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by
Dart Brooks Risley II
2010
The Thesis Committee for Dart Brooks Risley II
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:
British Interests and the Partition of Mosul
APPROVED BY
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:
Supervisor:
William Roger Louis
Yoav Di-Capua
British Interests and the Partition of Mosul
by
Dart Brooks Risley II, BA
Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts
The University of Texas at Austin
May 2010
Dedication
To my Parents.
Abstract
British Interests and the Partition of Mosul
Dart Brooks Risley II, MA
The University of Texas at Austin, 2010
Supervisor: William Roger Louis
This thesis seeks to examine and analyze British interests in the Iraqi province of
Mosul during World War I. The province was significant from many different points of
view, diplomatic, strategic, and economic. Most scholars have tended to focus on one of
these aspects and neglect the larger picture; this study will attempt to fill in the gap by
discussing all of these aspects in their proper context.
v
Table of Contents
List of Illustrations ............................................................................................... vii
Introduction: Mosul and History ............................................................................1
Chapter 1 Mosul before World War I ....................................................................7
Growing Interests and Rivalries .....................................................................9
The Baghdad Railway ..................................................................................13
War Begins: The Basra Campaign and the Route to Mosul ........................18
Continuity in British Policy .........................................................................23
Chapter 2 Mosul between Britain and France.......................................................25
Defining British Interests .............................................................................26
Sykes-Picot Agreement .................................................................................39
Promises to Sharif Husayn ...........................................................................44
The Capture of Mosul ..................................................................................47
The Eye of the Storm ...................................................................................50
Chapter 3 Mosul and British Interests ..................................................................53
The Lloyd George-Clemenceau Agreement ................................................54
The Spoils of War .........................................................................................65
Mosul in Context ..........................................................................................74
Conclusion: Mosul in Perspective .......................................................................76
Bibliography .........................................................................................................79
Vita ......................................................................................................................85
vi
List of Illustrations
Illustration 1:
The Modern Borders of Iraq .........................................................8
Illustration 2:
de Bunsen Committee Maps ......................................................38
Illustration 3:
Sykes-Picot Partition ..................................................................39
vii
Introduction: Mosul and History
In the discipline of history one frequently encounters the danger of excessive
specialization. The pursuit of obscure or narrow topics often leads the historian to
conclusions that leave little impression on the collective knowledge of society, or to
conclusions that inflate the significance a given topic. Yet at the same time, the historian
is compelled to explore uncharted territory for the expansion of knowledge and one’s
own career. Hence, scholars find themselves in a difficult predicament. The subject of
this study attempts to find a balance between these two forces. The Iraqi province of
Mosul, a province with rich and diverse culture, opens the historical profession to a wide
range of topics, debates, and trends.
The timeframe, 1914-1918, and perspective, British interests, of this study
automatically strikes a sensitive nerve in the profession. The study of Empire and its
inhabitants is divided and politically charged; many argue that studying from the view of
the colonizer projects a negative and inaccurate view onto the culture of the colonized
while others hold that without the view of the colonizer the historical record is
incomplete and inaccurate. Both of these views make valid points, but suffer from a
grave misunderstanding of each other. In the case of Mosul, much of its future during the
First World War depended to a large degree on the decisions of British officials. This
focus merely tells one part of the history of Mosul and by no means does it claim to
describe its culture.
The actions and words of the British statesmen represent a different time than our
own and historians, unlike other scholars, cannot truly visit the area of their study. One
can travel to Iraq, but one cannot travel to the past. Since the time of the British, the
culture and ethnic composition of Iraq has changed radically. Iraq’s Jewish population is
1
now almost non-existent, the swamps of the Basra province are drained and numerous
populations in Iraq were forcibly moved from their home origin and in Mosul many were
brutally murdered.1 Needless to say these events have changed Iraqi society and if one
seeks to study the past then one needs to understand society as it stood in its own time.
The British archives provide the most abundant and readily available collections of
sources for this very task. Thus, from a historical as well as methodological point of
view Britain is inseparable from our understanding of the region.
Mosul reveals something about the British Government and how it operates. In
the process of analyzing Mosul, British officials had to consider many kinds of interests
whether they were diplomatic, strategic, or commercial. All of these overlap at many
points, but nevertheless contain unique elements that work together with one another to
drive foreign policy. Some scholars have noted that it was commonplace that where
trading ventures have gone forth to new lands in search of wealth the extension of the
political authority of the mother country eventually follows in direct proportion to the
economic value of the territory. Political authority brings the potential of force to guard
its new possessions and allow commerce to commence without harassment.2
It was also commonplace that once political authority has been established, it
forgets the commercial origins which it sprang and maintenance becomes its chief
objective. Often the new administration of these new territories claim that only through
the maintenance of its own power can economic development occur to the benefit of the
mother country. And if a new territory becomes economically vital to the home country,
1
Kurdish deaths in the aftermath of an Iraqi military campaign in 1987-1989 are estimated at 50,000 –
70,000
2 Philip Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development (London, 1938), p. 34
2
then steps are taken to protect that area very often including the acquisition of new
territory.3
The distinction between a commercial interests, strategic, and diplomatic interests
are not always clear. The control of a regions trade, for instance, allows a country to
collect revenue from taxes, tariffs, and shares which it may then use to finance the
construction of weapons, train armies, and wage war upon her rivals. Aside from the
military aspect of power, the revenues obtained from trade compel nations to negotiate
with one another and can even provide welfare services to its citizens. Hence,
commercial interests and all its spoils are an essential component to a political entity’s
ability to project all dimensions of its power and influence.
There is much truth to the idea of commercial expansion leading to political
expansion, especially in the case of India and the Iraqi province of Basra. But Mosul on
the other hand is a unique case as its significance to the British was equally economic as
well as strategic. In fact, as this research will show, Mosul’s future among the great
powers during World War I was highly depended on how British and French officials
viewed Mosul. Was it a vital economic interest or was it an inseparable strategic
interest? Even within these debates, officials argued over which aspects of Mosul were
more strategically valuable (e.g. oil versus terrain). Ultimately, the kind of interests in
the region determined how the Britain conducted herself in it.
These debates also reflected a more time-specific set of interests, mainly those of
the First World War. Here again, Mosul offers us an important insight into British policy
during the war. Britain throughout this period, but especially during the beginning,
prioritized war-time concerns in Europe over imperial ambitions elsewhere in the world.
3
Ibid, pp. 35-36
3
This was particularly evident during partition negotiations with the French in 1915 and
1916, resulting in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The debate over Mosul gives us a direct
case study of this larger pattern of policy as it was not originally part of the British sphere
of influence. The First World War also opens another chapter in historical debate over
the issue of oil. With the Royal Navy, Britain’s main line of defense, depended on oil
and Britain’s own reserves sparse, many believe that this resource became a decisive
issue in Britain’s involvement in the Middle East in general. Mosul, with its vast oil
wealth, provides an important case to test the strength of oil centered arguments.
Aside from these insights into British policy, the study of Mosul and how came to
be part of British rule offers us a far greater insight into the history of the Iraqi state and
Mosul’s own unique history. The creation of a new state and national borders forever
changed the social dynamic of Mosul. Families were cut off from each other, trade
routes were severed, and new laws and regulations based on the interests of a foreign
government would be imposed upon the population. However, what is not immediately
evident is that the borders arranged as a result of the war would look radically different
depending on the outcome of the war. The effects experienced by the population may
very well have led into another direction. Thus, to determine how and why Mosul
eventually fell under the rule of the British we must examine the events and actors who
sought to include this province under British territory.
Most scholars who study Britain’s relationship to Mosul focus on two parts, first
Mosul’s relation to British oil interests and second, how Britain obtained the province in
1918.4 There is general agreement that oil was decisive in Britain’s decision to take
Mosul and that this was clearly defined objective of British policy. However, these views
4
It should be noted that most scholars only give casual mention to Mosul and there is little debate about
Britain’s motives behind their occupation of the province.
4
begin to blur upon closer examination, particularly in 1915 when the British agreed to
assign Mosul to the French. Most studies consider this a kind of accident that the British
were not serious about upholding, others note that oil had not yet gained its importance in
British strategic thinking. The latter view certainly holds a fair amount of truth to it
however both views mistakenly exaggerate the significance of oil in Britain’s affairs
during World War I.
Oil was indeed an important issue, but it was one issue among many. The
purpose of this study, therefore, is to reexamine Britain’s interests in Mosul and to assess
the value officials placed on Mosul. Oil will be discussed in the context of Britain’s
interests as a whole rather than isolating it and thereby emphasizing it above others. With
that in mind, the first chapter of this study will begin with the development of Britain’s
interests and rivalries in the region. Special attention is given to the controversy
surrounding the Baghdad Railway and how it would shape British policy on the eve of
World War I. British policy went through four stages during this period beginning with
vigorous defense of her interests against the German funded Railway and ending with a
compromise that prioritized Britain’s European interests over her imperial interests.
The second chapter dives into the heart of matter with an analysis of the SykesPicot Agreement and the policy developments leading to it. War began and the Ottoman
Empire sided with Germany leaving her open to an attack from Allied forces, especially
Russia. And though Britain, France, and Russia were allied in a war against Germany
they were also rivals, thus when it became apparent that the Ottoman Empire would be
divided, Britain had to consider the post war situation. She sacrificed Mosul in the
Sykes-Picot Agreement to both satisfy her allies and create a buffer state between herself
and her old rival Russia.
5
Agreements with European allies were not the only commitments made by the
British. In 1916 Britain made a pledge to support an undefined Arab state under the
authority of Sharif Husayn. Naturally, this conflicted with pledges made to the French,
but the inconsistencies didn’t end there with Britain making another pledge to support a
Zionist state in 1917. The third chapter follows Britain’s attempts to reconcile these
conflicting promises while attempting to alter their original agreement with France to
obtain the province of Mosul. By 1918 the fortunes of war brought unforeseen events,
the death of prominent British statesmen, the entrance of the United States into the war,
and perhaps most importantly the fall of Russia. These new circumstances, in the British
view, meant that the sacrifice of Mosul was no longer necessary, but while Britain surely
desired such a province under her rule the more pressing matter of war-times promises
pre-occupied her every step. Mosul would have to be a secondary priority.
Ultimately, Britain would obtain the province, but not through open diplomatic
channels with the French. The conflicting agreements proved too much for Britain to
resolve thus British and French Prime Ministers Lloyd George and Clemenceau met
privately to resolve their nations’ disputes. The third chapter also tackles the question of
Britain’s interest in Mosul directly and compares and evaluates its multiple dimensions.
Was oil as important as scholars have stated or are there other issues long neglected from
the historiography? And lastly, what did Mosul mean to the British in the broader
picture?
6
Chapter 1: Mesopotamia before World War I
Prior to the twentieth century, the British official mind placed a considerable
amount of value on what was then the Ottoman province of Mosul. Mosul had long been
a key trading center in the Middle East, but its most distinct feature, as far as the British
were concerned, was its location. Along with the Ottoman provinces of Baghdad and
Basra Mosul formed part of what was known as Mesopotamia, an area that fell on one of
the quickest routes to India. Because of this proximity to the most vital part of the British
Empire, Mesopotamia and her three provinces became entangled in a complex web of
British interests. These interests would eventually compel the British to occupy Basra in
1914, Baghdad in 1917, and finally Mosul in 1918. However, specific policies for Mosul
independent of neighboring provinces were practically non-existent in the years
preceding the war. Any consideration of this Ottoman province was closely tied to
British interests in the larger region of Mesopotamia. Thus to fully comprehend British
interest in Mosul it is necessary to first observe British interest in Mesopotamia.
Bearing this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to briefly describe the growth
of British interests in Mesopotamia as well as to define what these interests precisely
were on the eve of World War I. Special attention has been given to the issue of the
Baghdad Railway, which not only played an unparalleled role in shaping British policy
toward Mesopotamia, but also illustrates important patterns emerging in British policy.
These patterns would reappear in future quarrels over Mosul and thus require elaboration.
The chapter ends with a description of what sparked the initial military campaign into
Mesopotamia in fall 1914 and to determine how the added element of war interacted with
Britain’s already existing interests.
7
Modern borders of Iraq
8
GROWING INTERESTS AND RIVALRIES
Like many other parts of the world, trade would be the catalyst for expanding
interest in Mesopotamia.5 As early as 1619, before the union of the Britannic Kingdoms,
the East India Company established a monopoly on all silk that went through the Persian
Gulf and in 1643 the first English factory was established in the Southern Mesopotamian
port of Basra, increasing the sale of British goods. As British trade expanded further
inland and up to Mosul, the port of Basra became increasingly important both
strategically and economically as it became the gateway for British trade. Its importance
steadily grew during the eighteenth century when Britain gradually became a major trade
partner throughout the Ottoman Empire.6
During 1820s and 1840s, as river navigation technology advanced, the Tigris and
Euphrates river valleys became the focus of numerous transport companies and their
lucrative projects.7 The British government even considered the valley running through
Mosul as a potential candidate for a communication route to India over the Suez Canal.
In 1850, the first plans for a Mesopotamian Railway appeared in London, with Mosul
forming an intricate part of the route.8 Ultimately, none of these proposals fell through;
nevertheless, Mosul and more generally Mesopotamia remained important strategic and
commercial centers throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. To
give just an idea of the extent of this trade route, in the years 1912 to 1914 Britain
controlled nearly 70 per cent of trade in Mesopotamia.9 This trade alone would be a
consistent influence on British policy.
5
Ireland, Iraq, p.31
Ibid, p.31; the silk monopoly was granted by Persian Shah Abas.
7 Ibid, p.44
8 Stuart Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914 (London, 1976), p. 4; Ireland, Iraq, p. 45;
ultimately the route through Egypt was seen as the best option.
9 Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p. 251
6
9
Britain’s initial trading missions and her subsequent efforts to project her power
in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, such as the seizure of all salving ships and the
suppression of piracy, were largely the consequence of her control over India.10 The
defense of this vital area became an established principle of British foreign policy and
successive British governments sought to “‘safeguard all the routes leading to India’ and
to establish control over all the bases from which those routes might be threatened.”11
This line of thinking contributed significantly to the acquisition of places such as
Singapore, Gibraltar, and by the late nineteenth century central and eastern Africa. As far
as Mesopotamia was concerned, Baghdad was the main center of British influence in the
Arabia peninsula.12 Political residents were established in Baghdad to spread British
influence and safeguard their interests from rival European encroachments.
For much of the late nineteenth century, Britain’s primary threat in the Middle
East was the Russian Empire. Russia for her part had expanded rapidly during this time,
capturing all the land over the Caucasus and into the valley of Syr Darya (in what is
today known as Kazakhstan) in 1864. Russia’s expansion into Central Asia and her
proximity to India raised the eyebrows of many British statesmen, but more threatening
still was her establishment of a strong foothold in northern Persia. Persia provided both a
gateway to India and Mesopotamia, threatening both Britain’s position in India directly
as well as indirectly by access to Mesopotamia. In 1890 Russia even obtained a
concession to build a Railway in Persia, the Russo-Persian Railway Agreement,
10
Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p.3; M. And T. Zinkin, Britain and India: Requiem
for Empire (London, 1964), p. 48; R. Robinson and J. Gallagher with A. Deny, African and the Victorians:
The Official Mind of Imperialism, (London, 1961), p. 289; the central theme to Robinson and Gallagher’s
book is that security concerns over India were largely responsible for further expansion of the British
Empire.
11 Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p.3
12 Ireland, Iraq, p.37
10
strengthening Russia financial interests in the region.13 Great Britain was keen to
respond to Russian advances and even fought the Crimean War in 1853-56 alongside the
French and the Ottoman Empire to resist Russian encroachment.
