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Business and Environmental Ethics
Author(s): W. Michael Hoffman
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Source: Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Apr., 1991), pp. 169-184
Published by: Philosophy Documentation Center
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BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTALETHICS
W.MichaelHoffman
A6stract:This paper explores some
interconnectionsbetween the
business and environmentalethics movements.The firstsection
argues that business has obligationsto protect the environment
over and above whatis requiredby environmentallawand that it
should cooperate and interactwith governmentin establishing
environmental regulation. Business must develop and demonstrate environmentalmoral leadership. The second section exposes the danger of using the rationaleof "good ethics is good
business'tas a basis forsuchbusiness moralleadershipin both the
business and environmentalethics movements.The thirdsection
cautionsagainstthe moralshallownessinherentin the position or
in the promotional strategy of ecological homocentrismwhich
claims that society, includingbusiness, ought to protectthe environmentsolely because of harmdone to humanbeings and human
interests. This paper urges business and environmentalethicists
to promote broader and deeper moral perspectives than ones
based on mere self-interest or human interest. Otherwiseboth
movementswill come up ethicallyshort.
THE businessethics movement,frommy perspective,is still on the
l march.Andthe environmental
movement,afterbeingsomewhatsilent for the past twentyyears,has once againcapturedour attention
promisingto be a majorsocial force in the 1990s.Muchwill be written
in the nextfew yearstryingto tie togetherthesetwo movements.This is
one sucheffort.
Concernover the environmentis not new. Warningscame out of the
1960s in the formof burningrivers,dyinglakes,andoil-fouledoceans.
Radioactivitywas foundin our food, DDT in mother'smilk, lead and
mercuryin ourwater.Everybreathof air in the NorthAmericanhemispherewas reportedas contaminated.
Somesaid theseweretrulywarnings fromPlanetEarthof eco-catastrophe,
unlesswe couldfind limitsto
ourgrowthandchangesin ourlifestyle.
Overthe pastfew yearsPlanetEarthbeganto speakto us even more
(C)1991. Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 1, Issue 2. ISSN 1052-1SOX. 0169-0184.
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BUSINESSETHICSQUARTERLY
loudly thanbefore, and we began to listen more thanbefore. The message
was ominous, somewhat akin to God warning Noah. It spoke through
droughts,heat waves, and forest fires, raisingfears of global warmingdue
to the buildup of carbon dioxide and other gases in the atmosphere.It
warnedus by raw sewage and medical wastes washing up on our beaches,
and by devastatingoil spills one despoilingPrinceWilliamSoundand its
wildlife to such an extent that it made us weep. It spoke to us through
increasedskin cancersanddiscoveriesof holes in the ozone layercausedby
ouruse of chlorofluorocarbons.
It droveits message homethroughthe rapid
anddangerouscuttingandburningof ourprimitiveforests at the rateof one
football field a second, leaving us even more vulnerableto greenhouse
gases like carbon dioxide and eliminatingscores of irreplaceablespecies
daily. It raineddown on us in the form of acid, defoliatingour forests and
poisoning our lakes and streams. Its warnings were found on barges
roaming the seas for places to dump tons of toxic incineratorash. And
its message exploded in our faces at Chernobyl and Bhopal, reminding
us of past warnings at Three Mile Island and Love Canal.
SenatorAlbert Gore said in 1988: XThefact that we face an ecological
crisis without any precedentin historic times is no longer a matterof any
dispute worthy of recognition."l The question, he continued, is not
whetherthere is a problem, but how we will address it. This will be the
focal point for a public policy debate which requires the full participation of two of its major players- business and government. The debate
must clarify such fundamental questions as: (1) What obligation does
business have to help with our environmental crisis? (2) What is the
properrelationship between business and government, especially when
facedwith a social problem of the magnitudeof the environmentcrisis?
And (3) what rationale should be used for making and justifying decisions to protect the environment?Corporations,and society in general
forthat matter, have yet to answer these questions satisfactorily. In the
firstsection of this paperI will briefly addressthe first two questions. In
thefinal two sections I will say a few things about the third question.
I.
In a 1989 keynote address before the ZBusiness,Ethics and the Environment"conference at the Center for Business Ethics, Norman Bowie
offeredsome answers to the first two questions.
Business does not have an obligation to protect the environmentover
BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTALETHICS
171
and above what is required by law; howevers it does have a moral
obligation to avoid interveningin the political arena in orderto defeat
or weaken environmentallegislation.2
I disagree with Bowie on both counts.
