Download The United States and Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War

Jeffrey McMaster
(POL 3DA)
The United States and Humanitarian
Intervention after the Cold War
Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti
SPOL 3854 Séminaire de science politique et relations
internationales
Professeur M. Schmiegelow
Année académique 1996-1997
Jeffrey McMaster
CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE
Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War
Introduction
The U.S. and the End of the Cold War
1
1
3
CHAPTER TWO
The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath
The Gulf Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
U.S.-Iraqi Relations before the Gulf War
The American Decision to Intervene
The Nature of the American Response
The Post-Desert Storm Crises in Northern and Southern Iraq
9
9
9
15
18
22
CHAPTER THREE
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
Introduction
Roots of the Somali Conflict
Interests and Policies of Key Actors
Events Leading to Intervention
U.S. Involvement in Somalia: From Euphoria to Despair
26
26
26
32
38
52
CHAPTER FOUR
Restoring Order in Haiti
The September 1991 Coup and International Reaction
U.S. Policy under Clinton
Operation Restore Democracy
Conclusion
60
60
66
72
76
CONCLUSION
77
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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2
CHAPTER ONE
Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War
INTRODUCTION
Since the Cold War began to wind down in the late 1980s, a change has taken
place in the character of the actions placed under the rubric of humanitarian
intervention1. The institution that had been created in the wake of the Second
World War to prevent future conflicts, the United Nations, was severely
restrained in its actions during the first four decades of its existence due to EastWest rivalry. One innovation that did occur during the Cold-War period,
however, was the technique of peacekeeping, which consisted of operations set
up by the UN Security Council to separate parties in a conflict or to monitor or
implement cease-fires. Traditional peacekeeping operations were limited in that
they could take place only with the consent of the parties to the conflict and that
the lightly-armed military forces involved could only use their weapons in selfdefense. Peace-keepers were also supposed to observe strict impartiality in their
dealings with the parties in conflict. 2 Humanitarian assistance, by contrast, was
provided by UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNHCR, and the World Food
Program in response to natural disasters. Such relief efforts were therefore
considered to be apolitical in nature. 3
In more recent operations under the aegis of the UN, dealing with what
have been termed “complex emergencies,” both political and humanitarian
aspects are present. This new form of humanitarian intervention aims to assist
1
For this study, we have adopted the definition of intervention proposed by Peter J. Shraeder, i.e., “the
calculated use of political, economic, and military instruments by one country to influence the domestic or foreign
policies of another country.” See Peter J. Schraeder, “Studying U.S. Intervention in the Third World,” in Peter J.
Schraeder, ed., Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
1992), 3.
2
Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1996), 10, 29-30; A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations: Principle & Issues, (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1991), 142-3; United Nations. Department of Public Information. Basic Facts About the United
Nations (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1995), 27.
3
Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing States (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University, 1994), 10.
Jeffrey McMaster
civilian populations in areas disrupted by war or internecine conflict by delivering
relief supplies as well as to protect their basic human rights. Indeed, humanitarian
considerations are often advanced in promoting the establishment of
peacekeeping operations, as was the case in Somalia.
Like traditional peacekeeping operations, Cold-War humanitarian efforts
were also subject to considerations of state sovereignty. Aid could not be
delivered without the consent of the receiving state. 4 However, as peacekeeping
and humanitarian aspects became ever more closely entwined with the growing
number of crises in the media spotlight, attitudes toward the respect of states’
rights evolved. Many humanitarian disasters were occurring within states, rather
than between them, or in the vacuum created when political and economic
structures disintegrated. When violence breaks out in these so called “failed
states,” civilians are often targeted by the warring parties, and in any event are
less capable of defending their rights and access to food than armed bands and
militias. According to the authors of a study on recent humanitarian efforts,
“civilians are often now the explicit objects of military operations. […] Civilians
now constitute about 95 percent of the casualties in places such as Somalia and
Bosnia.”5
Faced with crises involving starving populations and heinous crimes
including ethnic cleansing and genocide, the images of which were relayed by the
media, military intervention, with or without the consent of the ruling authorities,
was viewed as the only way to ensure that humanitarian workers could carry out
their mission, even if the option was not always adopted.
Both the rise in the number of situations demanding outside intervention
and the possibility of such action are related to the reduction of tensions between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union. After having characterized the Soviet Union as
the “evil empire,” the Reagan administration began to seek better relations with
the Soviet Union following Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to the post of
Secretary General of the CPSU. The new Soviet leader’s statements, though
initially received with caution in the U.S., nevertheless hinted that he might be
seeking to abandon the confrontational attitude of his predecessors. The
improved relations manifested themselves within the Security Council as early as
the spring of 1987, when the representatives of the five permanent members of
4
Strategic Survey 1992-1993 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), 28.
Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 3.
5
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Humanitarian Intervention and the End of the Cold War
the Security Council began to meet informally extra muros.6 Later the same year,
in an article entitled “Reality and Safeguards for a Secure World” that appeared
in Pravda, Gorbachev iterated his support for a greater role for the UN in
peacekeeping. Though this statement was met by skepticism in the West, the late
1980s saw increased cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the
Security Council. 7 The impact of improved relations between the two
superpowers is best illustrated by the increase in the number of UN missions
created over the last decade. Between 1956 and 1978, just 13 UN peacekeeping
missions were established, compared with 21 missions since 1988. 8
THE U.S. AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Just as the end of the Cold War meant change for the UN and the concept of
humanitarian aid, it also signified the loss of the underpinnings that had supported
American foreign policy for four decades. Both the Bush and Clinton
administrations inherited various difficulties related to the disappearance of what
had justified so many sacrifices on the part of the American public. As early as
Reagan’s second term, the public’s lassitude with bearing the burden of the Cold
War became apparent. Within Congress appeals were made to lower defense
spending and achieve a more equitable balance between America’s defense
efforts and those of its allies 9. As the U.S. economy experienced slow growth at
the end of the 1980s, before slipping into recession in the second half of 199010,
public attention became even more focused on domestic problems, to the
detriment of foreign policy concerns.
This pessimism was reflected in the debate over American decline in the
late 1980s. In Beyond American Hegemony, David Calleo argued for a reduced
U.S. role in NATO and fewer overseas commitments in general. For him,
“America’s oversized commitments, of which NATO is the biggest single
6
Marie-Claude Smouts, Les organisations internationales (Paris: Armand Colin, 1995), 139.
Ibid. Dick A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia: Partners in International
Cooperation (The Hague: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1994), 3; A. LeRoy Bennett, International
Organizations: Principle & Issues, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1991), 128-9.
8
United Nations. Department of Public Information. Basic Facts About the United Nations (New York:
United Nations Reproduction Section, 1995), 27.
9
David Gergen, “America’s Missed Opportunities,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 2.
10
U.S. President, Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1992), 21.
7
3
Jeffrey McMaster
Real GDP Growth, 1980-1991
8
6.7
7
6
5
4.5
4
4.5
3.3
3
3.3
2.2
1.7
2
1
0.2
0
-0.2
-1
-0.1
-0.1
-1.1
-2
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
component, have pressed the United States into fiscal and financial practices
destructive to American, European, and global prosperity.”11 Another widely
quoted author in the declinist debate, Paul Kennedy, attributed what he perceived
as America’s problems to “imperial overstretch” in his work on The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500
to 2000.12 Later authors such as Lester Thurow of MIT and Laura D’Andrea
Tyson, future Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors under the Clinton
Administration, highlighted the confrontation between the U.S. economy and
those of its allies. The subtitle of one of these volumes heralded “the coming
economic battle among Japan, Europe, and America,” a struggle which the author
contended the United States was ill-equipped to win. 13
However, pessimism was not just the reserve of academe. Both the public
and political elites had a diminished view of their nation’s place in the world, a
fact not without consequences for the possibilities of humanitarian intervention.
The 1992 presidential election campaign is illustrative of the context in which
governmental action operated during this period of change. Several isolationist
candidates ran in the primaries, including Patrick Buchanan and David Duke on
the Republican side, though they remained a marginal phenomenon despite
11
David Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony:The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books,
1987), 215.
12
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).
13
Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America (New
York: William Morrow and Company, 1992).
4
Humanitarian Intervention and the End of the Cold War
echoing some of the voters’ concerns. More rich in insight is President Bush’s
loss to Bill Clinton despite the former’s enormous popularity immediately
following the liberation of Kuwait. The keyword of the 1992 election was
change. Bush led a weak campaign effort based on his foreign policy
achievements while voters were demanding that attention be turned to America’s
domestic ills. In response, Clinton and his team of campaign advisors penned
the slogan “it’s the economy, stupid,” sensing the downgraded status accorded
to international questions.
Several authors have described the public’s mood as the Cold War wound
down. Their assessments are generally in agreement with that of David Gergen,
who wrote:
Will the United States during the 1990s still seek to build a new
international regime, or will it slink away into a new isolationism?
[T]here were enough clues in the months leading up to the Persian Gulf
crisis and afterwards to suggest that with the Cold War’s end, domestic
politics will become a much more significant factor in the formation of
foreign policy and will increasingly drive the United States toward a
new world role that fits neither extreme. 14
This prediction proved to be true, though the manner in which the Clinton
administration defined its foreign and security policy during the president’s first
term was perhaps not as orderly as the previous quote might suggest. In the
instances where Clinton had criticized his predecessor’s handling of foreign
policy during the election campaign, he quickly reversed himself, and for the
most part followed the previous administration’s policy. The sense of
aimlessness in international affairs caused by these vacillations was compounded
by the lack of any clearly stated principles and goals guiding U.S. action in this
area.15
Responsibility for the Clinton administration’s lackluster performance in
the foreign policy arena lies in part with the president himself, and in part with his
leading advisers for international matters. Clinton’s inconsistencies are not
limited to his handling of world events, rather they are present in all aspects of
14
David Gergen, “America’s Missed Opportunities,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 2.
Linda B. Miller, “The Clinton years: reinventing US foreign policy,” International Affairs 70(4) (October
1994), 626.
15
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Jeffrey McMaster
his policy, including several of his much cherished domestic priorities. In the
parlance of international relations scholar James Rosenau, we can see the
predominance of the individual variable in post-Cold-War American politics, or
at least until the 1992 mid-term elections herald a new Republican majority in
both houses of Congress. Two main elements of Clinton’s character played a
key part in defining the foreign policy process under his administration, his
desire to be liked by all and his penchant for free-wheeling and rather chaotic
policy discussions with top advisers.
President Clinton’s earnestness to meet with everyone’s approval worked
at two levels to prevent the elaboration of coherent policy. At a more superficial
level, Clinton often demonstrated that he could be easily influenced to change his
position on foreign policy issues, which, as he stated during the 1992 election
campaign, he did not wish to be the major focus of his presidency. A concrete
example which illustrates this point can be found in Clinton’s handling of the
crisis in Haiti in the spring and early summer of 1994. At the time, Clinton first
yielded to the pressures of the Congressional Black Congress, not the most
powerful force on Capitol Hill, and that of activist Randall Robinson, who was
staging a hunger strike to protest the White House’s policy toward Haitian
refugees. Shortly thereafter, Clinton, faced angry Floridians fearing another
wave of refugees, effected another policy shift. As one analyst has described
the president’s approach to foreign policy, “a skillful politician, his ear clamped
to the ground, Clinton has proceeded accordingly.”16
Perhaps more serious however is the president’s tendency, as was also
demonstrated in the case of Haiti, to use foreign policy as a means to deflect
attention from his domestic woes, be they scandals or policy debacles. Of
course, such a charge is not true of Clinton alone. Similar allegations were
leveled at President Bush within the context of the Gulf War, in which he was
seen by some to be gesturing in order to appear more virile. But in a post-ColdWar world in which the United States is no longer constrained by the
imperatives of containment and bipolar confrontation, and where Washington no
longer has familiar bearings, the situation has abetted the president’s tendency
for frequent shifts in policy.
Finally the president, as well as his two top advisers in foreign affairs,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher and National Security Adviser W.
16
6
Barry Schweid, “Dateline Washington: Warren’s World,” Foreign Policy 94 (Spring 1994), 138.
Humanitarian Intervention and the End of the Cold War
Anthony Kirsopp Lake, were torn between their ideals and the possibilities that
were open to them in light of both the domestic and international environments.17
Both advisers harbored hopes of including such “soft” issues as human rights as
well as greater support for multinational humanitarian intervention—on the
campaign trail, Clinton indicated he was favorable toward the idea of a standing
UN army for just such tasks—in the administration’s foreign policy objectives,
but they faced a public opinion that was largely opposed to an large
interpretation of U.S. responsibilities overseas.
This popular sentiment was reflected in the 1992 congressional election
results, which brought a more introspective Republican majority to power. Like
Clinton, they been elected to accomplish a range of domestic chores from
lowering taxes to reducing the federal deficit, goals they saw best served by
reducing the size of government. As former secretary of state Lawrence
Eagleburger said of the new Republican members of Congress, “They have no
real knowledge [of foreign affairs]. They don’t care about it. They’re focused
on domestic problems.”18 When they did preoccupy themselves with matters
relating to foreign policy, it was usually either to lower federal spending or to
attack the Democratic occupant of the White House.
17
Ibid., 146; Jason DeParle, “Inside Mr. Inside,” The New York Times Magazine, August 20, 1995, 33-9, 46,
55, 57.
18
Robert S. Greenberger, “Dateline Capitol Hill: The New Majority’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 101
(Winter 1995-96), 162.
7
CHAPTER TWO
The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath
THE GULF CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
It has been said that the Gulf conflict consisted of not one, but three humanitarian
crises.19 The first arose when a huge influx of refugees arrived in Jordan in
following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which, on August 23, led to a call for
international assistance. 20 This, however, was more of a traditional relief effort, at
the express demand of the country receiving the displaced populations, and will
not be discussed here. The second crisis, that provoked in Kuwait by the
invading Iraqi forces, was mainly used in the fall of 1990 to maintain attention on
the issue, as we shall see below. U.S. reactions to the Iraqi invasion and to the
third crisis, that which led to the creation of Operation Provide Comfort, will be
the main topics of this chapter.
U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS BEFORE THE GULF WAR
On October 15, 1990, speaking before an audience in Dallas, Texas, President
George Bush limned the horrors committed by Iraq in Kuwait during the two and
a half months since it had invaded its tiny neighbor. After evoking images of
“newborn babies thrown off incubators” and “dialysis patients ripped from their
machines,” he concluded by stating that the Iraqi president was “Hitler
revisited.”21 In February 1992, almost a year after the cease-fire that ended
hostilities between coalition and Iraqi forces, Bush administration officials
criticized Saddam Hussein and “the totalitarian government of Iraq” for
“diverting humanitarian shipments for the personal benefit for his friends and
19
Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and the
Dilemmas of Help (Boulder: Westview, 1996), 74.
20
United Nations, Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict,
1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 18-9.
21
Murray Waas, “What Washington Gave Saddam for Christmas,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf,
eds. The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 95.
Jeffrey McMaster
family […] while his people suffer.”22 These statements contrast sharply with the
Bush administration’s stance in the months preceding the invasion of Kuwait, and
with previous American policy toward Saddam Hussein’s regime. As late as
April 26, 1990, John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs defended the administration’s policy of “develop[ing]
gradually a mutually beneficial relationship with Iraq in order to strengthen
positive trends in Iraq’s foreign and domestic policies,” and argued against
imposing sanctions.23
$
$
$
Georgia
$
Armenia
$
Turkey
Syria
$
Lebanon$$
Israel$ $
Jordan
$
Uzbekistan
$Azerbaidjan
$
Turkmenistan
$
Iraq
$
Iran
$
Kuwait
Egypt
$
Bahrain
$
$ Qatar
$
U.A.E.
$
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Oman
Map 1
The United States first began to support Saddam Hussein’s regime during
the Iraq-Iran war. Before the conflict broke out24, Iraq elicited little sympathy
from the West25, and had turned instead to the Soviet Union for support and
22
Remarks made on February 14, 1992, by David Mack, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs, and reproduced by the United States Information Service.
23
Transcript of House Subcommittee Hearings on U.S.-Iraqi Relations, in James Ridgeway, ed., The March
to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 43.
24
The war began on September 22, 1980, following a decision by Saddam Hussein to launch an attack
against Iran to win back a parcel of land that had been ceded to Iran in 1975. The war came to a close on August
20, 1988 following a cease-fire announced by UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. See Jean-Baptiste
Duroselle, Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours, 10th edition (Paris: Dalloz, 1990), 868-9.
25
According to an article in The Economist, “Before invading Iran in 1980, Iraq was a pro-Soviet Middle East
‘radical.’ In 1978, it had taken the lead in punishing Egypt for seeking peace with Israel. It was a sanctuary for the
deadliest Palestinian terror gangs. And it made no secret of its wish to challenge both Iran and the weaker Arab
10
The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath
arms.26 By the 1980s, however, the situation in the Middle East had changed.
The shah of Iran had been deposed and in his place an anti-Western
fundamentalist movement taken the reins of power. To prevent the spread of
Islamic fundamentalism throughout the region, the United States, while officially
remaining neutral, shifted its policy toward Iraq. In 1983 the Reagan
Administration removed Iraq from its list of states that sponsored terrorism,
reversing a 1979 action by President Carter. This decision made Iraq eligible for
U.S.-government guaranteed food purchases. Further U.S. aid came in 1987 in
the form of $200 million in short-term insurance coverage for U.S. manufacturing
exports to Iraq. The Reagan administration furnished this support for the
dictatorial Iraqi regime despite its poor human rights record, which included the
use of chemical weapons the war with Iran and, in 1988, against its own
population. On the contrary, budding U.S. business interests prevented the
Reagan and Bush administrations from taking action to sanction such ruthless
behavior. Although the State Department issued a statement condemning the use
of chemical weapons by Iraq against its Kurdish population in late August 1988,
the executive branch opposed a Senate bill that would have enacted severe trade
sanctions against Iraq.27 Later, following other incidents, President Bush and his
top advisers also argued before legislators against imposing sanctions.
Indeed, the Bush administration ignored a series of pronouncements by the
Iraqi president that, in retrospect, clearly show his hostile attitude toward the U.S.
and its allies in the region, and toward certain oil-producing states. The first
warning signal came in February 1990, at the first anniversary meeting of the Arab
Cooperation Council in Amman, Jordan. The meeting came to an early close
following a speech delivered by Saddam Hussein 28, in which he warned his fellow
states to the south for the mastery of the Gulf.” “Kuwait: How the West Blundered,” The Economist, September
29, 1990, reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents,
Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 101.
26
In 1972, Iraq signed a fifteen year treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. That same year, the U.S.
began to encourage the Iranian government to support Iraqi Kurdish insurgents in their struggle against
Baghdad. See Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, “Iraq and the New World Order,” in Tareq Y. Ismael and
Jacqueline S. Ismael, eds., The Gulf War and the New World Order (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994),
274; James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 12; Joe Stork and
Martha Wenger, “From Rapid Deployment to Massive Deployment,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds.
The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 33-4.
27
Murray Waas, “What Washington Gave Saddam for Christmas,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf,
eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 92-93.
28
The Iraqi president’s remarks were reported ill received by Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, whose
country is the recipient of large amounts of American aid. See “Kuwait: How the West Blundered,” The
Economist, September 29, 1990, reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader:
History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 100.
