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Humanitarian
Intervention
Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 2, 2011
Humanitarian intervention
Definition:
‘forcible military intervention in humanitarian
crises’
 in failed states to secure aid
 against murderous states to stop atrocities
The new interventionism
 1988-1993: 20 new missions
 UN peacekeeping budget
* $230 m in 1988
* $800 m – $1.6 b in 1990s
Rare during Cold War
1. Superpower stand-off
2. Insufficient public pressure
3. UNSC log-jam
Traditional peacekeeping
• Chapter VI and a half’ activity
- Required ceasefire and consent
• Limited in number, size and scope
- 1948-1978: 13 missions
- 1978-1988: none
- supervise truces
The blue helmets
UN Charter
 Article 2(3): Settle disputes by ‘peaceful means’
 Article 2(4): refrain from ‘threat or use of force’
 Article 2(7): non-intervention
 Article 51: inherent ‘right of self-defence.’
 Chapter VII: peace enforcement – in response to
a ‘threat to international peace and security.’
Humanitarian? Not in name
 India in East Pakistan (1971)
 Tanzania in Uganda (1978)
 Vietnam in Cambodia (1978)
 France in Central African Republic (1979)
Cold war attitude
“The notion that because a regime is detestable foreign
intervention is justified and forcible overthrow is
legitimate is extremely dangerous. That could
ultimately jeopardise the very maintenance of
international law and order.”
French rep to UNSC, on Vietnamese intervention in
Cambodia, 1978
Many interventions
 UN: Somalia (1992-95), Bosnia (1992-95),
Cambodia (1992-93), East Timor (1999)
 Coalition: northern Iraq (1991)
 ECOWAS: Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997)
 CIS: Tajikistan (1993), Georgia (1992)
 NATO: Kosovo (1999)
Serb thugs in action
UN impotence
Failure at Srebrenica
Somalia: mission over (1993)
Lessons from intervention failures
SOMALIA (1992-1994)
 dangers of crossing the consent divide
BOSNIA (1992-1995)
 dangers from peace spoilers
 need to induce consent
Shadow of Somalia
 Agenda for Peace (1992) v. Supplement to an Agenda for
Peace (1995)
 PDD-25 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming
Multilateral Peace Operations (1994)
Rwandan genocide
 800,000 massacred in 100 days (April-July 1994)
 Hutu extremists v. Tutsi and Hutu moderates
Causes of civil war
 Mary Kaldor – ‘new wars’: identity, non-state actors, and
low-tech.
 Paul Collier – greed v. grievance: economic motives
 Stuart Kaufman – elite manipulation v. mass moments:
myths about ‘ancient hatreds’
Road to genocide
 Elite manipulation of tribal identity
 Collapse in commodity prices
 French military support to Hutu extremists
 Tutsi RPF assault on Kigali in 1993 leads to
inclusion of Tutsis in govt
 The trigger: shooting down President’s plane (6
April 1994)
Rwanda, 1994
UN disgrace
UN Response
 UNAMIR reduced from 2,500 to 270 (21 April)
 UNSCR 918 expands force to 5,500 (17 May)
 2,300 strong French force create “Humanitarian
Protection Zone” (9 July)
Could intervention have worked?
 the French success?
 pace of slaughter?
 UNAMIR warned of genocide
Politics of HI: public opinion
1. ‘CNN effect’: dependent on degree of policy
certainty and political unity
2. ‘Bodybags effect’: misunderstood by
policymakers
Politics of HI: UNSC politics
 log-rolling problem
 veto problem
 posturing problem
 co-ordination problem
Peace ops: principles and practicalities
 Objective – often ambiguous and unattainable
 Unity of effort – divergent troop contributors
 Mass – dispersal of forces
 Surprise – little speed and secrecy in peace operations
Peace ops: public opinion and operational
pathologies
 Strategic compression of battlefield
 Full-force protection
 Over-reliance on air power
 Focus on exit strategies
Doctrine of International Community
 Are we sure of our case?
 Have we exhausted diplomatic options?
 Does the military instrument offer prudent and achievable
goals?
 Are we prepared to be in this for the long term?
 Is our national interest truly engage?
Tony Blair, Chicago, 22 April 1999
The future of humanitarian
intervention?
 Evolving norm
– state practice over time
– each intervention ‘unique’?
 International Criminal Court: agent for action
 R2P, Kosovo and Iraq – rising powers push back
 Western appetite post Iraq and Afghanistan?