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AMERICAN AID TO GREECE AND TURKEY
May 22, 1947
An Act to provide for assistance to Greece and Turkey.
Whereas the Governments of Greece and Turkey have sought from the
Government of the United States immediate financial and other assistance
which is necessary for the maintenance of their national integrity and their
survival as free nations; and
Whereas the national integrity and survival of these nations are of
importance to the security of the United states and of all freedom-loving
peoples and depend upon the receipt at this time of assistance; and . . .
Whereas the furnishing of such assistance to Greece and Turkey by the
United States will contribute to the freedom and independence of all members
of the United Nations in conformity with the principles and purposes of the
Charter: Now, therefore,
Be it enacted that, notwithstanding the provisions of any other laws,
the President may from time to time when he deems it in the interest of the
United States furnish assistance to Greece and Turkey, upon request of their
governments, and upon terms and conditions determined by him (1) by rendering financial aid in the form of loans, credits, grants, or
otherwise, to those countries;
(2) by detailing to assist those countries any persons in the employ of
the Government of the United States; . . .
(3) by detailing a limited number of members of the military services
of the United States to assist those countries, in an advisory capacity only; . . .
(4) by providing for (A) the transfer to, and the procurement for by
manufacture or otherwise and the transfer to, those countries of any articles,
services, and information, and (B) the instruction and training of personnel of
those countries; . . .
SEC. 3. As a condition precedent to the receipt of any assistance
pursuant to this Act, the government requesting such assistance shall agree (a)
to permit free access of the United States Government officials for the purpose
of observing whether such assistance is utilized effectively and in accordance
with the undertakings of the recipient government; (b) to permit
representatives of the press and radio of the United States to observe freely and
to report fully regarding the utilization of such assistance; . . . and (f) to give
full and continuous publicity within such country as to the purpose, source,
character, scope, amounts, and progress of United States economic assistance
carried on therein pursuant to this Act.
SEC. 4. . . . (b)There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
President not to exceed $400,000,000 to carry out the provisions of this Act. . . .
SEC. 5. . . . The President is directed to withdraw any and all aid
authorized herein under any of the following circumstances:
(1) If requested by the Government of Greece or Turkey, respectively,
representing a majority of people of either such nation;
(2) If the Security Council finds (with respect to which finding the
United States waives the exercise of any veto) or the General Assembly finds
that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the
continuance of such assistance unnecessary or undesirable;
(3) If the President finds that any purposes of the Act have been
substantially accomplished by the action of any other inter-governmental
organizations or finds that the purposes of the Act are incapable of satisfactory
accomplishment; and
(4) If the President finds that any of the assurances given pursuant to
section 3 are not being carried out.
SEC. 6. Assistance to any country under this Act may, unless sooner
terminated by the President, be terminated by concurrent resolution by the two
Houses of the Congress. . . .
SEC. 8. The chief of any mission to any country receiving assistance
under this Act shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and shall perform such functions relating to the
administration of this Act as the President shall prescribe.
The Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain Speech)
March 5, 1946
Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri
...
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in
the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across
the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals
of the ancient states of Central and Eastern
Europe.
Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna,
Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these
famous cities and the populations around them
lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all
are subject in one form or another, not only to
Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many
cases, increasing measure of control from
Moscow. Athens alone - Greece with its immortal
glories - is free to decide its future at an election
under British, American and French observation.
The Russian-dominated Polish Government has
been encouraged to make enormous and
wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass
expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale
grievous and undreamed-of are now taking place.
The Communist parties, which were very small
in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been
raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond
their numbers and are seeking everywhere to
obtain totalitarian control. Police governments
are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far,
except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true
democracy.
Turkey and Persia are both profoundly
alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are
being made upon them and at the pressure being
exerted by the Moscow Government. An attempt
is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build
up a quasi-Communist party in their zone of
Occupied Germany by showing special favors to
groups of left-wing German leaders. At the end
of the fighting last June, the American and British
Armies withdrew westwards, in accordance with
an earlier agreement, to a depth at some points of
150 miles upon a front of nearly four hundred
miles, in order to allow our Russian allies to
occupy this vast expanse of territory which the
Western Democracies had conquered.
If now the Soviet Government tries, by
separate action, to build up a pro-Communist
Germany in their areas, this will cause new
serious difficulties in the British and American
zones, and will give the defeated Germans the
power of putting themselves up to auction
between the Soviets and the Western
Democracies. Whatever conclusions may be
drawn from these facts - and facts they are - this
is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to
build up. Nor is it one which contains the
essentials of permanent peace.
The safety of the world requires a new
unity in Europe, from which no nation should be
permanently outcast. It is from the quarrels of
the strong parent races in Europe that the world
wars we have witnessed, or which occurred in
former times, have sprung. Twice in our own
lifetime we have seen the United States, against
their wishes and their traditions, against
arguments, the force of which it is impossible not
to comprehend, drawn by irresistible forces, into
these wars in time to secure the victory of the
good cause, but only after frightful slaughter and
devastation had occurred. Twice the United
States has had to send several millions of its
young men across the Atlantic to find the war;
but now war can find any nation, wherever it
may dwell between dusk and dawn. Surely we
should work with conscious purpose for a grand
pacification of Europe, within the structure of the
United Nations and in accordance with its
Charter. That I feel is an open cause of policy of
very great importance.
