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1 Between Le Longue Durée, Globalization and the Expansion of the Frontier: Income Inequality in Chile 1860-1930 Luis Bértola & Javier Rodríguez Weber Paper presented to the Conference A Comparative Approach to Inequality and Development: Latin America and Europe Madrid, 8-9 May 2009 Abstract: This paper presents a new set of estimates of income inequality in Chile between 1860 and 1930. Trends in inequality are discussed from two perspectives. First, we explore whether inequality is part of a set of long run features of the Chilean economy. These long-run features have to do with social relations and institutions operating both domestically and at the level of Chile’s relationship with the world economy. Second, the paper focuses on the impact of two related events during the period in question: the First Globalization Boom and the expansion of the Chilean Southern and Northern frontiers Our findings are that Chile was a society that by the mid-19th Century showed already high concentration of wealth, political power and income, where the hacienda system, of colonial origin, was a rather archaic one. The first early impact of globalization in Chile strengthened the power of the elite and had a negative impact on income distribution. The expansion of the frontier opened up a process of social change in the periphery of the Chilean economy and income distribution tended to improve, but the core of the old system remained alive and controlled the State policies. During the first decades of the 20th Century, while GDP growth rates decreased, the Chilean economy became more dependent on international prices. The distribution of income worsened considerably in the context of rising domestic prices and the distribution of power and wealth in favor of the elite. 2 Between Le Longue Durée, Gobalization and the Expansion of the Frontier: Income Inequality in Chile 1860-1930 1. Inequality and development in Latin America: the state of the art According to a wide range of studies carried out between the 1950s and the 1970s, the roots of Latin America’s underdevelopment are to be found in its colonial period. A high degree of dependency on foreign markets, capital and technology as well as an economic structure in which wealth and political power was highly concentrated, were responsible for a pattern of development characterized by sluggish growth and the reproduction of high levels of social and economic inequality (Stein and Stein 1970, Cardoso & Faletto 1967 & 1979, Cardoso & Perez Brignoli 1979, Furtado 1974, Frank 1967, and many others). These authors usually took a negative view of what we now call the First Globalization Boom, because it involved an authoritarian construction of national states and reinforced the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of an oligarchy. This oligarchy, in turn, was highly dependent on markets, trading, finance, services and technology controlled by foreign companies and states. Generally, these authors were critical of, but also somewhat sympathetic to, attempts made by Latin American countries to change the basis for their economic growth. During the so-called ISI-period structural change, social transformation and improvements in social conditions were promoted in what would later be labeled a process of growth “from within” (Sunkel 1991). According to this academic tradition, the structural reforms promoted since the 1970s in most Latin American countries contained some good fundamentals. However, they reinforced a long-run development path based on high income and wealth concentration, international competitiveness based on a perverse pattern of specialization in low-skilled and natural resource-intensive sectors, as well as high volatility. In recent decades the intellectual atmosphere has shifted towards different approaches that focus on actions taken in the 20th century as the primary sources of Latin America’s backwardness. In particular, the new ideas examine inward-looking growth, state interventionism, forced and artificial industrialization and different varieties of populism as the main causes of the disappointing economic and social outcomes of 20th Century Latin America’s development up to the 1980s. By going global and following best practices, Latin America should have caught up with developed countries, like the South-East Asia had recently done. What we now call the First Globalization Boom appeared to be the golden path to development, and deviation from this path cost Latin America dearly. During the last decade, the First Globalization Boom has been revisited by many scholars, including some who focused on Latin America. Jeffrey Williamson studied the period from many different points of view (Williamson 1995, 1999, 2002). His main message is that Latin America did relatively well during that period, and could have done much better had it been less protectionist. Latin America also suffered an increase in inequality due to the process of factor price convergence. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, the price of land increased significantly in relation to wages due to the intensification of immigration. The terms of trade moved in favor of Latin America, strengthening the position of the landowning classes and inhibiting structural change in the long run. Williamson’s latter contributions help to nuance the strong pro-globalization points of view of the early 1990s. Latin American economic history has also been revisited by other scholars. Neoinstitutional economic history has produced many comparisons between Latin and North America, in order to unearth the fundamental explanations for long-run growth. 3 Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000), North, Summerhill & Weingast (2000), Landes (1998), Robinson (2006), Acemouglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002, 2005), have all agreed with the previous thesis regarding the colonial roots of Latin America’s inequality and backwardness. The authors differ in their explanations of the origins and causes of the institutional settings in Latin America. However, they all stress the institutional setting that emerged soon after the conquest as the cause of long-run trends in inequality. The major features of these institutions were the concentration of wealth, mercantilism, religious and cultural intolerance, racism and exclusion, an authoritarian and centralized state, low human capital formation, limited political democracy and the presence of extensive privileges for the elite. Implicit in this line of research is the idea that development in Latin America during the last two centuries followed the path set during the Colonial period and did not diverge from it. This resembles Braudel’s ideas about the longue durée. However, in the Neo-institutional approach, long-run prisons are not cultures, but institutions. While the idea that Latin America’s colonial heritage set it on a particular development path is plausible, it does not mean that what happened in the centuries that followed was inevitable. The post-colonial periods are being intensively discussed, especially the years immediately following independence. As several authors have proposed (Prados 2007, Bates, Coatsworth & Williamson 2006), the way in which independent states were built had a lasting effect on the institutions of those countries. This idea has also contributed to a deeper understanding of the post-colonial era in Africa. Similarly, explanations that focus on the First Globalization Boom do not necessarily have to neglect Latin America’s “colonial roots”. Previous contributions to Latin American economic history agree on the profound changes that occurred during the First Globalization Boom and on the variety of transitions in the region (Cardoso Faletto 1967, Duncan & Rutledge 1977, Cardoso & Pérez Brignoli 1979, Sunkel & Paz 1982, Bauer 1986, Glade 1986, Bulmer-Thomas 1994, Bértola & Williamson 2006). The basic idea put forth by these authors is that the opportunities provided by the First Globalization Boom promoted a drastic expansion of the agrarian frontier and radical changes in the distribution of assets among the population. At the same time, the power of the state was significantly strengthened. Governments increasingly adopted the previously mentioned authoritarian character and vigorously enforced the property rights of the elite. The response of Latin American countries to globalizing forces varied according to their previous