Bowie's first point is very Friedmanesque.3The social responsibility
of business is to produce goods and services and to make profit for its
shareholders, while playing within the rules of the market game. These
rules, including those to protect the environment,are set by the government and the courts. To do more than is required by these rules is,
according to this position, unfair to business. In order to perform its
properfunction, every business must respond to the marketand operate
in the same arena as its competitors. As Bowie puts this:
An injunctionto assist in solving societal problems[includingdepletion
of natural resoutces and pollution] makes impossible demands on a
corporationbecause, at the practical level, it ignores the impact that
such activities have on profit.4
If, as Bowie claims, consumers are not willing to respondto the cost and
use of environmentally friendly products and actions, then it is not the
responsibility of business to respond or correct such marketfailure.
Bowie's second point is a radicaldeparturefrom this classical position
in contending that business should not lobby against the government's
process to set environmentalregulations. To quote Bowie:
Far too many corporationstry to have their cake and eat it too. They
argue that it is the job of governmentto correctfor marketfailure and
then they use their influence and money to defeat or water down regulations designed to conserve and protectthe environment.S
Bowie only recommends this abstinence of corporate lobbying in the
case of environmentalregulations. He is particularlyconcerned that politicians, ever mindful of their reelection status, are already reluctantto
pass environmental legislation which has huge immediate costs and in
most cases very long-term benefits. This makes the obligations of business to refrain from opposing such legislation a justified special case.
I can understand why Bowie argues these points. He seems to be
responding to two extreme approaches,both of which are inappropriate.
Let me illustrate these extremes by the following two stories.
At the Center's First National Conferenceon Business Ethics, Harvard
Business School Professor George Cabot Lodge told of a friend who
owned a paper company on the banks of a New England stream. On the
first EarthDay in 1970, his friend was convertedto the cause of environ-
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BUSINESSETHICSQUARTERLY
mentalprotection.He becamedeterminedto stop his company'spollution of the stream,and marchedoff to put his new-foundreligioninto
action.Later,Lodgelearnedhis friendwentbroke,so he wentto investigate.Radiatinga kindof ethicalpurity,the friendtold Lodgethathe
spentmillions to stop the pollutionand thus could no longercompete
with otherfirmsthatdid not follow his example.So the companywent
under,500 peoplelost theirjobs, andthe streamremainedpolluted.
WhenLodgeaskedwhy his friendhadn'tsoughthelpfromthe stateor
federalgovernmentfor stricterstandardsfor everyone,the manreplied
that was not the Americanway, that governmentshouldnot interfere
withbusinessactivity,andthatprivateenterprisecoulddo thejob alone.
In fact, he felt it was the social responsibilityof businessto solve environmentalproblems,so he was proudthat he had set an examplefor
othersto follow.
The second story portraysanotherextreme.A few years ago "Sixty
Minutes"intervieweda managerof a chemicalcompanythatwas dischargingeffluent into a river in upstateNew York.At the time, the
dumpingwas legal, thougha bill to preventit was pendingin Congress.
The managerremarkedthat he hopedthe bill would pass, and that he
certainlywouldsupportit as a responsiblecitizen.However,he also said
he approvedof his companybs
effortsto defeatthe bill andof the firm's
policyof dumpingwastesin themeantime.Afterall, isn't theproperrole
of businessto makeas muchprofitas possiblewithintheboundsof law?
Makingthe laws-setting the rulesof the game is the role of government,not business.While wearinghis businesshat the managerhad a
jobto do, even if it meantdoingsomethingthathe stronglyopposedas
aprivatecitizen.
Bothstoriesrevealincorrectanswersto thequestionsposedearlier,the
proofof whichis foundin the fact thatneitherthe New Englandstream
northe New Yorkriverwas madeany cleaner.Bowie's pointsare intendedto block these two extremes.But to avoid these extremes,as
Bowiedoes, missestherealmanagerialandethicalfailureof thestories.
Althoughthe papercompanyownerandthe chemicalcompanymanager
hadradicallydifferentviews of the ethicalresponsibilitiesof business,
bothsaw businessand governmentperformingseparateroles, andneitherfelt thatbusinessoughtto cooperatewithgovernmentto solve environmental
problems.6
If the businessethicsmovementhasled us anywherein thepastfifteen
BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTALETHICS
173
years, it is to the position that business has an ethical responsibility to
become a more active partnerin dealing with social concerns. Business
must creatively find ways to become a partof solutions, ratherthanbeing
a part of problems. Corporationscan and must develop a conscience, as
Ken Goodpasterand others have argued-and this includes an environmental conscience.7 Corporations should not isolate themselves from
participation in solving our environmental problems, leaving it up to
others to find the answers and to tell them what not to do.