Great efforts were made to protect Britain’s interests in Mesopotamia, especially
by Lord Curzon, who remarked that “Baghdad … must be included in the zone of
indisputable British Supremacy.”14 Convinced that the Russian presence in Persia was a
serious threat, Britain attempted to curb this rival influence using various methods. The
most significant of such attempts was the partitioning of Persia into spheres of influence
by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.15 This convention allotted to Russia the
northern most section of Persia while the Britain held the south, however, the convention
was not the only means of protecting British interests. One other tactic was the creation
of protectorates with Arab chiefs in the Persian Gulf. This included, the Trucial Coast
Agreement of March 6th, 1892, the Bahrain Agreement of March 13th, 1892, and perhaps
most important, the treaty with Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait in 1899. The latter brought
the best harbor in the Persian Gulf under British Protection.16
Russia was not the only power to contest Britain’s influence in Mesopotamia. By
the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, Germany had
become Britain’s chief rival. In economic terms, German companies and capital in the
Ottoman Empire were expanding at fast rate and German merchants were increasing their
share in the Turkish markets. But perhaps most importantly, the German government
was gaining greater influence within the Ottoman courts.17 Part of this was the result of
the fast growth of German power and prestige, but it was also the result of changes taking
13
Ireland, Iraq, p. 38
G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (New York, 2001), Vol. II p.578; Ireland, Iraq, p. 49
15 Ireland, Iraq, p. 42
16 Ibid, p. 39
14
11
place in the Ottoman government. In 1909 the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)
took power in the Ottoman Empire, initialing new policies in all manners of society. The
new government formed by the CUP saw great potential in an alliance with the Germans,
especially in any potential war against the Russians. A Turkish diplomat even remarked
that “his government was convinced that Britain was no longer willing to risk war to
defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire … The Turks therefore had no choice but to
sue for German support.”18 The emerging relationship gave Germany an added edge in
Asian affairs.
Britain during this period, the early twentieth century, saw numerous setbacks.
By 1903 she had ceased to dominate all trade in Turkey and French financiers now
controlled the majority of Turkish investment. In addition, her relations with the
Ottoman Empire had been deteriorating since the coming to the CUP to power.
However, while Britain’s influence in the Ottoman Empire as a whole was shaken, her
economic strength in Mesopotamia was untouched. In 1903 for example, Britain still
supplied 65 per cent of market goods to Mesopotamia.19 However, this stronghold too
would fall under siege by the economic ventures of her new rival.
Germany’s initial commercial ventures into Turkey were initially considered by a
threat primarily to Russia. But within the first few years of the twentieth century,
Germany had managed to find agreements with all major powers in the Middle East. In
August 1911 the Potsdam Agreement between Russia and Germany recognized each
other’s interests in Turkey while in February 1914 France and Germany reconciled their
17
Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p. 8
Paul Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission (London, 1994),
p.15
19 Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p.8
18
12
commercial interests with the Franco-German Agreement.20 In 1909, Britain too was
willing to reconcile her conflicting interests and give Germany a free hand in Mosul.21
However, British policy during this pre-war period was in the midst of a transformation
and thus requires more detail to fully understand the reaction to Germany.
THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY
The Baghdad Railway was the first major project by a foreign power to infiltrate
Britain’s hold on Mesopotamia.22 Throughout its development, it caused immense
anxiety among policy makers and it tested the strength of British influence in the region.
Most significant of all, many British policies developed as a result of the Baghdad
Railway would later be seen Mosul during the First World War. Originally conceived in
1887, the Baghdad Railway was the product of German financiers and the Ottoman
government. As the plans progressed into the twentieth century, both the German and
British governments began to take a greater interest in its development. By 1903
Germany had obtained a final concession from the Ottomans to build the new line and
along with it a new political and economic competition with Britain.
Railways extending from Constantinople already existed at the end of the
nineteenth century, but the proposed Baghdad line, set for completion in 1916, was to
extend east of Konia and pass through the Taurus Mountains to Alexandretta, Aleppo,
Mosul, and end in Baghdad.23 This configuration reflected political and economic
considerations as much as technical ones.
20
Ireland, Iraq, pp. 55-56
Ibid, p. 55
22 Official title of the Baghdad Railway Project: “La Societe Imperiale Ottomane du Chemin de Fer de
Baghdad.”
23 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 33; John Keay, Sowing the Winds: The Seeds of Conflict in the Middle East
(New York, 2003), pp. 33-36
21
13
To Germany this new railway line was a way to tie together a future “political and
economic federation” which would establish Germany as the Major power of
Mitteleuropa; an area that covered Germany through Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and
the Ottoman Empire.24 Indeed, German interest in Middle East railways was not limited
to Mesopotamia: German money financed Turkish Anatolian Railway and plans existed
for a Persian railway.25 The Baghdad Railway in particular was designed “to divert the
Levantine, Indian and Far Eastern trade from the sea lanes to London overland to the
Reich” and potentially provide a means for an invasion of Egypt or India.26 The military
side of this equation was solidified further on August 2, 1914 when the Ottoman Empire
entered the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria.27
If the Baghdad Railway was intended to “reflect the position of the German
Empire, its prestige in the world, its financial power and economic expansion,” then it
would be at the expense of the British.28 Such a predicament did not weather in
Whitehall and much debate was roused by the issue. Throughout this period between
1903 and 1914 (i.e. since the last Baghdad Railway concession and World War I) British
foreign policy went through four stages, each corresponding to an official document. The
first was a memorandum by Lansdowne (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 19001905) in 1903, the second was a Cabinet statement in 1907, the third was a dispatch by
Edmund Grey (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1905-1916) in 1910, and the last
24
Davis, Ends and Means, p. 32
Edward Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Baghdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism (New York,
1923), p. 47; The Persian Railway was blocked by Russia in a 1911 agreement, and the route to
Alexandretta was similarly met with French resistance. These railways, German officials believed, would
supply the necessary raw materials for German manufactures which could not be acquired from domestic
resources.
26 Davis, Ends and Means, pp.33-34; the military assessment is according to German field Marshall
Colmar von der Goltz
27 Ibid, p. 18; though it not publicized at the time.
28 Ibid, p. 33
25
14
was in 1913 and 1914 represented by the Anglo-Turkish and the Anglo-German
Agreements respectively.29
Landowne’s April 1903 Baghdad Railway memorandum emphasized negotiations
with German financiers and stressed the diplomatic advantages of using the Baghdad
Railway as a means of reducing tensions with Germany. The memorandum suggested a
plan to “internationalize” the Baghdad Railway by bringing French and Russian
Financiers into the project. This scheme was immediately met with resistance with
criticism coming from the House of Commons and the Indian government.30 Officials in
the Indian government even suggested limiting Germany influence to Mosul only.
This mounting pressure would materialize in the form of a new policy stance
articulated by the Cabinet memo of May 1907. The memo objected to any foreign
control of a route to India and rejected the “internationalize” of the Baghdad Railway in
favor of a “sectional” scheme where respective powers would have control over the
railway within their sphere of influence. For Britain, control over the area between
Baghdad and Basra was the highest priority. The shift reflects partly an increased
awareness of Mesopotamia, but comes as a result of a landslide election victory by the
Liberal Party.31 However, the strongest element driving policy during this period was
economic. German trade in the region had reached a number of areas such as importation
of heavy agricultural machinery and in traditional British strongholds, such as the
development of irrigation.32 The Baghdad Railway itself even threatened British
29
Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p. 16; M. K. Chapman, Great Britain and the
Baghdad Railway 1888-1914 (Northampton, 1948), p. 76
30 Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Baghdad Railway (New York, 1923), p. 180
31 Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, pp.32 & 68
32 Ibid, p.56
15
shipping companies who had long held a monopoly over the area connecting the Persian
Gulf to the Mediterranean.33
The perceived threat paved the way for another policy shift in 1910. The dispatch
by Grey to Lowther on April 20, 1910 indicated the government’s intention to intensify
its policies devised in 1907 with the notable demand of a British built railway in the
Tigris River Valley.34 While there were diplomatic considerations behind this
intensification, its primary motive again appears to be commercial. By obtaining the
concession to build a railway along the Tigris River where the region’s irrigation
developed from, Britain would ensure her place in all future developments concerning
Mesopotamia’s agriculture.35 Following the dispatch, the British government attempted
to enter negotiations with Germany however the concerned parties failed to reach an
agreement. Specifically, the German government rejected the idea of a British Railway
monopoly in Southern Mesopotamia.36
The disagreements and deadlock prompted the fourth and final stage of Britain’s
Baghdad Railway policy. Only this time the British and German governments would find
an agreement “destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding.”37 Britain first move
was to revise her demands for a Tigris Valley Railway and reduce it to a smaller line
from Kut al Amara to Mandali. Next she would retract her opposition to a German
railway from Baghdad to Basra and settle for control over any line between Basra and the
Persian Gulf.38 Britain also announced her willingness to accept a Turkish owned
Baghdad-Gulf Railway, provided commercial guarantees for British Merchants. The
33
Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Baghdad Railway (New York, 1923), p. 191; Earle also
insightfully notes that many of the charges against the Baghdad Railway could not be substantiated.
34 Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p. 91
35 Ibid, p.120
36 Ibid, p.144
37 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 35
16
result of Britain’s compromises was the Anglo-Turkish of 1913 and Anglo-German
agreements of 1914.
In comparing the agreements of 1913 and 1914 to Britain’s previous policy
statements we find a sharp contrast. In 1907 and 1910, local commercial interests played
a deceive role in shaping British policy, however, by 1914 Britain surrendered many of
her demands, giving up “more than the founders of the railway had dreamed of.”39
Lurking behind these seemingly contradictory policies were growing diplomatic and
political pressures from Europe. In 1910 the Russo-German Potsdam negotiations
undermined Britain’s position when the Russian representative had accepted the German
Baghdad Railway formula.40 And during the Turco-German Convention of 1911, the
Ottoman Empire and Germany arrived at a number of agreements concerning the
Baghdad Railway including length guarantees and military installations. In each of these
cases Britain had no input or influence. For British statesmen, these events illustrated
that unless they find a fair, yet favorable solution to the Baghdad Railway, they would be
left with neither.
Accompanying this weakened diplomatic position was a greater consideration of
Britain’s strategic position in Europe. The first and most important of these
considerations was the maintenance of the alliance with France and Russia. Many British
officials feared that a too pro-German policy in Mesopotamia would alienate the French
or even cause Russia to drop from the entente.41 At the same time, officials desired to
stay on good terms with Germany lest the entente should fall apart. There also the fear
38
Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p.238; Davis, Ends and Means, p. 35
Davis, Ends and Means, p. 35
40 Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p.201; Stephen Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A
Political, Social, and Economic History (London, 1953), p. 60
41 Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p. 211
39
17
that loyalty of the Muslim population of India would be compromised by antagonizing
the Ottoman Empire who’s Sultan could still claim religious leadership.42
The Baghdad Railway highlights several important aspects of British policy that
continued to develop in course of World War I. The first of these aspects was the
increased awareness of Mesopotamia, and in time Mosul, as an important trade center
with enormous economic potential. The second was the growing schism between
officials in India and their counterparts in London. Mesopotamia was long considered a
part of India’s flank and as such fell under the direction of the Indian government.43
However, Germany was the concern of London and thus had to consider the larger
picture. Third, and most important of all, was the emergence of a pattern of policy that
prioritized international and strategic concerns. With Germany firmly entrenched in
Ottoman affairs, Britain had re-evaluate their position in Mesopotamia in light of the
European theater which was about erupt into war.
WAR BEGINS: THE BASRA CAMPAIGN AND THE ROUTE TO MOSUL
On November 6th, 1914 the Indian Expeditionary Force “D” landed on Fao in
southern Mesopotamia on the Persian Gulf. This event, while limited in its conception,
represented yet another stage of British policy towards Mesopotamia. The advent of war
effectively ended negotiations with Germany however the interests compelling Britain to
maintain her influence in the region remained. These interests themselves did not
change, but rather the war elevated military and strategic concerns to the highest level, a
fact that would parallel the Mosul experience in the years to come.
42
Ibid, p. 211; one should also mention the change of personnel as an influence on foreign policy, at
Constantinople Ambassadors Lowther and then Mallet replaced O’Conor, in the Foreign Office Nicolson
replaced Hardinge as Under-Secretary, in the India Office Crewe replaced Morley, and in the Admiralty
Churchill became 1st Lord.
18
To understand how British policy would evolve to this point, we must first
elaborate the goals of the expedition and how its outcome shaped future policy. The
desire to acquire the province of Basra in southern Mesopotamia was not a new one. As
early as 1911 Britain began to prepare plans for a Mesopotamian expedition, but action
never materialized and repeated suggestions were frequently rejected.44 War, on the
other hand, gave the invasion plans new life and new objectives. There were three main
goals for Britain’s occupation of Basra in 1914. The first was the general but long
established desire to protect the route to India. Deriving from this goal came the second
which was the support of the Arabs against the Turks. The last was the protection of the
Persian petroleum fields and Abadan oil stores.45 Each of these goals focuses on one
particular aspect of British policy, but to focus on one as the decisive reason for the
invasion is problematic.
The goal of protecting oil resources in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, for
example, was a mixed priority. On one hand, oil was an important strategic resource as
fuel for the Royal Navy and by 1914 Britain had acquired a majority shareholding in the
British Petroleum Company, which at the time worked on the Persian oil fields. Many
British officials have also acknowledged its importance in decision making. Lloyd
George in his War Memoirs, for instance, states that “it became evident that Turkey was
likely to join the enemy powers. This made it at once important to take steps for
43
Ibid, pp. 15 & 73; the first members of the Iraqi Civil Administration, for example, were drawn from the
Indian government.
44 Ibid, pp.206 & 300
45 Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p.299; Keay, Sowing the Winds: The Seeds of Conflict
in the Middle East (New York, 2003), p. 45; Paul Guinn, British Strategy and Politics 1914 to 1918
(Oxford, 1965), p. 43; Longrigg, Iraq 1900 to 1950, p. 77; V.H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace
Diplomacy (Oxford, 1971), p. 18
19
safeguarding the oil supplies in the Persian Gulf.”46 Indeed, the protection of oil supplies
was in fact one of the objectives of the Indian Expeditionary force “D.”47
However, oil was only one of several objectives and its significance to the thought
process which led to the invasion was nuanced. Churchill, for instance, denied that
Britain would come to depend on the Persian oil fields, stating that there was “little
likelihood of any troops being available for this purpose.… we shall have to buy our oil
from elsewhere.”48 On the field, the ability of the expeditionary force to protect the oil
lines was severely limited by a lack of personnel.49 Plans for the actual protection of the
refinery, pipeline, and oil fields were not finalized until October 24, 1915 and even then
those plans were not truly put into effect until later.50 With the demands of the European
front and the lack of sufficient military forces, protection of the oil fields was largely a
secondary objective.
As for Britain’s intent to foster the Arab support, there also appears to be mixed
effort. On the one hand, British officials were aware of the anti-British sentiment that
existed amongst the Arabs of Basra and feared an uprising against British interests.51 On
the other hand, many of these same officials by 1914 believed that “the Arabs … are
almost certain to eliminate the Turks.”52 The two views suggested to officials that in
order to protect Britain’s position in southern Mesopotamia, it would be necessary to
acquire Arab support and channel it against the Ottoman Empire, thereby avoiding a
possible enemy and acquiring a new ally. The British did not want to promote Arab
46
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (Boston, 1936), Vol. II, p. 238
A.T. Wilson, Loyalties Mesopotamia 1914-1917 (Oxford, 1930), p. 8; F.J. Moberly, History of the Great
War based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918 (London, 1927), Vol. I, p.
