Download Vietnam War, Operation Rolling Thunder, 1965-1968

Vietnam War, Operation Rolling Thunder, 1965-1968
Chapter 1 Introduction
Operation Rolling Thunder
was a frequently interrupted bombing campaign that began on February 24, 1965 and continued until t
he end of October 1968. During this period U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft engaged in a bombing ca
mpaign designed to force Ho chi Minh to abandon his ambition to take over South Vietnam. The operat
ion began primarily as a diplomatic signal to impress Hanoi with America's determination. Warning t
he North Vietnamese that the violence would increase until Ho Chi Minh gave in. Secondly, it was in
tended to bolster the sagging morale of the South Vietnamese. Additionally, targets were supposedly
chosen to damage the supply lines between Hanoi and their soldiers fighting in South Vietnam. This
damage to the supply chain began to increase in importance as the U.S. determined that the will of
the North was not being broken by this campaign. This paper will evaluate the strategy of saturatio
n bombing used in this campaign and intends to show that Operation Rolling Thunder was a complete an
d udder failure in all of its objectives and cost the lives of hundreds of American servicemen.
Ch
apter 2 Conflict and Campaign Background
The Vietnam conflict was the longest war America ever foug
ht against a foreign power; the French and Indian War and the American Revolution being the only two
other conflicts that were longer in duration. The U.S. began its involvement in Vietnam at the end
of 1954, initialing just helping train the South Vietnamese army. The war lasted until April 1975
when South Vietnam finally collapsed. The heaviest U.S. involvement occurred from 1963 to 1973, tak
ing the lives of some 58,000 American men and women with another 365,000 being wounded (1:15). The m
ain goal of the U.S. involvement in this conflict was to preserve the independence of a non-Communis
t South Vietnam. The means employed to attain this objective, as well as our relations with South V
ietnam changed throughout the war. Vietnam was not a conventional war and was fought within a maze
of political influences. Each of these factors weighed heavily on the success of campaigns within t
he war like Rolling Thunder and greatly changed the prevailing military doctrine of the time. One of
the prevailing thoughts in military doctrine at the time was the technique known as saturation, or
carpet, bombing. Saturation bombing is defined as "dropping a large amount of bombs on an area of v
arying size over and over again until there is virtually nothing left to bomb (4:1). In most of our
modern conflicts, saturation bombing was used to cut off supply lines and decimate the enemy's warmaking capabilities. It was believed that air support was a vital part of any war effort in combina
tion with ground troops. In Vietnam, the U.S. tried three separate bombing campaigns; Operation Roll
ing Thunder, Operation Linebacker I, and Operation Linebacker II. They each had similar, yet varyin
g objectives, each achieving their objectives to varying degrees of success. What they all proved
was that saturation bombing will not be effective in all combat situations. It will, in fact, only
be effective in conventional warfare that is relatively free of political restraints. This was not
the combat environment of the Vietnam Conflict. Military analyst, Mark Clodfelter believed that airp
ower was a decisive element of military force in a conventional or nuclear war - provided the Tenets
of Airpower were stuck to and airpower application was not limited by political restraints. Even t
hough Clodfelter was a big defender of airpower, even he acknowledges that airpower would not be mos
t effective in an environment similar to that of the Vietnam Conflict (2:1).
Chapter 3 Strategy An
alysis
Operation Rolling Thunder was primarily the work of Lyndon Johnson. The original thinking b
ehind this plan was that air power would be used to force North Vietnam into peace talks. "If North
Vietnam pursued its war of conquest, air power would serve as the coercive stick, as the intensity
of the bombing gradually escalated. The bombing also provided a carrot, for the United States could
reward Hanoi for reducing the level of military operations, or calling them off entirely, by limiti
ng or ending the Rolling Thunder attacks," (3:1). Lyndon Johnson chose the choice of targets, somet
imes against what military intelligence suggested. Targets were chosen more for their impact on mor
ale, either improving that of South Vietnam or damaging that of Hanoi, than for their military value
. The choice of targets was also chosen according to political restraints. The Johnson administrat
ion imposed strict limits on the targets that could be attacked, for China and the Soviet Union were
seen as defenders of communism who might intervene if the North Vietnamese faced defeat. Consequen
tly, the administration tried to punish the North without provoking the two nations believed to be i
ts protectors. Our national interests and political relationships seemed much important in the desig
n of this operation, and for the entire conflict, that the actual success of the campaign or the int
erests of South Vietnam. The U.S. military were, of course, confined in our actions by the ethical
rules of war. We did not want to harm civilians during these bombings at all costs. Targets were a
lso chosen by how they would affect our relationships with the other Communist nations and their rel
ation to North Vietnam. The rules of engagement placed many restrictions on the armed forces. Bombi
ng was prohibited within 25 miles (40 km) of the Chinese border, within 10 miles (16km) of Hanoi and
within 4 miles (6.4 km) of Haiphong (the major port.) By placing the capital, Haiphong and surroun
ding areas off limits the U.S. Air Force was prevented from attacking nearly all military targets cr
ucial to the war effort of the enemy. Additionally, much to the annoyance of Air Force generals, no
enemy air bases could be attacked for fear of killing Soviet technicians. During the early part of
Rolling Thunder even the deadly surface to air missile (SAM) sites could not be attacked until they
were fully operational (firing SA-2 missiles at U.S. planes!) (1:7).
