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4/Language, Thought,
and Culture
PETER WOOLFSON
As far backas 1836, Wilhelm von Humboldt, in Linguistic
Variability and Intellectual Development, looked at language as a tool people use to represent ideas in sentences.
His work prefigured the emphasis on the relationship between language and thought later developed by Edward Sapir in Language (1921) and papularized by his student
Benjamin Lee Wharf. The so-called Sapir-Wharf hypothesis
remains highly controversial among linguistic anthropologists and psycho·linguists. In its strong form-the language
that an individual speaks imposes upon him or her a particular perception of reality and a particular way of thinking,
preventing others-is no longer taken seriously; but the
weak form of the hypothesis-the language that an individual speaks facilitates particular ways of thinking and perceiving but does not absolutely preclude others-is very
difficult either to prove or disprove conclusively. In the following article, Peter Woolfson, Professor of Anthropology at
the University of Vermont, examines the limitations and
potentialities of the Sapir-Wharf or linguistic relativity hypothesis.
Psycholinguists and lingUistic anthropologists share a common concern with the relationship between language and thought. Several
questions have been raised about this relationship, but the dominant
one can be stated very simply: does the language we speak determine
the way we think? One well-known attempt to answer the question is
the linguistic relativity hypothesis (also called the Sapir-Whorl hypothesis or the Whorfian hypothesis).' In essence, the hypothesis suggests
that a given language, especially in its grammar, provides its speakers
with habitual grooves of expression which predispose these speakers
to see the world in ready-made patterns. Since grammars vary from
lBenjamin L. Wharf, lAnguage, Thought, and Reality, ed. J. B. Carroll (New York:
Wiley, 1964).
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Language and Its Study
language to language, it is likely that the habitual patterns of thought
vary from language to language. If so, the world view of a speaker of
a particular language will be different from the world view of a speaker of a different language. Although the hypothesis seems to affirm
the view that language determines thought, one should remember
that it concentrates On habitual patterns; and habitual patterns may be
ignored or circumvented. What is necessary is that we become aware
of these patterns by conscious introspection, scientific study, or cross~
cultural comparison.
Why are habitual patterns of expression so important? We all
have approximately the same set of physical organs for perceiving reality----<eyes to see, ears to hear, noses to smell, tongues to taste. and
skins to feel. Reality should be the same for us all. Our nervous systems, however, are being bombarded by a continual flow of sensations of different kinds, intensities, and durations. It is obvious that
all of these sensations do not reach our consciousness; some kind of
filtering system reduces them to manageable proportions. The Whorfian hypothesis suggests that the filtering system is one's language.
Our language, in effect, provides us with a special pair of glasses that
heIghtens certain perceptions and dims others. Thus, while all sensations are received by the nervous system, only some are brought to
the level of consciousness. One of Wharf's classic examples, snow, illustrates the role of language in this process:
We have the same word for falling snow, snow on the ground, snow
packed hard like ice, slushy snow, wind-driven flying snow-whatever
the situation may be. To an Eskimo, this all-inclusive word would be almost unthinkable; he would say that falling snow, slushy snow, and so
on, are sensually and operationally different, different things to contend
with; he uses different words for them and for other kinds of snow. The
Aztecs go even farther than we in the oppOSite direction with "cold,"
"ice," and "snow" all represented by the same basic word. .. . 2
Although Wharf demonstrated that different languages use
words differently to classify reality, he also indicated by his techniques of illustration that these concepts can be expressed, in a language that lacks them, by other means. Thus, the different types of
snow may be described by adjectival words and phrases. Using these
alternatives in English grammar, he makes it possible for us to visualize the different types of snow and to perceive the differences
among them. Because the differences are specifically labeled, we become conscious of them. The important point to remember is that we
are not habitually conscious of these distinctions. But if it becomes necessary for us to perceive these distinctions, as a skier might with
2Whorf, p. 216.
WOOLFSON:
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snow, then they would become conscious, and the vocabulary or descriptive items would follow. In the case of the skier, he borrows his
terms for snow from the more specialized vocabulary of the Austrians.
Snow, however, is an example of a word with obvious cultural
and environmental emphases. In many instances the relationship between cultural emphasis and vocabulary is much less apparent. For
example, Americans are a mobile people and transportation plays an
extremely important role culturally in our society. And yet we use the
word go whether we are going by foot, car; train, or plane. Germans,
on the other hand, use gehen when they go by foot, and fahren when
they go by vehicle. The Navaho, according to Kluckhohn and Leighton, make an even more complex set of distinctions:
When a Navaho says that he went somewhere he never fails to specify
whether it was afoot, astride, by wagon, auto, train, or airplane. This is
done partly by using different verb stems which indicate whether the
traveler moved under his own steam or was transported, partly by naming the actual means . ...
