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Transcript
Structural and Cognitive Antecedents to
Middle Management Influence on Strategic Inertia
Paul Mallette, Colorado State University, USA
Willie E. Hopkins, Brooklyn College, USA
ABSTRACT
In this paper we explore the influence of middle managers on strategic inertia in organizations. We
present and discuss a conceptual model that shows the process by which this influence is exerted, and
propose that factors such as the amount of decision making autonomy possessed by middle managers,
their cognitive frame, and their emotional commitment to change influences whether, and the extent to
which, strategic inertia exists in organizations. We also propose that the disposition of top management
in organizations antecedes middle managers’ influence, and that this disposition is moderated by the level
of competitive intensity that exists in the industry in which firms operate.
INTRODUCTION
A major focus of strategic management research concerns the relationship between organizations
and their environments. Because performance is heavily dependent on the degree of organizationenvironment fit it is important that strategies undertaken are appropriate for environmental conditions.
However, while a change in strategy may be necessary to ensure that organizations survive and prosper in
their competitive environments, a number of inertial forces that work against change are typically present.
The concept of strategic inertia is generally viewed as the tendency for organizations to remain with the
status quo and the resistance to strategic renewal outside the frame of current strategy (Hill & Rothaermel,
2003). Despite the implications that strategic inertia has for organizational survival, factors that influence
this phenomenon have not been thoroughly explored. Prior studies have attributed strategic inertia to
organizational size (Miller & Chen, 1994), competitive forces (Toxvaerd, 2008), and top management
(Tushman, Smith, & Binns, 2011). Although several studies have also focused on the role of middle
managers (Fenton-O'Creevy, 2000; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994; Westley, 1990), the extant literature has
not fully explored the antecedents or the moderating factors that we propose.
Our primary objective in this paper is to model the process by which strategic inertia is likely
influenced by middle managers and provide theoretically sound arguments for why certain components
are critical to the process. Although prior studies have explored these components to some extent, albeit
individually, none have conducted an integrated exploration of them as they relate to middle management.
Because prior studies have largely neglected to explore the possible integrative aspects of the middle
manager-strategic inertia relationship, a knowledge gap has been left unfilled in the extant literature. We
contribute to existing literature by extending knowledge about the structural and cognitive dimensions
that impact the influential role that middle managers occupy with respect to strategic inertia.
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Organizational Ecology and Institutional Theories
Several theories have been used to explain the relationship between environmental conditions and
strategic change. Organizational ecology theory is concerned with populations of organizations. It
explains organizational diversity and how the composition of a population of organizations changes over
time. Organizational ecology views strategic change as a function of environmental forces on populations
of organizations with particular emphasis on why they fail. From this view, unfit firms die out from a
process of natural selection because they have a set of characteristics that is incompatible with conditions
in their environments. The theory is used to explain how populations of organizations evolve over time
even though individual firms may change very little. Population shifts occur over time as unfit firms are
replaced by those that are more closely aligned with their environments.
Organizational ecology theory holds that organizational change is difficult, costly, and time
consuming and that it carries a high risk of failure. In this framework, successful organizations are those
that consistently reproduce their structures and routines. However, organizations that do consistently
reproduce structures and routines also become more inertial. From this view inertia may be a good thing
that is related to organizational maturity. The challenge is to identify those situations where inertia
produces a survivability advantage (Peli, 2009) and those situations in which young organizations suffer
from a liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965).
Institutional theory is another framework that has been used to examine strategic change. It
assumes that most organizational activity derives from set processes, practices, and routines. These are
created to improve performance given a unique set of environmental circumstances. They become
institutionalized when they are used repeatedly and this helps to create stability over time (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that traditions, (industry) norms, and social
expectations force organizations to conform. When this occurs, the resulting sameness across
organizations is what gives them political and institutional legitimacy. While there may be some unique
organizational adaptation that takes place, they are constrained by broadly accepted norms, traditions, and
expectations that are placed on all ‘legitimate’ firms. From this perspective, firms that fail to adapt in
legitimate ways would have a high risk of failure (Baum, 1990).