institutional settings and social structures, as well as to their natural endowments and what has been labeled the “commodity lottery”. They also varied according to their different colonial heritages. As a result, inequality between Latin American countries increased became by the climax of the first globalization. These outcomes, in turn, constituted different contexts in which the later process of import substitution took place. The debate surrounding the role of inequality in growth has been increasing. The literature is already well-known. The discussion of the Kuznets curve, which mainly focused on the impact of growth on inequality, has given way to the study of the impact of inequality on growth. From a neo-classical point of view, income inequality negatively affects the formation of human capital, reduces access to credit and generates political instability. Inequality has also received attention from other perspectives. Income inequality puts limits on domestic demand. A small domestic market does not allow consumption of more sophisticated products to grow, thus hampering innovation and specialization in the mass-production of low quality goods. The elite develop 4 limited consumption of luxuries without any positive impacts on the domestic economy (Willebald 2006). 2. La longue-durée The study of the long-run features of the Chilean society can be approached from two perspectives: the domestic economic, social and political structures and institutions, and the relationship with the international economy. Of course, both perspectives are closely interwoven. Since the beginning of Spanish colonization, the driving force behind the Chilean economy was the export sector (Salazar & Pinto, 1992; 15), and it has remained so until recently. The origins of the Chilean export sector are to be found in the links with the Peruvian Potosí and Lima markets, which demanded Chilean wheat, produced in the Central Valley. At the end of the 18th Century, the Bourbonian Reforms stimulated the international links, either through a more liberal trade regime, or simply through the undesired expansion of smuggling. The role of international trade increased after Independence. The Chilean merchant, mining and landed elites were mainly orientated toward liberal ideas and an export-led strategy (Véliz, 1963; Salazar & Pinto, 1992; 18). The impacts of the First Globalization Boom were noticed early on. After the State-led Industrialization period, Chile remained closely tied to the world economy. Over the centuries, the Chilean export sector has always been concentrated in a few staple goods. Each went through different cycles, often determined by the “commodity lottery”. The colonial expansion of wheat production was resumed early after independence, together with the expansion of copper production. Nitrates followed a cycle of their own, with exports collapsing after the 1920s. Copper is still the Chilean economy’s star, even as exports have become more diversified. Still, the balance of trade shows that commodities are the only group showing a trade surplus (Cimoli & Porcile, ECLA). The domestic social and political order was based on a structure that took form early in the Colonial Era and went through several changes over time. Originally, the hacienda and the encomienda were almost the same thing. The hacienda was to the ownership of land what the encomienda was to the right to dispose of labor. Land ownership was concentrated in large estates, which remained remarkably stable until the mid 19th Century (Bauer, 1994; 26-28). In the 18th Century, when the hacienda was oriented towards the production of wheat for export, some of its features persisted: large estates, sluggish technological change and the control of important amounts of labor clearly stratified into different categories. As demand expanded, growth was extensive, adding new land and labor to the preexisting units (Salazar & Pinto, 1992; 103). This trend seems to challenge the general view that a country’s resource endowments imply a specific fate in terms of the social order and economic performance, and in particular that wheat production will always lead to small scale, egalitarian, agrarian development (Engerman & Sokoloff). In Chile’s case, wheat production is probably more a curse than to a blessing. The hacienda was not merely a production system but the centre of the strongly hierarchical social structure. In the 17th Century, control over labor was as important as control of land, due to the decreasing availability of workers caused by high mortality rates among the domestic population (Salazar & Pinto, 2002; 100). The hacendados reacted by introducing the inquilinaje, an “institution” destined to last for centuries. 5 Originally, the inquilinos were free renters, which had access to a piece of land that was part of the hacienda. They could cultivate crops and breed animals in exchange for payments in kind (wheat or other crops) or cash (Góngora, 1960; 93-95). When rents could not be paid in kind or cash, they could be paid in the form of services. This became the dominant trend, and what were originally free renters became heavily indebted peasants bonded to the land. It was a kind of sharecropping where the rent was paid with labor. Within a century, the old encomendero became a landowner, a lord of servants. These servants paid in different ways for the right to live in the hacienda. The labor system was complemented by two other kinds of workers: permanent and temporary peones. The former earned a salary, part of which was in the form of a small allotment of land that they were allowed cultivate. The latter were seasonal workers. Besides, there existed free peasants in the surroundings of the haciendas cultivating very small farms, who provided the haciendas with seasonal labor. This system was extended and reinforced during the expansion of wheat production in the mid 19th Century (Bengoa, 1988; 60-71). According to Bengoa, this stability of the hacienda system is the main reason for the historical stability of the Chilean State itself (Bengoa, 1988; 85). Control over land and people were the basis of social and political power. Hacendados and their descendants occupied many prominent positions in military, political and administrative bodies. However, the structure of economic, social and political power cannot be understood without the examining role played by the owners of merchant and financial capital. They were the real link to the international economy, but they were not necessarily different from the land-owning elite. The elite were really involved in all these different economic and political activities. While during the colonial time they had a strong alliance with colonial political institutions, after independence they simply took over control the political system (Salazar & Pinto, 1999: 38; Góngora, 1970: 125-126; Salazar, 2003: 47; Bengoa, 1988; 11; Mellafe, 2004, Bauer, 1994). In a continent ranking worst in terms of inequality, by 2003 Chile was among the five most unequal economies in Latin America. (De Ferranti et. al., Table 1.1). Many consider the social question to be one of the main shortcomings of the otherwise seemingly successful Chilean model. Translating income differences into differences in height and allowing mean income to equal mean stature of the population, we could find people shorter than one centimer, while others were as high as the Mount Everest (Espejo & Mery, 2006). 