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Phenomenology as Philosophical Method
Giovanni Piana
Università degli Studi di Milano
http://www.filosofia.unimi.it/piana/
ABSTRACT. Against the background of Gestalt psychology, the author argues
that the phenomenological method is not a generic plea for philosophical
innocence or the appeal to a conscious dismantling of every kind of
unconscious prejudices, but rather the uncovering of a set of well-determined
opinions, with precise theoretical consequences, mostly inspired by
psychological associationism. The theoretical core of phenomenology as a
philosophical method (distinguished from preliminary stages of psychological
research) and Husserl’s attempt to use it for responding to the appeals and
tensions of his historical moment have therefore to be sharply distinguished.
For Husserl, the problem of method became entangled with ethical tasks, while
phenomenology took more and more the shape of a philosophy of subjectivity,
until the idea of phenomenology was presented as the only answer to the
concept of crisis. While the rhetoric of the crisis gets poorer the more it is
iterated outside of its historical horizon, the theoretical core of phenomenology
as a method can be grasped in its validity only beyond it as the analytic task
driven by a theory of the intentionality of conscious acts. In the line of this
analytic interpretation of phenomenology, the first goal of philosophy is
bringing order into thinking: phenomenology is a – rather complex and
sophisticated – intuitionistic method. In this respect, intuition consists in a
method to trace modes of being by describing structural modes of
manifestation. The goal is not to describe phenomenological givens, but
phenomenological rules or structures: it is to sketch a phenomenologically
grounded ontology. Accordingly, philosophical analysis deals with the process
of “concept formation” from the inner structures of experience up to more
independent idealities, from general regularities that are directly graspable in
the configuration of what is given to more abstract concepts.
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1. Naiveté and Prejudice
Trying to outline – even in a largely introductory way – the problem of
phenomenology as a philosophical method by referring to the diversity of its
forms in the history of 20 th century thought would certainly be a hopeless
endeavor. These forms are too many to unfold them. It would even be
impossible to develop a schematic and concise report of how
phenomenological topics have been presented and represented in various
elaborations, and of how they have been integrated into cultural and
theoretical contexts, which are often characterized as much by differences and
deep contrasts as by similarities and affinities.
Nevertheless, it might be possible to meet a need that is preliminary to any
further possible discussion and closer examination: the need to rely on a rather
simple and complete conceptual framework, allowing us to reach a point of
view from which we can examine both affinities and differences.
Hence, what should be provided is a framework allowing us to circumscribe
what we consider to be the most solid and fruitful theoretical core of the
phenomenological method. We shall thus proceed in a doubtless unilateral way;
yet, this will probably not be ineffectual with regards to the aims we set
ourselves.
We wish to begin by taking a stance on a current phrasing of the problem –
often emphasized by popularizers –, which has encouraged some certainly
simplistic polemical rejections.
This is a point that can be connected to the early developments of Husserl’s
philosophy, to the motto “back to the things themselves!”, which positively
expressed what was to be subsequently conceptualized as the “bracketing” of
all theory, and which was tightly linked to the phenomenological epoché.
Statements of this sort have very often been considered outside those
research contexts in which they were first formulated. This has caused them to
assume a totally abstract and general meaning, according to which the
doorway to phenomenological philosophy precisely consists in the assumption
of a radically naïve attitude, an attitude of absolute philosophical innocence. Such
would be the condition for opening oneself to the disclosure of the truth of the
given, or to phenomenological givenness, as something not concealed by any
pre-constituted sense projections. It is self-evident that such a view can be very
easily confuted.
The very expression, i.e., the “bracketing” of all prejudicial opinions, is rather
controversial if it is understood as an aware philosophical decision: this is
because prejudices can actually act as such only behind our backs. As prejudices,
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they are beyond the field of our awareness. Accordingly, there cannot be any
general act of liberation from all prejudices, as if these could be chased away all
at once. This would only be a pure philosophical abstraction. What is needed in
the first place, instead, is the uncovering of the prejudice in its determinacy,
and in the determinacy of its consequences. Precisely this operation, which is
necessarily particular, makes the bracketing possible.
In fact, the goal of expressions like “back to the things themselves”,
“prejudice liberation”, and sometimes even “naiveté”, was to establish a set of
well determined opinions, with precise theoretical consequences, mostly
coming from the field of a philosophy of experience inspired by psychological
associationism. From this perspective, the plea for a prejudice-free observation,
typical of Gestalt psychology from its inception and never given up, is
exemplary. Such a plea cannot be interpreted as an expression of either a
generic anti-intellectualistic stance or of an empty controversy. The theories
and ideas to be “bracketed”, instead, were very clearly identified, as much as
their consequences for the interpretation of experiential facts were.
Accordingly, the emphasis on the need of a non-prejudicial stance could not
but be paired with the display of the falsifications de facto produced by those
interpretations.