99
48 Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p. 302; Davis, Ends and Means, p. 38
49 Wilson, Loyalties Mesopotamia 1914-1917, p.9
50 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 32
51 Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p. 307
47
20
Nationalism so much as forge a receptive relationship to protect their interests in the
region. Nevertheless, Britain set about soliciting the support of Arab notables.
One such case was that of Seyid Talib, a member of one the most respected Sunni
families in the Basra province. The British believed that Talib’s influence could provide
key assistance during a British attack. Hardinge, for example, considered it “essential to
his adherence” while the Foreign Office thought that “Talib … could and would either
raise a disturbance [against the Turks] or induce the Arab troops to desert.”53 Talib for
his part was wary about the Ottoman government, believing that they would soon expel
him from Basra.54 Unfortunately for the British, negotiations didn’t materialize into
assistance and Talib fled the region anyway on the outbreak of war.55 Talib, of course,
was not the only notable the British contacted; negotiations took place with the Sheikh of
Mohammerah, Aziz Ali Bey, and later during the war Sharif Hussein.56
Like the previous interpretations, there are also problems with the propagandist
view. By far the largest problem was one of scope. As Arnold T. Wilson put it, “One
essential, however, was lacking… it was clear that the Arabs would not commit
themselves definitely, for fear of subsequent Turkish reprisals… the British Government,
however, was unable to endorse any such assurances.”57 Without these kinds of
assurances the ability of the British government to win over Arab support was extremely
limited. Nor was there a clear post-war plan between the British, who sought control for
themselves, and the Arab notables, who desired their rule. Furthermore, the idea of
acquiring Arab support was in fact an instrumental goal as the Arabs could potentially
52
Ibid, p. 304
Ibid, pp. 306-07
54 Wilson, Loyalties Mesopotamia 1914-1917, p. 18
55 Ibid, p. 18
56 The Sheikh of Mohammerah was a long time ally of the British in southern Mesopotamia and Aziz Ali
Bey was an Arab nationalist from Egypt with connections to Kitchener.
53
21
protect existing British interests. The Mesopotamian Expedition, it seems, was prompted
by deeper concerns.
If all of these goals independently are inadequate, what then explains the
expedition into Mesopotamia? As one scholar noted, “in 1914, Britain’s policy towards
Mesopotamia was based on the need to preserve those interests which had been apparent
in the nineteenth century, and which had been developed since 1903.”58 Basra’s
proximity to India and its long established commercial ties, all threatened with the advent
of war, were more than enough to grab the attention of British statesmen. Oil and Arab
support both fall within this context; existing oil supplies in Persia would fare better with
British troops nearby and Arab support would allow the British to focus their manpower
in other theaters of war. The expedition with its limited objectives, therefore, was
defensive and intended to maintain the “status quo” in southern Mesopotamia.59
While the origins of the Mesopotamian Campaign are rooted in past events, the
consequences of the campaign would shape future events in both Mesopotamia and entire
Middle East. Basra was for the British the gateway to Mosul and the whole of
Mesopotamia. A few weeks after the British forces captured Basra, Sir Percy Cox, the
man who later become the High Commissioner of Iraq, stated that he could not see how
“we can avoid taking over Baghdad.”60 This change in attitude, of what was initially
designed to be a limited operation, reflected a new relationship between Britain and
Mesopotamia. The emerging civil administration that was established with the British
expedition brought more detailed and more localized demands to the attention of officials
in London. In this context, individual cities, villages, and provinces received more
57
Wilson, Loyalties Mesopotamia 1914-1917, p. 16
Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p. 308
59 Ibid, p. 308
60 Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq (New York, 2007), p. 9
58
22
attention and were viewed through the eyes of a provincial government rather than a
distant unconnected power in India and London.
CONTINUITY IN BRITISH POLICY
The history of Britain’s involvement in Mesopotamia, as we’ve seen, began
centuries before her acquisition of the region. Her interests grew steadily as did her rivals
and with the construction of the Baghdad Railway, Britain’s hold over this region was
directly threatened by another power, one that was fully aware of Mesopotamia’s
importance to Britain. When war erupted, Britain was prompted to take action and secure
gateway of Mesopotamia. Looking deep into these events one will find a number of
changes in British policy, but if one looks even deeper there exists an element of
continuity or more precisely a pattern of policy. One that guides the direction of these
changes and policies they produce, reappearing at key moments in the history of Mosul
and the wider Middle East.
During the Baghdad Railway quarrel the threat posed by German interests was
very high in the view of the British. The Railway could bring in both German companies
and goods to compete with British ones. It could also draw clients away from British
shipping and allow Germany to partake in the development of Mesopotamia’s irrigation
systems and petroleum exploitation. As a result Britain had to shift gears and alter their
strategy to handle the new situation. This shift in Mesopotamian policy, reflected a
“conceptual” change in general British policy where “the requirements of the European
diplomatic situation … exert a determining influence on the formation of Britain’s local
policy.”61
61
Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, p. 209; in his footnotes, Cohen mentions that this
change was not restricted to Mesopotamia. Also note that this quote was describing the latter stage of
23
Britain maintained a set of priorities that she would pursue according to her
ability and opportunity to do so. When Britain proposed in 1903 to internationalize the
Baghdad Railway it reflected a perception that Britain alone could not impose her will
upon Germany. Commercial interests did not disappear, but rather could not be pursued
with great enthusiasm. In 1907 Britain made a 180 degree turn and began to exert
influence to protect and, in 1910, expand her commercial interests. These interests were
not suddenly born within a four year period, but had developed for centuries and
therefore the change illustrates the new government’s view that her position in the
international context was strong enough to pursue a hard-line approach in Mesopotamia.
In this case diplomatic and strategic interests assumed a secondary role. Lastly, between
1910 and 1914 Britain made another turn reflecting the circumstances in the international
scene. Thus, the shifts in policy that occurred between 1903 and 1914 themselves
represent a continual pattern in British policy; Britain pursues her commercial interests
when possible and in the absence of external diplomatic or strategic threats, but in the
sufficient presence of such elements, she compromises.
For some scholars, the beginning of World War I brought an abrupt end to
previous forms of British policy. And to a degree the, the initial campaign into
Mesopotamia reflects this with Britain pursuing her interests in the midst of war.
However, the pattern would persist and continue throughout Britain’s trials with Mosul.
The Mesopotamian campaign was only the beginning of a much larger dispute, the
partition of the entire Middle East.
policy development during the Baghdad Railway and not the issue as a whole, which is the argument the
author takes.
24
Chapter 2: Mosul between Britain and France
Britain’s expedition into Mesopotamia gave the appearance of ground breaking
change in British policy. Instead of resisting German influence in the region through
various local elements, she was now directly engaged with direct rule. However, whereas
Britain’s approach to Germany and the Ottoman Empire had certainly changed, her
approach to the ambitions of her own Allies had not. On September 4, 1914, Britain,
France and Russia declared that they would not conclude a separate peace with their
enemies and to agree beforehand on the conditions of peace. This declaration applied as
much to the Ottoman Empire as it did to Germany. Thus from the very beginning of the
Britain’s war-time actions, British officials knew that the acquisition of any territory in
Mesopotamia would depend on the good will of their allies in Europe. And despite the
common goal of victory over the Central Powers, France, Russia, and Britain were rivals
with priorities and interests that were frequently at odds with one another.
In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting interests, these Great Powers
partitioned the Middle East into spheres of interests, the consequences of which are
evident even to the present day. For centuries this region’s political structure was under
the influence, though with varying levels of autonomy, of the Ottoman Empire. The new
cemented borders that emerge after the war would alter local trade and infringe on daily
life in many ways. Interestingly, when one looks at a map today, the province of Mosul
forms the northern part of modern Iraq, however, this was not the original design of the
war-time agreements that emerged. The partition plan spelled out in the Sykes-Picot
Agreement of 1916 in fact placed Mosul as well as its oil resources under the influence of
France. Britain in her subsequent military campaigns throughout the Middle East
25
operated under this understanding even after her occupation of Mosul in November 1918.
Such were the product of a complex combination of long term interests as well as
immediate war time concerns and by no means can be reduced down to a single element.
However, France and Russia were not the only partners in the partition of the
Middle East. In 1916, roughly the same time period of the Sykes Picot Agreement,
Britain had concluded a deal with the emir of Mecca, Sharif Husayn for the creation of an
Arab state after the war. The result of which was a great deal of confusion and
significant post-war diplomatic consequences. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to
map out what Britain’s interests were in the Middle East and more specifically the
province of Mosul. The contradictory claims of the Arab Revolt and the military
invasion of Mosul are also addressed. These events also help us understand why Britain
was willing to give Mosul to the French and provide the background for subsequent
chapters.
DEFINING BRITISH INTERESTS
Mosul was but one item on a long list of British concerns and its significance to
policy makers was mixed. On the one hand Mosul possessed numerous strategic and
economic assets which were by no means limited to oil, yet on the other hand, war and
power rivalry compelled the British take only what was absolutely necessary. To define
what these absolute necessities precisely were, the British convened a series of meetings
at the beginning of 1915.
The events leading up to these meetings began with the imperial ambitious of
Tsarist Russia. Already in September 14, 1914, the Russian Foreign Minister, Serge
Sazonov, informed his British and French counterparts of Russia’s demand for “the
permanent freedom of the straits” connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea as
26
part of any peace agreement.62 Thus, when British ships opened fire on Turkish forts
along the Dardanelles on February 19, 1915, Russian officials feared the possibility of the
British taking one Russia’s long territorial ambitions, Constantinople.63
The entente powers had already discussed in great detail their conditions for a
Turkish surrender, and the British Campaign in Gallipoli was intended, though never
realized, to make that desire a reality.64 Nevertheless, on March 4, 1915 the British and
French ambassadors to Russia received an aide-memoire calling for the official
recognition of the “traditional aspirations of Russia.”65 Essentially, Russia was
demanding the incorporation of the city of Constantinople into the Russian Empire in the
event of a peace treaty with the Ottomans. In return for the entente’s cooperation, Russia
promised her allies support for their territorial aspirations elsewhere in the Ottoman
lands.66
The demands on the part of Russia changed the entire framework of the Middle
East peace agreement. In Britain, the demand raised new questions about the Middle
East and initiated the first of a series of meetings. On March 10, 1915 in London the War
Council met to discuss a reply to Russia’s new demand and offer. Aside from Arthur
Balfour’s concern about the possibility of Russia lessening her effort on the German
front, it was generally agreed that “the Russians would so pleased with Constantinople
62
Paul Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission (London, 1994), p.
97; Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920 (London, 1969), p. 14.
63 From the point of view of Russian officials the war offered little prospects for gain. See Peter Sinnott,
Russia from Empire to Revolution: The Illusion of the Emreging Nation State in the South Caucasus and
Beyond, from Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor Tejirian, The Creation of Iraq 1914-1921 (New York,
2004), pp. 125-132.
64 The Gallipoli Campaign was specifically intended to force Turkey to surrender, influence Bulgaria,
Romania, and Greece into entering the war, and guarantee a safe means of supply to Russia.
65 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 98; David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman
Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (London, 1989), p. 140; Elie Kedourie, England and
the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914-1921 (London, 1956), p. 30
66 Davis, Ends and Means, pp. 98-99; Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, p. 140
27
that they would not object to any British claim.”67 The council then proceeded to discuss
what these territorial claims should be, with two primary areas of interest: the Ottoman
lands around the Persian Gulf, which included Mosul as a province of Mesopotamia, and
the port of Alexandretta along the Syrian coast.
Concerning the port of Alexandretta, both Secretary of state for Lord Kitchener
and 1st Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill believed the port was essential in any
post war agreement.68 Churchill thought that if Britain succeeded in defeating the
German Navy then she ought to be powerful enough to confront the French and Russian
fleets in the Mediterranean in any post-war situation. Kitchener saw the port as a means
of defending Egypt against the potential threat of Russia who would control
Constantinople after the war.69 He also understood that Alexandretta would be connected
to Mosul via railway which could then distribute the resources of Mesopotamia to the
Mediterranean. Only Lloyd George dissented believing that the British acquisition of the
region could potentially agitate both the French and the Russians. The meeting ended
without any specific agreements between officials, but instead with a vague idea of what
constituted British interests and to consent to Russia’s demands.70
As policy makers prepared for their next meeting, more officials began to take
issue both with both Alexandretta and Mosul. Military secretary Sir Edmund Barrow
disagreed with taking either Mosul or Alexandretta arguing that they would be too
difficult and costly to defend. In a note to the War Cabinet on March 16, Barrow wrote:
67
Davis, Ends and Means, p. 99
Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 15. Nevakivi also wrote an extensive
essay about British war time interests in Alexandretta, see Jukka Nevakivi, “Lord Kitchener and the
Partition of the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916,” K. Bourne and D.C. Watt, Studies in International History
(London, 1967) pp. 316-329
69 Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 16
70 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 99; Aaron S. Klieman, “Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915,”
Journal of Contemporary History, 3, 3, The Middle East (Jul., 1968), p. 240
68
28
If we annex Alexandretta we shall not only involve ourselves in enormous and
unprofitable expenditure in docks and fortifications, but we shall also be
committed to the control and defence of the long exposed line of the Baghdad
Railway between that port and Mosul, while at the same time we shall be
perpetually floundering in a maze of intricate political intrigues and racial
problems-Kurd and Armenian, Anatolian and Syrian—with which we ought to
have no concern.71
Barrow was by no means alone in his in critique. Many members of the Indian
government also shared the same concerns. Arthur Hirtzel, later the undersecretary of
state for India, remarked that “the temporary loss of Mosul and the fertile territory of the
Jebel Sinjar would be inconvenient. But in an Empire like ours it is impossible to defend
everything at once.”72 Essentially, the acquisition of Mosul, and Alexandretta whose fate
was closely tied to the former, was not yet a unanimously high priority for British
officials.
However, the debates were far from over. Soon after the March 10 meeting the
British Ambassador to Russia was instructed to inform the Tsar of their agreement
provided certain guarantees.73 The three powers also agreed to arrange a conference to
discuss their eventual peace terms. In the meantime, France had declared her interest in
Cilicia and Syria, the latter assumed to include the Palestine and the Christian Holy
Places, though she had not clarified the full extent of these interests.74 On March 19 the
War Committee met again to continue their discussion of partition in its broader context.
Secretary of state for foreign affairs Sir Edward Grey put forward two questions: “(1)
would the acquisition of fresh territories make England weaker or stronger; (2) should
account be taken of the strong feeling in the Moslem world that Islam ought to have
71
Note by General Edmund Barrow, March 16, 1915, CAB/24/1.
Comments by Arthur Hirtzel, March 17, 1915, CAB/24/1.
73; “de Bunsen Committee Report” from J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World
Politics: A Documentary Record 1915-1945 (London, 1979), vol. II, p. 28; Davis, Ends and Means, p. 99;
these guarantees included commercial freedom through the straits and autonomy for Muslim Holy sites.
72
29
political as well as religious existence?”75 Grey was personally against the idea of
expansion and his questions were directed at Britain’s long term goals and the means of
British rule.76
Two views emerged at the time; one believed that after the war the Ottoman
Empire should maintain her sovereignty while the second held that Ottomans should be
sacrificed in favor of an Arab state with the status of caliphate. Kitchener favored the
latter view, arguing that if Russia controlled Constantinople then the Turks would fall
under their sway, he also maintained that Mesopotamia should fall under British rule
rather than under an Arab state.77 In terms of the provinces of Mesopotamia, Basra and
Baghdad were given priority over Mosul. While some most officials, such Kitchener and
Churchill understood Mosul to be an integral part of Mesopotamia, others such as
secretary of state for India Lord Crewe saw Baghdad and Basra as the core provinces.
