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Cognition and Emotion
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For love or money? What motivates people to
know the minds of others?
a
a
a
a
Kate L. Harkness , Jill A. Jacobson , Brooke Sinclair , Emilie Chan &
Mark A. Sabbagh
a
a
Department of Psychology , Queen's University , Kingston , ON , Canada
Published online: 07 Jul 2011.
To cite this article: Kate L. Harkness , Jill A. Jacobson , Brooke Sinclair , Emilie Chan & Mark A. Sabbagh
(2012) For love or money? What motivates people to know the minds of others?, Cognition and Emotion, 26:3,
541-549, DOI: 10.1080/02699931.2011.588689
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2011.588689
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COGNITION AND EMOTION
2012, 26 (3), 541549
BRIEF REPORT
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For love or money? What motivates people to know the
minds of others?
Kate L. Harkness, Jill A. Jacobson, Brooke Sinclair, Emilie Chan, and
Mark A. Sabbagh
Department of Psychology, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada
Mood affects social cognition and ‘‘theory of mind’’, such that people in a persistent negative mood (i.e.,
dysphoria) have enhanced abilities at making subtle judgements about others’ mental states. Theorists
have argued that this hypersensitivity to subtle social cues may have adaptive significance in terms of
solving interpersonal problems and/or minimising social risk. We tested whether increasing the social
salience of a theory of mind task would preferentially increase dyspshoric individuals’ performance on
the task. Forty-four dysphoric and 51 non-dysphoric undergraduate women participated in a theory of
mind decoding task following one of three motivational manipulations: (i) social motivation (ii)
monetary motivation, or (iii) no motivation. Social motivation was associated with the greatest accuracy
of mental state decoding for the dysphoric group, whereas the non-dysphoric group showed the highest
accuracy in the monetary motivation condition. These results suggest that dysphoric individuals may be
especially, and preferentially, motivated to understand the mental states of others.
Keywords: Theory of mind; Depression; Motivation; Social cognition.
Theory of mind refers to the everyday ability to
decode others’ mental states (e.g., emotions,
beliefs, intentions) to understand and predict their
behaviour (Wellman, 1990). Theory of mind
decoding forms the basis of social cognition and
is apparent in all cultures that have been tested.
Despite this universality, there are clear individual
differences in the everyday engagement of theory
of mind (e.g., Sabbagh & Flynn, 2006). Generally, these differences are attributed to cognitive
and perceptual factors such as frontal lobe functioning and visual feature integration. The goal of
the current study was to ask whether individual
differences in theory of mind performance can
also be attributable to emotional and motivational
factors.
Correspondence should be addressed to: Kate L. Harkness, Department of Psychology, Queen’s University, KingstonON K7L
3N6 Canada. E-mail: [email protected]
This research was supported by grants from the Canada Foundation for Innovation to KH, JJ, and MS.
We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Kevin Rounding in data collection and management and Jordan Theriault in
manuscript preparation.
# 2012 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
http://www.psypress.com/cogemotion
541
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HARKNESS ET AL.
With respect to emotion, an emerging body of
literature supports a dissociation in theory of mind
decoding abilities between individuals with clinical levels of major depressive disorder (MDD)
and those with sub-threshold depression, or
‘‘dysphoria’’. Specifically, MDD is associated
with significant deficits in theory of mind decoding (e.g., Lee, Harkness, Sabbagh, & Jacobson,
2005; Wang, Wang, Chen, Zhu, & Wang, 2008).
The symptoms most strongly associated with
impaired theory of mind decoding in MDD
include anhedonia, psychomotor retardation, and
depressed mood, suggesting that a lack of motivation to attend to the mental states of others may,
at least in part, account for these individuals’ poor
performance (Lee et al., 2005). In contrast, several
studies have found that dysphoria is associated
with more accurate theory of mind decoding,
especially when individuals are presented with
very subtle social features such as eye expressions
(e.g., Harkness, Jacobson, Duong, & Sabbagh,
2010; Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey,
& Chen, 2005). Further, sad mood induction has
been found to enhance theory of mind abilities
(Converse, Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2008), whereas
happy mood induction decreases theory of mind
accuracy (Harkness et al., 2010).