Corporationshave special knowledge, expertise, and resources which
are invaluable in dealing with the environmentalcrisis. Society needs the
ethical vision and cooperation of all its players to solve its most urgent
problems, especially one that involves the very survival of the planet
itself. Business must work with government to find appropriatesolutions. It should lobby for good environmental legislation and lobby
against bad legislation, ratherthan isolating itself from the legislative
process as Bowie suggests. It should not be ethically quixotic and try to
go it alone, as our paper company owner tried to do, nor should it be
ethically inauthenticand fight against what it believes to be environmentally sound policy, as our chemical companymanagertried to do. Instead
business must develop and demonstratemoral leadership.
There are examples of corporations demonstrating such leadership,
even when this has been a risk to their self-interest. In the area of environmental moral leadership one might cite DuPont's discontinuing its
Freon products, a $750-million-a-year-business, because of their possible negative effects on the ozone layer, and Proctorand Gamble's manufacture of concentrated fabric softener and detergents which require
less packaging. But some might argue, as Bowie does, that the real
burdenfor environmentalchange lies with consumers, not with corporations. If we as consumers are willing to accept the harm done to the
environmentby favoring environmentallyunfriendly products,corporations have no moral obligation to change so long as they obey environmental law. This is even more the case, so the argument goes, if
corporationsmust take risks or sacrifice profits to do so.
This argument fails to recognize that we quite often act differently
when we think of ourselves as consumers than when we think of ourselves as citizens. Mark Sagoff, concerned about our over-reliance on
economic solutions, clearly characterizesthis dual natureof our decision
making.8 As consumers, we act more often than not for ourselves; as
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BUSINESS ETHICSQUARTERLY
citizens,we takeon a broadervisionanddo whatis in the best interests
of thecommunity.I oftenshopforthingsI don'tvotefor.I mightsupport
recyclingreferendums,but buy productsin nonreturnable
bottles.I am
not proudof this, butI suspectthis is moretrueof most of us thannot.
TQstakeourenvironmental
futureon ourconsumerwillingnessto payis
surelyshortsighted,perhapseven disastrous.
I am not saying that we shouldnot work to be ethicallycommitted
citizenconsumers,andinvestorsfor thatmatter.I agreewithBowie that
iiconsumersbeara far greaterresponsibilityfor preservingandprotecting the environmentthanthey have actuallyexercised,"9but activities
whichaffectthe environmentshouldnotbe left up to whatwe, actingas
consumers,arewillingto tolerateor accept.TQdo this wouldbe eOuse a
market-based
methodof reasoningto decideon an issuewhichshouldbe
determinedinsteadon the basisof ourethicalresponsibilitiesas a memberof a social community.
Furthermoreconsumersdon't make the products,providethe services, or enact the legislation which can be either environmentally
friendlyor unfriendly.Grassroots boycotts and lobbyingefforts are
important,but we also need leadershipand mutualcooperationfrom
businessand governmentin settingforthethicalenvironmentalpolicy.
EvenBowie admitsthatperhapsbusinesshas a responsibilityto educate
the publicandpromoteenvironmentally
responsiblebehavior.But I am
suggesting that corporatemoral leadership goes far beyond public educational campaigns. It requiresmoral vision, commitmentsand courage,
and involves risk and sacrifice. I think business is capable of such a
challenge.Some are even engagingin such a challenge.Certainlythe
businessethics movementshoulddo nothingshortof encouragingsuch
leadership.I feel moralityclemandssuchleadership.
II.