Similar to population ecology, ingrained routines produce inertial forces. While both population
ecology and institutional theories are more concerned with stability than adapting to change, the latter
does recognize that organizational adaptation may be necessary. Under institutional theory, institutional
forces may impede change but they can also initiate it. For example, when an organization makes a
strategic change that is deemed successful, the change is likely to be mimicked by other organizations
(Haunschild & Miner, 1997). As more and more organizations mimic the change, it becomes
institutionalized because it is viewed as a form of legitimacy. Firms that fail to adopt these successful,
legitimate practices are assumed to be at greater risk of poor performance. Thus, while both theories
recognize the problem of not changing, they are both concerned with the inertial forces that inhibit change.
Organizational and Structural Inertia Theories
Organizational and structural inertia theories are both logical extensions of the theories discussed
above. Organizational inertia theory has been viewed as a firm’s inability to enact internal change in the
face of significant external change (Gilbert, 2005). From this perspective, the structure of inertia can be
classified into two organizational dimensions: resource rigidities and routine rigidities. Resource
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105
rigidities refer to the inability of organizations to change their pattern of resource allocations in the face of
external threats and/or opportunities. Routine rigidities refer to the repeated patterns of behaviors that are
bound by the rules and customs that affect organizational activities on a day-to-day basis. These rigidities
are an issue when routines become self-enforcing, nonadaptable, and deeply embedded within the
operating environment. Overcoming resource rigidities depends to a large degree on management
understanding, support, and ability to freely allocate resources (Cartwright et al., 2005). Overcoming
routine rigidities is perhaps more problematic because they are a function of the cultural and political
forces that exist within organizations. When routines are self-enforcing, nonadaptable, and tightly
embedded in the environment, routine rigidities are significant contributors to inertia (Teece et al, 1997).
Structural inertia theory is also concerned with the forces that make it difficult for organizations to
change. A fundamental concept of structural inertia theory is that organizations are generally resistant to
change but that this resistance increases when changes are to an organization’s core (authority and
decision making structures, stated goals, core technologies employed, business strategy, etc.). When
organizations cannot keep pace with changes in the external environment they are assumed to be
structurally inert. Antecedents of structural inertia include firm age, complexity, size, routinization, past
success and failure, dependency, and influence activity or organizational constituents (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984; Kelley, 1990; Rungtusanatham & Salvador, 2008). Structural inertia theory holds that
the stronger these inertial forces, the lower organizational flexibility, and thus the more likely an
organization would experience poor performance when the external environment changes. However, it
also recognizes that change in core organizational features initiates processes of reorganization that
increase the chance or mortality and that this is most likely to occur in mature and complex firms.
Red Queen Competition Theory and the Behavioral Theory of the Firm
The Red Queen theory of organizational adaptation has been used to explain the evolution of
individual firms in intensely competitive environments (Barnett & Ponkikes, 2008; Peli, 2009). Red
Queen competition occurs when a firm’s performance falls below some acceptable level and the firm is
forced to look for ways to remedy the situation. When this happens organizations may pursue two types
of change to address performance shortfalls - exploratory change or exploitative change. Exploratory
change involves firms moving into new contexts: new products aimed at new markets utilizing new
supply chains to take on new competitors. Exploitative change involves firms adapting within their
current context.
When a firm becomes a stronger competitor it is more likely that its competition will increasingly
perform below levels it believes are acceptable. In a rational world, competitors attempt to address their
emerging shortcomings within their current context and, as a result, they become stronger competitors as
well. Over time this pattern repeats itself as competition and organizational learning each trigger the
other in an ongoing, self-initiating process referred to as the Red Queen. As competition continues to
intensify firms are rewarded for discovering and then adapting to changing competitive conditions - but
only within the current context. In this framework, competing successfully in one context hurts firms’
ability to explore others. Organizations that have shown the ability to compete successfully in one
context over time experience significant disruption when they move to another context (Barnett &
Pontikes, 2008).
