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Master's Theses
Theses and Dissertations
1936
The Relation of the Schleswig-Holstein Question
to the Unification of Germany: 1865-1866
Katherine Marie Brennan
Loyola University Chicago
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Master's Theses. Paper 68.
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Copyright © 1936 Katherine Marie Brennan
TH3 RELATION OF THE SCHLESV!IG-HOLSTEUi Q.UESTION
TO THE UNIFICATION OF
GERMJu~
1865-1866
by
KATHERINE MA...11IE BRE:t:TI\fAJJ"
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILI..:ME1TT
OF THE REQ.UIREUE1TTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
IN
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY
JUNE,
1936
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Historical Background
1
Chapter I
Convention of Gastein
15
Chapter II
Prussian Attempts at Alliance
37
Chapter III
Leading to War
53
Chapter IV
V/ar Comes
79
Chapter V
War and Peace
101
Appendices
110
Bibliography
124
VITA AVETORIS
Katherine Marie Brennan was born in February 18, 1913, in
Philadelphia, Pa.
Her primary and secondary education, howe-
ever, she received in the Middle West; and in September, 1930
entered Mundelein College, Chicago, Illinois.
In June, 1934
she received the A.B. degree from Mundelein College.
In September, 1934 she entered the Graduate School of
Loyola University as a part-time graduate student in history.
The time since then has been spent in graduate study at the
University.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Historians and diplomats have agreed that the question
of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein was a complicated
one.
Lord Palmerston said "that only three persons in
Eu~ope
were completely acquainted with the truth, the Prince Consort
who was dead, a German professor who was in a lunatic asylumt
--and himself and he had forgotten it."
In spite of this we
venture to consider the relation between the question of the
duchies and the unification of Germany.
In order to understand this relation, it is
know the historical background of the question.
necessa~y
to
In particular
it is necessary to know the facts concerning the union existi
between the two duchies and Denmark, and secondly, those concerning the laws of succession in the duchies and in Denmark.
Because of the conditions that resulted from the union between
the duchies and Denmark and the conflict over the succession,
it was possible for Prussia to interfere in the affairs of the
duchies.
In 1448, Christian I, Count of Oldenburg, became King of
Denmark.
Holstein.
Re also inherited the dukedoms of Schleswig and of
At this time Christian is supposed to have promised
1
the duchies that they would remain undivided.
The union, how-
lGeorg Herbert :Munster-Led~nburgl toli tical Sketches o·t
State 2f Europe f!:2!!! 1814.;.67. Ea. n Urg'h: Edll1onstol1 am!'
Douglas, 1868, 60
~
2
ever, between the duchies and the kingdom was a personal union
only, arising from the fact that the duke of Schleswig-Rolsteil
became the king of Denmark.
Secondly, according to the old
feudal system females could reign in Denmark, but in the duchies the Salic law governed succession.
Thus, on the extinctiol
of the direct male line of the royal house, the kingdom and
duchies would be separated:
the kingdom would pass to the
nearest royal prince while the duchies would pass to the nearest n:ale heir.
Both in the duchies and in the kingdom, nationalism and
liberalism developed, especially during the first part of the
nineteenth century.
For a time the liberals, German and Danisi.t
cooperated, but by 1848 their aims were so divergent that theil
differences had developed into nationalistic antagonisms.
The
national party in the duchies, the Schleswig-Holsteiners, were
imbued with the idea of a mtional German state which was to
include not only Holstein and Lauenburg which were members of
the German Confederation but would also include Schleswig.
The
claims of the Schleswig-Holsteiners were based on the followins
issues:
that Schleswig and Holstein were independent, sover-
eign states and united to Denmark in a personal union only;
that Schleswig and Holstein were inseparably united to one another, hence the name Schleswig-Holstein; and that the succession in the duchies was governed by the Salic law.
The second party was the nationalist party in Denmark
and in this party may be included the Danish nationalists in
Schleswig.
The Eider-Danes as these people were called based
their position on the following points:
that Schleswig was
rightfully a province of the kingdom having been incorporated
in 1721; that the so-called inseparable union between Schleswig and Holstein could not be justified by either law or by
history; and that the succession in the duchies and in the
kingdom was the same and governed by the
~
Regia of 1665
which per.mitted the succession to pass through females.
In
criticigm of these opposing claims, it is true that as a member of the Ger.man Confederation, Holstein was a sovereign
state, but the status of Schleswig is more difficult to determine.
However, it is true that the Eider-Danes were mistaken
in maintaining that Schleswig had been incorporated with the
kingdom.
With regard to the real union of the duchies, "the
Danes were justified in denying the applicability of the medieval charters on which the claim was based--the fact that the
duchies had been fiefs of different suzerains seems conclusive
against it--but a
~.facto
union had developed that had long
been recognized in practice."
Relative to the law of succes-
sion, it is true that the~ Regia had never been formally
promulgated in Schleswig and that the old Salic law still
2
applied.
In 1839 Frederick VI, King of Denmark, was succeeded by
his nephew, Christian VIII.
expected no heir.
Christian had one son from whom h'
Alarmed at the consequences that would fol-
low when the royal male line died out, ngmely, that the duchie
and the kingdom would separate and each go its way under a dif
ferent ruler, the Eider-Danes forced the government's hand.
In 1846 Christian, in response to a question from the Estates
of the Danish Islands, declared through a royal
procl~ation,
known as the Open Letter, that the succession in Schleswig
was the same as that in the kingdom.
Some doubts as to cer-
tain parts of Holstein were expressed, but with regard to the
doubts the government declared that it was exerting itself to
clear them.
This proclamation called forth a burst of indig-
nation both in Germany and in the duchies, but before any
change could be effected the Revolution of 1848 had begun.
In January, 1848 Christian VIII had died.
himself with the Danish democratic party.
His son allied
In March, he issued
a liberal constitution for Denmark and one was planned for the
whole monarchy.
This constitution was to link Schleswig more
closely to the kingdom than to Holstein.
and established a Provisional Government.
The duchies rose
At first the duch-
ies were aided by the people of Prussia, but under pressure
2Lawrence D. Steefel, The Schleswi~ Holstein Question.
Cambridge: Harvard Universrty Press, 1 32,6-'7.
5
from Russia and Great Britain, the Prussians withdrew from the
duchies and made separate peace with Denmark.
The revolt
ended with the Schleswig-Holsteiners in control of Schleswig.
The suppression of the Revolution of 1848 in Germany was ef3
fective in suppressing the revolt in the duchies.
A confer-
ence was held at Olmutz in 1850 and as a result Austrian
troops advanced into Holstein to disband the Schleswig-Holstein army.
Three commissioners Austrian, Prussian, and Dan-
ish administered Holstein; Schleswig was returned to Denmark,
and in 1852 Danish rule was in full operation.
Because it was foreseen that the union between Denmark
and the duchies which had been established by a dynastic accident might be destroyed by another such accident, it was decided to take some measures to stabilize the succession.
The
main line of the ruling dynasty was dying out, and the succession was certain to pass through the female line to the Glucksburg branch of the family.
Schleswig-Holstein, since its suc-
cession was governed by the Salic law, would pass, not to the
Glucksburg her, but to the younger Augustenburg branch.
At a
conference of the great powers held in London in 1852 this suecession was changed and the succession to the Danish throne was
regulated.
col.
The resulting treaty is known as the London Proto-
As a result of this conference the Duke of Augustenburg
3yunroe Smith, Bismarck and German Unitz.
The Columbia Press, l9i5, 25.---
New York:
6
gave up his possessions, and as compensation he received two
million dollars.
He renounced for himself and for his descen4
dants all claims on the duchies. Prince Christian of the Hol- ·
stein GlUcksburg branch was recognized as heir to the whole
Danish monarchy, and was adopted by the King of Denmark.
It
further decreed that Schleswig should be permanently associated with Denmark.
This protocol was signed by Austria and
Prussia as European powers, not as members of the Confederatio •
The German Confederation did not ratify it nor did SchleswigHolstein.
Austria and Prussia in signing the treaty did so
only in light of a previous treaty with Denmark by which she
bound herself to respect the autonomy of Schleswig and Holstei
not to incorporate Schleswig nor to put any obstacle in the
5
way of the use of the Ger.man language.
Denmark, unfortunately,
did not observe these agreements.
From 1852 to 1863 Denmark by her actions succeeded in
making herself very unpopular in the duchies.
party in Copenhagen was in power.
The Democratic
The leaders were imbued
with the ever constant idea of incorporating Schleswig and to
make the Eider the southern boundary of Denmark.
The engage-
.
4cambridge History 2f British Foreign Policl• Edited by
S1r A.W1 Ward and G.P. Gooch. New York: The Macmillan Co~­
pa~, 1~23, II~ 539 1
This reference states that the Duke did
not sign away nis r1ghts.
5 Smith, 26-27.
7
menta toward the duchies that Denmark had assumed in the
ty with Austria and Prussia in 1852 had not been kept.
t~ea-
Pub·
lic opinion in Germany was in favor of the oppressed duchies
and the unpopular middle states sought to regain their popu6
larity by favoring the rights of the duchies.
The Diet of the German Confederation had discussed and
amused itself with the question of the duchies between 1852
and 1863.
However, on March 30, 1863 the Danish government
took the first step in a series of events that was to lead to
the eventual solution of the Dano-German question.
On this
date by a royal ordinance, the March Patent, Holstein was excluded from the common oonstitution of the Danish monarchy.
It would seem also that the intention was to incorporate Schle 7
wig into the monarchy. The Patent was placed before the Federal Diet.
The Diet called upon Denmark to revoke the Patent
and to stand by the agreements of 1851 and 1852.
was made on
~uly
This demand
9, 1863 and the reply was to be forthcoming
within six weeks.
On August 27, Denmark replied to the ef-
feet that she would not revoke the Patent.
At the same time
the Danish reply together with the demands of the Confederation were laid before the usual committee of the Diet.
On
October 1, 1863, it was voted that since Denmark had not ful6MUnster, 8.
7steefel, 56.
8
filled its obligations, the demands of the Diet were to be
en~
forced by a federal execution of Holstein.
In the meantime in Denmark, Hall, President of the Danish
council, had been pushing plans for a new Constitution the
basis of which was the March Patent.
The draft af the new
Constitution passed its third reading on November 13, 1863.
It legally established the common oonstitution for both
wig and the kingdom; it regulated the relations of this new
constitutional unit to the German Federal lands of the monarc
it provided for the composition and powers of the Rigsraad
Denmark and Schleswig.
These were the new features of the
stitution but many of its provisions were the same as those of
the Constitution of 1855.
"Even assuming that the November
Constitution involved neither the 'incorporation' of Schleswig
nor a step leading thereto, the fact remains that it marks the
definite abandonment of the 'whole state• policy provided for
8
by the agreements of 1851-52."
On the following
d~,
November 15, Frederick VII, King of
Denmark, died quite suddenly before he gave the new constitution his formal approval.
He was the last male in the direct
line of the Danish royal house.
In accordance with the Lon-
don treaty and the Danish law of succession of 1853 he was
succeeded by Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sondenburg
8~ •• 74.
Glucksburg as King Christian IX.
The first question that con-
fronted the new king was whether or not he should sign the new
constitution.
This question was further complicated because
he wanted to retain the friendship of all the people, yet his
right to succeed to the duchies was questionable.
Further, he
did not want to alienate the people of the duchies nor did he
wish to alienate the Danes.
The ministry urged the king to
sign the Constitution and he finally yielded signing it on
November 18, 1863.
It was to go into effect at the new year.
The death of Frederick complicated the question of the
special rights of Schleswig with the broader question of suocession in both duchies.
According to the London Protocol,
Christian IX became duke of Schleswig-Holstein as well as King
of Demark.
The German Confederation, however, it will be
remembered, had never signed the treaty nor agreed to its stipulations, nor had the people of Schleswig-Holstein.
Prussia
and Austria had signed only in view of a previous agreement
with Denmark.
When the news that Christian had signed the new
Constitution arrived Germany there was an outburst of national
feeling which found a rallying point around Prince Frederick of
Augustenburg, the eldest son of Duke Christian who had renounce
9
his rights to the duchies in 1852.
Notwithstanding the fact
that his father had renounced his rights to the throne, Fred9 cambridge History ~British Foreign Policx. Edited by
Sir A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923, II, 539. This reference states that the Duke did
not sign away his rights.
10
erick went to Gotha on November 17.
He set up a Court there
and was allowed to organize a provisional government, with two
commissioners, one a Saxon and the other a Hanoverian.
These
two were to conduct the provisional government in the name ot
10
the Diet.
He acknowledged the Constitution of 1848 and set up
a liberal ministry.
The
peop~
of Holstein received him with
acclamation as Duke Frederick VIII.
The nobility of the duchy
opposed him and were in favor of a union with Denmark, but
later they changed and were in favor of a union with Prussia.
Not only were Denmark and the duchies disturbed by the
claims of Frederick of Augustenburg but the other nations were
interested because of the London treaty of 1852 which many of
them had signed.
terested.
Austria and Prussia were particularly in-
To Bismarck went the opportunity of deciding the
course that Prussia was to follow.
Two courses were open.
Prussia could recognize the London Protocol as still binding
and force Christian IX, as duke of Schleswig-Holstein, to observe the preliminary treaty that she and Austria had signed
with Denmark which guaranteed the autonomy of Schleswig.
On
the other hand, Prussia could declare the London Protocol
abrogated, recognize Frederick as the rightful duke and help
him gain possession of Schleswig.
To the Germans this latter
course would have been favorable, but this would have been
1o Munster,.
85.
1
harmful to the real interest, not only of the Germanies but of
Prussia.
The revolutionary nature of the popular program and
the necessary scrapping of treaties that it would have entaile
would have roused all Europe against Prussia.
And even if suc-
cessful, there would only have been added to the German states
another petty state.
This would be another obstacle in the
way of Prussian hegemony.
However, if the first course was
adopted, namely, to accept the situation as it existed according to the London Protocol, Prussia would demand that Schleswig should not be incorporated by Denmark.
If Bismarck won
this point, Prussia would have to restore both duchies to Denmark, but this was what Austria desired and German patriots
11
feared. Bismarck, however, had satisfied himself that the
Danish government would not consent to non-incorporation of
Schleswig and would go to war rather than adhere to Prussian
demands.
Prussia did not act alone in this.
Bismarck per•
suaded Austria that if she did not support him in these measures he and his ministry would retire.
The consequences of
this would be a wave of radicalism and liberalism that Austria
alone could not avoid.
On January 16, 1864 Austria and Prus-
sia signed a joint agreement the provisions of which were as
follows:
11 amith, JB-31.
(1) a demand upon Denmark for the withdrawal
of the November Constitution within 48 hours;
(2) independent joint action by Prussia and
Austria if the Confederate Diet refused to
join proposed measures; (3) the preparation
of the necessary military forces; (4) the
suppression of possible hostile demonstrations in case of the occupation of Schleswig; (5) the acceptance of a conference of
powers only after the withdrawal of the
November constitution; and (6) further consultat~on in case of interference by either
power.
The Diet did not approve of these measures, but Austria and
Prussia acted as two great powers.
The ultimatum was sent to
Denmark on the same day that the agreement between the two
powers was signed.
The ministers of Austria and Prussia pre-
sented the ultimatum, but the reply was a refusal.
Even if
the king had been inclined to withdraw the new Constitution,
he had to have the consent of the parliament.
The time given
for the answer, two days, was insufficient for such procedure.
Then, the king felt that he had the support of the people and
a reasonable expectation of foreign intervention so he did not
hesitate to refuse.
Diplomatic relations were broken off
after the refusal was given.
In spite of the presence of the Federal Army, which had
been in Holstein since the federal execution on December 7,
1863, the Austro-Prussian army which had been in readiness
l2Lucius H. Holt and A.w. Chilton, History 2! Euro~e ~
1862 12, !2.!!• from ~ Accessi£!! 2! Bismarck 12. ~ outbreak
of the Great War. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918, 77.
--
-
1~
marched into Holstein and advanced towards the Eider and the
frontier of Schleswig.
On January 31, 1864 before marching
into Schleswig, the two powers announced that the integrity of
Denmark would be respected and that the two powers were willing to attend a European conference.
But if Denmark opened
hostilities all treaty obligations were annulled and foreign
intervention would only make the fate of Denmark more precarious.
On February 1, 1864 the allied troops, 60,000 Austrians
and Prussians began to cross the Eider into Schleswig.
The
Danes could not withstand the onslaughts of the allies and on
April 18, the fortifications at DUppel were stormed by the
Prussians.
A week later, April 25, representatives of the
European powers met in London for a conference.
Bismarck
had acceded to the requests of Great Britain for a conference.
On May 12, a truce of one month was arranged, but later it
was extended until JUne 25.
The negotiations were fruitless.
Denmark refused to return to a personal union and demanded
the annexation of part of Schleswig.
By
this action Denmark
alienated the other powers many of whom had been friendly
toward her.
War was resumed on June 25 when General Herwath von :Bittenfeld stormed the island of AE en.
The Danes had considered
this island impregnable without a fleet.
The Prussian army
would have gone to Ffihnen also, but Austria who had entered
Jutland against her will refused to cooperate with Prussia in
14
these measures.
While the Austrians and Prussians were vio·
torious, the Saxons and Hanoverians had to stand idly by and
13
in many places collisions occurred. A preliminary peace was
signed in which Denmark yielded up her rights in the three
duchies--Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg.
After further
negotiations to determine the boundary lines and to determine
the duchies' share of the Danish debt, the final treaty of
peace was signed at Vienna on October 27, 1864.
Thus ended the first step in Bismarck's design to eliminate Austria from the German confederation.
He had separated
the duchies from Denmark; he had succeeded in having them
placed under the joint possession of Austria and Prussia.
Fur-
thermore, Prussia had always appeared diplomatically in the
right and her opponent in the wrong.
In this
w~
the inter-
vention of France and England on behalf of Denmark had been
forestalled, and a possible attack from Austria had been forestalled because her support had been enlisted.
13MUnster, 87.
CHAPTER I
COlfVENTION OF GASTEIN
At the conclusion of the treaty of peace with Denmark•
Austria and Prussia exercised joint sovereignty over the two
duchies.
This was what Bismarck desired because it would fur-
nish a convenient pretext for war with Austria.
Bismarck
considered such a war necessary to the successful solution of
the question of German unity.
The duchies themselves were a
stake in the game because while they would be of little advantage to Austria, their annexation to Prussia would be gainful and feasible.
If the duchies were of no possible gain to
AUstria, why had Austria joined Prussia?
have acted differently.
Austria could not
If Bismarck had rejected the London
Protocol, then Austria could have appeared as the defender of
the treaty.