If business has an ethical responsibilityto the environmentwhich
goes beyond obeying environmentallaw, what criterionshould be
used to guide andjustify such action?Manycorporationsare making
environmentallyfriendlydecisionswherethey see thereare profitsto
be made by doing so. They are wrappingthemselves in green where
they see a greenbottomline as a consequence.This rationaleis also
being used as a strategyby environmentaliststo encouragemorebusinesses to become environmentallyconscientious.In December 1989
BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTALETHICS
175
the highly respectedWorldwatchInstitutepublishedan articleby one
of its senior researchersentitledZDoingWell by Doing Goodb'which
gives numerousexamples of corporationsimprovingtheir pocketbooks by improvingthe environment.It concludes by saying that
'*fortunately,businesses that work to preservethe environmentcan
also makea buck.''l°
entitled"Profit
documentary
In a recentPublicBroadcastCorporation
the Earth,"severalefforts are depictedof whatis called the "newenwhich inducescorporationsto do thingsfor the envivironmentalismw
Defense
ronmentby appealingto theirself-interest.The Environmental
Fundis shownencouragingagribusinessin SouthernCaliforniato irrigate moreefficientlyandprofitby selling the watersavedto the city of
Los Angeles.Thisin turnwill helpsave MonoLake.EDFis also shown
lobbyingfor emissionstradingthatwouldallowutilitycompanieswhich
are undertheir emission allotmentsto sell their i'pollutionrights"to
thosecompanieswhichareovertheirallotments.Thisis for the purpose
of reducingacidrain.Thusthefrequentstrategyof thenewenvironmenproblemsby finding
talistsis to get businessto helpsolve environmental
profitableor virtuallycostless ways for themto participate.They feel
is theonly wayto save theearth.By
thatcompromise,notconfrontation,
using the tools of the free enterprisesystem,they are in searchof winwin solutions, believing that such solutionsare necessaryto take us
beyondwhatwe haveso farbeenable to achieve.
I amnot opposedto theseefforts;in mostcases I thinkthey shouldbe
encouraged.Thereis certainlynothingwrongwithmakingmoneywhile
just as thereis nothingwrongwith feeling
protectingthe environment,
goodaboutdoingone's duty.Butif businessis adoptingorbeingencouris good business,
aged to adoptthe view that good environmentalism
ethicsmovementthenI thinkthisposesa dangerfortheenvironmental
a dangerwhichhas an analogyin the businessethicsmovement.
As we all know,the positionthatgoodethicsis goodbusinessis being
executivestojustifythebuildingof ethics
usedmoreandmoreby corporate
to gainnewclients.
intotheircompaniesandby businessethicsconsultants
reportstates:
Ethics
Corporate
Roundtable's
Business
the
Forexample,
The corporatecommunityshouldcontinueto refine and renewefforts to improve performanceand manage change effectively
throughprogramsin corporateethics...corporateethicsis a strategic
in
in thiseraof fietcecompetitiveness
key to survivalandprofitability
a globaleconomy.1l
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BUSINESSETHICSQUARTERLY
And,for instance,the book The Power of Ethical Managementby Kenneth81anchardandNormanVincentPealestatesin big redletterson the
coverjacketthatZIntegrity
Pays!YouDon'tHaveto Cheatto Win."The
blurbon the inside cover promisesthat the book Zgiveshard-hitting,
practical,ethical strategiesthat build profits,productivity,and longtermsuccess.''l2Whoeverwouldhaveguessedthatbusinessethicscould
deliverall that!Insuchwaysbusinessethicsgetsmarketedas thenewest
curefor whatails corporateAmerica.
Is the rationalethat good ethics is good businessa properone for
businessethics?I thinknot. Onethingthatthestudyof ethicshastaught
us overthepast2500 yearsis thatbeingethicalmayon occasionrequire
thatwe placethe interestsof othersaheadof or at least on parwith our
own interests.Andthis impliesthatthe ethicalthingto do, the morally
rightthing to do, may not be in our own self-interest.Whathappens
whenthe rightthingis not the best thingfor the business?
Althoughin most cases good ethics may be good business,it should
not be advancedas the only or even the mainreasonfor doingbusiness
ethically.Whenthe crunchcomes,whenethicsconflictswiththe firm's
interests,any ethicsprogramthathas not alreadyfacedup to this possibility is doomedto fail because it will undercutthe rationaleof the
programitself. We shouldpromotebusinessethics, not becausegood
ethicsis goodbusiness,butbecausewe aremorallyrequiredto adoptthe
moralpointof view in all ourdealings andbusinessis no exception.In
business,as in all otherhumanendeavors,we mustbe preparedto pay
the costs of ethicalbehavior.