Crewe even suggested that both Basra and Baghdad should be given directly to India.
This did not imply that Mosul should fall under the sway of a foreign power, but rather
that Britain’s interests, and those of the Indian government in particular, were stronger in
those regions.
The two main dissenting voices against direct rule during the meeting, Lloyd
George and Arthur Balfour, eventually yielded to the views of Kitchener. However, the
committee had yet to declare an official decision on the question of territorial
74
Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, vol. II
p. 28
75 Klieman, “Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915,” p. 241; Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab
Middle East 1914-1920, p. 16
76 Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 16
77 Kedourie, England and the Middle East , p. 34; Klieman, “Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in
1915,” p. 241; Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 17
30
expansion.78 Britain still had to consider French objectives and to decide which
provinces would fall under direct British rule and which ones should belong to the
independent Arab state. Prime Minister Asquith best summed up the meetings
conclusion, “if for one reason or another … we were to leave the other nations to
scramble for Turkey without taking anything for ourselves, we should not be doing our
duty.”79
The previous meeting raised many questions and illustrated a divergence of
opinion between the Indian government and the War Office. It therefore became
necessary for officials to have a more thorough discussion of the situation and formulate
a clearer set of goals. On April 12, 1915 a committee headed by Sir Maurice de Bunsen
(the de Bunsen committee) was formed to tackle these issues.80 From the outset of this
meeting there was a general agreement of what Britain’s minimal demands should be,
namely Mesopotamia, though not necessarily Mosul, and some form of an independent
Arab state, however the maximum extent of these demands and the manner in which
Britain was to hold them was another question. The de Bunsen Committee therefore
sought to articulate British demands and the best course of action to protect them,
whether that meant partition, the creation of zones of interest, or a decentralized Ottoman
Empire.
Members of the India Office, such as Sir Edmund Barrow, Arthur Hirtzel, and
Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge, demanded the full annexation of Basra and a
78
Klieman, “Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915,” p.242; Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab
Middle East 1914-1920, p. 17; it is also worth mentioning that these dissident voices favored taking Haifa
over Alexandretta for Britain’s Mediterranean access.
79 H.H. Asquith, Memoirs and Reflections (London, 1928), vol. II, p. 69; Klieman, “Britain’s War Aims in
the Middle East in 1915,” p. 242; Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 17
80 Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, vol. II,
p. 27; The committee was made up of G.R. Clark of the Foreign Office, Sir H.B. Jackson of the Admiralty,
31
protectorate for Baghdad. Hardinge offered five reasons for a permanent occupation of
Basra:
(1) [It] settles the question of our supremacy in the Persian Gulf. (2) It ensures
safeguarding Abadan and [the] Anglo-Perisan Oil Company’s works… (3) It
makes secure position of [the] sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit. (4) It will
pay. (5) It solves question of Baghdad Railway terminus.81
Hirztel supported Hardinge’s points and added that all the commercial centers, including
Baghdad, should fall under British control as well.82 The boundaries Hirztel had in mind
extended to the 24th parallel and the Jebel Hamrin hills.83 It is also notable that these
demands and boundaries seem to have excluded Mosul entirely from the equation, an
issue that would return later in the meeting.
Sir Edmund Barrow suggested an even more restricted course of action by
annexing only Basra and leaving Baghdad under nominal Turkish sovereignty in a
fashion similar to Egypt.84 Barrow hoped that by not controlling Baghdad officially it
would garner good opinion with the Muslim world and reduce tension with the French
and Russians by creating a buffer zone between the British and their allies. He also noted
that such an arrangement would be significantly less expensive and much easier to
maintain.85 The guiding principle in each of these ideas, as Lord Crewe concluded, was
that “the boundaries of British acquisition in what is now Turkey in Asia must be guided
less by what we hope to obtain than by what we are determined others shall not obtain.”86
Major-General C.E. Callwell and Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes of the War Office, and Sir Hubert
Llewellyn Smith of the Board of Trade.
81 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 100
82 These centers included Basra, Kurna, Nasiriyah, Amara, and Baghdad.
83 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 101; Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North
Africa in World Politics, vol. II, p. 31
84 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 101; Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North
Africa in World Politics, vol. II, p. 31
85 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 101
86 Ibid, p.102; quoting Lord Crewe
32
If the Indian officials sought limited goals, then the War Office and the
Admiralty’s goals were more ambitious in scope. Kitchener, as noted earlier, was
particularly sensitive to the potential threat posed by Russia and believed that
Mesopotamia must be incorporated into the British Empire to prevent Russia from
gaining “an outlet to the sea and enable them to eventually control the military situation
and the greater part of its commerce.”87 In this view, an outlet to the Mediterranean
would be vital to any defense of the region.
The Admiralty also shared Kitchener’s views and feared the strength Russia
would gain by her acquisition of Constantinople. Hence, to balance this threat, the
Admiralty sought to play “Babylon against Byzantium” and to extend the ancient
empire’s boarders to the Mediterranean by acquiring the port of Alexandretta.88 More
specifically, the Admiralty believed that with Russia’s hold on Constantinople she would
now have access to Mediterranean Sea which threatened the Royal Navy’s position of
superiority. If Britain acquired the port of Alexandretta, then she could not only supply
the Mediterranean fleet with Persian Gulf oil, but the location itself would create a border
to prevent Russian incursions into the south. It could also act as a counter threat to any
French attempts to cut off trade in Mesopotamia.89
While military and strategic considerations dominated the views of the Admiralty,
the Board of Trade focused solely on the economic dimensions of British policy.
Baghdad from their point of was “the most important point in the eastern Ottoman since
87
Ibid, p. 102; quoting Kitchener
Davis, Ends and Means, p. 102; Nevakivi, “Lord Kitchener and the Partition of the Ottoman Empire,
1915-1916,” p.324; Kitchener’s reasons for the acquisition of Alexandretta can be summarized as “(1) it
would be possible in case of an emergency to dispatch troops to Mesopotamia by rail from Alexandretta
quicker than by sea via Suez; (2) thus, in ordinary times a smaller garrison would suffice in Mesopotamia;
(3) the British would be in a favorable strategical position for countering any enemy (Russian) offensive
against Mesopotamia; (4) the traffic of arms to the Arabs of Mesopotamia could be controlled at the
Mediterranean was well as the Persian Gulf end.”
88
33
it was the center of distribution for the vilayets of Mosul and Basra and held productive
advantages of its own.”90 In addition, the board recommended acquiring liberal tariff
policies from France as they would likely control the majority of the Eastern
Mediterranean coast as well as its trade. Constantinople, in their view, would not be a
problem as long as Britain could acquire free passage through the straits.91
Each of these groups prioritized different aspects of British policy, however not
all of these goals could be fully realized. Hence, the following day, April 13, committee
members attempted to synchronize their conflicting opinions into a single coherent
policy. The first point brought to the forum was the province of Mosul. As noted earlier,
many officials had left Mosul from their calculations, while others rejected its acquisition
entirely. This prompted an important debate among the committee members. Sir Mark
Sykes and General Callwell called for the acquisition of Mosul believing that the
boundary suggested by Hirtzel offered no defensive advantages.92 According to Callwell,
one “always had to bear in mind in the future was the possibility of a war with Russia….
The only possible line therefore was the clearly defined hills to the north of the Mosul
Vilayet.”93
Two more issues played a role in compelling officials to place Mosul in the
British sphere of influence, oil and agriculture. Admiral Slade, the Admiralty’s oil
expert, claimed that Mosul was a vital source of oil as it would supplement Britain’s
89
Davis, Ends and Means, p. 103; V. H. Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims, 1914-1918,” The
Historical Journal, 13, 2 (Jun., 1970), p. 277;
90 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 103
91 Ibid. 103
92 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 103; Klieman, “Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915,” p. 245
93 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 103; Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North
Africa in World Politics, vol. II, p. 31; its also notable that the Committee report makes a special reference
to the defensive importance of taking Mosul.
34
current oil supply and prevent competition with the Anglo-Persian oil fields.94 The
acquisition of Mosul and its oil resources also strengthened the case for acquiring the port
of Alexandretta since the two would be link directly by railway. No less important to
policy makers was Mosul’s vast agricultural potential and river access. As Hirtzel
remarked, “the lower sections [of the Tigris and Euphrates] are dependent on the
upper…. In other words, the Power that intends to develop the Basra… must also be the
Power that commands, at least politically, the upper reaches of the rivers to Mosul.”95 By
the end of the meeting, only Edmund Barrow objected to this extension on the basis of its
financial cost.96
While officials concluded that the Mosul should be included into the Britain’s
desiderata, the question of how these territories would be ruled was still unresolved. Four
schemes were recommended to the committee each of which had different implications
for Mosul. The first of these schemes was partition by which implied direct rule. Under
this scheme the “greater part” of Mosul would fall under British rule.97 The “greater
part” of Mosul was to include the majority of the province with the exception of a small
portion in that stretch from Syria to Iran, which the British intended to give to the French
to provide a buffer region between themselves and the Russians.98 Under the second
scheme, each region claimed by an Allied Power would become only a political and
economic zone of interest, though it was not clear what would become of the Ottoman
94
Davis, Ends and Means, p. 104
Note by Arthur Hirtzel, March 14, 1916, CAB/24/1.
96 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 104
97 Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, vol. II,
p. 33
98 Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, vol. II,
p. 33; Klieman, “Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915,” pp.246; Nevakivi, Britain, France and
Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 19
95
35
state in their respective regions.99 Would they still retain control over the territory or
would there be an independent state in its place? The next schemes tackled this question
directly.
The third scheme left the Ottoman Empire in its original form, or rather its
original form as much as possible. The scheme still conceded direct rule of
Constantinople to Russia and direct rule of Basra to Britain, but in return the Ottoman
Empire would maintain its authority in its Arab provinces without alteration.100 This
scheme seemed very unlikely to satisfy Britain’s allies and was largely contradictorily
with in nature. The fourth scheme on the other hand was more developed and combined
a number of elements from the previous schemes. It asserted that each Allied Power
would have political and economic influence in their respective areas, but through a
significantly decentralized Ottoman Empire.101 This meant that the Ottoman Empire
would continue to exist in the region as a nominal power but “would give the peoples of
the Empire a full and rational opportunity of helping themselves by freeing them from the
distant but powerful tyranny under which they have hitherto suffered.”102 In other words,
provinces within the Ottoman Empire would be allotted enough autonomy to secede from
it if it served British interests. But like the previous two schemes, Mosul would only fall
indirectly under British influence.
Finally, after much debate, the de Bunsen Committee completed its report in June
of 1915. The ultimate guiding principle behind its conclusions was that Britain should
avoid any clash with Russia and that France should act as a counter-balance to Russia and
99
Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, vol. II,
pp. 35-40; Davis, Ends and Means, p. 104
100 Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, vol. II,
pp. 40-42
101 Ibid, pp. 42-44
102 Ibid, p. 44
36
vise versa.103 Thus, in terms of territorial claims the committee made the following
recommendations. The Holy Cities in Palestine, at Russia’s suggestion, would be
internationalized, Alexandretta would be left to the French, and Haifa would become part
of the British sphere of influence. By conceding Alexandretta the de Bunsen Committee
hoped France would make no claim to anything south of Syria and concentrate her claims
in the north where they would likely collide with Russia.104 Haifa and its port would
replace Alexandretta in terms of its strategic function of connecting Mesopotamia to the
Mediterranean.105 As for Mesopotamia, Basra would be incorporated into British
possessions and all non-Turkish Powers would be excluded from Baghdad and Mosul.106
As for Britain’s preferred scheme of rule, it was decided that the fourth scheme, the
decentralized Ottoman Empire, would “if attainable on the lines indicated in this report,
offer on the whole the best solution in the interests of Turkey and Great Britain.”107 This
plan outlined by the de Bunsen Committee, however, was only the beginning of a
complicated story that would divide Mosul and the rest of the Middle East among the
Great Powers.
103
Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 19
Klieman, “Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915,” p.250; Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab
Middle East 1914-1920, p. 19
105 Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, vol. II,
p. 31
106 Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, vol. II,
p. 31; Stuart Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914 (London, 1976), p. 2.
107 Hurewitz, “de Bunsen Committee Report,” The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, vol. II,
p. 45
104
37
de Bunsen Committee Maps108
108
Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, pp. 20-21; maps proposed by the de
Bunsen Committee.
38
Sykes-Picot Partition109
THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT
Although the de Bunsen Committee Report was never officially adopted by the
government and it did outline Britain’s desiderata for future diplomatic negotiations and
significantly influenced future policy.110 It also represented a major shift in British policy
toward the Ottoman Empire, for it was no longer necessary to maintain the empire’s
integrity. British officials had already been debating the idea of an independent state for
the Arabs at the outbreak of war in 1914, but with the new demands on the part of Russia
109
Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, 1991), p. 476; map of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement.
110 Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 23
39
and later France, the political tide went in a new direction. Foreign powers would now
have an opportunity to directly rule their respective interests in the Middle East.
The first bi-national negotiations began on March 23 when the French
Ambassador, Paul Cambon, informed Grey that the French Foreign Ministry had
requested him to discuss the Middle East situation.111 However, at this time Britain had
little prepared in terms of her desiderata and no plans were formulated.112 Serious
discussion would begin after October 23 when Grey proposed to Cambon that partition
talks should begin.113 The French decided to appoint Francois Georges-Picot as their
representative in the ensuing negotiations. Picot was an experienced career diplomat who
had served as the consul-general in Beirut and was a strong proponent of the French
acquisition of Syria.114
Prior to negotiations, Picot spent a month in Paris preparing for France’s
demands. Numerous French committees and meetings had clearly defined Syria as the
key goal for France’s desiderata.115 However, the definition of what the Syrian province
contained was considerably different from the British interpretation. According to
French Senator Flandin, “there is, on the western coast of Asiatic Turkey, from the chain
of the Taurus to the Sinai Peninsula, a land … called the France of the Levant.”116 Such
would become Picot’s initial stance during negotiations with the British.117
111
Davis, Ends and Means, p. 105
Ibid p. 105
113 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, p. 190; Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 19141920, p. 30
114 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, p. 190; Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 19141920, p. 30
115 Kedourie, England and the Middle East, pp. 45-46; Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East
1914-1920, pp. 30-31; for a more extensive account of Picot and French interests during negotiations see
Christopher M. Andrew and A. S. Forstner, The Climax of French Imperial Expansion: 1914-1924
(Stanford, 1981), p.66
116 Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 31
117 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, p. 190; Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 19141920, p. 31
112
40
Britain’s initial pick for a negotiator was Sir Arthur Nicolson, permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, who was assisted by a committee comprised of
members of the Foreign Office, War Office, and India Office.118 His first meeting with
Picot on November 23, 1915 ended in a deadlock, neither man was willing to budge from
their position. After another meeting, also ending in deadlock, the British government
decided to change their negotiator.119 Sir Mark Sykes was chosen to be Nicolson’s
replacement; he was an Orientalist with a long travel record in the Middle East and had
served in the War Office as Kitchener’s adviser for near eastern affairs.120 However,
Sykes had little to no experience as a negotiator and his French counterpart was a veteran
diplomat.