The Red Queen theory helps to explain why successful firms might change contexts. When firms
continue to excel within their current managers believe that the firm is able to adapt. However, in the
minds of decision makers, adaptation is viewed broadly as the ability to adapt both within their current
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context and, if desired, outside of it. Unconstrained by the view that adaptation is context-specific,
successful firms often engage in exploratory change. This cognitive frame makes exploratory change
extremely disruptive and at the same time encourages managers to think exploratory moves are the right
thing to do. The exploratory/exploitative distinction is important because organizations are assumed to
face tradeoffs between them. When firms initiate exploitative changes they get better at what they
already do and, in the process, they become a more formidable competitors. Exploratory change involves
organizations going in new and different directions. Building on central tenets of structural inertia theory,
organizations are especially disrupted by changes to their core activities (Hannan & Freeman, 1984),
changes that render an organization’s capabilities inappropriate (Christensen, 1997), and changes that
require a different organizational design (Henderson & Clark 1990).
Similarly, the behavioral theory of the firm suggests that poor performance can impact risk-taking
and inertia. According to the theory, decision makers set performance targets that reflect aspirational
performance levels. When these targets are met or exceeded performance is viewed as satisfactory.
Satisfactory performance is viewed as inertial because the tendency is to continue to do what is producing
satisfactory results. When performance falls below target levels, decision makers typically search for
solutions – to a point. If managers’ cognitive frames remain focused on aspirational goals, risk-taking
and further adaptation is likely. However, if managers’ cognitive frames shift to survival mentality then
risk aversion (and inertia) dramatically increase (Desai, 2008). Numerous factors affect the way
performance shortfalls are viewed, including experience, organizational legitimacy, and organizational
age (with more experienced, more legitimate, and younger firms being less inertial (less risk averse).
These firms are more likely to remain focused on exceeding aspiration targets when performance falls
below acceptable levels. Conversely, less experienced, less legitimate, and older firms are likely to be
more inert when performance falls below aspirational levels (Desai, 2008).
SUPPORTING LITERATURE
Our focus in this paper is on strategic inertia which refers primarily to the failure of organizations to
adapt strategy to environmental changes. We view strategic inertia as applying to a host of variables that
affect organizations’ abilities to better position themselves to cope with changing circumstances. These
actions can involve significant changes in organizational structure and processes, a larger expenditure of
organizational resources, the development of new organizational capabilities, a shift in strategic position,
a longer time horizon, or any other significant departure from the status quo (Markides, 2000).
Management and Strategic Inertia
Top management refers to the individual(s) whose primary responsibility is to make strategic
decisions that can result in strategic change or to some level of strategic inertia in organizations. It is the
influence that they have on future strategy, leading to strategic renewal, which overcomes the inertial
forces that may be embodied in the organization’s existing strategy (Floyd & Lane, 2000). However, top
management must be willing to take the types of strategic actions that lead to strategic renewal before
these inertial forces can be overcome. We argue in this paper that the disposition of top management
determines the extent to which these types of strategic actions are taken. The type of information
individuals are attuned to, how they interpret this information, and the thoughts and actions produced as a
result of this process are all influenced by their disposition (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990).
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Within the context of decision-making theory, disposition has been described as a set of
assumptions which is so established in the minds of people that it creates a powerful incentive within
them to continue to adopt or accept prior choices (Blackburn, 1998). This set of assumptions also shape
peoples’ predisposition towards risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Thus, research suggests that top
managers with a disposition that is more risk oriented are more likely to take the types of strategic actions
that overcome strategic inertia and those with a disposition that is less risk oriented are less likely to take
such strategic actions. In this paper, we consider two types of top management disposition – managerial
and entrepreneurial.