3. Globalization, frontier expansion, institutions and inequality Even if we argue that these general features of the Chilean economic, social and political system were long lasting, they still went through important changes over time. Our aim is to see how inequality behaved during the First Globalization Boom, and detect whether the new configurations of power introduced altered the long-run features described above. In other words, the question is whether the pattern of development seen in Chile in the 20th Century, unequal or not, is the result of either long-run trends, or completely new constellations of forces created during the export-led growth experienced since the mid 1850s. The period we are studying features two central processes: globalization and the expansion of the Chilean frontier both to the South and the North. The two processes are not delinked from each other. A very influential interpretation of the changes in inequality during the First Globalization Boom is offered by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, and Jeffrey 6 Williamson’s (see especially Williamson 2009) application of it to Latin America. The basic idea behind this approach is that the transport revolution changed relative factor endowments and initiated a process of adaptation of prices to the new equilibrium. The abundant factors in a region tended to increase their prices relative to other factors. In land-abundant regions the rental-wage ratio increased, as well as inequality. “The inequality-globalization connection in the nineteenth century can be summarized this way: globalization seems to have had an inegalitarian effect in (initially) land-abundant countries, a force raising inequality by rewarding landowners more than workers; and globalization seems to have had an egalitarian effect in (initially) land-scarce countries, especially in those that stuck with free trade and resisted pleas for protection.” (Lindert & Williamson, 2001; 13). This basic approach may be complemented and modified, providing different outcomes. One obvious complement is that these forces may produce different impacts according to the specific settings of actors and institutions in a region. The impact of these trends may be quite different in family-based farmer economies with access to well developed free labour markets, than in, say, a slave economy like the Brazil in 1872, or hacienda-dominated Chile in the 19th Century. Trends in land-labour ratios do not say anything about absolute inequality levels and social features of different societies. Also, we can examine whether we can approach globalization forces as a once for all change in factor endowments and a subsequent adjustment to this new equilibrium. The best way to approach this is as a process in which technological change and economic growth produce waves of productivity growth, in turn altering transport and commodity prices. Two different outcomes may be noticed. First, globalization makes new factors of production available, and the increased supply causes the relative factor price to fall. That makes these new regions competitive in distant markets. Later on, the expansion of demand for these new factors may raise their relative prices. However, this is one time change, but rather a process of continuously counteracting forces. So, the expected outcome has to do with what the frontier looks like: how fast productivity grows in maritime transport, channel building, railroad expansion, engineering infrastructure, other terrestrial communication, etc. Obviously, the cost of introducing new amounts of factors of production (land) also depends on institutional contexts: the strength of the state, the strength of the elites, the interaction between colonizers and native populations, property rights, access to labour, control of commercial networks, etc. This point was recently made by Harley (2007). “Influenced by an older literature, I tend to think about nineteenth-century globalisation in terms of expansion of an Atlantic economy into frontier peripheries from its north-western Europe core rather than a ‘regime switch to openness’. Of course, both elements were present, but a major part of globalisation was the expansion of the core into newly settled peripheries rather than a change in trading relationships between established economies. A key feature of the peripheries, which the Williamson lens leaves out of focus, was that they originally lay beyond the frontier of organised economic activity and globalisation was about their incorporation. (…) Globalisation is seen as the evolution of the relationship of the European core with an expanding periphery – usually but not always in the Americas. (…) Integration of a frontier into the Atlantic economy involved the discovery of export staples, a process of learning how best to exploit them and the mobilisation of capital and labour for their exploitation.” (Harley, 2007; 240-241) 7 The impact of frontier expansion on relative factor prices was already highlighted by Rybczynski in 1955. Recently, Shanahan & Wilson, (2007; 14) studied how globalization, combined with the expansion of the frontier, produced very different outcomes in different regions of Australia. While Victoria showed the expected increase in the rental-wage ratio, the land-abundant South Australia shows a decrease in this ratio. Emery, Inwood & Thille (2007) report a similar variety of outcomes in different Canadian regions. Besides the impact of frontier expansion in purely economic terms, the institutional settings involved are crucial for the distributive outcome. Again, the Australian case sheds light on that point. “Despite their superficial similarities in one factor input (land), other factors such as labour and capital, as well as differences in policies and governance, could, and did, influence the measured level of inequality. In South Australia, government legislation and technological invention appear to have combined to decrease land prices and lower inequality for 20 out of 50 years. These findings are important. They suggest that in the Australian case at least policy differences did affect the returns to factors and measured inequality. Such variation was the result of relative resource abundance, which governments could influence through policies that opened up land or assisted (hindered) migration. Ultimately, long-run resource flows still produced outcomes that saw returns to relatively abundant factors improve relative to scarce.” (Sanahan & Wilson, 2007; 18). The point of the decisive role of institutions has been a classical one. Let´s only mention Adelman´s comparison between Argentina and Canada and the recent contributions on New Zealand and Uruguay (Álvarez, Bértola, Porcile 2007). More recently, García and Robinson (2009) made a similar point: “... most countries in the Americas had an open frontier, how that frontier land was allocated differed a lot... Our hypothesis suggests that if political institutions were bad at the time of frontier settlement, the existence of such frontier land might actually lead to worse development outcomes, probably because it provides a resource which non-democratic political elites can use to cement themselves in power” (García & Robinson, 2009:17-18). Another concern with this approach is the strong assumptions underlying it. The two most mentioned in the literature are the assumption of constant returns to scale and that technology is ubiquitously available. What are the implications of those assumptions in this case? - If we assume that the same technology is available everywhere, we assume that, once markets move towards equilibrium growth rates, factor prices will tend to converge. - Furthermore, if technology is freely available, then no changes in productivity growth and per capita income may arise from that aspect. As an outcome, factor allocation is transformed into the key-explanation of economic performance. Productivity growth and its determinants almost disappear from the scene and from the core of the analysis. - It does not consider that economies of scale are especially important in transport networks and in frontier expansion, a central aspect of this process. - Different social institutional and organisational patterns have long-lasting impacts on productivity growth and technical change. Moreover, they 8 have an impact on the way the fruits of technological change are distributed, both within and between countries and regions. We will try to analyze the Chilean experience with these ideas in mind. 4. Trends and phases in income inequality 4.1 Chilean GDP Chilean GDP grew relatively fast from 1860 to WWI (Graph 1). As shown in Graph 2, the gap between Chilean GDP and that of more developed countries shrank. Even so, the absolute difference was rarely less than 40% of the per capita income of the leading countries. The trend changed after WWI, when Chilean GDP started to diverge. Growth was clearly export-led, driven mainly by the mining industry, but also by agriculture. Two different growth cycles may be noticed. The first, starting in the 1850s and lasting until the early 1870s, was dominated by wheat, flour, copper and silver exports. The second is the nitrates boom: after showing strong growth starting in the 1880s, there were large fluctuations after the 1910s, finally collapsing by 1930 (Cariola & Sunkel, 1982; Meller, 1998; Salazar & Pinto, 2002). This export-led growth had strong impacts on the rest of the economy, in terms of urbanization, demographic change, growth of the service sector (especially the State) and creating a small market for manufacturing production. As shown in Graph 3, the foreign trade-coefficient grew noticeably during both cycles. Graph 1. Gross Domestic Product and Gross Domestic Income at 1908-1910 prices, 18601930 (1908-10=100) 1000 GDI GDP 100 1860 1864 1868 1872 1876 1880 1884 1888 1892 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 10 GDI: own estimates. GDP: Díaz et al 1998. 