11
Jeffrey McMaster
Arabs of the danger posed by the United States. According to his analysis, the
end of the Cold War and the decline of Soviet power meant that the U.S. would
dispose of greater leeway to exert its influence in the Middle East. He warned, “if
the Gulf people, along with all Arabs, are not careful, the Arab Gulf region will be
governed by the wishes of the United States.… [Oil] prices would be fixed in
line with a special perspective benefiting American interests, and ignoring the
interests of others.” Saddam Hussein’s concern for the price of oil, which in
1990 accounted for 99.5% of all of Iraq’s exports, became a recurrent theme in
the months leading to the August 2 invasion. The source of this concern was the
$75 billion in debt that the country had run up in its eight-year war with Iran.
Therefore, as we shall see below, while publicly attacking the United States and
Israel—always favorite targets bound to rouse support from the Arab masses—
Iraq’s president privately lambasted the rich oil emirates for overproducing oil.
The conclusion that Iraq drew, however, was not as menacing as the
content of later statements. Saddam called on the Arab oil states to use their
petrodollars as an arm with which to defend themselves, remarking, “Just as
Israel controls interests to put pressure on the U.S. administration, hundreds of
billions invested by Arabs in the United States and the West may be similarly
deployed. Indeed, for instance, some of these investments may be diverted to
the USSR and East European countries.”29
President Hussein continued his anti-American rhetoric over the next
months by demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy from the Gulf. A much
more serious incident, however, occurred in late March and early April 1990. On
March 28, U.S. and British customs officials seized a shipment of 40
capacitors—devices used for triggering nuclear weapons—en route to Baghdad
from London’s Heathrow airport. A few days later, on April 2, Saddam Hussein
issued a menacing statement in which he claimed that Iraq did not need to
develop nuclear weapons, as it already had binary chemical weapons at its
disposal. He added a warning that, “we will let our fire eat half of Israel if it tries
to wage anything against Iraq,” an allusion to the Israeli air raid that destroyed a
nuclear reactor under construction in the Iraqi city of Osirak. 30 The Bush
administration however, limited its response to verbal admonishment that called
29
Speech to the Arab Cooperation Council (FBIS-NES-90-039, 27 February 1990: 5), in Shibley Telhami,
“Explaining U.S. Behavior in the Gulf Crisis, ” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, eds., The Gulf War and
the New World Order (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 160.
30
Jill Smolowe, “Turning Up the Heat,” Time International, April 16, 1990, 20.
12
The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath
the remarks “inflammatory, outrageous, and irresponsible.”31 Indeed, in
testimony delivered before various congressional subcommittees a few weeks
later, officials argued against imposing sanctions against Iraq. Secretary of State
James Baker best summed up the administration’s rationale when, speaking
before a Senate appropriations subcommittee on May 1, he said, “I think we
ought to at least be conscious of the fact that if we take that action with respect
to [the Commodity Credit Corporation] or other economic measures [against
Iraq], in all probability our allies will be very quick to move in there and pick up
our market share. There will be some people in the United States that will be less
than enthusiastic about that.”32
Saddam Hussein had already generated ill will in the West in March, when
an Iranian-born British-based journalist Farzad Bazoft was hanged for espionage.
Later in April and May 1990, in addition to the attempt to smuggle nuclear
triggering devices into Iraq, another secret weapons procurement scheme, which
became known as the “supergun” affair, received media attention in Europe.
At the Arab League summit held in Baghdad in May, once again Saddam
Hussein had harsh words for Israel and the United States. Challenging the U.S.,
he attempted, unsuccessfully, to rally his fellow Arabs around a proposal to
impose oil sanctions against the American “imperialists.”33 Behind closed doors,
however, the objects of Saddam’s attacks were Gulf states he accused of
overproducing oil, thereby lowering its price. He claimed that for every dollar
that the price of the barrel fell, Iraq lost $1 billion in annual revenues.34
The lack of response by the United States to these repeated attacks surely
emboldened Saddam Hussein. One explanation of American behavior contends
that policy makers and analysts were misled by a certain reading of the situation
that prevailed in administration circles in the early months of 1990. According to
this view, Saddam Hussein’s remarks merely reflected his unease with his
31
“Kuwait: How the West Blundered,” The Economist, September 29, 1990, reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and
Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random
House, 1991), 102.
32
James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 49. The Bush
administration remained determined to grant $500 million in credits that year to Iraq under the Commodity Credit
Corporation program, even though an investigation into loans made by the Atlanta branch of the Italian Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro had shown that some CCC funds may have been used for arms procurement rather than the
import of American agricultural goods. See Richard Hornik, “With a Little Help from Friends,” Time International,
June 11, 1990, 32.
33
Jill Smolowe, “The Sword of the Arabs,” Time International, June 11, 1990, 31.
34
“Kuwait: How the West Blundered,” The Economist, September 29, 1990, reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and
Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random
House, 1991), 102-3.
13
Jeffrey McMaster
diminished power in the wake of the war with Iran. Articles critical of Iraq were
appearing frequently in the Western press, the U.S. Congress debated measures
to take in light of the human rights abuses committed by the regime, and
members of the State Department met with Kurdish dissidents.35 Another reason
for this lack of confidence was that Iraq’s economy was closely tied to those in
the West. The leading markets for Iraqi goods in 1990 were respectively the
United States, Brazil, Turkey, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Jordan, France, and
Italy. Together, exports these countries represented 78 percent of sales of Iraqi
oil to other nations.36 Iraq was also dependent on the West for its imports. The
United States alone accounted for 10.7 percent of Iraqi imports, surpassed only
by Germany (13.3 percent), and ahead of Turkey (9.2 percent). 37 Furthermore,
Iraq’s relations with its Arab neighbors had benefited from the support the latter
had provided during the Iran-Iraq War. The U.S. was comforted in this analysis
by its allies in the region, Israel excepted.
The United States was also constrained in its policy options when dealing
with Arab states, a major factor throughout the conflict. Before the invasion of
Kuwait, Arab nations made clear to the United States that the quarrel between
Iraq and Kuwait over the Rumaila oil field was a matter to be dealt with among
Arabs38. Arab governments were loath to ask publicly for U.S. assistance. This
was evidenced by the fact that, despite the buildup of Republican Guard forces
on its border, Kuwait did non voice any desire to receive American forces to
counter that threat. Gaining Arab support therefore was a major concern for the
Bush administration before deploying forces in Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein
attempted to block these efforts by appealing to an often sympathetic public
opinion in the Arab countries. When twelve members of the Arab League voted
on August 10 to dispatch forces to Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi president responded
by delivering a speech in which he exhorted “Moslems and believers everywhere
[…] to rise an defend Mecca, which is captured by the spears of the Americans
and the Zionists.”39
THE AMERICAN DECISION TO INTERVENE
35
Ibid., 101.
Encyclopedia Britannica.
37
Ibid.
38
Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine, 1996), 446; Bob Woodward, The Commanders
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 194-5.
39
James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 61.
36
14
The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath
Much of how the decision was taken to send U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia
remains unknown. Few of Bush’s advisors took part in the actual decisionmaking process, and because of both the nature of the American political system
and the president’s own personal character—it has been said of him that he is
“secretive and likes to rely on a upon a closed circle”—the ultimate decision lay
with George Bush. 40 However, once the decision to deploy had been made, the
administration was unanimous in its desire to avoid a repetition of Vietnam. The
memory of the United States’ involvement in Lebanon was also present in the
minds of policy-makers, having already left its mark on policy under Reagan. 41
In light of this, Washington strove to adhere to a series of principles to prevent
another debacle: only commit forces when vital American interests are at stake;
clear objectives and the means to achieve those objectives should be elaborated;
obtain and maintain support for the effort at home and abroad.42
The requirements for the first guideline—using the military only when vital
interests are threatened—were met, as a multiplicity of stated U.S. objectives in
the region were menaced when Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait. Chief among
these was to prevent one state in the region from becoming inordinately powerful
in relation to its neighbors, thereby creating an unstable environment in an area
that contained slightly over 65 percent of the world’s known oil reserves in
1989.43 Indeed, preventing a hostile country from gaining disproportionate
influence in the Gulf had led the United States to support Iraq during its war with
Iran in the 1980s. It was not so much Kuwaiti oil or Iraqi oil that required a U.S.
intervention—of the 63.3 million barrels of oil produced daily in 1989, less than 3
million were supplied by Iraq, and fewer than 2 million by Kuwait44—but the
necessity to maintain a balance in the region and to prevent a rapacious and
unpredictable dictator from dominating it.
The United States was also obliged to defend its non-Arab ally in the
Middle East, Israel. In the months before the August 2 invasion, Saddam
Hussein had made repeated verbal attacks not only against the United States, but
against Israel as well, and the Israelis were clearly anxious. The U.S. goal of
40
David Gergen, “America’s Missed Opportunities,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 7.
Shibley Telhami, “Explaining U.S. Behavior in the Gulf Crisis, ” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael,
eds., The Gulf War and the New World Order (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 163.
42
Ibid.
43
The figure was cited in The Economist, August 4, 1990, 54.
44
Ibid.
41
15
Jeffrey McMaster
defending the existence of the Jewish state was, however, ancillary to the larger
issues of preventing Saddam from advancing into Saudi Arabia and liberating
Kuwait. One analyst has even gone so far as to note that the American Jewish
lobby had little impact on the decision to deploy, as it would have had more
influence on the Democratic majority in Congress, which was reticent about the
use of U.S. troops, than on the Republican Bush administration. 45
Having defined its interest in reversing the Iraqi aggression, the Bush
administration needed to drum up support both with the American public that
would spending tax dollars and sending its sons and daughters for the effort, and
with the other members of the international community to make the operation
more palatable both domestically and abroad. In the passing months between the
decision to deploy and the beginning of the allied assault to free Kuwait, U.S.
officials presented various explanations to the American public to justify the
country’s policy. In a year in which the U.S. was already experiencing negative
economic growth46, the administration attempted to play on people’s fears by
highlighting the danger of loosing American jobs in a recession made worse by
increased fuel prices. If the Iraqi army moved into Kuwait, it was argued,
Saddam Hussein would control over forty percent of the world’s known oil
reserves.47 This approach apparently worked well in August 1990. Public
opinion in the U.S., as evidenced by polls taken at the time, was highly
supportive of the sending of forces to prevent an Iraqi advance into Saudi
Arabia. 75 percent of respondents to a Gallup poll were in favor of the
intervention, the most positive response to a decision to use force in the postWorld War II era. However, when asked for their opinion on the possibility of
an offensive strike to force the Iraqi army from Kuwait, a significant majority—59
percent—were opposed to such action. 48
45
Shibley Telhami, “Explaining U.S. Behavior in the Gulf Crisis, ” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael,
eds., The Gulf War and the New World Order (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 155-7.
46
According to the 1992 Economic Report of the President, “[t]he American economy, which was already
experiencing slow growth, fell into recession in the second half of 1990. Between the third quarter of 1990 and the
first quarter of 1991, output fell 1.6 percent and 1.7 million jobs were lost.” See U.S. President, Economic Report of
the President (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), 21. The convergence of the
savings and loan crisis, high consumer debt, demographic trends, and the impact of increased defense spending
in the 1980s brought about the recession, which was aggravated by speculation on oil prices and general
uncertainty in the business sector before the beginning of the operation to free Kuwait.
47
David Gergen, “America’s Missed Opportunities,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 5-6; see also figures in
The Economist, August 4, 1990, 54.
48
Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “Arms and the People,” Foreign Affairs 73(6) (November/December
1994), 48-50. According to James Bennet, a Washington Post poll on August 10 had found that 68 percent of
respondents were against an offensive to liberate Kuwait. See James Bennet, “How the Media Missed the Story,”
16
The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath
In his speeches, the president likened Saddam Hussein to a bully who
threatened the nascent “new world order” by invading Kuwait and through his
programs for acquiring nuclear and chemical weapons. Before the crisis, the
government had estimated that it would take between five and ten years to
develop a nuclear weapon. It revised its estimates after the takeover of Kuwait,
lowering the amount of time Iraq needed to build a nuclear device to between six
months and one year, thus adding a sense of urgency to the mission. 49
To ensure popular support, however, the Bush administration did not limit
its appeal to reasons of national interest and security. It was also deemed
necessary to emphasize the moral grounds upon which America’s role was
founded. The plight of the foreign hostages, used as “human shields,” and that
of the staff of the American embassy of Kuwait, where “people inside are being
starved by a brutal dictator,”50 were used to bring the conflict closer to home for
the American people.
President Bush skillfully managed opinion not only at home, but overseas
as well. Gaining international support was critical for the success of the mission
in several respects. First, by rallying the international community around U.S.
policy, the administration made it much more difficult for Congress to object.
The resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council gave a certain
legitimacy to the actions taken by the United States. This was reflected in
opinion polls taken before and after the November 29 Security Council vote
adopting resolution 678. 51 Prior to the Security Council decision, a majority of
Americans were against a war with Iraq; after resolution 678 was adopted,
however, a majority was favorable to the use of force to free Kuwait. 52 In
addition, pledges by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to pay for part of the cost of the
American deployment, as well as financial contributions from Japan and
in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York:
Times Books/Random House, 1991), 362.
49
Gary Milhollin, “How Close is Iraq to the Bomb?” (Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, November 30, 1990) in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History,
Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 243.
50
Remarks by President George Bush on October 31, 1990, quoted in James Ridgeway, ed., The March to
War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 134.
51
Resolution 678 set the January 15, 1991 deadline for the withdrawal Iraq from Kuwait and the
implementation of all other Security Council resolutions related to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. In the event of noncompliance, resolution 678 authorized the use of “all means necessary,” including military force to implement the
resolutions. See the text of S/RES/678 (1990) in the United Nations Department of Public Information, The United
Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis, 1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1996), 178.
52
Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “Arms and the People,” Foreign Affairs 73(6) (November/December
1994), 50.
17
Jeffrey McMaster
Germany, which, for constitutional reasons, could not send military forces to the
Gulf, prevented the operation from becoming the subject of partisan debates over
the spending of tax dollars. 53 Furthermore, the participation of Arab states in the
coalition defused somewhat the sensitive issue of the presence of American
troops in the country in which the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina were
located.
Another way in which Bush and his advisers sought to prevent another
Vietnam was through the control of the press. A prevailing view was that it was
necessary to control information that could potentially undermine public support.
This was evident in the early days of the crisis, when the administration was less
than forthright about the number of troops to be sent to Saudi Arabia. 54 The lack
of candor was often justified by the need to protect the safety of the troops
stationed in the Gulf, especially in the early days of the deployment, when the
U.S. was numerically at a disadvantage.
THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN RESPONSE
When the decision was made to send troops to the Middle East, it was presented
to the public as a defensive measure in response to a request by the Saudi
Arabian government55. Three months later, George Bush announced an increase
in the number of troops in Saudi Arabia “to ensure that the coalition has an
adequate offensive option should that be necessary to achieve our common
goals.”56 There has been some debate about whether the president planned to
order offensive operations from the outset, but it is clear that events elsewhere in
the Middle East created a sense of urgency.
The international community responded quickly to Iraq’s attack on Kuwait.
Just hours after Iraqi troops had crossed the border into Kuwait, the Security
Council adopted resolution 660 condemning the invasion. All five permanent
members voted for the resolution and expressed their opposition to the act of
53
David Gergen, “America’s Missed Opportunities,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 6.
James Bennet, “How the Media Missed the Story,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf
War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 356-359.
55
In response to a question after the delivery of his August 8, 1990 speech announcing the deployment,
President Bush said unequivocally, “that is not the mission, to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait.” See George Bush,
“In Defense of Saudi Arabia,” (Speech of August 8, 1990) in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf
War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 199.
56
George Bush, “The Need for an Offensive Military Option,” (Speech of November 8, 1990) in Micah L.
Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times
Books/Random House, 1991), 199. Emphasis added.
54
18
The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath
Iraqi aggression. In the United States, France, and Britain, officials moved
swiftly to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, while the Soviet Union agreed to
suspend all arms sales to Iraq 57.
Despite calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi
troops from Kuwait, however, the Bush administration did not seem to be
contemplating the dispatch of American forces to the area in the first days of the
crisis, an attitude which was in line with previous policy. This changed on
August 5, when Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was sent to Riyadh to
convince King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to allow U.S. forces to be stationed in his
kingdom. Nevertheless, the stated objective of the deployment was to defend
Saudi Arabia against possible Iraqi aggression. A comprehensive embargo
against Iraq imposed by Security Council resolution 661 was the sole means
publicly envisaged at the time to force the Iraqi army out of Kuwait.
Part of the difficulty that faced decision-makers in the U.S. was that they
were torn by two opposing goals. They ardently desired to disarm Iraq and, if
possible, topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, thereby reducing the country’s
capacity to be a nuisance to its neighbors. At the same time, they wanted to
prevent the destruction of the unitary Iraqi state, fearing the power vacuum that
would result. At no point during the crisis did officials meet with Kurdish
dissidents, who were viewed as separatists, or with Shi’ite Muslims, who were
considered to be fundamentalists. The goal finally adopted was, in the words of
a senior administration official, not “to alienate the Iraqi people—just deal with
their leader, who has taken them down this dangerous path.”58 Even after the
offensive option was adopted, the goal was only to liberate Kuwait. U.S. forces
did not continue on to Baghdad despite the fact they were practically unopposed.
During the first months of the crisis, the U.S. forces assembled in Saudi
Arabia were touted as a purely defensive deployment, and officials maintained
that they would let sanctions run their course. The situation changed in October
as another crisis in the Middle East threatened to destroy the cohesion of the
U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. On October 8, 17 Palestinians were killed and
more than 100 injured by Israeli police during a protest on the Temple Mount. 59
The incident immediately captured the headlines, and was widely condemned.
57
James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 59.
Elizabeth Drew, “Washington Prepares for War,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf
War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 181.
59
The Temple Mount is a site that is holy to both Moslems and Jews. The Arab protest had been called in
attempt to prevent Jewish extremists from laying the foundation for a new temple.
58
19
Jeffrey McMaster
The PLO Central Council demanded that the UN take action as it had in the Gulf
crisis, and laid blame for the incident with the United States, which it accused of
being favorably biased toward Israel. Saddam Hussein seized upon the
opportunity to reiterate his proposal to link negotiations concerning Iraq’s
withdrawal from Kuwait with discussions on the Palestinian question. This
suggestion found currency in the public opinion of many Arab states participating
in the anti-Iraqi coalition, where rapid UN action in the case of Kuwait was
considered hypocritical when compared with the lack of progress in the enduring
occupation of Palestinian territories by Israel. At first, the United States
attempted to defuse the issue by proposing to send a UN fact-finding mission to
Israel. The lack of enthusiasm among Arabs for this idea and Israeli obstruction
kept the issue in the forefront of the news in the ensuing weeks. As the problem
refused to fade away, the Bush administration changed tacks and hardened its
stance toward Iraq in an effort to refocus attention on the situation in the Gulf.