In front of the iron curtain which lies
across Europe are other causes for anxiety. In
Italy the Communist Party is seriously hampered
by having to support the Communist-trained
Marshal Tito's claims to former Italian territory at
the head of the Adriatic. Nevertheless the future
of Italy hangs in the balance. Again one cannot
imagine a regenerated Europe without a strong
France. All my public life I have worked for a
strong France and I never lost faith in her destiny,
even in the darkest hours. I will not lose faith
now. However, in a great number of countries,
far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the
world, Communist fifth columns are established
and work in complete unity and absolute
obedience to the directions they receive from the
Communist centre.
Except in the British
Commonwealth and in the United States where
Communism is in its infancy, the Communist
parties or fifth columns constitute a growing
challenge and peril to Christian civilization.
These are somber facts for anyone to have to
recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so
much splendid comradeship in arms and in the
cause of freedom and democracy; but we should
be most unwise not to face them squarely while
time remains.
The outlook is also anxious in the Far
East and especially in Manchuria.
The
Agreement which was made at Yalta, to which I
was a party, was extremely favorable to Soviet
Russia, but it was made at a time when no one
could say that the German war might not extend
all through the summer and autumn of 1945 and
when the Japanese war was expected to last for a
further 18 months from the end of the German
war. In this country you are all so well-informed
about the Far East, and such devoted friends of
China, that I do not need to expatiate on the
situation there.
I have felt bound to portray the shadow
which, alike in the west and in the east, falls upon
the world. I was a high minister at the time of the
Versailles Treaty and a close friend of Mr.
Lloyd-George, who was the head of the British
delegation at Versailles. I did not myself agree
with many things that were done, but I have a
very strong impression in my mind of that
situation, and I find it painful to contrast it with
that which prevails now. In those days there
were high hopes and unbounded confidence that
the wars were over, and that the League of
Nations would become all-powerful. I do not see
or feel that same confidence or even the same
hopes in the haggard world at the present time.
On the other hand I repulse the idea that
a new war is inevitable; still more that it is
imminent. It is because I am sure that our
fortunes are still in our own hands and that we
hold the power to save the future, that I feel the
duty to speak out now that I have the occasion
and the opportunity to do so. I do not believe
that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire
is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of
their power and doctrines. But what we have to
consider here today while time remains, is the
permanent prevention of war and the
establishment of conditions of freedom and
democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries.
Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed
by closing our eyes to them. They will not be
removed by mere waiting to see what happens;
nor will they be removed by a policy of
appeasement. What is needed is a settlement,
and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult
it will be and the greater our dangers will
become.
From what I have seen of our Russian
friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced
that there is nothing they admire so much as
strength, and there is nothing for which they have
less respect than for weakness, especially military
weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a
balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford,
if we can help it, to work on narrow margins,
offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the
Western Democracies stand together in strict
adherence to the principles of the United Nations
Charter, their influence for furthering those
principles will be immense and no one is likely to
molest them. If , however, they become divided
or falter in their duty and if these all-important
years are allowed to slip away then indeed
catastrophe may overwhelm us all. Last time I
saw it all coming and cried aloud to my own
fellow-countrymen and to the world, but no one
paid any attention. . . .
THE MARSHALL PLAN
June 5, 1947
I need not tell you gentlemen that the
world situation is very serious. That must be
apparent to all intelligent people. I think one
difficulty is that the problem is one of such
enormous complexity that the very mass of facts
presented to the public by press and radio make
it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to
reach a clear appraisement of the situation.
Furthermore, the people of this country are
distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it
is hard for them to comprehend the plight and
consequent reaction of the long-suffering peoples,
and the effect of those reactions on their
governments in connection with our efforts to
promote peace in the world.
In considering the requirements for the
rehabilitation of Europe the physical loss of life,
the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines,
and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has
become obvious during recent months that this
visible destruction was probably less serious than
the dislocation of the entire fabric of European
economy. For the past 10 years conditions have
been highly abnormal. The feverish maintenance
of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national
economics. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or
is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and
destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible
enterprise was geared into the German war
machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private
institutions, banks, insurance companies and
shipping companies disappeared, through the
loss of capital, absorption through nationalization
or by simple destruction. In many countries,
confidence in the local currency has been severely
shaken. The breakdown of the business structure
of Europe during the war was complete.
Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact
that 2 years after the close of hostilities a peace
settlement with Germany and Austria has not
been agreed upon. But even given a more
prompt solution of these difficult problems, the
rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe
quite evidently will require a much longer time
and greater effort than had been foreseen.
There is a phase of this matter which is
both interesting and serious. The farmer has
always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with
the city dweller for the other necessities of life.
This division of labor is the basis of modern
civilization. At the present time it is threatened
with breakdown. The town and city industries
are not producing adequate goods to exchange
with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials
and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is
lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant
cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to
purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for
money which he cannot use seems to him an
unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has
withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and
is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to
stock and finds for himself and his family an
ample supply of food, however short he may be
on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of
civilization. Meanwhile people in the cities are
short of food and fuel. So the governments are
forced to use their foreign money and credits to
procure these necessities abroad. This process
exhausts funds which are urgently needed for
reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is
rapidly developing which bodes no good for the
world. The modern system of the division of
labor upon which the exchange of products is
based is in danger of breaking down.
The truth of the matter is that Europe's
requirements for the next 3 or 4 years of foreign
food and other essential products - principally
from America - are so much greater than her
present ability to pay that she must have
substantial additional help, or face economic,
social, and political deterioration of a very grave
character.
The remedy lies in breaking the vicious
circle and restoring the confidence of the
European people in the economic future of their
own countries and of Europe as a whole. The
manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide
areas must be able and willing to exchange their
products for currencies the continuing value of
which is not open to question.