From December 1915 to January 1916, Sykes met Picot privately. After several
meetings, on December 16 Sykes reported back to the War Cabinet about France’s
demands and the current state of negotiations.121 At the time, he believed that French
interests were driven by financiers connected to Constantinople. “Finance,” according to
Sykes, “interfered in policy … nations were set by the ears, wars promoted, peoples
oppressed, reforms delayed or rendered nugatory, in order that individual fortunes might
be built up.”122 His approach to the negotiations, therefore, was to “split the Syrian
Party” in France by appealing to the Catholic influence in French policy circles.123 This
meant that Sykes hoped to persuade the French that their interests were primarily around
118
Other members of the committee included Hirtzel, Holderness, Callwell, and Parker
Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 31
120 For detailed accounts of the life of Mark Sykes, see: Roger Adelson, Mark Sykes: Portrait of an
Amateur (London, 1975); Shane Leslie, Mark Sykes: His Life and Letters (New York, 1923); Karl E.
Meyeer and Shareen Blair Brysac, King Makers: The Invention of the Modern Middle East (London, 2008),
chap. 3.
121 War committee meeting, December 16, 1915, “Evidence of Lieut.-Col. Sir Mark Sykes on the Arab
Question,” p. 3, CAB/24/1/2
122 Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 32; Mark Sykes: Future of the Middle
East (Armenian Bureau Publications, London, 1918), p. 5. The quoted statement was from two years after
the agreement, but nevertheless reflects his opinion.
119
41
the coast of Lebanon, where the majority of Syrian Christians were as well as significant
French missionary activity. By doing so, Sykes hoped that the French would renounce
their claims to Palestine, which at this point the French still considered as part of Syria.
However, unknown to Sykes was the French strategy of negotiation. The French
Foreign Office was already aware of costs of policing and maintaining such a large area
and their primary territorial aspirations were in fact around Lebanon.124 Thus, “Picot’s
plan was to pretend to Sykes that France insisted on obtaining direct rule over all of
Syria, so that when he moderated the claim he could obtain some concessions in
return.”125 One especially notable concession was a sphere of influence that extended
over the entire province of Mosul and connected to Persia.126 While the British wanted
the French to possess part of the province, the proposal went far beyond their desired
boundaries.
By December 21, both Sykes and Picot managed find a compromise concerning
an Arab administered region under French influence which included the towns of Homs,
Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.127 This meant that an independent Arab entity, as the de
Bunsen Committee desired, could exist in the context of the agreement, however,
partition and direct rule would inevitably be part of the agreement as well. France in
particular insisted upon the policing and governance of Lebanon. Mosul and the ports of
the Mediterranean on the other hand were still left unresolved.128
It became obvious to British officials, such as Kitchener, Sykes, Balfour, and
Hirtzel, that in order to obtain a port on the Mediterranean, it would be necessary to make
123
Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 33
Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, p. 191
125 Ibid, p .191
126 Ibid, p. 191
127 Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 33; Davis, Ends and Means, p.107
128 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 107
124
42
a concession to the French elsewhere. Already on December 16, when the French
originally requested Mosul, Sykes was prepared to redraw the map to give the French
territory up to Kirkuk.129 The decision was a difficult one, but ultimately Britain agreed
to these demands, largely due to the efforts of Kitchener who believed that it was
strategically necessary to both obtain access to the Mediterranean as well as to pit the
French against the Russians in Northern Mesopotamia.130 As Hirtzel wrote: “[the] loss of
the Mosul Vilayet is a serious sacrifice for us… [but the] settlement now proposed
represents a considerable abatement on M. Picot’s original claim, and we are under a
great obligation to Mark Sykes.”131 It should also be noted that Britain obtained from the
French Ambassador, Cambon, an oil concession for Mosul, though none the details were
ever worked out.132
On January 3, 1916 a draft of the agreement was made, but several more
modifications were to follow, mainly focused on economic interests such as railway
concessions and trade rights. The official draft was signed by the British on February 4,
1916 and then by the French on the February 8. However, Russian consent was needed
before the document could become legally binding. Thus, in early March 1916 both
Sykes and Picot traveled to Petrograd to finalize the agreement.133 Negotiations with
129
Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 35
“Memorandum by Arthur Balfour, September 9, 1919,” from E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler,
Documents on British Foreign Policy (London, 1952), series 1,vol. IV, p. 374
131 Davis, Ends and Means, pp. 107-108; Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian
Oil 1900-1920 (London, 1976), p. 122
132 Stephen Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development (Oxford, 1961), p. 44;
Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 40
133 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 108; Habibollah Atarodi, Great Powers, Oil and The Kurds in
Mosul(Southern Kurdistan/Northern Iraq), 1910-1925 (Lanham, 2003), p. 24; Atarodi’s book deals with
the questions as this paper, but his evidence and conclusions are misleading and his book suffers greatly
from the near absence of primarily sources.
130
43
Russia, in comparison to the British and French, was relatively quick though no less
intense.134
On March 17 Russia demanded, in addition to the Turkish territories she had
already captured such as Trebizond and Erzeroum, that area around Lake Van in Eastern
Anatolia all the way south along the border of Mosul.135 Russia permitted France to
extend her influence in Anatolia north of Alexandretta while on the issue of the holy
cities of Palestine Russia agreed to the internationalization scheme proposed by the
British. By mid-April Sykes was able to report to back to London that the Russians had
agreed to the territorial exchange. The final agreement between all three parties came
into being on May 26, 1916. In hindsight, both the British and French demands were
more compatible than was obvious to officials at the time and Britain in particular was
able to obtain all of her objectives outlined by the de Bunsen Committee save the
“Greater part” of Mosul. However, the Sykes-Picot agreement was not the only secret
pledge Britain made during this time period.
PROMISES TO SHARIF HUSAYN
While negotiations between the Allied powers were taking place, Britain was in
the midst of soliciting Arab support. The most significant of which was the McMahonHusayn correspondence that took place from July 1915 to March 1916.136 Husayn ibn
Ali was the Emir of Mecca who claimed lineage to the Prophet Mohammad and was a
prominent influence in the Hijaz region. His approach, via his son Abdullah, to the
134
Davis, Ends and Means, pp. 108; on March 10 during negotiations the French Ambassador to Russia,
Maurice Paleologue, exclaimed to the Russians that the British government wanted the area around Mosul
connecting to Persia “to be French as they wanted a buffer between them and the Russians.”
135 Ibid, p.108
136 Britain’s solicitation efforts, as mentioned earlier, on the eve of the Basra invasion in November 1914,
included contacts with the tribal leaders in the Gulf such as the sheikh of Mohamerah in the province of
Basra.
44
British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, in July 14 1915 initialed a
series of talks that would eventually lead to the famed “Arab Revolt.”137 Most
importantly, for the purposes of this paper, are the territorial promises made to Husayn by
the British.
Acting as a representative for his father, Abdullah made a case for an independent
Arab state to the British. He claimed that the new Ottoman government headed by the
Committee for Union and Progress (C.U.P.) “does not act harmoniously with his father”
and “if the C.U.P. compel us to fight in defence of our country, and if you will prevent
them from bombarding our coasts and landing troops,… we would facilitate your trade
and give you preference over all Powers.”138 The proposal gave the British an
opportunity to achieve one of their primary goals since the beginning of the
Mesopotamian campaign, to provoke a pro-British Arab Revolt against the Ottoman
Empire.
The proceeding talks that occurred between the British and Husayn were long and
complicated.139 Husayn’s original conception of an independent Arab state included the
much of the Arab Middle East, “bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37
of latitude … [and] up to the borders of Persia; on the East by the borders of Perisa up to
the Gulf of Basra.”140 This of course conflicted with both British and French interests
which were in the process of development at the time. However, by October 24, 1915
137
Kedourie, England and the Middle East , pp. 36-38; Elie Keduorie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The
McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations (London, 1976), p. 4; Kedourie strives to
discuss the Sykes-Picot agreement in this part, but elaborates more on British promises made to Sharif
Husayn.
138 Keduorie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, pp. 4 & 9-10
139 For an in depth account of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, see George Antonius, The Arab
Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (New York, 1946); Eli Kedourie’s In the AngloArab Labyrinth; Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies (Chicago,
2004); chap. 2; Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand (Cambridge, 1970).
140 “Note from Sharif Husayn, July 14, 1915,” from J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle
East: A Documentary Record 1912-1956 (Princeton, 1956), vol. II, p. 14
45
McMahon wrote to Husayn explaining that if his territorial demands were modified to
exclude the west coast of Syria and give “special administrative arrangements” to the
British in both Baghdad and Basra, though he neglected to mention Mosul, then “Great
Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs.”141 It was
also necessary for the Arabs to wage war against the Ottoman Empire and be willing to
accept French advisors in parts of their territory.142
On January 1, 1916 Husayn gave his consent to most of the proposals made by
McMahon, however, he completely rejected the dismemberment of Beirut from his
proposed state and preferred only to give up the regions of Mersina and Adana.143
Surprisingly, this did not deter McMahon from concluding a deal with Husayn, and on
January 25 McMahon wrote back stating that Husayn’s reply had “filled us with the
utmost pleasure and satisfaction at the attainment of the required understanding.”144
Collaboration between the two parties on a planned revolt would proceed without a clear
definition of what an independent state would look like. Would it include Beirut? And
did Husayn know that his northern boundary, Mosul, would be under French rule?
Husayn was kept in the dark for much Britain’s dealings and the contradictory nature of
the promises to Husayn would contribute to the discrediting of Sykes-Picot Agreement as
well as to the push to withdraw from it.145
141
“Note by Sir Henry McMahon, October 24, 1915,” from Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle
East, vol. II, p. 15
142 Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p.28; Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace,
p. 194; there seemed to be much confusion concerning French advisors, McMahon believed that the Arabs
did not want French advisors while Sykes reported that Husayn’s representative had agreed. Fromkin
asserts that this division was based on conflicting policy view among British advisers.
143 “Note from Sharif Husayn, January 1, 1916,” from Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East,
vol. II, p. 16; Elizebeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914-1971 (London, 1981), p. 32;
Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 29
144 Note by Sir Henry McMahon, January 25, 1916, from Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle
East, pp. 16-17; Keduorie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, p. 121
145 Keduorie’s In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth offers an explanation for ambiguity surrounding the
McMahon-Husayn correspondence stating that both men were engaged in a kind of bluffing strategy to
46
THE CAPTURE OF MOSUL
As the British government debated and formulate its policy toward Mosul and the
Middle East in general, the military campaign in Mesopotamia continued to make
territorial gains. After the occupation of Basra on November 22, 1914 British forces
advanced on the province of Baghdad. The campaign proceeded slowly with stiff
resistance and significant setbacks, but finally on March 11, 1917 British forces occupied
Baghdad and began to consolidate their authority.146 Plans for the occupation of Mosul
had not yet developed and as far as military commanders were concern, Mosul was to be
added to the French sphere of influence. This, of course, did not mean that military
commanders neglected Mosul; already during Britain’s operations in southern
Meopotamia the Ottomans were using Mosul as their base of Operations, allowing them
to continue their defensive struggle against both the British and the Russians as well as
enabling them to strike at neighboring Persia.147
British officials contemplated plans for the invasion of the Mosul Viyalet with the
assistance of Russia, some even preferred Russia to take Mosul so that it would allow
Britain to reduce her troop levels.148 Even without Russian assistance, British officials
still considered the merits of taking Mosul: “the capture of Mosul, coupled with the
defeat of Hali’s army, would be a great blow to Turkish prestige, and would deny to the
enemy a large and fertile area from which they have hitherto drawn the bulk of their
acquire the others support. There was also, according to Fromkin, the need on the part of Husayn to rebel
on the side of the British to protect himself from being disposed by the Ottomans; see Fromkin, A Peace to
End All Peace, p. 185.
146 For a full account of Britain’s military campaign see F.J. Moberly, History of the Great War based on
Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918 (London, 1927), vol. I-IV; vol. IV focuses
specifically on the Mosul campaign.
147 William Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts (London, 1929), p. 248; Moberly, History of the Great
War, vol. IV, pp. 12-14; Mohammad Gholi Majd, Iraq in World War I: From Ottoman Rule to British
Conquest (Lanham, 2006), p.342
148 Moberly, History of the Great War, vol. IV, p. 3;
47
foodstuffs.”149 However a British advance was not possible militarily until the railways
were extended northward from Samarra.150
On Sunday November 18th, 1917 General Stanley Maude, commander of the
British and Indian troops in Mesopotamia, died of cholera. This led to the succession of
General William Marshall who, in time, would complete the conquest of Mesopotamia.151
Upon assuming commander, Marshall received orders from London to establish and
maintain British influence Baghdad while taking “advantage of your central position and
of the superiority of communications … to strike at the enemy whenever he gives you an
opportunity of doing so with success.”152 In essence, Marshall’s mission was defensive,
but it was clear from his instructions that he should advance if the opportunity presented
itself. He was also authorized to assist any potential Russian advance into the region.
Marshall quickly carried out his orders and operations along the border of Mosul
took place, he even employed a battalion of Russian soldiers along side British forces.153
Marshall wanted to attack Mosul as early as February 1918, but was fully aware of the
difficulty given the terrain and supply difficulties hindering any such attempt.154 This
was particularly evident in May 1918 when Marshall received orders to capture Kirkuk.
By May 7th he had accomplished this goal, but withdrew from the city shortly after due
149
Memorandum by Major-General W. Gillman, February 6, 1918, CAB/24/4
Moberly, History of the Great War, vol. IV, p. 16; General Maude even considered assisting a Russian
advance.
151 Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts, pp. 259-260;
152 Moberly, History of the Great War, vol. IV, p.87
153 Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts, p. 266 A Russian detachment from Persia headed by Colonel
Bicharakov (the Partisanski detachment) fought under the command of Marshall in Mesopotamia. Russian
troops participated alongside the British at Jebel Harim for instance in December 1917 and were awarded
many decorations of honor.
154 Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts, p. 286
150
48
supply difficulties and troop shortages.155 No campaign to recapture the city took place
until the railway extension to Tekrit was available.156
As the war drew closer to its conclusion, British officials, such as Sir Percy Cox,
High Commissioner for the civil administration in Iraq, and Arnold Wilson, became
increasingly more anxious to capture the Mosul. It also became clear that Russian
assistance would not materialize, as Marshall stated: “the Russian army in Persia had now
become infected with the disease known as Bolshevism, and their men were deserting in
large numbers.”157 Even the relatively small number of local supporters, such as the
influential Kurdish tribal leader Sheikh Mahmud could offer little assistance to a British
advance into Mosul.158 This situation made it very clear to statesmen that if Britain, or
any allied power for that matter, were to have control of Mosul in any post-war
arrangement it was necessary for Britain and Britain alone to take the province.
The victories of General Allenby in Syria strengthened Marshall’s position in
Mesopotamia by protecting his flank and with the completion of the railway extension
into Tekrit, an advance on Mosul was now plausible.159 Finally, on October 7, 1918
General Marshall received a cable to capture as much territory as possible toward
Mosul.160 Marshall acted quickly and competently, re-occupying Kirkuk on October 25
and arriving at the outskirts of Mosul by October 30. Mosul appeared to be within the
155
Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts, p. 302, Moberly, History of the Great War, vol. IV, p. 167; Sir
Arnold Wilson, Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties (London, 1931), p. 9
156 Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts, p. 318
157 Ibid, p. 318; Jan. 1918 the Russian troops under British command return to Persia at the order of their
commanders.
158 Gertrude Bell, Review of the Civil Administration, 1914-1920, Cmd. 1061, 1920, p. 47; Sheikh Mahmud
made early contacts with the British and was appointed to be the British representative in Sulaimaniyah.