Although President Bush had seemingly adopted a more conciliatory stance
toward Iraq in a speech delivered before the UN General Assembly on October
1, by the end of the he hinted at the possibility of a U.S.-led offensive. During
this period, the UK adopted a similar tone. It was against this backdrop that on
October 29 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 674, which condemned
“the actions taken by the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take thirdState nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti and third-State
nationals.”60
The tensions in the coalition forced a reappraisal of the efficacy of
sanctions. Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee on December
5, CIA director William Webster said that despite the apparent effectiveness of
the sanctions, Saddam Hussein and his army would probably not be affected, at
least in the near term. According to his assessment, the army was less
susceptible to feel the effect of sanctions as the Iraqis disposed of important
inventories of basic military supplies. But the key factor remained Saddam
Hussein, whom Webster felt “almost certainly assumes that he is coping
effectively with the sanctions. He appears confident in the ability of his security
forces to contain potential discontent, and we do not believe he is troubled by the
60
See the text of S/RES/674 (1990) in the United Nations Department of Public Information, The United
Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis, 1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1996), 176-7.
20
The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath
hardships the Iraqis will be forced to endure.”61 Secretary of Defense Richard
Cheney expressed the administration’s view when he stated, “It’s far better to
deal with [Saddam] now while the coalition is intact, while we have the United
Nations behind us, while we have 26 other nations assembled with military forces
in the Gulf.”62
As already noted, President Bush was also eager to disarm Iraq, having
sent a large military force to the region at great expense. This explains the U.S.
reaction to a last minute Soviet effort to resolve the conflict by offering an end to
all UN imposed sanctions in conjunction with an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. 63
Washington hesitatingly accepted, but established a deadline such that Iraqi
compliance appeared unlikely. 64 This fits in with a larger pattern of intransigence
on the part of the administration throughout the crisis that left Iraq little room for
maneuver. Indeed, according to one writer, officials had dubbed the possibility
of a partial Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, though not from the oil fields or the
islands of Warba and Bubiyan, as the “nightmare scenario.”65
Beyond strategic considerations, Operation Desert Storm enabled
President Bush to appear strong and determined in foreign policy at a time when
he was bogged down in domestic politics. In October, a budget agreement the
White House had negotiated with Congress was defeated by a mixture of
Democrats, who opposed deficit-reducing cuts in services and transfers, and
Republicans determined to prevent tax increases. Eventual a bill that leaned in
favor of the Democrats proposals was passed in both houses, and was signed by
the president Two other bills passed by the Democratic-controlled Congress in
October—one reinforcing existing civil rights protection, the other limiting
imports on textiles and clothing—were not able to garner enough support to
override the presidential veto. The president may have looked to foreign policy
as a means to divert attention from his troubles with the legislature.
61
CIA Director William Webster’s Statement to the House Armed Services Committee on Sanctions Against
Iraq, in James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 154-157.
62
Washington Post, December 4, 1990, A-34, cited in Shibley Telhami, “Explaining U.S. Behavior in the Gulf
Crisis, ” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, eds., The Gulf War and the New World Order (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 1994), 168.
63
The United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis,
1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1996), 27.
64
Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 502-3.
65
Elizabeth Drew, “Washington Prepares for War,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf
War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 185. She states that
21
Jeffrey McMaster
THE POST-DESERT STORM CRISES IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN IRAQ
George Bush and his advisers never intended to intervene militarily in Iraq
beyond the region adjoining Kuwait where elements of the Iraqi army had been
massed. And although in the wake of the success of Desert Storm the president
enjoined the people of Iraq to rise up and eject Saddam Hussein from power, his
main objectives—the liberation of Kuwait and the destruction of the Iraqi war
machine—had already been achieved.
The Bush administration based its position on a series of considerations
that militated against a more active U.S. role in toppling Saddam Hussein’s
regime. Perhaps foremost among them was the fear of being drawn into a messy,
long-term involvement in internal Iraqi affairs. As one expert stated, reflecting the
general sentiment at the time, “We all want Saddam gone. But unless Americans
are prepared for unlimited occupation of Iraq, we’d do better letting the Iraqis get
rid of him.”66 A major U.S. military operation to oust Saddam appeared
particularly unlikely one year before the U.S. presidential election, especially since
Washington’s Gulf War allies refused to take part in such an intervention. 67 As
the election campaign wore on, and under mounting criticism that President Bush
devoted too much attention to foreign policy and too little to domestic issues,
campaign advisers cautioned against any major foreign-policy initiatives.
Without the possibility of playing a more active role in the Iraqi president’s
removal, United States could only hope for an Iraqi solution to the problem.
However, the forces that most likely would have opposed the regime—the
country’s Kurdish population in the north and Shi‘ites in the south—both
presented serious drawbacks. The Kurds had long sought autonomy not only in
Iraq, but in adjoining areas in Turkey, Iran, and Syria, making these countries
hostile to the creation of any sort of entity with in Iraq that resembled an
independent Kurdish state. They shared a common fear that granting self-rule to
Iraqi Kurds would give rise to similar aspirations among separatist elements
within their own borders. Such concerns, especially coming from Turkey, a
NATO ally and faithful Gulf War coalition partner, certainly played a part in
the “nightmare” dread by Washington was “less Hussein’s acquisition of territory than his remaining well armed
and in power.”
66
Daniel Pipes, Director of the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute, quoted by Christopher
Ogden, “Realism, Saddam and the Kurds,” Time, March 2, 1992, 28.
67
George C. Church, “Are Saddam’s Days Numbered?” Time, February 3, 1992, 14.
22
The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath
Washington’s calculus.68 The other possible source of opposition to the Iraqi
dictator, the Shi‘ite majority in southern Iraq, was viewed by Saudi Arabia and
the oil emirates as being under the control of Iran’s fundamentalists, and
therefore constituted an equally unpalatable solution.
Furthermore, the intense hatred the Kurds and Shi‘ites shared for each
other, as well as deep factional divisions within the two populations, led analysts
to believe that any attempt by either or both groups to overthrow Saddam
Hussein would end in a civil war for predominance in which Iraq’s Sunni
Muslims would also pay a heavy toll. 69 Indeed, in the summer of 1996, one
Kurdish faction called on the Iraqi army to intervene in a dispute with a rival,
undermining U.S. and allied efforts in the area. One outcome that the Bush
administration wanted to avoid at any cost was the partitioning of Iraq and the
attendant creation of a power vacuum in the region.
Hence, when President Bush called on “the Iraqi military and the Iraqi
people” to “force Saddam to step aside,” what he in fact desired was a military
coup to eliminate the Iraqi dictator while maintaining a strong control over
society. However, in the weeks following the end of hostilities in the Gulf War, it
was the Kurds and Shi‘ites, groups that had been precluded from playing a
political role in a system dominated by Sunni Muslims, who were spurred to
action by U.S. rhetoric. The Iraqi army responded to the insurrections with
unexpected vigor—Saddam Hussein had kept his best units out of the fighting in
the Gulf War for just such a contingency—first crushing the uprising in the south,
then turning north, causing nearly two million Kurds to flee into neighbor Turkey
and Iran. 70
The massive influx threatened to overwhelm the capacities of the host
countries, and some saw the phenomenon as Saddam Hussein’s revenge against
Turkey for supporting the U.S.-led coalition. With almost 500,000 Kurdish
refugees along the Turkish border with Iraq, Turkish President Turgut Ozal
issued a plea to the international community for a show of the same kind of
solidarity that had been demonstrated during the Gulf conflict.
68
Ibid.; Bruce W. Nelan, “A Land of Stones,” Time, March 2, 1992, 27.
George C. Church, “Are Saddam’s Days Numbered?” Time, February 3, 1992, 14-5.
70
The United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis,
1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1996), 56-7; Chapour Haghighat, Histoire de la
crise du Golfe (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1992), 268; Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Peacekeeping Operation in
Northern Iraq, 1991,” in David A. Charters, ed., Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution
(University of New Brunswick, 1994), 97.
69
23
Jeffrey McMaster
After initial hesitation, President Bush finally ceded to allied pressure and
agreed to commit U.S. resources to the humanitarian efforts underway,
establishing Operation Provide Comfort on April 5, 1991 in conjunction with UN
Security Council Resolution 688. Although twice as many Kurds had sought
refuge in Iran, the United States ignored its appeals and concentrated its efforts
near the Turkish border. 71 From the outset, the Bush administration had
determined to limit its involvement to humanitarian assistance and the
establishment of “safe havens” under cover of U.S. air power to permit the return
of Iraqi Kurds to their homes. To this end, the United States imposed a “no-fly
zone” over Iraqi territory above the 36th parallel and prohibited Iraqi military
personnel from entering the area. On the ground, 8,000 U.S. and European
troops occupied the zone. By early June 1991, the mission’s limited objectives
had been met and authority over relief efforts was given to the UNHCR. In midJuly the last allied ground forces withdrew, but the ban on Iraqi military forces in
Kurd-populated areas remained in effect and was to be enforced by U.S. and
European air power operating out of Turkey in Operation Poised Hammer. 72
The U.S. efforts in favor of the Kurds who had fled to Turkey contrasted
sharply with its lack of action on behalf of repressed populations elsewhere in
Iraq. The difference in the rate at which Kurdish refugees returned from the
Turkish border and Iran is significant in this regard. Those who crossed over
into Iran to escape repression were much slower to go back to their homes than
refugees prodded by Turkish authorities and protected by allied troops. But the
U.S. policy toward Iraqi Kurds in general was fraught with ambivalence. When
the Turkish military launched attacks in Kurdish-populated areas in northern Iraq
to root out forces loyal to the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), the U.S.
condoned the move.
In the case of the Shi‘ite Muslims, the United States initially refused to take
any action. Later a no-fly zone was also established in southern Iraq, but this did
not prevent the Iraqi army from continuing its reprisals, and the so-called “Marsh
Arabs” were decimated as a result of the shelling of their villages.
In the absence of a successful military coup, U.S. policy toward Iraq has
basically remained unchanged. As mentioned briefly above, rivalries between the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party have generated
71
Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Peacekeeping Operation in Northern Iraq, 1991,” in David A. Charters,
ed., Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution (University of New Brunswick, 1994), 97-8.
24
The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath
problems for the U.S. in Iraq, particularly in the summer of 1996, when the latter
group invited Iraqi army divisions into the protected zone. Meanwhile, U.N.imposed sanctions have remained in place, but have yet to have produced any
positive effect. On the contrary, the Iraqi regime has employed shortages of
food and medical supplies and American missile attacks to stoke anti-American
sentiment among the population. The sole U.S. response has been to accuse
Saddam Hussein of lavishing money on the construction of palaces while
refusing to comply with UN resolutions that would allow him to sell oil in
exchange for food and other badly need supplies.73
Following the election of Bill Clinton in 1992, little has changed in the U.S.
attitude toward Iraq. Recently, the current administration’s policy, which has
endured under the label of “dual containment”—referring to the two potential
sources of instability in the region, according to the official U.S. outlook—has
come under attack by former foreign policy advisers.74 While conceding the
necessity of continuing the military containment of Saddam Hussein, the former
officials they argue that “the United States and others should try to mitigate the
sanctions’ effects on ordinary Iraqis.”75 Nevertheless, for the most part their
recommendations remain within the bounds of the conventional wisdom,
including “reassur[ing] Iraqis and their neighbors that [the United States] is
committed to the integrity of the Iraqi state,” and “send[ing] a clear signal that it
is prepared to work with a post-Saddam Iraqi regime.”76 Indeed, given the lack
of priority that the issue constitutes for the present occupant of the White House,
and provided that Saddam Hussein does not provoke U.S. action, the status quo
will most likely persist into the foreseeable future.
72
Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Peacekeeping Operation in Northern Iraq, 1991,” in David A. Charters,
ed., Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution (University of New Brunswick, 1994), 103.
73
“Saddam Causes Iraqi Pain—Not U.N.,” (VOA Editorial), The Washington File, January 3, 1995.
74
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, “Differentiated Containment,” Foreign Affairs
76(3) (May/June 1997), 20-30.
75
Ibid., 25.
76
Ibid.
25
Jeffrey McMaster
CHAPTER THREE
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1992, American television screens were filled with graphic
images of human suffering, first of emaciated Bosnians behind the barbed wire
fences of concentration camps, then of starving Somalis gathered in camps set
up by international relief organizations. Yet, despite the simultaneity of the
appeals, the United States chose to respond only in Somalia. Its choice was
motivated by the belief that addressing the problem of the African tragedy was
“doable,” while the specter of Vietnam prevented the U.S. from taking decisive
action in the Balkans.
ROOTS OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT
Founded in July 1960 by the union of two former British and Italian colonies, the
Somali Republic was a rarity among the sub-Saharan nations in that its people
were almost entirely of the same ethnic group, spoke a common language, and
shared the same religious beliefs. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s a major
humanitarian crisis erupted in this country which eventually led to the
establishment of a relief effort by the international community. A fractured social
structure prone to strife and the political maneuvering of Siad Barre, a Somali
general who had seized power in a military coup in 1969, lay at the roots of the
country’s breakdown of civil society.
The difficulty of creating a viable civil society at the national level stems in
part from the social institutions that evolved from the predominant economic
activity, nomadic pastoralism. I.M. Lewis, in his classic study on the Somali
people, A Pastoral Democracy, describes the situation he saw while conducting
field research in the late 1950s in the following manner:
26
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
Like many pastoral nomads who range far and wide with their herds of
camels and flocks, the Somali have no indigenous centralized
government. And this lack of formal government and of instituted
authority is strongly reflected in their extreme independence and
individualism. Few writers have failed to notice the formidable pride
of the Somali nomad, his extraordinary sense of superiority as an
individual, and his firm conviction that he is sole master of his actions
and subject to no authority except that of God. If they have perceived
it, however, they have been for the most part baffled by the shifting
character of the nomad’s political allegiance and puzzled by the fact
that the political and jural unit with which he acts on one occasion he
opposes on another. 77
The traditionally pastoral economy of Somalia gave rise to a clan-based
society in which kinship considerations permeated all aspects—economic, social,
and political—of life. The Somali people are divided among three main family
groups—the Saab, the Irir, and the Darod—which are subdivided into more
restrictive clans, these also being subject to further subdivisions (figure 1).
Cohesion in the clans was assured by the diya, or “blood payments,” in which
family members were morally obligated to seek restitution for offenses committed
against persons belonging to their group. As a result, traditional Somali society
was marked by recurrent internal inter-group feuding, especially over resources
such as potable water and grazing areas,78 or for reasons of prestige or honor, 79
presaging the situation in the early 1990s.80 In this Hobbesian society lacking a
central authority, fighting ability was the main determinant of resource allocation
and political status.81
77
I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of
the Horn of Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 1.
78
Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International
Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 18.
79
I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of
the Horn of Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 242. Lewis characterizes the Somali as “essentially a
warlike people who readily engage in battle or raiding to redress wrongs and injuries, to release pent-up enmities,
to acquire or maintain honour, and to gain access to natural resources or to conserve their rights to them.”
80
Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and
Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1995), 8-10.
81
I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of
the Horn of Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 242.
27
Jeffrey McMaster
In the political system that grew up during the transition from colonial to
independent status, nepotism was rampant as politicians and others used clan
interests to further their personal gain. Working for the state as either an elected
official or civil servant became the goal of many who wished to receive a share of
the financial aid flowing into government coffers. A multitude of mainly clanbased parties sprung up before each parliamentary election, 82 with most winners
eventually joining the dominant Somali Youth League (SYL). The scramble for
self enrichment led to the neglect of national and local concerns, while the
recourse to clan-based cleavages sometimes led to violence.
Figure 1
Major Somali Clans
IRIR
SAAB
Digil
Rahanwein
Dir
Isaq
DAROD
Hawiye
Mijerteen
Dolbahante
Warsangali
Ogaden
Marehan
Source: Adapted from Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral
Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1995), 9.
In October 1969, following the assassination of President Abdirashiid Ali
Shermaarke, a military coup brought Mohammed Siad Barre to power. At first
the coup leaders were greeted with enthusiasm as they acted to resolve many
issues that the parliament had ignored. Siad Barre adopted a policy of “scientific
socialism” and vowed to put an end to rivalries based on clan interests.83 This
initial euphoria was short-lived, however, as Barre soon adopted a tactic of
manipulating clan interests and rivals to reinforce the power of his own lineage.
82
The 1969 election, in which more than 60 parties fielded candidates for 122 parliamentary seats, is
illustrative of the problems the political system faced. Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State
Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 13; United Nations, Department of Public Information, The
United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 9.
83
Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and
Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1995), 14; Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia,
International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 19.
28
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
SAUDI ARABIA
OMAN
CHAD
SUDAN
YEMEN
DJIBOUTI
ETHIOPIA
CENTRAL
AFRICAN REP:
RWANDA
.
Hargeisa
SOMALIA
.
KENYA
ZAIRE
.
Baidoa
« Muqdisho
(Mogadishu)
Kismaayo
(Chisimayu)
BURUNDI
Map 2
Somalia’s defeat in the 1978-1979 Ogaden war represented a watershed in
the central government’s efforts to assert its legitimacy. Siad Barre had used
pan-Somali nationalism to garner support for his rule among the people,
proclaiming his desire to unite all Somalis, including those of neighboring
Ethiopia, in a Greater Somalia. 84 Shortly after the country’s defeat, a group of
officers belonging to the Mijerteen clan plotted to unseat President Barre. When
their coup failed, Barre’s government sought to punish the Mijerteen clan
collectively by arming rival clans, employing violence against civilian clan
members, and destroying their property. Large numbers of Mijerteen fled into
exile, where they joined various armed opposition groups that were eventually
consolidated into a single movement, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front
(SSDF). 85 This marked the beginning of the phenomenon of clan-based
84
Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International
Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 20.
85
Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and
Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1995), 17; Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia,
International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 20; United Nations,
29
Jeffrey McMaster
insurgencies that would oppose the regime throughout the 1980s in a context of
increasing violence and weakening state control.
Many of the rebel groups operated out of Ethiopia, which had strained
relations with Barre’s government. They lost this safe haven in April 1988, when
the two countries signed a treaty of non-aggression and noninterference.
Insurgencies in both Ethiopia and Somalia had made the agreement possible, as
each side wished to reaffect troops along their mutual border to the task of
repressing rebel movements.86 Under the accord, the Ethiopian government had
pledged to drive the Somali rebels out of its territory. These developments
spurred the preponderantly Isaq Somali National Movement (SNM) to launch a
last-ditch effort to conquered lands in northwestern Somalia in which their clan
was predominant. The army responded by attacking not only the SNM’s forces,
but also the Isaq civilian population in the area. Hargeisa, the largest city in the
region, was reduced to ruins by government artillery and aircraft sent to expel the
SNM.87
By using the armed forces ruthlessly against civilians, the government was
laying the foundation for the chaos that broke out in the late 1980s and early
1990s. The army, which had become an instrument to mete out punishments to
the civil population, grew ever more unruly. At the same time, the firearms the
government had furnished to rival clans to punish the family members of rebels
circulated widely. According to 1993 figures compiled by the United Nations
Development Program, Somalia spent five times more on defense than it did on
education and health, making it one of the world’s most militarized states.88 The
lack of spending on schools and infrastructure and the climate of civil war
created a generation of young men with little skills or education that turned to
violence to survive. Faced with dim prospects for their future, they joined the
ranks of the mooryaan, gangs of khat-chewing bandits 89 that created additional
insecurity in a country torn by inter-clan strife.
Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations
Reproduction Section,1996), 11.
86
Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia : State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and
Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C. : The Brookings
Institution, 1995), 18.
87
Peter Biles, “Anarchy Rules,” Africa Report 37(4) (July-August 1992), 32; United Nations, Department of
Public Information, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction
Section,1996), 11.
88
United Nations, Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New
York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 11.
89
Leaves of khat are chewed for their stimulating effect.
30
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
This explosive situation was aggravated by recruiting methods adopted
during the 1980s that had transformed the army into a hotchpotch of clan-based
units. Those units that remained faithful to Barre sought to stem the rising tide of
political opposition by violently quelling anti-government protests. They also
increasingly availed themselves to various criminal activities—theft, rape, and
murder—as Somalia descended into chaos.
In their desire to topple Barre’s government, the various Somali factions
were briefly united in their goal. However, as the designs of the clans were the
same—seizing power for their members as Siad Barre had for his own90—the
renewal of antagonism among the different groups was inevitable. Thus, when
President Barre finally fled Mogadishu in January 1991, the alliance between the
Hawiye clan’s United Somali Congress (USC), the Ogadeni Somali Patriotic
Movement (SPM), and the Isaq-based SNM crumbled, inaugurating a period of
total absence of an even nominal central authority that has continued to this day.
INTERESTS AND POLICIES OF KEY ACTORS
Cold War superpower rivalry extended to sub-Saharan Africa, though usually
not, at least for the United States, with the intensity that marked relations with
other parts of the globe. Nevertheless, the U.S. and the Soviet Union contributed
considerable amounts of financial and military aid to countries that were willing to
align themselves. With the decline in East-West tensions, however, the attention
of the major powers has been diverted from Africa to other regions, mainly as the
result of two factors.
First, with the end of the Cold War, climatic changes were taking place in
Europe. The threat of war receded on the continent that had come to symbolize
the tension between ideological blocs, as Communist regimes fell and Soviet
troops withdrew. NATO, long one of the United States’ principal overseas
commitments, first saw its adversary retreat, then collapse. Relations with the
emerging democracies had to be defined and financial aid to rebuild economies
devastated by nearly a half-century of Communist rule had to be found, while the
Atlantic Alliance, deprived of its traditional adversary, needed to find a new
raison d’être. A series of crises that sprung up elsewhere, most notably in the
90
Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, “The Lessons of Famine,” Africa Report 37(6) (November-December
1992), 64.
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Jeffrey McMaster
Persian Gulf and the former Yugoslavia, further absorbed the attention of the key
actors in the international system.
Second, as the Cold War abated, most African states lost whatever
political or strategic interest they held in the past. 91 They are for the most part
poor countries saddled with foreign debt and constrained by multiple
impediments to economic development too numerous to go into here. 92 The
whole of the continent of Africa has a combined GNP dwarfed by that of Great
Britain. The Third World accounts for less than 20 percent of world economic
production. 93 At the beginning of the 1990s, with the exception of oil, little
concern was voiced about access to strategic raw materials produced by Third
World countries. From a U.S. standpoint, there existed alternative sources for
most raw materials, though at a greater expense. 94 More importantly, however,
with the end of superpower rivalry it was less likely that resources and strategic
sites would fall into unfriendly hands.
Of the sub-Saharan African nations, Somalia was one of the poorest and
least well-endowed. Barely two percent of the land is arable, and the lack of
cultivable land combined with recurrent droughts were responsible for the
country’s chronic food deficit. 95 Nevertheless, agriculture formed the backbone
of the economy before fighting and drought drove villagers to the cities in search
of food being distributed by nongovernmental organizations. In 1987, 72 percent
of the labor market was employed in traditional farming activities—approximately
one quarter of the population were sedentary farmers, while nearly twice that
number were nomadic herdsmen. 96 Despite the unfavorable environment,
Somalia did produce enough of some commodities, mainly live animals and
91
Michael Chege, “Remembering Africa,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 156.
Among the many problems African nations have to face are poor infrastructure and services, including
health and education, with the implications these carry for the workforce, and dependence on few or single
products that form the basis of the economy.
93
Stephen M. Walt, “U.S. Grand Strategy for the 1990s: The Case for Finite Containment,” in Daniel J.
Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan, eds., U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 146. See also Thierry de Montbrial, ed., RAMSES 96 (Paris:
Dunod/Institut français des relations internationales, 1995), 386.
94
Stephen M. Walt, “U.S. Grand Strategy for the 1990s: The Case for Finite Containment,” in Daniel J.
Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan, eds., U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 147.
95
A large influx of ethnic Somali refugees from Ethiopia in the wake of the Ogaden War taxed Somalia’s
scarce food resources, leading to a major humanitarian crisis in the late 1970s. See United Nations, Department of
Public Information, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction
Section,1996), 13.
96
The Economist Book of Vital Statistics (London: The Economist Books Ltd, 1990), 57; “Somalia,”
Encyclopedia Britannica 1992 World Data, 700; United Nations, Department of Public Information, The United
Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 13.
92
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Responding to Crisis in Somalia
bananas, for export. The main markets for Somali livestock, which accounted
for more than half of the country’s exports, were its neighbors on the Arabian
peninsula, led by Saudi Arabia, the destination of 51 percent of Somalia’s
exports.97 Notwithstanding these commercial ties, the Arab states, as well as
most African nations, were conspicuously absent from efforts to remedy the
situation in Somalia.
Although UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his report An
Agenda for Peace, called for a greater involvement of regional organizations in
the resolution of post-Cold War crises, regional and intergovernmental
organizations of which Somalia was a member—the Arab League, the
Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Organization of African Unity
(OAU)—largely failed to heed his call. Somalia’s Arab neighbors were absorbed
in dealing with the Gulf conflict and its aftermath when the crisis was still in its
early stages, while the OAU consisted of members whose economic situation
prohibited them from intervening effectively. 98 Even UN Secretary-General
Boutros-Boutros Ghali was unable to rally his fellow Arabs to the cause. As one
observer described the situation, “the Arab League and the Organization of
African Unity largely ignored Somalia. Sub-Saharan Africa essentially deserted it.
[No sub-Saharan] country, other than Sudan, has sent a single grain of food.
Neighborly help consisted primarily of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s passive
acceptance of Somali refugees.”99 Figures compiled by the UN on donations
show just how little the wealthy oil-producing states across the Gulf of Aden did
for their fellow Muslims suffering in Somalia. By mid-January 1993, Saudi
Arabia contributed a mere $10 million to a trust fund, set up under Security
Council Resolution 794 of December 3, 1992, whereas Japan had given ten times
that amount. As for relief contributions, Saudi Arabia provided slightly over $1.2
million, with OPEC as a group offering $1 million, out of a total of $335 million
received from various donor countries.100 As another of critic of the regional
organizations’ inefficacy in the Somali crisis has pointed out, most regional
97
The Economist Book of Vital Statistics (London: The Economist Books Ltd, 1990), 160.
Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International
Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 14.
99
Jonathan Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993), 145.
100
Figures from UN Africa Recovery Briefing Paper, No. 7, 15 January 1993, 2, cited in Samuel M. Makinda,
Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International Peace Academy Occasional
Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 44-5.
98
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Jeffrey McMaster
organizations lack the resources to handle humanitarian emergencies because they
were not created with this contingency in mind.101
The role of one Arab state that did actively participate in efforts to reach a
diplomatic solution, Egypt, deserves further mention. Of course, Egyptian
diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali played an important role as secretary-general of
the United Nations, using the pulpit of his office Secretariat to shame the
members of the Security Council into action in 1992. But Egypt’s, and BoutrosGhali’s, involvement go back much further, as Cairo had historical and regional
interests in Somalia. Both Egypt and Italy tried unsuccessfully in late 1990 to
bring Siad Barre’s government and opposition groups to the negotiating table to
work toward a smooth transition of power. Boutros-Ghali himself, during his
tenure in the Egyptian foreign ministry, was involved both in the talks aimed at
defusing the situation in Somalia and, earlier, in handling the military and financial
assistance that Egypt had provided Barre over the years.102 He was thus a figure
of suspicion to many Somalis, a burden he carried with him to his post at the
UN. According to one rumor, the aid that Boutros-Ghali had overseen was part
of an agreement by which Egyptians would be given rights to Somalia’s scarce
arable land, taking it away from native Somalis.103 Regardless of the rumor’s
veracity, it nevertheless tainted the secretary-general’s image, and added to the
United Nations problems as well. The fact that the Egyptian government was
seen as leaning in favor of Aidid’s rival within the United Somali Congress, Ali
Mahdi, did little to facilitate either Boutros-Ghali’s or Cairo’s roles in
negotiations.
Other African states involved in the numerous talks aimed at reaching a
diplomatic solution to the conflict were neighboring Djibouti, which has its own
population of ethnic Somalis, as well as Ethiopia and Eritrea. The latter two were
particularly active in late 1993, following the deaths of U.S. Rangers and the
subsequent decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia. They were
encouraged to do so by the United States, which, after the debacle in October
1993, had adopted a policy of seeking “African solutions to African
101
Thomas G. Weiss, “Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Intervention,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey
Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1997), 219.
102
Gérard Prunier, “The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope,” in Walter Clarke and
Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1997), 146, note 11.
103
Jonathan Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993), 149.
34
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
problems.”104 Nevertheless, they too suffered, as did most actors who
intervened, from a perception of siding with one party, to the detriment of others.
Somalia’s other major trading partner, Italy, has a long history in the
Somali banana industry dating back to the colonial days. Italian investments in
the banana production placed Italy as the country’s second leading export market
and procured it a quasi-monopoly in that sector. 105 The Italian government was
active in Somalia as well, providing funds designated as development and military
aid. Political scandals that erupted in the early 1990s brought to light various
shady government dealings with the Barre government and kickback schemes
involving development projects to establish a Somali fishing industry. 106 Thus,
while Italy, on both economic and historical grounds, had an interest in the
restoration of some semblance of order in Somalia, the “clean hands”
government was constrained in the actions it could take, lest it appear to be
following in the footsteps of its disavowed predecessors.
The United States, like Egypt and Italy, had long provided military and
financial aid to Somalia. Although Siad Barre had chosen in 1974 to align his
country with the Soviet Union, the relationship was not an easy one, and shortly
thereafter, discrete overtures were made, via the Saudis, seeking U.S. aid in return
for breaking with the Soviets. At the time, however, such propositions were
made to no avail. The administration feared that without the Soviet naval base in
Barbera, it would be unable to justify the planned expansion of facilities at Diego
Garcia. After the Soviets and Cubans sided with Ethiopia in the 1977-1978
Ogaden War, Somalia turned once again to the United States to ask for arms and
development assistance in return for cutting their ties with the Soviet Union. But
it was only after the Shah of Iran was deposed in 1979 that the United States
accorded a presence in the region any strategic importance. As Chester Croker,
former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, stated in 1983 while
testifying before a House of Representatives subcommittee, “Our strategic
interests in the Horn of Africa are strictly corollary to our broader interests in
104
Ken Menkhaus, “International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in
Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian
Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 47.
105
Ibid. See also Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia : State Collapse, Multilateral
Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C. : The
Brookings Institution, 1995), 16.
106
Gérard Prunier, “The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope,” in Walter Clarke and
Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1997), 142-3.
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Jeffrey McMaster
Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean, and our military activity in the Horn,
including our acquisition of access rights in Kenya and Somalia, is directed at
protecting these larger interests.”107
In the early to mid-1980s, the American government had provided sizable
amounts of financial and military aid to the Barre regime. Much of this U.S.
support was halted in 1988 as Congress and the State Department learned of the
brutal attacks on Isaq civilians committed by the Somali army in their efforts to
crush the Somali National Movement. Nevertheless, when U.S. soldiers arrived
in the war-torn country four years later, many Somalis still had bitter memories of
the planeloads of American-supplied arms that the government received as it
repressed the rebellion in Hargeisa. This Cold War legacy came back to haunt
the United States in another fashion as well. Shortly before the Marines began to
land in December 1992, it was estimated that some 100,000 weapons—ranging
from AK-47 assault rifles to rocket-launched grenades—were held by both gangs
and the clan militias. In a prescient report prepared in 1989, Colonel Al Girardi, a
military attaché who had recently completed his assignment in Mogadishu,
opined, “Sooner or later, the country will be thrown into prolonged and violent
tribal conflict and no amount of U.S. assistance will change this.”108
After Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in January 1991, some government
agencies in Washington were monitoring what was happening in the Somalia, but
the issue was not accorded top priority. The deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal of
Kuwait was approaching and the Cold War was drawing to a close.
Furthermore, the evacuation of the embassy in Mogadishu when the Barre
government collapsed meant that the U.S. was no longer present in the country
and had few direct sources of information. Only the Egyptian embassy had
remained open after Barre’s fall, and most of the information the State
Department and other agencies were receiving came from NGOs.109 Even most
journalists steered clear of Somalia in the early days of the crisis.
107
Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1984, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 304, quoted in Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace
from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 56.
108
Jane Perlez, “Expectations in Somalia,” New York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A14.
James L. Woods, “U.S. Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian Operations in
Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian
Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 151.
109
36
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
EVENTS LEADING TO INTERVENTION
The famine that led to foreign intervention resulted from the conjunction of a
number of man-made and natural causes. A major factor was the fighting that
took place in the anarchy after Siad Barre was forced out of Mogadishu.
Members of the former president’s clan fled with him as he crossed the Juba
river into the territory of his larger clan, the Darod, located in southern Somalia
near the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders. Shortly thereafter, clashes broke out
between Darod forces loyal to Barre and fighters of the United Somali Congress
(USC), which had taken over Mogadishu after Barre had escaped from the
capital. A constantly fluctuating battle line between Barre loyalists and the USC
spread destruction in the area between Kismayu and Mogadishu. This land,
situated between the Juba and Shabelle rivers, was Somalia’s breadbasket—the
region in which the country’s modest areas of arable land were concentrated.
The sedentary farmers who lived in the region, including groups that did not have
clan structures like other Somalis, were looked down upon by most of their
fellow countrymen as lacking the fighting prowess and proud and noble character
of the nomadic herdsmen. Because of their military weakness, they were unable
to defend themselves as Siad Barre’s army resorted to a scorched earth policy,
burning crops, killing livestock, polluting wells, and destroying homes and
irrigation systems before abandoning their positions to the enemy. As a result,
the farmers represented a disproportionately large share of the famine victims.
Furthermore, farmers who hid their dwindling food stores to stave off starvation
were brutalized by the warring clans for whom food had become a strategic
asset. Among both clan militias and bandits alike, payments were made in food
rather than in worthless Somali shillings. 110
In addition to the ravages caused by fighting, food production was
hindered by a drought in late 1991. The drought’s effects were aggravated,
however, by the anarchy and violence that ruled in southern Somalia.
110
Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia : State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and
Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C. : The Brookings
Institution, 1995), 22; Andrew S. Natsios, “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos,”
in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian
Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 79; United Nations, Department of Public Information, The United
Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 14; Jonathan
Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993), 143; Peter Biles, “Anarchy Rules,”
Africa Report 37(4) (July-August 1992), 31-32; Ramesh Thakur, 338; Roland Marchal, “Somalie : les dégâts d’une
improvisation,” in Marie-Claude Smouts, L’ONU et la guerre. La diplomatie en kaki (Paris: Editions Complexe,
1994), 80.
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Jeffrey McMaster
Neighboring regions in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya suffered from the
same drought, but there relief supplies reached those in need and the death toll
was much lower. By contrast, the situation in Somalia made delivery of food aid
well nigh impossible.111
The food shortage was made even worse as farmers left their villages in
search of food and safety and flooded into the cities and refugee camps. A UN
study states that “The civil war that preceded and followed the fall of the Siad
Barre Government uprooted an estimated 1.7 million people, about one fifth of
the total population. Well over 700,000 fled to Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and
Yemen. More than 250,000 displaced persons poured into Mogadishu from rural
towns and villages, and there were large influxes into other southern cities,
including Kismayo and Baidoa.”112 As a result, those farmers that had not fallen
victim to hunger or violence nevertheless did not plant their fields to renew the
food supply. Humanitarian aid unwittingly, as it had after the Ogaden War,
created a vicious cycle of dependence on the food aid of the NGOs. Aid
workers were unable to coax the farmers who had flocked to distribution sites to
return home to cultivate their fields.113
Agriculture was not the only segment of society that was disrupted by the
chaos. All of Somalia’s infrastructure and services were affected. Government
services at all levels stopped functioning, including schools and the criminal
justice system. The health situation degraded seriously, adding to the problems
posed by famine. Most hospitals and clinics ceased to operate, while those that
did remain open lacked medical supplies and equipment. Problems of hygiene
arose as sanitary and water services also came to a halt. Electrical service was
cut as well when looters stripped cables to recover the aluminum and copper they
contained.114
At the time, U.S. involvement was limited to food and money offered by
government agencies to NGOs working to help the victims of the violence and
famine. Yet without a media presence and with more pressing problems
111
Andrew S. Natsios, “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos,” in Walter
Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 79.
112
United Nations, Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New
York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 14.
113
Brigette Doppler and Frédéric Vigneau, “Vols américains au-dessus d’un pays affamé,” Le Monde, jeudi,
12 novembre 1992, 2; Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1996), 3-4.
114
United Nations, Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New
York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 14.
38
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
elsewhere, the crisis in Somalia was not accorded top priority by either the
United States or most other nations. Throughout 1991, only Italy and Egypt,
both nations with historic interests in Somalia, and the adjacent state of Djibouti
were involved in mediation to reach a political settlement. These talks failed to
yield results due to a series of stumbling-blocks that find their roots in the very
nature of the post-Barre Somali society. First, there was intense competition
among the various clans and their leaders for recognition by other members of
society and the international community. Discussions became hostage to
considerations of prestige and legitimacy, with both factions and their leaders
trying to inflate their own importance and advance their own agendas, to the
detriment of their rivals. Fixing the size of delegations representing the factions at
peace talks was a considerable point of contention, since the number of
representatives was seen to be indicative of the relative importance of the clans in
the absence of a decision arbitrated by an impartial central government.
Negotiations were also hostage to the maneuvering of individuals who sought to
participate in the conferences not to advance the cause of peace, but to acquire a
certain legitimacy conferred by the international community that could be used at
home to bolster their own personal position against potential political rivals.
Faction leaders often faced challenges from a myriad of other members within
their own movement, including clan elders, ambitious military officers, and the
heads of the various subclans that had been grouped together in fragile
alliances.115
A further obstacle to serious discussions came from what one author has
termed the “conflict constituency.” With the disappearance of functioning state
government and the ensuing violence, well-armed groups had taken advantage of
the situation, often reaping substantial benefits for themselves. Flush with their
new-found power, clan militias and mooryaan undoubtedly were reluctant to
accept the establishment of a new civil society in which their role would be
diminished,116 especially considering that most Somalis, having known Siad
Barre’s rule for most of their lives, had a negative view of government. Another
problem, one which is not often mentioned in case studies of the Somalia crisis,
is that of illiteracy, which was a major impediment to development. UN figures
place the illiteracy rate in Somalia in1990 at nearly 76 percent, one of the highest
115
Ken Menkhaus, “International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in
Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian
Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 57-8.