Aside from the demoralizing effect on
the world at large and the possibilities of
disturbances arising as a result of the desperation
of the people concerned, the consequences to the
economy of the United States should be apparent
to all. It is logical that the United States should
do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return
of normal economic health in the world, without
which there can be no political stability and no
assured peace. Our policy is directed not against
any country or doctrine but against hunger,
poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose
should be the revival of working economy in the
world so as to permit the emergence of political
and social conditions in which free institutions
can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must
not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises
develop. Any assistance that this Government
may render in the future should provide a cure
rather than a mere palliative. Any government
that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will
find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the
United States Government. Any government
which maneuvers to block the recovery of other
countries cannot expect help from us.
Furthermore, governments, political parties, or
groups which seek to perpetuate human misery
in order to profit therefrom politically or
otherwise will encounter the opposition of the
United States.
It is already evident that, before the
United States Government can proceed much
further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and
help start the European world on its way to
recovery, there must be some agreement among
the countries of Europe as to the requirements of
the situation and the part those countries
themselves will take in order to give proper effect
to whatever action might be undertaken by this
Government. It would be neither fitting nor
efficacious for this Government to undertake to
draw up unilaterally a program designed to place
Europe on its feet economically. This is the
business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think,
must come from Europe. The role of this country
should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a
European program so far as it may be practical
for us to do so. The program should be a joint
one, agreed to by a number, if not all European
nations.
An essential part of any successful
action on the part of the United States is an
understanding on the part of the people of
America of the character of the problem and the
remedies to be applied. Political passion and
prejudice should have no part. With foresight,
and a willingness on the part of our people to face
up to the vast responsibilities which history has
clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I
have outlined can and will be overcome.
NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security
(April 14, 1950)
A Report to the President
Pursuant to the President's Directive
of January 31, 1950
TOP SECRET
[Washington,] April 7, 1950
I. Background of the Present Crisis
Within the past thirty-five years the world has
experienced two global wars of tremendous
violence. It has witnessed two revolutions--the
Russian and the Chinese--of extreme scope and
intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five
empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian,
German, Italian, and Japanese--and the drastic
decline of two major imperial systems, the British
and the French. During the span of one
generation, the international distribution of
power has been fundamentally altered. For
several centuries it had proved impossible for any
one nation to gain such preponderant strength
that a coalition of other nations could not in time
face it with greater strength. The international
scene was marked by recurring periods of
violence and war, but a system of sovereign and
independent states was maintained, over which
no state was able to achieve hegemony.
Two complex sets of factors have now basically
altered this historic distribution of power. First,
the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline
of the British and French Empires have interacted
with the development of the United States and
the Soviet Union in such a way that power
increasingly gravitated to these two centers.
Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous
aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new
fanatic faith, anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to
impose its absolute authority over the rest of the
world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic
and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by
violent or non-violent methods in accordance
with the dictates of expediency. With the
development of increasingly terrifying weapons
of mass destruction, every individual faces the
ever-present possibility of annihilation should the
conflict enter the phase of total war.
On the one hand, the people of the world yearn
for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of
atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial
further extension of the area under the
domination of the Kremlin would raise the
possibility that no coalition adequate to confront
the Kremlin with greater strength could be
assembled. It is in this context that this Republic
and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength
stand in their deepest peril.
The fundamental purpose of the United States is
laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: ". .
. to form a more perfect Union, establish justice,
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental
purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of
our free society, which is founded upon the
dignity and worth of the individual.
Three realities emerge as a consequence of this
purpose: Our determination to maintain the
essential elements of individual freedom, as set
forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our
determination to create conditions under which
our free and democratic system can live and
prosper; and our determination to fight if
necessary to defend our way of life, for which as
in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm
reliance on the protection of Divine Providence,
we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our
Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."
III. Fundamental Design of the Kremlin
The issues that face us are momentous, involving
the fulfillment or destruction not only of this
Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues
which will not await our deliberations. With
conscience and resolution this Government and
the people it represents must now take new and
fateful decisions.
II. Fundamental Purpose of the United States
The fundamental design of those who control the
Soviet Union and the international communist
movement is to retain and solidify their absolute
power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the
areas now under their control. In the minds of the
Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this
design requires the dynamic extension of their
authority and the ultimate elimination of any
effective opposition to their authority.
The design, therefore, calls for the complete
subversion or forcible destruction of the
machinery of government and structure of society
in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their
replacement by an apparatus and structure
subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin.
To that end Soviet efforts are now directed
toward the domination of the Eurasian land
mass. The United States, as the principal center of
power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark
of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal
enemy whose integrity and vitality must be
subverted or destroyed by one means or another
if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental
design.
IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of ideas
and Values between the U.S. Purpose and the
Kremlin Design
….
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November
23, 1948) ... are fully consistent with the objectives
stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The
growing intensity of the conflict which has been
imposed upon us, however, requires the changes
of emphasis and the additions that are apparent.
Coupled with the probable fission bomb
capability and possible thermonuclear bomb
capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying
struggle requires us to face the fact that we can
expect no lasting abatement of the crisis unless
and until a change occurs in the nature of the
Soviet system….
V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities
The Kremlin's design for world domination
begins at home. The first concern of a despotic
oligarchy is that the local base of its power and
authority be secure. The massive fact of the iron
curtain isolating the Soviet peoples from the
outside world, the repeated political purges
within the USSR and the institutionalized crimes
of the MVD [the Soviet Ministry of Internal
Affairs] are evidence that the Kremlin does not
feel secure at home and that "the entire coercive
force of the socialist state" is more than ever one
of seeking to impose its absolute authority over
"the economy, manner of life, and consciousness
of people" (Vyshinski, The Law of the Soviet
State, p. 74). Similar evidence in the satellite states
of Eastern Europe leads to the conclusion that this
same policy, in less advanced phases, is being
applied to the Kremlin's colonial areas.