The importance of middle managers’ role in the functioning and success of organizations is welldocumented. Often referred to as change agents (Albrecht 2002), the importance of their role is most
visible during periods of strategic change. However, it has been observed that if top management is not
supportive of middle managers during the change process the roles used to influence strategic inertia will
not be executed effectively (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006). In this paper, we propose two types of support –
tangible and emotional – that top management must provide to middle managers if they are to effectively
execute these roles. Specifically, we propose that middle managers must have decision making autonomy
(tangible support) and an encouraging organizational culture (emotional support) that develops and
enhances their emotional commitment to change. In addition, adaptation is the result of cognitive
processes in which middle managers learn what needs to be done, when it needs to be done, how it should
be done, and what happens as a result. Cognitive frames affect how they collect, share, and analyze
information about both the organization and its environment and thus influence adaptive actions.
Environmental Change and Strategic Inertia
It is widely accepted that in highly competitive environments organizations must take strategic
actions to maintain their competitive advantage. Implicit in this understanding is the notion that there is a
direct relationship between the amount of competitive intensity that exists in the environment and the
level of strategic inertia that exists in organizations. That is, strategic actions will increase as competition
intensifies, and decrease (toward an inertial state) as competition stabilizes (Lant & Mezias, 1992).
Although this line of inquiry provides both empirical and conceptual evidence that competitive
intensity is a primary driving force behind strategic change, and thus a determinant of whether and/or the
extent to which inertia exists in organizations, what is lacking in this line of inquiry is the recognition of
the primary role of top management in this relationship. There is agreement in the literature that any
strategic actions taken in organizations are initiated by top management and based on their perceptions of
the amount of competitive intensity that exists in the environment (Srivastava, & Frankwick, 2011).
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND PROPOSITIONS
The foregoing literature review supports the model shown in Figure 1. As indicated in the model,
we propose a direct relationship between top management disposition and strategic inertia (P1a). Middle
managers’ decision making autonomy, their cognitive frame, and their emotional commitment to change
are also proposed in the model to directly influence whether and the extent to which strategic inertia
exists (P2, P4e and P5b respectively).
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P3a
P3b
P1a
P4a
P4b
Top Management
Disposition
P6a
P2
Middle Manager’s
Decision-Making Autonomy
Middle Managers’
Cognitive Frame
P4d
P4c
P4e
Strategic
Inertia
P5a
P5b
Middle Managers’ Emotional
Commitment to Change
P1b
P6b
Competitive
Intensity
Figure 1: Model of Strategic Inertia
The model further proposes that the disposition of top management affects middle managers’
decision making autonomy as well as their cognitive frame and emotional commitment to change (P3a, P4b,
and P6a respectively). Middle managers’ decision making autonomy is shown to influence their cognitive
frame (P4a); in turn, their cognitive frame and their decision making autonomy are proposed to have an
influence on their emotional commitment to change (P4d, and P5a respectively). Finally, the model
proposes that competitive intensity moderates the relationships between top management disposition and
strategic inertia ((P1b), middle managers’ decision making autonomy (P3b), cognitive frame (P4c), and
emotional commitment to change (P6b).
Top Management Disposition and Strategic Inertia
Antecedent to the influence middle managers are proposed to have on strategic inertia is the
disposition of top management. Two types of top management disposition have been identified in the
literature - entrepreneurial (Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003) and managerial (Busenitz & Barney, 1997).
An entrepreneurial disposition refers to the extensive use of rules of thumb and individual beliefs in the
decisions involved in strategic innovations, where rules of thumb represent simplifying strategies or
decision heuristics based on such things as prior experiences, individual beliefs, and perceptions. A
managerial disposition refers to the use of more systematic decision making based on established
algorithms, practices, and procedures. It has been suggested that individuals with an entrepreneurial
disposition seek opportunities to take strategic action (Gaglio & Katz, 2001), resulting in organizational
renewal and/or rebirth, and are able to deal with the uncertainty of dynamic environments due to their
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inherent risk taking propensity (Baum & Locke, 2004). The more systematic decision making framework
used by individuals with a managerial disposition is viewed as being reluctant to initiate strategic actions
that require more risk than they are willing to take thus promoting strategic inertia.