Moreover the Navaho language insists upon another type of splitting of the generic idea of "going" to which German is as indifferent as
English. The Navaho always differentiates between starting to go, going
along; arriving at, returning from a point. .. 3
And so, although transportation is a major cultural emphasis in
American society, our word go is certainly considerably less precise
than the terms used by the Navaho for this activity. It becomes apparent, then, that even when an activity has considerable cultural emphasis, certain perceptions may be heightened by the language while
others may remain dim.
Does haVing separate words for different aspects of a thing or an
event really make a difference in our consciousness, our awareness?
For example, we commonly make distinctions between the colors purple, blue, green, yellow, orange, and red. If we have speCial interests like
painting or dress deSigning, we may have a much wider vocabulary
which includes distinctions between shades such as "cerise," "burgundy," or "magenta." These distinctions, however, are not part of
the ordinary vocabulary of the American male, for instance. Investigations show that other languages are more restricted in their color vocabulary than English. The Shona of Rhodesia have only three major
terms: cipsuka (orange, red, purple and some blue); citema (blue and
some green); and cicena (green and yellow). The Bassa of Liberia have
only two major color terms: hui which represents purple, blue, and
3Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Leighton. The Navaho (New York: Doubleday,
1962). pp. 274-275.
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WOOLFSON: Language, Thought, and Culture / 49
Language and its Study
green; and ziza which represents yellow, orange, and red.' In one
sense, these more restricted vocabularies do not affect consciousness.
If the speaker cif one of these languages finds it necessary to make
color distinctions not indicated by his color terms, he can still express
the distinction by using the objects in the environment-"that's leaf
citema" or "that's sky citema," for example. On the other hand, psycholinguists like Lantz, Brown, and Lenneberg have shown that having a number of terms for color distinctions is particularly useful for
remembering colors that have been seen at an earlier time. s The more
color terms the subjects in these experiments had, the better their
memories were for sorting out the colors they had seen. These examples show that there is a relationship between vocabulary, cultural
Thus, the Taos Indian classifies the objects in .his universe .differ-
ently from a native speaker of English. The Whorhan hypothesIs suggests that because of this difference In claSSificatIOn, the Taos Indian
actually sees the world differently from a native speaker of Enghsh.
The apparent relationship between grammar and world vIew can
be seen in the basic types of sentence structures. Probably the most
typical kind of sentence in English is the declaral1ve sentence made
up of a subject, verb, and direct object and ass~Clated WIth our conceptual focus of an actor, an action, and the oblect of an ,~clton. For
example, the answer to the question "What happened? could be
either
emphasis, and habitual consciousness.
But does the language of a speaker provide him with a structure
for seeing the world in ready-made patterns? In other words, is the
Whorfian hypothesis valid? It should be obvious that the Whorfian
hypothesis is just that, a hypothesis: an idea to be tested, an informed
guess. In spite of numerous attempts at verification, it has never been
Plurality, in these examples, is reiterated by the use of a number
word, a noun suffix, and a specific verbal form. Singular and plural
are categories that can hardly be ignored. A speaker of English finds
it natural to divide his universe into things that are either singular or
plural. To a speaker of Taos, an American Indian language, however,
this view would represent a gross oversimplification. According to
Trager:
... In the Taos linguistic universe there is no such simple distinction: some things are indeed unitary, and others are multiple, but some
unitary things can be multiple only in sets, while others are multiple as
aggregates: moreover, a set can be unitary, if it is inanimate, or it can be
multiple-but then only if it is animate.
6
4H. A. Gleason, ]r., An Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics, rev. ed. (New York:
Holt. 1961), pp. 4-5.
sJoseph DeVito, The Psychology of Speech and Language (New York: Random House,
19701. p. 200.
6George L. Trager, Languages Of the World (Buffalo, New York: unpublished manuscript), IV, 17.
dropped
Verb
Action
The car
Subject
Actor
hit
Verb
Action
the ball
Direct Object
Object of Action
or
satisfactorily proved or disproved. But it remains plausible. For example, the grammatical categories of singular and plural are important
ones in English grammar, so important that they are expressed redundantly:
One boy goes outside.
Two boys go outside.
John
Subject
Actor
the bridge
Direct Object
Object of Action
This sentence fonm is so common in English that we use the form
metaphorically without being the least bit conscIOUS of .Imposmg the
form "actor, action, object of action" where it does not hterally apply.