Thereis a similardangerin the environmental
movementwithcorporationschoosingor beingwooedto be environmentally
friendlyon the
groundsthatit will be in theirself-interest.Thereis the riskof participatingin the movementfor the wrongreasons.But whatdoes it matter
if businesscooperatesfor reasonsotherthantherightreasons,as longas
it cooperates?It mattersif businessbelieves or is led to believe thatit
onlyhasa dutyto be environmentally
conscientiousin thosecaseswhere
such actionseitherrequireno sacrificeor actuallymakea profit.AndI
amafraidthis is exactlywhatis happening.I supposeit wouldn'tmatter
if the environmental
cooperationof businesswas only neededin those
cases whereit was also in business'self-interest.But this is surelynot
the case,unlessone beginsto reallyreachandtalkaboutthatamorphous
conceptXlong-term"
self-interest.Moreover,long-terminterests,I sus-
BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTALETHICS
177
have in
pect, are not what corporationsor the new environmentalists
action.
mindin usingself-interestas a reasonfor environmental
into
I amnotsayingwe shouldabandonattemptsto enticecorporations
out
by
pointing
and in otherways,
being ethical,bothenvironmentally
and providingopportunitieswheregood ethics is good business.And
therearemanyplaceswheresuch attemptsfit well in boththe business
ethicsmovements.Butwe mustbe carefulnot to cast
andenvironmental
this as the properguidelinefor business'ethicalresponsibility.Because
whenit is discoveredthatmanyethicalactionsarenot necessarilygood
for business,at leastin the short-run,thenthe rationalebasedon self-interestwill come up morallyshort,andbothethicalmovementswill be
seen as deceptiveandshallow.
III.
Whatis the properrationaleforresponsiblebusinessactiontowardthe
environment?A minimalistprincipleis to refrainfromcausingor preharm,becausefailureto do so would
vent the causingof unwarranted
violatecertainmoralrightsnot to be harmed.Thereis, of course,much
dueto conflictof rights
debateoverwhatharmsareindeedunwarranted
andquestionsaboutwhethersome harmsare offset by certainbenefits.
NormBowie, for example,uses the harmprinciple,but contendsthat
law.Robert
businessdoesnotviolateit as longas it obeysenvironmental
Frederick,on theotherhand,convincinglyarguesthattheharmprinciple
morallyrequiresbusinessto find waysto preventcertainharmit causes
law.'3
even if suchharmviolatesno environmental
However,Fredericksanalysisof the harmprincipleis largelycast in
terms of harmcausedto humanbeings and the violationof rightsof
humanbeings. Even when he hintsat the possiblemoralobligationto
harm,he
protectthe environmentwhen no one is causedunwarranted
doesso by suggestingthatwe lookto whatwe, as humanbeings,value.14
This is very much in keepingwith a humanisticposition of environmental ethics which claims that only humanbeings have rights or
moralstandingbecause only humanbeings have intrinsicvalue. We
may have duties with regardto nonhumanthings (penguins, trees,
islands, etc.) but only if suchdutiesarederivativefromdutieswe have
towardhumanbeings.Nonhumanthingsare valuableonly if valuedby
humanbeings.
Such a positionis in contrastto a naturalisticview of environmental
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BUSINESSETHICSQUARTERLY
ethicswhichholdsthatnaturalthingsotherthanhumanbeingsareintrinsically valuableand have, therefore,moralstanding.Some naturalistic
environmentalists
only includeothersentientanimalsin the framework
of being deservingof moral consideration;others include all things
whicharealive or whicharean integralpartof an ecosystem.Thislatter
view is sometimescalleda biocentricenvironmental
ethicas opposedto
the homocentricview which sees all moralclaims in termsof human
beings and their interests.Some characterizethese two views as deep
versus shallowecology.
Theliteratureon thesetwo positionsis vastandthe debateis ongoing.
Theconflictbetweenthemgoes to the heartof environmental
ethicsand
is crucialto our makingof environmental
policy andto our perception
of moraldutiesto the environment,includingbusiness'.I stronglyfavor
the biocentricview. And althoughthis is tlOt the place to try to adequatelyarguefor it, let me unfurlits bannerforjust a moment.
A versionof R. Routley's'*lastman"examplelSmightgo something
like this: Supposeyou were the last survivinghumanbeing and were
soon to die from nuclearpoisoning,as all other humanand sentient
animalshavediedbeforeyou. Supposealso thatit is withinyourpower
to destroyall remaininglife, or to makeit simpler,the last tree which
couldcontinueto flourishandpropagateif left alone.Furthermore
you
will not sufferif you do not destroyit. Wouldyou do anythingwrongby
cuttingit down?Thedeeperecologicalview wouldsay yes becauseyou
wouldbe destroyingsomethingthathas valuein andof itself, thusmaking the worlda poorerplace.