2. Phenomenological Reduction
Within such a critical horizon, what looked particularly relevant from both a
philosophical and a scientific point of view was not the totally insignificant
topic of a philosophically innocent gaze, but rather the set of particular analytic
tasks, oriented in several directions, which were being put forward by a theory
of the intentionality of conscious acts.
It is only when Husserl reintroduced the idea of phenomenology by
rephrasing the Cartesian doubt as “suspension of judgment” that the motto
“back to the things themselves”, like the “bracketing” topic, could be
considered a true and autonomous methodological problem. Thus, the theory of
the phenomenological reduction arose.
Such a theory is inspired by two fundamental demands: on the one hand, the
need to clearly characterize the idea of phenomenology as a philosophical
method, thus distinguishing it from the preliminary stage of psychological
research; on the other hand, the need to voice appeals and tensions of the time.
Despite not being explicitly formulated, the latter nevertheless deeply
motivates the developments of the theory.
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Both demands precisely converge in the rephrasing of Descartes’ argument.
Indeed, the philosophical nature of method is most strongly accentuated
precisely through such a rephrasing. At the same time, the entailed
foundational aspect – which, already for Descartes, was not meant as a pure
speculative polemic, but rather touched the dominant trends in the
philosophical culture of the time – is permeated by the historical concerns
pervading the first decade of the century, namely the catastrophe of World War
I, the tragedies of fascism and Stalinist communism.
The zero-setting required by the phenomenological epoché tends to assume
the character of an immense cathartic operation, which is supposed to arrive at a
reassessment of the very idea of rationality and at a radical renewal of life and
culture. On the basis of these remarks, I believe it becomes understandable
why phenomenology as a whole tends to assume more and more clearly both
the character of a philosophy of subjectivity, which does not hesitate to appeal to
the idealistic tradition, and of a gigantic discourse on method, which
continuously crosses over to ethical responsibility and to the necessity of
historical awareness.
This is an extremely important point in order to understand the inclination of
the idea of phenomenology in the development of Husserl’s thought, and also
its interconnection with the concept of crisis. Yet, it is also a comprehensive
orientation of the problem that only allows us to re-propose that concept. And
such re-proposing is doomed to get poorer and poorer due to iteration after iteration.
To put it briefly: the concept of crisis cannot be applied to an entire century;
otherwise it would have to be applied to all centuries.
3. Philosophy and Clarity
Before proceeding in determining the specificity of phenomenological issues,
we undoubtedly need to rethink the idea of method in philosophy and its inner
complexity in general terms.
Among the aims of philosophy, and actually among its most important aims,
certainly is that of bringing some clarity to our thoughts. The free course of our
thoughts is sometimes disturbed. When this happens, we want to clarify it.
The problem got tangled, and it needs to be unraveled.
Here, we can already grasp the difficulties adhering to the idea of method in
philosophy. Is there a method to unravel a tangled problem? We would
certainly hesitate to answer this question affirmatively, as we immediately
realize how difficult it would be to put it down in black and white. We cannot
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say: first you shall do this, then that, and then, if this happens, you shall do
that.
It is thus doubtless that if we think of a method as a determinate series of
steps and procedures that can be clearly codified, there are good reasons to
claim that there is no method in philosophy. However, it is quite certain that, in
order to untangle a knot, we cannot proceed as we please. For instance, we
cannot just randomly pick one thread and pull it toward us; nor can we just
plunge our hands in the knot and pull any thread in any direction, hoping to
unravel the knot in this way. Certainly, some philosophers do precisely this, but
it is not how one should philosophize.
There is something peculiar here, even paradoxical: we must think in a certain
order, there is an order in thought – and precisely for this reason, we can talk about
a philosophical method. Yet, such an order cannot itself be singled out. Thus, a
philosophical discourse on method seems to be a nonnegotiable quest for
philosophy and, at the same time, something unrealizable in principle.
This holds true unless we take the expression “discourse on method” in its
largest sense and, indeed, in its richest sense: discourse on method would
mean a conversation or a debate concerned with method, an exploration of the
regions of methods by means of our discourses. In this case, the previous
remarks do not lead us to a dead end, but can rather be taken as initial
observations open to many possible developments.
As has been said: when a problem gets tangled, we want to see more clearly.
After all, in order to untangle a knot it is at least necessary to pay a lot of
attention to it. For instance, we shall first try to find the ending within the knot
of thickly entangled threads. If we happen not to find it, we would perhaps be
left with the choice to randomly pick one thread and pull, see what happens,
and then act accordingly.
We are in need of a method, no doubt. And despite all previous uncertainties
regarding the question of method, I can say that I know with certainty that I
cannot disentangle a knot with my eyes closed. Seeing is in any case important.
In such a way, we begin to emphasize that phenomenology, as a philosophical
method, is first and foremost an intuitionistic method. It is a rather complex and
rather sophisticated form of intuitionism.