Unfortunately for Austria, Bismarck abided by
the
If she had not joined Prussia, then Prussia
~reaty.
would have defended them alone, and consequently would have
annexed the duchies and gained the prestige and power for
herself alone.
That Austria was duped cannot be maintained
1
because she realized the purpose in Bismarck's mind.
The Condominium exercised by the two powers led quite
early to trouble.
Austria was willing to turn over the duch-
ies to Prussia in return for compensation in Silesia, but
William was not willing to give up any portion of his dominions.
After this refusal, Austria pushed forward the claims
1 smitE, 32-34.
15
6
of Frederick of Augustenburg.
Under him the duchies were to
become members of the German Confederations.
Many of the Ger-
mans as well as some Prussians favored this solution, but not
Bismarck.
His policy was one whereby the duchies would even-
tually be incorporated in Prussia.
In order to accomplish
this, it was necessary to keep off the throne of the duchies,
Duke Frederick of Augustenburg.
However, Bismarck could not
refuse Austria outright when she pressed these claims.
In-
stead he delayed the matter by questionning not only the
validity of the Augustenburg claims which were surrounded
with a certain amount of doubt, but also the claims of others;
2
among the claimants was the Grand Duke of Oldenburg.
In the duchies themselves there was considerable agitation in favor of the Hereditary Prince.
After the military
occupation by Austria and Prussia had been established and
the provisional government set up according to the provisions
of the treaty of Vienna, a pretense was made of permitting
the people of the duchies to express their wishes with respect
to the future government of the duchies.
In Holstein public
meetings were held at which the almost unanimous vote was
that the people desired to be united to the German Confederation as a sovereign state
und~r
3
the Prince of Augustenburg.
-
2Lucius H. Holt and A.W. Chilton, Historz of EuroRe from
New York: Macmillan Company, 88. -3sir Alexander Malet, The Overthrow of the Germanic
federation £l Prussia in 1866: London: LOngmans, Green
Company, 1870, 96. - -- ----
1862-1914.
17
The civil commissioners who were administering the affairs
the affairs of the duchies for the condominate powers inquired
on December ?, 1864, of the clergy and civic officers of the
duchies as to their wishes with regard to the future government of the duchies.
To this inquiry they replied that their
4
wishes were identical to those already expressed by the people.
Toward the end of December, a small portion of the landed
population led by Baron Scheel Plessen expressed its wishes
for annexation to Prussia.
But this elicited expressions of
counter-opinion from the greater majority of the population.
On January 12, 1865 a committee of the Schleswig-Holstein
union publicized a proclamation containing 60,000 signatures
protesting any attempt to infringe on the relation existing
between the Hereditary Prince and the duchies.
This publica-
tion also protested any possible attempt to segregate part of
the territory under another ruler.
this kind followed in February.
Further demonstrations of
However, other events with
regard to the relations between Austria and Prussia took place
during February.
On February 21, 1865 the Austrian govern-
ment was the recipient of a Prussian despatch to the effect
that the latter government required the assistance and cooperation of the Imperial government in a system of government
for the duchies which she (Prussia) had evolved.
The contents
of this despatch laid down the conditions which Prussia considered essential to maintain in order to safeguard the in4Ibid.
5
terests of both Prussia and Germany in the duchies.
18
To this
despatch Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, replied on March 5.
Mensdorff, in a definite tone,
said that the conditions laid down by the Prussian government were not consonant with Federal rights.
At the same
time he demanded the re-establishment of the independence of
both duchies and that their future relations with Prussia
be conducted according to the articles of the Federal Diet.
These measures had been demanded by Prussia in order to
subdue the various agitations in the duchies.
To this Prus-
sian despatch, or to the February demands as they are better
known, representatives of the two duchies replied in a declaration dated March 26.
This declaration rejected for the
most part the February demands of Prussia; secondly, it indicated certain mncessions which their future Duke might
make without infringing on the rights of the duchies.
on
April 19, 117 delegates of the Schleswig-Holstein associations approved this declaration, as had the Prince himself
on March 31.
While the duchies and the governments of Austria and
Prussia were busy trying to effect a solution, the other
members of the Confederation were anxious to bring about a
solution that would be satisfactory to the whole Confederation.
Consequently on March 27, Bavaria, Saxony, and the
5 Ibid., 98-99.
1
Grand Duchy of Hesse placed a proposition relative to the solution of the question before the assembly of the Diet.
The
motion was as follows:
Awaiting ulterior decision, the Diet confidently expects that the Governments of
Austria and Prussia will now hand over the
Duchy of Holstein to the Government of the
Hereditary Prince of Schleswig-HolsteinAugustenburg; and communicate with the
Diet in reference to the agreement they
have come to concerning the Duchy of Lauenburg.
There are some who maintain that this proposition was insti6
gated by Austria, but the truth of this cannot be determined.
The Prussian government, however, was inclined to believe this.
The arguments of Saxony and Bavaria as expressed by their
respective leaders, Beust and Pfordten, contained a great deal
of truth, but Bismarck was not to be defeated.
While the
leaders in the lesser states might see what the outcome would
be they could do nothing.
Bismarck was supported not only by
Moltke and the army, but by ne n such as Heinrich von Treitschke
who said:
"In this matter
Schleswig-Holstein
positive law
is irreconcileable with the vital interests of our country.
We must set aside positive law and compensate those who may be
?
injured in consequence • • • • •
Bismarck, of course, denied
6Heinrich Von Sybel, The Foundi~ of the German Empire Bl
Willism I. (Transl. by Marshall Liv~~Bto~errin). lew
York: T.nomas Y. Crowell and Company, Ll891, c.dJ IV, 109-113.
7R.B. Mowat, ! History 2f European Diplomacy, 1815-1914.
London: Edward Arnold and Company, 192?, 186.
20
the right of the Diet to handle this situation.
Nevertheless, on April 6, the vote on the proposition
submitted by the three states was taken and was adverse to
Prussia by a vote of nine to six.
To this decision Prussia
replied she expected that before any formal declaration of
views was made by the Diet that an inquiry into the various
claims, not only those of Augustenburg, should be made, and
that those of the House of Brandenburg should be considered.
Austria adhered to the proposition of the three states only
to the extent to which it did not disturb the relations
existing between Austria and Prussia.
The population of the duchies was becoming more outspoken and more audacious in the plans for the coronation of
Prince Frederick of Augustenburg.
On April 3, Baron von
Zedlitz, the Prussian commissioner in the duchies, issued a
statement to the effect that the Prussian marine station was
8
to be transferred from Danzig to Kiel.
At first, Halbhuber,
the Austrian commissioner, agreed to take part in the preliminary arrangements, but on April 11, he received word from
Vienna to stop the preparations; which he did by forbidding
the governments of the duchies to take part in the preparations.
Later he published his prohibition in the newspapers.
Mensdorff made the official protest to Berlin for Austria as
8 s.ybel, IV, 112. Royal command to this effect had been
issued on March 24 by William to the Minister of the Navy to
signify that Prussia would not be pushed out of the duchies
by either the Diet or Augustenburg.
21
a member of the Confederation and as a joint owner in Schleswig.
The matter was finally decided by Austria's pacific
policy.
Austria agreed to this transfer of the naval station
on condition that the military forces of Prussia should be
reduced by a number equal to that of the force to be stationed
9
at Kiel.
On April 20 and 21, occurred an event of not much importance in itself but one with a certain
~ount
of significance.
on these dates cornerstones of two monuments to commemorate
those who died in the war of 1864 were laid in Alsen and Duppel.
Both Austrian and Prussian troops took part in this com-
memoration.
But the Prussian royal rescript which was pub-
lished on the occasion stated that these monuments would serve
to keep up the courage of those who had fought in the war of
1864,
"!!
called~~
the sword."
defend the fruit of their victory with
This seems to indicate that there was present the
idea of a future conflict with regard to the disposal of the
duchies.
Meanwhile, Bigmarck was pressing plans for the convening
of the Assembly of the Estates of Schleswig and Holstein
under the joint authority of Austria and Prussia.
From this
assembly he hoped to obtain, at least, accession to the demands put forth in the February despatch, if not consent to
9Malet, 104.
22
Von Richthofen, Am-
annexation of the duchies by Prussia.
bassador in Hamburg, Baron Scheel Plessen in Holstein, and
Baron von Zedlitz advised against this.
They maintained
that this would only be playing into the hands of the politi·
cal societies who controlled the duchies and who would only
vote against the demands of Prussia.
vored Augustenburg.
These societies fa-
Bismarck communicated his plans for con-
voking the Estates to the Austrian government on April 17.
Mensdorff replied on April 27 to the effect that this
proposition was both surprising and disagreeable.
He fur-
ther insisted on the rights of Augustenburg as sovereign.
However, Austria would agree to summon the Estates before
the actual coronation of the sovereign (this Austria considered opposed to all principles of government) on three
conditions:
'First, in all negotiations with the Estates, the supreme civil authorities must
act strictly on the basis of the joint
ownership; neither of the two Governments
shall by itself have any separate dealings
with the Estates. Secondly, in the summons the object in view shall be distinctly stated and limited; the Estates must
be given to understand that they have to
express the wishes of the country, but
that this expression shall in no way anticipate or interfere with the decision
of the future sovereign, nor, so far as
Holstein is concerned, with the decrees
of the German Confederation. Thirdly,
Austria is willing to have the Estates
summoned according to the electoral law
of 1848; but yet, since the Constitutions
23
of 1854 have never been revoked, it
seems advisable, in order to insure
the legality of the assembly to allow the convention of the same to be
autho~~zed by the Estates as they now
exist.
Prussia could not accept these conditions because they were
contrary to her plans, and secondly, because these conditions
implied Austria's assent to the Prussian February demands,
but these had already (March 5, 1865) been refused by Austria.
Bismarck replied to this latest Austrian note on May 7,
and at the same time suggested that an assembly should be
called, the representatives to be chosen by universal suffrage and direct election.
He also suggested that it would
not be proper for the Hereditary Prince to remain in the
duchies while the elections were held.
Austria accepted this
11
second Prussian proposal, but with conditions.
Great interest was evinced in the negotiations between
the two powers.
France, Hanover, and Bavaria in particular
showed their interest.
In France the newspapers were very
friendly to Bismarck.
However, in the duchies the effect of
the Prussian proposals was unfavorable.
The people regarded
these measures as a subterfuge for a Prussian retreat. Consequently, the agitation for Augustenburg was increased by the
members of the political societies.
Bismarck, however, had
lOsybel, IV, 125, cites the Austrian reply of April 27.
llibid., 128.
24
been warned that this would happen, but he had proceeded against the advice of Scheel Plessen and Zedlitz.
The agita-
tors began to formulate platforms in which they stated that no
man would be chosen as a representative unless he promised
"to vote in the very first session for the proclamation of
nuke Frederick VIII as sovereign, and for the resolution that
the Assembly is incompetent to act until the Duke is crowned."
Bismarck still remained self-assured of the success of his
plans.
Prussia still had complaints to offer against the attitude of Austria.
These were compiled and forwarded to
Werther, the Prussian Minister at Vienna.
Werther was in-
structed to discuss each one separately with Mensdorff.
At
the same time, however, he was instructed to assure Mensdorff
of Prussia's desire for peace, but to indicate that the Prussian government was willing to resort to armed force, if the
occasion demanded such a display.
To these complaints Mens-
dorff agreed to prevent the proclamation of Augustenburg as
Duke.
He further agreed to urge Halbhuber to adopt a more
friendly attitude toward Prussia.
Unfortunately, the main
tenor of the Austrian reply was haughty and domineering• and
the Austrians persisted in their first views.
This attitude,
however, caused no alarm in Prussia because the Prussian
government was well aware of the internal dissension of the
Austrian empire.
On May 19, instructions were drawn up for
r
25
General Manteuffel in case it was necessary to send him to
Vienna if relations became any worse.
The purpose of his mis-
sion was to be to bring about a better understanding.
Before this precipitous mission was to take place, a
Ministerial Council was held in Berlin on May
29.~
The King
presided, and both the Crown Prince and Moltke attended.
The King stated that although the war of 1864 had been conducted not for Prussian interests, but for national ones,
that Austria was fully cognizant of the fact that Prussia
expected to be repaid for her sacrifices.
and continued with his remarks.
Bismarck then rose
First, Prussia could limit
herself to the February demands; secondly, Prussia could
secure the duchies through the payment of an indemnity to
Austria, and a payment could also be made to the claimants
to the throne of the duchies; and, thirdly, Prussia could secure the duchies by a formal demand for annexation.
The at-
titude of the Austrian Emperor with regard to the second alternative was already known, and consequently was not to be
considered.
The third alternative would undoubtedly bring
about war with Austria.
The majority of the Council was a-
gainst measures that would lead to war;
the King reserved
his decision; and Manteuffel was not sent to Vienna.
Between May 24 and June 24, several notes were exchanged
between Bismarck and Mensdorff.
The purpose of these was to
determine how the elections should be conducted, whether or
26
not the Hereditary Prince should remain in the duchies, and
to decide what procedure should be adopted with regard to
other claimants, namely, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, who was
a Confederate Prince.
On June 24, Mensdorff, however, de-
cided to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Prussia.
He
was forced to do this because he did not wish to come to issue with Prussia in view of the precarious situation of the
internal affairs of the Empire.
Austria agreed to the es-
tablishment of the naval port and Confederate fortress at
Kiel.
With regard to military control, the Austrian govern-
ment said that it could not decide, but that this decision
lay with the Confederate Diet.
The other arrangements would
have to be made between Prussia and the future sovereign.
sequently, the first step was to decide who the future sovereign would be.
The Prussian cabinet recognized Austria's
change of manner by declaring its readiness to submit the
question of the military organization of the Holstein contingent to the Confederation.
Prussia also stated that she
was disposed to establish the Grand Duke of Oldenburg as
Duke, if Austria would join her in this action.
On this
point, however, they were as far apart as ever for Austria
still favored Augustenburg while Prussia would accept him
on no conditions whatever.
In the duchies, meanwhile, the agitation in favor of
Augustenburg continued, and annexation to Prussia was
Co~
27
ridiculed and despised on every side.
The Austrian government
however, realized that the cause of Augustenburg might be fostered more advantageously if he removed himself from the duch-\
ies.
Consequently, a note suggesting this was sent to him at
Kiel, accompanied by an Austrian declaration of protection for
him.
At this same time the same thought occurred to
Willi~
who sent him a letter advising his absence from the duchies.
But Frederick refused to withdraw.
His cause was looked upon
with greater favor than ever by the population of the duchies.
Arrangements were made for the celebration of the birthday of
the Prince on July 6.
Simultaneously, the crown lawyers pre-
sented their findings with regard to the right of Augustanburg to the throne of the duchies, which right they declared
did not exist.
The basis for this judgment was the Law of
Succession which had been established by the London Protocol
of 1852.
There were many legal intricacies and artifXes in
this report which made it interesting and which succeeded in
giving it importance from both an international and a nation12
al viewpoint. This report finally released William from any
obligations that he had felt concerning Augustenburg as a
rightful German prince.
From that time on the February de-
mands became the Prussian program of procedure in the duchies.
12rbid., 158-165. Consult these pages for a description
of the Council of Crown lawyers and for a criticism of this
report.
J"'' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .
28
Consequently Zedlitz in the duchies was instructed to
suppress any dangerous agitation and also to suppress in as
many instances as possible any celebration of the birthday of
A~gustenburg.
At the same time the King addressed a note to
the Emperor of Austria asking for his cooperation in removing
the Prince from the duchies.
While waiting for a reply from
the Emperor, the Prince's birthday was celebrated in the
duchies.
In the towns, there were large demonstrations,
especially in Kiel, but in the rural districts there were no
such demonstrations.
These districts had acceded to Zed-
litz's proclamation of July 5.
Because of the possibility
of war with Austria, if the Emperor's answer was not satisfactory, the Prussian government began to make military preparations.
The word that the government received from the
military officials was very satisfactory as to the condition
of the Prussian military forces.
On July 11 or 12, there arrived from Vienna a despatch
from the Emperor and one from Mensdorff.
Both urged the
Prussian King to desist in his hostile attitude toward the
prince and to recognize him as the sovereign of the duchies.
In Mensdorff's letter he asked whether or not a special agent could be sent by Prussia to either Carlsbad or to Gastein to discuss the Schleswig-Holstein question.
Bismarck
answered that this would be acceptable and that Austria's
concessions had been quite satisfactory except for her re-
29
fusal to change her policy with regard to Augustenburg.
The
prince, he considered as an undermining influence in the duchies.
A Council of the Ministry was called to meet at Ratisbon
on
~uly
21 to consider what final measures were to be adopted
by Prussia with regard to the duchies and the Austrian atti13
tude. Besides the ultimatum which was to be prepared to be
sent to Austria, preparations for military measures in Holstein
were made.
Instructions were prepared to be sent to General
Herwarth in case such military measures were necessary.
Prus~
sia also took steps to assure herself of the friendly attitude
of France and of Italy.
The ultimatum that was sent to Aus-
tria read as follows:
'All negotiations concerning the future of
the Duchies are refused until authority is
established there and all agitation done away with. When this is accomplished, Prussia will be ready to treat with Austria concertning the establishment of the Grand Duke
of Oldenburg as sovereign. The candidacy of
Augustenburg is entirely out of the question
for us, so long as the Hereditary Prince persists in his attitude of usurpation. Should
Austria refuse to restore order in the Duchies, Prussia will find herself in a situation
necessitating self-defense, and will, on her
own account, instruct General Herwarth to
take the necessary steps. The further decision, whether or not Herwarth shall receive
13 Letter of Bismarck to Crown Prince, ~uly 15, 1865 with
regard to the Conference.
r--------------------------------------~
orders to this effect, depends upon the
proposed visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph to Gastein, and the result of the
meeting of the two Sovereigns.•l4
After the ultimatum was sent, the King, Bismarck, and General
Manteuffel set out for Gastein, but stopped en route at Salzburg for a conference with von Pfordten, the President of the
Bavarian Ministry.
Pfordten had reviewed the Prussian cause
with greater favor than his colleague Beust of Saxony.
Beust
refused to adopt any other than a hostile attitude toward Prus
sia.
At Salzburg, on July 25, Pfordten after conversations
with Bismarck and the King becmne convinced of Prussia's
15
desire for peace. After-his return to Munich he communicated
these impressions to Count Mensdorff and to Augustenburg•
urging the latter to abide by the wishes of William.
Meanwhile in Austria there was a change in the Ministry.
Dissatisfaction with the Schmerling ministry had been expressed throughout the Empire.
was formed with Belcredi as
the Ministerial Council.