It mightbe arguedthatthe only reasonwe mayfind the treevaluable
is because humanbeings generallyfind trees of value either practically or aesthetically,ratherthanthe atomsor molecules they might
turninto if changed from their present form. The issue is whether
the tree has value only in its relationto humanbeings or whetherit
has a value deserving of moralconsiderationinherentin itself in its
present form. The biocentric position holds that when we find
something wrong with destroying the tree, as we should, we do so
because we are respondingto an intrinsic value in the naturalobject, not to a value we give to it. This is a view which arguesagainst
a humanisticenvironmentalethic and which urges us to channelour
moralobligationsaccordingly.
Whyshouldone believethatnonhumanlivingthingsornaturalobjects
BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTALETHICS
179
formingintegralpartsof ecosystems have intrinsicvalue?One can respond
to this question by pointing out the serious weaknesses and problemsof
human chauvinism.l6More complete responses lay out a frameworkof
concepts and beliefs which provides a coherentpicture of the biocentric
view with humanbeings as a partof a more holistic value system. But the
final answerto the questionhinges on what criterionone decides to use for
determiningmoral worth-rationality, sentience, or a deeper biocentric
one. Why should we adoptthe principleof attributingintrinsicvalue to all
living beings, or even to all naturalobjects, ratherthan just to human
beings? I suspect Arne Naess gives as good an answeras can be given.
Facedwith the ever returningquestionof 'Why?,'we have to stop
somewhere.Hereis a placewherewe well mightstop.Weshalladmit
thatthe value in itself is somethingshownin intuition.We attribute
intrinsicvalueto ourselvesandournearestsandthe validityof further
identiElcation
canbe contested,andis contestedby many.Thenegation
mayshowever,alsobe attackedthrougha seriesof 'whys?'Ultimately,
we arein thesamehumanpredicament
of havingto startsomewhere,at
leastforthemoment.Wemuststopsomewhereandtreatwherewe then
standas a foundation.l7
In the final analysis, environmental biocentrism is adopted or not depending on whether it is seen to provide a deeper, richer, and more
ethically compelling view of the natureof things.
If this deeper ecological position is correct, then it ought to be reflected in the environmentalmovement.Unfortunately,for the most part,
I do not think this is being done, and there is a price to be paid for not
doing so. Moreover, I fear that even those who are of the biocentric
persuasion are using homocentric language and strategies to bring business and other major players into the movement because they do not
think they will be successful otherwise. They are afraid,and undoubtedly
for good reason, that the large part of society, including business, will
not be moved by argumentsregarding the intrinsic value and rights of
naturalthings. It is difficult enough to get business to recognize and act
c,n their responsibilities to human beings and things of human interest.
Hence many environmentalistsfollow the counsel of Spinoza:
...it is necessarythat while we are endeavoringto attainour purpose...we arecompelled...tospeakin a mannerintelligibleto themultitude...Forwe cangainfromthemultitudeno smalladvantages....l8
I understandthe temptationof environmentalistsemploying a homocentric strategy, just as I understandbusiness ethicists using the rationale
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BUSINESSETHICSQUARTERLY
that good ethics is good business. Both want their importantwork to
succeed. But just as with the good ethics is good business tack, there are
dangers in being a closet ecocentrist. The ethicists in both cases fail to
reveal the deeper moral base of their positions because it's a hardersell.
Business ethics gets marketed in terms of self-interest, environmental
ethics in terms of human interest.
A major concern in using the homocentric view to formulate policy
and law is that nonhumannaturewill not receive the moral consideration
it deserves. It might be argued, however, that by appealing to the interests and rights of humanbeings, in most cases natureas a whole will be
protected. That is, if we are concerned about a wilderness area, we can
argue that its survival is importantto future generations who will otherwise be deprived of contact with its unique wildlife. We can also argue
that it is importantto the aesthetic pleasureof certain individuals or that,
if it is destroyed, other recreationalareas will become overcrowded. In
this way we stand a chance to save the wilderness area without having to
refer to our moral obligations to respect the intrinsic value of the spotted
owl or of the old-growth forest. This is simply being strategically savvy.
To trot out our deeper ecological moral convictions runs the risk of our
efforts being ignored, even ridiculed, by business leaders and policy
makers. It also runs head-on against a barrageof counter argumentsthat
human interests take precedence over nonhumaninterests. In any event
it will not be in the best interest of the wilderness area we are trying to
protect. Furthermore,all of the above homocentricargumentshappento
be true people will suffer if the wilderness area is destroyed.