Being a totalitarian dictatorship, the Kremlin's
objectives in these policies is the total subjective
submission of the peoples now under its control.
The concentration camp is the prototype of the
society which these policies are designed to
achieve, a society in which the personality of the
individual is so broken and perverted that he
participates affirmatively in his own degradation.
The Kremlin's policy toward areas not under its
control is the elimination of resistance to its will
and the extension of its influence and control. It is
driven to follow this policy because it cannot, for
the reasons set forth in Chapter IV, tolerate the
existence of free societies; to the Kremlin the most
mild and inoffensive free society is an affront, a
challenge and a subversive influence. Given the
nature of the Kremlin, and the evidence at hand,
it seems clear that the ends toward which this
policy is directed are the same as those where its
control has already been established.
A. POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of
this policy are limited only by considerations of
expediency. Doctrine is not a limiting factor;
rather it dictates the employment of violence,
subversion, and deceit, and rejects moral
considerations. In any event, the Kremlin's
conviction of its own infallibility has made its
devotion to theory so subjective that past or
present pronouncements as to doctrine offer no
reliable guide to future actions. The only
apparent restraints on resort to war are, therefore,
calculations of practicality.
With particular reference to the United States, the
Kremlin's strategic and tactical policy is affected
by its estimate that we are not only the greatest
immediate obstacle which stands between it and
world domination, we are also the only power
which could release forces in the free and Soviet
worlds which could destroy it. The Kremlin's
policy toward us is consequently animated by a
peculiarly virulent blend of hatred and fear. Its
strategy has been one of attempting to undermine
the complex of forces, in this country and in the
rest of the free world, on which our power is
based. In this it has both adhered to doctrine and
followed the sound principle of seeking
maximum results with minimum risks and
commitments. The present application of this
strategy is a new form of expression for
traditional Russian caution. However, there is no
justification in Soviet theory or practice for
predicting that, should the Kremlin become
convinced that it could cause our downfall by one
conclusive blow, it would not seek that solution.
In considering the capabilities of the Soviet
world, it is of prime importance to remember
that, in contrast to ours, they are being drawn
upon close to the maximum possible extent. Also
in contrast to us, the Soviet world can do more
with less--it has a lower standard of living, its
economy requires less to keep it functioning, and
its military machine operates effectively with less
elaborate equipment and organization.
The capabilities of the Soviet world are being
exploited to the full because the Kremlin is
inescapably militant. It is inescapably militant
because it possesses and is possessed by a worldwide revolutionary movement, because it ' is the
inheritor of Russian imperialism, and because it is
a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent crisis,
conflict, and expansion are the essence of the
Kremlin's militancy. This dynamism serves to
intensify all Soviet capabilities.
…Finally, there is a category of capabilities,
strictly speaking neither institutional nor
ideological, which should be taken into
consideration. The extraordinary flexibility of
Soviet tactics is certainly a strength. It derives
from the utterly amoral and opportunistic
conduct of Soviet policy. Combining this quality
with the elements of secrecy, the Kremlin
possesses a formidable capacity to act with the
widest tactical latitude, with stealth, and with
speed.
The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in
the basic nature of its relations with the Soviet
people.
That relationship is characterized by universal
suspicion, fear, and denunciation. It is a
relationship in which the Kremlin relies, not only
for its power but its very survival, on intricately
devised mechanisms of coercion. The Soviet
monolith is held together by the iron curtain
around it and the iron bars within it, not by any
force of natural cohesion. These artificial
mechanisms of unity have never been
intelligently challenged by a strong outside force.
The full measure of their vulnerability is therefore
not yet evident….
C. MILITARY
The Soviet Union is developing the military
capacity to support its design for world
domination. The Soviet Union actually possesses
armed forces far in excess of those necessary to
defend its national territory. These armed forces
are probably not yet considered by the Soviet
Union to be sufficient to initiate a war which
would involve the United States. This excessive
strength, coupled now with an atomic capability,
provides the Soviet Union with great coercive
power for use in time of peace in furtherance of
its objectives and serves as a deterrent to the
victims of its aggression from taking any action in
opposition to its tactics which would risk war….
During this decade, the defensive capabilities of
the Soviet Union will probably be strengthened,
particularly by the development and use of
modem aircraft, aircraft warning and
communications devices, and defensive guided
missiles.
VI. U.S. Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and
Potential
A. POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
Our overall policy at the present time may be
described as one designed to foster a world
environment in which the American system can
survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the
concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of
our positive participation in the world
community….
As for the policy of "containment," it is one which
seeks by all means short of war to (1) block
further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the
falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a
retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence,
and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of
destruction within the Soviet system that the
Kremlin is brought at least to the point of
modifying its behavior to conform to generally
accepted international standards.
It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy
that we possess superior overall power in
ourselves or in dependable combination with
other likeminded nations. One of the most
important ingredients of power is military
strength. In the concept of "containment," the
maintenance of a strong military posture is
deemed to be essential for two reasons: (1) as an
ultimate guarantee of our national security and
(2) as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct
of the policy of "containment." Without superior
aggregate military strength, in being and readily
mobilizable, a policy of "containment"--which is
in effect a policy of calculated and gradual
coercion--is no more than a policy of bluff.