Also included in the off-limi
t sites, at least initially, were all high-value targets such as petroleum, oil, or lubricant storag
e facilities, and electric power generation plants (4:2). Many were dismayed by these requests sinc
e it seemed to most military personnel that only civilian targets should be off-limits. Instead of
listening to many of his advisors, Johnson opted to design a personally controlled, target restricte
d, small scale, limited bombing endeavor with a very gradual rate of increase. Very few officials w
ith actual military expertise were involved in the planning of this operation. President Johnson fai
led badly at understanding the targeting science. As described by Clodfelter, President Johnson was
provided military designed targeting lists, which he subsequently circumvented and ultimately disre
garded...President Johnson's personal insecurity and disdain of the military provided him the impetu
s to believe he and his advisors alone had the national perspective to orchestrate airpower to accom
plish his vague political objectives. However, the President was neither suited nor qualified to pe
rsonally run an aerial campaign (2:4).
Therefore, Operation Rolling Thunder was designed politicall
y, not militarily, which ultimately led to its poor results discussed later. The lack of early succe
ss in Operation Rolling Thunder forced President Johnson to decide that American ground forces were
necessary to protect an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. Therefore, the thinking behind Rol
ling Thunder changed from being the primary attack and mode of intimidation to supporting the ground
campaign. "The President and his advisers considered the air war and ground campaign complementary
efforts that, together, would provide a shield behind which the South Vietnamese armed forces could
prepare to defend their country once the Americans had reduced the Communist threat to manageable p
roportions," (3:2). Of course this fantasy goal was never accomplished but Operation Rolling Thunde
r became primarily support for the ground forces and a means to damage the North Vietnamese supply c
hain. As this objective changed, Johnson finally increased the targets that where allowed to be bomb
ed. They were increased to include transportation, oil storage, and the nation's few industries (3:
2). This was supposed to result in a blow to the North Vietnamese morale and inhibit their ability
to fight. In reality, however, the North Vietnamese were always able to retain the initiative and
were able to maintain the level of fighting that their supply lines, no matter how damaged by bombin
gs, could support. Alternate plans to Operation Rolling Thunder were common. Pilots and other Air F
orce personnel believed that the chosen targets would do little to change the outcome of the fightin
g and thought more military-value targets should have been selected. General LeMay and others argue
d that military targets, rather than the enemy's resolve, should be attacked and that blows should b
e rapid and sharp, with the impact felt immediately on the battlefield as well as by the political l
eadership in Hanoi. The Johnson administration chose to disregard these ideas, or any military plan
s for an air war, and chose instead to pursue a picky, gradual air war. As this was the first major
air campaign in the Vietnam conflict, Johnson and others had little else to learn from in planning O
peration Rolling Thunder. They knew from previous wars that airpower has been historically very suc
cessful in breaking the resolve of an enemy and had not yet come to the full realization that Vietna
m was not a conventional war. They could have looked back onto the Korean war for insights, as many
of the conditions were similar, but with the differing political considerations between the two con
flicts it may have been of little help. They were able to learn from the failings of Operation Roll
ing Thunder and the other major air campaigns of Vietnam to apply to future conflicts. Most importa
ntly being that air power is not as effective in an unconventional war with so many political constr
aints.
Chapter 4 Air Campaign Execution
As discussed previously, Operation Rolling Thunder was a
saturation bombing campaign. Targets were chosen starting just north of the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone
) and progressively moved north toward Hanoi as the campaign went on. F-105Ds from the 67th TFS and
the 355th and 188th Tactical Fighter Wings (TFW) waged the brunt of the war on North Vietnam (1"6).