Taken together, the results above suggest that
dysphoric individuals may have an exquisite
sensitivity to others’ mental states, which is
eclipsed when their depression becomes more
severe by the amotivational symptoms of the
syndrome (Lee et al., 2005). The findings above
are consistent with a growing body of research
proposing that depression promotes an analytical
style of processing that selectively enhances accuracy on complex tasks that have a social component (see Andrews & Thomson, 2009). Indeed,
dysphoria is associated with enhanced performance on tasks similar to subtle theory of mind
decoding, such as detecting deception (e.g., Lane
& DePaulo, 1999) and social decision making
(e.g., Forgas, 1995). According to some theorists,
this hypersensitivity to subtle social cues may have
adaptive significance in terms of solving interpersonal problems and/or minimising social risk
(Allen & Badcock, 2003; Andrews & Thomson,
542
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2012, 26 (3)
2009). In contrast, researchers have not detected
such enhanced patterns of performance in more
severe MDD (see Allen & Badcock, 2003).
Despite dysphoric individuals’ enhanced accuracy in decoding others’ mental states, and success
in achieving certain social goals (see Andrews &
Thomson, 2009), these individuals suffer from
profound deficits in their actual social skills (e.g.,
Segrin, 2000). For example, dysphoric individuals
have fewer social contacts and less integrated social
networks relative to non-depressed individuals
(e.g., Billings & Moos, 1984; Gotlib & Lee,
1989), and they engage in negative interpersonal
behaviours that can lead to rejection by others (e.g.,
Joiner, 1995). Indeed, the social and interpersonal
difficulties exhibited by dysphoric individuals may
be what motivates them to seek an understanding of
others’ minds (Allen & Badcock, 2003; Harkness
et al., 2010). Alternatively, having a hypersensitive
social cognition may cause the very interpersonal
rejections and conflicts that trigger more severe
depression (e.g., Potthoff, Holahan, & Joiner,
1995). As such, the above research raises the
intriguing possibility that superior theory of mind
may not translate into superior social functioning.
Understanding the motivational underpinnings of
this profile, then, becomes relevant to understanding the social cognitive basis of depression.
The above research suggests, therefore, that
depressed mood may be associated with a specific
and preferential social motivation to know others’
minds. The effect of motivation on social cognition and theory of mind has now been examined
in a number of studies. For example, in both
clinical and non-clinical samples, performance on
theory of mind and facial emotion recognition
tasks is more accurate when participants are
provided with monetary rewards for correct answers than in conditions of no reward (e.g., Klein
& Hodges, 2001). Further, studies in non-clinical
samples have shown that social motivation also has
effects on social cognition. For example, Pickett,
Gardner, and Knowles (2004) found that individuals high in a measure of social connectedness
(need to belong) were more accurate at decoding
emotion in vocal tone and facial expressions, and
showed higher empathic accuracy, than those low
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THEORY OF MIND AND MOTIVATION
in social connectedness. A number of additional
studies have found that a motivation to connect
with others induces a tendency to, and increases
accuracy of, mental state identification (see
Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010).
For their part, dysphoric individuals may engage
a theory of mind to better understand their social
relationships. Therefore, we might expect that
dysphoric individuals would be more strongly
motivated by the social rewards inherent in attending to others’ mental states, and, thus, increasing
their social motivation to attend to others’ mental
states may preferentially increase dysphoric individuals’ accuracy in decoding those mental states.
Dysphoria is a potentially powerful individual
difference framework within which to examine this
question because it characterises a unique population
who evince superior theory of mind skills.
In the current study dysphoric and non-dysphoric
individuals were randomly assigned to complete a
theory of mind decoding task under conditions of
social motivation, monetary motivation, or no
motivation. Only women were recruited in the
current study because evidence suggests that sex
differences exist in theory of mind decoding skills
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, &
Plumb, 2001). We recognised that our projected
sample size would not be powerful enough to permit
including gender as a further moderator, particularly
in the context of the 2:1 sex ratio in the prevalence of
depression and dysphoria that makes recruitment of
men very difficult. Following the hypothesis of a
dissociation in theory of mind motivation, we
predicted that dysphoric women would be more
accurate on a theory of mind decoding task under
conditions of social motivation than under conditions of monetary or no motivation. In contrast, we
predicted that non-dysphoric women would be most
accurate in their theory of mind decoding under
conditions of monetary motivation.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 95 female undergraduate students recruited from an introductory psychology
class (age range 1721; M18.2; SD 0.7).