At the same time, it is essential to the successful
conduct of a policy of "containment" that we
always leave open the possibility of negotiation
with the USSR. A diplomatic freeze--and we are
in one now--tends to defeat the very purposes of
"containment" because it raises tensions at the
same time that it makes Soviet retractions and
adjustments in the direction of moderated
behavior more difficult. It also tends to inhibit
our initiative and deprives us of opportunities for
maintaining a moral ascendancy in our struggle
with the Soviet system.
In "containment" it is desirable to exert pressure
in a fashion which will avoid so far as possible
directly challenging Soviet prestige, to keep open
the possibility for the USSR to retreat before
pressure with a minimum loss of face and to
secure political advantage from the failure of the
Kremlin to yield or take advantage of the
openings we leave it….
*****
D. THE REMAINING COURSE OF ACTION--A
RAPID BUILD-UP OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC,
AND MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE FREE
WORLD
A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and
military strength and thereby of confidence in the
free world than is now contemplated is the only
course which is consistent with progress toward
achieving our fundamental purpose. The
frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free
world to develop a successfully functioning
political and economic system and a vigorous
political offensive against the Soviet Union.
These, in turn, require an adequate military
shield under which they can develop. It is
necessary to have the military power to deter, if
possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if
necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed
actions of a limited or total character. The
potential strength of the free world is great; its
ability to develop these military capabilities and
its will to resist Soviet expansion will be
determined by the wisdom and will with which it
undertakes to meet its political and economic
problems.
1. Military aspects. …U.S. military capabilities are
strategically more defensive in nature than
offensive and are more potential than actual. It is
evident, from an analysis of the past and of the
trend of weapon development, that there is now
and will be in the future no absolute defense. The
history of war also indicates that a favorable
decision can only be achieved through offensive
action. Even a defensive strategy, if it is to be
successful, calls not only for defensive forces to
hold vital positions while mobilizing and
preparing for the offensive, but also for offensive
forces to attack the enemy and keep him off
balance….
In the broadest terms, the ability to perform these
tasks requires a build-up of military strength by
the United States and its allies to a point at which
the combined strength will be superior … to the
forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet
Union and its satellites. In specific terms, it is not
essential to match item for item with the Soviet
Union, but to provide an adequate defense
against air attack on the United States and
Canada and an adequate defense against air and
surface attack on the United Kingdom and
Western Europe, Alaska, the Western Pacific,
Africa, and the Near and Middle East, and on the
long lines of communication to these areas.
Furthermore, it is mandatory that in building up
our strength, we enlarge upon our technical
superiority by an accelerated exploitation of the
scientific potential of the United States and our
allies.
Forces of this size and character are necessary not
only for protection against disaster but also to
support our foreign policy. In fact, it can be
argued that larger forces in being and readily
available are necessary to inhibit a would-be
aggressor than to provide the nucleus of strength
and the mobilization base on which the
tremendous forces required for victory can be
built. For example, in both World Wars I and 11
the ultimate victors had the strength, in the end,
to win though they had not had the strength in
being or readily available to prevent the outbreak
of war. In part, at least, this was because they had
not had the military strength on which to base a
strong foreign policy. At any rate, it is clear that a
substantial and rapid building up of strength in
the free world is necessary to support a firm
policy intended to check and to roll back the
Kremlin's drive for world domination….
2. Political and economic aspects. The immediate
objectives--to the achievement of which such a
build-up of strength is a necessary though not a
sufficient condition--are a renewed initiative in
the cold war and a situation to which the Kremlin
would find it expedient to accommodate itself,
first by relaxing tensions and pressures and then
by gradual withdrawal. The United States cannot
alone provide the resources required for such a
build-up of strength. The other free countries
must carry their part of the burden, but their
ability and determination to do it will depend on
the action the United States takes to develop its
own strength and on the adequacy of its foreign
political and economic policies. Improvement in
political and economic conditions in the free
world… is necessary as a basis for building up
the will and the means to resist and for
dynamically affirming the integrity and vitality of
our free and democratic way of life on which our
ultimate victory depends.
At the same time, we should take dynamic steps
to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin
inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its
control. The objective would be the establishment
of friendly regimes not under Kremlin
domination. Such action is essential to engage the
Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance, and force
an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in
counteraction. In other words, it would be the
current Soviet cold war technique used against
the Soviet Union.
A comprehensive and decisive program to win
the peace and frustrate the Kremlin design
should be so designed that it can be sustained for
as long as necessary to achieve our national
objectives. It would probably involve:
1. The development of an adequate political and
economic framework for the achievement of our
long-range objectives.
2. A substantial increase in expenditures for
military purposes adequate to meet the
requirements for the tasks listed in Section D-1.
3. A substantial increase in military assistance
programs, designed to foster cooperative efforts,
which will adequately and efficiently meet the
requirements of our allies for the tasks referred to
in Section D-l-e.
4. Some increase in economic assistance
programs and recognition of the need to continue
these programs until their purposes have been
accomplished.
5. A concerted attack on the problem of the
United States balance of payments, along the
lines already approved by the President.
6. Development of programs designed to build
and maintain confidence among other peoples in
our strength and resolution, and to wage overt
psychological warfare calculated to encourage
mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to
frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.
7. Intensification of affirmative and timely
measures and operations by covert means in the
fields of economic warfare and political and
psychological warfare with a view to fomenting
and supporting unrest and revolt in selected
strategic satellite countries.
8. Development of internal security and civilian
defense programs.
9. Improvement and intensification of
intelligence activities.