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Note
The image of the tangle certainly reminds of other, similar images Wittgenstein
suggested for philosophy. Such a connection is clearly present in Wittgenstein,
starting from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus up to his later writings, with
nuances and tones sometimes significantly different from each other. This
requires further discussion: initially, we find the exaggerated and utopian form
of effectively reached clarity; subsequently, and consistent with the
characteristic dynamics of that work, this is overturned into impenetrable
obscurity, which even philosophical discourse defies. Yet, the idea that «a
philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations» 1 has a history that goes
way beyond the strict limits of the Tractatus. It extends up to those later
formulations, in which the accent is put differently, namely on clarification as
the actual aim of philosophy, which shall be pursued with different methods
(the persisting reference to language, I believe, does not mean the appeal to one
exclusive and privileged method). And still, it remains a controversial path, on
which we can find no rest precisely as far as the nexus between philosophy and
clarity is concerned. In a way, we could say that the situations that appeal to
philosophy are “blocked” situations – they are blocked from a conceptual point
of view, although a certain existential inclination in Wittgenstein’s “figures” of
philosophical confusion cannot be ignored. For instance, although this aspect
has been rather neglected thus far, the “fly-bottle” 2 is particularly unsettling, as
is the following remark, which is a peculiar and remarkable variation of the
preceding one: «Someone is imprisoned in a room if the door is unlocked, opens
inwards; but it doesn't occur to him to pull, rather than push against it». 3 The
solution is close at hand, and yet painfully inaccessible. In statements like
these, we can notice another problem as well: philosophical problems, as
Wittgenstein several times suggests, derive from artificial constructions, from
an unjustified manipulation of the rules of ordinary language. Therefore, those
figures of imprisonment can be considered figures of the complexity of
philosophy itself, in an unsolved contraposition to the “simplicity” of life. The
philosopher himself becomes a fly in a bottle. Therefore, he is unable to
indicate the way; and the philosopher is also the one who stubbornly pushes
the door instead of pulling it. Here is a surprising reaction to Plato’s dialogues:
«Reading the Socratic dialogues, one has the feeling: what a frightful waste of
time! What's the point of these arguments that prove nothing and clarify
1
2
3
WITTGENSTEIN 1971, TLP 4.112.
WITTGENSTEIN 1972, PI 309.
WITTGENSTEIN 1998, CV 48.
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nothing».4 Philosophical reflection here has the character of a knot that gets
more and more tangled, of an endless spiral we can escape only by jumping
back into ordinary language, i.e., into everyday life before and outside of
philosophy. Yet, if this is the way things are, we can perhaps understand the
following statement, the true meaning of which is certainly not understandable
at first sight:
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this
simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear. The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of
stopping doing philosophy when I want to.5
The first two sentences say the following: since we cannot hope to reach the
complete clarity we strive for, philosophical problems cannot fully disappear.
Therefore, what is important is to realize that I can stop doing philosophy at
every moment, and precisely at the moment I want to.
If this interpretation is correct, we can argue that the problem Wittgenstein
discussed in the Tractatus, the core of which was doubtless not so much the
exaggeration of the theme of clarity, but rather of the theme of complete clarity,
is still present in later developments. Different from the Tractatus, however, the
problem here cannot take the shape of dogmatism, but rather bears some traces
of skepticism, which appeals to the contrast between “simply” living and
philosophically reflecting. As a great precursor of the just quoted statement by
Wittgenstein, we could thus mention Hume’s conclusion regarding the
philosophical struggle concerning insoluble alternatives: «Carelessness and inattention alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon
them».6 And: «I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry
with my friends; and when after three or four hours’ amusement, I would
return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous,
that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther».7
This story, which we could present only schematically here, reveals the inner
ramifications of the problem, the variety of the possible directions in its
development. But it also invites us to reflect on the fact that, taking a
phenomenological stance, we can, on the one hand, initially appeal to a
“Wittgensteinian” image. On the other hand, however, the paths will most
likely diverge at some point. Or, in any case, they would be able to coexist only
4
5
6
7
WITTGENSTEIN 1998, CV 21
WITTGENSTEIN 1972, PI 133.
HUME 2005, 144.
HUME 2005, 175.
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by some sort of reciprocal compensation. Particularly, I wish to point out that
we could significantly profit from the association of Wittgenstein’s ironical
corrosiveness with the rigorousness characteristic of phenomenological
thought.
4. Intuitionism
Unsurprisingly, the claim that phenomenology is a kind of intuitionism is
rather infrequent. More precisely, such a word is mostly associated with
phenomenology in the context of the critical debate against the
phenomenological method, rather than being employed by the advocates of
such a method. Among the latter, due to the implications of this word in the
philosophical tradition, some sort of scruple and worry seems to prevail. Such
implications can be considered as more or less alluring. Yet, in any case, they
have always exposed the complexity and the richness of the phenomenological
thought to excessively hasty critiques.