Britain had hoped that Mahmud could provide internal security while Sheikh Mahmud believed that Britain
could guarantee his autonomy. Neither went according to plan. For a detailed account of Shiekh Mahmud
see Abdul-Rahman Idris Saleh Al-Bayatti, Al-Barazinji and British Influence in Iraqi Kurdistan Until 1925
(London, 2005); note: last source is in Arabic only.
159 Bell, Review of the Civil Administration , pp. 48; Majd, Iraq in World War I, pp. 343-345; Marshal,
Memories of Four Fronts, pp. 318
49
grasp of British forces until October 31, 1918 when the armistice with the Ottoman
Empire went into effect. Hostilities ceased between both sides, however the question of
Mosul’s fate was yet unresolved.
Marshall himself learned of the armistice on November 1 and received the details
a day later.161 According to the armistice, the “Allies have the right to occupy any
strategical points,” furthermore Marshall received orders from the War Office to occupy
Mosul. 162 Marshall arrived at Mosul on November 7 and talks took place between
himself and the Ottoman Commander Ali Ihsan. Marshall best summarized the content
of their meeting, “[Ali Ihsan] was very lawyer-like and specious in argument, but I was
not prepared to argue at all, and told him, that, however he liked to read the terms [of the
armistice], I was determined to take over the whole of the Mosul Vilayet.”163 From this
day forward, despite some delaying tactics on the part of the Ottomans, Mosul was
effectively part of Allied, though not necessarily British, territory.164
THE EYE OF THE STORM
The entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of Germany shift
Britain’s policy toward the Ottoman Empire, but not toward the province of Mosul. With
the Russian demand for Constantinople and the need to satisfy all of her allies’ demands
for the sake of victory, Britain abandoned her traditional policy toward the Ottoman
Empire of territorial integrity and sought its partition. In preparation for negotiations
with France and Russia, British met in series of meeting to discuss their desiderata in the
160
Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts, p. 318
Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts, p. 323; Wilson, Mesopotamia 1917-1920, p. 20
162 Moberly, History of the Great War, vol. IV, p.326; Marshall gave direct orders to attack Mosul, but due
to the actions of General Cassels and his meeting with the Ottoman commander, bloodshed was averted.
163 Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts, p. 324; Marshall also stated that he considered Ali responsible for
any bloodshed thereafter.
161
50
Ottoman Empire. The de Bunsen Committee, as it was known, articulated what Britain
desired both in terms of territory and strategy. In the course of discussion Mosul became
an issue of contention. While all officials agreed on the acquisition of Baghdad and
Basra, Mosul was a different story due to its distance and the cost of maintaining a large
force there. Most officials viewed the acquisition of Mosul in favorable terms citing its
oil supplies and agricultural potential. However, the single most decisive factor guiding
British policy toward Mosul and the Middle East at large was strategic.
British officials unanimously agreed on both the acquisition of Basra, which was
a security interest in of itself, and the development of an independent Arab state. Ever
mindful of the potential conflicts that might erupt with Russia, Britain sought to create a
buffer zone between herself and the likely territorial claims of Russia. In addition, to
more readily supply and defend her position in Mesopotamia British officials, particularly
Kitchener and members of the admiralty, desired a Mediterranean port.
In this regard, Mosul provided both a natural frontier with its mountains in the
north as well as a valuable strategic resource in its potential oil reserves. Officials agreed
to add Mosul to Britain’s desiderata, but with a territorial modification in the north
allowing for a buffer zone to be occupied by the French. However, though Mosul was a
desirable territory, Britain’s war-time and diplomatic concerns in Europe and her primary
strategic goals in the Middle East would trump her interests in Mosul. This was
illustrated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement when in order to acquire a port in
Mediterranean and create a buffer zone between Britain and Russia, Mosul was ceded to
the French sphere of interest. Thus, in a pattern found already during the Baghdad
164
Ibid, p. 326; Ihsan refused to recognize Marshall’s authority and had resigned from his post which
would require the British commander to wait until a replacement.
51
Railway, we see British policy makers reacting to the political scene in Europe and
configuring her policies in Mosul and Mesopotamia to fit this scene.
Yet, the Mosul question did not end with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. At roughly
the same time period, the British were making contradictory agreements with their Arab
supporters. Moreover, one of the key members of the Agreement, Russia, fell during the
war retreating all of her forces and in the process negating the entire basis on which
Britain had given up Mosul. Lastly, Britain only after the end of war forces the Ottomans
out of Mosul and occupies the province, leaving all kinds of questions about its future.
52
Chapter 3: Mosul and British Interests
The end of World War I in 1918 was a pivotal moment in history and with it came
the fall of four global empires, the partitioning of territory, and economic recession.165
For the territories of the former Ottoman Empire, a new order was coming into being, one
that was unfamiliar and shaped by the interests of foreign powers. The armistice and
negotiations developing in the immediate aftermath of the war played a significant role in
shaping the future of this region and it was not always clear which direction they would
lead. Statesmen from each of the Allied Powers competed for the territories, trade rights,
and concessions which they believed they had earned through the blood of their kinsmen.
In the midst of these events, the former Ottoman province of Mosul would become a key
issue of contention between the British and the French.
As we have seen in previous chapters, the acquisition of Mosul was one of
Britain’s original goals as discussed in the de Bunsen Committee of 1915, however, in
1916 Mosul was assigned to the French in what became known as the Sykes-Picot
Agreement. In the final years of the war a number of events occurred with profound
implications for Mosul, the Middle East, and the entire world: Russia, one of the primary
entente members and a participating party in the Sykes-Picot, fell to revolution and
withdrew all her forces from the war. Under President Woodrow Wilson, American
forces entered the war on the side of the entente bring a new set of interests to the
equation. Lastly, Britain herself now occupied Mosul, Syria, Palestine, and would now
be responsible for honoring all of her conflicting war-time promises.
165
The four empires included the Austria-Hungary Empire, the Tsarist Russian Empire, the German
Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. Germany’s colonial territories as well as that of the former AustriaHungary Empire were all divided ruled by foreign powers (as in the case of Germany) or declared
independent (as in Austria-Hungary).
53
However, British officials by the end of the war did not want to surrender any of
the territory she held by the end of the war, at least not to France. The radical changes
that took place during the war gave meant that the old strategies and territorial partitions
were obsolete and amendments were preferable. And not least of which Mosul, assigned
to the French, must be part of these new amendments. The task was not an easy one,
France did not want to alter their original agreement and Britain’s Arab allies became
increasingly vocal. It was evident then from the beginning that any deal for Mosul would
be connected to rest of the region. Therefore the goal of this chapter is to review the role
Mosul played in British strategy, why the British took the province back from the French,
and what pressures and circumstances gave rise to their new agreement.
THE LLOYD GEORGE-CLEMENCEAU AGREEMENT
The conquest of Mosul and the majority of the Arab Middle East, difficult as it
was, did not bring about a definite peace in the region. On the contrary, all the seeds of
renewed conflict were planted during the war itself. For the peoples living in this region,
the new conflict was often a violent one, but for British officials, the conflict was
diplomatic. Central to the conflict was the Sykes-Picot Agreement arranged originally
between, France, Britain, and Russia, then revised again in April1917 to include Italy.
But from the very beginning of this document’s conception, there were many critics who
deemed it “a foolish document” and a complete failure.166 Nevertheless, officials by in
large supported the agreement as the circumstances of the time dictated its necessity.
Ironically, circumstances would also deem it necessary to reconfigure the details
of the agreement. In December 1918, British Prime Minister Lloyd George and French
166
Efraim Karash and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East17891923 (London, 1999), pp.251; quoting Lloyd George
54
Prime Minister Clemenceau met privately in London where an informal agreement
occurred to alter the Sykes-Picot Agreement permanently. The actual content of this
meeting is shrouded in mystery as no official documentation exists that outlines the
meeting’s details. It is only in the memoirs of Lloyd George that we have some evidence
for the conversation: “after we reached the Embassy,” Lloyd George recalls,
“[Clemenceau] asked me what it was I specially wanted from the French. I instantly
replied that I wanted Mosul attached to Irak, and Palestine from Dan to Beersheba under
British control. Without any hesitation he agreed.”167 However, while the meeting itself
may have been short and clear, the processes leading to this agreement were long and
complex.
From the point of view of the opponents of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, there
were two main flaws --one, that France should have control of Mosul and a large section
of Palestine, and two, that the agreement itself was a direct contradiction to the promises
made to the leader of the Arab Revolt, Sharif Husayn.168 A campaign within the British
government to unmake the Sykes-Picot Agreement ensued. There were two important
preconditions for this campaign to gain enough strength to materialize into policy
measures. The first of these was a change in the British Government, and the second was
the fall of Russia.
On June 5, 1916 a major disaster occurred when the ship carrying Lord Kitchener,
on route to the port of Archangel in Russia, struck an enemy mine killing Kitchener and
most of the ship’s passengers.169 The event was a shock to the entire world and its
consequences were far reaching, however, in terms of the Mosul and the Sykes-Picot
167
David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), Vol. II, p. 673
Such opponents included the majority of the members of the Arab Bureau and Lloyd George.
169 For a more detailed description see David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman
Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (London, 1989), p. 217.
168
55
Agreement, its primary supporter and architect (in terms of strategy) was gone and
replaced by one its opponents, Lloyd George. Kitchener supported the Sykes-Picot
Agreement in its entirety and was the one who approved of Mosul’s transfer to the
French. His death not only meant that one the key supporters of the Agreement was
gone, but that whoever filled his position would have a great influence on how the war in
Mesopotamia would proceed. Lloyd George took over Lord Kitchener’s position and
while he believed that “the Sykes-Picot Pact was discredited,” it would not be until the
end of the Asquith government, which had approved the agreement, that Lloyd George
would be able to fully pursue its alterations.170
Prime Minster Asquith led Britain into World War I and by the end of 1916
Britain had seen some of worst military disasters in her history; in just four days of
fighting at Arras in France, Britain had around 142,000 casualties while at Somme she
had 420,000 even including Asquith’s own son.171 The effects of the war on Britain’s
population made its way into government. Members of the Liberal party made new
alliances, and pressure was being excreted on the Prime Minister.172 By December 7,
1917 Asquith had resigned and Lloyd George became the new Prime Minister. With
Lloyd George at the helm of the empire, British strategy in the Middle East would follow
a new direction, though with the same destination in mind.
The second precondition for the alteration of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was the
gradual retreat and ultimate fall of Tsarist Russia in 1917. Britain’s relationship with
Tsarist Russia was another long and complex story, but it was clear that Russia, in British
eyes, “went from being an ally potentially capable of winning the war, to being an ally of
170
Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, vol. II p. 673
Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, pp. 233
172 Ibid, p. 234
171
56
dubious value.”173 This was partly the result of the many Russian military blunders
against Germany as well as the material and financial support Britain sent to Russia in
order to compensate.174 Despite these military disasters and the financial strain the
entente depended a great deal on Russian participation in the war and when the
Bolsheviks did finally seize power in November 1917 the consequences were
immediately felt.
In military terms the fall of Russia meant that Germany now had thousands of
soldiers available to move to their western front without fear of an attack from the east.
This subsequently meant that it would be even more important for the British to station
soldier on the Western Front to prevent the collapse of the French government.175 There
was also the possibility that with a separate peace treaty, Germany would be able to
receive supplies unchecked through Russia. Most important of all, British officials
believed that “it is in the East that the effect of Russia’s collapse is being most acutely
felt by us.”176 Russia could no longer assist the British against the Ottoman Empire by
capturing Mosul as originally planned or as a threat to keep the Ottomans in check. On
the contrary, the retreat of Russia would allow the Ottomans to reinforce their defenses
around British occupied territories.177
These effects were most keenly felt in the realm of diplomacy. To begin with,
Britain lost one of the key members in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, hence on legal basis
the agreement could be considered void. Another significant effect, and one that the
British were completely unaware of, was that France and Russia had made a secret pact
173
Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894-1917 (Oxford, 1995), pp. 350
For a comprehensive study of Britain’s supply to Russia see Keith Neilson, Strategy and Supply: The
Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914-17 (London, 1984)
175 The French government had changed many times during the war and the French army had mutinied in
May 1917
176 Note by W.R. Robertson, May 9, 1917, CAB/24/2
174
57
to support each others objectives in future negotiations with Britain, though this lost
certainly worked to the favor of Britain, it meant that the possibility of revising the
partition plan with France was stronger than before the fall of Russia.178 The most
significant effect for the purpose of this paper, was that the entire justification for the
cession of Mosul to France, namely to provide a buffer between Britain and Russia, was
gone. Even statesmen who originally agreed with the severance of Mosul from
Mesopotamia, such Arthur Hirtzel and Arthur Balfour began to disown the agreement.
The new circumstances emerging from the fall of Russia simply did not deem it
necessary to abandon the province.
The preconditions for taking Mosul were firmly in place, the old justifications for
Mosul’s abandonment were gone and a new British government was in power and eager
to take the province. However, Britain still had to consider French interests and to
further complicate matters a new power entered the war. On April 6, 1917 the United
States of America entered World War I on the side of the Triple Entente. With this came
the political rhetoric and diplomatic pressures of President Woodrow Wilson. From the
moment the U.S. entered the war, Wilson took the moral high ground distancing himself
from imperialist schemes like the Sykes-Picot Agreement and he even refused to declare
war on the Ottoman Empire.179 This political idealism was epitomized by Wilson’s
famous fourteen points which called for nations to guarantee the independence and
territorial integrity of states. It would be under this atmosphere that British activities in
Mosul and the rest of the Middle East would operate.
177
Ibid
Karash and Karsh, Empires of the Sand, p. 248; Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: The
Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914-1921 (London, 1956), p. 134
179 Karash and Karsh, Empires of the Sand, p. 265
178
58
Nevertheless, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was made before American entry into
the war and Britain would still have to comply if it could not be altered. Aside from the
rhetoric of Wilson there was another more pressing issue driving the British to obtain at
least some sort of amendment to the agreement. Nationalist aspirations were on the rise
at the end of the war and Britain wanted to channel these feelings in their favor by
declaring pledges with various local leaders regardless of their compatibility with the
Sykes-Picot Agreement. The most widely known of these pledges were the promises to
Sharif Husayn and the Balfour Declaration, Britain’s pledge of support for a Jewish State.
To some degree, Britain entered these agreements with the intent of the undermining the
Sykes-Picot Agreement the only problem was that neither the French nor Britain’s other
war-time partner were willing to retract their earlier commitments.
Part of the reason for much of Britain’s dissatisfaction with the Sykes-Picot
Agreement came from the fact that France had contributed very little, militarily, to its
realization. Lord Curzon remarked, “When the Sykes-Picot agreement was concluded it
was on the hypothesis that France and England would make approximately equal efforts
in the matter of men and money in conquering Turkey.”180 Though this was a reasonable
complaint, the Sykes-Picot Agreement made no such demand on the part of the French or
the Russians. More importantly, British officials regretted the territorial allocation
assigned to Britain especially in regards to Palestine and Mosul. The fate of Mosul was
intimately tied to the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the agreement itself controlled the fate
of the entire Middle East. With that in mind, most of the promises that conflicted with
the Sykes-Picot Agreement centered on Palestine and Syria.