On July 27, a new ministry
~nister
of State and President of
Despite these precarious conditions
--the army had been reduced, Hungary was expressing dissatisfaction--Mensdorff had to reply to the Prussian ultimatum.
14sybel, IV, 175,cites this ultimatum.
15Munster, 91. Bismarck is reported to have said to
Pfordten that "if the rest of Germany would only be sensible
enough to play the part of a passive spectator, the duel between Austria and Prussia might be fought out."
In
r
31
view of the internal affairs of the .Empire a peaceful policy
was the wisest one to adopt.
count Esterhazy, the minister
without a portfolio, favored a conciliatory policy toward
16
prussia. At this time Count Blome, the Austrian ambassador
17
at Munich came to Esterhazy with his plan for conciliation.
count Blome was a native nobleman of Holstein and as such he
opposed Augustenburg, but as an Austrian diplomat he was
forced to uphold Austria's support of Augustenburg.
His plan was very simple:
and Prussia, Schleswig.
the Emperor.
Austria would annex Holstein,
Esterhazy approved this plan as did
18
Blome was given instructions to go to Gastein.
First he was to attempt to gain Prussian recognition for
Augustenburg.
Secondly, if Prussia persisted in her opposi-
tion, he was to inquire as to the possibility of the adoption
of his plan of division.
At the same time Herwarth was
carrying out some of his instructions; and the notes exchanged between Bismarck and Mensdorff were inimical to the
success of Blome's
e~forts.
Blome according to instructions
began his overtures by requesting that Prussia recognize
16Chester Wells Clark, Franz Joseph ~ Bismarck. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934, 241. See also, Sybel,
IV, 180-189 for description of internal affairs.
17
clark, 254-256, for origin of Blome's plan.
18ill£.
r---------------------.
32
Frederick.
Bismarck answered by refusing to consider Augus-
tenburg and continued to press the claims of the Grand Duke
of Oldenburg.
He said that Prussia could proceed to no set-
tlement until she was guaranteed that her February demands
would be accepted.
According to him, the Grand Duke of Olden-
burg was likely to accede to these demands.
Blome also had
an interview with the King who said that Austria had been
placing obstacles in the way of Prussia ever since the Seven
Years• War.
William also complained of Halbhuber•s conduct
in the duchies.
Blome had answered these charges without in-
forming either the King or Bismarck of his alternate plan.
Finally he spoke in bare outline of this plan to Bismarck to
which the latter replied that the plan might be worthwhile,
but that certain reservations would probably have to be made.
Nothing definite was to be decided until the two sovereigns
19
would meet.
Blome returned to Ischl on July 31, where the
Emperor was staying.
A Ministerial Council was held at which Franz Joseph
20
himself presided. There was a party in the Council which del9Letter of Bismarck to William{ August 1, 1865 requested
that this plan be kept secret. Part tion was ~he last resort.
20 clark, 275. This Council was secret; no secretaries
admitted, bu~ Ministers alternated at taking the minutes. No
copies of these minutes have been retained in the archives.
"One thing was certain; the 'inevitable' war with Prussia had
now become a very real fact to all, and even to the Emperor
himself." Clark, 282.
Biegleben, the expert on German affairs, was thunderstruck at the idea of partition. He had been kept in ignorance of the plan in order to forestall his opposition to it.
33
sired to go to war rather than desert Augustenburg.
Howe~er,
the Emperor who was still anxious to preserve peace decided to
endorse Blome's proposals.
The plan was dran up in detail
according to orders and approved by both Mensdorff and the Emperor.
On August 7, the Emperor sent King William an auto-
graph letter which was taken to Gastein by Blome and presented
to William on August 8.
The Emperor remarked in it that the
course they were about to adopt was not "consistent with the
original aim of the Danish war."
During the time in which
Blome had been at Ischl, Prussia had pushed forward her war
preparations, and had been sounding France and Italy with
regard to their attitudes in case of war.
By the time Blome
returned, however, no definite agreements had been made.
The second and final set of negotiations began at Gastein
on August 10, 1865.
Prussia still insisted that she would not
consider a proposition alluding to the final disposition of
the duchies until order was restored therein.
Consequently,
the discussion centered round Blome's proposal for rearranging
21
the government of the duchies.
Blome presented his plan some
of which points displeased Bismarck who himself had worked out
a more definite proposition.
However, Bismarck in view of the
European situation which was not definitely favorable to him,
decided to make no mention of his plan, but to accept Blome's
proposals.
Austria, in proposing this plan which became the
2lsee Appendix A.
r-----------------------------------------3-4~
basis for the final treaty, implied that she and Prussia were
the legitimate sovereigns in the duchies since no one but a
sovereign could have the proper authority to dispose of possessions.
Consequently, this should have meant that the Augus
tenburg agitation would be subdued because his claims were
fallacious if Austria and Prussia were the legitimate sover22
eigne.
On August 14, Bismarck and Blome signed the completed
23
treaty, and on August 20, the treaty was ratified by William
and Franz Joseph at a meeting in Salzburg.
go into effect on September 1'5.
The treaty was to
It provided that the govern-
ment of Holstein was to be administered by Austria and that
of Schleswig by Prussia.
The l1lnperor of Austria ceded his
rights in Lauenburg for an indemnity of 2,500,000 Danish rixdollars.
There were other provisions with regard to forti24
fications.
Prussia named General Baron von Manteuffel as
22 For the intricacies of this argument see Sybel, TV,
214-215.
23 Preamble and Articles 1,3,4 5,6,8, and 9 are the work
1
of Biegleben with a few additions oy B1smarck and Blome.
Articles 2,7,10, and 11 are the work of Bismarck.
Bismarck said: "'Well, I never should have expected to
find an Austrian diplomat who would put his name to that.••
See Clark, 290 and footnote.
24 For the complete provisions see Appendix B.
Munster, 91. "Austrian diplomacy succeeded for the
moment at Gastein in putting off the struggle. The Gastein
Convention surprised all the world, standing, as it did, in
direct opposition to Bismarck's demands."
Clark, 297, considers it a triumph for Prussia.
Carleton J.H. Hayes, Political ~ Social History£!
Modern Europe. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929, II,
187. Considers it a triumph for Bismarck.
35
governor of Schleswig and Austria named Lieutenant Field
Marshal Baron von Gablenz as governor of Holstein.
The civil
commissioners retained their positions with the exception of
Baron Halbhuber who was replaced by Herr von Hofmann.
Thus,
the catastrophe that both Prussia and Austria had protested
against and waged war in 1864 was accomplished, namely, the
25
separation of the two duchies.
Finally, what were the effects of the treaty.
In both
Italy and France the treaty was regarded with distrust, and
was censured openly in France by the government.
At this same
time the English fleet was recalled from the Mediterranean to
take part in joint manoeuvres with the French fleet at Cher26
bourg.
But more interesting is the.attitude of the Diet
27
toward the treaty. As a rider to their propositions, the
members of the Diet requested the two powers to inform the
members of the intentions of the former with regard to the
final disposition of the duchies, and whether an assembly of
the Estates of Holstein and one of the Estates of Schleswig
would be convoked.
In reply to this the two powers submitted
on August 24, the treaty of Gastein itself and added a state25
Mowat, 187.
26Malet, 111-112.
27 nated March 27.
See page 16.
r
36
ment that both Austria and Prussia were anxious for a definite
solution and that the Diet could expect such a one.
To this
the Diet replied that the statement of the two powers had been\
unsatisfactory.
This was followed by a motion which provided
that a general assembly of the representatives of Holstein
should be held, and secondly, that the Diet and the two powers
should act together for the incorporation of Schleswig into the
Confederation.
On November 18, the Austria andPrussian re-
presentatives answered this motion in a manner tantamount to a
refusal to permit the Diet to interfere with the actions of the
28
two powers with regard to the duchies. This reply of November
is important because it was the last action participated in
jointly by the two powers with regard to the solution of the
question of the duchies.
2~
Malet, 119-121.
r--------------------------------------~
CHAPTER II
PRUSSIAN ATTEMPTS AT ALLIANCE
The treaty of Gastein was only a truce, not a solution of
the question.
Prussia intended that she would possess the
duchies some day.
The February demands testify to the truth
of this.
How then, was Prussia to obtain possession of the
duchies?
Whatever means she decided to adopt, it would be
necessary to have treaties of alliance in order to protect
herself from aggression by either Italy or France.
Bismarck first turned his attention to France.
Immediate-
-
ly after the publication of the treaty, the French newspapers
attacked it vehemently.
This pleased Drouyn de Lhuys, the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, who favored Austriat and
opposed a strengthening of the French alliance with Prussia.
Napoleon III expressed his regret that the two powers had not
done that which they had promised to do and for which they had
fought Denmark, namely, to maintain the indivisible union of
the two duchies.
However, because of the conversations which
took place between Goltz, the Prussian Ambassador at Paris,
and Napoleon, the latter adopted a more friendly attitude.
Goltz explained that the treaty of Gastein provided for a temporary arrangement only in the administration of the duchies,
and that it did not purport to effect a final solution of the
1
question of sovereignty.
1
Sybel, IV, 230-236.
r ~----------------~
38
Meanwhile, Drouyn de Lhuys was doing what he could to
weaken the cause of Prussia in France.
He had had published
in newspapers throughout Europe the circular letter of the
French government to its ambassadors.
August 29, 1865.
This letter was dated
It condemned the policy pursued by Prussia
in very strong terms.
This was followed by the publication of
a despatch from Lord John Russell, dated September 14, in
which Russell expressed similar views.
The news of the pub-
lication of these two despatches was received with surprise in
Berlin.
However, the friendly attitude of France seemed as-
sured when Napoleon left for Biarritz on September 7.
He was
accompanied by Count Goltz and another Prussian diplomat, a
son of General von Radawitz.
Bismarck, also, at this time decided to go to Biarritz.
He was interested in the attitude of France and he wanted to
see for himself whether or not Napoleon was favorable to Prussia.
At this time, Bismarck was not worried about the atti-
tude of the German states.
The reason for this was that these
states were engaged in expressing their dissatisfaction with
the course adopted by Austria when she came to a separate a2
greement with Prussia.
Austria had always been looked upon
with favor by the German states, but this incident had
de~
2
Sir James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley, Bismarck and the
Foundations ~ ~ German Empire. New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1899, 240.
--
r~--------------------------~
39
stroyed their esteem and confidence.
Secondly, Bavaria, the
strongest of the lesser states, might soon enlist on the side
of Prussia because of this reversal in Austrian foreign policy.
Bismarck, therefore, felt safe for the present with re-
gard to the relations of the German states and Prussia.
In th
meantime, Drouyn de Lhuys at the insistence of Napoleon had
apologized in a private statement for the extremeness of the
3
French circular of August 29.
September 30 via Paris.
Bismarck left for Biarritz on
He consulted with the Emperor until
october 12, the date of the latter's departure.
Bismarck
remained in Biarritz for the rest of October.
Previous to his departure from Berlin, BismarCk had had
conversations with Lefebvre de Bebain, the French
affaires.
I
char~~
He intimated to Lefebvre what promises he hoped to
obtain from Napoleon with regard to a French alliance of some
4
sort.
Before
procee~ng
directly to Biarritz, Bismarck
stopped in Paris for a day where he first visited Rouher, the
Minister of State, who was more friendly to a Prussian alliance for France than to an Austrian one.
In order not to
slight Drouyn de Lhuys, Bismarck visited him also.
Drouyn
3 Ad.olphus Ward, Germa:gz, 1815-1890 (Cambridge Histol"ical
Series, 8). New York: The Macmillan Company, 207.
Correction of Sybel, IV, 242, line 3. Ward says that apology
was not a despatch as stated in Sybel.
4~.
r
40
r
de Lhuys was very cordial toward Bismarck and explained that
his hostile attitude had been the result of a fear that the
duchies would be annexed to Prussia without compensation for
France.
He further suggested some possible advantages that
might accrue to France, but said that he had no designs on
Prussian or French territory.
This intimation was similar to
5
that made by Lefebvre in Berlin. There is some evidence to
indicate that Drouyn de Lhuys spread a rumor in France, at a
later date, that Bismarck intended to make large extensions of
6
Prussian territory.
On the second day of his stay in Biarritz, Bismarck was
granted an interview with Napoleon.
Napoleon was anxious to
undo the damage done by the circular of August 29, and hastened to explain that he did not always have complete knowledge
of the details concerning foreign affairs.
The Emperor was
also anxious to know if there were any unpublished "commitments" to the treaty of Gastein that would endanger France
7
and that guaranteed Venetia to Austria. But Bismarck assured him that Prussia had no intention of placing Austria
in a position where she could register a casus belli at will.
At this juncture, Napoleon said that he had the best inten5sybel, IV, 244 ff. cites Bismarck's complete report
dated October 24. This report contains all the information
on the negotiations with France.
6 Ibid., 244, see footnote. This information was contained-rn-a letter from Goltz dated October 23.
7Mowat, 188. See also Sybel, IV, 245.
r r------------------------------------------------41
tiona to maintain the peace of Europe.
Furthermore, he said
that events should not be forced upon the world, but should be
allowed to occur in the natural course of history.
In other
words, he did not want to take a definite step toward alliance
until it was necessary.
"'What are your views with regard to Holstein?'"
Napoleon •"s next question.
"'We intend to annex it.'"
was
Bi s-
marck, however, expressed the willingness of Prussia to indemnify Austria for Holstein.
Napoleon raised no objection
to this and approved of Bismarck's remarks to Drouyn de Lhuys
with regard to a possible gain for France, However, Bismarck
was not satisfied to end his conversation at that point.
He
continued to the effect that the acquisition of the duchies
would not be an increase in Prussian power, but that it would
be a burden to the Prussian government, especially with regard to the defenses in the north and the increase in the
navy that it would entail.
However, this "'would be only
earnest-money (arrhes) for the fulfillment of the task, which
history had laid upon the State of Prussia, and for the further prosecution of which we need to maintain friendly rela8
tions with France.'" He added that a "vigorous Prussia will
9
naturally associate itself with France" and that France shoul
be happy to encourage Prussia in her national growth.
8Sybel, IV, 247, cites the report of Bismarck.
9 Mowat, 189.
-
r--------------------------------------~
42
.
In another conversation Napoleon queried whether or not
the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia might
not be used as compensation to Austria for the cession of
venetia to Italy.
Napoleon was still interested in Venetia
because he was a partisan of the development of Italy as a
national state.
Bismarck replied that the only interest that
prussia had in Wallachia and Moldavia was to avoid antagonizing Russia.
In the latter manner, he managed with regard to
the Venetian question to discourage the possibility of French
support of Austria.
Nepoleon made other remarks concerning
the duties of nations to prevent the spread of disease from
the Near East to Europe.
After these conversations the Em-
peror left Biarritz and returned to Paris, but Bismarck stayedt
On his return trip to Berlin in early November, 1865,
Bismarck again talked with Napoleon.
had ensued at Biarritz were reviewed.
The discussions which
Further, Napoleon re-
quested that William be informed that he believed that Prussia
and France should proceed in a cautious manner in the matter
of their relations and that it would be wiser to await developments.
(This, Bismarck said, was the result of his tone to
the Emperor although Napoleon was not aware of this unconscioue
influence.)
Napoleon added that as soon as circumstances
seemed to demand a more formal agreement between the two
powers the King should communicate with him.
\V:hen this time
came some definite agreement could be made.
Napoleon also in-
r----------------------------------------4~3
formed Bismarck that any agreement between France and Austria
was not possible, and that he had informed Metternich of this
before the treaty of Gastein had been concluded.
This infor-
mation "showed with what reluctance Austria had entered into
the Gastein compact, and what irregularities might be conceivable in its execution."
Bismarck returned to Berlin on
November 7, and he was very much encouraged by the success of
these negotiations.
Probably one of the reasons why Napoleon acquiesced in
Bismarck's plan was that he was interested in the development of national states.
"The division of Europe into large
national states was what was meant by Napoleonic ideas; he
was willing to help in Germany a change such as that he had
10
brought about in Italy." There are conjectures as to whether
Bismarck and Napoleon discussed possible territorial gains
for France.
Drouyn de Lhuys had circulated the report, so it
is said, that Bismarck had promised all kinds of compensations
to France.
It is true that Napoleon, later on in life, also
maintained that Bismarck had made such promises.
One thing
is certain that if any promises were made, they concerned the
possible addition of the territory of French-speaking peoples
11
and not Prussian or German territory. Bismarck's success
satisfied him and upon his return to Berlin he was able to
lOHeadlam-Morley, 241.
11
~., 243.
r---------------------------------------44~
leave Sarre Louis, Coblenz, Luxemburg, and Cologne with only
a small portion of their artillery and with a small force of
landwehr to guard them.
This would have been impossible had
12
he not been convinced of the good intentions of France.
Napoleon, however, was not entirely convinced of the ability
of the Prussian military forces to overcome those of Austria.
It is quite possible that he intended to step in as arbiter
when the two powers had exhausted themselves.
French alliance was ever concluded.
No definite
But at a later date,
13
March 3, 1866 William wrote an autograph letter to Napoleon.
'This had been suggested by Napoleon.
This letter stated that
the proper time had arrived for an understanding.
Goltz and
Napoleon discussed the terms, and again Napoleon suggested the
annexation of some German territory.
To this Prussia answered
that she would not permit such annexation.
However, if France
annexed part of Belgium, then the Prussian frontier must in14
elude the north-east of Belgium. And again, no alliance was
made because Napoleon's neutrality seemed secure.
The only
object that Bismarck had in mind with regard to a possible
alliance with France was to secure her neutrality.
12Malet, 114.
13Sy.bel, IV, 324.
14Headlam-Morley, 248.
After Bismarck had heard from Napoleon that Austria had
attempted to conclude an alliance with France, he decided to
attempt to come to some understanding with Italy.
However,
while he was at Biarri tz, the Italian government approached
· Austria.
Since 1859 there had been no diplomatic relations
between Austria and Italy so La Marmora, the Italian premier
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave this difficult task to
count Malaguzzi of Modena.
The Count was a patriotic Italian
and at the same time a member of a noble family related to the
royal family.
His instructions were as follows:
he was to propose to the Austrian government the sale of Venetia (with Isonzo as
boundary) for a thousand million lire, or
four hundred million Austrian florins [or
40,000,000 pounds]. Italy would then in
addition to the payment of the money, conclude an advantageous commercial treaty with
Austria, and preserve a conciliatory conduct
toward the Pope; but she would also on her
part, desire a further secret understanding,
which might lead her to hope, under certain
conditions• for the acquisition of the Italian Tyrollo
The Count remained in Vienna for nearly two months and
during that time he made as many contacts as possible with
members of the Ministry, of the Press, and of the commercial
world.