They received course credit for their participation.
Initial recruitment was based on participants’
score on the Beck Depression Inventory-II
(BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) obtained
during a pre-screening session held at the start of
term. The pre-screen was employed to ensure that
we would be able to recruit sufficient numbers of
dysphoric women into the study.
We initially contacted and recruited 98 women
for the study: 63 women from a list of students with
pre-screen BDI-II scores at or below 12, and 35 from
a list of students with pre-screen BDI-II scores
above 12. Pre-screen BDI-II scores of our
sample ranged from 036 (M9.1, SD8.4).
Three participants were excluded from our final
sample due to anomalies during the experiment (e.g.,
did not understand instructions, took a cell-phone
call during the task). This left a final sample of 95.
Measures
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al.,
1996). The BDI-II is a 21-item questionnaire
that assesses the presence and severity of depressive
symptoms on a scale from 0 to 3, with higher scores
indicating greater severity (Cronbach’s a .95).
Group membership in the current study was based
on BDI-II scores assessed at the time of the study.
Study BDI-II scores ranged from 043 (M 12.5,
SD 10.4), and were highly correlated with the
pre-screen BDI-II scores, r(94).71, pB.001.
Based on the study BDI-II scores, we derived
two groups: dysphoric (BDI-II 12; n 44;
M20.8, SD 9.7), and non-dysphoric (BDIII 512; n 51; M5.3, SD 3.4). A cut-off of
12 was used on the BDI-II because this is the
score below which denotes ‘‘minimal’’ depressive
symptomatology according to Beck et al. (1996).
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ;
Watson & Clark, 1991). The MASQ is a 90item questionnaire that assesses depression and
anxiety symptoms on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5
(extremely). The MASQ comprises three subscales:
Anhedonic Depression (AD), which includes
symptoms unique to depression; Anxious Arousal
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2012, 26 (3)
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HARKNESS ET AL.
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(AA), which includes symptoms unique to anxiety;
and General Distress (GD), which includes symptoms common to both depression and anxiety. The
AA scale was included in the current study to
control for the effect of anxiety on theory of mind
decoding (Cronbach’s a for AA .91).
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task, Revised (‘‘Eyes
task’’; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The Eyes task is
the most widely used test of theory of mind
decoding in adults and can be used with individuals of normal intellectual capacity. The task
consists of 36 black-and-white photographs of the
eye region of the face taken from slightly above
the eyebrows to midway down the bridge of
the nose. Participants made a forced choice
between four adjectives (the standardised correct
response and three distracters) that describe the
mental state portrayed by the eyes. Each photograph was standardised to the same size (14.5
cm 5.5 cm) and centred on the computer screen
with the four adjectives placed at the four corners
of the photograph at an equal distance from the
centre of the screen. Participants responded by
pressing one of four keys (S, X, K, M) that are
spatially analogous to the location of the adjectives. The computer digitally recorded responses
and response latencies. Median response latency
was chosen as the measure of central tendency for
analysis because individual item response latencies
within participants were positively skewed. The
target adjectives are categorised into three emotional valence categories: positive (e.g., ‘‘Playful’’),
neutral (e.g., ‘‘Reflective’’), and negative (e.g.,
‘‘Upset’’). These valence categories have now
been used in several studies (Harkness et al.,
2005, Harkness et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2005). See
Figure 1a for a sample item.
Animals task (Harkness et al., 2005). The Animals task consists of 12 black-and-white photographs of different animals. Each photograph is
surrounded by four adjectives (the standardised
correct response and three distracters) that were
equidistant from the centre of the computer screen.
Participants were required to select the adjective
that best described the animal. Because the
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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2012, 26 (3)
response demands are similar to the Eyes task, the
Animals task serves as a control for the surface
characteristics of the task, namely finding and
selecting the most appropriate adjective from the
array of four. The Animals task has been used in
several studies (Harkness et al., 2005, Harkness
et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2005). See Figure 1b for a
sample item.