180
Ibid, p. 248
59
Among the major issues of contention was the future of Palestine and the Zionist
state. As early as 1914 there were suggestions for giving British support for the
development of a Jewish state, but the idea did not really begin to pick up steam until
Lloyd George became Prime Minister in 1916.181 Many officials, especially those in the
foreign office believed that by helping supporting the Zionists in Palestine they may in
turn persuade the new emerging Russian government to stay in the war.182 Lloyd George,
on the other hand, disliked the French presence in the Levant and believed that support
for the Zionist cause could help rid Palestine of both the French and the Turks, he noted
that “the Jews might be able to render us more assistance than the Arabs.”183 Lloyd
George’s reasons for supporting the Zionists were not solely opportunistic, but the
possibilities it offered were enough to support Arthur Balfour’s historic declaration on
November 2, 1917.
Several meetings convened to discuss the specifics of the Sykes-Picot Agreement
and its compatibility with Britain’s other pledges, like the Balfour Declaration. On April
19, 1917, the Committee on Territorial Terms of Peace, headed by Lord Curzon,
proposed that the Sykes-Picot Agreement should be modified in response to new political
challenges emerging.184 Specifically, they proposed that Palestine and Mosul should
become part of the British sphere of influence. However, the French parliamentary
committee for foreign affairs, at roughly the same time, declared Palestine as belonging
to France.185 A new quarrel was emerging and it would be to Mark Sykes that the British
would depend on for negotiations.
181
Ibid, pp. 248-251
Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, p. 288
183 Karash and Karsh, Empires of the Sand, p. 251
184 Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920 (London, 1969), p. 46
185 Ibid, p. 46
182
60
Sykes again met frequently with his French counter-part Picot until the end of the
war. During the latter part of 1917 he made it clear to Picot that the 1916 agreement
bearing their names was out of date, particularly after the retreat of Russia. He noted that
with the advent of the Bolsheviks to power, “President Wilson’s voice is now the one and
the ideas that do not fit his speeches won’t have much influence on the peace
conference….”186 Sykes for his part was trying to get everything all at the same time, a
British protectorate in Palestine, British influence in Mosul, and good terms with the
French, Arabs, Zionist, and Armenians.187 His task was exceedingly demanding and
difficult, particularly as his own government would be as uncooperative as the French
government.
Essentially, Sykes was attempting to negotiate a compromise between a party that
wanted to get of the Sykes-Picot Agreement on the one hand, the British, and a party that
desperately wanted hold on to whatever claims to the Middle East they had, the French.
Sykes attempted to persuade Picot of the benefits of the Zionist state, namely its
compatibility with Wilson’s demand and its strategic value, but Picot doubted that the
French government would accept the deal.188 In fact, Picot reported to the French
government that “London now considers our agreements a dead letter.”189 This of course
caused the French to cling tighter to the 1916 agreement. France also found an ally
(though in some respects a rival) in Italy who, as a party in the Sykes-Picot Agreement
since 1917, showed an eagerness to defend the agreement’s integrity. Italy was allotted a
section of Anatolia as part of the agreement and thus acquired a vested interest in
186
Ibid, p. 50
Ibid, p. 51
188 Karash and Karsh, Empires of the Sand, p. 252
189 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, p. 287
187
61
maintaining it.190 Still, Sykes could bypass Italian influence through persuasion of the
French.
Ironically, persuasion of the French was to a certain extent depended on the
persuasion of British generals and civil servants. General Allenby, commander of the
British forces advancing on Palestine wanted the French out of the Middle East entirely.
He actively encouraged Arab leaders to bypass French claims even to the point where
French banks were refused licenses in Beirut and the circulation of French currency was
prohibited.191 Allenby’s motives appeared to in sync with those of the Arab Bureau in
Cairo who preferred the establishment of an Arab state to any non-British power.
Needless to say, France resented Allenby’s support for the Hashimites as well as the
continued British Military presence in Syria.192
Sykes continued with is mission and in May 1917 managed to work out a
compromise with Picot concerning promises to Husayn.193 The new agreement was little
more than a French acknowledgement of the aspirations of Husayn and it did not specify
any allocation of territory to him or resolve the dispute around the costal region of Syria
and on top of that there was mention of the fate of Mosul. Nevertheless, Sykes wished
obtain the approval of the British government for the compromise. He went to general
Wingate, the successor to McMahon as High commissioner of Egypt, but Winagte
considered the agreement “pre-mature” and desired a military victory in Palestine first
before making any further commitments to the French and thus rejected the proposal.194
Even if the proposal had succeeded, there still remained the question of territorial
allocation and the reactions of both Britain’s Arab allies and President Wilson. The
190
Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, pp. 54-55
Karash and Karsh, Empires of the Sand, p. 263
192 Ibid, p. 263
193 Nevakivi, Britain, France and Arab Middle East 1914-1920, p. 60
191
62
French underestimated the importance of the Middle East as a theater of war and sent
very little in terms of military and diplomatic representatives to the region relying instead
on Picot.195 No doubt the French were too concerned with their front with Germany to
send any significant Military presence. Nevertheless France still had the Sykes-Picot
Agreement and could rely on post-war diplomacy to obtain her objectives.196
In response to Wingate’s rejection, Sykes wrote back stating that “the world has
moved so far since then that the Agreement can only be considered a reactionary
measure.”197 Following this line of thinking and in attempt to satisfy both the Arabs and
the French, Sykes in August 1917 revised the annexation clauses to give the British and
French direct control over their respective regions but “agree not to annex but to
administer the country in consonance with the ascertained wishes of the people.”198 This
revision also appeared to consider Wilson’s post-war vision. Sykes added clauses that
guaranteed French control over specific religious institutions in Palestine. However, it
would not be until one year later, in July of 1918 that he would convince Picot to accept
these amendments.199
Unfortunately for Sykes these amendments did not mount into a policy change.
In fact one month later in August 13, 1918, a British War Cabinet meeting unanimously
agreed that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was “dead.”200 Furthermore, the rapid speed at
which events moved during the war proved too fast for Sykes to keep up with. On
December 6, 1917, Djemal Pasha published in Arab newspapers the terms of the Sykes-
194
Ibid, p. 60
Ibid, pp.64-66; France had sent only one very small military detachment to Lebanon during the time of
the British offensive in Syria.
196 Ibid, pp. 65-67
197 Karash and Karsh, Empires of the Sand, p. 261
198 Ibid, p. 261
199 Ibid, p. 261
200 Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920 (London, 1976), p. 126
195
63
Picot agreement, which the new Soviet government had just disclosed to the rest of the
world. Husayn already knew about British talks with the French, but had not known the
details of their agreements. The publication was enough to upset Husayn who in turn
spoke with Wingate who assured him that the documents published by the Soviets
weren’t real.201 Members of Britain’s Arab Bureau in Cairo were from the beginning
against French influence in the Middle East and had made several attempts to undermine
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, thus Wingate’s outright lie was not a complete deception.
However, Husayn and his family were not the only faction in the Middle East to
receive political support. In 1918 a group of seven Syrian formed the Party if Syrian
Unity in Cairo and in July of that year Wingate gave support to them for independence in
an ambiguous document known as the Declaration of Seven.202 This group’s ambitions
were never fully realized, and some have viewed the declaration as a means to counter
Husayn’s influence, but its implications were clear and simple, Britain desired some sort
of influence in the territories designated French by the Sykes-Picot Agreement.203 As for
negotiations with the French, the declaration was of no help for Sykes’ endeavors and it
appeared to undermine all of his efforts.
By September 1918, both the British and French realized that it was necessary to
clarify their intentions in the Middle East and held a joint convention.204 A new
declaration was drawn up and issued in November 1918, stating their support for the
“emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks.”205 While the declaration
rejected annexation, both the British and French interpreted it differently. The British
201
Kedourie, England and the Middle East, p. 112
Ibid, p.113
203 Ibid, pp. 115-116; Kedourie states that there is little info on why Britain made the declaration of seven.
204 Ibid, p. 132
205 Karash and Karsh, Empires of the Sand, p. 262; Kedourie, England and the Middle East, p. 132; Karash
states that the agreement was issued on November 7, while Kedouire states it was issued on November 8.
202
64
believed that the declaration essentially disowned the Sykes-Picot Agreement while the
French believed that it actually re-enforced their claims.206 Thus it seemed that by the
end of the war, while political realties had changed drastically, the Sykes-Picot
Agreement had made little to no accommodation for these changes.
Meanwhile, the armistice of November 1918 solidified the current administrative
situation in the Middle East. Britain now occupied and controlled Syria, Palestine, and
Mesopotamia, but neither the British nor the French wished to keep it that way. The
stagnant talks and the conflicting pledges made by Britain were too much for Sykes to
handle, perhaps too much for the British government in its entirety. If Britain still
wanted to obtain Mosul and alter the Sykes-Picot Agreement she would now have to do
in the larger context of peace talks, which was another mess yet to come for Britain.
Thus, in December of 1918, Prime Minister’s Lloyd George and Clemenceau met
privately and skipped the slow and often ambiguous diplomatic process to make a new
Agreement. This one was not signed in paper and had no witness, but would nevertheless
alter the political map of the Middle East permanently.
THE SPOILS OF WAR
While it is clear that Britain wanted Mosul for herself, and through a complex
process was finally able to obtain it, there still remains the question --what for? What
was in Mosul that was so vital for the British? According to the actual war cabinet
papers that led to the advance on Mosul it was suppose to “Britain in as strong a
bargaining position as possible for negotiating peace with Turkey and a reorganization of
the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France.”207 However, if one reads the relevant
206
207
Karash and Karsh, Empires of the Sand, p. 263
Kent, Oil and Empire, p. 126
65
documents from before and after the capture of Mosul, one quickly realizes that this was
an insufficient answer. For most scholars the motive was very clear, oil. Without a
doubt oil was an important issue, but in order to answer the question fully and to be true
to historical fact, it is necessary to place oil in its proper context alongside other British
interests.
As mentioned earlier, the exclusion of Mosul from the Sykes-Picot Agreement
was unpopular but was accepted until circumstances deemed otherwise. The de Bunsen
Committee of 1915 had outlined the reasons for the desirability of Mosul, namely
irrigation, oil, and “a frontier where an enemy’s advance can be delayed.”208 However,
individual branches of the British government valued different aspects more than others.
From the beginning of the World War I, the greatest advocates for the capture of Mosul’s
oil fields were members of the Admiralty. With Britain’s Royal Navy based on oil and
an 80% dependency on foreign sources, the Admiralty was eager to find additional
supplies.209 During the de Bunsen Committee Winston Churchill, then 1st lord of the
Admiralty, argued in favor of Mosul’s inclusion citing oil as the province’s outstanding
feature.210 Another adamant voice on this subject was Admiral Slade who believed that
“it is evident that the power who controls the oil lands of Persia will control the source of
supply of the majority of the liquid fuel of the future,” and that Britain at all costs must
“hold on the Persian and Mesopotamian oil fields.”211 In the time between the SykesPicot Agreement in 1916 and the end of World War I in 1918, Slade would pursue, to the
208
“de Bunsen Committee Report” from J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World
Politics: A Documentary Record 1915-1945 (London, 1979), vol. II, p. 30
209 Kent, Oil and Empire, pp. 117-120
210 Paul Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission (London, 1994),
pp. 103-105
211 Habibollah Atarodi, Great Powers, Oil and The Kurds in Mosul(Southern Kurdistan/Northern Iraq),
1910-1925 (Lanham, 2003), p. 48
66
utmost of his ability, the revision of the agreement to include Mosul into the British
sphere of influence.212
Slade was not alone in his struggle for the oil of Mosul. Maurice Hankey, the
Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet, viewed oil as a high priority for British policy and
attempted to convince his colleagues of this view. In August 1918 Hankey wrote to
Lloyd George stating that “there is no military advantage in pushing forward in
Mesopotamia…. [however] there may be reasons other than purely military for pushing
on into Mesopotamia… [w]ould it not be an advantage, before the end of the war, to
secure the valuable oil wells in Mesopotamia?”213 Lloyd George was already a supporter
of the motion to include Mosul into the British sphere and was aware of the importance
of oil. Although Lloyd George did not view oil as the sole reason for the acquisition of
Mosul. Balfour, however, was not convinced by Hankey’s solicitation and declared that
the acquisition of oil was a purely “imperialistic war aim.”214
Balfour was not so much resisting the idea as he was concerned with the view and
the potential diplomatic pressure of American President Woodrow Wilson. As was
mentioned already the Mosul issue was part of an international context and thus could
potentially help or hurt the British in peace negotiations. Lord Curzon, on the other hand
stated from that he did not care if Britain was accused of being “capitalistic,
monopolistic, or imperialistic” over the issue.215 Later Balfour himself would eventually
come around to the Admiralty’s view of oil, particularly after the Imperial War Cabinet
212
Atarodi, Great Powers, Oil and The Kurds in Mosul, p. 48; Kent, Oil and Empire, pp. 118-119
Atarodi, Great Powers, Oil and The Kurds in Mosul, p. 50; Hankey to George, August 1, 1918,
CAB/21/119
214 Kent, Oil and Empire t, p. 147
215 Atarodi, Great Powers, Oil and The Kurds in Mosul, p. 51
213
67
meeting on August 13, 1918 when he stated that it was necessary to secure a settlement
“which would not endanger our facilities for obtaining oil from this region.”216
Still, Balfour was keen not to forget the international scene, but neither did
members of the Admiralty. Hankey, in fact, offered another reason for Britain’s
acquisition of Mosul to guise their oil interests:
[N]either President Wilson nor anyone else will wish to place the vast regions of
Mesopotamia bordering the Tigris and Euphrates again under Turkish control….
The question I ask, therefore, is as to whether it is not of great importance to push
forward in Mesopotamia at least as far as the Lesser Zab, or as far as is necessary
to secure a proper supply of water. Incidentally this would give us most of the
oil-bearing regions.217
As the quote suggests, the issue of water supply was to be an excuse for Britain’s seizure
of Mesopotamian oil. While this idea was dropped among policy makers, public
imagination and even some scholars have taken this quote to be representative of the
entire discussion concerning Mosul.218 And due to international pressure oil was viewed
as shady to a certain extent; one observer, General Marshall, noted that “[w]hilst one
could freely discuss the possibilities of cotton-growing in Mesopotamia with Government
officials, the bare mention of the word ‘oil’ at once created a chilly atmosphere.”219
However, as will be demonstrated later, water supply and agriculture were very important
interests driving British policy.
Oil was indeed a significant issue and its influence on British decision making
cannot be ignored, on the other hand its importance has been exaggerated to a large
extend by scholars. While there are many great works on oil with important insights the
216
Kent, Oil and Empire, p. 126
Letter from Sir Maurice Hankey to Arthur Balfour, August 12, 1918, CAB/21/119
218 Kent, Oil and Empire, p. 126; Atarodi, Great Powers, Oil and The Kurds in Mosul, p. 51; according to
Kent “Slade’s memorandum was shortly quietly dropped.” According to Atarodi the memorandum led
directly to a policy change.
217
68
structure of these works creates a kind of bias toward oil by isolating and emphasizing it
among other interests.220 As for works that focus on Mosul’s oil they conceal, though not
intentionally, the fact that the real focal point of Britain’s oil interest was Persia.221 For
example, Britain had supported its nationals politically in their economic endeavors, as
was common practice at the time. Most notably, William Knox d’Arcy, the man who
pioneered and funded British oil projects in Persia and was a main contender for oil
concessions in Mosul. While d’Arcy was active in Mesopotamia, his primary area of
activity was in Persia and it is there that Britain exerted the most effort to support him,
even investing in company and acquiring a majority ownership.222
Furthermore, finding oil in Mosul was only one part of the picture, finding oil in
large quantities was another, perhaps more important, part. As one scholar wrote, “[t]o
glance through company records for the years between the wars is to be struck by the
uncertainty in which they worked in the Middle East---unaware, both of the rosy future of
world consumption, and of the exact location of the hypothetical oil.”223 Even after the
Britain had developed the oil industry in Mosul, it would not be until 1927 when Mosul
would produce any kind of significant return.224 Even in 1937, on the eve of the Second
World War, the oil production of the Middle East, Mosul included, was 6 million tons out
300 million tons produced by the entire world, barely 2 percent. In terms of the British
Empire’s production the Middle East only supplied an estimated 24.3 percent of its total
219
William Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts (London, 1929), p. 318; Marshal was also very suspicious
of “The Persian Famine Relief Commission,” an American Mission sent to investigate food supplies in
Mesopotamia, which he believed was there to obtain oil instead.