It has also been argued that as competition in an organization’s environment becomes more intense
there is no such thing as a sustainable competitive advantage (D’Aveni, 1994). The rationale for this
argument is that the only way organizations faced with a competitively intense environment can sustain
any competitive advantage is through substantial adaptive change. As discussed above, institutional
theory supports these arguments by suggesting that competitively intense environments force
organizations to adapt or lose their standing in the industry as successful competitor adaptations are
copied by rivals (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). As additional firms imitate a successful adaptation it
becomes ‘institutionalized’ and viewed as legitimate. While our earlier discussions indicate that the
nature of organizations’ environment is not likely to provide much motivation for top managers with an
entrepreneurial disposition to take strategic actions that lead to organizational renewal and/or rebirth
thereby diminishing strategic inertia, this line of research suggests that competitive intensity is likely to
be a strong motivator for top managers with a managerial disposition to take such actions. The following
propositions reflect this rationale:
P1a: trategic inertia is more likely to exist in organizations when top management’s disposition is
characterized as managerial and less likely to exist when top management’s disposition is
characterized as entrepreneurial
P1b: hen top management’s disposition is characterized as managerial strategic inertia is likely to
decrease as competition in the organization’s environment becomes more intense
Decision Making Autonomy and Strategic Inertia
It has been suggested that it is often middle managers, rather than top managers, who are more
closely attuned to the firm’s external environment (Ikavalko & Aaltonen, 2001). It has also been
suggested that when middle managers have decision-making autonomy, organizations will be more
responsive to changes in their external environment (Williams, 2000). When middle managers have
decision-making autonomy organizations are more flexible and amenable to such changes. They are in the
best position to know what needs to be done and how to do it and, because they have decision making
autonomy, they are constantly looking for ways to make a positive impact on organizational performance.
A strong inference to be drawn from these studies and others (e.g., Hopkins, Mallette, & Hopkins, 2013;
Fenton-O’Creevy, 2000; Jones, 1984) is that middle managers’ lack of decision – making autonomy to
affect change may facilitate strategic inertia. That is, they may not only refrain from engaging in
behaviors that champion change efforts but may engage in behaviors that promote strategic inertia.
P2: he more decision making autonomy middle managers have the less likely strategic inertia will exist
in organizations
The descriptions of the entrepreneurial and managerial dispositions suggest that decision making
authority is likely to be more centralized in organizations where top management’s disposition is
characterized as being managerial and more decentralized in organizations where it is characterized as
being entrepreneurial. In competitively intense environments there is pressure for both a rapid and highquality decision-making process. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1998) contend that organizations in such
environments can benefit from a fast decision-making process. Thus, strong competitive pressures may
serve to heighten a sense of urgency within organizations, which may drive them to actively search for
ways to maintain competitive position (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). When middle managers have decision-
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making autonomy, organizations will be more responsive to changes precipitated by these competitive
pressures, such pressures are likely to be a strong motivator for top managers with a managerial
disposition to provide them with the decision making autonomy they need to effectively respond.
P3a: iddle managers are likely to have less decision making autonomy when top management’s
disposition is characterized as managerial and more decision making autonomy when top
management’s disposition is characterized as entrepreneurial
P3b: hen top management’s disposition is characterized as managerial middle manager’s decision
making autonomy is likely to increase as competition in the organization’s environment becomes
more intense
Cognitive Frames and Strategic Inertia
Cognitive frames are important in shaping individual interests and the effectiveness of various
incentive mechanisms that are used to reward actions. As incentives are likely to be based on measures
that are subject to interpretation, it is important for middle managers to not only see clearly what needs to
be done, but also whether they have the autonomy to do it and to understand how their actions will be
rewarded. Since top management is likely to influence middle managers’ perception of what needs to be
done and determines whether they have the autonomy to do what needs to be done the disposition of top
management is likely to have an influence on their cognitive frames. With respect to inertia, however,
they also must know what and how actions are rewarded. Cognitive frames can lead to inertia when the
context changes and employees lack knowledge of effective behaviors, they look to the past to make bets
on the future, and it is difficult to develop new relational contracts (Kaplan & Henderson, 2005).