10. Reduction of Federal expenditures for
purposes other than defense and foreign
assistance, if necessary by the deferment of
certain desirable programs.
11. Increased taxes….
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable
fission
bomb
capability
and
possible
thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet
Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to
the security of the United States. This threat is of
the same character as that described in NSC 20/4
(approved by the President on November 24,
1948) but is more immediate than had previously
been estimated. In particular, the United States
now faces the contingency that within the next
four or five years the Soviet Union will possess
the military capability of delivering a surprise
atomic attack of such weight that the United
States must have substantially increased general
air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities,
and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to
provide reasonable assurance, in the event of
war, that it could survive the initial blow and go
on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In
return,
this
contingency
requires
the
intensification of our efforts in the fields of
intelligence and research and development….
Our position as the center of power in the free
world places a heavy responsibility upon the
United States for leadership. We must organize
and enlist the energies and resources of the free
world in a positive program for peace which will
frustrate the Kremlin design for world
domination by creating a situation in the free
world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to
adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by
the United States, we will have to make gradual
withdrawals under pressure until we discover
one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital
interest.
It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a
much more rapid and concerted build-up of the
actual strength of both the United States and the
other nations of the free world. The analysis
shows that this will be costly and will involve
significant domestic financial and economic
adjustments.
The execution of such a build-up, however,
requires that the United States have an
affirmative program beyond the solely defensive
one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet
Union. This program must light the path to peace
and order among nations in a system based on
freedom and justice, as contemplated in the
Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must
envisage the political and economic measures
with which and the military shield behind which
the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin
design by the strategy of the cold war; for every
consideration of devotion to our fundamental
values and to our national security demands that
we achieve our objectives by the strategy of the
cold war, building up our military strength in
order that it may not have to be used. The only
sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin
design by the steady development of the moral
and material strength of the free world and its
projection into the Soviet world in such a way as
to bring about an internal change in the Soviet
system. Such a positive program--harmonious
with our fundamental national purpose and our
objectives--is necessary if we are to regain and
retain the initiative and to win and hold the
necessary popular support and cooperation in the
United States and the rest of the free world.
This program should include a plan for
negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and
agreed with our allies and which is consonant
with our objectives. The United States and its
allies, particularly the United Kingdom and
France, should always be ready to negotiate with
the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our
objectives. The present world situation, however,
is one which militates against successful
negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of
agreements on important pending issues would
reflect present realities and would therefore be
unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United
States and the rest of the free world. After a
decision and a start on building up the strength of
the free world has been made, it might then be
desirable for the United States to take an initiative
in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might
facilitate the process of accommodation by the
Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the
unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable
terms or its bad faith in observing them would
assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free
world in support of the measures necessary to
sustain the build-up.
In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and
sustained build-up of the political, economic, and
military strength of the free world, and by means
of an affirmative program intended to wrest the
initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with
convincing evidence of the determination and
ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin
design of a world dominated by its will. Such
evidence is the only means short of war which
eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its
present course of action and to negotiate
acceptable agreements on issues of major
importance.
The whole success of the proposed program
hangs ultimately on recognition by this
Government, the American people, and all free
peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in
which the survival of the free world is at stake.
Essential
prerequisites
to
success
are
consultations with Congressional leaders
designed to make the program the object of nonpartisan legislative support, and a presentation to
the public of a full explanation of the facts and
implications of the present international situation.
The prosecution of the program will require of us
all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded
by the vital importance of the issue and the
tenacity to persevere until our national objectives
have been attained.
Recommendations
That the President:
a. Approve the foregoing Conclusions.
b. Direct the National Security Council, under
the continuing direction of the President, and
with the participation of other Departments and
Agencies as appropriate, to coordinate and insure
the implementation of the Conclusions herein on
an urgent and continuing basis for as long as
necessary to achieve our objectives. For this
purpose, representatives of the member
Departments and Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff or their deputies, and other Departments
and Agencies as required should be constituted
as a revised and strengthened staff organization
under the National Security Council to develop
coordinated programs for consideration by the
National Security Council.
STALIN’S DECLARATION OF THE COLD WAR
Radio Address: February 9, 1946
The catastrophe of war might be avoided if it were possible to make
periodic redistribution of raw materials . . . But this is impossible under present
conditions of capitalistic development.
. . . I have no doubt that if we render the necessary assistance to our scientists,
they will be able not only to overtake but also in the very near future to surpass
the achievements of science outside the boundaries of our country. The party
intends to organize a new mighty upsurge of national economy, which will
enable us to increase the level of our production . . . Only [then] will our
country be insured against any eventuality.
STALIN’S REPLY TO CHURCHILL’S SPEECH
Pravda, March 13, 1946
Question: What is your opinion of Mr. Churchill=s latest speech in the United
States of America?
Answer: I regard it as a dangerous move, calculated to sow the seeds of
dissension among the Allied states and impede their collaboration.
Q: Can it be considered that Mr. Churchill=s speech is prejudicial to the cause
of peace and security?
A: Yes, unquestionably. As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill now takes the stand
of the warmongers, and in this Mr. Churchill is not alone. He has friends not
only in Britain but in the United States of America as well.
A point to be noted is that in this respect Mr. Churchill and his friends
bear a striking resemblance to Hitler and his friends. Hitler began his work of
unleashing war by proclaiming a race theory, declaring that only Germanspeaking people constituted a superior nation. Mr. Churchill sets out to
unleash war with a race theory, asserting that only English-speaking nations
are superior nations, who are called upon to decide the destinies of the entire
world. The German race theory led Hitler and his friends to the conclusion that
the Germans, as the only superior nation, should rule over other nations. The
English race theory leads Mr. Churchill and his friends to the conclusion that
the English-speaking nations, as the only superior nations, should rule over the
rest of the nations of the world. . . .