Without exacerbating the terminological issue more than necessary – given
that it remains less important than the actual underlying problems –, I believe
instead that we can take full and complete responsibility for the
abovementioned claim. For instance, we should not be too worried if, in
association with intuitionism, the names of thinkers like Bergson and
Schopenhauer may also be polemically mentioned. Indeed, we could even take
the occasion to broaden our discussion and enrich our topic with more precise
comparisons.
For Bergson, for instance, the word intuition mostly alludes to one source of
knowledge that is unattainable by rational means – thus, it is something like an
enlightenment coming from unfathomable depth. In a certain sense, the idea of
clarity is here associated with the idea of a necessary darkness – some deep
and thick darkness which can only be occasionally pierced by intuition.
Therefore, we would be very far from the commonsense understanding of
“seeing”, and particularly from seeing considered as a perceptual experience,
characteristically bound to the surface of things. On the contrary: in this context,
to intuit means to arrive at sharing the interiority of things, which we cannot
see and therefore represent. The very notion of a point of view belongs to seeing,
and not to intuiting. It belongs to the field of representation, of “symbolic” and
discursive mediation, which does not intuit, but rather analyzes and describes.
Intuition, thus, becomes the entrance door to metaphysics: it is what allows us
to overcome exteriority and go beyond the surface.
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Things are rather different for Schopenhauer. He certainly has an idea of
intuition as a special mode of knowledge, allowing us to access the
metaphysical layer of reality. Yet, this idea is strongly characterized by the
possibility of “seeing clearly”. Thus, in the first pages of his On the Fourfold Root
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, he connects the idea of seeing clearly with
philosophical reflection in general. Philosophy, he claims, needs to be totally
similar to a Swiss lake – the calm and tranquil surface exhibiting in
transparency what lies at the utmost depth. Metaphysics, the system of the
world, cannot be constructed by means of logical arguments. And yet, the
fundamental ideal of the whole tradition of rationalism persists in Schopenhauer: the
ideal of a clear, i.e., fully understandable and evident, metaphysics. The
metaphysical principle may well have its abyssal darkness, but not the way in
which we attain it through philosophy.
In any case, phenomenology precisely gives up such a tie between intuition
and metaphysics. And in such a way it radically changes the meaning and the
relevance of the appeal to intuition. From the phenomenological perspective,
the strong presentation of the topic of intuition is not characterized by the ideal
of a special form of knowledge that would disclose some otherwise inaccessible
truths, but rather by the tie with the phenomenological reduction, which we
shall now reassess in the context of the methodological questions.
Notes
1) In some cases, in Husserl’s texts, the references to seeing, looking,
observing are also stylistically rather harassing and even annoying. See, for
instance, the second lesson of The Idea of Phenomenology, where we can count
fourteen contexts that refer to seeing (schauen, rein schauend, hinblicken, vor
Augen stehen, schauende Wahrnehmung, herausschauen, die geschaute Fülle der
Klarheit, etc.).8
2) «By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one
places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it
and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation
which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements
8
HUSSERL 1999, 23 f. There is some heaviness in the Italian translation that mostly derives from the
translator’s choice, motivated by being the most literal, to avoid the use of “intuition” as a
translation of schauen. However, most puzzling are not those forced expressions that the Italian
translator recognizes as “unpleasant” – all translations of Husserl have to pay a price in this respect
– but rather those passages that risk becoming unnecessarily incomprehensible precisely due to the
emphasis on phenomenology as a philosophy obsessed by the quest for something to look at.
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common both to it and other objects. […] In its eternally unsatisfied desire to
embrace the object around which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies
without end the number of its points of view in order to complete its always
incomplete representation, and ceaselessly varies its symbols that it may
perfect the always imperfect translation. It goes on, therefore, to infinity. But
intuition, if intuition is possible, is a simple act. […] If there exists any means of
possessing a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively, of placing
oneself within it instead of looking at it from outside points of view, of having
the intuition instead of making the analysis: in short, of seizing it without any
expression, translation, or symbolic representation - metaphysics is that means.
Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols».9
3) The philosopher, as Schopenhauer writes in the wonderful third paragraph
of his On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (first Edition
1813),10 cannot cast doubt on what his role is in the tale of the country mouse
and the city mouse in Horace’s second book of the Satires. The country mouse
is happy with what he can attain, but then he gets persuaded by the city mouse
to steal the remains of the rich peoples’ lavish meals. The landlord’s dogs,
however, convince him to go back to the woods. The philosopher certainly has
the part of the country mouse. First and foremost because, says Schopenhauer,
a safe and reliable possession of few things is better than a possession largely
built just on words and which can be subtracted from an impartial and
objective criticism in an instant. Thus, there is the objective of a solid
construction, with correct and balanced measures, even if deprived of
magniloquent splendor. Yet, this objective also entails the exposition of
«greater lucidity and precision in philosophizing; for I hold the extreme
clearness to be attained by an accurate definition of each single expression to
be indispensable to us, as a defense both against error and against intentional
deception, and also as a means of securing to ourselves the permanent,
unalienable possession of each newly acquired notion within the sphere of
philosophy beyond the fear of losing it again on account of any
misunderstanding or double meaning which might hereafter be detected». For
this reason: «The true philosopher will indeed always look after light and
perspicuity, and will endeavor to resemble a Swiss lake – which through its
peacefulness is enabled to unite great depth with great clearness – rather than
a turbid, impetuous mountain torrent».11
9 BERGSON 1999, 24.
10 SCHOPENHAUER 1813/1977.
11 SCHOPENHAUER 1889, 3-4.
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5. Evidence
The being of beings shall be traced back to their mode of appearing: this is
what the theory of the phenomenological reductions says. Or, to paraphrase an
extremely concise phrase in the Cartesian Meditations:12 So much appearance, so
much being.
Yet, in spite of the literal affinity, we need to grasp the huge distance between
the meaning of such a phrase and that of Berkeley’s esse est percepi. More
precisely: Berkeley’s principle aims at grasping the essence of the world, the
“true nature of things”. Therefore, it cannot be detached from the metaphysics
of immanence and from the new proof of the existence of God, due to the
necessity of the persistence of a gaze that preserves the being of the world.
Nevertheless, Berkeley is also aware of the deep epistemological meaning of
that principle, as it is shown in his Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. A
critical discussion of this text is particularly suitable to introduce the
phenomenological themes. In the phenomenological rephrasing of Berkeley’s
esse est percipi nothing is said about the true essence of reality. Instead, a
philosophical maneuver is accomplished. It is as if one would stretch one’s
arm, in order to indicate a horizon of possible research, the guiding thread of
which is the idea of a characterization of beings by means of displaying the
differences in their modes of manifestation, rather than by means of definitions.
A subjective ontology must take over from an objective ontology. Yet, the former
is nothing else than onto-phenomenology, i.e., a phenomenologically grounded
ontology.
There are several meaningful aspects here related to the notion of intuition –
if we still want to use this term, despite all possible misunderstandings that
may dissuade us from such a use.
First, intuition is not a kind of probe to be used for something posited as
unfathomable in principle.
Yet, most remarkable here is how the appeal to evidence is made. In this
respect, although much water has flowed under the bridge since the
epistemological dogmatism of yore, it is still necessary to emphasize that the
frequent critiques of the very use of the word “evidence” by logicians and
epistemologists, which were made on behalf of non-Euclidean geometries or of
the axiomatic method, have often been wrongly perceived as challenging. Such
critiques, indeed, refrained from any historical or conceptual analysis and
implicitly assumed a psychologizing notion of evidence. Alternatively, the
phenomenological evidence we are now talking about has nothing to do with
12 HUSSERL 1960, 103.
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those kinds of psychic hindrance, of severe inner admonition against
contradiction, or of pleased inner assent, which were traditionally evoked in
order to justify the immediacy of logical evidences.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the idea of intuition as a special faculty of the
mind, supposed to disclose a special form of otherwise inaccessible knowledge,
does not play any role in this context.
Yet, if we are not dealing with any special faculty of the mind, and thus with
any special kind of knowledge, then what are we talking about?
We shall especially refer – in relation to the problem of our thoughts getting
tangled, or risking to get tangled – to an exemplary situation, which can be
perceptively or imaginatively grasped, and thus described and freely varied to
be redescribed anew. We shall draw the attention to the relations characterizing
that situation and to its internal interconnections.
Many complex and apparently deeper answers always risk missing the
essential point, namely that the kinds of intuiting and showing advocated by
phenomenology consist in drawing attention to something, in emphasizing
something that may pass unobserved, in pointing something out. And all this
can only happen if the here solicited “looking” is not a mere passive
registration of everything there is, but rather an inspecting look, which
searches for answers to some problems, and thus has specific aims.
Notes
1) The passage of the Cartesian Meditations actually says «Soviel Schein, soviel
(durch ihn nur verdecktes, verfälschtes) Sein».13 The text put into brackets
highlights that the stated principle, which is considered an “apodictic formal
law”, does not suppress the possible concealment of being through appearing.
Paci (1961) dwells on this passage.
2) On the relevance of Berkeley for Husserl’s thought, the Lecture XXI in
Husserliana VII, “Berkeleys Entdeckung und naturalistische Missdeutung des
Problems der Konstitution der realen Welt”. Appealing to his own concept of
“experimental phenomenology”, Bozzi writes positively about Berkeley. The
objects of experimental phenomenology «exist as objects for experimentation
insofar as they are presently there and accessible to direct inspection [...], that is