The industrial world, the politicians, and the Minis-
ter of Finance were in favor of such a treaty with Italy.
The government deficit was increasing every month, and the
benefits that would accrue from the addition of four hun15aybel, IV, 270.
46
dred million florins were desirable to the Minister of Finance.
The opposition was constituted by the clergy, who were
opposed to the Italian King, by the army, and by the Emperor.
If a government loan had not been negotiated, perhaps, this
, alliance would have been concluded.
However, Herr von Beeke,
the agent of the chief of the department in the Ministry of
Finance, who was Count Larish, negotiated a ninety million
loan in silver at a high rate of interest.
fused to cede Venetia:
The Emperor re-
"Schleswig shall be abandoned only in
return for an indemnification in land and people!
Venetia
shall be ceded only after a war that has brought honor to
Austrian arms:•
At first the Italians thought that this de-
claration was a warlike one, but when the Italian government
received Malaguzzi's reports it reversed its opinion.
These
reports seemed to indicate that Austria did not contemplate
_the overthrow of Italy, but that Austria would make no commercial treaty, nor cede Venetia as a matter of military
honor.
Consequently, on November 25, La Marmora in a circular
note to the Italian embassies stated that no commercial relations with Austria could be engaged in without the introduction of the question of Venetia.
In the same note he sug-
gested that an improvement in trade across the frontier could
be effected without diplomatic contrivances.
Later, this was
16
accomplished through the mediation of Drouyn de Lhuys.
16
~., 285-287.
r
47
But the rapprochement between Italy and Austria pro-
I
gressed no further.
Instead Prussia seized the opportunity
which Austria had neglected.
Before Gastein Bismarck had sug-
gested that a commercial treaty between Ger.many and Italy
might be concluded.
However, because of the opposition of
saxony and Bavaria, it was not concluded.
After Gastein, it
was a difficult question for these states to decide since
Austria had adopted such a hostile attitude toward the confederation.
In December, therefore, after the type of treaty
had been decided upon, Prussia and Bavaria asked the governments of the zollverein for their acceptances.
over accepted.
All but Han-
B.Y this action these German states recognized
the new kingdom of Italy.
At the beginning of January, 1866
Victor Emmanuel received the order of the Black Eagle from
1?
William. The news of the conclusion of this commercial
treaty was received with great bitterness in Vienna.
As a
consequence, there were renewed outbreaks of trouble in Sch18
leswig-Holstein. This oommercial treaty was not the end of
negotiations between Prussia and Italy.
Relations between
Austria and Prussia became steadily worse.
On January 13,
1866 Bismarck wrote to Count Usedom in Florence.
stance of his remarks was:
The sub-
that since Austria had conducted
affairs in the duchies contrary to the obligations incurred
17~., 288.
See also Headlam-Morley, 245.
18 For an account of the strained relations and the outbreaks in Schleswig-Holstein consult Chapter III.
r
48
by the treaty of Gastein, Prussia was free to resume her
"natural relations with Italy."
He also told Usedom that in
the ultimate solution of the question between Austria and Prus\
sia that Italy would necessarily have a part.
Bismarck con-
eluded his remarks by saying that if Italy did not join Prus19
sia she(Prussia) would maintain the peace.
Further inquiries were made at Florence, but no definite
answer was received.
After the famous Ministerial Council
held in Berlin on February 28, plans were made to send
Moltke on a mission to Florence.
Meanwhile, both Italy and
Prussia were anxious and distrustful of one another because
"each feared that the other would use the alliance as a
lever at Vienna, to get the Austrian government to make con20
cessions without fighting." However, Yoltke's instructions
were drawn up and were in final form by March 12, 1866.
In
order to keep Napoleon placated, the Prussians were careful
to insist on the conditional character of the proposed
treaty with Italy, that is, in case Prussia were attacked.
In
event of war the instructions provided that Prussia would obtain a position in North Germany according to the Imperial
Constitution of 1849; that Italy would receive Venetia, but
would not be permitted to take any Confederate territory, in
Trieste, nor Tyrol.
If Italy would not agree to this, then
19Headl~-Morley, 246.
20:u:owat, 156.
4
21
it would be best to conclude a simple treaty of friendship.
yoltke was about to depart for Florence when word came that
La Marmora was sending an Italian general to Berlin for the
same purpose.
Consequently, it was decided that it would be
advisable for Moltke to remain in Berlin.
Previously on February 28, Nigra, the Italian Minister
at Paris, had spoken with Napoleon.
There had been a revolu-
tion in Bucharest on February 24, and this seemed like an opportunity to offer Austria the Danubian principalities in exchange for Venetia.
gestion.
Nigra approached Napoleon with this sug-
But the latter had given his approval only on con-
dition that the proposed Italo-Prussian alliance should be
concluded.
Consequently, Usedom, upon La Marmora's orders,
sent a telegram to Bismarck stating that Italy intended to
send an officer to Berlin, if this arrangement was agreeable.
This telegram and one from Bismarck (telling of Moltke's mission to Florence) crossed in transit.
The Italians thought
that Bismarck's telegram was a response to the Italian telegram.
General Govone, therefore, was summoned from Perugia
to obtain his instructions.
_\fter Bismarck realized what had
occurred he sent his consent to the mission of Govone.
La Marmora had no intention of concluding an alliance
with Prussia.
\
What he desired was to scare APstria with the
possibility of such an alliance.
lL__
In this way he hoped to
r_o_r_c_e_h_e...;;r_t_o...;...c_e_d....;e;.....V_e_n_e_t_i_a.;..:;..i_n_r_e_t_u_r_n_f_o_r_Rum
__a_n_i_a_.__Go_v_o_n_e_,____,
21 Sybel, IV, 330-332.
50
therefore, according to his instructions was to sound out the
Prussian sentiment with regard to contemplated military operations against Austria.
If Prussia wanted an alliance for the
declaration of war against Austria, then La Marmora hoped to
be able to force Austria to cede Venetia to Italy.
Govone arrived in Berlin on March 14, ostensibly to study
22
the system of fortifications.
Together with count Barral, the
Italian Minister to Berlin, he visited Bismarck.
Govone told
Bismarck that the purpose of Italy in subscribing to this proposed alliance was to effect a solution in the Venetian question.
If such a basis could be found, then he would discuss
the military arrangements which would be necessary between
the two powers.
To this Bismarck replied:
that the Holstein question which was at
issue between Prussia and Austria was not
sufficient to warrant a declaration of war;
and that therefore Prussia intended to 1~
at the basis of her future action the national question of the reform of the German Confederation; that in the desirable
promulgation of these doctrines several
months would still necessarily be consumed;
and that in order to have a safer basis to
work upon, Prussia proposed a treaty to the
Italian Government, in which Italy should engage to declare war against Austria so soon
as Prussia should take up arms in the cause
of Confederate reformi3
This, however, served to reenforce the suspicions of the
Italians against Prussia, but Govone decided to stay in Berlin and perhaps conclude a treaty of friendship.
2 2Mowat, 156.
23sybel, IV, 337.
But, at
51
this time there arrived in Italy, news of the disapproval of
England, Russia, and Austria to the proposed exchange
mania to Austria, for the cession of Venetia to Italy.
~
RuSecond~
lY• affairs between Austria and Prussia had increased the probability
~war.
In view of these two facts, it was decided to
accept Bismarck's plan, but to limit its binding force to three
24
months. On April a, after several conferences to obviate the
difficulties, an offensive and defensive alliance between Prus25
sia and Italy was signed, and a week later it was ratified.
Bismarck had succeeded not only in securing an alliance with
Italy, but by virtue of this alliance he had prevented a hostile attack by Napoleon because the latter, as the protector
of ItalY, would not fight Prussia as long as she was allied
with Italy.
It can be observed that the relations of the four powers,
France, Italy, Austria, and Prussia with regard to alliances
26
depended upon Venetia. Italy would not be secure until she
obtained Venetia; Napoleon, as the protector of Italy and in
order to redeem his promises, wished to prevent a reconciliation between Austria and Prussia; Bismarck was anxious to prevent the cession by Austria of Venetia so that Austria would
be unable to obtain French or Italian support; finally, Aus24ward, 216.
25see Appendix c.
26 neadlam-Morley, 243-245.
r--------------------------------------5~2
tria refused to cede Venetia unless she was guaranteed compensation in Silesia, but this William would not do.
It may
be said that if Austria had ceded Venetia, the war of 1866
might not have been fought.
Belcredi, the Emperor, Ester-
hazy, and the Archduchess Sophie opposed the cession of Ven27
etia.
2'clark, 30?.
CHAPTER III
LEADING TO WAR
According to the treaty of Gastein, the administration
of Holstein by Austria and of Schleswig by Prussia began on
September 15.
Both Manteuffel and Gablenz published proclgma-
1
tiona on this date.
Manteuffel had visited both duchies
shortly after the conclusion of the treaty.
After he assumed
his duties of governor of Schleswig he had some trouble with
the government in Berlin concerning the appointment of officials and appropriations of money.
In several speeches to
the people he had mentioned the possibility of the cession of
Schleswig to Prussia; by some he was praised for this, by
others censured.
However, it was generally agreed that Man-
teuffel was a strong and honest man.
When Gablenz began his administration of Holstein, he
regulated his actions according to the strict orders that he
had received from Vienna.
"The instructions given to the new
Statthalter revealed the desire of the Austrian government to
preserve its 'pawn'--Holstein--from 'deterioration,• so that
it could later be handed over either to Prussia or to the
Diet, according to circumstances at the proper time."
He was
further instructed to conduct himself differently than Halbhuber had.
Thirdly, he was to treat Augustenburg as a pri2
vate citizen.
The relations between the two governors were
lsee Appendix D.
2 Clark, 315-316.
54
quite friendly, and it seemed that affairs in the duchies
would proceed quitely and amicably.
On October 14, the
Prince of Augustenburg visited his cousin near Eckernforde in
Schleswig.
His arrival was known beforehand, and acts of hom-
age were paid him both on his arrival and his departure.
Man-
teuffel protested this action to Gablenz, and the Prussian
government protested it to the government at Vienna.
The pro-
test of Prussia asked that the Prince should be forbidden to
accept such demonstrations even in Holstein.
This request
was granted by the Austrian government, and Mensdorff communicated with Gablenz.
The communication ordered Gablenz
not to tolerate any such demonstrations.
In general, however,
during the autumn of 1865 friendly relations were maintained
between the two governors and the two governments.
However, in the beginning of October the opinion of the
crown lawyers in connection with the question of succession
3
in the duchies was published.
This decision is supposed
never to have been communicated to Austria.
It was at this
same time, October, 1865, that Bismarck was visiting in
4
Biarritz, but he returned to Berlin in November full of new
schemes against Austria and plans to gain the duchies.
~
I
l
He
3Malet, 122. See also, Sir Henry Montague Rozier, ~
Seven Weeks' War. London: Macmillan and Company, 186?,
I, 19. Sybel~akes no mention of the publication of the
report. On pages 158-165, he gives the contents of it.
3_?_-_4_4_·------------------------------------~
-------4--se_e__p_a_g_e_s__
55
gave carte-blanche to the Prussian press to retaliate against the Austrian press.
at Berlin, he said:
To Chetek, the Austrian charge/
"'There cannot exist between Austria
and Prussia a half-relationship.
Either sincere alliance
5
or war to the knife.'"
Meanwhile in the duchies the Augustenburg agitation had
increased, especially in Holstein, and propaganda began to
reappear.
Manteuffel took measures to prohibit the sale of
newspapers in Schleswig that were friendly to Augustenburg.
On December 6, he wrote to Biamarck stating that the condition of affairs in Holstein was similar to that existing
6
before Gastein. The attitude of Gablenz had changed, and
in many instances he made declarations hostile to Prussia.
The Princess Frederick, the wife of the Hereditary Prince,
journeyed from Altona to Kiel, and along the way she was
greeted with royal honors.
All these and similar occur-
rences in Holstein seemed to indicate that the pre-Gastein
situation had returned.
Yanteuffel began to lose patience.
On December 14, he dined with Gablenz.
A long interview be-
tween Manteuffel, Gablenz, and Hofmann ensued.
Gablenz and
Hofmann told Manteuffel that Austria would guard her position in Holstein in order to protect her place in German affairs which place Prussia was trying to usurp.
5clark, 324.
6Ibid., 316-320. Clark states that there was no change,
but thar-Gablenz had followed his instructions and that the
Austrian policy of neutrality had been explained to Prussia.
~
56
After the incidents concerned with the journey of the
Princess, Manteuffel sent a protest to Gablenz.
The latter
replied that even at the moment he was inquiring of the
Vienna government if it was permissible for him to inform the
Prussian government of the administrative measures enforced
in Holstein.
After this reply, Manteuffel reported to Bis-
marck that it seemed advisable to question Vienna whether or
not that government would break with Prussia or with Augustanburg.
Accordingly, Werther, the Prussian Minister at Vienna,
was instructed on December 29, 1865 to question Mensdorff.
The instructions said that he was to point out
how very contradictory it was to the agreements of Salzburg and Gastein to permit such
demonstrations, and to suffer them to go unpunished; that the administration of the Duchies was divided, but the sovereignty was held
in common as before; that each of the two
Powers was, in the Duchy intrusted to her, the
depositary of the other's rights; that therefore Prussia was justified in demanding that
Austria should in Holstein prove herself worthy
of the confidence placed in her at Salzburg
and Gastein, and should now, after two ineffectual warnings, make the Hereditary Prince
feel that she, as well as Prussia, was determined to support the common righta7
Before these instructions reached Werther, Bismarck on
December 31, received his answer from Hofmann who was returning to Holstein from Vienna by
w~
of Berlin.
Hofmann re-
iterated what he and Gablenz had told Manteuffel, namely,
l________
I
7_s_y_b_e_l_,__rv
__, __29_4__• ______________________________________-J
57
8
that the laws of 1854 had been abrogated and that Augustenburg
bore the title of Duke rightfully.
He also said that if Prus-
sia complained of the Angustenburg agitation in the newspapers
that Austria could as justly oppose the journals in Schleswig
that were agitating for annexation to Prussia.
However, he
did state that Austria had no desire to cause friction between
prussia and herself, but that a common policy would be the
only one that would lead to any mutual understanding.
With the new year, Gablenz received instructions similar
to those he had received in September.
On .January 3, Bismarck
received a communication from Werther stating that Mensdorff
had expressed his desire for amicable relations, that concerning the Constitution of 1854 he was not quite sure, but
that he (Mensdorff) wished that Prussia would be more sympathetic with the occurrences in the duchies.
However, in
spite of this friendly attitude Manteuffel had been urging
Bismarck to demand the removal of Augustenburg because he felt
that was the only way in which a satisfactory solution could
be effected.
marck.
On .January 18, he wrote to this effect to Bis-
But previous, Bismarck had already started such ne-
gotiations.
On .January 13, he had written to Usedom concern-
ing the Italian alliance.
In this letter he mentioned the in-
tentions of Prussia in connection with the new conditions in
Germany.
8 The Constitution of 1854 which had been annulled by the
Confederate commissioners in 1864.
58
Meanwhile in Holstein, the popularity of the Augustenburg
caused more demonstrations in his favor.
was reached on January 23.
The climax of these
The Austrian government had been
informed of a proJect to assemble the delegates of the Holstei
and Schleswig associations.
The Vienna cabinet issued a note
of warning, but it was assured that any "agitating questions"
would not be discussed.
Consequently, the Austrian government
9
did not forbid the Assembly.
This mass-meeting at which four
thousand people were present was held on January 23 at Altona.
In keeping with the promises to the Austrian government, no
resolutions were passed, but there were loud clamorings in
favor of Augustenburg, and expressions of favor concerning
the possible convocation of the assembly of the Estates.
By
permitting this meeting to take place, Gablenz was guilty of
an error of judgment.
Bismarck himself was not concerned par-
ticularly because he could see no disastrous effects.
However,
he did not overlook this opportunity to lodge another com10
plaint at Vienna. This complaint was presented on January 26
in a letter to Werther.
as follows:
The general tenor of the despatch was
that the two powers had tought against
revolu~
tionary tendencies in the past and it was ill-befitting that
Austria should support such measures against Prussia.
Austria
9Malet, 123.
10 clark, 327. See also Sybel, IV, 304, wherein he states
that there was a great deal of apprehension in Prussia. I am
inclined to believe Clark.
59
was asked to put an end to these events in Holstein and to
reply in a positive fashion to Frusta.
sist Prussia in determining her policy.
This answer would asWhether or not it
was to be one of freedom from that of Austria would depend
upon this answer.
The points covered in this despatch were
not new to Mensdorff, save one, "the solemn and official request for an answer quite as official and as definitive, as
to whether Austria would choose to renounce her support of
Augustenburg or her friendly alliance with Prussia."
The Austrians raiized the seriousness of this note.
Mensdorff expressed his disapproval of the Altona meeting,
and he had already sent a reproof to Gablenz for permitting
it.
At the same time, however, he maintained that Austria
could not interfere with the freedom of the press in Holstein,
and secondly, that both powers had agreed to recognize Augus11
tenburg by the motion of May 28, 1864. These were his unofficial words; but they became the basis for the official Austrian reply which was dated February 7, 1866.
Without adducing any proofs, it was denied
that the agitation in Holstein had a revolutionary character--an assertion that could not,
indeed, be gainsaid, if Austria seconded the
deductions of Beust and Pfordten concerning
Augustenburg, which, however, would mean that
she cut loose from the basis of the Vienna
and the Gastein treaties. 'Prussia,' it was
said in the reply, 'has, in making her complaints about the Altona meeting, evidently
forgotten that it was her own Government that
once rejected the proposal of Austria to bring
forward in the Confederation a motion prohibllneclaration made in common at the London Conference.
60
iting all such meetings throughout Germany.
Austria recognizes her duty of preserving
uninjured the pledge that has been intrusted
to her care, but can understand this duty
only upon its own promptings, and it considers every single question that may come
up within the range of its administration
as a question arising solely between itself
and its Statthalter, and in every way removed from the reach of foreign interference.
The same independence is also recognized and
conceded to the Royal Prussian Government in
Schleswig. • • • .