As a result, English commonly produces sentences such as:
Communism
Subject
Actor
threatens
Verb
Action
Southeast Asia
Direct Object
Object of Action
Northern Chinese, however, does not ordinarily use this kind of seni
tence structure. If one asked a speaker of Chinese the eqUIvalent 0
the question "What happened?" he would probably get the answer m
the form of topic and comment. In other words, where the Am~~can
would say, "John dropped the ball," the Chmese would say, Ballarticle (type of object)-dropping." It is not necessary for the Chmese
fo indicate the actor or the time of the action. Speakers of Enghsh, In
contrast, specify whether the action was In the past or not: Howe~er,
they do have a sentence fonm where the actor is not speClf1ed: subject
.
verb'. "The ball was dropped." Nevertheless,
an d passive
.
. d manyt
5
eakers of English feel uneasy about this cons~ructlOn;
It
oeS no
a~pear complete. Since only two of the three habItual com~~nents are
present, they feel compelled to ask, "Dropped by whom? In short,
!
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Language and Its Study
Americans and Chinese have different basic sentence structures
which focus on different aspects of a situation.'
In order to deal systematically with the question of the validity of
the Whorfian hypothesis, it is necessary to ask several other questions. Flrst, IS thought possible without speech? If it is, then at least
same perceptions are possible without the mediation of language.
StudIes of ammal behavior suggest some answers. W. H. Thorpe, an
ethologIst, mamtains that all animals perceive-that is, anticipate and
recogmze. He wntes, "Some essential ability to deal with events in
time as m space is, by definition, to be expected throughout the world
of living things."· For example, when a cat runs up a tree after seeing
a dog,. he exhibits this ability. The cat sees the dog (perception); it
IdentifIes the. dog as dangerous (cognition); it foresees trouble (anticipatIon); It qUIckly checks its environment (evaluation); and it runs up
the nearest tree (resolutIon). The cat does all this without the aid of
language, and therefore it seems reasonable to aSSume that we are capable of some processes of thought without the mediation of language.
Second, are the grammars of various languages really different?
Do not all languages possess features in common? Is there not a universal grammar, a general grammar of human languages? Are not the
dIfferences between languages, in reality, superficial, of little conseq~ence m determining man's perceptions of reality? Let us look at the
kmds of language universals that have been identified by Charles
Hockett and joseph Greenberg. HockettO outlines thirteen design features of la.nguage, such as semanticity (shared associations), arbitrariness (non-Icomclty), and productivity (open-endedness). Greenberg lO
dIScusses such umversals as multi-modality: indicative mode (statement)
and ImperatIve mode (command), for example. There are, to be sure,
very broad and general, universal statements about language that can
be made to whIch no exceptions can be found. However, it is equally
true that the grammars of the languages of the world show considerable variety in the devices they employ to classify reality. It is this level of claSSIfication, dissectio.n, and organization, the level of diversity
rather than umversalIty, WIth whIch Whorf's linguistic relativity hypothesis is concerned.
Third, what effect does culture-learned and shared behavior
patterns--have on the way we perceive the world? Although lan7Charles F. Hockett, A Course in Modern Linguistics (New York: Macmillan, 1958),
pp. 201-203.
8W. H. Thorpe, Learning and Instincf in Animals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1958), p. 4.
9Charles Hockett, "The Origin of Speech," ScientifiC American, 203 (1960), 89-96.
lOJoseph Greenberg, Anthropological Linguistics (New York: Random House, 1968).
WOOLFSON:
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guage is our principal means of transmitting culture from generation
to generation, much of our learning, especially while we are young,
takes place without explicit verbalizations:. that is, :"uch of our behavior is learned informally through observation and Imitation. All kmds
of sensory data may be used to recognize, classify, anticipate, and
evaluate experiences. For example, a child whose first experiences of
life take place within a single-roomed structure such as an igloo, tipi,
or tent develops a sense of reality which is quite different from the
child whose early experiences take place in a multi-partitioned structure in which his own place, the nursery, is safely insulated from the
adult experiences around him. The different settings, themselves, affect the child's image of self, his relationship to others, to events, and
to things. Thus culture provides many avenues for developing our
perception of reality.
In spite of these questions, social scientists have attempted to devise tests for verifying the Whorfian hypothesis. One major consideration in such testing has been the nature of Whorf's evidence.
Frequently, he named a grammatical device in one language and a
different device for handling a similar situation in another language,
and assumed that the difference demonstrated a difference in perception. This assumption is not necessarily valid. For example, French
classifies all nouns as either masculine or feminine-Ie solei!, "the
sun," is masculine, but la lune, "the moon," is feminine. Despite this
classification, the Frenchman does not actually perceive these gender
distinctions as real; they are simply grammatical devices. Whatever
relationships these classifications once had with reality are now very
remote.