The following circumstances should not be forgotten. The Germans
made their invasion of the USSR through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria,
and Hungary. The Germans were able to make the invasion through these
countries because, at the time, governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed
in these countries. As a result of the German invasion the Soviet Union has lost
irretrievably in the fighting against the Germans, and also through the German
occupation and the deportation of Soviet citizens to German servitude, a total
of about seven million people. In other words, the Soviet Union=s loss of life
has been several times greater than that of Britain and the United States of
America put together. Possibly in some quarters an inclination is felt to forget
about these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people which secured the liberation
of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget about
them. And so what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union,
anxious for its future safety, is trying to see to it that governments loyal in their
attitude to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries? How can anyone,
who has not taken leave of his senses, describe these peaceful aspirations of the
Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies on the part of our state?
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
MARCH 12, 1947
...
The gravity of the situation which
confronts the world today necessitates my
appearance before a joint session of the Congress.
The foreign policy and the national security of
this country are involved.
One aspect of the present situation,
which I wish to present to you at this time for
your consideration and decision, concerns Greece
and Turkey.
The United States has received from the
Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial
and economic assistance. Preliminary reports
from the American Economic Mission now in
Greece and reports from the American
Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement
of the Greek Government that assistance is
imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.
I do not believe that the American
people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear
to the appeal of the Greek Government. . . .
The very existence of the Greek state is
today threatened by the terrorist activities of
several thousand armed men, led by
Communists, who defy the government's
authority at a number of points, particularly
along the northern boundaries. A Commission
appointed by the United Nations security Council
is at present investigating disturbed conditions in
northern Greece and alleged border violations
along the frontier between Greece on the one
hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on
the other.
Meanwhile, the Greek Government is
unable to cope with the situation. The Greek
army is small and poorly equipped. It needs
supplies and equipment if it is to restore the
authority of the government throughout Greek
territory.
Greece must have assistance if it is to
become a self-supporting and self-respecting
democracy. The United States must supply that
assistance. We have already extended to Greece
certain types of relief and economic aid but these
are inadequate. There is no other country to
which democratic Greece can turn. No other
nation is willing and able to provide the
necessary support for a democratic Greek
government.
The British Government, which has been
helping Greece, can give no further financial or
economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds
itself under the necessity of reducing or
liquidating its commitments in several parts of
the world, including Greece.
We have considered how the United
Nations might assist in this crisis. But the
situation is an urgent one requiring immediate
action and the United Nations and its related
organizations are not in a position to extend help
of the kind that is required. . . .
Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves
our attention. The future of Turkey as an
independent and economically sound state is
clearly no less important to the freedom-loving
peoples of the world than the future of Greece.
The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself
today are considerably different from those of
Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that
have beset Greece. And during the war, the
United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey
with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now
needs our support.
Since the war Turkey has sought
financial assistance from Great Britain and the
United States for the purpose of effecting that
modernization necessary for the maintenance of
its national integrity. That integrity is essential to
the preservation of order in the Middle East.
The British government has informed us
that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer
extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in
the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the
assistance it needs, the United States must supply
it. We are the only country able to provide that
help.
I am fully aware of the broad
implications involved if the United States extends
assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall
discuss these implications with you at this time.
One of the primary objectives of the
foreign policy of the United States is the creation
of conditions in which we and other nations will
be able to work out a way of life free from
coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the
war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was
won over countries which sought to impose their
will, and their way of life, upon other nations.
To ensure the peaceful development of
nations, free from coercion, the United States has
taken a leading part in establishing the United
Nations. The United Nations is designed to make
possible lasting freedom and independence for all
its members. We shall not realize our objectives,
however, unless we are willing to help free
peoples to maintain their free institutions and
their national integrity against aggressive
movements that seek to impose upon them
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on
free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression,
undermine the foundations of international peace
and hence the security of the United States.
The peoples of a number of countries of
the world have recently had totalitarian regimes
forced upon them against their will. The
Government of the United States has made
frequent protests against coercion and
intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement,
in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also
state that in a number of other countries there
have been similar developments.
At the present moment in world history
nearly every nation must choose between
alternative ways of life. The choice is too often
not a free one.
One way of life is based upon the will of
the majority, and is distinguished by free
institutions, representative government, free
elections, guarantees of individual liberty,
freedom of speech and religion, and freedom
from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the
will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the
majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a
controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and
the suppression of personal freedoms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the
United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures.
I believe that we must assist free peoples
to work out their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be
primarily through economic and financial aid
which is essential to economic stability and
orderly political processes.
The world is not static, and the status
quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes
in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the
United Nations by such methods as coercion, or
by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In
helping free and independent nations to maintain
their freedom, the United States will be giving
effect to the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.
It is necessary only to glance at a map to
realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek
nation are of grave importance in a much wider
situation. If Greece should fall under the control
of an armed minority, the effect upon its
neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and
serious. Confusion and disorder might well
spread throughout the entire Middle East.
Moreover, the disappearance of Greece
as an independent state would have a profound
effect upon those countries in Europe whose
peoples are struggling against great difficulties to
maintain their freedoms and their independence
while they repair the damages of war.
It would be an unspeakable tragedy if
these countries, which have struggled so long
against overwhelming odds, should lose that
victory for which they sacrificed so much.