9 Graph 2 Chile´s per capita GDP in relation to Australia, UK and USA., 1860-1930 70 60 50 40 30 1860 1870 1880 1890 Chile/Australia 1900 Chile/RU 1910 1920 1930 Chile/EUA Graph 3: Foreign trade coefficient, 1840-1930.. 70 60 Porcentaje (%) 50 40 30 20 10 1841 1847 1853 1859 1865 1871 1877 1883 1889 1895 1901 1907 1913 1919 1925 Based on Braun et al. (2000) Table 5.6 4.2 Income estimates: the data Here we present two different types of estimates. The first is a continuous inequality series for the years 1860 to 1930. The second is a set of benchmark estimates for the years 1875, 1885, 1907 and 1930. In both cases the strategy used for constructing the estimates is similar. First we organize the population according to the economic activity in which they are engaged. Then we search for information in order to assign each occupational group an income. Thus, our database contains information on the active population with an identifiable profession. While the continuous series has some restrictions in terms of the income categories considered, it has the virtue of showing trends in inequality more clearly. The changing 10 structure of the active population by sector of activity (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, transport and communications, commerce, and others) is based on Galvez & Bravo (1992), but many corrections were introduced in order to make the available information compatible. These large sectors include several occupations each. Additional disaggregation was made for some occupations, such as the agrarian sector and mining. In other cases, some occupations were aggregated in larger groups. With respect to income, several different sources were used and made comparable. When prices or income were not directly available, factor price series were applied to existing data in order to complete the information. In some cases, the values are the result of interpolation between other available years. Appendix Table 1 presents the different occupations considered, their weight at the start (1860) and end (1930) years, as well as the main source of information for both the size and income of each group. The benchmark estimates are based on census data and have different features for each year. This makes them more difficult to compare with each other. However, they have the virtue of allowing for more in depth studies of each year because the level disaggregation is higher, as well as allowing for inter-regional comparisons. Appendix Table 2 shows the different income groups considered in each benchmark estimate. Detailed information on incomes may be found in Rodríguez Weber (2009). 4.2 One proxy for the Gross Domestic Income, 1860-1930 and Ginicoefficients The continuous series may be regarded as a Gross Domestic Income series. When comparing it to the GDP series, a warning is necessary. The main purpose of our series is to estimate income inequality. The sources used were those that are best suited for this purpose. The GDP series focuses less on how income is distributed and pays more attention to output. Thus, divergence between both series is not an unexpected result. Growth rates for the whole period are rather similar and both series show a faster growth rate in 1860-1900 than in 1900-1930. The GDP series is more volatile (Table 1). Another difference is that the GDI growth rate is higher than the GDP growth rate in 1870-1900, while the opposite is found in 1900-1930. Table 1: GDP and GDI growth rates, 1860-1930 1860-1930 1860-1900 1900-1930 current prices constant 1908-1910 prices constant per active population own Díaz et. Al own Díaz et. al own Díaz et. al 5,70 5,90 2,60 2,80 1,53 1,57 4,80 5,30 2,80 3,20 1,60 1,84 7,00 6,70 2,30 2,10 1,43 1,20 Sources and comments: GDP: constant prices, Díaz et. al (1998); current prices, Díaz et. Al. Inflated by the general price index, excepting for agriculture and mining, which were inflated by special sectoral indices. Price indices were taken from Wagner (1992). GDI: current prices, own estimates; constant prices, deflated by the same price indices as for GDP inflation. 11 In terms of growth per member of the active population, the GDP series shows a strong reduction of growth rates in the first decades of the 20th Century. The GDI series also shows a reduction, but a more modest one. The Gini-coefficients arising from the GDI series are presented in Graph 4. The inequality level is rising during the first decades of the series. A downward trend is noticed from the early 1870s until the first years of the 20th Century. Then there is a sharp rise, continuing until 1930. An important bias present in the GDI series is that it does not take into consideration the income of foreign investors in nitrates production. This was a particularly important component of total income at the end of the 19th Century, during the nitrates boom, before production went into the hands of national capitalists. In order to have an idea of the impact of this component, Graph 5 presents a functional distribution of income between wages and profits. The two series are quite similar except during two periods: the records for 1895-1905 are low but not exceptionally low as in the GDI series, and the 1920s, which show decreasing instead of increasing inequality. The inequality levels at the end of the period are high in both cases. The benchmark estimates also presented in Graph 4 yield rather similar results to those of the continuous series. They will be used to discuss regional inequality. In what follows we will look at three different periods separately: 1860-1873, 18731905 and 1905-1930. Graph 4. Gini-coefficient 1860-1930, continuous series and benchmarks estimates 0,7 0,65 Índice de Gini 0,6 0,55 0,5 0,45 0,4 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 Own estimate of Gross Domestic Income. Income of foreign owners of nitrate mills are not included. 5. Increasing inequality during the wheat cycle 1840-1875: globalization, commodity lottery and the hacienda After Independence, the Chilean economy started a period of relatively fast and stable growth. Growth was based on wheat, silver and copper exports. According to Braun (2000) the export-coefficient doubled between the early 1840s to the early 1870s (see also Graph 3). We are not able to estimate the changes in inequality during the whole period. Our hypothesis is that the rising trend in inequality found in 1860-1875 had started by the 12 1840s. This inequality trend could be interpreted in two different but complementary ways. Table 2: Yearly growth rates of GDP by sector at constant prices and GDI at current prices., 1860-1930) Agriculture Mining ManufacturingOther Total 1860-1873 Real GDP 3,68 2,84 3,37 6,37 3,63 Current income 2,80 3,10 3,76 4,45 3,43 1873-1905 Real GDP 0,50 5,59 2,70 4,64 2,85 Current income 4,81 7,10 5,43 5,56 5,69 1905-1929 Real GDP 3,26 4,01 2,24 1,29 3,03 Current income 5,02 9,25 7,70 10,32 8,34 1905-1930 Real GDP 2,81 2,54 1,93 0,55 2,20 Current income 4,00 6,49 6,59 9,80 6,91 GDP: Diaz et. al. (1998, Cuadro AE 12); GDI, own estimate. Wheat production in the Central Valley of Chile experienced a short-lived success in the commodity lottery during these years. Massive migration into new areas on the coast of California and to Australia produced a large increase in demand that temporarily could not be met by their domestic production. The expansion of the Atlantic economy, partly due to falling transport costs, opened a window for Chilean wheat production to be exported overseas. But soon the markets of these settler economies were being supplied by their own domestic production. In the 1860s the British market became an important destination for Chilean wheat. High wheat prices and falling transport costs created an opportunity for great fortunes to be earned in Chilean agriculture (Bauer 1970:87, 93-95, 154-155, 157; 1994) for the first time in its history. As shown in Table 3, agrarian exports increased from 17% of total exports in the 1840s to 40% in the early 1870s. Table 3: Value of exports by sector of origin, 1846-1890 (5 year-averages) Million dollars per year % Período Mineras Agropecuarias Manufacturas Otras Mineras Agropecuarias Manufacturas Otras 1846-1850 5 2 - 2 63 17 - 20 1851-1855 8 4 - 2 56 26 - 18 1856-1860 13 4 - 2 71 20 - 9 1861-1865 15 5 - 1 72 23 - 6 1866-1870 16 9 - 1 62 34 - 4 1871-1875 17 13 0 2 53 40 1 6 1876-1880 20 8 0 0 68 30 2 0 1881-1885 38 6 2 - 83 12 4 - 1886-1890 42 5 1 - 86 11 3 - Braun et. al 2000, Table 5.7 Wages remained at similar levels during this period (Díaz et. al., 2007). However, there exists some evidence that land prices increased significantly. Claudio Gay mentions the example of the Choapa hacienda, which was rented at 8,000 pesos in 1837, and at 18,910 pesos in 1850. 