When environmental change is slow, middle managers’ cognitive frames that are anchored in
existing systems and structures may produce desired results. However, when environments are changing
rapidly and adaptive responses become necessary, the links between actions, outcomes, and rewards is
uncertain. This can lead to adaptation but it is not clear to managers what they should do and little
knowledge exists about how specific actions lead to defined rewards (Gavetti & Levinthal 2000). And, as
competitive intensity increases it becomes even less clear what managerial/organizational interests are
and how to incentivize desirable actions. In these situations, if a strategic change requires a new
cognitive frame to implement a different course of action, it is less likely to be executed by middle
managers anchored in old ways of doing things and/or invested in existing incentive systems. Viewed in
this way, cognitive frames not only lead to appropriate adaptive responses, but also enhance the emotional
commitment needed to execute those responses. For effective adaptive responses to occur, top
management must be able to reduce uncertainty in middle managers’ cognitive frames.
P4a: he more decision making autonomy middle managers have the less embedded their cognitive frames
will be
P4b: iddle managers are less likely to have embedded cognitive frames when top management’s
disposition is characterized as entrepreneurial and more embedded cognitive frames when top
management’s disposition is characterized as managerial
P4c: hen top management’s disposition is characterized as managerial, middle managers are less likely
to have embedded cognitive frames as competition becomes more intense
P4d: he less embedded the cognitive frames possessed by middle managers the stronger will be their
emotional commitment to change
P4e: he more embedded the cognitive frames of middle managers the more likely strategic inertia will
exist in organizations
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111
Emotional Commitment to Change and Strategic Inertia
It has been suggested that a manager’s emotional commitment is the ultimate trigger for their
discretionary efforts leading to the solving of unsolvable problems, the creation of energy when all energy
has been expended, and the ignition of emotional commitment in other employees within organizations
(Slap, 2010). The emotional commitment of middle managers is evident when they passionately
champion strategic change. Huy (2002) asserts that to generate passion that fuels the pursuit of strategic
change middle managers have to strive continuously to manage their own emotions associated with the
change. We contend in this paper that managing their emotions is facilitated by the type of support (e.g.,
emotional and tangible) middle managers perceive they have to affect change.
Being respected for their loyalty and importance to the social network of the organization, and
perceiving that they are operating within a culture characterized by trust and justice have been identified
as important sources of middle managers’ emotional commitment to change (Huy, 2000). A logical
conclusion is that inertia is likely to exist in organizations when middle managers’ emotional commitment
to change is low. Feeling powerless is another barrier to middle managers’ emotional commitment to
change. What we propose in this paper is that tangible support, specifically decision making autonomy,
authenticates emotional support and has a positive effect on the emotional commitment of middle
managers.
P5a: he greater the amount of decision making autonomy possessed by middle managers the stronger
will be their emotional commitment to change
P5b: he stronger middle managers’ emotional commitment to change the less likely strategic inertia will
exist in organizations
Emotional support is an integral component of organizational cultures created by top managers with
an entrepreneurial disposition (Hitt et al., 2011). In such cultures, risk taking is encouraged and failure is
tolerated for the purpose of engendering the trust required to ensure high levels of emotional commitment
to change (Gupta, Macmillan, & Surie, 2004). It has also been suggested that top managers with an
entrepreneurial disposition express the type of passion that is contagious and engenders employee
commitment to change (Baum & Lock, 2004). The descriptions of the entrepreneurial and managerial
dispositions provided suggest that the emotional support that engenders emotional commitment to change
is more likely to occur in organizations in which top management’s disposition is characterized as
entrepreneurial than in organizations in which it is managerial.