Motivation. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of three motivation conditions: social (15
dysphoric, 17 non-dysphoric), monetary (14 dysphoric, 16 non-dysphoric), or no motivation (15
dysphoric, 18 non-dysphoric). Social motivation
was induced by having participants read the
following paragraph adapted from Baumeister
and colleagues’ social exclusion manipulation
(e.g., Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, &
Bartels, 2007):
Figure 1. Sample items from (a) Eyes task (panicked is the
target), and (b) Animals task (ferocious is the target).
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THEORY OF MIND AND MOTIVATION
The next task is a measure of how well you’re able to
read other people’s emotions. Researchers have found
that the better a person can read emotions, the more
successful he/she is in social situations. This correlates
very highly with how satisfying a person finds his/her
social interactions. People who read emotions well tend
to have rewarding relationships throughout life. They
are more likely to have long and stable marriages and
friendships that last into later years. On the other hand,
people who read emotions poorly are more likely to end
up alone later in life and to have relationships that don’t
last as long. At the end of study, you will receive
feedback on how well you did compared to other people.
In the monetary motivation condition, participants
read a paragraph stating that for each correct
response they would receive a ticket for a monetary
draw for $250 to be held at the end of the study.
Participants in the control group received no
additional instructions. All participants were fully
debriefed of the deception at the end of the study.
Procedure
Ethical approval for this study was obtained by the
General Research Ethics Board at Queen’s University. All participants provided written informed
consent after a complete description of the study
procedures. Tasks were completed individually on a
computer. Participants first viewed instructions for
completing the Eyes and Animals tasks. They then
read their vignettes, if in the social or monetary
motivation conditions. Next, they viewed a sample
item from the Eyes task and completed a practice
trial. They then completed the Eyes and Animals
tasks. Photographs for both the Eyes and Animals
tasks were randomly interspersed and presented in a
single block of 48 randomly ordered photographs
(36 photographs for the Eyes task and 12 for the
Animals task). Finally, participants completed the
BDI-II and the MASQ.
RESULTS
Preliminary analyses
In the present sample, more participants selected
the target than would be expected by chance for
all items on the Eyes task and all items on the
Animals task (binomial tests, all ps B.0005).
Accuracy on the Eyes and Animals tasks was
defined as the percentage of items on which
participants matched the photograph stimulus to
the standardised correct adjective (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001). Sample mean accuracy was 74.2
(SD9.3) for the Eyes task, and 78.1 (SD 14.7)
for the Animals task. Eyes task accuracy was not
significantly correlated with age (r .05, p.64),
BDI-II scores (r .05, p.66), AA scores
(r .06, p.57), or median response time on
the Eyes task (r .11, p.31). Inclusion of these
variables in the models below as covariates did not
change the pattern of results. Therefore, the
uncontrolled results are presented below for ease
of interpretability.
Eyes task performance was not significantly
related to performance on the Animals task
(r .02, p.86). Further, a 2 (Group: dysphoric vs. non-dysphoric) 3 (Condition: social
motivation vs. monetary motivation vs. control)
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on Animals task
accuracy revealed no significant effect of Group,
F(2, 89) 1.23, p.27, h2 .01, or Condition,
F(2, 89) 2.18, p.12, h2 .05, nor did the
Group by Condition interaction approach significance, F(2, 89) 1.16, p.32, h2 .02.
Accuracy analyses
For the dependent variable percent accuracy on
the Eyes task, we conducted a general linear
model analysis that included an effects-coded
Group (dysphoric vs. non-dysphoric) variable
and two contrast-coded Condition variables plus
the interaction between Group and each coded
Condition variable (see Cohen, Cohen, West, &
Aiken, 2003). We specified a priori orthogonal
contrasts to test our hypothesis regarding the
interaction of group and condition. Specifically,
the first contrast-coded variable (Contrast 1)
compared the average effect of the social and
monetary motivation conditions against the control condition, and the second contrast-coded
variable (Contrast 2) compared the monetary
motivation condition against the social motivation
condition. According to our hypotheses stated
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2012, 26 (3)
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HARKNESS ET AL.
above, we expected that Group would not interact
with Contrast 1 but should interact with Contrast
2. That is, for the latter, social motivation should
be associated with better performance than monetary motivation in the dysphoric group, whereas
the reverse should be true for the non-dysphoric
group.