39
Jeffrey McMaster
percentages in Africa. 117 Given that the teenage members of the mooryaan had
grown up in a climate of violence and repression and had little or no schooling
and no prospects for the future, they had little incentive to give up their arms and
return to a “normal” lifestyle that they may never have known.
There were, nevertheless, a few prospects for peace in 1991, but they
proved to be shorted lived and soon rivalries had sparked renewed violence in
Mogadishu. A May 1991 reconciliation conference organized in Djibouti by the
Hassan Gouled government together with Egypt and Italy ended in failure, but on
June 5, an agreement was reached between the two principal warlords in
Mogadishu, Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohammed, both heads of
rival factions of the USC. During the summer, the truce, which placed Aidid at
the head of the USC in return for granting Mahdi the title of interim president,
seemed to hold. However, it was supposed to be understood that the two
remained equals, and when foreign governments began to recognized the
government Mahdi had formed, Aidid withdrew his support from the accord.118
1991 ended with renewed hostilities in Mogadishu in which tens of thousands of
civilians were killed. The scale of the bloodshed was such that, in December
1991, the UN was finally jolted into action.
It was the conjunction of the heavy casualties in Mogadishu and the arrival
of a new secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, that resulted in the adoption
of a more active approach by the universal organization to dealing with the crisis.
On January 23, 1992, following a plea from Somalia’s interim prime minister—
and member of Mahdi’s government—the UN Security Council convened and
adopted Resolution 733, calling on all parties to halt the fighting and to assist
humanitarian workers in accomplishing their tasks. The council members also
invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and placed an embargo on all arms
destined for Somalia. But despite urging by Boutros-Ghali, the Security Council
did not adopt more stringent measures. Herman Cohen, assistant secretary of
State at the time, has noted that the United States and Russia were particularly
reluctant to engage in any activities beyond relief aid: “A dozen peacekeeping
operations had been authorized in the previous twenty-four months, and costs
116
Ibid.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division,
Statistical Yearbook 1990/91 Thirty-eighth issue (New York: United Nations Publishing Division, 1993), 140.
118
John Drysdale, “Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia: The Root Cause of the Shift from UN
Peacekeeping to Peacemaking and Its Consequences,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from
Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 119.
117
40
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
were mounting at extraordinary rates. The Cambodia operation alone was
budgeted for $2 billion.… Both the United States and Russia were running
considerable arrears in their peacekeeping accounts even before Somalia’s crisis
appeared on the council’s agenda. Hence, both governments insisted that UN
involvement in Somalia be limited to humanitarian operations, which are financed
within the regular UN budget.”119
The main problem from the U.S. point of view was, and would remain, the
securing of unimpeded access to the needy to distribute food aid. At a
humanitarian conference held in Addis Ababa in January 1992, USAID and State
Department officials delivered an ultimatum to the Somali factions. If the Somalis
continued to prevent aid workers from carrying out their mission, they warned,
the resources that the government had allocated to the Somali crisis would be
diverted to other regions which were just as much in need—southern Africa,
Sudan, Angola, or even the Soviet Union. 120
In late January 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali invited Ali Mahdi
and Aidid to New York for a series of consultations to take place during the
week of February 10. The goals of the discussions were twofold: establish a
cease-fire in Mogadishu and prepare the way for possible future peacemaking
activities. During the course of the meetings, Boutros-Ghali held individual
discussions with representatives of the two rival USC factions in which he issued
a warning, stating that if they remained intractable about halting the violence, the
international community would abandon its humanitarian efforts and leave
Somalia. On February 14, the two groups did consent to a cease-fire, and on
March 3, a UN delegation to Mogadishu led by Undersecretary James Jonah
succeeded in getting Aidid and Ali Mahdi to sign an accord.121
Although this agreement brought an end to most of the fighting between the
two USC leaders, it ignored the other sources of disorder both in Mogadishu and
throughout the country. The UN concentrated its attention exclusively on the
situation in the capital in the early stages of its involvement in the crisis, leaving
119
Herman Cohen, “Intervention in Somalia,” in Allan E. Goodman, ed., The Diplomatic Record, 1992-1993
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 54, quoted in James L. Woods, “U.S. Government Decisionmaking Processes
During Humanitarian Operations in Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia:
The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 152.
120
Andrew S. Natsios, “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos,” in Walter
Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 81.
121
The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, p. 18; Judy Aita, “Somalia Peace Talks Set for U.N.,” The
Washington File, February 11, 1992; Judy Aita, “U.N. Sends Observers to Somalia,” The Washington File, April
27, 1992; Makinda, p. 62.
41
Jeffrey McMaster
aside the problems that prevented humanitarian aid from reaching famine victims
in other areas. Even in Mogadishu, the cease-fire, which only concerned the
forces of Aidid and Ali Mahdi, did not deal with the racketeering and banditry of
other clans. Shortly after the cease-fire had been signed, the Marco Polo, a
World Food Program ship containing food aid, was fired upon as it attempted to
enter Mogadishu harbor and was forced to change course and leave without
unloading. Clans at the airport and the port extorted large sums of money and a
portion of relief supplies from aid organizations,122 while deliveries in transit often
fell prey to armed youths in “technicals,” jeeps and trucks mounted with artillery
and which received their name from the practice of demanding payment for
“technical assistance” the gangs allegedly provided aid workers.123 Among the
estimates of relief supplies lost in this manner, one specialist involved in the
humanitarian efforts placed the share appropriated by clan militias at
approximately 20 percent, with another 30 percent winding up in the hands of
armed gangs.124
Further difficulties to effective outside intervention were posed by the
interminable negotiations that preceded each new step taken by the UN. General
Aidid proved most recalcitrant in this regard. The strong opposition UN
encountered from Aidid stemmed in part from his perception of peacekeepers as
being favorable to Ali Mahdi. Ali Mahdi had in fact advocated a deployment of a
UN force, stating to the technical team sent by the Boutros-Ghali in March that
the future of the cease-fire hinged upon the presence of peacekeepers.125 UN
Security Council Resolution 751, which was adopted unanimously on April 24,
1992, acted on this proposal, requesting that “the Secretary-General immediately
[deploy] a unit of 50 United Nations Observers.”126 Long and arduous
negotiations—which included the issue, raised by Aidid, of whether or not the
UN personnel could wear uniforms—finally resulted in the sending of fifty
unarmed military observers along a so-called “green line” that separate the
sections of Mogadishu controlled by Aidid from those held by Ali Mahdi’s
forces.
122
“Airlift for Humanity—or ‘Other Means’,” Time, August 10, 1992, 11; Bertrand Le Gendre, “Les enfants
de moins de cinq ans sont menacés de disparition avant la fin de l’année,” Le Monde, mardi, 3 novembre 1992, 7.
123
Jonathan Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993), 138.
124
Mohamed Abdi, “Quelle aide?” Le Monde, jeudi, 12 novembre 1992, p. 2.
125
The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, p. 19.
126
Excerpted from the text of Resolution 751 (1992), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3069th meeting,
on 24 April 1992.
42
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
However, UNSCR 751, also included a provision concerning a 500-strong
peacekeeping force to accompany relief supplies in transit between the port, the
airport, and the various storage site in Mogadishu. Despite U.S. reluctance to
engage in expensive peacekeeping missions, the text of the resolution
nevertheless specified that council members agreed, in principle, that a larger
security force should be sent as soon as possible. Once again, Aidid resisted
UN involvement, and was particularly adamant that no peacekeeping
responsibilities be contained in the security force’s mandate. An agreement was
reached only in mid-August, and the first 40 troops from the Pakistani battalion
designated for the mission arrived one month later, on September 14. Before
long, it became evident that the lightly armed force, authorized to use force solely
in self-defense, was insufficient to fulfill its mission.
Another reason for the protracted chaos was the disrespect the Somalis
had for the cease-fire agreements they entered. Thus, while the UN, through the
work of its indefatigable special representative for Somalia, the Algerian diplomat
Mohammed Sahnoun, did conclude several understandings with various factions,
they were inevitable broken and the violence continued. Furthermore, the
mooryaan, which constituted a major hindrance for the humanitarian aid
operations, were beyond the control of the major clans that vied for power. In
light of this fact, the UN Secretary-General became increasingly convinced of the
necessity of a large-scale military intervention to impose some semblance of
order.
Throughout the spring of 1992, Boutros-Ghali had sought enlarged
involvement by Security Council members in resolving the crisis, but their
attention was retained by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The media had
focused on the suffering and atrocities inflicted by Serb, Croat, and Muslim
soldiers on innocent civilians, and stories appeared in which internment camps
for men were likened to the German concentration camps of World War II.
Television screens and front pages were filled with images of haggard, emaciated
men behind barbed wire fences. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General grew
increasingly incensed by what he considered to be undue attention to what he had
dubbed “the rich man’s war,” while no progress was being made in Somalia.
A turning point was reached in late July 1992, when the Security Council’s
gave its approval to a European Community plan that authorized the deployment
of a contingent of 1,100 UN peacekeepers to Sarajevo airport to ensure the
delivery of humanitarian aid, despite a series of objections to the proposal that
43
Jeffrey McMaster
Boutros-Ghali had raised earlier. At a July 22 meeting to discuss the his report
on the EC plan—which basically met the same objectives that needed to be
addressed in Somalia—the UN chief expressed his displeasure. He criticized the
council for accepting an expensive operation at a time when peacekeeping
missions elsewhere had already created strains on the UN budget. He was also
incensed by the fact that the Security Council had acted under pressure from the
EC, a regional institution. This ran counter to his suggestion, laid out in his
Agenda for Peace, that a heavily burdened UN have greater recourse to the
assistance of regional and other intergovernmental organizations in carrying out
its missions.
During the July 22 meeting, Boutros-Ghali also presented his latest report
on the situation in Somalia (S/24343), which highlighted the fact that “without
adequate protection for relief personnel and supplies, the implementation of an
effective relief program is not possible.”127 Five days later, the Security Council
adopted resolution 767, which authorized the secretary-general to organize an
“urgent airlift operation” to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance in
areas outside Mogadishu. An airlift was viewed as a means for aid shipments to
avoid the dangerous port facilities in the capital. The resolution also included
tougher wording that aimed to obtain greater cooperation from the warring
factions, with an admonition that “in the absence of such cooperation, the
Security Council does not exclude other measure to deliver humanitarian
assistance to Somalia.”128 Finally, consent was given to a recommendation
included in the July 22 report for a greater UN presence, to be based in four
operational zones.129 This additional force had already received prior approval in
resolution 751 of April 24, 1992.
This more aggressive stance resulted in part from the increasing
importance accorded to the issue within both the legislative and executive
branches of the U.S. government. Congressional interest in the Somalia tragedy
can be traced back rather early due to the actions of subcommittee members
preoccupied with questions of hunger and humanitarian aid. In late April 1991,
while the Gulf War still occupied the centerstage of U.S. foreign relations, Senate
Nancy Kassebaum (R.-Kans.) submitted a resolution appealing for presidential
127
Quote in Russell Geekie, “While the UN Fights Itself, Somalis Struggle for Survival,” Africa Report 37(5)
(September-October 1992), 6.
128
See the text of Resolution 767 (1992), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3101st meeting on 27 July
1992.
129
“Boutros-Ghali Suggests Food-For-Guns Swap in Somalia,” The Washington File, July 24, 1992.
44
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
leadership and a more active U.S. role in resolving the Somali crisis.130 However,
congressional interest and influence were marginal at that early stage.
American involvement during the period spanning from Siad Barre’s fall
and the evacuation of the U.S. embassy in January 1991 up to July 1992 was
limited to attempts to improve the efficacy of its humanitarian efforts. It was a
media campaign beginning in the summer of 1992 that finally served as a catalyst
for greater U.S. implication. Coverage of the starvation sarted with an article in
the New York Times, and quickly spread to other media. The interest sparked by
the tales of suffering led to visits by members of Congress, including Senators
Nancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon, thus providing a “news event” that futher
amplified the issue’s resonance in the media.
The news coverage occured at a time when members of nongovernmental
organizations working in Somalia were demanding more forceful action on the
part of the international community and a growing number of reports condemned
past efforts as ineffectual. In addition, campaigning Democratic presidential
candidate William Clinton and others in his party harshly criticized the Bush
administration for failing to adopt adequate measures.131 This deluge of criticism
together with Boutros-Ghali’s lobbying for greater involvement by the Western
nations and the realization of the inadequacy of the UN’s efforts to date
apparently brought about a change in the administration’s thinking. The White
House signaled its new commitment by making it clear that President Bush had
taken a personal interest in the problem. 132
A White House statement on August 14 outlined the new steps the
administration had decided to take. It also affirmed that “the U.S. will take a
leading role with other nations and international organizations to overcome the
obstacles and ensure that food reaches those who so desperately need it.”133
Specifically, the Department of Defense was to execute emergency airlift
operations to suppy food to the Somali hinterland, and an additional 145,000
130
H. Johnston and Ted Dagne, p. 192.
“Clinton Promises Strong Defense,” The Washington File, August 26, 1992. See also Bill Clinton, “The
Democratic Agenda,” Africa Report 37(5) (September-October 1992), 18. Fellow Democrat Jesse Jackson was
particularly acerbic in his denunciation of Bush’s policy toward Somalia. When asked by a reporter whether he
was satisfied with American efforts, he replied, “Absolutely not. […] Somalia has been under distress for more
than two years now. But it’s Somalia, it’s the Sudan, it’s Mozambique, it’s Angola, it’s South Africa—our policy
toward African peoples, whether in Africa, or in Haiti, or in urban America, is racist. It’s beneath the dignity of
our country.” See “Jesse Jackson Comments on U.S. Policy Toward Somalia,” The Washington File, August 31,
1992.
132
James L. Woods, p. 155.
131
45
Jeffrey McMaster
tons of food was donated. The Bush administration had further decided to
instruct the U.S. Ambassador to the UN to consult with other members of the
Security Council to reach an agreement on the use of additional measures to
ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.134
The airlift operation was dubbed Operation Provide Relief, and was
envisaged from the start as a temporary measure. However, as with the Pakistani
peacekeepers, it proved to be another case of “too little, too late.” Much touted
in official administration declarations, the actual results in the field were far less
impressive. Much of the time the C-130s were grounded, either for maintenance
or for reasons of safety. For those flights that did get off the ground, safety
regulations prevented the aircraft from flying with a full load of supplies, reducing
the efficacy of the aid deliveries. The threat of violence at landing strips further
hindered the operation, as pilots often refused to land in an area where open
gunfire had been reported.135
Despite all the efforts of the international community, there was no
evidence of an amelioration of the situation in Somalia. In September, one
quarter of all Somalis still faced starvation, and hundreds of thousands of
refugees had not yet returned to their homes. Furthermore, a statement by the
UN Secretary-General had created a new row with Aidid, who had begun to
prove receptive to Sahnoun’s negotiating. The incident was provoked in late
August 1992, when Boutros-Ghali, commenting on the authorization contained in
Security Council Resolution 775 to increase troop strength in Somalia from 500
to 3,500, that the deployment would take place regardless of the wishes of the
factional militias. Thenceforth, relations between the UN and Aidid soured,
destroying any hopes that the UNOSOM mission might prove effectual. The
Pakinstani soldiers remained confined to their quarters at the airport, and even
there they were unable to establish a secure environment. 136 Aidid supporters
demonstrated against the proposed increase in front of the UN’s headquarters in
133
“U.S. to Airlift Emergency Food for Somalia,” The Washington File, August 14, 1992; Charles W. Corey,
“Natsios Named Special Coordinator for U.S. Relief,” The Washington File, August 17, 1992.
134
Ibid.
135
Brigitte Doppler and Frédéric Vigneau, “Vols américains au-dessus d’un pays affamé,” Le Monde, jeudi,
12 novembre 1992, 2.
136
James L. Woods, p. 156; Jonathan Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer
1993), 147; Brigitte Doppler and Frédéric Vigneau, “Vols américains au-dessus d’un pays affamé,” Le Monde,
jeudi, 12 novembre 1992, 2.
46
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
Mogadishu, threatening retaliation that would result in “an unprecedented
bloodbath.”137
Conscious of the UN’s failures and the insufficency of the U.S. airlift, the
U.S. Central Command began to draw up possible plans of action in the event
that the Bush administration wish to be presented a list of options. Military
planners quickly recognized that positive results hinged upon a large military
force backed up by the kind of political leadership that the United States alone
could provide. They spent the fall of 1992 dressing an inventory of viable
options. By Thanksgiving week, the National Security Council Deputies
Committee had prepared for the president a choice among three feasible courses
of action. 138 On the day before Thanksgiving, the alternatives—increasing the
number of UN peacekeepers to 3,500, the maximum number authorized, offering
air and sea support for a major UN deployment, or sending a sizable U.S. force
into the country—were presented to President Bush. 139 He immediately chose
the third, most radical option, Operation Restore Hope. In a December 4
address explaining his decision to the American people, he outlined the mission’s
limited objectives:
First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts of
Somalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people in
the countryside now devastated by starvation. And second, once
we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our
troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN
peacekeeping force. Our mission has a limited objective, to open
the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way
for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is
not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is
necessary.”140
137
“Plus de deux mille “ boat people ” ont été secourus au Yemen,” Le Monde, mercredi, 18 novembre 1992,
6.
138
James L. Woods, p. 157.
Bruce W. Nelan, “Taking On the Thugs,” Time, December 14, 1992, 25; see also James L. Woods, “U.S.
Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian Operations in Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey
Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1997), 157.
140
“Transcript of President Bush’s Address on Somalia,” New York Times, Saturday, December 5, 1992, 4.
139
47
Jeffrey McMaster
From the start, the White House viewed the action as a short-term effort limited
in its objectives to getting food to the starving. White House spokesman Marlin
Fitzwater made it known that President Bush hoped to terminate the mission by
Clinton’s Inauguration Day, January 20. This assessment was not shared by the
Department of Defense, which had drawn up the plans for Operation Restore
Hope, nor by the Central Intelligence Agency. The plan that General Hoar,
Commander in Chief of CENTCOM, had prepared involved a deployment over a
period of 30 to 60 days. One senior Pentagon official quoted by the press went
so far as to call the timetable suggested by Fitzwater “utterly ridiculous.”141
Bush’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, told the
press that most of the U.S. troops were to arrive in Somalia by early January, and
that he planned to “see our way clear of this operation in a few months.”142
Powell and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney also stated that even after
Operation Restore Hope was completed, the U.S. would maintain a residual
force, and perhaps some Marines on board ships off the Somali coast as well, to
act as a deterrent to renewed violence. 143
However, the military did share the administration’s desire of avoiding
long-term participation in policing the country. The United States had
responsibilities around the globe and was further constrained by a diminishing
defense budget that prevented it from taking anything but a limited approach in an
area in which it had no vital interests.144 This short-term outlook would create
tensions between the United States and the UN, and ultimately proved to be a
recipe for disaster, as we shall see in the next section.
Because of Bush’s secretive nature, which we have already seen in the
section on the Gulf Crisis, it is impossible to say with any certainty what motives
were underlying his decision. Of course, there was pressure from many
quarters—Capitol Hill, the media, and presidential candidate Bill Clinton—for
greater action. Two people active on the periphery of events have proposed their
own views on the factors that may have been at work. According Andrew
141
Michael R. Gordon, “U.N. Backs a Somalia Force as Bush Vows a Swift Exit; Pentagon Sees Longer Stay,”
New York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A14.
