admonishes against demonizing or marginalizing others, which is thought to limit the possibility of compromise and to constitute ‘‘non-reasoned’’ debate. When taken on its own, this literature—as demonstrated earlier in this essay—portrays personal attacks and related rhetorical moves as Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 616 C. R. Darr uncivil, but reframing such moves within the context of Ferguson’s (1767=2000) civil society tempers this conclusion. For example, during the Ashcroft debate, several senators directly and indirectly portrayed others as ideological extremists. Senator Kennedy criticized Ashcroft’s ‘‘extreme view of the second amendment’’ (USS, 2001a, p. S851), whereas Wellstone argued that ‘‘some of his views on abortion . . . are extreme and harsh’’ (USS, 2001b, p. S951). Senators Mikulski (USS, 2001a, p. S855), Levin (USS, 2001a, p. S865), Sarbanes (USS, 2001b, p. S939), Schumer (USS, 2001a, p. S867), and Stabenow (USS, 2001a, p. S880) also labeled Ashcroft’s ideology as ‘‘extreme.’’ Ashcroft’s supporters used this approach as well. Hatch described organizations who oppose the Ashcroft nomination as ‘‘narrow left-wing interest groups’’ (USS, 2001a, p. S839), whereas Senator Allen lamented that ‘‘heavily funded special interests’’ have sought to destroy Ashcroft’s reputation (USS, 2001a, p. S907). These senators, along with Bond (USS, 2001b, pp. S986–S988) and Grassley (USS, 2001a, pp. S878–S880), implied that because these organizations hold extreme views, they are not to be taken seriously. By extension, the senators who opposed Ashcroft were also discredited. None of the senators who railed against ‘‘special interests’’ discussed any specific policy positions of those groups. Indeed, specific organizations were not even named. From the perspective of the contemporary literature, such charges violate civility because they marginalize other points of view and serve as a form of name-calling. Ashcroft held ‘‘extreme’’ views, and was characterized as an ideologue not fit for the office of Attorney General. ‘‘Special interest groups’’ and the ‘‘liberal’’ views they hold are ridiculed as outside the mainstream and, therefore, not worthy of serious consideration. As such, these arguments function as name-calling, as they are used to marginalize and demonize specific targets. As Carter (1998), Hart (1989), and Heflin (1997) argued, the characterization of another as ‘‘extreme’’ implies that their views are illegitimate, thereby excluding them from serious consideration. However, by reframing these arguments in terms of Ferguson’s (1767=2000) civil society, we are encouraged to ask questions and perhaps to come to an alternative conclusion. Ferguson encouraged us to consider our antagonistic nature and to seek out robust debate. Although rules are important, they should not be overly restrictive. This perspective encourages us to ask if these arguments are valid in the sense that they are legitimate points of contention related to the issue being considered. In the case of a confirmation debate, the nominee and his or her record are, in a very real sense, the issue being debated. The central question can be thought of as, ‘‘Is this person fit for this office?’’ From this point of view, questioning whether Ashcroft is ‘‘outside the mainstream’’ by reviewing his voting record as a senator seems quite fair, as it may provide an indication of how he will behave while in office. Likewise, attacking the credibility of those groups who oppose a nominee may seem uncivil at first blush, but from the perspective of a robustly argumentative civil society, they are an important part of the debate. Are these credible sources? Do they have ideological biases that affect their judgment of the nominee? The contemporary literature would decry these questions as forms of incivility; but from the perspective of a robust civil society, these moves constitute attacks on the ethos of participants in the public Communication Quarterly 617 discourse, and should not be dismissed outright as invalid. Although they may be distasteful to some contemporary observers, such tactics should be understood as attempts to discredit the speaker’s opposition, and should be evaluated in terms of their relevance to the issue being considered. This behavior may look uncivil, but it is ultimately productive to decision making and to the public’s understanding of the nominee. Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Upholding and Enacting Civility: The ‘‘Reasonable’’ Debater The contemporary literature encourages the use of civility in specific ways, but does little to clarify the rhetorical functions of these actions. Senators are encouraged to be civil because this is thought to encourage compromise and, thus, lead to better legislation; but, what advantages are gained by the arguer? Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil society is grounded in the principle of robust, rule-bound debate by moral individuals, and I suggest here that civility functions to bolster the ethos of arguers by helping create an image of the arguer as a civil—and, thus, moral—participant in the discourse. Arguers use civility to bolster their own ethos and, thus, their image in the eyes of those constituents and observers who may be following the debate. For instance, all three debates include statements that express respect for others and for other points of view. This is especially apparent during the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 (UVVA; USS, 2004) debate, which includes much discussion of the divisive issue of abortion. Senator Graham (an outspoken, pro-life advocate) expressed sensitivity to—and respect for—pro-choice perspectives, stating that ‘‘pro-choice people are very sensitive to the fact that a woman should decide what to do with her body in an intimate situation like a pregnancy. I understand that debate clearly’’ (p. S3134). Similarly, immediately after Democratic Senators Feinstein and Lautenberg characterized the UVVA and its supporters as part of a conspiracy to restrict women’s rights (which could arguably read as an act of incivility in that this conspiracy argument clearly attributes evil motives to supporters of the bill), DeWine, who supports the UVVA, said: I have a great deal of respect for my colleagues from New Jersey and California. . . . We have worked together on a bipartisan basis on a wide range of issues. I would hope that as we debate this bill, we would focus on the legislation [rather than motives]. I say that with all due respect. (p. S3129) DeWine used flattering, respectful language (as well as references to bipartisanship) to rebut a conspiracy charge. In doing so, he constructed an image of himself as calm and reasonable. In contrast to his opponents, he respected other views and refused to engage in personal attacks based on alleged hidden motives. Senators engage in many behaviors that can be considered—according to the standards espoused in the modern literature—as civil. These brief examples illustrate how senators can capitalize on the norm of respect to portray themselves as reasonable debaters. They portray themselves as weighing ideas on their merits and as seeking out and respecting other points of view, even when they ultimately reject them. Thus, Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil society being grounded in robust debate 618 C. R. Darr practiced by moral individuals allows us to view the rules of civility as a source of invention: Senators can make themselves appear reasonable and more ‘‘senatorial’’ by simply following the prescribed norms of civility. This effect may be amplified when a senator follows a seemingly uncivil speech with an appeal to respect, as in the DeWine case. This may also be particularly effective when others are explicitly accused of breaking the rules of civility, as the next example shows. Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 Accusations of Incivility: ‘‘They Don’t Play by the Rules’’ Senators frequently accuse others of incivility. For instance, one would be hard pressed to find a USS debate in which no one is accused of partisanship. However, what is the rhetorical function of such accusations? The contemporary literature portrays civility as a set of standards for public discourse that should be followed. Thus, there are two possibilities: Follow the rules and remain civil, or break them and create incivility. We are left with no concrete suggestions on how to evaluate accusations—critics are only encouraged to denounce incivility and applaud civil behaviors. Ferguson’s (1767= 2000) view, however, encourages critics to consider the larger context of civil society, particularly whether USS debate is sufficiently robust and antagonistic and whether it is practiced in a moral fashion, not just whether it follows the rules. Thus, a third rhetorical function is revealed: Accusations of incivility function to portray the speaker as more civil than his or her opponents, thereby attacking the opponents’ ethos while bolstering the speaker’s own. Perhaps the best example comes during the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty debate, where Senator Byrd asked for unanimous consent to speak for 15 min prior to a vote on whether to enter Executive Session. Senator Lott objected; and upon entering Executive Session, Byrd accused Lott of incivility: Mr. President, as majority leader, and as minority leader, I never once objected to a Senator’s request to speak for a few minutes—15 minutes in my case today—nor do I ever expect to object to another Senator’s request to speak. My request was for only a short amount of time. The distinguished majority leader objected. He has a perfect right to object. I don’t question his right to object. But, Mr. President, I think we have come to a very poor pass in this USS when Senators can’t stand to hear a Senator speak for 15 minutes. (USS, 