The main effects of Group, F(1, 89) 0.03,
MSE114.91, p.88, h2 B.001, and Contrast
2, F(1, 89) 0.24, MSE 114.91, p.63,
h2 .003, failed to reach significance. However,
Contrast 1 was significant, F(1, 89) 8.03,
MSE114.91, pB.01, h2 .08. Overall, participants were more accurate when provided with a
motivation (M76.83, SD 11.15) than not
(M70.30, SD 9.98). Further, as expected,
the interaction of Group with Contrast 1 comparing the combined motivation conditions against
control was not significant, F(1, 89) 0.11,
MSE114.91, p .74, h2 .001. However, consistent with our hypotheses, the interaction
between Group and Contrast 2 comparing the
social against the monetary motivation conditions
was significant, F(1, 89) 4.48, MSE114.91,
pB.05, h2 .05.
To follow up this significant interaction, the
social and monetary motivation conditions were
compared separately for the dysphoric and nondysphoric participants (See Figure 2a). As predicted, dysphoric participants were more accurate
in the social motivation condition than the
monetary motivation condition, F(1, 89) 3.19,
MSE114.91, pB.05, one-tailed, h2 .04, but
the opposite pattern was found for the nondysphoric participants who were more accurate
in the monetary motivation condition than the
social motivation condition, although not significantly so, F(1, 89) 1.42, MSE114.91,
p.12, one-tailed, h2 .02.
Response time analyses
The effects reported above suggest that dysphoric
participants were most accurate in their performance on the Eyes task when provided with
socially motivating cues. In contrast, non-dysphoric
participants show greatest accuracy when provided
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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2012, 26 (3)
Figure 2. Eyes task accuracy by (a) dysphoria group and
motivation condition, and (b) eyes valence and dysphoria group.
with monetary motivation. We next sought to
determine whether better performance in these
groups was associated with longer response times in
a general linear model analysis that again included
an effects-coded Group (dysphoric vs. non-dysphoric) variable and two contrast-coded Condition
variables plus the interaction between Group and
each coded Condition variable. The same a priori
orthogonal contrasts as above were specified to
examine the interaction of Group and Condition.
In this model, there was a trend for a main effect of
Group, F(1, 94) 2.98, MSE1,531,813.45,
p.09, h2 .03, such that the dysphoric participants took longer on the task than the nondysphoric participants (Ms 4864.94, 4425.09;
SDs 186.68, 173.51). However, none of
the remaining effects approached significance (all
Fs B1.2, ps.30, h2sB.02). Further, the
THEORY OF MIND AND MOTIVATION
accuracy model was robust when controlling for
response times (see above). Therefore, our results
cannot be better explained by a speedaccuracy
trade-off.
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Valence analyses
We next conducted a general linear model analysis
with the same between-subjects predictors used in
the overall accuracy analysis and with Valence
(accuracy for positive, negative, and neutral Eyes)
as a within-subjects factor. A significant Valence
main effect, F(2, 178) 9.51, MSE172.69,
pB.001, h2 .10, was qualified by a two-way
interaction of Valence by Group, F(2,
178) 4.15, MSE172.69, pB.05, h2 .05.
No other within-subjects effects were significant.
The simple Valence main effect was significant for
both dysphoric, F(2, 178) 10.09, MSE
178.00, p B.001, h2 .10, and non-dysphoric
participants, F(2, 178) 3.06, MSE178.00,
pB.05, h2 .03. Follow-up paired-samples t
tests revealed that the dysphoric participants
were significantly more accurate on the positive
eyes relative to either the neutral, t(43) 3.89,
pB.001, or negative, t(43) 4.34, p B.001, eyes.
Further, the non-dysphoric participants were less
accurate on the negative eyes relative to either the
neutral, t(50) 2.22, pB.05, or positive,
t(50) 1.88, p.07, eyes although the latter
comparison was only marginal. The pattern of
means is presented in Figure 2b.