In most cases, what is in the best interests of human beings may also
be in the best interests of the rest of nature. After all, we are in our
present environmental crisis in large part because we have not been
ecologically intelligent about what is in our own interest just as business has encounteredmuch troublebecause it has failed to see its interest
in being ethically sensitive. But if the environmentalmovement relies
only on arguments based on human interests, then it perpetuates the
danger of making environmental policy and law on the basis of our
strong inclination to fulfill our immediateself-interests, on the basis of
our consumer viewpoints, on the basis of our willingness to pay. There
will always be a tendency to allow our short-termintereststo eclipse our
long-terminterestsand the long-terminterestof humanityitself. Without
some grounding in a deeper environmental ethic with obligations to
BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTALETHICS
181
nonhumannaturalthings, then the temptationto view our own interests
in disastrously short-termways is that much more encouraged. The biocentric view helps to block this temptation.
Furthermore,there are many cases where what is in human interest is
not in the interest of other naturalthings. Examples range from killing
leopards for stylish coats to destroying a forest to build a golf course. I
am not convinced thathomocentricarguments,even those based on longterm humaninterests, have much force in protectingthe interests of such
naturalthings. Attemptsto make these interests coincide might be made,
but the point is that from a homocentricpoint of view the leopardand the
forest have no morally relevant interests to consider. It is simply fortuitous if nonhumannatural interests coincide with human interests, and
are thereby valued and protected. Let us take an example from the work
of ChristopherStone. Suppose a streamhas been polluted by a business.
Froma homocentricpoint of view, which serves as the basis for our legal
system, we can only correct the problem through finding some harm
done to human beings who use the stream. Reparationfor such harm
might involve cessation of the pollution and restorationof the stream,
but it is also possible that the business might settle with the people by
paying them for their damages and continue to pollute the stream.
Homocentrismprovides no way for the stream to be made whole again
unless it is in the interestsof humanbeings to do so. In short it is possible
for humanbeings to sell out the stream.l9
I am not saying that human interests cannot take precedence over
nonhumaninterests when there are conflicts. For this we need to come
up with criteria for deciding on interspecific conflicts of interests, just
as we do for intraspecific conflicts of interest among human beings.20
But this is a different problem from holding that nonhuman natural
things have no interests or value deserving of moral consideration.There
are times when causing harm to naturalthings is morally unjustifiable
when there are no significant human interests involved and even when
there are human interests involved. But only a deeper ecological ethic
than homocentrismwill allow us to defend this.
Finally, perhapsthe greatest danger that biocentric environmentalists
run in using homocentric strategies to furtherthe movement is the loss
of the very insight that groundedtheir ethical concern in the first place.
This is nicely put by Lawrence Tribe:
Whatthe environmentalist
may not perceiveis that,by couchinglliSclaitn
182
BUSINESSETHICSQUARTERLY
in termsof humanself-interest-byarticulating
environmental
goals
whollyin termsof humanneedsandpreferences he maybe helping
tc legitimatea systemof discoursewhichso structures
humanthought
andfeelingas to erode,overthe longrunstheverysenseof obligation
whichprovidedthe initialimpetusfor his own protectiveefforts.21
Business ethicists run a similar risk in couching their claims in terms of
business self-interest.
The environmentalmovement must find ways to incorporateand protect the intrinsic value of animal and plant life and even other natural
objects that are integral parts of ecosystems. This must be done without
constantly reducingsuch values to humaninterests. This will, of course,
be difficult, because our conceptual ideology and ethical persuasion is
so dominantly homocentric; however, if we are committed to a deeper
biocentric ethic, then it is vital that we try to find appropriateways to
promoteit. Environmentalimpactstatementsshould make explicit reference to nonhuman natural values. Legal rights for nonhuman natural
things, along the lines of Christopher Stone's proposal, should be
sought.22And naturalisticethical guidelines, such as those suggested by
Holmes Rolston, should be set forth for business to follow when its
activities impact upon ecosystems.23
At the heart of the business ethics movement is its reaction to the
mistaken belief that business only has responsibilities to a narrowset of
its stakeholders, namely its stockholders. Crucial to the environmental
ethics movement is its reaction to the mistaken belief that only human
beings and human interests are deserving of our moral consideration. I
suspect that the beginnings of both movements can be traced to these
respective moral insights. Certainlythe significance of both movements
lies in their search for a broaderand deeper moral perspective. If business and environmental ethicists begin to rely solely on promotional
strategies of self-interest, such as good ethics is good business, and of
human interest) such as homocentrism, then they face the danger of
cuttirlgoff the very roots of their ethical efforts.
Centerf vr Bu.sine.s.Ethic.s,Bentley Collcvgcv
Notes
This paper was originally presented as the Presidential Address to the Societyfor
Bu.sirle.s.sEthic.s, August 10, 1990, San Francisco, CA.