142
Michael Wines, “Bush Declares Goal in Somalia Is to ‘Save Thousands’,” New York Times, Saturday,
December 5, 1992, 4.
143
Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Is Sending Large Force As Warning to Somali Clans,” New York Times,
Saturday, December 5, 1992, 5.
144
Jonathan T. Howe, “Relations Between the United States and the United Nations in Dealing with
Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian
Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 176.
48
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
Natsios, assistant administrator during the Somalia operations, memories of a
visit to feeding center in famine-stricken Sudan in the mid-1980s were the
catalyst. 145 For James L. Woods, deputy assistant secretary of defense for
African affairs at the time of the Somali crisis, the answer lay in affirmations made
by key military officials conveying their attitude that the mission was executable if
deemed necessary by the political authorities.146 Undoubtedly, a combination of
the circumstances mentioned above, as well as others, all played a role in the
outcome.
It is clear that this marked a major transformation in Bush’s attitude toward
his duties in the wake of his defeat in the presidential election just weeks earlier.
On November 17, Bush declared that he was “referring all calls” to Clinton. 147
Yet, having committed the United States to intervening in Somalia, the President
became highly active once again in the conduct of foreign policy. A Bush family
friend explained the shift as being due to the realization that “he’s still the only
person that can make these decisions, and that the wisdom and experience he
brings to these problems is important to the nation.”148
Having taken this decision, the Bush administration had to address the
question of coordination both with the President-elect and the United Nations.
Clinton’s criticism of Bush’s Somalia policy during the election campaign left
little doubt of how he would receive news of the operation. 149 Speaking in Little
Rock, Clinton called the initiative “an historic and welcome step,” adding, “I
commend President Bush for taking the lead in this important humanitarian
effort.”150 Nevertheless, Clinton aides voiced their hopes that the mission would
145
Andrew S. Natsios, “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos,” in Walter
Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 78.
146
James L. Woods, “U.S. Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian Operations in
Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian
Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 158.
147
Michael Wines, “Bush Rebounds to Center of the World Stage,” New York Times, Friday, December 4,
1992, A14.
148
Ibid.
149
In an article outlining what U.S. policy toward Africa would resemble under a Clinton administration, the
Democratic candidate wrote, “In Africa, as elsewhere, the Bush administration has been tepid—when it should
have been decisive—[…] in responding to the humanitarian tragedy in Somalia. I believe we can do better.” See
Bill Clinton, “The Democratic Agenda,” Africa Report 37(5) (September-October 1992), 19.
150
Michael R. Gordon, “U.N. Backs a Somalia Force as Bush Vows a Swift Exit; Pentagon Sees Longer Stay,”
New York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A1. See also “Clinton Backs Bush on Somalia Decision,” The
Washington File, December 4, 1992.
49
Jeffrey McMaster
reach a successful conclusion as rapidly as possible. And although White House
kept the President-elect’s advisers informed, no input was sought from them. 151
To proceed with the initiative, the Bush administration needed to secure
approbation from the United Nations. The matter was complicated by the fact
that the U.S. insisted that its military retain command of the force. It therefore
faced possible opposition from certain members of the Security Council, most
notably China, which, as a permanent member, could veto a resolution
authorizing the action. A main issue was the degree of control the UN would
exercise over the operation. There was a consensus among most Council
members that they be granted greater authority than had been the case during
Gulf War operations. The United States was able to overcome possible
objections by allowing a provision to be included in the resolution that foresaw
the creation of a UN liaison staff working alongside the U.S. commander.
Security Council Resolution 794 was thus adopted on December 3, 1992. The
final text, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized those member
states taking part in the operation “to use all necessary means to establish as
soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in
Somalia.”152
151
“Why Clinton Can’t Say No,” Time, December 14, 1992, 24.
Paul Lewis, “U.N. Council Essentially Agrees to U.S. Command in Somalia,” New York Times,
Wednesday, December 2, 1992, A18; Paul Lewis, “First U.N. Goal is Security; Political Outlook is Murky,” New
York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A14; “Excerpts From a Resolution On Delivering Somalia Aid,” New York
Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A14.
152
50
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA: FROM EUPHORIA TO DESPAIR
The decision to establish the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), as the largescale deployment of U.S. forces was called, initially received widespread public
support. Surveys conducted shortly after the announcement showed that 66
percent of the American public approved the mission. This high level of positive
response undoubted resulted from the extensive media coverage of the suffering
throughout the summer and fall. Images of U.S. soldiers carrying out their
humanitarian mission further bolstered support, which reached a favorable rating
of 84 percent in opinion polls.153
This euphoria was shared by many policymakers as well, though a few
dissenting voices were inevitably heard.154 Upon learning of the decision—
Congress was in recess at the time—leaders on Capitol Hill expressed their
support. One legislator, Representative David R. Obey (D-Wis.), stated during a
White House meeting with the president that he hoped the experience in Somalia
would serve as a model for a UN peacekeeping force to restore order in Haiti. 155
On January 8, 1993, Representative Tony Hall, a member of congressional
delegation conducting a five-day tour of the U.S. deployment in Somalia said that
he believed “current allied troop involvement in Somalia provides an ideal
example of how such a quick response force could function in a world-class
humanitarian disaster. […] We could be witnessing the army of the future—
post-Cold-War allies hard at work on such goals as world peace and the end of
hunger.” Hall also said that when he returned to Washington, he wanted
Congress to consider establishing a permanent U.S. humanitarian force to
prevent “future Somalias.”156
This initial enthusiasm eventually receded as fundamental flaws in policy,
notably a lack of will to address the root causes of the crisis, manifested
themselves in a slow descent into renewed fighting which ultimately resulted in the
complete withdraw of the United States from Somalia. The idea that the U.S.
153
Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “Arms and the People,” Foreign Affairs 73(6) (November-December
1994), 51-2.
154
At the outset, there was concern both about the mission’s objectives and compatibility with the 1973 War
Powers Act. Later members of Congress expressed dismay at the potential cost of the operation for U.S.
taxpayers. See Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne, “Congress and the Somalia Crisis,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey
Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1997), 196-7.
155
Clifford Krauss, “A Few in Congress Advising Caution, or Vote, on Somalia,” New York Times, Monday,
December 7, 1992, A13. U.S. intervention in Haiti will be discussed in the following chapter.
156
“Congress Members Assess Somalia’s Needs,” The Washington File, January 8, 1993.
51
Jeffrey McMaster
could provide a short-term fix to a complex emergency that was years in the
making ran counter to expectations both among Somalis and the United Nations.
Somali civilians greeted U.S. troops with open arms, but they saw the military
presence as having a task that went far beyond the protection of humanitarian
relief. They felt that only the Americans were capable of stopping the violence
and nurturing a long process of political and economic reconstruction, a process
which would necessarily entail the disarmament of clan militias and gangs, as well
as the creation of a new police force. 157
UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali too shared this desire to see the
United States engaged in the endeavor of nation building, which was generally
seen as the only lasting solution to Somalia’s troubles. He believed that the
presence of a powerful U.S. force would serve as an incentive to bring opposing
factions to the negotiating table and increase the probability of obtaining results.
But shifting the goal from ensuring favorable conditions for the delivery of relief
supplies to effective peacemaking would involve the pacification and
disarmament of the clan militias, an eventuality the Bush administration had
excluded. Indeed, in a December 19 report to the Security Council, BoutrosGhali recommended that the hand over from UNITAF to a conventional UN
peacekeeping force should be contingent upon “the establishment of a cease-fire,
the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs and the creation of
a new police force.”158
Those were exactly the kinds of missions that the United States had
opposed during discussions prior to the adoption of Resolution 794. Rather, it
had favored the terminology contained in the final text that defined the goal rather
nebulously as achieving “a securing environment.”159 Department of Defense
officials were equally vague about disarmament policy, stating merely that military
personnel were authorized to take any measures necessary to ensure their safety,
including preemptive attacks.160 But weapons seizures were not conducted in a
systematic manner, and occasionally arms caches that were discovered could not
157
Jane Perlez, “Expectations in Somalia,” New York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A1; Jill Smolowe,
“Great Expectations,” Time, December 21, 1992, 23.
158
Quoted in Jonathan T. Howe, “Relations Between the United States and the United Nations in Dealing
with Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed
Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 175-6.
159
Paul Lewis, “U.N. Says Somalis Must Disarm Before Peace,” New York Times, Sunday, December 6, 1992,
15.
160
Jill Smolowe, “Great Expectations,” Time, December 21, 1992, 23; Jane Perlez, “U.S. Role Is Not to Disarm,
Aide to a Top Somali Insists,” New York Times, Sunday, December 6, 1992, 14.
52
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
be impounded. The U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, took great
pains to prevent incidents from occurring between clan militias and U.S. soldiers.
He discouraged disarmament, a position which was based on an understanding
of Somali culture acquired previously in his tenure as U.S. Ambassador in
Mogadishu. Knowing the importance of weapons to the nomadic Somalis, he
esteemed that by confiscating weapons the U.S. would come to be seen as an
enemy, and he feared a repetition of the same sort of incident that had occurred
in Beirut in 1983, when a bomb blast left 241 Marines dead. It was
considerations of this nature—ensuring the safety of the lives of American
servicemen and -women—that motivated the Bush administration’s insistence
that the operation be organized by and remain under the chain of command of the
United States.161
Nonetheless, Pentagon officials were aware that weapons would remain a
problem after UNITAF had completed its mission. As one senior Pentagon
official described the problem, “If the armed clans fade away in the night because
we have deployed overwhelming force and we go for a month without sniping
attacks, you could say that the country is pacified. Then after we get up to leave,
the clans could come back out of the woodwork again.”162 Indeed, as UNITAF
forces advanced, weapons and their owners vanished. Some factions placed
their weapons stores in areas not covered by the deployment, while others moved
them to neighboring countries.163 But the U.S. refused to deal with the issue,
leaving the task to lesser armed UN peacekeepers.
In addition to the problems posed by the caches of arms, future UN
peacekeepers would have to contend with the warlords, whose position was
undiminished as the U.S. prepared to depart from Somalia. In fact, U.S.
negotiations led by Robert Oakley to prepare the way for the deployment of
American forces had inadvertently conferred an aura of legitimacy on the militias
and their leaders,164 a phenomenon that was reinforced by the UN in its peace
talks held in Addis Ababa in January and March 1993. Although clan elders and
161
Raymond Bonner, “The Dilemma of Disarmament,” Time, December 28, 1992, 28. According to one report,
the policy proved effective: “eight U.S. servicemen have been killed in Somalia in five months, no more than
would have lost their lives in training accidents if they had stayed at home.” See George J. Church, “Mission Half
Accomplished,” Time, May 17, 1993, 31.
162
Michael R. Gordon, “U.N. Backs a Somalia Force as Bush Vows a Swift Exit; Pentagon Sees Longer Stay,”
New York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A14.
163
United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: 1996), 34.
164
Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia : State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and
Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C. : The Brookings
Institution, 1995), 40-1.
53
Jeffrey McMaster
other political actors were invited to the reconciliation conferences held in the
Ethiopian capital, the representatives of the armed factions remained the
privileged interlocutors of the UN as it attempted to conclude a durable ceasefire.
Moreover, as an American-led effort, UNITAF inspired a competition
among faction leaders to establish special relations, and with it, ascendancy over
rivals. This explains why Aidid, who had always been critical of UN involvement
in the past, publicly welcomed the deployment. His attitude changed, however,
when the U.S. refused to take sides and attempted to adhere to a minimalist
definition of its role in Somalia.
For Boutros-Ghali, who had been assigned by the council the task of
preparing the follow-up mission, UNITAF needed to accomplish two objectives
before a successful transition could take place. First, he insisted that without
disarming both factions and gangs, both political reconciliation and traditional
peacekeeping activities were doomed to failure. Second, he wanted UNITAF to
extend its deployment throughout the country, thus eliminating areas where
weapons could be stored unmolested. He informed President Bush of his views
in a letter dated December 8, 1992, but to his dismay UNITAF did not act on his
suggestions. We have already seen the attitude of the United States toward
disarmament. It also refused to countenance expanding the geographical
coverage of the operation. As of March 1993, 60 percent of Somali territory was
outside the control of the task force. 165
Because the secretary-general had been unable to convince the U.S. to
carry out action necessary to achieve these goals, and with the situation remaining
unstable due to the rivalry among factions and their leaders, he concluded that the
mandate of the follow-up mission, UNOSOM II, would need to be one of peace
enforcement. The unprecedented nature of the UN mission, authorized under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, had in fact been proposed by U.S. officials as
early as December 1992. 166 In a March 3 report on the future UNOSOM II force,
Boutros-Ghali set out an ambitious program covering a wide range of military
tasks, including:
monitor[ing] that all factions respected the cessation of hostilities and
the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993; prevent[ing] any
165
166
54
United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: 1996), 40-1.
United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: 1996), 42.
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
resumption of violence and, if necessary, tak[ing] appropriate action
against any faction violating the cease-fire; maintain[ing] control of the
heavy weapons of the organized factions pending their destruction or
their transfer to a unified national army; seiz[ing] the small arms of all
unauthorized armed elements; secur[ing] or maintain[ing] security at all
ports, airports and lines of communication needed for the deliveries of
humanitarian assistance […]. 167
Drawing upon past experience in Somalia, the secretary-general requested a
force of 28,000. The Security Council acquiesced, passing Security Council
Resolution 814 on March 26, 1993. At the time, the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the Council said of the decision, “Thus is an historic
undertaking. We are excited to join it and we will vigorously support it.”168 The
main U.S. contributions, however, a joint task force of the Somali coast and
1,300 troops of a rapid deployment unit, were to remain under American
command. Of the 4,000 military personnel the U.S. planned to have stationed in
the country, the remaining 2,700 were in charge of logistics.169
The formal transition of command from UNITAF to UNOSOM II
occurred on May 4, 1993, following a period of relative calm after the signing of
the Addis Ababa agreements in March. One month later, however, an attack on
Pakistani peacekeepers would plunge the country into a period of renewed
violence.
The attack, in which 23 peacekeepers will killed, was carried out by forces
loyal to General Aidid. U.S. forces left behind as part of UNOSOM II were
particularly outraged by the vicious assault. The attackers used innocent civilians
as human shields and mutilated the bodies of the dead soldiers. In response, the
United States pressed the UN to allow UNOSOM II forces to retaliate against
Aidid. Given the flagrant violation of the Addis Ababa agreement and the
challenge to the mandate of UNOSOM II, the Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 837, in which the UN’s capacity to employ “all necessary
measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks” was reaffirmed.170
167
Ibid., 42-3.
Ibid., 44.
169
George J. Church, “Mission Half Accomplished,” Time, May 17, 1993, 30.
170
United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: 1996), 50.
168
55
Jeffrey McMaster
One week later, Clinton, for the first time in his presidency, authorized a military
operation against key locations held by Aidid.171
Thus the second UN peacekeeping mission began to take a personal twist
that would ultimately undermine its internal cohesion and poison relations
between Somalis and the outside world. A manhunt for Aidid was undertaken,
and several attacks were launched in June and July 1993. UNOSOM II forces
also began to forcible disarm members of Aidid’s United Somali Congress,
leading to more military engagements. Civilian casualties rose as militia gunmen
resorted to a tactic of using bystanders as a screens against enemy fire. 172 As a
result, anger became focused on the UN mission, and more specifically on the
U.S. The assets used were mainly American, and although the commander of the
UN forces was Turkish General Cevik Bir, a significant proportion of his staff
was American, including his second in command. And it was an American,
retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, who, as U.N. Special Representative to Somalia,
had demanded the arrest of Aidid.173
The wrath of the Somalis was not confined to the United States, however.
It extended to all UN peacekeepers and foreigners, making it once again
extremely dangerous for humanitarian aid workers. The director of CARE’s
relief operations in Somalia described the situation in July as, “more dangerous
[…] than at any time during the civil war.”174
As the situation worsened, dissension grew within the UN operation.
Promises to contribute forces by countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
India remained unfulfilled, while nations with forces already present, among them
Italy and Germany, threatened to review their commitments. The United States,
however, backed by Pakistan, refused to renounce in its hunt for Aidid. 175
Late August marked an important moment in the Clinton administrations
handling of the Somalia crisis. Under increasing pressure from Congress to
abandon the military effort to capture Aidid, the White House apparently changed
its stance. In an August 30 speech, the president announced the new emphasis
of American policy, declaring, “There needs to be a lot of nation-building in
Somalia from the ground up, a lot of institution-building. We did go there to
stop the starvation and the violence and the bloodshed, but it’s also true that the
171
Jill Smolowe, “Counterpunch,” Time, June 21, 1993, 46.
Ibid., 52; J.F.O. McAllister, “Pity the Peacemakers,” Time, June 28, 1993, 22-23.
173
Marguerite Michaels, “Peacemaking War,” Time, July 26, 1993, 24.
174
Ibid.
175
Ibid., 24-5.
172
56
Responding to Crisis in Somalia
absence of order gave rise to all those problems, and we’re still trying to fulfill
our original mission in Somalia.”176 In September, Secretary of State Warren
Christopher presented a U.S. proposal to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali that
refocused the mission on political reconciliation. 177
U.S. participation came to an abrupt end following an attack on October 3,
1993, in which 12 American soldiers were killed. One hundred Rangers had been
sent to capture top military aides to General Aidid that were reportedly hiding
near the Olympia Hotel in southern Mogadishu. The anger aroused by the loss of
American lives was aggravated by scenes of Somalis mutilating the bodies of the
dead soldiers as they were dragged through the streets. The situation was further
complicated by concerns for the safety of a U.S. helicopter pilot who had been
taken hostage. Senate minority leader Robert Dole (R.-Kans.) said at the time,
“If we had a vote today, we’d be out today.”178 Another senator, Democrat
Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina, said, “It’s Vietnam all over again.”179
Congressional anger was fueled by the apparent lack of coordination
among the different members of the Clinton administration charged with policy
toward Somalia, and the apparent contradiction between the executive’s recently
stated aims of reaching a political solution and the recourse to military operations
against Aidid and his followers.180 The debacle occurred as the public was
receiving mixed signals about the future of the American military presence in
Somalia. Just a week before, President Clinton had asked for a specific date for
the withdrawal of troops, while other pronouncements from Department of
Defense officials gave the impression that the U.S. was planning for a long-term
commitment.181
The incident sparked congressional demands for a clear exit strategy.
Although initially hesitating, Clinton finally opted for a temporary increase in
troop strength from 4,700 to about 20,000 to ensure the safety of U.S. forces,
with a planned withdrawal scheduled for March 31, 1994. He was thus able to
meet the demands of Congress, which clamored for a precise timetable for the
176
“American Presidents on Somalia,” New York Times, Friday, October 8, 1993, A15.
Elaine Sciolino, “Puzzle in Somalia: the U.S. Goal,” New York Times, Tuesday October 5, 1993, A8.
178
Thomas L. Friedman, “Congress Turning Hostile After Hostage-Taking and Heavy Losses,” New York
Times, Wednesday, October 6, 1993, A1.
