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University of Hong Kong ECON6021 Microeconomic Analysis Oligopoly Introduction Three models of oligopoly. Cournot competition Bertrand competition Stackelberg competition Cournot Competition An industry is characterized as Cournot oligopoly if 1. There are few firms in the market serving many consumers. 2. The firms produce either differentiated or homogeneous products. 3. Each firm believes rivals will hold their output constant if it changes its output. 4. Barriers to entry exist. Reaction Functions and Equilibrium. further simplification: duopoly – 2 firms only reaction function defines the profit-maximizing level of output for a firm for given output levels of the other firm. Q 1 r 1 Q 2 . and Q 2 r 2 Q 1 . Point E thus corresponds to the Cournot equilibrium– where neither firm has a unilateral incentive to change its output If the (inverse) demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P a bQ 1 Q 2 , where a and b are positive constants, then the marginal revenues of firms 1 and 2 are MR 1 Q 1 , Q 2 a bQ 2 2bQ 1 MR 2 Q 1 , Q 2 a bQ 1 2bQ 2 Assume that total cost functions C 1 Q 1 c 1 Q 1 and C 2 Q 2 c 2 Q 2 . Equating MRMC, we have a bQ 2 2bQ 1 c 1 for firm 1, and a bQ 1 2bQ 2 c 2 for firm 2. Their reaction functions are Q 1 r 1 Q 2 a c 1 1 Q 2 2 2b for firm 1, and Q 2 r 2 Q 1 a c 2 1 Q 1 2 2b Isoprofit Curves. How to graphically determine the firm’s profits. Four aspects of the figure are important to understand. 1. Every point on a given isoprofit curve for firm 1 yields firm 1 the same level of profits. 2. Isoprofit curves that lie closer to firm l’s monopoly output (Q M 1 ) are associated with higher profits for that firm. 3. The isoprofit curves for firm 1 reach their peak where they intersect firm l’s reaction function. 4. The isoprofit curves do not intersect one another. Changes in Marginal Costs. What happens if there is a decline in firm 2’s marginal cost? Collusion Whenever a market is dominated by only a few firms, firms can benefit at the expense of consumers by ”agreeing” to restrict output or, equivalently, charge higher prices. Such an act by firms is known as collusion. Stackelberg Oligopoly An industry is characterized as a Stackelberg oligopoly if: 1. There are few firms in the market serving many consumers. 2. The firms produce either differentiated or homogeneous products. 3. A single firm (the leader) selects an output before all other firms choose their outputs. 4. All other firms (the followers) take as given the output of the leader and choose outputs that maximize profits given the leader’s output. 5. Barriers to entry exist. Model Two firms–Firm 1 is the leader with a “first-mover” advantage, and Firm 2 is the follower, who maximizes profit given the output produced by the leader. same cost functions, and demand function as in Cournot model Follower’s reaction function: Q 2 r 2 Q 1 a c 2 1 Q 1 , 2 2b which is simply the follower’s Cournot reaction function. After taking into account the follower’s response, the leader’s profits are a c2 1 Q 2 1 2b The leader chooses Q 1 to maximize 1 Q 1 . It is straightforward to show that the leader’s output is Q 1 a c 2 2c 1 . 2b 1 Q 1 a b Q1 Bertrand Oligopoly An industry is characterized as a Bertrand oligopoly if: 1. There are few firms in the market serving many consumers. 2. The firms produce identical products as a constant marginal cost. 3. Firms engage in price competition and react optimally to prices charged by competitors. 4. Consumers have perfect information and there are no transaction costs. Q1 c 5. Barriers to entry exist. Model Consider a Bertrand duopoly, and both firms have the same marginal cost. Price war – Both firms charge a price equal to marginal cost: P 1 P 2 MC! Conclusions Three models of oligopoly have been introduced. Interdependence of choices are emphasized. Collusion improves firms’ collective profits (at the expense of consumers)