1999c, p. S12505) Byrd’s speech clearly functions to discredit Lott. Although Lott technically followed the rules of the USS by objecting to a unanimous consent agreement, Byrd accused him of violating another, more important, standard—that of allowing for free expression and unlimited debate. While censuring Lott, Byrd bolstered his own credibility by maintaining that he would never engage in such behavior. The rhetorical value of Byrd’s (see USS, 1999c, p. S12505) charge is twofold. First, he portrayed Lott as unnecessarily partisan and unreasonable. He denied another senator the courtesy of the right to speak and, thus, was creating an unfair discursive situation. He (and, by extension, the Republicans, who are the majority party) was engaging in uncivil tactics. Second, Byrd directly argued that he himself is above the pursuit of purely partisan goals. By chastising Lott for violating civility, Byrd Communication Quarterly 619 Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 assumed a position of moral superiority, thus boosting his own ethos. More important, all of this took place within the context of the rules of civility as espoused by the USS in its written rules, as well as by observers, who have described the norms of the institution. A narrow view of civility as rules that are followed or broken may miss this point, but Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil society encourages us to ask questions about not just the rules, but about the antagonistic nature of debate and the morality of its participants. Rather than evaluating this exchange by simply asking whether Lott behaved in an uncivil fashion (a rules-only approach would conclude that he did indeed follow the rules of the USS), we ask what Byrd gained through the exchange. Accusations of incivility can function as rhetorical struggles for moral superiority. Conclusion: Civility as One Component of Civil Society As the considerable volume of scholarly research indicates, incivility is a significant problem faced by democratic societies. This essay provides further understanding of this problem as it specifically relates to the USS by grounding the civility literature in Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil society, and by suggesting that such a grounding allows for the critical examination of the rhetorical functions of (in)civility in USS debate. I do not intend to argue that USS debate is more or less civil than before, or even necessarily that the previous examples illustrate that we have a ‘‘civility problem.’’ I do, however, contend that (in)civility—as conceptualized in modern studies—is used by senators for particular rhetorical ends. Civility is more than a set of norms, it is also a site of invention. Ferguson’s notion of civil society suggests that critics must examine not only the rules or standards for public argument, but the how those norms improve or diminish the robustness of debate, the morality of the USS’s participants, and its pragmatic outcomes. The brief examples given illustrate how scholars of political communication might engage in just such a critical enterprise. One of the primary conclusions of this essay, therefore, is that critics must account for all three of these factors (antagonism, rules, and morality) as they discuss the civility of USS discourse. The civility literature too often primarily focuses on the normative function of civility, thus overlooking the rhetorical functions of upholding or violating civility and of accusing others of having violated its standards. Civility, from the point of view constructed in this essay, is not just a set of standards for appropriate public discourse; it is also an enactment of civic virtue: Those who are virtuous will argue in ways that are respectful of others and that show appreciation for diverse points of view. Moreover, senators can take advantage of this assumption by using it to create ad hominem attacks—incivility is a sign of a ‘‘virtue deficit’’; thus, senators look for opportunities to accuse others of violating civility, thereby attacking their ethos. Grounding civility in Ferguson’s (1767=2000) notion of civil society problematizes the concept and forces critics to ask several important questions. What goals should deliberation achieve, and why and how does incivility make achieving these goals less likely? Are rules of civility too restrictive? Do appeals to civility actually constrain argument, rather than enabling rational discourse? Perhaps most important, what Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 620 C. R. Darr rhetorical functions do civility, incivility, and accusations of incivility play in USS rhetoric? I have attempted to provide a partial answer to these questions here, but recognize that this is a first step—much more analysis of USS rhetoric is needed for us to more completely understand how (in)civility is used as a rhetorical strategy within USS debate. This essay has repeatedly