179
Clifford Krauss, “White House Tries to Calm Congress,” New York Times, Wednesday, October 6, 1993,
A16.
180
Elaine Sciolino, “Puzzle in Somalia: the U.S. Goal,” New York Times, Tuesday October 5, 1993, A8; R.W.
Apple, Jr., “Clinton Sending Reinforcements After Heavy Losses in Somalia,” New York Times, Tuesday October
5, 1993, A1, A8.
181
Elaine Sciolino, “Puzzle in Somalia: the U.S. Goal,” New York Times, Tuesday October 5, 1993, A8.
177
57
Jeffrey McMaster
winding down of the U.S. participation, as well as those of his military advisers,
who worried about the vulnerability of the U.S. forces in Somalia. 182 He made
this decision despite objections from Kofi Annan, the chief of the UN’s
peacekeeping operations. Annan contended that without U.S. support, the
peacekeeping mission would “unravel altogether.”183
182
Douglas Jehl, “Clinton Doubling U.S. Force in Somalia, Vowing Troops Will Come Home in 6 Months,”
New York Times, Friday, October 8, 1993, A1.
183
“U.N. Opposes a G.I. Pullout From Somalia,” New York Times, Thursday, October 7, 1993, A10.
58
CHAPTER FOUR
Restoring Order in Haiti
THE SEPTEMBER 1991 COUP AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION
Since the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986, Haiti had gradually progressed
toward democratic government, aided by the United States. Although its
advancement toward truly representative government was marred by coups and
other setbacks, on December 16, 1990 fair elections were held for the office of
president. The surprise winner was Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest,
who garnered 67 percent of the vote, placing him well above the thirteen other
candidates.184 Nine months later, however, a disgruntled military staged a coup,
forcing the popular president out of office.
The army’s discontent was caused by a series of faux pas in Aristide’s
handling of the military after the election. Among the instances that generated ill
will in the ranks of the Haitian army were several promotions decided by the
president, thereby circumventing the normal system of military promotion. Far
graver, however, was his decision to create a 300-member elite militia that would
operate outside the military chain of command and report directly to him. Angry
troops dubbed the members of the force “attachés,” a reference to the reviled
Tontons Macoutes that had operated under the Duvalier dictatorship and had
marginalized the military.185
The army, however, was not alone in its distrust of Aristide. The Catholic
Church and political and economic elites with ties to the Duvalier regime were
also fearful of the president’s rhetoric and his popularity with Haiti’s
impoverished masses. His speeches drew their inspiration from liberation
theology and incited listeners to seek revenge upon their enemies, exacerbating
the already profound cleavages in society. In a speech delivered just two days
before the coup, President Aristide encouraged his supporters to punish
184
Département de l’information publique de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la
situation en Haïti (New York, Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 1; Pamela Constable, “Dateline
Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93), 177-8.
185
Howard W. French, “Army Strikes Back,” New York Times, Wednesday, October 2, 1991, A12.
59
Jeffrey McMaster
suspected opponents by means of a form of torture known as “Père LeBrun,” in
which the victim was burned to death by means of tire placed around the neck. 186
With tense relations prevailing between the army and the president since his
inauguration in February 1991, soldiers felt targeted by the remarks.
FLORIDA
BAHAMAS
CUBA
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Guantánamo
HAITI
PUERTO RICO
Map 3
The takeover began on the night of September 29, 1991. Early the next
morning, mutinous soldiers fired upon Aristide’s home and an armored personnel
carrier that transported him the National Palace, where the president was finally
captured. Only diplomatic efforts by Venezuelan, French, and American officials
were able to save the ousted leader’s life and arrange his flight into exile. Having
deposed the civilian government, the newly installed military junta, headed by
Brigadier General Raul Cédras, Commander-in-Chief of the army since July 3,
1991, set about consolidating its control over the Caribbean nation. 187
186
Pamela Constable, “Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93), 178-9; John
Sweeney, “Stuck in Haiti,” Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1996), 143-4. Aristide said of the technique in his speech,
“What a beautiful tool. What a beautiful instrument, what a beautiful device. It smells good and everywhere you
go you want to breathe it.” See Howard W. French, “Envoys Arrive in Haiti to Seek An End to Coup,” The New
York Times, Saturday, October 5, 1991, 4. Later, Aristide argued that his remarks had been taken out of context:
“The coup had started. I was using words to answer the bullets.” See Joelle Attinger and Michael Kramer’s
interview with Aristide, “‘It’s Not If I Go Back, but When,’ Time, November 1, 1993, 16.
187
Associated Press, “Haiti’s Military Assumes Power After Troops Arrest the President,” New York Times,
Tuesday, October 1, 1991, A1.
60
Restoring Order in Haiti
Upon learning of the events, the international community denounced the
military move and established a set of diplomatic and economic designed to
pressure the coup leaders into allowing Aristide’s return. On October 2, the
Organization of American States convened a meeting of foreign ministers in
Washington to discuss an appropriate course of action. The meeting resulted in
the adoption of a resolution of all economic, commercial, diplomatic, and military
assistance to Haiti to remain in place until President Aristide was restored to
power. OAS members also agreed to consider additional, unspecified action if
these measures did not prove sufficient, though military intervention seemed
improbable as the organization traditionally opposed such actions.188
For its part, the Bush administration stated its determination to reverse the
coup, but from the beginning it ruled out the use of American military force. 189 In
justification of his decision, President Bush said, “We’ve got a big history of
American force in this hemisphere, and so we’ve got to be very careful about
that. But I will see how others feel at the O.A.S.” Furthermore, President
Aristide himself made clear that he did not wish to be reinstated by force,
American or otherwise. Thus, in the absence of a vital interest and confronted by
the trepidation of both the Haitian leader and the OAS, a military option was not
considered.190
Instead, the U.S. halted all economic, food, and military aid to Haiti that
had previously been approved but had not yet been given, a total of $66 million,
and the State Department canceled its planned request to Congress for $88.6
million in economic assistance and $2.2 million in military aid for fiscal year
1992.191 President Bush also signed an executive order freezing the assets of the
Haitian government in the U.S. Yet he expressed his reluctance to resort to
economic sanctions, which he considered would hurt the Haitian people. 192
188
Thomas L. Friedman, “The O.A.S. Agrees to Isolate Chiefs of Haitian Junta,” New York Times, Thursday,
October 3, 1991, A1; Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Suspends Assistance to Haiti And Refuses to Recognize Junta,”
New York Times, Wednesday, October 2, 1991, A1, A12.
189
A few hundred marines were sent to Guantanamo Bay Naval Station in the event that an evacuation of
the 8,000 U.S. citizens living in Haiti became necessary. See Thomas L. Friedman, “The O.A.S. Agrees to Isolate
Chiefs of Haitian Junta,” New York Times, Thursday, October 3, 1991, A8; Karen de Witt, : ”Bush Reassures
Haiti’s Ousted Chief,” The New York Times, Saturday, October 5, 1991, 4.
190
Thomas L. Friedman, “Haiti’s Coup: Test Case for Bush’s New World Order,” New York Times, Friday,
October 4, 1991, A8.
191
Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Suspends Assistance to Haiti And Refuses to Recognize Junta,” New York
Times, Wednesday, October 2, 1991, A12; Thomas L. Friedman, “The O.A.S. Agrees to Isolate Chiefs of Haitian
Junta,” New York Times, Thursday, October 3, 1991, A8.
192
Thomas L. Friedman, “The O.A.S. Agrees to Isolate Chiefs of Haitian Junta,” New York Times, Thursday,
October 3, 1991, A1, A8.
61
Jeffrey McMaster
Washington was forced to revise its position on the matter, however, following
the expulsion on October 7, 1991, of an OAS delegation that had been sent to
Haiti to negotiate the coup leaders. On October 8, the OAS decreed a trade
embargo against Haiti and recommended a freeze of all assets belonging to the
Haitian government by those members that had not yet done so.193
Contrary to the OAS, action at the UN’s Security Council had been
blocked, notwithstanding the support of the United States, France, other Western
nations, and the Soviet Union. China, encouraged by non-aligned countries
temporarily sitting on the Council, prevented the passage of a resolution,
contending that the UN should not involve itself in a state’s internal affairs. The
group of developing countries expressed its concern that the organization was
increasingly being asked to do just that at the bidding of Western states. The
Council’s president, Indian representative Chinmaya Gharekhan, therefore simply
issued a statement condemning the junta’s seizure of power and supporting the
efforts already underway by the OAS.194
Despite pronouncements of American resolve to see Aristide returned to
power, no further action was taken. Though community of Haitian immigrants
living in the United States naturally took an interest in the issue, no powerful
lobby or strategic interest militated for decisive action beyond letting sanctions
exert their effect on the junta. Not even tales of flagrant human rights abuses
committed by members of the military and police against suspected Aristide
supporters mobilized significant action. Rather, the United States left the matter
in the hands of the OAS, which first designated former Colombian Foreign
Minister Ramirez Ocampo and later former Argentinean Foreign Minister Dante
Caputo as mediators in its efforts to convince the military regime to step down
and accept Aristide’s return.
Washington’s passivity in the first few months was the expression of a
lack of strategic interest in the small island nation. 195 Although located a mere
565 miles from the U.S. mainland, Haiti, a backward, densely populated country
burdened with a variety of ills that impeded its development, did not represent a
major threat, especially in the post-Cold War world. With a per capital gross
domestic product of approximately $250, Haiti was the poorest country in the
193
Département de l’information publique de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la
situation en Haïti (New York, Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 1.
194
Paul Lewis, “U.N. Stops Short of Haiti Resolution,” New York Times, Friday, October 4, 1991, A8.
195
The Republic of Haiti covers only about one third of the island of Hispaniola.
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Restoring Order in Haiti
Western Hemisphere, and indeed among the poorest nations worldwide. 196
Unemployment was excessively high, and the illiteracy rate, according to U.N.
figures, was 65.2 percent. 197 With poor or inexistent water and sanitation
infrastructure, Haiti was also last among its hemispheric neighbors in a battery of
health indicators, including infant mortality, which was high, and life expectancy,
which was low.198 And although some American companies had business
interests in Haiti, the Caribbean nation was more dependent on the U.S. than the
U.S. was on Haiti. 199
The OAS-brokered talks, however, saw little progress for much of the first
year after the coup. Both Aristide and the military junta bore their share of
responsibility in the impasse. The most significant obstacle was the mutual
distrust the two sides shared and which unraveled any agreements that were
reached. Aristide’s personality, his often inflammatory off-the-cuff remarks, and
his insistence that those responsible for the takeover be prosecuted did little to
allay the fears of the military and the police that had been the cause of the
president’s ouster in the first place. For their part, Cédras and other army and
police officials, while proclaiming their allegiance to civilian authorities and their
sincerity in proceeding with negotiations, nevertheless remained hostile to the
deposed president’s return. They also refused to countenance an OAS proposal
to mount a major peacekeeping operation to guarantee order in the transition
period to a new Aristide government.
Furthermore, weakly enforced economic sanctions gave little impetus to
Haiti’s military rulers to alter their position. As the measures had been adopted
solely by the Organization of American States, countries outside the regional
organization were not bound to respect them. Indeed, many European nations
insisted upon upholding bilateral trade agreements previously signed with Haiti,
while ships bearing goods continued to arrive in Haiti’s ports from around the
globe, including OAS member states. The effort was further undermined by the
196
Robert I. Rotberg, “Clinton was right,” Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1992), 140-1; Joseph G. Sullivan,
Special Haiti Coordinator, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, Statement before the
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., May 14,
1997.
197
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division,
Statistical Yearbook 1990/91, Thirty-eighth issue (New York: United Nations Publishing Division, 1993), 140.
198
Joseph G. Sullivan, Special Haiti Coordinator, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State,
Statement before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House International Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C., May 14, 1997; Robert I. Rotberg, “Clinton was right,” Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1992), 140-1.
63
Jeffrey McMaster
blatant disregard toward its enforcement by Dominican President Joaquin
Balaguer, who disliked Aristide and whose country shared a border with Haiti. 200
The main effect of the porous embargo had in fact been to increase the
suffering of the poor, i.e., those who constituted the backbone of Aristide’s
support. Haiti’s elites, the key instigators of the coup, were relatively untouched
by shortages, though they were forced to pay higher prices. Some even profited
from the embargo by engaging in smuggling.201
In light of this, OAS countries wavered in their determination to continue
the embargo. In the United States, the Bush administration succumbed to
pressure from American investors and, in February 1991, granted a partial
exception from the embargo to export assembly plants located in Haiti and
owned by U.S. companies.202 Nevertheless, Aristide and his supporters argued
for maintaining sanctions, and in May 1992, some steps were taken by the OAS
to tighten the embargo. At the same time, the United States attempted to gain
European compliance, both to increase the efficacy of the measures and to calm
protests by American firms that their market share was simply being taken by
foreigners not restricted by the regional organization’s decisions.203
However, conditions in the Caribbean nation continued to worsen as the
economic effects of the embargo aggravated a situation of political turmoil.
Haitians responded by setting out by boat for the long and arduous voyage to
Florida on overcrowded and often unseaworthy craft. Tens of thousands would
attempt the crossing—10,514 in the month of May 1992 alone. 204 Refugee
camps established at the naval station in Guantánamo Bay in Cuba were soon full
beyond capacity. At first, President Bush instructed the Coast Guard to limit its
rescue operations to only those who were in imminent danger of sinking or
starving. Others were warned to turn back, but no efforts were made to stop the
refugees. One week later, however, the Bush administration took a much
stronger stance, announcing that the Coast Guard would forcibly return all
199
In 1987-88, Haiti was ranked fourth among nations most dependent upon a single market. At the time, the
United States served as a market for 84.8 percent of Haitian exports. See The Economist Book of Vital Statistics
(London: The Economist Books Ltd, 1990), 161.
200
Jill Smolowe, “With Friends Like These,” Time, November 8, 1993, 26.
201
André Linard, “Démocratie à Haïti: comment s’est joué le retour d’Aristide,” L’ONU dans tous ses états
(Brussels: GRIP, 1995), 92; Pamela Constable, “Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter
1992-93), 182-4.
202
André Linard, “Démocratie à Haïti: comment s’est joué le retour d’Aristide,” L’ONU dans tous ses états
(Brussels: GRIP, 1995), 92; Pamela Constable, “Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter
1992-93), 184.
203
“Against All Odds,” Time, June 1, 1992, 34-5.
64
Restoring Order in Haiti
refugees it intercepted at sea, and that the camp at Guantánamo Bay would be
closed and the majority of asylum-seekers there repatriated.205
Speaking in Atlanta, Georgia, President Bush justified the decision by
claiming, “Yes, the Statue of Liberty still stands, and we still open our arms,
under the law, to people that are politically oppressed. I will not … open the
doors to economic refugees all over the world.”206 However, the true reason
behind the shift in policy lay in the fact that 1992 was an election year, and
Florida was a key conservative state. With a poorly performing economy,
several candidates on the right were promoting an isolationist and, in some
instances, even xenophobic agenda. They hoped to garner the support of those
Americans who favored a halt to new immigration—55 percent of the population,
according to one survey. 207 These considerations, as well as the experience of
former President Jimmy Carter, whose reelection bid in 1980 was undermined by
the arrival of more than one hundred thousand Cuban refugees on Florida’s
shores in the Mariel boatlift, led Bush to adopt more stringent measures.
U.S. POLICY UNDER CLINTON
During the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign, Clinton criticized his Republican
opponent’s handling of the Haitian refugee problem. If elected president, he
pledged to reverse the Bush administration policy of forcibly repatriating those
interdicted at sea, a treatment he decried as “a blow to the moral authority in
defending the rights of refugees” and said that a Clinton government would not
turn back fleeing Haitians “until some shred of democracy is restored there.”208
Yet beyond this rhetoric asserting the rights of refugees to make their claims for
asylums, the Democratic candidate did not address the sensitive issue of actually
accepting the mass of potential refugees.
Upon his election, however, the vagueness dissipated as Clinton decided
to continue the policy of his predecessor, stating, “We believe that we should
process the Haitians who are asking for asylum in Haiti, and that that is the safest
thing for them.” In fact, the prospect of hundreds of boats overflowing with
204
Ibid., 34.
“Closed-Door Policy,” Time, June 8, 1992, 14; Cathy Booth, “Send ‘Em Back!” Time, June 8, 1992, 32.
206
Cathy Booth, “Send ‘Em Back!” Time, June 8, 1992, 32.
207
Ibid.
208
J.F.O. McAllister, “Lives on Hold,” Time, February 1, 1993, 32; Michael Kramer, “Putting People Second,”
Time, November 1, 1993, 17.
205
65
Jeffrey McMaster
refugees making the dangerous crossing, at a time when the newly-elected
president had ambitious plans for his first hundred days in office, motivated the
shift.
Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts conducted by the UN and the OAS to
resolve the crisis continued. In June 1992, Marc Bazin, a former World Bank
official with reportedly good relations with Washington, was named prime
minister, an appointment that was widely seen as a conciliatory gesture by the
junta toward the United States. Nonetheless, the United States remained firmly
committed, in word if not in deed, to its objective of restoring of Haiti’s
democratically elected president to power.
A concession granted by the military leaders in late January 1993, and the
reaction it caused in the ranks of the army and police, demonstrated the delicate
position from which the junta negotiated and underlined the difficulties to
reaching a lasting solution to the problem. In a letter to Special Envoy Dante
Caputo, General Cédras and Prime Minister Bazin had agreed to a joint
deployment by the UN and the OAS of approximately 400 human rights
observers to monitor the situation in Haiti, the International Civilian Mission
(MICIVIH).209 Upon learning of the decision, however, members of the lower
echelons of the army and police forces mutinied, with some soldiers even
attempting to mount a coup. They feared that top officers were planning to
negotiate a comfortable retirement for themselves in exile while the rank-and-file
would be left behind to face reprisals from an angry population. 210 Nevertheless,
the junta succeeded in maintaining order, and the international observers were
allowed into the country. The episode does serve to highlight, though, the
military leaders’ tenuous position.
The United States faced difficulties as well, most notably due to Aristide’s
stubborn and controversial character, that prevented it from acting more
vigorously in negotiating a solution. The Bush administration had never been
enthusiastic about the Haitian president following his election in December 1990,
but it nevertheless stood by its policy of seeking Aristide’s reinstatement. The
difficulty of its task, as well as that of its successor, was increased by charges
that the exiled leader was mentally ill and had ordered the murders of political
209
Le Départment de l’information de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la situation en
Haïti (New York: Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 3-4.
210
J.F.O. McAllister, “Lives on Hold,” Time, February 1, 1993, 33.