In an attempt to provide a more defensible way of verifying the
hypothesis, social scientists began to look for n?n-verbal behavioral
concomitants for linguistic categories. One test, gIven by john Carroll,
involved showing English and Hopi subjects three pictures from
which they were to select the two that they felt were most alike. The
pictures were based on differences in the way objects are handl~d.
For example, one series of pictures showed three ~en, one unloadl.ng
a carton of fruit, one spilling milk, and one droppmg a com. EnglIsh
subjects most often grouped the accidental actions, whereas the Hopi
grouped the first two because words in their language for these actions are similar ,II
Another experiment, conducted by joseph Casagrande, involved
Navaho and English-speaking children:
Navaho and English-speaking children were presented with two objects
which differed from each other in both form and color, for example, a
blue stick and a yellow rope. They were then shown a third object which
llDeVito, p. 205.
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WOOLFSON: Language, Thought, and Culture
Language and Its Study
matched one of the original objects in color and the other in form, for ex·
ample, a blue rope. They were asked to select one of the two original objects which best matched this third object. A number of such sets were
used and the results confirmed the hypothesis. Navaho children, in the
example cited above, selected the yellow rope, whereas English-speak·
ing children selected the blue stick. 12
When middle-class English-speaking children in metropolitan
Boston were given the same test, however, there were unexpected results. 13 They made choices similar to those of the Navaho children.
Apparently, the Boston children were accustomed to having "creative" toys to play with, toys that involve the child in manipulating
objects. Certainly the results achieved in Boston weaken the conclusiveness of the original experiment. An additional problem with the
validity of these tests is that they are designed to show relationships
between language and behavior on a relatively concrete level, and the
selection of a yellow rope or a blue stick hardly qualifies as an example of philosophical orientation. In reality, the Whorfian hypothesis
has most relevance in the areas that are most difficult to pin down:
philosophy, religion, ethics, and values. Behavioral concomitants on
this level are difficult to find and test.
Another difficulty in testing the Whorfian hypothesis is that of
controlling variables. Ideally, tests should be conducted on subjects
whose backgrounds include a unilingual-unicultural environmen t.
Unfortunately, the kind of geographic and cultural isolation necessary
for this kind of environment is very rare. The modern world is one
that fosters cultures which are multilingual and languages which are
multicultural.
In the final analysis, Wharf's linguistic relativity hypothesis will
probably remain only a hypothesis. But this does not mean that we
should abandon it as a useful tool. On the contrary, by comparing
patterns of grammatical usage-becoming conscious of them, studying them, and evaluating them-we will gain insights into the categories our language forces us to pay attention to, the ideas that are easy
for us to express, and the ideas that are difficult to voice. We can, as
Wharf put it, turn background into foreground. Thus, both science
and man are served.
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Bibliography
Brown, Roger. Social Psychology. New York: The Free P:ess, 196~.
.
Carroll. john B. Language and Thought. Englewood ClIffs, N.j .. Prenuce-HalL
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0
CarrolL john B., and joseph B. Casagrande. "The Function of Language assifications in Behavior." Communication and Culture. Ed. Alfred Smtth.
New York: Holt, 1966.
Chomsky, Noam. Language and Mind. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
DeV:t:~joseph.
The Psychology of Speech and Language. New York: Random
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Fishman, Joshua. "A Systematization of the Whorftan HypotheSIS. Be VlOra
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eason,
H. A., j r . An Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics. Rev. ed. New
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York: Holt, 1961.
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House, 1970.
Greenberg, Joseph. Anthropological Linguistics. New York: Random House,
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Hockett, Charles F. A Course in Modern Linguistics. New Yor:
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Hymes, Dell, ed. Language in Cult"re and Society. New York: Harper
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Sapir, Edward. Culture, Language, and Personality: Ed . David B. Man e aum,
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CalIforma Press, 1949.
___. Language. New York'. Harcourt, Brace, 1921..
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Thorpe, W. H. Learning and Instinct in Animals. Cambndge, Mass .. Harvard
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Trager, George L. Languages of the World. Buffalo, New York: UnpublIshed
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Woolfson, Peter. "Sapir's Theory of Language." Language SCiences, 11 (August
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FOR DISCUSSION AND REVIEW
1. Explain the linguistic relativity hypothesis (the ~api~.~horf hypothesis). Why is it of interest to psycholinguists and hngulstlc anthropolo-12DeVito, p. 206.
13John B. Carroll and Joseph B. Casagrande, "The Function of Language Classifications in Behavior," Communication and Culture. ed. Alfred Smith (New York: Holt,
1966), pp. 503-504.
gists?
2. What are "habitual patterns"? According to Woolfson, why are they
so important?