DISCUSSION
The current study demonstrated that people can
attain very high levels of accuracy on a difficult
theory of mind task when they are motivated to
do so. Broadly speaking, our findings suggest that
individual and group differences in theory of mind
performance may stem from underlying differences in what motivates people to deploy and
sharpen their theory of mind skills. In particular,
we found evidence for a dissociation in the
motivational factors that promoted theory of
mind accuracy. Individuals with dysphoria performed best when led to believe that their
performance had implications for the success of
their interpersonal relationships. In contrast, nondysphoric individuals only improved their accuracy when money was at stake. These findings
were robust when controlling for anxiety, response
times, and performance on a control task. In
addition, we found that social motivation
increased the accuracy of mental state decoding
similarly across eyes of a positive, negative, and
neutral valence.
These findings are consistent with previous
research showing that individuals’ accuracy in
complex skills such as decoding others’ mental
states or intentions can be improved by increasing
the reward salience of the task (e.g., Klein &
Hodges, 2001; Waytz et al., 2010). Further, they
extend these results by showing that dysphoric
individuals, in particular, find social reward to be
an especially powerful motivator. In addition, our
results suggest that differences in motivation
rather than ability may underlie the enhanced
pattern of theory of mind performance in dysphoric versus non-dysphoric individuals. By making the social relevance of this skill explicit by
experimentally increasing the social salience of the
task, the performance of dysphoric individuals,
and only the dysphoric individuals, is enhanced
even further.
The current results are preliminary and need to
be replicated. Nevertheless, they are consistent
with a growing body of evidence that supports a
profile of enhanced social cognitive abilities
in individuals with sub-threshold depression.
Researchers have postulated that depressed
mood encourages a hypersensitive, analytical,
and detail-oriented approach to complex social
problems that is motivated by a desire to regain
control over the social world (e.g., Allen &
Badcock, 2003; Andrews & Thomson, 2009;
Forgas, 1995). In the current study we also found
that the dysphoric group was significantly more
accurate across motivation conditions when decoding eyes of a positive valence than eyes of
negative or neutral valence. This result is consistent with some studies of basic facial emotion
processing, more generally, which have found
deficits in the accurate recognition of sad faces
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2012, 26 (3)
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HARKNESS ET AL.
in depressed individuals (e.g., Rubinow & Post,
1992). It is also consistent with studies showing
that depressed individuals are more likely than
non-depressed individuals to judge ambiguous or
neutral faces as negative (see Bourke, Douglas, &
Porter, 2010).
The present results should be considered in the
context of the following limitations. First, this
study only examined women, thus future studies
are required to determine whether the phenomenon revealed here generalises to men. Second,
the sample comprised undergraduate students
who may not be representative of the population
of dysphoric individuals. Third, our study examined only one aspect of theory of mind
judgement*the decoding of mental states based
on eye expressions. Therefore, future research is
required to examine the hypotheses of the present
study in relation to other aspects of theory of
mind decoding (e.g., tone of voice, body posture)
and reasoning (e.g., reasoning about false beliefs).
Our findings confirm that increasing people’s
motivation to attend to mental states can increase
their accuracy in decoding those mental states.
Most intriguingly, we discovered that there are
significant individual differences in the motivational power of ‘‘love’’ versus ‘‘money’’ on theory of
mind. The ecological significance of this dissociation requires further research. For example, our
results may suggest that non-dysphoric individuals
are primarily instrumental in their approach to
social relationships (e.g., Paal & Bereczkei, 2007;
see also Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld,
2006). In contrast, dysphoric individuals may have
an intrinsic motivation to understand the minds of
others. This is intriguing given that individuals
with dysphoria show impairments in their interpersonal functioning and are vulnerable to developing more severe depression (Potthoff et al.,
1995). This raises the paradoxical possibility that
dysphoric individuals’ strong motivation to understand other minds comes at a cost to their actual
social functioning. Future research, then, should
potentially refocus on how dysphoric individuals’
difficulties in social relationships stem not from
social cognitive deficits, but rather from maladaptive strengths.
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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2012, 26 (3)
Manuscript received 8 December
Revised manuscript received 10 May
Manuscript accepted 11 May
First published online 7 July
2010
2011
2011
2011
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