8 years later, after being divided into 7 different units, the total rent went up to 52.950 pesos (Gay, 1863: 100). Wheat production is often considered a crop that promotes small scale family farming and a fair income distribution (Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997). However, the Chilean case shows that the expansion of wheat production for export was based on, developed with, and reinforced by, the traditional hacienda. Salazar & Pinto (1992:103) argue that this cycle produced extensive growth, putting more land, inquilinos and peones into work. The property rights of hacendados were 13 reinforced both by law and by the establishment and control of the precise limits of the hacienda. The extension of cultivated land involved a more effective use of the land of the hacienda, the transformation of pastureland into cultivated land, and the subdivision of the very large colonial units (Bengoa, 1988: 209). Within the hacienda the division of labor increased, incorporating vineyards and dairy production. The increased production per hectare allowed an increase in the number of families living from income earned on the hacienda (Bauer 1994; 153-155). According to Bauer, Chilean wheat producers were conscious of the ephemeral conditions that allowed them to export and about the lack of natural competitiveness of Chilean wheat. Thus, producers opted not to invest in the sector (Bauer 1970: 157). An observer from the early 20th Century sustained that this prosperity cycle changed the habits of landowners in many ways. The increasing land rents, far from feeding productive investment in the land, served to finance a new urban life, the construction of luxury houses and the organization of costly parties and ceremonies (Schneider, 1904: 7; Bauer 1994; 135) adds that a share of the land rents where invested in banking, urban properties, commerce and mining. Through these means, the old class of hacendados became more integrated with other sectors of the economic elite. However, other scholars emphasize different things. The integration of the elite was also driven by the increasing attraction of land as an investment opportunity for other members of this class. According to Salazar (1985: 157-162), the wheat boom attracted the interest of capital from other origins that introduced important changes to the traditional haciendas. The so-called merchant-hacendados invested in certain technological improvements and stimulated some mechanization of the productive process. The wheat cycle did not leave labor relations unchanged. It seems that a two-fold took place. On the one hand, the social and economic position of the inquilinos continued to fall in the haciendas. They ended being in an even worse position than the peones: they had to pay exhorbitant prices for housing, and indebted inquilinos were forced to supply family labor to the hacendados (Salazar, 1985; 163-166). At the same time, increasing wheat prices and the expansion of production induced an increase in demand for labor. Young descendants of inquilinos families had an opportunity to leave the haciendas, and could find occupation elsewhere. While they could be seen as a good alternative for more modern estates, the traditional haciendas saw them as a threat. They were a labor force outside of the control of the hacendados, who could press for wage increases as wheat prices increased. As Bengoa (1988; 151) states, while free labor in the 19th Century was searching for a piece of land where to settle down, the new gañanes had broken their subordination to the land and tried to find a job in different places (mines, services, ports, agriculture, etc), exhibiting a great deal of mobility (Salazar, 1985; 171-172) . Thus, the hacendados preferred the inquilinos, who were more easily controlled. Furthermore, the credit system seems to have been an important vehicle in order to weaken the position of the inquilinos. Contrary to the Australian and American experience, hacendados were in a position to take advantage of the official financial system and in turn, they were the financers of the peasants established at the hacienda. Hacendados usually bought the harvest in advance at half the market price (Bauer 125126, 171). The inquilinos and the peasant population near the hacienda became increasingly indebted and were therefore exposed to increased extractions of family work. 14 6. Decreasing inequality and nitrates: State-led frontier expansion and structural change, 1873-1905 The 1870s were years of crisis. The end of the wheat cycle, the crisis of copper production, and an international economic crisis, were all factors that contributed to a decline in GDP. As shown in Graph 3, the foreign trade coefficient was strongly reduced. Around that time some politicians argued, in the spirit of the era, that Chile needed a war and to incorporate new territories and new export staple goods in order to counteract the crisis and improve national performance. They were not simple speculations. Chile won the Pacific War against Bolivia and Perú, and incorporated to its territory the natural-resource-rich Norte Grande. Another war was won in the South, against the indigenous population of the Araucania. Chile’s territory almost doubled. As shown in Table 4, the distribution of economic activity in the territory changed accordingly. The expansion to the North was not only important in terms of population but particularly in terms of income. The North made an important contribution to per capita income growth. Even if the expansion to the South deserves considerable attention, we will limit our examination to the expansion to the North. Table 4: Regional distribution of population and income, 1875-1907 (%) 1875 1885 1907 Region Income share Pop. Share Ratio income/pop. Shares North 17 12 1,4 Centre 70 75 0,9 South 13 13 1 North 22 17 1,3 Centre 64 66 1 South 14 17 0,8 North 28 18 1,6 Centre 57 65 0,9 15 17 0,9 South As shown in Graph 1, GDP growth shifted to a lower growth path after the 1880s compared to the previous period. However, the expansion of the frontier produced a once off increase in GDP. Growth was followed by structural change (Table 5). Mining (including nitrates) almost doubled its share in GDP, while agriculture significantly reduced its contribution. As a result, population became more concentrated in urban areas. Still, the agrarian population was 62% in 1907 (74% in 1875, Hurtado 1966, Table 2). According to Meller (1998; 21), all previous booms experienced by the Chilean economy were insignificant compared to the nitrates boom. This was the first truly capitalist sector of the economy, given the scale of production, the technology it used and labor relations based on wage earners, who did not produce anything that they consumed directly. Nitrates faced increased demand from European agriculture, which was confronted with increasing domestic costs and external competition (Miller & Greenhill, 2006). Nitrates were extracted from a region 750kms long and 0.5-10kms wide, running parallel to the Pacific Coast. Distance to the sea was 40-80km. Several towns grew 15 along this strip; several ports saw increasing activity and transport networks flourished (Cariola & Sunkel, 1982; 81). Table 5. Sectoral GDP shares, 1871-1910 (ten-year averages, %) Agriculture Mining Manufactures Public sector Total 1871-1880 39 17 35 9 100 1881-1890 27 26 36 12 100 1891-1900 25 28 34 12 100 1901-1910 22 32 29 17 100 1911-1920 23 37 27 13 100 1921-1930 24 36 29 12 100 Based on Diaz et. al. (1998), TAble AE 12. The main technological transformation introduced in nitrates production was the Shanks system. It allowed to process low quality caliches and was energy and labor saving. During the 1880s productive capacity increased three-fold, while production costs were reduced by 40% (Pinto & Ortega, 1990; 40). At the same time, increasing returns to scale were present, and the mills demanded