'Count Mensdorff has, without doubt, the
right to confide to his friend Baron von Werther, what the Govetnment of the :Emperor
thinks about the authorization of that Altona meeting, to which, moreover, the courct
of Berlin seems to attach altogether too
much importance. But the Minister of the
Emperor must decidedly refuse to recognize
the claim of the Royal Prussian Ambassador
to any justification of an act that concerned the administration of Holstein. When
I give utterance to these sentiments, I am
but following the commands of my Imperial
Master. •12
This reply seems to have been given for the benefit of the pub
lie because Karolyi, in a private conversation, and under orders from Mensdorff apologized for this meeting at Altona •
.~stria, however, had adopted a firm stand and could not re13
tract. Bismarck made no official reply to the Austrian note
of February 7, but at a meeting with Karolyi he remarked that
12sybel, IV, 308-309, cites Mensdorff's note. See also
Malet, 128-129 for a good summary of it. Rozier, 21 has
erred in the date of the note.
13clarkr 334-336, mentions this private apology.
Sybel, IV, 3u9, mentions the meeting with Karolyi but does
not allude to any apology.
'
l
61
the relations of Austria and Prussia had lost their intimate
character.
In other words in accordance with his note of
January 26 addressed to Austria, "'that convinced of the impossibility of longer acting with Austria, Prussia resumed her
14
liberty of action, and would only consult her own interests.'"
These notes definitely mark the end of the Austro-Prussian alliance, and the beginning of hostilities which eventually lead
to the war of 1866.
Also, any further altercations or ne-
gotiations between Austria and Prussia with regard to the
duchies were linked with the broader question of war and reform of the Confederation.
The question of the duchies was no
longer considered exclusively.
Bismarck spoke of the imminence of war to those people
who would be sure to spread this rumor in Austria.
He also
fostered agitations and outbursts of indignation in the Prus15
sian newspapers. How did Austria react to the recurrence of
the pre-Gastein relations?
The Emperor had determined to
yield no further, and for four reasons:
first, public opinion
favored Austria's stand; secondly, the policy of Bismarck itself; thirdly, the improvement in Austria's internal affairs
and in her international position; fourth, the influence
exerted by the military and Court circles in Vienna.
14Malet, 130.
15 clark, 336.
It was
62
at this time that he turned a deaf ear to the plans for a
16
rapprochem~ with Italy.
-
In Vienna on February 21 a Council was held to determine
what policy Austria should adopt in view of these new developments, namely, the situation created by the exchange of notes.
"To the menaces of Monsieur de Bismarck, the Emperor and his
council had decided to reply, not with armaments [at least,
not immediately] nor yet with concessions, but by showing their
teeth to Prussia and bestowing their glances on the Mittel17
staaten." And again, at this Council the Emperor refused to
cede Venetia and thus gain Italy as an ally.
Esterhazy and
Belcredi urged the rapprocbment with the secondary states.
This, however, had already begun.
On February 11, Mensdorff
had instructed Blome at Munich to discover confidentially if
the guess of Bismarck with regard to Bavaria was correct, namely, that she would stall off entering the war until she could
determine which was the winning side and then she would ally
herself with that side.
one.
This conjecture seemed to be a correct
On the other hand, Saxony, under the leadership of Beust,
18
was in favor of strong measures to be adopted by the Diet.
Meanwhile in Prussia, Bismarck was contemplating the
possibilites of a reform in the Confederation.
This idea had
been in his mind for a number of years, but it was necessary to
16 Ibid., 328-332.
17 Ibid., 339-340.
18 Ibid.
See also pages 45-47.
63.
to attack the solution of this question with caution.
He
realized that in order to accomplish this reform, a war would
be necessary.
On this point he had to meet the opposition of
the King who would not go to war on a small pretext, but his
reasons for adopting a warlike policy would have to be sound
and well established. B.Y family and by sentiment he was drawn
toward Austria and away from Napoleon.
Consequently, Bismarck
proceeded in a judicious manner in order to lead William into
a frame of mind which was favorable to war.
In the early part of February Bismarck instructed Prince
Reuss to communicate to Pfordten the Prussian messages of
19
January 20 and January 26 that had been sent to Austria.
Pfordten replied favorably to Prussia's attitude as it was indicated in these despatches.
On February 2? in his conversa-
tion with Pfordten, Reuss brought up the question of Federal
reform.
The latter agreed that Prussia was entitled to an in-
crease in power.
He also said that the voting power of the
Diet as it existed then was a mistake and that the apportionment of votes should be based on the actual power of the members.
With regard to Schleswig-Holstein he said he could not
answer definitely until he could determine the motive for Austria's attitude.
"If she opposed the Prussian Court for the
19 on January 20, Bismarck had reviewed the situation in
Holstein in a letter to Werther. He wished to suppress the
secret societies and the press.
64
sake of Augustenburg, then she was right.
If she wished only
to hinder the Prussian annexation, she ought not to expect
others to join her."
If it came to a decision, he would pre-
fer Prussian annexation to any other course, so he said.
Whil
these events were in progress, the question of Venetia and the
possibilities of alliances were discussed in France, Prussia,
Austria, and Italy.
In February the negotiations for alliances that Prussia
had been conducting did not seem favorable to her so a full
Ministerial Council was called for February 28 to discuss the
situation.
The King presided at the council which was at-
tended by the Crown Prince, Bismarck, Goltz, Manteuffel• Moltke, and others.
The meeting was opened by the King who made a
short speech saying that the affairs in Holstein were only
one indication of Austria's intention to keep Prussia in
second position if she could.
He further remarked that "the
possession of the Duchies is the national desire of all Prussia.
That a war was to come was certain, but Prussia would
have to be careful not to provoke the war herself.
Bismarck
gave the historical background of the diplomatic conflict
with Austria and concluded his remarks by saying that the rupture had already been effected by his remarks to Karolyi upon
receipt of the Austrian note of February 7.
isters favored Bismarck and his plans.
Most of the min-
Goltz reported on Nape-
leon's favorable attitude, and Moltke reported on the military
65
status of Prussia.
The Crown Prince gave a dissenting opinion
He had never favored any but amicable relations between the
two German powers, and said:
"The war, with Austria is a war
between brothers; and the interference of the Foreign Powers
is certain."
King.
The decision, however, was in the hands of the
He said that the possession of the duchies was
sufti~
cient cause for a war, but that if the question could be settled peacefully it would be wise.
The decision, whether it shall be war or
peace, depends therefore, upon Austria's
further conduct. On the part of Prussia,
diplomatic negotiations alone can for the
present be undertaken, in order to secure
for her the most favorable chances in the
event of war~O
The King was also of the opinion that the question of the
duchies was bound up with the question of the reforms in the
Confederation.
One of the results of this Council was the
renewal of efforts to make alliances with France and Italy.
It was at this time that the King sent his autograph letter
to Napoleon, and that Moltke's instructions for his mission
to Italy were framed.
Karolyi in his reports to Vienna indicated the hostile
attitude which was manifest in Berlin.
Mensdorff.
These reports alarmed
The feeling in Vienna against Prussia was also
rising every day, and Mensdorff was finding it more difficult
to deal with the militarists.
20sybel, IV, 323.
When news came that Prussia
66
bad called out the militia the Austrians feared that war was
at hand.
This, however, was not an extraordinary event, but
nevertheless, the Austrians were alarmed.
On March 2, orders
were sent to six cavalry regiments and six batteries to be
prepaxed for action.
A Council of war was held in Vienna between March 7 and
21
March 13. The entire military situation was discussed. The
extent of the· strength of Austria was compared with that of
22
Prussia, and was found to be superior. Austria, as well as
Prussia, wished to ally the question of the duchies with the
question of the reform of the Confederation.
At this time
Beust sent news to Vienna of Bismarck's retort to Countess
Hohenthal when she asked if it were true that he wished to
23
fight Austria and thus conquer Saxony. After this Council,
Austria's preparations were pushed, but secretly.
This was an
unfortunate move for Austria because as soon as she did this
she was committed to war and to Bismarck.
Prussia's military
machine was much better organized; could mobilize more quickly;
and Bismarck could always maintain that it was Austria who
21Hozier, 25, says March 10.
22rbid., 26. Sybel makes no mention of these miscalculations or-the Austrian Council.
23 sybel, ·IV, 344-345, has the best account of this incident, but it is mentioned in all references.
l
67
24
had started to prepare.
Events occurred in rapid succession.
On March 3 Karolyi
presented at Berlin a statement from Austria to the
e~ct
that
Austria would not permit her position in the provisional
government to be jeopardized, nor her position in ·the Confederation.
Similar statements were presented to the govern25
mente of France and England.
However, during all these plans for war, Mensdorff who
favored peace had decided on a peace offensive.
of two parts:
It consisted
first, that a dualism between the two poers
should be established in the Confederation; and secondly,
it provided for a German national movement, or to be more
definite, the question of the duchies and the question of the
reform of the Confederation were to be linked together.
Stated differently, his plan was to wage a peace campaign
against Bismarck, and if this failed, to wage a diplomatic
war by taking the Schleswig-Holstein question to the Federal
Diet, and finally to make an alliance with "l'infame" in
Paris.
He wished to conduct his peace offensive in such a
way that it would be
casus belli. '
11
11
'impossible for Bismarck to register a
In this manner Mensdorff hoped not only to
avoid war, but to make it impossible for Bismarck to remain
24Headlam-Morley, 247.
25:Malet, 130.
68
26
in office.
As part of his peace procedure he offered on March 3, to
reopen negotiations with regard to Schleswig-Holstein.
On
March 15, he is supposed to have stated that the duchies shoul
be independent under Prussian influence, and that the Grand
nuke of Oldenburg was an acceptable candidate.
Again on March
27, he said to Gramont, the French Minister in Vienna that
'he cared little what accession of territory Prussia gained outside of Germany; and that he would consent to annexation of Schleswig if absolutely
necessary to avoid war, but Holstein
27
must be independent in the Confederation.'
These peaceful advances, however, were too late.
While Mensdorff was making his peaceful advances to restore harmony, a decree in the name of the king of Prussia was
issued on March 11.
This decree may be regarded as a reply
to Karolyi's communication of March 3.
It provided for the
punishment by imprisonment "with hard labour for any attempt
within the Schleswig-Holstein territory, calculated to impair his own Willi-am'-s or the .Emperor of Austria's sovereign
28
rights."
The implications in this decree were meaningful
because Prussia,
~ccording
to the treaty of Gastein, had no
26 clark, 349-354. This plan was not original with Mensdorff but seems to have been suggested in 1864 by others.
This was the only reference to these plans that were found in
my research, but this work has authority and was written from
Austrian state documents.
27Ibid., 358. There is no mention of these proposals in
the books which favor Prussia.
28Malet, 130-131.
r
.
69
'
right to interfere in Holstein. When she did this, she showed
29
her disregard for this treaty. Naturally, this caused alarm
in Vienna.
Consequently, Mensdorff instructed Karolyi to
make an interpellation at Berlin, whether Prussia intended to
break the Gastein convention and to disturb the peace.
marck replied:
"No."
Bis-
In answer to a question about Prussia's
preparations for war, Bismarck answered that she was conducting no such preparations.
To which Karolyi answered that the
Austrian preparations were merely for defense and protection.
The sending of troops into Bohemia, and this interpellation of
Bismarck are regarded as examples of precipitate action by Aus
tria.
The second was foolhardy because Bismarck could hardly
have answered affirmatively.
On March 16, the same day that he had sent instructions
to Karolyi, Mensdorff sent a secret circular despatch to all
the German governments.
The purpose of this circular was to
state what would be done if Bismarck's reply was unsatisfactor
According to this despatch, the Diet was to be called to make
a decision with regard to Schleswig-Holstein.
If Prussia op-
posed this, then the Confederate army with the exception of the
Prussian contingents was to be mobilized.
However, when Bis-
marck replied so emphatically to Karolyi, the need for the
despatch was unfounded.
Therefore, on March 18, Mensdorft
telegraphed the secondary states that the Prussian answer had
been satisfactory.
The despatch of March 16 and the telegram
29sybel, IV, 348.
70
of March 18 had been sent to the following capitals of states:
Munich in Bavaria, Dresden in Saxony, Hanover, Stuttgart in
30
\~rtemberg, Karlsruhe in Baden, Cassel, and Darmstadt.
The possibility of war was imminent, but still William
was opposed.
The Absolutist party headed by the Dowager
queen was also against it.
In Austria, the Emperor had just
refused to cede Venetia for one million lire.
And, to in-
crease the war scare in Austria, Karolyi had informed his
31
government that he considered war inevitable.
On March 24t
the Prussian government sent a circular despatch to all the
German governments.
Bismarck protested the movements of the
Austrian army and said that it was necessary for Prussia to
protect herself.
He asked if the assistance of the members
of the Confederation could be guaranteed in case Prussia would
be attacked.
At this time he made his first announcement of
32
his proposal for a reformed Confederation. Moltke states in
a confidential note dated March 24 that this despatch sent by
Bismarck was a pretext.
He declared that all the Austrian
preparations had been defensive and not offensive at least up
36clark, 370, corrects Sybel, IV, 350. Sybel states that
Mensdorff countermanded the presentation of the despatch
but Clark says he did not, nor did these states warn Austria
but instead sent warnings to Berlin.
31Malet, 138.
32 s
ee Append.1x E •
r
~··
33
to that date. Thus both powers had addressed notes to the
71
other states indicating what might be expected if a peaceful
solution were not found.
A Ministerial Council was held in Berlin on March 27
and the King presided.
As a result on March 28 and 29 de-
crees were issued for military reenforcements.
In particular
34
it was decided to arm the Silesian and Elbe fortresses.
Meanwhile, the Italian enboys had observed these events and
the treaty with Italy was signed on April 8.
The movement for a reform in the confederation had been
in Bismarck's mind for some time.
His announcement of it on
March 24 was a result of long deliberations.
As early as
February 14, he had broached the subject to Pfordten.
The
latter had maintained an attitude of friendliness to Prussia
for some time, and Bismarck encouraged the friendly relations
between the two states.
On March 8, Reuss told Pfordten that
Prussia was contemplating a revision of the Constitution of
the confederation and that Prussia intended to move to summon
a German parliament which should be composed of members
elected directly by the people.
Pfordten asserted that he was
33Headlam-Morley, 249.
34sybel, IV, 351. Other provisions were "to purchase
horses for half of the Prussian field-artillery, and to increase seventy-five battalions, each from 530 to 685 men
(their full war-footing would have been 1002). The increase
of the force by this means amounted to 11 1 000 men, which was
almost exactly the same number that the Austrian provinces
on the frontier had received by the changes that had been
made."
?2
friendly to this, but said that Prussia would have to come to
som understanding with Austria.
Bismarck, however, had plans
to offer Bavaria the military supremacy of the south German
states.
In this way he hoped to destroy any Austrian senti-
ments that might be harbored by Pfordten.
The circular of
March 24 when it was sent to Bavaria was accompanied by a
lengthy explanation of the new parliamentary system which
35
Bismarck desired to initiate.
Austria, on the other hand, had not been idle with regard
to the German states.
Mensdorff, as part of his peace offen-
sive, wanted Bavaria and Saxony jointly to make a motion in
the Diet to preserve peace.
Pfordten was asked to take the
initiative, but he refused because his connections with Prussia were too friendly. Secondly he was busy with his own
36
peace plans.
To Pfordten his most important task was to gain
safety, influence, and prestige for Bavaria.
In order to do
this, therefore, it was necessary that the rivalry between
the two powers should be sustained but that this rivalry
should be kept within peaceful limits.
Consequently, for the
sake of the state which he served, if for no other reason,
37
Pfordten was sincere in his efforts to preserve peace.
When the Schleswig-Holstein question had come to the fore,
35Ibid., 360-363.
36 clark, 3?0.
37
l_______
·---------------------------------------J
3-64__
_ _s_y_b_e_l_,__I_v_,__
?3
ne had vacillated in his policy, but finally he had decided
tnat the cause of the trouble was Austria's attitude.
He be-
lieved that aside from Augustenburg's rights, the best solution of the question would be found in the annexation of the
duchies by Prussia.
Austria, he declared, opposed this in
order to reap advantages for herself.
He became convinced that
war between the two powers was almost inevitable, and if that
war came, it would mean the destruction of the Confederation.
This he wished to avoid.
As a result of his wish to maintain
the Confederation, he began to outline a plan for the reorganization of the Confederation.
Pfordten was supported in this
policy by the Bavarian King Ludwig.
This plan provided for a
three-fold division of the confederation, with Austria remain38
ing in the Bund. This was his reply to Bismarck's circular
despatch of March 24.
Previously, on March 26, Pfordten had surprised Blome
with the following proposal which was to serve as a basis of
his mediation between the two powers.
'Prussia to accept Augustenburg and a modification of the February demands, Austria to
allow a new allotment of voting power in the
Diet in accord with Prussia's actual strength,
and to per.mit Prussia to exercise a preponderant influence in North Germany.t39
This proposal, however, was never given any serious consideration by either power.
3 BMQwat, 190, SaYS that this plan had great possibilities,
if Pruss1a had accepted it.
39clark, 3?1, cites letter to Mensdorff, dated March 26.
?4
Meanwhile, Austria was criticized for her troop movements
in the north.
Therefore, in order to maintain her position as
desiring peace, a very vigorous peace campaign supplemented
the diplomatic campaign.
This plan had three parts:
first,
to challenge Prussia to announce that her intentions were
peaceful and to give an explanation of her preparations;
secondly, to continue to seek alliances; thirdly, to weaken
the position of Bismarck.
The first of these was carried into effect on March 31.
Mensdorff instructed Karolyi to address a note to the Prussian
government in which Austria disclaimed ho ::tile intentions
and in which the Emperor refused to put himself in a position
40
of opposition to Article XI of the Act of Confederation.
This same note ended with a request that Prussia would declare
her intentions to preserve peace. As a consequence of this
41
note, a series of notes between the two governments ensued
with the result that they agreed to recall their military
42
forces. The Prussian reply, dated April 6, was equivalent to
a request for an explanation of Austria's military preparation
40see Appendix H.
41 sybel, IY,384-389, gives a detailed description of
each note. Clark, 375, mentions subsequent notes in footnotes
42Letter from William to Bismarck, April 3, sayin~ that
proposed reply to Austria is too brusque. Letter of B1smarck
to William, April 3, saying that it would not be advisable to
modify the proposed reply.
43
in Bohemia. The other Prussian notes bear the dates of A-
75
pril 15 and 21, while the AUstrian notes are dated April 7
and 18. The crucial note was the reply of Prussia on A44
pril 21 in which that g~rnment engaged to reduce her army
by the extent to which it had been increased by the orders of
March 29.
This was to be done as soon as Austria withdrew
her troops from the north, and would be done in proportion to
the Austrian reduction in war equipment.
The latter was to
use her influence on the secondary states to stop their military preparations.
The second part of Mensdorff's vigorous peace campaign,
45
namely, to secure alliances has been discussed elsewhere.
But the third part is very interesting, and if it had succeeded, its effects would have been far-reaching.