suggested that a rules-based approach to civility is incomplete. There can be a point at which civility, like all norms and rules that govern debate, can become too restrictive and actually harm the deliberative process and the functioning of civil society. Ferguson (1767=2000) called for a healthy balance among antagonism, rules, and morality that helps place civility—as currently conceptualized—in perspective. Rules, he said, can be used to ‘‘terminate the agitations of a free people, not to remedy their corruptions’’; and when such is the case, ‘‘we may expect that many of the boasted improvements of civil society, will be mere devices to lay the political spirit at rest, and will chain up the active virtues more than the restless disorders of men’’ (pp. 339–340). Rhetorical theorists and critics must be careful that, in our zeal for a more civil public discourse, we do not neglect the important roles of antagonism and morality in the healthy functioning of civil societies. Notes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] For his systematic and empirical approach to studying society, Ferguson has been called the ‘‘father of sociology’’ (Daiches, 1986, p. 4) and a founder of modern social science (Sheets, 1993). He has also been characterized (along with Hume, Smith, & Hugh Blair) as one of the ‘‘first intellectual celebrities of the modern world’’ (Buchan, 2003, p. 2). Readers will, no doubt, notice a striking similarity with Burke’s (1973) notion of congregation and segregation. Burke said that uniting against a common enemy is perhaps ‘‘the most urgent form’’ of identification (p. 268). Although Ferguson (1767=2000) saw internal violence as the mark of ‘‘rude’’ nations, he did not totally rule out a role for violence in ‘‘civil’’ nations. Such violence, however, is to be directed outward as a means of national defense. I draw on sources that include (a) political science literature regarding procedures, norms, and civility in political institutions; (b) literature on civil communication in a broader cultural sense; (c) the rules of the U.S. Senate (USS); (d) historical accounts of USS floor behavior; (e) speeches, interviews, and writings of current and former senators; and (f) communication literature on argument, specifically in political institutions. For instance, the political science and political communication literature tends to describe processes and structures that create or are affected by incivility, and to make suggestions for improving the quality of legislation (e.g., Loomis, 2000; Uslaner, 1991, 1993, 2000) or discourse (e.g., Jamieson, 1997). Speeches and writings of senators (e.g., Byrd, 1995; Cohen, 1997; etc.), which might include valuable descriptive and proscriptive aspects, must be read differently, as they are also political documents aimed at other, perhaps less noble, goals. Byrd’s speech, for instance, must be read within the context of the Republican takeover of the House and the rhetorical assault on President Clinton that followed in both chambers of Congress. Byrd’s speech is not simply a description of the state of incivility in the U.S. Senate; it is an attack on Republican senators and a defense of a Democratic president and his agenda. Likewise, in their discussion of invitational rhetoric, Bone, Griffin, and Scholz (2008) suggested the importance of balancing civility with other goals. They argued that invitational rhetoric seeks and creates civility through mutual participation and ongoing dialogue, but Communication Quarterly [7] Downloaded by [Indiana University Kokomo] at 08:27 14 October 2011 [8] 621 noted that it is not always appropriate, such as when confronting racist rhetoric (pp. 439–440). Such rhetoric, they argued, should be defeated, not compromised with. For instance, Kane (2001) argued that during the Cold War, ‘‘deliberation became secondary to patriotism’’ (p. 112). The sort of stifling of debate and marginalizing of dissenters that Kane described is clearly harmful to civil society and to deliberative bodies: Ferguson’s (1767=2000) view favors more debate and more dissent, rather than less. For examples, I draw on three U.S. Senate (USS) debates, including debates over the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT; 106th Congress), the confirmation of John Ashcroft as Attorney General (107th), and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004(UVVA; 108th; see USS, 2004). The CTBT, signed by President Clinton on September 24, 1996, was formally debated on October 8, 12, and 13, 1999 (USS, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c), and was ultimately not ratified by the Republican-controlled USS. The debate over the confirmation of John Ashcroft to U.S. Attorney General took place on January 31 and February 1, 2001 (USS, 2001a, 2001b). Ashcroft was confirmed along highly partisan lines. Finally, the UVVA was debated on March 25, 2004 (USS, 2004). 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