Strong competitive pressures may serve to heighten a sense of urgency within organizations, which
may drive them to actively search for ways to deal with these pressures. We contend that when middle
managers are emotionally committed to change they will be more responsive to competitive pressures in
the organization’s environment. While the strategic entrepreneurship literature suggests that top managers
with an entrepreneurial disposition are likely to create and maintain an organizational culture that
engenders emotional commitment to change, such pressures are likely to be a strong motivator for top
managers with a managerial disposition.
P6a: iddle manager’s emotional commitment to change is likely to be weaker when top management’s
disposition is characterized as managerial and stronger when top management’s disposition is
characterized as entrepreneurial
P6b: hen top management’s disposition is characterized as managerial middle manager’s emotional
commitment to change is likely to increase as competition in the organization’s environment
becomes more intense
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Although prior research has attempted to bring some clarity to the phenomenon of strategic inertia,
its focus has largely been on the impact of a limited number of factors. This narrow focus has resulted in
theoretical and practical gaps in our understanding. We have made the case that overcoming strategic
inertia is the result of both structural arrangements and cognitive processes. It is apparent that structure
and cognition are intertwined and that an appropriate adaptive response is more likely to occur when all
of these elements co-evolve. Rather than re-state our propositions here, we would like to conclude by
outlining promising areas for future research.
The framework that we present contributes to the theoretical and supporting empirical literatures in
several ways. The discussion of whether inertia is good or bad is perhaps less important than when and to
what extent different adaptations produce desirable results. All of the theoretical perspectives discussed
herein recognize that organizational structure affects inertia. Without specifically addressing middle
management decision making autonomy, most theories recognize that embedded routines, practices, and
routines are associated with organizations that are more inert. When there is little opportunity to act
outside of traditional boundaries, adaptive responses become limited. Thus, part of the adaptive response
needs to contemplate structural impediments to change. Second, cognitive frame is an important
dimension that the perspectives address in different ways. While organizational ecology and institutional
theories generally assume it is embedded, others recognize that it can be shifted through adequate
organizational resources (which may include incentives), competitors do it when they mimic successful
competitor actions, or that it is transitory. The behavioral theory of the firm also views competitive
intensity as an important moderating force, but the focus is on performance and not on the processes that
affect how firms understand and attempt to overcome inertia. While emotional commitment to change is
only tangentially addressed by the Red Queen theory and behavioral theory of the firm (survival is
assumed to garner commitment), we believe that this dimension of our framework is very important as a
factor that affects firms’ ability to develop and execute adaptive responses. Thus, understanding the
factors that impact the commitment dimension, and to what degree, need to be determined. Future
research should examine how these components interact to affect the choices that managers make and
how different environmental contexts influence those choices.
Specifically, researchers need to more thoroughly address the complex factors (and the
relationships among them) that contribute to inertia. For example, organizations don’t perceive things,
individuals within organizations do and it is likely that each perceives things uniquely. Future research
that looks at how individual cognitive frames are formed, and how incentives affect individuals
differently, could produce important findings. In addition, future research needs to explore how
individual cognitive frames coalesce to produce both “organizational” frames and subsequent outcomes.
Further, looking at how these processes unfold in different environmental contexts could produce findings
that not only make a significant contribution to the literature in this area, but prove valuable for managers
dealing with inertia issues. Future research should also seek to understand how managers perceive
performance shortfalls, and how this factor helps establish a cognitive frame. Future research could also
examine inertia from a social movements perspective in which a powerful and influential group is able to
shift organizations from embedded frames to new ones (Benford & Snow, 2000). Future research also
needs to explore the moderating effect of competitive intensity on the middle management dimensions
presented in our framework across multiple industries. It is reasonable to assume that industry
idiosyncratic competitive conditions exist and that these unique features would affect how managers
perceive and respond to the competition.
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