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22 Part V ● Social psychology
NON-COMMON EFFECTS PRINCIPLE: WHICH CAR WILL YOU BUY?
Car A
Lead-free petrol
Power steering
Air bag
Expensive to service
Car B
4-star petrol
Power steering
Air bag
Cheap to service
Car C
Diesel
Power steering
Air bag
Cheap to service
If you buy Car A, we can infer that lead-free petrol is important to you. You will not have made your
decision because of the power steering or air bags, as they are common to the other two cars. We might
then infer that you also care about the environment.
we deal with Kelley’s (1967, 1973) attribution theory. Later on, more recent attribution
theories are considered.
Correspondent inference theory
We think of Tom Hanks as an
all-round nice guy because that is
what he is often like in his films.
We are making inferences about
his true disposition on the basis of
observable behaviours. This is an
example of “correspondent
inference”.
According to correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis, 1965), we use information
about another person’s behaviour and its effects to draw a correspondent inference,
in which the behaviour is attributed to a disposition or personality characteristic. How is
this done? First, there is the issue of whether the effects of someone’s behaviour were
intended. We are more likely to draw a correspondent inference if the behaviour appears
intentional than when it is unintentional.
Second, we are more likely to decide there is a correspondence when the effects of the
behaviour are socially undesirable. For example, if someone is very rude in a social situation, we conclude that he/she is an unpleasant person. On the other hand, if someone is
conventionally polite, we feel we have learned little about that person.
In deciding whether someone’s behaviour corresponds to an underlying disposition,
we also make use of the non-common effects principle. If the other person’s actions have
rare or non-common effects not shared by other actions, then we infer an underlying
disposition.
Correspondent inference theory has various limitations. First, it is assumed that
observers decide on the commonality of effects by comparing the actor’s actual behaviour
with several non-chosen actions. In fact, observers rarely consider non-chosen actions
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Second, correspondent inferences are often drawn even when we
judge someone’s actions to be unintentional. As Hogg and Vaughan (2002) pointed out,
careless behaviour is unintentional, but often leads us to conclude that the individual
concerned is a careless person. Third, as we will see shortly, the processes involved in
drawing inferences about others’ behaviour are more complex than is suggested within
correspondent inference theory.
Kelley’s attribution theory
KEY TERMS
Correspondent inference:
attribution of an actor’s
behaviour to some disposition or
personality characteristic.
Kelley (1967, 1973) extended attribution theory. He argued that the ways in which people
make causal attributions depend on the information available to them. When you have
much relevant information from several sources, you can detect the covariation of
observed behaviour and its possible causes. For example, if a man is generally unpleasant
to you, it may be because he is an unpleasant person or because you are not very likeable.
If you have information about how he treats other people, and you know how other
people treat you, you can work out what is happening.
In everyday life, we often only have information from a single observation to guide us
in making a causal attribution. For example, you see a car knock down and kill a dog. In
such cases, you use information about the configuration or arrangement of factors. If
there was ice on the road or it was a foggy day, this increases the chances that you will
make a situational attribution of the driver’s behaviour. In contrast, if it was a clear, sunny
day and there was no other traffic on the road, then you will probably make a dispositional attribution of the driver’s behaviour (e.g., he is a poor or inconsiderate driver).