higher minimum scales. While a typical mill in the 1870s demanded an investment of about £23,000, the Shanks system required a minimum investment of £40,000 and by the early 20th Century the average mill involved an investment of about £100,000 and employed 300 workers (Pinto & Ortega 1990; 41-44). Decreasing inequality during this period was the result of different forces. In the North, a capitalist labor market flourished, drawing large quantities gañanes, in spite of the hard climatic and working conditions (Pinto & Ortega, 1990; 65-66). Wages were higher than in the agrarian sector in Central Chile: two to three times higher according to Pinto Vallejo (1998; 31). This was not counterbalanced by the higher costs of living they likely encountered. Also, many opportunities for wageearners were to be found in activities linked to the nitrates industry, for example, railway building. The expansion to the South was the scenario of confronting interests. Some land was given to indigenous groups. Other farms were given to domestic families (some of them members of the army, both officers and soldiers). These farms tended to be subdivided over time, giving rise to poor minifundia. Some land remained in the hands of immigrant settlements. Finally, a group of originally medium-size estates considerably increased their size over time (Bengoa, 1988; 253). The South looked like a new environment in which the development of a new kind of agrarian society distinct from the traditional hacienda was possible, although the influence of the traditional system was present. Two other features of the production of nitrates added to the above-mentioned trend. Nitrate mills were mainly owned by foreigners, whose profits were not considered as part of domestic income (they are considered in GDP estimates). Second, due to Chile’s monopoly over nitrates production in world markets, the state was able to tax exports, which allowed for the expansion of state bureaucracy. Changes in income inequality had a clear regional component. Table 6 shows how inequality decreased in the North and in the South, while remaining for the most part unchanged in the Center. Following Rybczynsky (1955), inequality was reduced in regions were the supply of land increased significantly. If we look at inequality by 16 sector, the reduction of inequality present in the mining sector strengthens the previous conclusion. In order to take into account the impact of foreign nitrates mill owners on the distribution of income, we have shown the relationship between profits and wages in Graph 5. The difference between this and the continuous Gini-coefficient series seems to be that while the latter continues to fall until the early 20th Century, the former shows a stable distribution. Graph 5. Profit-wage rate, 1860-1930 1,2 1 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2 1860 1863 1866 1869 1872 1875 1878 1881 1884 1887 1890 1893 1896 1899 1902 1905 1908 1911 1914 1917 1920 1923 1926 1929 0 It is possible to consider the reduction in inequality as a process unfolding in two stages. As shown in Graph 6, inequality decreased first due to the impact of mining. The impact of mining on the agrarian labor market started to be perceived and the profit share in agriculture started to fall, adding to the reduction of total inequality. 40 100 Graph 6: Profit shares in agriculture and mining (1880-1905) 38 90 36 80 34 32 70 60 28 26 50 24 40 22 Agro Minería 20 1880 1882 1884 1886 1888 1890 1892 1894 1896 1898 1900 1902 1904 30 Mining Agriculture 30 17 The case may be clearly understood looking at the income of the gañanes. They were agricultural workers at the bottom of the social hierarchy, accounting for 18-26% of our active population. Their personal income increased from being 35% of average income by the 1880s to 48% in 1905. Their real income increased considerably since the mid 1890s (Graph 7). Graph 7: Gañanes real income, 1880-1930 (1913=100) 160 150 140 140 130 120 110 Deflactado por IPC 80 100 60 90 40 80 20 70 60 0 1880 1890 1900 DPI Matus (2006) 1910 DPI Díaz & Wagner (2008) 1920 1930 Agrarian prices (Wagner, 1990) The economic and territorial expansion during this period could not have been carried out without a strong role played by the State. The Chilean State was among the most developed in Latin America, as evidenced by its military victory in the Pacific War. The State came to play an important role in the distribution of income. The monopolistic position enjoyed by Chilean nitrates allowed the State to charge nonnegligible taxes on nitrates exports. By the 1890s, this source of revenue (Table 7) accounted for half total State revenues. Graph 8 shows the share of Gross Value Added by mining that was appropriated by the State: up to 39% at the end of the century. Table7: Fiscal revenues by origin, 1850-1929 (%) Mining Direct Indirect domestic Indirect froeign Non-fiscal Extraordinary 1850-1859 0 11 23 62 4 0 1860-1869 8 9 22 52 4 6 1870-1879 5 7 23 56 6 2 1880-1889 35 6 8 44 8 0 1890-1899 53 1 1 30 6 10 1900-1909 50 0 2 31 6 10 1910-1919 50 3 8 29 8 3 1920-1929 28 10 9 23 9 20 Wagner, Jofre & Luders, 2000; Cuadro 1 Deflactado por Precios Agrícolas 120 100 18 The traditional elite benefitted from the expansion to the North, as increased State revenues allowed the reduction of fiscal pressure on other economic sectors. Also, the State created the Caja de Crédito Hipotecario, a credit system that mostly benefited the rich elite. Obviously, the increased State revenues fed a growing and powerful body of civil servants, especially the armed forces, whose role was decisive in the annexation of new territories and maintaining the domestic order. Graph 8: Share of Gross VAlue Added by mining captured as state revenues, 1880-1905 45 40 35 (%) 30 25 20 15 10 1880 1882 1884 1886 1888 1890 1892 1894 1896 1898 1900 1902 1904 7. Divergence, inequality and expansion of the hacienda system: 1905-1930 The period under consideration has many contradictory trends which do not allow presenting an easy summary. 1913-1930 has always been a difficult period for Latin American historiography, as the First Globalization Boom already was showing signs of exhaustion, but it should continue until the late 1920s. At the same time, WWI introduced many disruptions that blur the difference between ephemeral facts and trend changes. According to Díaz et. al. (Graph 1 and Table 1), during the three first decades of the 20th Century, and especially after 1913, Chile´s GDP and per capita GDP growth slowed down. As shown in Table 5, no important structural change took place, excepting for a continued modest expansion of the mining sector and a reduction of the weight of the public sector. Since then, Chile started to diverge with world leaders, breaking the trend of the late 19th Century (Graph 2). This changing trend seems to be related to the performance of the export sector. Graph 3 shows that the foreign trade coefficient changed the increasing trend followed during most part of the 19th Century and much earlier than any kind of inward-looking policy could take place. With respect to inequality, the decreasing trend of the late 19th Century was reverted according to almost all measures: benchmark estimates, the continuous series and the profit-wage ratio. The inequality increase looks as very important and seems to have been present in every sector, excepting for services, and in every region. We can always doubt about the absolute increase of inequality. Let´s see if we can find reasonable explanations for that or if we have to assume that we have overestimated this movement. 