"The majority of missions for Operation Rolling Thunder were carried out by U.S. Air Force planes
based in Thailand and by Navy squadrons flying from Yankee Station, the code name for carriers based
in the South China Sea," (1:7). From 1965 to 1968, the US flew over 300,000 fighter-bomber sorties
and over 2,000 B-52 sorties over North Vietnam, dropping over 600,000 tons of bombs (1:7). Over 90
0 aircraft were lost and over 500 airmen lost their lives. Operation Rolling Thunder was divided int
o five phases. The first phase lasted from March-June 1965 and was primarily only a show of our pow
er as a number of different targets, of varying importance were hit. This first phase did nothing t
o impact the actions of the North. The second phase lasted from July 1965 to June 1966 and was focu
sed on moveable targets including trains, trainyards, boats, and trucks. This second phase was a ma
ssive failure. The North had an army of 500,000 whose sole purpose was to repair any damage to the
transportation system that the U.S. military caused, as well as to build new roads, bridges, and rai
lways. New transportation systems were built faster than we could bomb them and approximately 300 o
f our aircraft were lost. Phase three lasted only one month, June 1966. During this phase, the U.S
. did manage to destroy three-fourths of the North's fuel supply, however, this seemed too little af
fect their ability to fight. Johnson finally allowed the bombing of once off-limit targets in Octob
er 1966, phase four of Rolling Thunder but retracted this March 1968 for phase five, limiting bombin
g to only targets moving down throughout North Vietnam's southern panhandle. Johnson finally halted
Operation Rolling Thunder on October 31, 1968 (4: 2-3). This phase layout looks as if they were no
t planned in this fashion. In other words, Johnson and McNamara did not sit down and plan each of t
hese five phases at the beginning of the operation. They, instead, appear to be subsequent back-up
plans that were initiated as the one before it failed to achieve the desired results. Instead of im
plementing new phases, however, Johnson should have stopped Operation Rolling Thunder after the firs
t, or possibly even the second, phase failed. Over the three years that the U.S. military pursued Op
eration Rolling Thunder, they failed to meet any of the campaign's objectives. Not only was the cam
paign a failure in its planning, it also failed because we underestimated our enemy (4:7) Because of
the North's resiliency and persistence, supplies and troops sent to the South nearly doubled every
year that Rolling Thunder continued. By 1968, the transportation system was capable of handling thr
ee times as much traffic through the panhandle as it could in 1965. We were simply fighting an unco
nventional war with conventional warfare tactics. The war had developed into sporadic battles that
were fought Guerrilla style and bombing could do little to stop this...There was nothing to bomb bec
ause the country had virtually no war-making capabilities; most of their armor, weapons, ammunition,
etc. came from China and the Soviet Union...(4:7).
The gradual application of the air power also c
ontributed to the Operation's failure. Between bombings, the North Vietnamese were able to improve
their defenses with weapons imported from China and the Soviet Union. The end of Operation Rolling
Thunder heavily defended military targets in North Vietnam defended by antiaircraft weapons. The end
result was that the objectives of damaging the supply lines and defeating the North's morale were n
ot met. The North were able to repair and improve their supply lines faster than we could bomb them
and the North never did give up their resolve to fight. "According to the Pentagon Papers, the int
elligence panel within the National Security Council working group...'did not concede very strong ch
ances for breaking the will of Hanoi' with Operation Rolling Thunder. Once set in motion, however,
the massive bombing effort seemed to stiffen rather than soften Hanoi's will to resist, which would
lead to the decision to escalate the war by sending American ground troops to Vietnam," (6:4).
Cha
pter 5 Summary and Doctrinal Implications
President Johnson's Rolling Thunder campaign was initiate
d to try and force the North Vietnamese into peace talks by showing our intent to cause destruction
if they pursued their attacks of South Vietnam. In the process, Johnson focused on targets that he
thought would damage the North's supply chain enough to impede their ability to fight but not enough
to instigate the protection of the North's Red allies. Because of poor planning and the nature of t
he Vietnam war in general, Operation Rolling Thunder did not succeed in any of these objectives. Th
e U.S. underestimated the North's ability and determination and overestimated the ability of air pow
er in an unconventional war. The majority of the targets that were chosen, like roads and bridges,
could be easily rebuilt by the North Vietnamese and thus did little to change the North's ability to
fight. Targets that may have had an impact were off-limits by Johnson for fear of provoking China
or the Soviet Union. The Vietnam war, overall, was heavily constricted by politics, and this was tr
ue for Operation Rolling Thunder as well. These political restrictions were one of the main reasons
that Operation Rolling Thunder failed to meet its objectives as well as being the main reason for u
s failing to meet our objective to protect a free and independent South Vietnam. The failure of Oper
ation Rolling Thunder, and the lack of success of subsequent air campaigns did impact the formulatio
n of airpower doctrine. "Rolling Thunder provides a classic illustration of how not to accomplish a
n air campaign," (2:3). The U.S. military learned from its mistakes and can now apply them to futur
e conflicts. One lesson the U.S. learned was the impact of air power is limited in an unconventiona
l war or in a conflict that is restricted by so many political guidelines. Clodfelter summed up his
lessons learned from Operation Rolling Thunder as: airpower works best in unrestrained conventional
wars, where airpower can concentrate on the enemy to wreck maximum havoc, with the least political
controls on the process. Airpower works least in unconventional guerrilla type warfare where the en
emy's forces are dispersed, the lines of communications are meager, plus political restraints compel
very tight controls on application...it is essentially 'double jeopardy' to give airpower an extrem
ely difficult task, without providing the national will, support and latitude to accomplish necessar
y operational art. (2:5).