Collapse of free institutions and loss of
independence would be disastrous not only for
them but for the world. Discouragement and
possibly failure would quickly be the lot of
neighboring peoples striving to maintain their
freedom and independence.
Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey
in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching
to the West as well as to the East. We must take
immediate and resolute action.
I therefore ask the Congress to provide
authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in
the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending
June 30, 1948. . . .
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress
to authorize the detail of American civilian and
military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the
request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of
reconstruction, and for the purpose of
supervising the use of such financial and material
assistance as may be furnished. I recommend
that authority also be provided for the instruction
and training of selected Greek and Turkish
personnel.
Finally, I ask that the Congress provide
authority which will permit the speediest and
most effective use, in terms of needed
commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such
funds as may be authorized. . . .
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are
nurtured by misery and want. They spread and
grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They
reach their full growth when the hope of a people
for a better life has died. We must keep that hope
alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for
support in maintaining their freedoms.
If we falter in our leadership, we may
endanger the peace of the world - and we shall
surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.
Great responsibilities have been placed
upon us by the swift movement of events. I am
confident that the Congress will face these
responsibilities squarely.
TRUMAN’S STATEMENT ON FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY
October 27, 1945
. . . 1.
We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage. We
have no plans for aggression against any other state, large or small. We have
no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nation.
2.
We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and
self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force.
3.
We shall approve no territorial changes in any friendly part
of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people
concerned.
4.
We believe that all peoples who are prepared for
self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government
by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign
source. That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western
Hemisphere.
5.
By the combined and cooperative action of our war allies, we
shall help the defeated enemy states establish peaceful democratic
governments of their own free choice. And we shall try to attain a world in
which Nazism, Fascism, and military aggression cannot exist.
6.
We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon
any nation by the force of any foreign power. In some cases it may be
impossible to prevent forceful imposition of such a government. But the
United States will not recognize any such government.
7.
We believe that all nations should have the freedom of the
seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and
of rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country.
8.
We believe that all states which are accepted in the society of
nations should have access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of
the world.
9.
We believe that the sovereign states of the Western
Hemisphere, without interference from outside the Western Hemisphere, must
work together as good neighbors in the solution of their common problems.
10.
We believe that full economic collaboration between all
nations, great and small, is essential to the improvement of living conditions all
over the world, and to the establishment of freedom from fear and freedom
from want.
11.
We shall continue to strive to promote freedom of expression
and freedom of religion throughout the peace-loving areas of the world.
12.
We are convinced that the preservation of peace between
nations requires a United Nations Organization composed of all the
peace-loving nations of the world who are willing jointly to use force if
necessary to insure peace.
. . . [T]hat is the foreign policy which guides the United States [now].
That is the foreign policy with which it confidently faces the future.
It may not be put into effect tomorrow or the next day. But
nonetheless, it is our policy; and we shall seek to achieve it. It may take a long
time, but it is worth waiting for, and it is worth striving to attain. . . .
TRUMAN’S STATEMENT ON THE KOREAN WAR
June 27, 1950
In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border
raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from
North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the
invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This
they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security
Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every
assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these
circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the
Korean Government troops cover and support.
The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that
communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent
nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of
the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international
peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by
Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area
and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in
that area. Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on
Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese
Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the
mainland. The 7th Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the
future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a
peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.
I have also directed that United States Forces in the Philippines be
strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be
accelerated.
I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military
assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo-China and
the dispatch of a military mission to provide dose working relations with those
forces.
I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully
the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of
the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would
have far reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of
law.
I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the
United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.
VYSHINSKY ON THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE MARSHALL PLAN
September 18, 1947
The so-called Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are particularly
glaring examples of the manner in which the principles of the United Nation
are violated, of the way in which the organization is ignored.
a bloc of several European countries hostile to the interests of the democratic
countries of Eastern Europe and most particularly to the interests of the Soviet
Union.
As the experience of the past few months has shown, the proclamation
of this doctrine meant that the United States Government has moved towards a
direct renunciation of the principles of international collaboration and
concerted action by the great powers and towards attempts to impose its will
on other independent states, while at the same time obviously using the
economic resources distributed as relief to individual needy nations as an
instrument of political pressure. This is clearly proved by the measures taken
by the United States government with regard to Greece and Turkey which
ignore and bypass the United Nations as well as by the measures proposed
under the so-called Marshall Plan in Europe. This policy conflicts sharply with
the principles expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution of 11
December 1946, which declares that relief supplies to other countries "should . .
. at no time be used as a political weapon."
An important feature of this plan is the attempt to confront the
countries of Eastern Europe with a bloc of Western European states including
Western Germany. The intention is to make use of Western Germany and
German heavy industry (the Ruhr) as one of the most important economic
bases for American expansion in Europe, in disregard of the national interests
of the countries which suffered from German aggression. . . .
As is now clear, the Marshall Plan constitutes in essence merely a
variant of the Truman Doctrine adapted to the conditions of postwar Europe.
In bringing forward this plan, the United States Government apparently
counted on the cooperation of governments of the United Kingdom and France
to confront the European countries in need of relief with the necessity of
renouncing their inalienable right to dispose of their economic resources and to
plan their national economy in their own way. The United States also counted
on making all these countries directly dependent on the interests of American
monopolies, which are striving to avert the approaching depression by an
accelerated export of commodities and capital to Europe. . . .
It is becoming more and more evident to everyone that the
implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries
under the economic and political control of the United States and direct
interference by the latter in the internal affairs of those countries.
Moreover, this plan is an attempt to split Europe into two camps and,
with the help of the United Kingdom and France, to complete the formation of