This pro-
vided for the weakening of Bismarck's position and was designe
46
to drive him from office. It is known as the Coburg Intrigue.
43 It is well to remember that the treaty with Italy was
signed on April 8.
Malet, 160, has the dates of these events in March
rather than in April. Seems to have been a printer's error.
44 see page 76. Letter of William to Bismarck, April 20,
stating that Austrian plan was to be accepted.
45
46
plot.
See Chapters II and IV, passim.
clark, 375-379, gives a complete description of this
'76
The plan was to hold Bismarck personally
responsible for misleading the King into
a warlike policy against Austria, 'which
no true German desired, as it would simply
play into the hands of France.' The King
was to be urged to drop Bismarck and appoint a more liberal minister. In essence,
it was simply the culmination of the struggle
which had been going on for years at the
Prussian Court, between the Crown Prince's
faction and the Bismarck faction.
All the people in Prussia who were friendly to Austria, either
by kinship or merely because of their opposition to Bismarck
47
were employed to effect this plan.
Even
~ueen
Victoria wrote
letters to the Dowager queen of Prussia supporting this
mo~e.
These influences which had been inaugurated in Vienna were
assisted by the illness of Bismarck.
This illness probably
48
was caused by his worries about the success of his plans.
Mensdorff's plans seemed to be successful, and when Prussia
accepted the proposal for mutual disarmament the designs for
war seemed to have been forestalled.
At this juncture, how-
ever, occurred the death-knell of Mensdorff's peace offensive
49
when the Emperor gave the order to mobilize against Italy.
A favorable reply to Austria's offer of prior disarmament was
being drafted in Berlin.
Karolyi telegraphed this news to
Mensdorff, but the telegram arrived a few hours after the
47Letters of William and B~smarck dated April 3,4,7, and 8
refer to this plot against Bismarck. These J.e tters indicate
that Duke Ernest II of Coburg-Gotha was implicated.
48Headlam-Morley, 249.
49 The reasons for this will be found in Chapter IV.
f
77
50
mobilization orders had been sent.
While Mensdorff pushed forward his peace campaign, Bismarck pushed forward his plans for reform in the Confederation.
In spite of Pfordten's counter proposition, Bismarck hoped to
win his support.
On April 4, Savigny, the Prussian representa
tive at Frankfort, received his preliminary instructions.
On
April 9, he presented the motion to the Diet.
'The Diet will within a period to be precisely fixed decree the convocation of a
National Assembly to be elected by universal
and direct suffrage, for the purpose of receiving and deliberating on the proposals
of the German Governments for the reform of
the Confederation. The Governmen~ however,
must meanwhile, and until the said Assembly
comes together, determine on these proposals
by mutual understanding.r51
Needless to say, this motion was received with surprise and
apprehension.
liberalism.
Bismarck the reactionnary, had now turned to
As part of his absolutist program he had denied
the rights of Augustenburg, and had denied the right of the
people of Schleswig-Holstein to decide this matter.
Austria,
while more absolute than Prussia had defended Augustenburg
and the duchies.
"A popular assembly in Hanover declared it
to be an accursed enterprise to use Confederate reform as a
pretext for beginning a fraticidal war."
Everywhere the
50 clark, 387. Telegram from Karolyi to Mensdorff arrived
at 6 P.M.
51Malet, 161-162, cites this motion.
~---------
r
~
motion was received with condemnation:
expressed their disapproval.
?8
2
Even foreign powers
But Bismarck remained undaunted.
The question which had been raised by the motion April 9 1 was,
on April 21, referred to a committee of nine members.
At
the same time it was decided to request the Prussian government for details and explanations as to the object and extent
of these reforms.
April 26.
The election of the committee took place on
On April 27, Bismarck replied to the request. sayin
'the determination of the period of the opening of the Parliament was to be regarded as
the essence of the proposition, and that he
could put no reliance on the Governments
coming to an agreement as to the text and
terms of their proposals, unless that preliminary determination was taken as a self-imposed necessity.
'If this question was put aside, all
serious consideration of Dietal reform became
impossible; he would however indicate in the
deliberations of the Committee, to what regions of political life the Prussian proposals would extend.'53
Savigny was then called to Berlin to participate in the discussions of the proposals for confederate refor.m.
Thus by April 27, 1866 Prussia had prepared the way for
her proposed reforms of the Confederation.
These reforms were
connected with the Schleswig-Holstein question.
Austria by
April 21 had committed herself to war by the mobilization
orders against Italy.
52sybel, IV, 3?0-3?3.
See also, Headlam-Morley, 253-254.
53Malet, 162-163, cites Bismarck's reply of April 2?.
CHAPTER IV
WAR COMES
The events described in the last chapter indicated that
war between Prussia and Austria was inevitable, but the moment
that it was to be declared might be within a few weeks or
;
I
months.
Vf.h.en Austria mobilized against Italy, the first
direct step had been taken.
mobilization order?
vVhy
did the Emperor sign the
Up to that time Austria's peace offen-
sive seemed to be successful but Mensdorff was the only one,
who at this time, hoped for peace.
His colleagues in the
ministry were not favorable to his peace plans.
While he was
working for peace and trying to dissuade the Emperor from
!
l[,
f.
making further military preparations, word kept coming to Austria concerning the military preparations of Italy.
Belcredi,
the president of the ministry in Vienna, was anxious for war.
Therefore, when a letter from the Director of Police in Venice
informed Belcredi that the Italians were concentrating 49,000
fI
men at Bologna and that an Italian general was engaged in obtaining horses, he thought he could use this information to
get action.
It should be noted, however, that this action of
the Italians was already known to the Intelligence service of
1
Austria.
A Council was called on April 22, the day after the
order for mobilization, but neither Mensdorff nor Esterhazy
was present, both men being ill.
Without these peace advocates
the result was a foregone conclusion, namely, that further
1 Clark, 381.
r
80.
military preparations would be endorsed.
move was that Austria was afraid.
Ambassador at Vienna said:
The reason for this
Lord Bloomfield, the Englis
"'The Austrians are driven wild by
2
the danger of their position.'"
It was the consensus of opin-
ion in the European courts that Bismarck was responsible for
the arming of Italy as a move to ruin the disarmament scheme
3
before it could be effected.
It may be noted here that neithe
government had taken any steps to disarm.
The Austrian southern army was mobilized, and part of the
northern army withdrawn from Bohemia.
This was done in order
to withstand a supposed attack by Garibaldi's men.
only a rumor, but the harm had already been done.
This was
Secondly,
"the threatened march of troops toward the Venetian frontier
consisted of only twelve squadrons of cavalry which had been
sent down to Naples against the brigands two years before;
and as they proved unserviceable for this purpose, their return to their former garrisons had already been decided upon
4
some time previous to this."
The English Ambassador at
Florence, and the Russian ani French charges d'affaite~ all
testified to their home governments that these moves by the
2 Ibid., 386, cites Bloomfield's note to Clarendon, April
26.
3Ibid., 38?.
4 sybel, IV, 393.
r
81
rtalians were harmless.
Austria, however, once she started to
arm could not revoke her actions.
arm further.
Consequently, she had to
Prussia warned Austria that she could not be in-
different to an attack on Italy.
Prussia did not believe that
the northern army of Austria would be reduced so she took step
5
to counteract this.
By April 26, the Italian army was mobil-
6
ized.
Before we treat of the actual steps that led to mobilization and war, we must return to Prussia's proposal for areform in the Confederation.
After April 2?, Savigny had been
recalled to Berlin to participate in the deliberations on the
question of Federal reform.
William wished only that Prussia
would have rights and powers equal with those of Austria, and
military supremacy at least over the northern states of the
Confederacy.
He also believed that a representative body e-
lected by the people should be established along with the Diet,
but the Diet should maintain the controlling authority.
It
was also important for Prussia to keep these proposals modest
?
in order to prevent the possibility of foreign intervention.
The result of these deliberations was the following communication to be presented to the committee appointed by the Diet.
5Hozier, 35.
6Mowat, 190.
?
Sybel, IV, 3??.
82
'A national assembly shall be established,
to be convened periodically, which shall
share in Confederate legislation, and shall
replace the requirement of unanimity which
has hitherto been necessary in certain cases.
The functions of this Confederate body thus
organized shall be concerned with such matters of common interest as are designated
in the Vienna Final Act; also with the regulation of commercial intercourse, the freedom to move from State to State and hold a
common citizenship, legislation respecting
customs and trade, protection of German
trade in foreign countries as well as of
German navigation and German colors, a consular representation of Germany as a whole,
the establishment of a navy, revision of
the Confederate military organization by
providing for the better centralization of
the forces with a view to increasing the
actual efficiency of the whole army and
lightening the burden of the individual.
With reference to the system of election to
be applied to the convention of the parliament ad hoc, universal suffrage shall prevail,-one-Fepresentative being chosen for
every one hundred thousand souls, and the
eligibility of the candidate being dete~­
mined as in the electoral law of 1849.'
These proposals were modest ones, but even then they were
likely to be refused by the Diet.
Prussia announced that if
this were the case then she would make even more strict demands in the form of reforms.
Thus, on May 11, Minister
von Schrenck of Bavaria gave his report according to his
instructions from the lesser states.
He stated that before
the Confederate assembly should take any steps that Prussia
should be asked to present her outline for reform.
8rbid., citation of proposal for reform.
But he
r--------------------------------------------------------~~
83
also supplemented his report with a request that Savigny
should be allowed to say a few words before the vote was taken
The Prussian proposal was so moderate that the committee decided to omit the vote until the representatives had received
further instructions from their governments.
This was done in
spite of the opposition of Austria and Darmstadt.
Austria viewed the complete Italian mobilization with
some alarm.
Consequently, Mensdorff sent two notes to Karolyi
on April 26 which he was to present to the Prussian government.
The first dealt with Italy and mobilization; the second
with Schleswig-Holstein.
The first despatch said that the
Emperor accepted the disarmament proposal (the acceptance of
which by William had been received in Vienna on April 21, a
few hours after the mobilization order against Italy had been
signed).
He was prepared to withdraw the troops from Bohemia,
but it was necessary in order to protect the Venetian frontier
to put her Italian or southern army on war footing.
mobilization was a cause of the second note.
This
"When the army
(Austrian] was once mobilized, the bad condition of the Austrian finances forbade a long and inactive continuation of
such an expensive state of things.
of the whole question, the
Consequently, the source
question, must
Schleswig-Ho~tein
9
be got out of the way as quickly as possible."
Austria,
therefore, according to her notes of March 16to the German
9Ibid., 39?.
See also, Malet, 16?-169.
r-----------------.
84
i
states, offered Prussia snall gains in Schleswig-Holstein.
At the same time she stated that if Prussia did not accept
this proposal, Austria would refer the matter to the Diet and
would also obtain the opinion of the Schleswig-Holstein Estates.
The Austrian government knew that this declaration might
lead to hostilities, and on April 2?, the orders for mobilization of the northern army were given.
After the mobilization
against Italy had been ordered, Mensdorff had undertaken to
remove as much blame from Austria for this move as he possibly
could.
The move against Prussia, however, caused little loss
of neutral support.
Mensdorff had several plans in mind.
First, he could seek the neutrality of Napoleon, and secondly,
he could place the Schleswig-Holstein question before the
10
Diet at the proper time.
Meanwhile in Berlin, Bismarck was taking no action.
La
Marmora requested information, but Bismarck would give none.
He was waiting for the Austrian reply to his note of April 21
stating that Prussia would accept the disarmament scheme.
The
reply was given to him on April 28, i.e., the two Austrian
despatches of April 26.
To the first despatch, Bismarck re-
plied on April 30; to the second, he did not reply until May?.
°
1 Clark, 389.
r
I
85
The
n~e
of April 30 declared:
That they were grievously disappointed,
having expected that the re-establishment
of the normal status quo would have extended to all movements of troops conducing to the war effective state. The Imperial Government, however, now alluded
merely to the movements of troops in Bohemia, passing unnoticed those which had
taken place in Moravia and West Galicia.
Neither could the Prussian Government
recognise the motives alleged for arming in
Italy, for all sources of information agreed
in stating that no warlike preparations had
taken place in the kingdom of Italy • • • •
The Prussian Government could not but
express the hope that Austria would not only
withdraw all preparations in the northern
provinces, but being speedily convinced of
the groundlessness of any motives for arming
in the south, would consequently proceed to
restore the peace establishment of the entire
Imperial army. On these conditions alone, or
otherwise only by maintenance of parity in war
effective of both states, could the Rolal Government consent to enter on negotiationst
This despatch was delivered in Vienna on May 2, and replied to
by Mensdorff on May 4.
This latter despatch declared that
negotiations with regard to di sar.mament ·had terminated.
After
the despatch of May 4, the Austrian army was strengthened by
the calling in of the reserves and absentees in regiments not
on war footing already. In Prussia orders for partial mobiliza
12
tion were given on May 3 and 5. The reply of Bismarck to the
second Austrian despatch of April 26 was dated May?.
11Malet, 165-166.
12 sybel, IV, 405.
Bismarek
'----------------------------------------------------~
86
had delayed in answering this despatch because it obviously
meant that the treaty of Gastein was abrogated.
"Ror the de-
claration that Austria intended to bring the question before
the Confederate Diet for settlement evidently could be anawered only by the subordination of Prussia or a rupture that
13
vrould mean war."
In his reply Bismarck stated that Prussia
had every intention of abiding by the treaty of Vienna and the
treaty of Gastein.
Further, the intervention of any third
party (this included the Diet) was precluded according to
these two treaties.
Prussia would not renounce her claims to
the duchies to any third party, but was willing to negotiate
with Austria concerning the terms on which the latter would.
14
cede her rights. Thus, the question of the duchies had come
to an impasse, and no agreement was either possible or probable.
Meanwhile. the secondary states were not idle.
Upon the
receipt of Bismarck's despatch many of them began to arm.
The
government of Saxony had received a supplementary note on
April 27.
In this note Prussia complained of the military
preparations undertaken in Saxony which seemed to be directed
against Prussia, and she asked for a satisfactory explanation.
The Hanoverians armed because they knew that in the event of
war their territory would only be a pawn.
13
~., 402.
14 Malet, 169-170.
The King of Hanover
r
87
rejected Bismarck's gurantee of territorial integrity in re15
turn for neutrality. When Prussia started to mobilize at the
beginning of May, Bavaria also began to arm.
In the midst
of all these preparations, an attempt was made on Bismarck's
16
life by Cohn, a Wurtemberg Republican. But this did not unnerve him.
The situation in Germany at the beginning of May was as
follows:
The Austrian Government had not ceased its
movement of troops, and, convinced at length
of the seriousness of the crisis, began
earnestly to prepare to meet it. The fortresses of Theresienstadt and JOsephstadt
were armed, the fortifications of Cracow
strengthened, and the restoration of the
dilapidated place of arms, Koniggratz, was
vigorously pressed. The regiments in Bohemia,
Moravia, and West Galicia were raised to
their full war.complement, several of them
receiving their fourth battalion; the transport corps was horsed, and the reserves
formed. Two regiments of Hussars from
Galicia, and three of Uhlans from Hungary,
entered Bohemia and Moravia. The ammunition cars of the artillery were horsed.
Concentration of troops took place at Pesth,
Vienna, and Laybach, and the Grenzu or
frontier battalions formed a reserve of
forty battalions ready to take the field.
All the men on furlough were summoned to
the ranks, so that the Austrian force in
readiness to take the field had apparently
some advantage in priority of concentration.
15yowat, 191.
16sybel, IV, 406, says the man's name was Cohn. In a
letter fromMarquis Wiepolski to Bismarck, May 8, the name is
given as Blind.
r~--------------~
88
i
The Prussian orders for mobilization
were issued between the 3rd and 12th of :May.
In the first instance they embraced only the
3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th army corps, and the
guard, with a portion of the Landwehr of the
5th and 6th district, to form battalions for
garrison duty, but the entire cavalry and
artillery were at once brought to their full
war establishment, as was the case with the 1?
light infantry (Jager) and pioneer battalions.
While all these preparations were going on, Saxony on
May 5 asked the Diet to demand a statement from Prussia with
regard to her intentions concerning the peace of the Confederation.
Savigny replied that Prussia was only protecting her
frontiers as a means of defense.
If the Confederation could
not assure her (Prussia) of a satisfactory explanation of
these moves then she must regard it {Confederation) as a
source of danger and act to protect her own interest and inter
national position.
In spite of this explanation of the Prus-
sian envoy, the Saxon motion was carried ten votes to five on
18
:May 19. Feeling in Germany ran high and the lesser states con
tinued to arm.
On May 11 Wurtemberg followed Bavaria in is-
suing orders for general mobilization.
Nevertheless, these
states were still interested in maintaining peace.
19
On May 19
1?Malet, 1?3. See also, pages 1?4-1?? where he gives a
numerical summary of the relative strength of the Prussian,
Austrian, and ~talian, and Confederate armies. "Prussia
entered the war with 600,000 men, while Austria and her
allies had some 360,000 men in Germany, and 150,000 in Italy.
Italy had on foot nearly 300,00 combatants, ; • •• "
18sybel, IV, 409, Malet, 1??; Rozier, 45, all give the
same information. Rozier has the date wrong as May 9.
19some references do not make it clear that the motion
was presented on May 19, and accepted on May 24.
89
the following motion, which had been passed in the Conference
of Bamberg attended by the representatives of Bavaria, wUrtemberg, Baden, Grand-Ducal Hesse, Saxon Grand-Ducal, BrunsM
wick, and Nassau, was made in the Diet:
'The Diet will request those members of the
Confederation which have taken any steps
for military preparation or movements beyond their peace establishments, to declare
in the next sitting of the Diet, whether,
and on what conditions, they will be prepared simultaneously to reduce their armed
force to the peace establishment, and on a
day to be agreed upon in the Diet's sitting.•20
On May 24 the Diet unanimously accepted this motion, and the
vote was to be taken on
~une
1.
In the midst of these preparations, Napoleon proposed
that the difficulties be settled by a congress.
On April 25
Napoleon had remarked to Goltz that perhaps a congress would
be able to eliminate the confusion and restore peace.
But
the chief difficulty was the possibility of compensation for
France.
However, on May 2, Benedetti officially asked Bis-
marck how he would receive the invitation to a congress.
Bismarck said that such a congress would be agreeable if
Prussia and France had some secret understanding beforehand.
At first the possibility of such an understanding seemed improbable because Prussia was regarded with disfavor by the
French.
Secondly, Austria had offered to cede Venetia to
20Malet, 1?8, cites the motion.
r~--------------~
90
f
to Italy in return for Silesia.