66
Restoring Order in Haiti
opponents.211 Aristide himself undermined his position in Washington by
asserting claims that the CIA had been involved in the coup in which he was
overthrown. 212
Against this backdrop, ongoing diplomatic efforts failed to yield substantial
results. In addition, the international observers stationed throughout Haiti under
MICIVIH witnessed the rampant violence and corruption. Given the lack of
progress, the UN Security Council acted in June 1993 to take more stringent
measures against the military regime. On June 16, the Council passed Resolution
841 which, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, instated an embargo on all
petroleum products and arms destined for Haiti. As the action had been taken at
the level of the UN, rather than by the regional OAS, the embargo had a much
greater impact. It was accompanied by an innovative decision by the Clinton
administration to freeze the assets of 83 members of Haiti’s economic elite, thus
punishing those who had benefited from the military takeover. 213 The United
States employed this opportunity to apply pressure on both Aristide and the junta
to reach a settlement. U.S. nudging—which included a proposed $1 billion aid
package—apparently proved successful, and on July 3, after one week of talks
held on Governor’s Island, New York, an accord was reached that foresaw
General Cédras’s retirement and Aristide’s return by October 30, 1993. The
agreement was considered by the State Department to constitute an appreciable
victory for American diplomacy, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher
trumpeted the achievement in a letter sent to American ambassadors around the
globe. 214 The optimism with which news of the agreement had been received
proved to be short-lived, however, as subsequent events demonstrated that
Haiti’s military leaders did not intend to respect the commitments contained in the
document.
Following the designation of Robert Malval as prime minister of an
transitional government in application of the Governor’s Island agreement, on
August 27, 1993 the Security Council voted resolution 861. The text of the
resolution called for an immediate suspension of the economic sanctions
established under resolution 841, while reaffirming the readiness of the UN to
reinstate the embargo in the event that the accord was not carried out in good
211
Bruce W. Nelan, “Is Haiti Worth It?” Time, November 1, 1993, 17.
Pamela Constable, “Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93), 184-5.
213
Steven A. Holmes, “Clinton and Aristide Move To Affirm Policy on Haiti,” New York Times, Thursday,
October, 14, 1993, A8.
214
George J. Church, “In and Out With the Tide,” Time, October 25, 1993, 20.
212
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Jeffrey McMaster
faith. Included in the agreement was a UN plan that envisaged the creation of
1,300-strong international force of training officers to assist in the reeducation
and modernization of Haiti’s military and police forces in view of their new role in
a democratic society. 215 Once again, these two segments of society felt
threatened and sought to prevent action. A staged protest was organized to greet
the U.S.S. Harlan County, a amphibious landing craft carrying a first detachment
of American and Canadian military engineers and instructors, as it arrived Portau-Prince on October 11, 1993. A few hundred police auxiliaries, or “attachés,”
and other armed civilians entered the port area and began to riot, causing panic
among diplomats and journalists present to witness the arrival. The lightly armed
soldiers—only selected members had been authorized to carry pistols—had been
prepared for this sort of scenario and had been instructed to “run the other way”
in the event that they encountered any resistance. 216 The incident occurred at a
difficult moment for the Clinton, which was already confronted congressional
demands for a speedy withdrawal of U.S. forces in Somalia following the deaths
of 18 Rangers in an ill-fated assault on General Aidid’s key military advisers.217
Indeed, the protesters were well aware of the United States’ problems and
shouted, “We are going to turn this into another Somalia.”218
In reaction to the incident, President Clinton stated that unless security
guarantees for both foreign troops and President Aristide were forthcoming, U.S.
military advisers would not be sent. Instead, he said, “What I plan to do now is
press for sanctions.”219 Public and congressional outcry over the deaths of
American soldiers serving in Somalia was acknowledged as the leading force in
shaping Clinton’s decision. 220 Indeed, opinion polls in late October showed that
two-thirds of the American public was firmly against the idea of military
intervention in Haiti. 221
215
American and Canadian soldiers were to retrain the Haitian military, while police forces from several
French-speaking countries were sending officers to establish an independent police force. Elaine Sciolino,
“Pentagon and State Dept. at Odds Over Sending of Soldiers to Haiti,” New York Times, Friday, October 8, 1993,
A1.
216
Howard W. French, “Envoys Flee Port as Their Cars Are Struck,” New York Times, October 12, 1993, A1.
217
On the day the Harlan County was prevented from landing, Senate leaders were demanding that a vote
be held to repatriate U.S. forces in Somalia at the latest by the end of 1993, rather than by March 31, 1994, as
proposed by President Clinton. See Clifford Krauss, “Senators Seek Early Pullout Of U.S. Troops From Somalia,”
New York Times, Tuesday, October 12, 1993, A1.
218
Howard W. French, “Envoys Flee Port as Their Cars Are Struck,” New York Times, October 12, 1993, A1.
219
Steven A. Holmes, “U.S. Withdraws Ship and Asks Sanctions,” New York Times, Wednesday, October
13, 1993, A1.
220
Ibid.
221
Bruce W. Nelan, “Is Haiti Worth It?” Time, November 1, 1993, 16.
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Restoring Order in Haiti
But Clinton’s difficulties in the foreign policy arena were merely
symptomatic of more profound troubles that plagued his administration in all
areas. The tensions between the White House and Congress had been created in
part by the apparent lack of coordination between the activities of the different
executive agencies, and the sense of confusion that often appeared to reign. U.S.
policy toward Somalia in early October 1993 was exemplary in that regard, as the
State Department was publicly stating one policy, that of greater emphasis on
diplomatic means, while the Pentagon was pursuing in the field a policy
diametrically opposed. The two departments were equally at odds concerning
action in Haiti immediately before the Harlan County mishap. In this instance,
the State Department was pressing for intervention while top military officials did
not wish to become embroiled in yet another messy conflict.
These sources of distrust were exacerbated by President’s failure to
convey his foreign policy goals to legislators on Capitol Hill. Indeed, the White
House’s inconsistencies in matters of foreign policy led detractors to claim that
no clear set of priorities guided U.S. action other than Bill Clinton’s desire to be
liked, with its attendant shifts in line with the changing opinion of the American
public.
In the months that followed, the situation in Haiti continued to worsen.
The United States asked that the UN impose once again the embargo on oil and
military equipment destined for Haiti. The human rights observers who had been
sent to Haiti under MICIVIH were pulled out of the country, inaugurating a
period of increased violence committed mainly against Aristide supporters by the
military, “attachés,” and members of a group known as Front révolutionnaire
pour l’avancement et le progrès (FRAPH). 222 Meanwhile, the junta and its allies
in Haitian society adopted a much harder line toward the U.S. as was evidenced
by the murder of Haitian Justice Minister Guy Malary shortly after the Harlan
Country was prevented from docking in Port-au-Prince. Just hours before,
President Clinton had made an appeal for the safety of those who were to have
participated in Aristide’s new government upon his return. 223
Over the course of the following months, little progress was made. In
February 1994, a group of Haitian legislators proposed a new plan to put an end
to the enduring crisis, but Aristide obstinately refused, demanding the
222
Le Départment de l’information de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la situation en
Haïti (New York: Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 10.
223
George J. Church, “In and Out With the Tide,” Time, October 25, 1993, 20.
69
Jeffrey McMaster
deployment of the UNMIH force as foreseen by the Governor’s Island
Agreement. The exiled president’s obduracy and the mounting toll of policeinflicted deaths, as reported by MICIVIH observers who had begun to return to
the country in early 1994, had begun to wear down the patience of the
international community. Furthermore, economic sanction proved to be less than
adequate, as they had in the past. On April 29, UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali presented a report on the situation to the General Assembly in
which he recommended that the best course of action would be to find a Haitian
solution to the problem. 224
In the U.S., Clinton was coming under pressure from members of the
Congressional Black Caucus to take a more active role in finding a solution to the
continuing drama in Haiti, while the executive director of the TransAfrica Forum,
Randall Robinson, staged a hunger strike to protest against the White House’s
continuation of the Bush administration policy of turning back refugees.225 The
Clinton administration eventually yielded to the activist’s demands, sparking a
new wave of asylum-seekers. Floridians began to protest the cost that the influx
of immigrants required them to bear, while other Caribbean countries that might
have aided the U.S. in supporting the refugees burden began to close their doors
to Haitians.
At the same time, a new policy directive on peacekeeping, Presidential
Decision Directive 25 (PPD 25), seemingly signaled a reluctance, based on past
experiences in Somalia and Haiti, to become involved in future UN operations.
The document, which was signed by President Clinton on May 3, 1994, after
extensive consultations with members of Congress, listed a series of strict
conditions—including the advancement of American interests, congressional
support, and clearly defined objectives—to be met before the United States
would commit forces to peacekeeping missions. In the directive, Clinton
recanted on statements made during the presidential campaign in favor of a
standing, multinational UN army. According to the new policy, “The U.S. does
not support a standing U.N. army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units
for participation in U.N. operations. It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either
224
Le Départment de l’information de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la situation en
Haïti (New York: Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 11.
225
Michael Mandlebaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs 75(1) (January/February 1996),
21.
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the number of U.N. peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations.”226
The document also made clear that the U.S. did not intend to place its troops
under foreign command in the event that they did participate in a UN operation.
These concerns shaped the U.S. approach to resolving the Haitian crisis that was
finally set into motion, as we will see in the following section.
OPERATION RESTORE DEMOCRACY
Throughout the spring and early summer, tensions continued to mount between
Haiti’s military leaders and the international community. On May 6, 1994, the UN
Security Council imposed yet stricter sanctions against Haiti, passing resolution
917. The junta responded by appointing a new interim president, Haitian
Supreme Court justice Emile Jonassaint, who soon announced that new
presidential elections would be held in January 1995, a development that would
have further complicated the situation. Meanwhile, the United States sent two
additional warships to join the six that it had already stationed off the Haitian
coast to enforce the economic sanctions against Haiti. 227
As the summer wore on, observers on both in Haiti and in the U.S. began
to see a confrontation between the United States and Haiti’s de facto government
as becoming more and more inevitable. Only General Cédras seemed to
discount such a possibility, which he viewed as highly unlikely given
congressional resistance. 228
Following the expulsion of the international
observers of MICIVIH n July 11, 1994, the UN Security Council was forced to
adopt an even sterner tone. In resolution 940, voted on July 31, the council
members approved a report prepared by the Secretary-General which called for
the creation of a multinational force under unified, i.e. American, command to
restore President Aristide to power by force. Once this task was accomplished,
a follow-up force under UN command was to be deployed to retrain Haiti’s army
and police forces.229 In the meantime, the United States had begun to work with
Haiti’s neighbor, the Dominican Republic, to prevent oil smuggling along the
226
From the declassified version of the directive quoted in Elaine Sciolino, “New U.S. Peacekeeping Policy
De-emphasizes Rôle of the U.N.,” The New York Times, Friday, May 6, 1994, A7.
227
Le Départment de l’information de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la situation en
Haïti (New York: Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 12.
228
“Tightening the stranglehold,” The Economist, August 6, 1994, 39.
229
Ibid.; “Ready, steady, steady, oh,” The Economist, August 6, 1994, 45.
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Jeffrey McMaster
border between the two countries. Six U.S. military helicopters and 88
international observers on the ground were involved in the effort. 230
Upon adoption of resolution 940, the UN Secretariat and military planners
from the U.S. Atlantic command immediately set about organizing the U.S.-led
Multinational Force and the follow UNMIH. Both operations would in fact be
under U.S. command, UNMIH’s commander being a U.S. major general, thus
respecting an important guideline set out in Presidential Decision Directive 25.
Furthermore, the concept of operations employed overwhelming force and the
possibility to use that force, in the hopes of preventing another Somalia-like
debacle. 231
The political decision, however, ultimately lay with President Clinton,
notwithstanding the homage paid to the notion of congressional consultation
contained in PPD 25, as events will show. But first let us examine the difference
between the avowed motives of the White House approving the use of force to
resolve the crisis and those which can be drawn from the domestic political
context at the time of the decision.
In presenting his decision to the American public, President Clinton’s
attempted to sway opinion by invoking several converging arguments. First, he
highlighted the fact that the crisis was occurring on America’s doorstep, and that
the U.S. had a tradition of playing a leading role in the Western Hemisphere.
Second, he justified the intervention in light of the violence and human rights
abuses suffered by the civilian population, notwithstanding an absence of U.S.
response in other regions also afflicted with the same evils, whether in Bosnia or
Rwanda. Furthermore, the president invoked the specter of new waves of
refugees trying to reach American shores, a rather disingenuous contention, given
that Clinton had ordered all refugees to be taken to camps in Guantánamo Bay,
from which they had little chance to gain entry to the U.S. Finally, Clinton
employed an argument that had in fact had currency in some quarters from the
very beginning, i.e., that by allowing a group of army and police officers seize
power by force, the U.S. was setting a bad precedent both for its credibility,
which had been engaged by former President Bush when he had vowed to return
Aristide to power, and for the other new democracies throughout the Americas,
230
“Tightening the stranglehold,” The Economist, August 6, 1994, 39.
Robert Oakley and David Bentley, “Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti,” National
Defense University Strategic Forum, 30 (May 1995), 2.
231
72
Restoring Order in Haiti
many of which were still fragile and ad a long heritage of military rule. Among
those reasons advanced by the White House, the last was the most plausible. 232
However, examining the U.S. political scene in August 1994, sheds a rather
different light on the President’s possible motivations. At the time, a series of
legislative setbacks together with the Whitewater scandal and low-opinion poll
ratings led some pundits to draw comparisons between the Clinton presidency
and that of former President Jimmy Carter. President Clinton’s difficulties in
getting legislation passed by the Democratically-controlled Congress was perhaps
most damaging for him. His election in 1992 had been trumpeted as the end of
gridlock, as both the White House and Capitol Hill were controlled by the
Democrats. This view did not take into consideration, however, the divisions
that split congressional Democrats and that became apparent a crime bill
proposed by President Clinton was unable to muster sufficient support to pass.
This failure to pass legislation that was mainly designed to provide legislators
with something to present to their constituencies just before the upcoming
legislative elections did not bode well for a much more important piece of
legislation, the Clinton health care package that had long been proclaimed as the
centerpiece of his presidency. 233 Some have posited that Clinton turned to
foreign policy to turn attention away from his domestic problems and provide
him with a positive achievement in the weeks ahead of the November elections, in
which it had already become evident that the Republicans might be capable of
wresting the majority from the Democrats.234
The president, rather uncharacteristically, made his decision despite a
largely unfavorable public opinion. An ABC poll from September 8-11, 1994,
had shown that 73% of those surveyed were against the notion of a U.S.-led
invasion.235 Faced with possible Republican opposition and division among the
Democrats, he also chose to exclude Congress from the decision-making
process. Many in Congress voiced their opinion that any use of force in Haiti
should be submitted to prior congressional approval, as had been the case in the
Gulf War. Fearing such a scenario, which could have constrained the president
232
233
“The nightmare next door,” The Economist, September 24, 1994, 21-2.
“Raging Bill,” The Economist, August 20, 1994, 9; “Things fall apart,” The Economist, August 20, 1994,
39.
234
“To Haiti’s rescue?” The Economist, September 17, 1994, 13; “William Jefferson Bonaparte,” The
Economist, September 17, 1994, 53.
235
“William Jefferson Bonaparte,” The Economist, September 17, 1994, 54.
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Jeffrey McMaster
in an unprecedented manner, the White House countered that no such approval
had been sought before interventions in Panama and Grenada. 236
Ultimately Clinton acted without consulting Congress. A last-ditch
diplomatic effort by former President Carter, who traveled to Port-au-Prince on
September 17 to convince the military leaders to step down, was successful, and
U.S. troops were able to deploy on September 19 without encountering
resistance. 237 Attachés continued to intimidate civilians, despite the U.S.
military’s assertion that it was collaborating with he Haitian army to ensure a
secure environment. 238 Nevertheless, the imposing U.S. force, which peaked at
21,000, compared with about 7,000 for the Haitian army, did create some
semblance of order, and even initiated a “weapons control and reduction
program,” removing thousands of weapons from circulation. 239 On October 10,
Cédras and other military leaders stepped down, and shortly thereafter an
arrangement was reached with the Panamanian government which granted them
asylum in exile. President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15. The transition
from the U.S.-led Multinational Force to the UN-controlled UNMIH was able to
take place in March 1995, and in January 1996, President Clinton decided to
withdraw the last U.S. troops from the country.
CONCLUSION
The results of the intervention have draw mixed appraisals. Republicans, who
received a majority of seats in both houses of Congress in the 1994 elections,
have been critical of the operation’s effectiveness, and have complained about
the costs of the multinational and the UN mission, as well as that of the aid
granted to Haiti. On the left, Clinton’s handling of the crisis is generally seen as
one of his foreign-policy victories.240 As evidence of the intervention’s success,
Clinton supporters point to the peaceful transition of power on February 7, 1996
from Aristide to his democratically-elected successor, René Préval.
236
Ibid.
Le Départment de l’information de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la situation en
Haïti (New York: Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 15.
238
“Haiti faces the morning after,” The Economist, September 24, 1994, 45.
239
Department of Defense News Briefing, General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, JCS, Tuesday, October 4,
1994, 1:00 p.m., the text of which is provided by the Navy Public Affairs Library (NAVPALIB),
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/intl/haiti/shal1004.txt.
240
For views from both sides see the debate published in the Spring 1996 issue of Foreign Policy: Robert I.
Rotberg, “Clinton Was Right,” Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1996), 135-41; and John Sweeney, “Stuck in Haiti,”
Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1996), 143-51.
237
74
Restoring Order in Haiti
However, in light of the current situation in Haiti, the effort does not appear
to be an unalloyed success. Violence marred senatorial and local elections held
on April 6, 1997, a symptom of the country’s dire economic predicament. As
one Haitian recently said of the elections, “At the beginning I thought things
would change. I was full of hope. But nothing has changed with democracy.
Every day life is harder.241 There is nothing left to hope for.” The country’s
poor economic prospects have given rise to fears that renewed violence might
destabilize the Préval government.
241
Douglas Farah, “Life Keeps Getting Harder for Haitians,” Guardian Weekly, April 13, 1997, 15.
75
CONCLUSION
Since the end of the Cold War, and despite a certain amount of resistance, the
United States has on occasion abandoned its traditional calculus of national
interest and committed its armed forces to intervene for a variety of humanitarian
purposes. Although some have heralded this as the basis of a new “Clinton
doctrine,”242 it is more of a limited ad hoc approach. The president has
underlined these limits himself, stating, “The United States cannot and should not
try to solve every problem in the world,”243 and indeed as recent crises in
Rwanda and Zaire have shown, the U.S. will remain selective in the areas in which
it wishes to intervene.
The criteria which have guided American action since the fall of the Berlin
Wall are made up of an admixture of old and new concerns. The loss of
American servicemen’s lives, no matter how few, is still a decisive factor in
determining whether or not to intervene. In addition, both the public and
Congress continue to demand a well-defined exit strategy to avoid Vietnam-like
mission creep.
At the same time, Americans, weary of Cold-War burdens, have elected
first a president, then a new Republican majority, that pledged to bring domestic
issues to the fore. Thus, while Americans have occasionally displayed
humanitarian impulses, mainly in the case of Somalia, they have been increasingly
reluctant to bear the costs of such missions. Furthermore, the failure in Somalia
has even led members of Congress to propose new legislation, the United States
Armed Forces Protection Act of 1996, which would severely restrict the ability
of the president to place U.S. troops under UN command. Past experience has
made Americans even more wary of relinquishing command over their armed
forces, especially to the UN.
242
Michael Dobbs, “The ‘Clinton Doctrine’ Of Scaled-Down Force,” International Herald Tribune,
Monday, November 18, 1996, 10.
243
Ibid.
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