These lessons should come as no surprise as they are closely tied to the
Tenets of Airpower. For an air campaign to be successful these should not be ignored. Some of these
lessons learned from Operation Rolling Thunder were quickly applied to the subsequent air campaigns
in Vietnam. In Operation Linebacker I and II, for example, Nixon gave military commanders much mor
e flexibility. "Unlike Johnson's planning and regulations for each bombing mission, Nixon gave them
the power to decide when and how targets would be destroyed," (4:4). The nature of the overall war
still limited the effectiveness of these campaigns, however, at least these bombings were planned b
y the military instead of by the politicians. Bibliography
1."Air Power Over Vietnam," www.danshist
ory.com.
2.Kee, Randy, Maj, USAF, "Are There Limits to Airpower? A Critical Review of Mark Clodfel
ter's 'The Limits of Airpower,' From the Perspective of the 1990's," www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil.
3.Nalty, Bernard C., "An Uncommon War: The U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia," www.airforcehistory.hq
.af.mil.
4."Rain of Fire or Rain of Failure: An Analysis of Saturation Bombing," www.people.ucsc.ed
u.
5.Torres, G., "Operation Rolling Thunder March 1965," www.gfsnet.org.
6.Wilson, Colonel Willia
m, U.S. Army (ret.), "The Infamous Pentagon Papers give insights into Johnson administration's think
ing on the Vietnam War," 1997, www.thehistorynet.com.
vietnam operation rolling thunder chapter in
troduction operation rolling thunder frequently interrupted bombing campaign that began february con
tinued until october during this period force navy aircraft engaged bombing campaign designed force
minh abandon ambition take over south vietnam operation began primarily diplomatic signal impress ha
noi with america determination warning north vietnamese that violence would increase until minh gave
secondly intended bolster sagging morale south vietnamese additionally targets were supposedly chos
en damage supply lines between hanoi their soldiers fighting south vietnam this damage supply chain
began increase importance determined that will north being broken this campaign paper will evaluate
strategy saturation bombing used intends show rolling thunder complete udder failure objectives cost
lives hundreds american servicemen chapter conflict background conflict longest america ever fought
against foreign power french indian american revolution being only other conflicts were longer dura
tion involvement initialing just helping train vietnamese army lasted until april when finally colla
psed heaviest involvement occurred from taking lives some american women with another being wounded
main goal involvement conflict preserve independence communist means employed attain objective well
relations with changed throughout conventional fought within maze political influences each these fa
ctors weighed heavily success campaigns within like greatly changed prevailing military doctrine tim
e prevailing thoughts military doctrine time technique known saturation carpet saturation defined dr
opping large amount bombs area varying size over over again there virtually nothing left bomb most m
odern conflicts used supply lines decimate enemy making capabilities believed support vital part eff
ort combination ground troops tried three separate campaigns linebacker linebacker they each similar
varying objectives each achieving their objectives varying degrees success what they proved will ef
fective combat situations fact only effective conventional warfare relatively free political restrai
nts combat environment military analyst mark clodfelter believed airpower decisive element force con
ventional nuclear provided tenets airpower were stuck airpower application limited political restrai
nts even though clodfelter defender even acknowledges would most effective environment similar chapt
er strategy analysis primarily work lyndon johnson original thinking behind plan power would used no
rth into peace talks pursued conquest power serve coercive stick intensity gradually escalated also
provided carrot united states could reward hanoi reducing level operations calling them entirely lim
iting ending attacks lyndon johnson chose choice targets sometimes against what intelligence suggest
ed targets chosen more their impact morale either improving damaging than value choice also chosen a
ccording restraints johnson administration imposed strict limits could attacked china soviet union s
een defenders communism might intervene faced defeat consequently administration tried punish withou
t provoking nations believed protectors national interests relationships seemed much important desig
n entire actual success interests course confined actions ethical rules want harm civilians during t
hese bombings costs also they affect relationships other communist nations relation rules engagement
placed many restrictions armed forces prohibited within miles chinese border miles miles haiphong m
ajor port placing capital haiphong surrounding areas limits prevented from attacking nearly crucial
effort enemy additionally much annoyance generals enemy bases could attacked fear killing soviet tec
hnicians during early part even deadly surface missile sites attacked fully operational firing missi
les planes included limit sites least initially high value such petroleum lubricant storage faciliti
es electric generation plants many dismayed these requests since seemed most personnel only civilian