to say, to adopt current terminology, insofar as they are perceived. Berkeley’s
statement, esse est percipi, can be a good guide for the definition of the
13 HUSSERL 1950, HUA I, 133.
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phenomenological method. Such esse est percipi, of course, is of exclusively
methodological nature and does not entail any traces of Berkeley’s
subjectivism. The methodological esse est percipi teaches us to look at facts with
a free attitude, released from all kind of pre-constituted knowledge, even well
grounded. It exercises the power of observation diverting it from the
convictions of “what ought to be”».14
3) An extremely vivid controversy with the “psychologistic” approach to the
topic of evidence, which can be traced back to the idea that the difference
between the condition of evidence and non-evidence coincides with the
presence or the absence of a special inner sensation, can be found in the fourth
lesson of Husserl’s The Idea of Phenomenology: «Epistemologists of the empiricist
persuasion, who speak so much of the value of investigating origins, and yet
remain just as far removed from the true origins as the most extreme
rationalist, would have us believe that the entire distinction between evident
and non-evident judgments consists in a certain feeling by which the former
make themselves known. But how can feeling contribute to the intelligibility of
anything here? What can it accomplish? Is it, perchance, to call out to us: "Stop!
Here is the truth!"? And why should we believe this feeling? Must this belief
also be supplied with an index of feeling?». 15 In this context, the distinction
between the intuitive and the symbolic level, which is also present in Bergson,
emerges. And it would certainly be interesting to further investigate the
analogies and the differences. The preceding passage, indeed, proceeds as
follows: «Well, one says to oneself: "Logically speaking, the same judgment, say
the judgment "2 times 2 equals 4," can at one time be evident to me and at
another not be evident to me, the same concept of 4 can at one time be given to
me intuitively with evidence, and at another time be given by way of a mere
symbolic representation. Thus in both cases it is the same phenomenon with
respect to content, but in the one case a distinguishing feeling lends it a
preferred value, a character of value." But do I in fact have in each case the
same phenomenon, the one accompanied by a feeling, the other one not? […] If
I see that 2 times 2 equals 4, and then say this in vague symbolic judgments,
then I am referring to an equality. But to refer to an equality is not to have the
phenomenon of equality. Thus in the two cases the content is different in the
one case I see, and in the act of seeing the state of affairs is itself given; but in
the other case I have only the symbolic reference. In the one case I have
intuition, in the other, an empty intention. […] Let us take a simpler example: if
I at one time have a vivid intuition of red, and at another time think of red in
14 BOZZI 1989, 26.
15 HUSSERL 1999, 44.
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an empty symbolic intention, then is it the case that both times the same red
phenomenon is really [reell] present, the one time with feeling and the other
time without feeling?».16 The old protest “back to the things themselves!”
resurfaces in front of such a theory of feeling-indexes: « But one should look at
the phenomenon itself, and not speak of it and construe it from on high».17
4) Shall we problematize the question as to an “intuitionistic” component in
Wittgenstein as well? From several points of view, there is such an issue. The
dominating reference to ordinary language has often drawn the interpreters’
attention elsewhere. Yet, I believe that we can talk about “linguistic
intuitionism” already in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, thus offering a precise
interpretation of the following passage: «To the question whether we need
intuition for the solution of mathematical problems it must be answered that
language itself here supplies the necessary intuition». 18 Here, the topic of
intuition is first traced back to that of pure seeing. The question of symbolism
presents itself in a new form: no longer from the view point of mere
representation and possibly of mere empty intention, but rather as simple sign
(drawing), as a thing of perception that is primarily grasped through sight.
“Presenting” in the Tractatus does not have the magniloquent meaning of
mystical silence, as the city mice would like. Rather, it is bound to a philosophy
of calculus and generally of symbolic languages. It is also bound to the
subsequent developments of Wittgenstein’s research, and particularly to the
philosophical style of the Philosophical Investigations, where, in the context of
some methodological reflections particularly relevant to the overall meaning of
the work, we can read the following passage, which sounds like a stroke:
«Don’t think, but look!» [Denk nicht, sondern schau!].19
6. Platonic References
If we put the problem this way, it is difficult not to think about Plato’s Meno.
Remember Socrates drawing a square on the ground and asking: “Tell me, boy,
do you know that a figure like this is a square?” (82a)
The boy answers: “yes”. And this yes is of course of extreme importance. The
16
17
18
19
HUSSERL 1999, 44-5.
HUSSERL 1999, 44.
WITTGENSTEIN 1971, TLP, 6.233.
WITTGENSTEIN 1972, PI, 66. In a certain sense, the difficulty and complexity of the problem can be
grasped by considering that, while we previously complained about the redundancy of the
vocabulary of “looking”, we now have to express our regret for the Italian translation of the
imperious “look” with the harmless and reflective “observe”
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“proof” precisely begins with this syllable. And it proceeds step by step, figure
by figure, until it arrives at the final construction, which has this shape:
The double of a given square ABCD is the square constructed on its diagonal
line, as can be drawn from the way of construction and from its final result.
The way in which Socrates’ discourses and actions develop can then be
described with the very same expressions we used before. Socrates draws the
attention; Socrates points this or that out, until the right relation is finally
grasped.