220 There are many great works on British oil policy such as Marian Kent, Moguls and Mandarins: Oil,
Imperialism and the Middle East in British Foreign Policy, 1900-1940, (London, 1993); Stephen Longrigg,
Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development (Oxford, 1961); George Lenczowski, Oil and State
in the Middle East, (Ithaca, 1960); Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers
(Jerusalem, 1973).
221 Davis, Ends and Means, p. 37; Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, p. 5
222 Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly (New York, 2004), p. 67
223 Elizebeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914-1971 (London, 1981), pp. 95-96
69
need the majority of this, 19.4 percent, came from Persia while only 5.2 percent came
from Iraq. Thus nearly twenty years after World War I, Britain was still dependent on
foreign sources of oil.225 To contrary of oil enthusiasts, by the time of the next “Great
War” Mesopotamia’s oil and by extension Mosul’s oil was not as decisive as was
believed.
Oil, however, was not the only valuable resource Mosul had to offer, nor was it
the only reason for Britain’s acquisition of the province. Among these reasons,
agriculture and water supply were as much an influence as oil. At the beginning of the
War Lord Kitchener, suggested that “strong arguments can be adduced for incorporating
Mesopotamia in the Empire merely on the grounds of its potential agricultural
resources.”226 And according to sources conducted at the time, cotton experiments
demonstrated that Mesopotamian soil was capable of producing a higher class of cotton
and a heavier yield per acre than Egypt.227 The importance of this element was consistent
throughout the war and was noted during the de Bunsen Committee in 1915 (see above).
Key to the agricultural and economic success of Mesopotamia as whole, in British
eyes, was Mosul. Arthur Hirtzel noted about the issue that:
(1.) We have old-established trade at Mosul, which some hold… should find its
natural exit at Basra … (2.) The Baghdad Railway … (3.) The strip of country
west of Mosul and north of the Jebel Sinjar is exceedingly fertile … (4.) We want
the water of the Tigris up to Mosul in order to secure our irrigation and navigation
further south.228
224
Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly, pp. 66-67; Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq (New York, 2007), p. 107
Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 148
226 Memorandum by Lord Kitchener, March 16, 1916, CAB/24/1
227 Marshal, Memories of Four Fronts, pp. 317. In October of 1918, A.T. Wilson had brought into
Baghdad a large group of prominent sheikhs who were introduced to a new kind of farming model intended
to increase agricultural outputs.
228 Sir T.W Holderness to Sir A. Nicolson, January 13, 1916, enclosing note by Sir A. Hirtzel; FO
371/2767
225
70
Writing in January of 1916, Hirtzel’s note reflected the primary concerns of both the
realities of 1916 as well as those specific interests of the Indian government. He goes on
to mention, “The [Sykes-Picot Agreement] seeks to obtain this by requiring a guarantee
of a given supply of water. Such a guarantee seems to me to be contra naturam, and in
any case likely to give rise to friction.”229
Hirtzel’s four points were all interconnected with the need to ensure the economic
viability and independence (from powers other than Britain) of what would later become
the state of Iraq. Much of the information on Mesopotamia’s agricultural potential came
from studies conducted by Sir Willcocks, which outlined plans for agricultural
development that would benefit Britain economically.230 Thus Hirtzel and his colleagues
were as much concerned for Britain’s own economic benefit as much as Iraq’s.
However, in 1916 British officials were believed that no such plans would be possible
without the approval of their war-time allies. Hirtzel, in the same note as above, also
recognized the importance of an agreement with France concluding that “these
considerations are stated not for the purpose of urging that we should necessarily stand
out for Mosul, which it may be impossible to obtain, but rather as reasons why we should
expect the French to be very accommodating elsewhere, e.g., Haifa.”231
Hirtzel wasn’t the only one to acknowledge the importance of Mosul’s
agricultural resources to future of Mesopotamia. In her review of the Civil
Administration of Iraq, Gertrude Bell, the Oriental Secretary for Britain’s provisional
Iraqi Government, noted that “the stable of Crops of the Mosul Division are wheat and
Barley, a far larger proportion of wheat being grown than in the southern Wilayets.
229
Ibid
For details see W. Willcocks Irrigation of Mesopotamia (New York, 1911); Sir Willcocks was the
advisor to the Turkish Ministry of Public Works.
230
71
Baghdad has always been accustomed to look to Mosul for its wheat supply.”232 And
indeed there was long a historical connection of grain trade between Baghdad and Mosul
that predated the British occupation. These connections were also to be found at another
level that was not always considered by policy makers, the local population. The Political
Resident of Baghdad, made a brief mention of this aspect when he noted in 1918 that
“innumerable Moslem families are divided between Mosul and Baghdad. Personal
questions such as inheritance will constantly occur.”233 This statement was correct in that
many families would be separated by the creation of borders, though it neglected to
mention that same was true for the separation of Mosul from Damascus and Aleppo.234
To some degree the Political Resident wanted to sell the idea of attaching Mosul
to Iraq and he gave another reason that was somewhat neglected at the time but would
later emerge as significant force in post-war Iraqi politics, the Kurds. Strategically the
inclusion of the Kurds of Mosul “would, moreover, enable us to control Kurdistan, and
build up a Kurdish confederation independent of Turkish rule.”235 Britain was already in
contact with Kurdish leaders, such as Sheikh Mahmoud, but the value of an alliance with
the Kurds had yet to materialize in the British official mind. Ultimately, the Political
Resident’s primary justification was agriculture,
the connection between Baghdad and Mosul is as close as between Baghdad and
Basra …It is of the utmost importance that the products of Mosul Vilayet should
continue to find their market at Baghdad, as Baghdad is dependent for wheat on
the great wheat-growing area around Arbil north of Lesser Zab.236
231
Sir T.W Holderness to Sir A. Nicolson, January 13, 1916, enclosing note by Sir A. Hirtzel; FO
371/2767
232 Gertrude Bell, Review of the Civil Administration, 1914-1920, Cmd. 1061, 1920l, p. 53
233 “Note from the Political Resident of Baghdad, October 16, 1918” from Alan de Lacy Rush and Jane
Priestland, Records of Iraq 1914-1966 (Slough, 2001), vol. I, p. 618
234 Sara Shields, Mosul Before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells (New York, 2000), pp. 21-23; Sara
Shields, “Sheep, Nomads and Merchants in Nineteenth-Century Mosul: Creating Transformations in
Ottoman Society,” Journal of Social History, 25, 4, (Summer 1992), pp. 773-789
235 Rush and Priestland, “Note from the Political Resident of Baghdad, October 16, 1918,” Records of Iraq
1914-1966, vol. I, p. 618
236 Ibid, p. 618
72
Interestingly, many cases, like that of the Political Resident and Arthur Hirtzel, oil was
neglected or reduced in the equation, even among highly classified exchanges.
Sir Percy Cox, the High Commissioner in Mesopotamia, perhaps best
encapsulated debate over Mosul:
I can only contemplate with the greatest dismay the suggestion that we should
withdraw from Mosul … I regard such the maintenance of our present position in
Mesopotamia as a factor of enourmous importance to our general interests in the
Middle East and India. From an economic point of view … I understand that it is
estimated that [Mesopotamia] will produce in the near future 2,000,000 cwt. of
cotton and 1,000,000 tons of wheat. Oil is, of course, an uncertain quantity, but
the prospect is at any rate sufficient to attract to Mesopotamia the interest and
capital of very large concerns.237
Cox believed that Mesopotamia, Mosul included, was strategically “an asset of the
greatest importance,” as the region fell on the route to India.238 Essentially, as the
quotation suggests, there were several reasons for the inclusion of Mosul into
Mesopotamia and among them both agriculture and oil were most prominent. To be sure,
the uncertainty of oil made Mosul’s agricultural potential the most secure resource to
provide a payback.
Thus when Lloyd George noted in his memoirs that for many “practical reasons
the Sykes-Picot Pact was discredited, and the British authorities were convinced that in at
least two respects amendment was essential. The first was in regard to the severance of
Mosul from Mesopotamia. Deprived of the grain and oil supplies of this region, Irak
would have been seriously crippled financially and economically,”239 he was genuinely
concerned with Mosul’s agricultural wealth as much as its oil wealth. The importance of
237
“Memorandum by Sir Percy Cox, July 24, 1920,” from Rush and Priestland, Records of Iraq 19141966, vol. I, p. 744, emphasis added; Cox was in fact writing after it was already decided by Lloyd George
and Clemenceau that Mosul should go to the British. However, the fate of Mosul at the time was still far
over and Cox’s statement reflects part of the ongoing debate.
238 Ibid, p. 744
239 Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, pp. 672-673
73
oil was elevated in near the end of the war and many of the discussions that took place
reflect that fact. Agriculture was not a mask for acquiring Mosul’s oil fields, as some
have suggested, and was a consistent concern throughout the war. Oil was a priority, but
it was by no means the only or most decisive one.240
MOSUL IN CONTEXT
The reasons for the British acquisition of Mosul in at the end of World War I were
essentially the same as those at the beginning of the war as articulated by the de Bunsen
Committee: defensive boarder, agricultural production, and oil. The priorities of these
interests was reconfigured with agriculture and oil taking precedence over the need for
defensive boarders (though this issue did not disappear) and was largely the result of the
changing political and military circumstance of the war.
As the war dragged on, the political situation in Britain, Russia, and the Middle
East changed. A large section of the Middle East was now under British Military
occupation and Britain’s new Prime Minister was an opponent of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement. Thus Britain had both the will and the might to impose her will on the
Middle East if it was in her interest. However, it would be the withdrawal of Russia that
would force British policy makers to rethink their entire strategy in the Middle East.
The most significant impact of this event, for the purposes of this paper was that
the entire justification for the cession of Mosul was gone. Russia was no longer a
potential military threat to Britain in the former Ottoman territories. Furthermore, as one
scholar noted, “[t]he ambitions of France therefore, however limited, acquired a new
240
“Memorandum Respecting British Interest in the Persian Gulf,” Kenneth Bourne and D. C. Watt,
British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print
(Fredrick, 1985), Part I, Series B, vol. 18, p. 195; this provides by far the best summary of British
commercial interests in the Gulf prior to World War I.
74
importance.”241 France become Britain’s principle rival and according to treaty held the
economic and strategically important region of Mosul. Moreover it became increasing
apparent that Britain could not uphold all of her war-time promises such the pledges
made to Sharif Husayn because of France’s claims. Hence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement
had to be altered to accommodate all of these factors.
Once again Mark Sykes was at work to find some kind of middle ground with his
French counterpart Picot and Britain’s regional allies. But there was no easy solution,
“France after all was an ally in Europe and it was European combinations and European
quarrels that largely decided the fate of Eastern possessions and spheres of influence.
The question that faced English statesmen was, whether by checking France in the
Middle East, they would not forfeit its support in Europe, and whether they could replace
the support of France by that of an equivalent Power.”242 This predicament led to
stagnant progress minor alterations that had no effect on Mosul. The bypass this
diplomatic clutter, Lloyd George and Clemenceau made their own agreement in
December 1918 and Britain at last officially held the province of Mosul.
241
242
Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East, p. 134
Ibid, p. 134
75
Conclusion: Mosul in Perspective
Judging from the actions of the British government, the province of Mosul
appeared to be a significant point of interest. As part of the route to India, officials were
mindful of any potential threats to the region, particularly from Russia and Germany.
The development of the Baghdad Railway in the early twentieth century represented the
first major economic penetration of the region by a foreign power. The growing power of
the German Empire forced the British to adapt and find an acceptable solution to the
dispute. What emerged from this clash with Germany was a pattern of policy that would
characterize Britain’s strategy in Mosul in subsequent years.
The pattern follows that Britain pursues her commercial interests when possible
and in the absence of significant external diplomatic or strategic threats, the decisive
element being the diplomatic situation in Europe. The outbreak of World War I and the
partition of the Middle East among the Allied powers would again force Britain into
another quarrel over her traditional sphere of influence. The military situation in Europe
took priority above all other considerations and in order to achieve victory Britain would
need the cooperation of her Allies, France and Russia. Thus, in 1915 when the Russian
ambassador proposed to partition the Ottoman Empire, Britain conceded even though
such an endeavor would guarantee the penetration of rival powers into the region.
British officials met frequently to discuss their demands and formulated a strategy
that would pit France against Russia. The ensuing negotiations between Mark Sykes and
Francios Georges-Picot reflected this aspect when Sykes assigned the province of Mosul
over to the French in order to create a buffer zone between themselves and Russia, their
76
new principle rival. Though many were unhappy with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of
1916, it was viewed as necessary to achieve victory in Europe.
However, the tides of war did not flow in the direction planned by the British.
Additional pledges were made to Arab leaders, such as Sharif Husayn, and to Zionists
leaders as announced in the Balfour Declaration. Neither of which were compatible with
the promises made in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Furthermore, Russia, who Britain had
feared as her new rival in the post-war situation, fell to revolution and retracted from both
the war and the Sykes-Picot Agreement. By the end of the war, Britain occupied the
entire Arab Middle East, including Mosul and with no significant European rival to
challenge her authority.
The end of war in 1918 raised many questions, the legitimacy of the Sykes-Picot
agreement, the promises to Husayn and others, and should the French have any role in the
Middle East? Britain was now in a position of strength and could now pursue her
imperial interests to a greater degree. Mosul offered secure boundaries with the
mountains terrain in the north, as well as oil and agricultural potential. With Russia
absent from the picture, the latter two acquired greater significance. Nevertheless,
Britain had to reach an agreement with France that would satisfy all concern parties,
French, Zionist, and Arab. After months of stagnate negotiation, the Prime Ministers of
Britain and France met privately to reshape the map to their liking. Mosul would now be
British.
In each of these episodes, Britain followed a pattern of policy that was already
present during the Baghdad Railway. Mosul was an important region, but it was not
Britain’s highest priority; the resources Mosul offered were not yet fully realized and
Britain could always obtain concessions. Basra on the other hand was always
77
indisputable and Britain even invaded before partition plans were spelled out to protect
that essential territory. Mosul was viewed as more of an extension to protect that
territory and thus Mosul was expendable.
78
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Vita
Dart B. Risley II was born in San Antonio, Texas. After graduating from William
Howard Taft High School in San Antonio, he enrolled with the University of Texas at
San Antonio in the fall of 2003. After one year of study, Dart transferred to the
University of Texas at Austin where he completed his Bachelor of Arts in Middle East
Studies in May, 2007. He enrolled in the Middle East Studies graduate program at the
University of Texas during the fall of 2007 and was awarded a Fulbright Fellowship to
study Arabic in Egypt for 2008-2009. After a leave of absence, Dart returned to the
University of Texas in fall of 2009. Dart has also attended classes in Middlebury College
in the summer of 2006, Damascus University in the summer of 2008, American
University of Cairo from fall 2008 to spring 2009, and Dhofar University in Oman in the
summer of 2009.
Email: [email protected]
This thesis was typed by Dart Brooks Risley II
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