19 Nitrates. A first movement has to with the partial ¨nationalization¨ of nitrates production. Chileans controlled by 1920 more than 50% of the mining sector. This was mainly because foreign owners became assimilated rather than because of new Chilean investments (Soto Cárdenas, 1998; 52). At the same time, it seems that this could have eroded the chances of the state to extract revenues from the now local elite. In the 1920s the role of mining in state revenues decreased in favor of extraordinary sources, i.e., foreign debt. These two facts have to be interpreted together with a third and decisive one: the production of nitrates was rather obsolete in technological terms. Nothing happened after the introduction of the Shanks system, excepting for the use of oil instead of coal. Thus, profits were highly dependent on the evolution of world prices. Agriculture The slow rhythm of the expansion of demand for labor in the North already noticed in the previous period was combined with a continuous growth of the agrarian population. This led to a reversion of the previous trend of the income of gañanes. This was combined with what can be labeled as a regression in the evolution of the social structure and institutions of the South. While this region showed varied patterns of land tenure and farm sizes, the early 20th Century witnessed how the South adopted the old hacienda model of the Central Valley (Bengoa, 1990; 154-155). Indeed, the inquilinos system became a dominant labor relation. However, some differences with the Central Valley could be noticed. Wage relations were more important and share-cropping was the dominant form in which inquilinos paid for the land. The state played a decisive role in the expansion of the hacienda system to the South, through the concession of land to entrepreneurs in order to promote immigration of colonos from Europe. While these colonos seldom came, the concessionaries extended their property rights over these lands. Concessions were huge in size: under the Presidency of Riesco in 1901-1905 46 of them amounted to 4.5 million hectares (for this and many other examples, see Bengoa (1990; 167 footnote 23). According to this author, what happened in the Araucania at the beginning of the 20th Century resembled very much what had happened in the Central Valley 300 years before. Relative prices, exchange rates and terms of trade Chile had two episodes of fast devaluation of its currency and a correspondingly high domestic inflation. The first one was during the 1880s and up to the mid-1890. In close relation to the war, the state had to expand its expenses. Even if adopting the gold standard was always under discussion, this step was never taken. The Chilean growth model was too much dependent on the expansion of the state. Thus, its current needs often led to deficits, the search for external financial support. In turn, it contributed to the occurrence of balance of payments deficits, devaluation, inflation, and so on. As shown in Graph 4, the episode of fast devaluation provoked an upsurge of inequality. The second episode took place especially during WWI. This time inflation was triggered off by increasing export and import prices. As shown in Graph 9, after decades of decreasing export and import prices, export prices started to rise by the mid 1890s, why the previously stable terms of trade improved significantly up to 1906. This relatively high price level was maintained through the 1920s. As shown in Graph 10, agricultural and mining prices grew much more than the consumer prices index, implying a redistribution of income in favor of the export sector. 20 Graph 9: Terms of trade 1860-1930 (1913=100) 300 160 Exports and imports 120 200 100 80 150 Terms of trade 140 250 60 100 40 50 20 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 Exports Imports Terms of trade Price movements were also linked to the exchange rate. While the first devaluation episode was directly dependent on the needs of state expenditures in relation to the Pacific War and the 1891 year Revolution, devaluation and inflation in the early 20h Century seems to reflect some kind of institutional inertia linked to the consumption habits of the elite (Millar Carvacho 1994; 428-429). In 1904-1907 the amounts of issued paper money answered for 50% of that of the whole period 1876-1907 at current prices (Clavel & Jeftanovic 1983, Table 1). During these years, an important share of the new emission was directed towards the acquisition of bonds of the Caja de Crédito Hipotecario, whose activity directly benefitted the hacendados (Clavel & Jeftanovic 1983). 21 Índices 1913=100. Escala logarítmica 1000 Graph 10: Price indices 1883-1930 (1913=100) 100 10 1883/1887 1 888/1892 1 893/1897 1 898/1902 1 903/1907 1 908/1912 1 913/1917 1918/1922 1923/1927 DPI Matus (2006) DPI Díaz & Wagner (2008) Agriculture, Wagner (1990) Mining This process was exacerbated by the outbreak of WWI. While export prices boomed, the State supported banks and the nitrates industry and met deficits with new paper money emissions (Clavel & Jeftanovic 1983; Table 2, Soto Cárdenas). A nonnegligible actor is the security forces, who answered for about a quarter of total public expenditure (Wagner, Jofre & Luders, 2000: Tables 3.I and 3.II). 8. Main conclusions Our study shows that the impact of the First Globalization Boom on the distribution of income in Chile had varying outcomes, depending on the commodity lottery, the expansion of the frontier and on the way in which social structures and economic and social institutions interacted both in the core areas of the Chilean society and in the frontier. Three distinct trends could be found. 1. Since the mid 18th Century and up to early 1870s the “commodity lottery” transitorily benefitted Chile´s wheat exports to California, Australia, and then Great Britain. More than an expansion to new areas, the wheat boom led to a more efficient use of the land already in hands of hacendados. While some haciendas did modernize, mainly because of the investment by merchant capitalists and some peasants were forced to the free labor market, the core of the colonial hacienda system not only persisted, by social conditions became harder for the inquilinos and their families. Income distribution moved clearly in favor of the agrarian, mining and commercial elites. 2. The 1870s were years of crisis and wheat exports collapsed. The relatively strong Chilean State came to play a decisive role in the expansion of the frontier towards the North and the South. The Pacific war against Bolivia and Perú and the pacificación of the Araucania doubled the Chilean territory. Between the 1880s and the early 19th Century a trend of decreasing inequality was noticed. In the North, production of nitrates adopted capitalist labor relations and attracted large amounts of free labor, the 22 gañanes. The combined effect of a large increase of the natural resources, the increased demand for labor and the impossibility of attracting labor by other means than economic incentives, led to a positive trend in income distribution in the mining sector, especially when compared to the traditional hacienda system. Besides, as nitrates production was in the hands of British capital, this share of income is not accounted for in our estimates of total income. However, even when this income is accounted for comparing profits and wages, the decreasing inequality trend is noticed. In the South, frontier expansion adopted a variety of forms, where the traditional hacienda system was combined with settlements of European immigrants, spontaneous occupation by peasants, and concessions to enterprises and army personnel. By then, this was a region with relatively low inequality, whose expansion added to the general trend. The Central Valley of Chile, suffering the wheat crisis, recovered much later. It was not until the 1890s that the incomes of the gañanes started to rise and the general trend was present even there. 3. The first decades of the 20h Century showed a clearly different scenario. While in previous periods Chilean per capita GDP grew relatively fast and kept pace with income growth in the core countries, since WWI Chile started to diverge from the core and the income gap, which was very important, continued to increase. Makin things even worse, income inequality grew significantly. While GDP growth in real terms was slowing down, the general domestic price level grew relatively fast. This was the result of domestic monetary expansion (a trend already present in the mid1880s), which was partly the result of domestic political economy and partly the result of the impact of increasing international prices and improved commodity prices and terms of trade. The nitrates industry moved into Chilean hands, accounting for increased domestic inequality. At the same time, the mining sector´s contribution to State revenues was reduced. In a context of technological stagnation real wages remained stable, but profits were increased following international prices. The most important changes took probably place in the agrarian sector. While the agrarian population continued to grow, the trend in real wages was reverted and the social relations experienced some kind of reversion, especially in the South. There, the concessions of land made by the State contributed to the recreation of the social relations prevalent in the hacienda system. Even if share-cropping became the dominant institutional