should limits instead listening many advisors opted design personally controlled target restricted
small scale limited endeavor very gradual rate increase very officials actual expertise involved pla
nning president failed badly understanding targeting science described clodfelter president provided
designed targeting lists which subsequently circumvented ultimately disregarded president personal
insecurity disdain impetus believe advisors alone national perspective orchestrate accomplish vague
however neither suited qualified personally aerial therefore designed politically militarily which u
ltimately poor results discussed later lack early forced decide ground forces necessary protect inde
pendent communist therefore thinking behind changed from primary attack mode intimidation supporting
ground advisers considered complementary efforts together provide shield behind which armed forces
prepare defend country once americans reduced threat manageable proportions course fantasy goal neve
r accomplished became primarily support means damage chain objective finally increased where allowed
bombed increased include transportation storage nation industries supposed result blow morale inhib
it ability fight reality however always able retain initiative able maintain level fighting lines ma
tter damaged bombings support alternate plans common pilots other personnel little change outcome fi
ghting thought more value should have been selected general lemay others argued rather than resolve
should blows rapid sharp impact felt immediately battlefield well leadership administration chose di
sregard ideas plans chose instead pursue picky gradual first major others little else learn planning
knew previous wars been historically very successful breaking resolve come full realization have lo
oked back onto korean insights conditions similar differing considerations between conflicts have be
en little help able learn failings major campaigns apply future importantly unconventional constrain
ts execution discussed previously starting just demilitarized zone progressively moved toward went t
actical fighter wings waged brunt majority missions carried planes based thailand navy squadrons fly
ing yankee station code name carriers based china flew fighter bomber sorties sorties dropping tons
bombs aircraft lost airmen lost lives divided into five phases first phase lasted march june show nu
mber different importance first phase nothing impact actions second phase lasted july june focused m
oveable including trains trainyards boats trucks second massive failure army whose sole purpose repa
ir transportation system caused well build roads bridges railways transportation systems built faste
r than bomb them approximately aircraft lost three month june manage destroy three fourths fuel howe
ver seemed affect ability fight finally allowed once limit october four retracted march five limitin
g moving down throughout southern panhandle halted october layout looks planned fashion words mcnama
ra down plan five phases beginning instead appear subsequent back plans initiated before failed achi
eve desired results implementing phases stopped after possibly second failed years pursued meet fail
ure planning because underestimated because resiliency persistence supplies troops sent nearly doubl
ed every year continued system capable handling times much traffic through panhandle simply unconven
tional warfare tactics developed into sporadic battles fought guerrilla style stop there nothing bom
b because country virtually making capabilities armor weapons ammunition came china soviet union gra
dual application contributed between bombings improve defenses weapons imported union heavily defend
ed defended antiaircraft weapons result damaging defeating repair improve faster them never give res
olve fight according pentagon papers intelligence panel national security council working group conc
ede strong chances breaking once motion massive effort stiffen rather soften resist lead decision es
calate sending troops summary doctrinal implications initiated peace talks showing intent cause dest
ruction pursued attacks process focused thought chain enough impede ability enough instigate protect
ion allies poor nature general succeed underestimated determination overestimated unconventional maj
ority like roads bridges easily rebuilt thus change fear provoking overall heavily constricted polit
ics true restrictions main reasons meet main reason failing meet objective protect free independent
lack subsequent formulation doctrine provides classic illustration accomplish learned mistakes apply
future lesson learned limited restricted guidelines summed lessons learned works best unrestrained
wars where concentrate wreck maximum havoc least controls process works least guerrilla type warfare
where dispersed communications meager plus compel tight controls application essentially double jeo
pardy give extremely difficult task without providing latitude accomplish necessary operational less
ons come surprise closely tied tenets successful ignored some lessons quickly applied subsequent lin
ebacker example nixon gave commanders more flexibility unlike regulations mission nixon gave decide
when destroyed nature overall still effectiveness planned politicians bibliography danshistory randy
usaf there critical review mark perspective maxwell nalty bernard uncommon southeast asia airforceh
istory rain fire rain analysis people ucsc torres march gfsnet wilson colonel william army infamous
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