On May 5, Napoleon communi-
cated this information to the Italian government, but the
Italins did not favor an alliance with France against Prussia.
They were beginning to feel enthusiastic about the Prussian
21
alliance and a dislike for any dealings with France. After
this rebuff Napoleon told Goltz that his only hope was that
the congress would prevent war.
consequently plans were made.
England, Russia, and France were to be represented, and invitations were extended to Austria, Prussia, Italy, and the
Diet on May 24.
Prussia accepted on May 29, Italy and the Diet on June 1.
Austria who had been engaged in secret negotiations with
22
France since the end of April, had determined not to permit
the question of Venetia to come before a conference.
The
subjects of discussion for which the conference had been summoned were:
the question of the two duchies; the means of
pacifying Italy; and the reform of the Diet in so far as it
23
affected the balance of power in Europe. Austria accepted
the invitation but on two conditions, namely, that an invitation should be extended to the Pope {but this had already
been refused by France, England, and Russia), and secondly•
that no subject which involved territorial aggrandizement
2lsybel, IV, 414-425, has the best account of the relations between France and Italy.
22see pages 94-95.
23Malet, 193.
r
t
91
should be discussed.
This condition was a virtual refusal.
In his answer, dated June 1, Mensdorff said that the invitation implied the cession of Venetia, but that Austria could
not countenance this.
But, "'If war should actually break
out, if brilliant military successes should raise the power of
Austria, then, indeed, it would not be out of the question
for us to give up one province in order to insure another.••
This meant that in the event of war, Austria would give up
24
Venetia in order to conquer Prussia and regain Silesia.
It
might be added that the Diet had an objection to the proposed
program, namely, that the question of Holstein, leaving out
the question of Schleswig, was a question which came under
the jurisdiction of the Diet, and this body retained ita
25
right to decline foreign intervention. But in view of Austria's reply, the answer of the Diet was not considered.
Austria probably made a mistake in handling the question
26
of the conference. Even if she had no desire to attend, it
would have been better if she had delayed any definite statement.
Thus, Napoleon's plans for peace had failed, but there
were another peace negotiations in progress.
These are known
as the Gablenz negotiations.
Baron Anton Gablenz was the brother of the Austrian
Statthalter of Holstein and a resident of Prussia.
24sybel, IV, 460-461.
25Malet, 194.
26clark, 428-429.
He was re-
92
garded with high esteem in governmental circles.
He wished to
find a satisfactory solution to the question of the duchies in
order to avoid war.
Gablenz appeared in Vienna in April, but
Mensdorff, although he received him in a friendly manner, told
him to present his plan in Prussia.
Mensdorff then gave him a
letter of introduction to Bismarck, and he appeared in Berlin
27
at the beginning of May. His plan was as follows:
Austria had desired an independent, Prussia a
Prussian Schleswig-Holstein: therefore Gablenz proposed to place the sovereignty of the
Duchies as an independent state in the hands
of a Prussian prince. For an independent
Schleswig-Holstein Prussia had imposed the
'February conditionsJ and Austria rejected
these as inconsistent with the Confederate
military organization: Gablenz now proposed
a new reform of this organization, equally
to Prussia's and to Austria's advantage, by
suggesting that in war and in peace Austria
should have the superior command over the
South German, and Prussia over the North
German, troops.
Then he included other details with regard to Kiel, to fortresses and to garrisons.
Austria was to receive three mil-
lion thalers from Prussia for Kiel, and twenty million from
the duchies for war expenses.
Bismarck was surprised by this attempt at reconciliation,
especially in view of the war fever in Vienna.
He decided
to determine, if possible, the extent of the sincerity of
Austria.
On May 4, therefore, he informed Werther that Gab-
27 sybel, IV, 414-42, has the best account of these negotiations. Clark, 414-428, also has a good account, but
gives Sybel credit for the best account.
r~------------------------------~
93
lenz would arrive in Vienna on May 5. Bismarck replied on
28
May 7 to Mensdorff's second despatch of April 26. Gablenz
arrived in Vienna and Mensdorff promised to inform the Emperor.
Both Mensdorff and Esterhazy were willing to do almost
anything to maintain peace, but others in the ministry were
not so disposed.
Franz joseph consented to a continuation of
the Gablenz negotiations, but asked that a more definite plan
be formed.
Gablenz returned, therefore, to Berlin on Yay lOt
and remained there until May 20.
During this time Gablena
and Bismarck deliberated over the more detailed plans. Finall
29
the revision was agreed upon. William approved this, and in a
special audience with Gablenz asked him to communicate these
proposals directly to Franz joseph.
Before Gablenz departed
again for Vienna, Manteuffel had written a letter, dated
May 18, to William.
In this letter he described a conversatio
with General von Gablenz, the Austrian Statthalter• and Manteuffel urged a quick and definite decision.
Manteuffel• in
William's reply, was urged to communicate to Gablenz William's
desire for peace.
These same sentiments were sent to Werther,
that is, no official action was to begin until Prussia was
sure of Austria's sincerity.
Until that time, Gablenz was to
convey William's desire for peace to the Emperor.
2Bsee pages 85-86.
29see Appendix F.
r
94
Gablenz arrived again in Vienna on May 22, having been
delayed by military transports.
seph took place.
An interview with Franz Jo-
During the interview, Gablenz urged the ap-
pointment of General Gablenz as a commissioner to act with
Manteuffel who would be appointed by Prussia.
These two might
be able to lessen the distrust which existed between the two
powers.
too late.
The Emperor said that these proposals came six weeks
For some reason the Emperor insisted that Bismarck
was the author of these proposals, and nothing that Gablenz
could say would dissuade the Emperor.
reply, but was very cordial.
ended at this point.
He gave him no definite
These negotiations actually
They were undoubtedly the best solution
of the question, but the preparations for war had progressed
to such an extent that it was impossible to retreat.
Austria felt obligated to the lesser states.
Secondly
If she had ac-
cepted these proposals, it would have meant that she would havE
had to desert them to return to her Prussian alliance.
On
May 28, Mensdorff wrote the official Austrian reply to the
effect that in view of the strained relations, no further negotiations were permissible.
Austria still continued her efforts to obtain alliances.
On June 1, she had replied to Napoleon's invitation to the
conference with conditions.
When these conditions were made
known, it became evident on what grounds Austria would seek
an agreement with France.
During April, Austria had appro ache
95
30
France, but these approaches were not successful. In view of
Austria's answer to the invitation to the congress, Napoleon
announced on June 3 that the plan had been abandoned.
On
June 4, the Emperor, Drouyn de Lhuys, and the Due de Gramont
conferred on the instructions with which Gramont would return
to Vienna.
Between June 4 and June 9, there were many deliber
ations, but a treaty was finally concluded on June 12.
The
first draft of the treaty "offered French neutrality on two
conditions, the cession of Venetia after the war under
~
circumstances, and the promise not to make territorial changes
without French consent, if the balance of power in Germany
31
These conditions were not enthusiastically
were threatened."
received in Vienna, but Gramont was able to make further concessions which were detrimental to Italian unity.
says:
As Sybel
"France gave up Italian unity to the Court of Vienna,
in return for which Austria sacrificed German independence to
the French."
A Council was held in Vienna on June 11, and it
was decided to accept the treaty as better than nothing, but
neither the Emperor nor the ministers was pleased.
and Gramont signed the treaty on June 12.
Mensdorff
All it did was to
give Austria a feeling of security, but there were no real
benefits.
Let us return to the proceedings which led directly to the
30clark, 40?, 411-413.
31 rbid., 434.
96
32
declarations of war. On May 24, the Diet had accepted the
motion prepared in the Bamberg Convention, and the vote was to
be taken at the next session on June 1.
When the Diet met
Baron Kubeck presented Austria's answer.
Accordingly, Austria now declared that she
had been forced to arm on account of Prussia's
claims to Schleswig-Holstein, unlawful in
themselves and supported by an alliance with
Italy and by threats of force: Austria would
disarm when a lawful and constitutional state
of things was re-established in the Duchies;
therefore, she was about to refer the question of the Duchies to the decision of the
German Confederation, which should beforehand be assured of Austria's heartiest recognition, and she would at the same time announce that the Statthalter of Holstein had
received orders to summon the Estates of the
country, whose wishes and judgment in point
of law should form an important factor in the
final decision~3
·
This was virtually a declaration of war because it was well
known that the Diet would support Austria, and that Prussia
would retaliate with an attempt to overthrow the Confederation
To these remarks Baron de Savigny, the Prussian envoy replied.
He
commenced his remarks by a repetition of
the charge against Austria of having taken
the lead in arming. He said, however that
the Prussian government was still ready to
revert to the peace establisment, if the
Diet would enjoin Austria and Saxony to
countermand their preparations which were
menaning to peace, and if the Royal Govern32John Ward, Experiences of a Diplomatist.
!mcmillan and Company, 18?2, 239.
3 3sybel, IV, 461.
London:
9?
ment could be guaranteed against similar
infractions of the Federal peace. If the
Diet found itself incompetent to the task,
or if it opposed the introduction of such a
reform as was calculated to obviate the recurrence of such situations, Prussia would
found her future decisions solely on her own
appreciation of rights.
In the proceedings of Austria, both as
regarded her appeal to the Diet, and in convoking the States of Holstein, Prussia saw a
violation of the Convention of Gastein~4
On June 3, Bismarck addressed a protest containing these
ideas to Vienna.
He concluded that since the treaty of Gas-
tein had been violated, the condominate power was reestablishe
in the duchies, and Manteuffel had been placed in command of
the defense of the condominate rights.
This'was followed on
June 4 by a formal circular to the German states and the other
European states in which he accused Austria of an attempt to
bring on war, and further said that Prussia had tried to preserve peace.
Bismarck published on June 5, the heretofore
35
secret tresu of January 16, 1864. By this he hoped to alienate the rest of Ger.many from Austria by showing that she had
no regard for the Confederation.
He seemed not to care that
36
this proved the same disregard by Prussia.
\Vhile these and other diplomatic notes were
military preparations were pushed forward.
exch~nged,
On June 5, General
Gablenz issued the order convoking the Holstein Estates.
34 Malet, 1?9-180.
35 see page 12.
36Mowat, 191.
98
Manteuffel protested.
The Austrian troops at Rendsburg left
on June 7, and on June 8 and 9 Manteuffel crossed the Eider.
The Austrian government was declared terminated, and Baron
von Scheel Plessen became Over-President of the two duchies.
At Izehoe, on June 10, the Holstein Estates began to assemble.
But when the representatives learned of the new turn of affair
they left.
On June 11, Gablenz moved his entire force from
Altona across the Elbe to Harburg during the night.
This was
done to avoid collision with the Prussian forces which were
advancing from the north.
Prussia, on June 9, entered a protest against the intervention of the Diet in the affairs of Holstein.
She reiterate
her plans for reform, and would accept a satisfactory solution
of the question of reform.
On June 9, Mensdorff replied to
Bismarck's note of June 3.
'That the rights of the Germanic Confederation neither ought to be nor could be
infringed by any agreement made between
Austria and Prussia; neither could any member of the Confederation, which declared
its willingness to recognise the constitutional decision of the Diet, trench thereby on the right of any other Confederate.
'The Royal Prussian Government, having
by word and deed ignored the binding force of
its engagements to Austria, had lost the right
of appealing, as against Austria, to obligations which she herself had not respected.
'That the Imperial Government protested
against the taking matters into her own hands
(Selbsthulfe), whereby Prussia had violated
99
Article XI of the constitutional Act, and
had brought on the case provided for by
Article XIX of the final Act of Vienna.t3?
On june 10, Bigmarck sent the Prussian plan for the re38
form of the Confederation to all the German governments.
Austria proposed in an
extraordin2~y
sitting of the Diet on
june 11 that all Federal contingents should be mobilized and
39
be prepared to move within twenty-four hours. By a vote of
nine to six, the Austrian proposal was carried at the meeting
40
on june 14. Karolyi had been recalled from Berlin on june 12
and passports had been sent to Werther.
In this fashion
Austria broke off diplomatic relations.
Immediately after
Austria's motion had been passed, Savigny rose and, according
41
to his instructions from Bismarck, he outlined the Prussian
plan for reform.
At the same time he declared that the old
Confederation was dissolved because a break of the union had
3?For Article XI, see Appendix H. Article XIX of the
Vienna Final Act is as follows: "'Should there be ground for
apprehending the use of force between Confederates, or should
such have taken place, the Diet has the duty of taking preliminary steps for staying all self-righting • • • , and for
putting a stop thereto if begun. For this object, care is
above all to be given to the maintenance of the existing
right of possession.'" Malet, 18?.
38see Appendix G.
39 Malet, 188, in footnote. See also Sybel, IV, 493-496.
40 Ma1et, 189.
41sybel, IV, 496-49?.
100
been constituted by the waging of war by the Diet on one member.
He concluded by asking the states who had remained to
form a new Confederation.
Baron Kubek, the President, re-
primanded him for this motion and the majority of the Diet
concurred in the reprimand.
Meanwhile, in Prussia Bismarck had been preparing for
war.
On June 15, Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, and Saxony received
notes from Prussia.
These notes requested these governments
to declare in favor of Prussia.
If the reply was negative,
Prussia would declare war upon the three states.
refused immediately.
Samny
The other two states did not answer
within the prescribed time, and was was declared upon them,
also.
The actual war began on June 16.
The Austrian declara42
tion followed on June 17, and the Italian on June 20.
42Mowat, 191.
CHAPTER V WAR AND PEACE
When war was declared between Austria and Prussia, neithe
power stood alone.
Austria was supported by the South German
states, namely, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden and Hesse-Dar.mstadt, and by the more important North German States, namely,
Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau.
Prussia in view
of her treaty with Italy was supported by Italy.
While the
majority of the members of the Confederation supported Austria,
the international situation was favorable to Prussia.
Great
Britain's favor had been secured by low tariff relations between her and the zollverein; Russia's, through Prussian intervention in the Polish insurrection in 1863; France, because
Bismarck knew how to appeal to the political ambitions of Na1
poleon.
In general, the attitude of the German states was
very hostile.
Most of them were willing to endure any sacri-
fices in order to crush Prussia.
example.
Hanover was the outstanding
B.Y her adhesion to Austria, Hanover lost her nation-
al existence.
Saxony would have suffered the same fate had it
not been for the interference of Napoleon and the obstinance
2
of Austria during the peace negotiations.
The war was a short one, lasting only seven weeks.
To
the surprise of Europe, Prussian arms overcame Austria in a
lHayes, 188-189.
2
Malet, 202-205.
102
3
short time.
At the outset of the struggle the opinion of
Europe favored Austria as the victor.
This was because most
of the powers underrated Prussia's military strength.
Within
two weeks Prussia had subdued the lesser German states.
The
most important battle in these engagements against the minor
German states was the battle of Langensalza in which the
Hanoverians were badly defeated by the Prussians.
A week
earlier, on June 27, the Bavarians had been routed at Fulda.
While Prussia was subduing the lesser states, Austrian ar.ms
had been successful in Italy.
This had been accomplished
by the addition of part of the Austrian northern army.
Un-
fortunately, this lowered the defenses of Bohemia and ennabled the Prussian troops to enter Bohemia.
Here on June 3,
at Koniggratz or Sadowa, the most important and decisive battle of the war was fought.
Prussia was victorious.
Feldzug-
meister Benedek, although an able and devoted soldier, could
not compare with the Prussian strategist, Moltke.
When Franz
Joseph heard that the Bohemian army was in retreat he tried to
cede Venetia to Napoleon.
France against Italy.
In this way he hoped to involve
Advances for peace were made to Italy,
4
but she refused to conclude terms of peace until Prussia did.
When the Prussians won at Koniggratz the war had been decided.
3For a complete description of the war itself, see
Hozier. This thesis does not include any details as to military engagements.
4Munster, 101.
103
On July 4, Franz Joseph telegraphed Napoleon, requesting
his good offices in the peace negotiations.
It was in this
telegram that the Emperor agreed to cede Venetia.
Immediately
Napoleon telegraphed William of these events, and offered his
services as mediator.
Bismarck decided that Prussia could not
afford to refuse Napoleon's offer because West Germany was almost defenseless and the southern German states had not been
conquered.
If he refused, it was possible that Napoleon might
enter the war.
Consequently, he replied that Prussia was
willing to accept an armistice, "but it was only on condition
that the preliminaries of peace were settled before hostilitie
ceased, and to them the King could not agree except after con5
sultation with the King of Italy." Meanwhile the Prussian army
advanced towards Vienna.
Bismarck was proceeding slowly because he did not wish to
have the terms of peace dictated by a congress of
~ropean
6
powers.
England, he was sure, would not interfere.
Of France
and Russia, he could not be so sure.
Napoleon changed from
day to day as to what the
peace should include.
preli~inary
Finally, on July 14, Goltz was able to send Bismarck some
definite information.
Benedetti arrived in Berlin to discuss
the terms of peace with Bismarck, but he had no definite in5Headlam-Morley, 263.
6cambridge History ~British Foreign Policy, II, 580.
With the death of Palmerston, British foreign policy changed,
and England no longer aimed at being the arbiter of Europe.
104
structions.
All that Benedetti had been instructed to do was
to urge Prussia to moderation.
Bismarck asked what non-German
compensation Napoleon desired, but Benedetti remained silent.
The truth of this matter seems to be that Napoleon did not
know what he wanted.
These negotiations were of little value
to the finalpeace negotiations, and ultimately all that Napoleon asked was that Prussia should be moderate; that the unity
of Germany should be avoided, if only in appearance; and that
7
Saxony should be spared.
MearoNhile, Bismarck had decided to enter into separate
negotiations with Austria as to the terms of the preliminary
peace.
This was done indirectly, at first, through diplomatic
channels through st. Petersburg.
An Austrian nobleman who was
friendly to Prussia also undertook a mission of peace.
He
announced to the Emperor the terms on which Prussia would make
peace.
These ter.ms were very lenient, but had been made so
8
only after a struggle in Berlin in the Council. In substance
these terms provided for the dissolution of the old Confederation and the establishment of a new North German Confederation
secondly, Austria agreed that the southern states might for.m
their own uniona thirdly, she renounced her rights to the
duchies and acquiesced in certain additions to Prussian territoryJ and fourth, she ceded Venetia to Italy.
liminaries were signed at Nicolsburg on July 26.
7Headlam-Morley, 270-273.
Bsee pages 105-+06
These pre-
105
The last thing that remained was to secure the assent of
William.
On July 12, a council of War had been held at Prue-
sian headquarters at Czermahoen.
The Generals and even the
King were enthralled with their first great victory over a
first-class power.
Moltke was busy with plans to capture Vi-
enna, but Bismarck would not agree.