arrangement and free labor was also present, land concentration increased as well as the power of the hacendados, inhibiting the possible development of a powerful agrarian middle class. In short, Chile was a society that by the mid-19th Century showed already high concentration of wealth, political power and income, where the hacienda system, of colonial origin, was a rather archaic one. The first early impact of globalization in Chile strengthened the power of the elite and had a negative impact on income distribution. The expansion of the frontier opened up a process of social change in the periphery of the Chilean economy and income distribution tended to improve, but the core of the old system remained alive and controlled the State policies. During the first decades of the 20th Century, while GDP growth rates decreased, the Chilean economy became more dependent on international prices. The distribution of income worsened considerably in the context of rising domestic prices and the distribution of power and wealth in favor of the elite. The pattern of development followed by the Chilean society during the First Globalization Boom, being globalization friendly, did not generate a dynamic productive structure particularly friendly towards technological change and dynamic and egalitarian social change. On the contrary, strong links with the world economy, at the time they promoted structural change and expansion to new territories, preserved, 23 under new forms, archaic social structures that inhibited further growth: le longue durée appeared under new forms. This strong link between integration to the international economy and archaic domestic social structures and institutions are behind the temptations of the so called dependency school to imagine a process of progressive social development isolated from the international economy. In reaction to that, many scholars and politicians have believed that the recognition of role of the international economy and by being proglobal, the road to economic growth and development should be almost automatically found. Neo-institutional approaches have correctly emphasized the role of domestic institutions to understand the lack of economic dynamism. 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Sources for the income series SOURCE (NUMBER) PROCEDURE (NUMBER) SECTOR Agriculture 1860% 1930% 45,7 40,2 SOURCE (INCOME) Landowners 1,9 2,5 Tornero (1872), Salazar (1985), Bengoa (1990), Gálvez y Bravo (1992), Censo Población (1930), Censo agrícola (1936) Disaggregation of censal profession "agricultores" Tornero (1872), Wagner, (1990) We depart from 1861's income (Tornero 1872), and project by the agrarian price index IPALS (Wagner, 1992) Peones and Gañanes 26,3 19,7 Gálvez y Bravo (1992), Censo Población (1930) Aggregation of different "professions" of farm workers · Bauer (1994)· (Díaz et. al. 2007)· Wagner (1992)· Bengoa (1990) Daily salary (Bauer, 1994) times working days by year (Wagner, 1992) Peasants 17,5 18 Salazar (1985) Salazar, (1985, Table 2; 36) Mining 3,3 6,2 Salazar (1985), Bauer (1994), Díaz et. al. 2007, Wagner, 1992), Bengoa (1990) We depart from 1861's income (Salazar, 1985) and project by an ad hoc index composed by IPALS index and gañanes's income In 1907 and 1920 the occupation "mineros", according to the 1930 Census Share of mining gross income at · Braun et al (2000)· Díaz current prices produced by nationals et. al. (1998 y 2007)· Cariola (copper, yodo, nitrates), minus taxes & Sunkel (1983)· Wagner et. and salaries, is distributed among al (2000) Chilean capitalists. · García (1989)· Wagner (1992) Capitalists 0,01 0,01 Gálvez y Bravo (1992), Censo Población (1930) White collars 0,3 0,6 Gálvez y Bravo (1992), Censo Población (1930) We apply to all years the proportion of 1930 3 5,6 Gálvez y Bravo (1992), Censo Población (1930) Aggregation of many categories of mining · Salazar (1985)· Ortiz workers Letelier (2005) Industry 31,8 24,4 Capitalists 0,4 1 Díaz, et. al (1998) Number of "industries" Textile artisans 22,9 7,9 Gálvez y Bravo (1992) Agreggation of many categories of artisans and workers. Carpenter 2,4 3,4 Gálvez y Bravo (1992) Aggregation of many categories of artisans and workers. Metalurgia 0,6 1,4 Gálvez y Bravo (1992) Building worker 1,2 1,9 Gálvez y Bravo (1992) Aliments y afines 1 1,6 Gálvez y Bravo (1992) Skill textile artisans 1 1,9 Gálvez y Bravo (1992) Aggregation of many categories of artisans and workers. Skill Carpenters 0,1 0,7 Gálvez y Bravo (1992) Aggregation of many categories of artisans and workers. Skill Building workers 0,2 2,6 Gálvez y Bravo (1992) Aggregation of many categories of artisans and workers. 2 2 0,6 0,03 4,2 1,5 Blue collars Others Transport Train labourers White collar workers Professional Drivers State Civil servants (eight categories) Teachers (six categories) Aggregation of many categories of artisans and workers. Aggregation of many categories of artisans and workers. Aggregation of many categories of artisans and workers. PROCEDURE (INCOME) Foreman in 1869 projected by a general wage index (Índice general de remuneraciones, Wagner 1992) Original data for 1860-1879; 1904, 1916 and 1919. Interpolation otherwise. · Carmagnani (1998)· Braun Utilities 1915 and 1918projected by an index of gross value added by industry et al (2000)· Díaz et. al. minus wages. (1998 y 2007) · Alvarez (1936)· Anuario (1871) · Censo Industrial Direct information for several years and (1895)· Ortiz Letelier (2005)· interpolation otherwise. Errazúriz y Eizaguirre (1903)· Díaz et. al (2007) Aggregation of many categories of artisans and workers. Gálvez y Bravo (1992), Anuario 1871, Braun et al (2000), Díaz et. al. (2007) Aggregation of railroad "professions" and disagreggation in professionals, white collar and workers by the proportion in Anurario 1871. Drivers is the result of the agregation of many categories. Gálvez y Bravo (1992), Censo Población (1930) Anuario 1871 Disagregation of census categories by wage structure in 1871 Mean income of each category in 1870 · Anuario (1871)· Díaz et. al (Anuario, 1871) projected by Rojas as (2007) in Díaz et. al (2007). · Anuario (1871) · Errazúriz y Eizaguirre (1903)· García (1989)· Wagner (1992)· Díaz et. al (2007 We estimate the income of three categories of railroads workers using the data from the Anuario 1871. These categories (professionals, white collars and blue collars) porjected by railroads wages (Wagner 1992). 0,001 0,2 0,001 0,6 1,9 0,3 0,1 2,4 6,1 1,6 0,2 1,6 Soldiers and policemen (seven categories) 1,4 2,9 Personal services 16,7 18,9 Professionals 0,2 1,2 Gálvez y Bravo (1992), Braun et al (2000), Díaz et. al. (2007) Aggregation of many categories · Díaz et. al (2007) Civil engineer income from Rojas, quoted by Díaz et. al. (2007) 16,5 17,7 Gálvez y Bravo (1992), Braun et al (2000), Díaz et. al. (2007) Aggregation of many categories Salazar (1985) Direct information for several years and interpolation otherwise. 16,5 17,7 Gálvez y Bravo (1992), Braun et al (2000), Díaz et. al. (2007) Aggregation of many categories Braun et al (2000). Urban servants and labourers Sirvientes y peones urbanos 35 Appendix Table 2. BENCHMARKS ESTIMATES: STRUCTURE OF CATEGORIES SECTOR AGRO 1907 1875 and 1885 CAPITALISTS Landowners (three categories) LABOURERS peones and "gañanes" CAPITALISTS Capitalists Emplyees INDUSTRY Shoemakers and textile artisans bulding workers CAPITALISTS EMPLOYEES Landowners (six Empleoyees categories) Peasants Capitalists Mining workers Capitalists LABOURERS Landowners peons and (four categories) "gañanes" Peasants MINING 1930 Emplyees LABOURERS Peons "Inquilinos" Capitalists Emplyees Mining workers Mining workers Capitalists low skill artisans Employees Capitalists (three (three categories) categories) high skill artisans industrial workers (three categories) low skill artisans high skill artisans cook high skill artisans TRANSPORT DOMESTIC SERVICE STATE COMERCE OTHERS Capitalists (two categories: railroads and others) Employees (two categories: railroad and others) Workers (two categories: railraods and others) transport workers transport workers Servants and peons Servants and peons Civil servants (four categories) Civil servants (four categories) Civil servants state workers (two categories) Teachers (three categories) Teachers (three categories) Teachers (two categories) Soldiers and policemen (four categories) Soldiers and policemen (three categories) Soldiers and policemen (two categories) Servants and peons Capitalists (five categories) Proffesionals Workers Employees Peones