IAlbert Gore, "Whatis Wrolig With Us?" TioJe(January2, 1989), 66.
BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTALETHICS
183
2NormanBowie, ZMorality,Money, and MotorCars,"Business,Ethics, and the
ThePublicPolicyDebale,editedby W.MiehaelHoffman,RobertFrederEnvironment:
iek, andEdwardS. Pet2y,Jr.(New York:QuorumBooks, 1990),p. 89.
3See Milton Friedman,iThe Soeial Responsibilityof BusinessIs to InereaseIts
Profits,"TheNew YorkTimesMagazine(September13, 1970).
4Bowie,p. 91.
SBowie,p. 94.
6RobertFrederiek,AssistantDireetorof the Centerfor BusinessEthics,and I have
developedand writtenthese points together.Frederiekhas also providedme with
invaluableassistaneeon otherpointsin thispaper.
Conscience,"
have an Environmental
7KennethE. Goodpaster,"Cana Corporation
editedby W.MichaelHoffman,Robert
TheCorporation,Ethics,and the EzzvironJneslt,
Frederick,andEdwardS. Petry,Jr.(New York:QuoromBooks, 1990).
8MarkSagoff,ZAtthe Shrineof OurLadyof Fatima,or WhyPoliticalQuestionsAre
Moralar1dCasesirlCs3rporate
Erhics:Readirlgs
Not All Eeonomie,"foundin Busirle.ss
ity, 2nd edition,editedby W.MichaelHoffmanandJenniferMills Moore(New York:
McGraw-Hill,1990),pp. 494-503.
9Bowie,p. 94.
(November/DePolloekShea,ZDoingWellBy DoingGood,"World-Watch
10Cynthia
cember,1989),p. 30.
A.vset,a reportby The BusinessRoundtable,
1lCorporateEthics:A PrimeBusizle.ss
February,i 988, p. 4.
l2KennethBlanchard,andNormanVillcentPeale,ThePowerf)fEthicalMa)la,s,}eR1et
(New York:WilliamMorrowandCompany,Inc., 1988).
presentedat
Protection,"
RightsandEnvironmental
13RobertFrederick,ZIndividual
theAnnualSocietyforBusinessEthiesConfereneein SanFraneiseo,August10 and 11,
1990.
4Frederick.
Ethics,"
andEnvironmental
Chauvinism
Routley,andValRoutley,ZHuman
15Richard
Series,No. 2, editedby DonMannison,Michael
Monograph
Philo.sophy,
Ezlvironrnerltal
NationalUniversity,1980),pp. 121ff.
McRobbie,andRichardRoutley(Australian
16SeePaulW.Taylor,XTheEthicsof RespectforNature,"foundin People,Pezl<g,*ui/l.sw,
andChristinePierce(Belmont,CaliforarlclPlastic Trees,editedby DonaldVanDeVeer
1986),pp. 178-83.Alsosee R. andV.Routley,ZAgainsttheInevitability
nia:Wadsworth,
of the 21.stCetury, edited
foundin EthicLa1ldthe Probleolas
of HumanChauvinism,"
by K. E. Goodpasterand K. M. Sayre(NotreDame:Universityof NotreDamePress,
1979),pp. 36-59.
as a Soureeof DeepEcologicalAttitudes,"Deep Ecol17ArneNaess,wIdentifilcation
ogy, editedby MichaelTobias(SanMarcos,California:AvantBooks, 1988),p. 266.
foundin Phiof the Understanding,"
18Benedictde Spinoza,ZOnthe Improvement
Io.sophyof Berledictde Spitloza,translatedby R. H. M. Elwes (New York:Tudor
PublishingCo., 1936),p. 5.
184
BUSINESSETHICSQUARTERLY
19Christopher
D Stone, ZShouldTteesHave Standing? TowardLegal Rightsfor
NaturatObjects,"foundin People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees,pp. 86-87.
20SeeDonaldVanDeVeer,
ZInterspecific
Justice,"People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees,
pp. 51-66.
21LawrenceH. Tribe,ZWaysNot to ThinkaboutPlasticTrees:New Foundationsfor
Environmental
Law,"foundin People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees,p. 257.
22Stone,pp. 83-96.
23HolmesRolston,III,EnvironmentalEthics (Philadelphia:
TempleUniversityPress,
1988),pp. 301-13.
t)l991. Business Ethics Quarterly,Volume 1, lssue 2. ISSN 1052-1SOX.0169-184.