Yet, while reconsidering this extraordinary moment of the history of Western
thought – probably the authentic place of origin of rigorous science [strenge
Wissenschaft] –, we should perhaps put the innatist motive, which has always
been associated with it and which is obviously also linked to the Platonic
theme of reminiscence, on the margins.
Already in Plato, indeed, the problem seems to be traced back to the
subjectivity of knowledge, which recovers in itself those forgotten evidences
that pertain to the ideal constitution of the objective world.
I rather wish to suggest that we could also abide by, and in a sense linger on,
the first and essential moment of Plato’s story. Here, it is assumed that the right
relation is in any case directly and visually graspable within the figure,
precisely in the way its parts are connected. Yet, this way may not be
immediately seen, and rather needs to be uncovered, i.e., it might need to be
pointed out step by step.
Note
There is a passage in which Schopenhauer, in his The World as Will and
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Representation, should refer to Plato’s Meno, and more precisely to Socrates’s
proof. Surprisingly enough, instead, the reference is absent. In place of it, we
find the following figure:
In such a figure, we are supposed to evidently grasp the relation stated in
Pythagoras’ theorem, at least in the case of isosceles triangles. In order to make
such a relation really visible, it is useful to rotate Plato’s square by 45 degrees:
Alternatively, we may first draw the right triangle in the disposition that is
most familiar to us, and then construct the squares on the two catheti:
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One figure is thus contained in the other. While provocatively criticizing the
Euclidian axiomatic and demonstrative method, Schopenhauer takes the
occasion to argue that, in Euclid’s proof of Pythagoras’ theorem: «lines are
drawn without our knowing why. It afterwards appears that they were traps,
which shut unexpectedly and take prisoner the assent of the learner, who in
astonishment has then to admit what remains wholly unintelligible to him in
its inner connexion».20 The figure is opposed to the proof, in order to
emphasize the capacity of the former to display the existence of a relation that
can hardly be expressed. Thus, with a genial jump, we are brought back from
Euclid to Plato, i.e., from an elaboration by now aiming at a systematically
presented deductive science to the issue of its own origins. Certainly,
Schopenhauer’s intuitionism can also be considered a mode of thinking which
is totally incapable to imagine what was at stake in the attempts to demonstrate
the parallel postulate. As he writes in chapter XIII of the Supplements to the first
volume of the World: «The Euclidean method of demonstration has brought
forth from its own womb its most striking parody and caricature in the famous
controversy over the theory of parallels, and in the attempts, repeated every
year, to prove the eleventh axiom. [...] This scruple of conscience reminds me of
Schiller's question of law: "For years I have already made use of my nose for
smelling: Then have I actually a right to it that can be demonstrated?"».21
7. Towards an Analytics of Bastard Concepts
Different interpretations are also possible with regard to phenomenological
Platonism. And the just proposed illustration of the reference to the spirit of
Platonism within phenomenological “intuitionism” defines one possible path
for understanding and developing phenomenological issues.
The very expression “eidetic intuition” has always been especially associated
with the grasping of the pure ideality in the empirical case. Thus, the
operations aiming to highlight the inner structural nexuses of the exemplary
situation, which are given through manifestation, have often faded into the
background. Moreover, this has also diverted attention from the problem of the
formation and the genesis of concepts starting from experience
phenomenologically considered.
The path we have tried to outline, instead, emphasizes the fundamental
problem of an analysis that does not begin with already ordered concepts, for
20 SCHOPENHAUER 1958a, 70.
21 SCHOPENHAUER 1958b, 130.
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these are already the result of rationalizing operations, but rather with
concepts that are closer to experience and that are modeled upon experience.
There is a whole tradition of thought that has underestimated such a
fundamental problem, as if these “intuitive” concepts – which, again based on
Plato, I would like to call bastard concepts – would be nothing but vague and
unarticulated formations. As if they would only be valid in a pragmatic sense,
for everyday practical aims, but deprived of any theoretical interest and
consistency.
Against such underestimations, we needed to foster a true analytics of bastard
concepts as an authentic philosophical task. And we need to show the
possibility and the scope of such analytics.
This recommendation shall not be interpreted as an attempt to limit the
autonomy of the operations of “pure thought” from the bottom up. On the
contrary, it refers to the task of spelling out the possible meanings of, and thus
the problems arising in, the process of “concept formation”, which begins with
the forms of our primal world constitution. Among such observations, thus,
the importance of rationalizing operations shall be emphasized to the utmost.
In the same way, the function of going beyond experience, which in principle
pertains to such operations, shall be clearly recognized. From this perspective,
what is needed is not a generic dismissal of “intuitive” concepts, but rather the
capacity to measure the distance from such concepts, together with the clear
identification of the sense and the direction of the rationalizing operations.
This can only be accomplished if a processual view is taken, i.e., it is not
something to be accomplished as a jump of someone who is not even aware of
having a trampoline under his feet.