He realized that after
the war Prussia would need a friend.
If the terms of peace
were lenient, then the feeling in Austria would not be so hostile and proud Austria would not feel that she had been humiliated.
Bismarck says in his Reminiscences:
"It was my object
in view of our subsequent relations with Austria, as far as
possible to avoid cause for mortifying reminiscences, if it
could be managed without prejudice to our German policy."
With regard to a triumphal entry into Vienna he says:
A triumphal entry of the Prussian army into
the hostile capital would naturally have
been gratifying recollection for our soldiers, but it was not necessary for our
policy. It would have left behind it, as
also any surrender of ancient possessions
to us must have done, a wound to the pride
of Austria, which, without being a pressing
necessity for us, would have unnecessarily
increased the difficulty of our future
mutual relations. It was already quite
clear to me that we would have to defend the
conquests of our campaign in future wars,
• • • • That a war with France would succeed
that wi~h Austria lay in the logic of history,
• • • •
However, two weeks passed before anything definite had to be
9otto Bismarck, Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman.
New York: Harper and Brothers,ll89~c:-dl-;-42.
106
decided since it was necessary to replenish the artillery if
the Prussians were to advance to Vienna.
On July 23, another Council was held.
Bismarck was only
more firm in his opinion that the war should be concluded with
out any further humiliation of Austria.
his opinion.
But he was alone in
He presented all his evidence including document
but still the opinion was against him.
left the romm, and went to his own room.
Finally, he rose and
While he was there
musing on the probable failure of all his plans, the Crown
Prince entered.
war.
He said:
"You know that I was against this
You considered it necessary and the responsibility for
it li:es on you.
If you are now persuaded that our end is at•
tained, and peace must be concluded, I am ready to support
you, and defend your opinion with my father."
The Prince
then went to his father, and within half an hour he returned.
11
It has been a difficult business, but my father has consented
The King could not stand against both his son and Bismarck•
but that he did as he did unwillingly can be testified to by
the following marginal notes.
'Inaamuch as my Minister-President has left
me in the lurch in the face of the enemy, and
here I am not in a position to supply his
place, I have discussed the question with my
son; and as he has associated himself with
the Minister-President's opinion, I feel
myself reluctantly compelled, after such
brilliant victories on the part of the army,
to bite this sour apple and accept so disgraceful a peace. tlD
lOBismarck, 48-54.
This is his own account.
10?
Thus, after almost despairing Bismarck had won his greatest
victory, and the preliminaries of peace were signed.
Before the final treaty of peace was signed, Napoleon
through Drouyn de Lhuys made one more attempt to influence the
11
peace settlement, but it was unsuccessful. However, Bismarck
12
was able to use this attempt later in his war against France.
The final peace was signed on August 23, 1866 at Prague by
Werther for Prussia and Brenner for Austria.
Venetia was
ceded to Italy; Franz Joseph acknowledged the dissolution of
the Confederation and the creation of a new North German Confederation to be composed of the states north of the Main.
North of the Main Prussia could annex such territory as she
wished, but promised to spare Saxony.
The South German states
could organize their own union if they wished, but Austria
was forever excluded from Germany.
Austria's rights in the
duchies were ceded to Prussia subject to a proposed plebiscite
1
with regard to the wishes of the population of North Schleswig
Prussian territory was increased by 28,000 Eng]sh square miles,
and the population was increased by
3t million
14
inhabitants.
Peace between Italy and Austria was concluded on October 3,
1866 at Vienna.
11Malet, 373.
12
Headlam-Morley, 278.
13 subsequently abrogated by a treaty of October 11, 18?8.
14Mowat, 195.
108
Thus, Prussian supremacy was established in North Germany.
But what was the influence of the question of the duch-
ies in the development of the unification of Germany?
Bis-
marck had realized that in order to bring about Prussian
hegemony in Germany and its unification, that Austria would
15
have to be expelled from the Confederation. It was then
necessary for him to have at hand a means whereby he could
force a war with Austria, and through this war defeat her,
and his plans for a new Confederation could be enforced.
The
Schleswig-Holstein question furnished the necessary pretext
for embroiling Austria in war.
Previous to 1865, the question
had been an international one, but after that time it became
16
an element in the relations between Austria and Prussia.
During the course of the negotiations and diplomatic relations
between the two powers, both of them had introduced the question of Federal reform.
This was probably done to enlist the
assistance of the other German states in the event of war.
Bismarck was proud of the diplomacy employed in the
Schleswig-Holstein affair.
He said:
"'What I am proudest of,
however, is our success in the Schleswig-Holstein affair, in
which the diplomatic intrigues would furnish matter for a
17
play.'" By using the divergent laws of succession of the
Danish monarchy and the duchies, and the disagreement between
15Malet, 112.
16cambridge History£! British Foreign Policy, II, 581.
17Moritz Busch, Bismarck: Some
History. London: Macmillan Com-a--
109
the two with regard to the type of union, Bismarck had caused
the war of 1864.
BY entangling Austria with Prussia in the ad
ministration of the duchies, Bismarck caused the war of 1866
and the consequent exclusion of Austria from the confederation
In this way the hegemony of Prussia was established in North
Germany.
Complete unification under Prussian leadership could
not be established until a war with France united the South
German states to the Northern confederation.
In concluding,
it is necessary to say a word about the reform of the Confederation.
Some have said that the reform was the cause of the
18
war between the two po7:ers. Whether or not this is true does
not come within the scope of this .. thesis.
All that has been
attempted has been to show that the question of the duchies of
Schleswig and Holstein was instrumental in causing a war with
Austria.
And secondly, that it was in virtue of this war that
Austria was expelled from Germany, and Prussian leadership
assured.
By the zollverein Bismarck had established Prussian
economic superiority, by the war with Austria he had excluded
extraneous nationalities from participation in German affairs
and had secured Prussian superiority among the German states.
But it still remained for a war with France to complete the
political unification of Germany.
lSMowat, 190. See also, Ernest Flagg Henderson, A Short
History ~ Germany. New York: The Macmillan Company,-1916, ·
II, 396-397.
110
APPENDIX A
BLOME'S
PROPOSAL
The exercise of those rights that have been obtained by
the two Powers in virtue of the Peace of Vienna shall in
Holstein be the affair of Austria, and in Schleswig, of Prussia.
Prussia s·hall for this purpose be granted a military
road with stations and also a line of telegraph through Halstein; and she shall furthermore receive permission to build
a canal connecting the North Sea and the
Ba~
ic on conditions
similar to those usually granted in the charter of a railway
(consequently, without the right of supreme domain or the
right to build fortifications).
The Confederation shall be
requested to raise Kiel to the rank of a Confederate port,
and Rendsburg to that of a Confederate fortress.
Until the
necessary Confederate decree is passed concerning this matter,
the garrison at Rendsburg shall be composed of Austrian and
Prussian troops, and the harbor of Kiel shall be used by the
men-of-war of both Powers.
The intention is, that both of
the Duchies shall join the Tariff Union.
Finally Austria
shall give up to Prussia her rights in Lauenburg in return for
a proper indemnity in money.
From a Prussian State Document
cited by Sybel, IV, 210.
111
APPENDIX B
TEXT OF THE TREATY OF GASTEIN
Art. 1--The common right obtained by the high contracting
parties by Art. 3 of the Treaty of Vienna of the 30th of October, 1864, is transferred, as respects the Duchy of Holstein,
to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and as respects the
Duchy of Schleswig, to his Majesty the King of Prussia, without prejudice to the continuation of these rights of both
Powers to the whole of both Duchies.
Art. 2--The high contracting parties will propose in the
Diet the
establisl~ent
of a German fleet, and appoint the
port of Kiel as the Federal harbour.
Until the putting in
execution of the consequent Dietal decree, this port to be
made use of by the ships of war of both Powers, the commandership and police of the port to be exercised by Prussia.
At
Friederichsort, opposite the entrance, Prussia is authorised
to erect the necessary defensive works, as well as to construe
such marine establishments on the Holstein shore as are requisite for a port of war.
These fortifications and estab-
lishments are to be likewise under Prussian command, and the
Prussian marines and sailors
re~uired
for garrisoning and
protection thereof may be quartered in Kiel and the vicinity.
Art. 3--The high contracting parties will propose at
Frankfort to establish Rendsburg as a Federal fortress.
Un-
112
til the Diet has regulated the mode of garrisoning this fortress, the garrison is to be composed of Imperial Austrian and
Royal Prussian troops, with the com.rnand alternating yearly,
on the 1st of July.
Art. 4--Until the carrying out of the partition stipulated
by Art. 1 of this Convention, the Prussian Government shall
have possession of two military roads through Holstein; the
one from Lubeck to Kiel, the other from Hamburg to Rendsburg.
Special regulations as to the places of halt are to be made
as soon as possible by a sep&.rate convention, as well as for
the transporting and the providing for the troops:
until this
is done the existing regulations for the Prussian march-routes
through Hanover to be in force.
Art. 5--The Prussian Goverrunent has the privilege of using a telegraphic wire for
~
mmunicating between Kiel and
Rendsburg, and the right for its Post-office carriages, with
its own employes, to
circuL~·.te
on both railway lines through-
out the Duchy of Holstein.
Inasmuch as the construction of a direct railroad from
LUbeck to Kiel across the boundary of Schleswig is not yet
assured, the concession for the same shall be granted on the
usual conditions if requisition is made by Prussia--so far
reg~rds
Holstein territory--without any demand of sovereign
rights, as respects the railroad, on the part of Prussia.
113
Art. 6--The high contracting parties hold the common intent, that the Duchies shall accede to the German customs
union.
Each Duchy, until further arrangement, maintains the
system of customs hitherto subsisting, with equal partition
of revenue, until union with the Zollverein.
In case it seems
expedient to the Royal Prussian Government to open negotiationf
for the accession of the Duchies to the Zollverein, pending
the duration of the separation which has been agreed upon by
Art. 1 of the present Treaty, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria is ready to name a plenipotentiary to
ta~e
part in such
negotiation.
Art. ?--Prussia has the right of directing through Holstein territory the intended North Sea canal, which is to be
built after the plans of the technical surveys instituted by
the Royal Government; that is to say, Prussia has the right
of prescribing the direction and the dimensions of the Canal,
to acquire--by way of expropriation and for paY-ment of its
value--the land required for the construction, to direct the
building, to have the supervision and maintenance of the Canal
and to exercise the faculty of enacting all regulatory ordonnances.
No transit duties or imposts on vessel or cargo, beyond
those similar normal ship-tolls for use of the Canal which
Prussia will establish for the vessels of all nations, are
to ·be exacted upon the whole extent of the Canal.
114
Art. 8--This Convention makes no change in the stipulatior.s
of the Vienna Treaty of 30th of October, 1864, as to the financial services to be respectively at the charge of the Duchies, of Denmark, and of Austria and Prussia; but the Duchy of
La.uenburg shall be freed from all contribution to war costs.
The repartition of these costs between the Duchies of Holstein
and Schleswig shall be made in proportion to the population.
Art. 9--His Majesty the ::rr:mperor of Austria gives over
to his Majesty the King of Prussia the rights accruing to him,
by the oft-cited Treaty of Vienna, to the :Duchy of Lauenburg,
in exchange for which cession the Royal Prussian Government
binds itself to pay the Imperial Austrian Government the sum
of two millions five hundred thousand Danish rixthalers, payable in Berlin in Prussian specie, within four weeks after
ratification of the present Treaty by their Majesties the
Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia.
Art. 10--The execution of the hereinbefore-agreed-upon
partition of the joint sovereignty shall follows as speedily
as possible upon the ratification of this Convention by their
Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, and
at latest be carried out by the 15th of September, after
115
termination of the evacuation of Schleswig by the Austrian
and of Holstein by the Prussian troops.
Signed at Gastein, the 14th of August, 1865,
(Signed)
G. Blome, M.P.
(Signed)
V. Bismarck, M.P.
Text cited from Malet, 106-110.
116
APPEliDIX C
TEXT OF THE TREATY WITH ITALY
Art. I.
Friendship and alliance are to be maintained be-
tween His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the
King of Italy.
Art. II.
If the negotiations His Majesty the King of
Prussia has opened with the other German Government concerning
certain reforms of the Confederate Constitution, which are
demanded by the needs of the German Nation, shall fail, and
in consequence thereof His Majesty be forced to take up arms
in order to give effect to his proposals, then His Majesty
the King of Italy, after Prussia has taken the initiative,
and so soon as he is made aware of that fact, shall in virtue
of this Treaty, immediately declare war against Austria.
Art. III.
From that moment the war shall be carried on
by both their Majesties with all the powers that Providence
has placed at theil' disposal; and neither Italy nor Prussia
shall conclude either peace or armistice without consent of
the other.
Art. IV.
This consent may not be withheld, when Austria
shall have expressed her willingness to cede to Italy the
Lombardo-Venetian kingdom and to Prussia Austrian territory
that shall be equivalent in population to the above-mentioned
kingdom.
117
Art. V.
This treaty loses its validity three months
after being signed, unless the conditions mentioned in
Article II. shall have been fulfilled, namely, that Prussia
shall have declared war upon Austria.
Art. VI.
If the Austrian fleet, which is now being
equipped, shall have quitted the Adriatic Sea before the declaration of war, then shall His Majesty the King of Italy
send a sufficient number of ships to the Baltic Sea, which
shall take up their station there in order to be ready to
unite with the Prussian fleet at the outbreak of hostilities.
From a Prussian State Document,
cited by Sybel, IV, 355.
118
APPENDIX D
PROCLAMATION OF GABLENZ
Keeping aloof from political complications, I am solely
inspired by the wish sedulously to promote the development
of the country's weal; a stranger to all party, and desirous
of anticipating the just wishes of the people, supported by
their confidence.
Cited by Malet, 115.
PROCLML~TION
OF
]L~EUFFEL
B,y the Treaty of Gastein, you are transferred to a
separate Government, under the authority of the King of Prussia.
The phrase "Prussian Government" includes in itself
justice, public order, and the promotion of the public good.
While from this day forth, by command of His Majesty the
King of Prussia, I assume the government of the Duchy, and
promise you at the same time complete attention to your
peculiar interests, I expect from you obedience to His Majesty's orders, and confidence.
Cited by Malet, 116.
119
APPENDIX E
GIST OF THE PRUSSIAN DESPATCH OF MARCH 24
Prussia has irrevocably broken with Austria.
perial Government takes a menacing attitude.
courts the issue and is
re~dy
that all Germany will side
to fight.
The Im-
Prussia rather
Prussia expects
with her against Austria.
Confederation is antiquated and must be remodelled.
must have control of the armed force of Germany.
Malet, 149.
The
Prussia
120
APPE1IDIX F
REVISION OF GABLENZ PROPOSALS
TI1e paragraphs concerning Schleswig-Holstein remained in general unchanged.
As future sovereign of the Duchies, Prince
Albrecht of Prussia was now definitely selected; and to Prussia was given beside the harbor of Kiel, both Duppel and
Sonderborg.
The most im9ortant change was made in Article
v.,
about
the Confederate military organization, which received more
exact specifications.
'Both Governments,' it read now,
'shall bring forward in the Confederate Assembly a motion
for Confederate reform.
In this matter the most urgent
feature is the reform of the Confederate military organization.
The rights of sovereignty of the Confederate Princes over
their own contingents shall be preserved; but they shall all
maintain the same system of organization, of equipment, and of
drilling.
The Emperor of Austria is to be both in peace
and war, the Confederate commander in the South, the King of
Prussia in the north.
The Confederate commanders have the
right and duty of providing for this similarity in system
and organization.
Each of them has the right, in urgent cases,
todispose the army in his charge in readiness for war, with
the reservation that this disposition shall later be approved
by a decree of the Confederation.
Both governments,' Bismarck
then added, 'shall without delay urge the acceptance and
execution of these reforms, and shall not disarm before this
is accomplished.
They shall for this purpose summon a con-
vention of the German Princes and free cities, to be held at
Weimar.
The Princes are invited to bring their Ministers
with them, and to decide upon some definite result before they
separate.'
Cited by Sybel, IV,
430-432.
122
APPE1IDIX G
PRUSSIAN PLAN OF REFORM
On June 1, Prussia sent her plan for the future Confederate
Constitution to all the German Governments.
the main points:
The following were
"exclusion of Austria; creation of a Con-
federate marine; division of the supreme military command,
Prussia taking the North and Bavaria the South; a parliament
to be elected by the people on the basis of universal suffrage,
and which should have the functions already specified above
and sharply defined; and finally, the regulation of the future
relations with German Austria by means of a special treaty."
Sybel, IV, 484.
123
APPENDIX H
~qTICLE
XI OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DIET
All members of the Confederation engaged to defend Germany, and in like manner each individual Confederate State against every attack, and guarantee to each other mutually all
their possessions comprised in the Confederation.
In case of
war declared by the Confederation no member can enter on individual negotiations or conclude a truce or peace individually.
The members of the Diet retain the right of contracting
any alliance, but bind themselves not to make any engagement
direct against the safety of the Confederation or of any of
its members.
The members of the confederation promise not
to make war on each other on any pretext whatsoever, or to
pursue their differences by force, but to lay them before the
Diet.
It then becomes the duty of the Diet to endeavour to
promote an accord by a committee, and in case such attempt
should fail, and a judicial decision become necessary, to
bring this about by a properly instituted Austragal Tribunal,
to whose sentence the contending parties are bound instantly
to submit.
Cited by Malet, 153.
124
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I·
~
German Empire
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Sir Alexander Malet, The Overthrow of the Germanic
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~·
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~­
Longmans, Green and
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~
The
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London:
~dward
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European Divlomacy, 1815-1914.
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£f
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Schleswig Holstein Q.uestion.
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the Founda·
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·w.
H. Bidwell, Ed. and
"DeTh'Jl::>.rk c-md the Duchies of Hol:::!tein and Schleswig."
Vol. y:.:r, Sel)tember, 1848; "The Danish Duchies."
Vol. IJCII,
May and June, 1864; "Hi story of Conference on Danish Affairs."
Vol. LXIII, September, 1864; "Campaign in Germany."
Vol.LXVII,
:November, 1866.
:fh~
Nation, Nevr York:
Vol. III, August, 16, 1866.
3. L. Godkin and
Com~)any,
Publishers
The thesis. "The Relation of the Schleswig-Holstein
Question to the Unification of Germany 1865-1866."
written by Katherine Marie Brennan has been accepted
by the Graduate School with reference to form. and
by the readers whose names appear below. with
reference to content.
It is. therefore. accepted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts.
Jerome V. Jacobsen,S.J.
April 10. 1936
Rev. Joseph Roubik.S.J.
April 17, 1936