Note
Plato talks about “bastard reasoning” in Timaeus 52 b (λογισμοὶ νόθοι) in relation
to the problem of spatiality.22
8. Data and Rules
The problem of a genetic clarification of concepts is located in a larger thematic
domain. The phenomenological reduction, as we have observed, traces the
22 I have referred to such a phrase in PIANA 1988, 250.
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being of beings back to their mode of appearing. This is above all a phrase to
express the multiplicity of descriptive tasks oriented towards the senseformations that are realized on this ground. The realization of an ontophenomenology, as a field of inquiry comprised within the larger field of a
theory of experience, depends on the accomplishment of these tasks.
Yet, while paying particular attention to methodological issues, we shall ask
ourselves how such a description shall be conceived. I believe that we shall first
exclude what seems to be implicit in the use of the word. Talking about
description, we seem to be evoking a passive registration of small details, as if,
in the end, the result amounted to something like a list of objects and their
properties. Here, the mistake is not so much the appeal to details, to fine
observation, which is by no means objectionable. Rather, the mistake consists
in the idea of a collection of details as a function of displaying lists, and, what is
more, lists of objects. The situation would not be significantly better if, instead
of objects or things, we talked about givens. Words like given or givenness often
occur in phenomenological language, and for this reason we must even more
beware of misunderstandings. This is not only because phenomenological
description is not interested in what is empirically given, with accidental
character and here-and-now determinations: this is something stated and
restated over and over again. Instead, we need to clarify that what is searched
for, the authentic objective of description, are not by all means givens, but rather
rules; more precisely, rules determining the display of this or that perceptual
formation, of this or that objectual formation in general.
The point is to determine how, by varying certain conditions in the
perceptual situation, the sense of the latter also changes. And this goes hand in
hand with the highlighting of nexuses and functional relations, of the modes of
articulation, of reciprocal determinations. Accordingly, I believe it is more
appropriate to talk about phenomenological rules rather than givens, and thus
about structures, the grasping of which is the true objective of research.
The notion of rule shall be juxtaposed to the notion of structure. Together, they
contribute to more precisely defining the very idea of description. This holds
not only in relation to the modes of appearance, but also in relation to the
noetic aspects that are necessarily correlated to them: to the modes of
intending. In other words: in the field of experiences there are also nexuses and
articulations. Thus, a description aiming at grasping structure is demanded
also in such a field.
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Note
Bozzi’s observation with regard to the notion of “experimental
phenomenology” – according to which in «the jointure of observable
characteristics», which is the object itself, one shall see «what depends on what,
what will vary if one varies something, what will remain if one removes
something» – actually holds for “pure phenomenology” as well.23
9. The Geometry of Experience
I wish to conclude by referring once more to Plato’s Meno and to its
fundamental lesson for the characterization of an idea of phenomenology that
emphasizes the topic of structure. With Plato’s Meno, we are at the origins of
geometry. And in these origins we can grasp a precise point of juncture
between intuition and concept, between the formal scheme and the intuitive
vision.
Already in Euclid, for whom the relation to concepts modeled upon
experience is still vivid, a new order begins to prevail: an order in which clarity
and conceptual connection shall be mainly searched for in the linguistic
domain, i.e., in the domain of the propositional forms expressing geometric
knowledge. Here, the transition to an essentially new notion of proof becomes
obvious, in which proving does not simply mean to put something in front of
one’s eyes, to point out, or to draw attention to the inner relations of objects.
It is almost unnecessary to recall that this concept of proof, and thus the idea
of deduction systematically practiced by Euclid for the first time, has always
justified the assumption of geometry as a model for traditional philosophical
rationalism.
Yet, the exemplarity of geometry can also be advocated in relation to
phenomenology, if such an appeal is made by keeping in mind the origins of
geometry in the authentic Platonic spirit. Here, the main idea is that of general
regularities that are directly graspable in the configuration of what is given. More
precisely, the metaphor of phenomenology as a “geometric” discipline cannot
be considered particularly significant in relation to any notion of
phenomenology whatsoever, but rather only in relation to an interpretation of
the phenomenological method as a phenomenological-structural method. This
traces, in a certain sense, a demarcation line. There are different
phenomenologies everywhere claiming for themselves the status of
23 BOZZI 1989, 26.
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philosophies of experience. And, with various inflections and nuances, they
can even claim for themselves an intuitionistic matrix. Instead, in the different
directions in which phenomenological questions have been framed, it is not
easy to find the fundamental thesis that experience has a structure expressed
and illustrated as the “geometry of experience”.
Finally, it is interesting to point out that such a fundamental thesis,
understood from the perspective of that metaphor, will not principally be
found in all of those developments in which existentialistic motives have been
superimposed on, or got intertwined with, phenomenology. This is primarily
due to the shift in the very conception of the tasks that pertain to philosophy.
Conversely, that metaphor could even be taken as suggesting the validity of the
critique to the abstract nature of phenomenology, from which those motives
and points of view nevertheless arose.
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