Download Geopolitics of Democracy and Dynamics of Emotions (Positive and

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Geopolitics of Democracy and Dynamics of Emotions
(Positive and Negative)
DRAFT
Jean-Marc Coicaud
The focus of this essay is Geopolitics of Democracy and Dynamics of Emotions
(Positive and Negative). It is part of the research I am currently developing in
the context of two related book-projects that I am preparing for Cambridge
University Press. One book-project deals with global justice in relation with the
nature and evolution of the contemporary international system. And the other
book-project focuses on the role of emotions and passions in contemporary
politics, especially at the international level. The book also reflects on the
emotional foundations of the sense of justice, and injustice. Parts of these two
projects have already been published in articles and book-chapters. Also, with
colleagues I will be releasing soon a book on emotions in international politics,
with Cambridge University Press.
Incidentally, while these two projects are theoretical in nature, they also factor
in Asia, more specifically the role of Asia in the evolution of the contemporary
international system and the role of emotions and psychology in the relations
among countries in Northeast Asia and with the rest of the world.
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That said, the essay is organized in four sections. The first section clarifies the
connection that exists between democracy and emotions. The second section
highlights the geopolitical dimension of democracy. The third brings together
geopolitics, democracy and emotions and alludes to the fact that the articulation
of these three notions and the issues they entail helps understanding the nature
and evolution of the international system today, including in its positive and
negative aspects. Fourth, and finally, the paper finishes with connecting some
general thoughts explored in it with the question of the impact of Asia on the
evolution of the international system, for today and tomorrow.
I – Democracy and Emotions
I begin here with the relationship between democracy and emotions. And as a
way to start elucidating or clarifying this relation, I propose to focus on the
question of the classification of political regimes, including democracy, and the
place of emotions in such classification.
a) The classification of political regimes, and of democracy, and emotions
The classification of political regimes based on their respective characteristics
has been a constant concern in Western political theory and philosophy. In this
regard, iconic names and iconic works are those of Plato and The Republic,
Aristotle and The Politics, and Montesquieu and The Spirit of the Laws.
In the classifications of political regimes put forward by these authors, that
more or less in the West serve as a template for other authors’ classification of
political regime, we find grosso modo six kinds of distinctions on the basis of
which political regimes are organized, that is distinguished, defined and ranked
for their qualities or limitations.
. 1) There is the distinction between what makes a political regime just or unjust,
or more or less just or unjust, with the criteria of justice and injustice that come
with it.
. 2) There are the distinctions concerning the ends of political power and the
organization of society that correspond to them.
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. 3) There are the distinctions of means fitting the ends of political power and
their organization in a given society.
. 4) There are the distinctions concerning the identity and the number of those
who govern and of those who are governed.
. 5) There are the institutional arrangements that help to structure the
relationships between the governors and the governed, between those who are
in charge and those who are asked to follow.
. 6) Finally, there are the distinctions that allow distinguishing and identifying
the various social groups that exist within the society and that are meant to echo
and fit the political and legal organization of power that overview the life of and
life in society.
It is on these sorts of distinctions that, each in its own way, Plato, Aristotle and
Montesquieu and, following them, other authors in Western thought organize
the types of political regimes.
It is on the basis of these distinctions and their modalities and combinations
that Plato both distinguishes and identifies the ideal polity in contrast with the
concrete and more or less imperfect polities that the aristocratic, oligarchic,
democratic and tyrannical regimes are.
It is on the basis of these distinctions and their modalities and combinations
that Aristotle both distinguishes and identifies in his own way the three types of
political regimes (what he calls constitutions) that royalty, aristocracy, and
republic are, and their deviations that tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy
constitute.
And it is on the basis as well of these distinctions that Montesquieu distinguishes
and identifies his three types of government: republican (which includes
democracy), monarchic, and despotic.
Incidentally, on this issue of classification of types of political regimes, I do not
know enough to say whether or not similar distinctions are used in the moral
and political philosophy traditions of the Asian region to classify political
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regimes. But it would be interesting to look into this, in particular in the
framework of comparative political philosophy and theory.
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In any case, and this is the key point here, these types of distinctions and the
classifications of political regimes that come with them are not all there is to the
identification of various political regimes. In fact, accompanying them are
regimes of values and regimes of interests, but also regimes of emotions.
In particular, along with the classification of political regimes there is the
celebration of certain values and emotions, and the rejection of certain values
and emotions.
This is to say that the classification of political regimes always conveys valuejudgements on the right and wrong values. And it conveys as well judgements
on right and wrong emotions, to be understood as positive and negative
emotions, the first ones meant to be celebrated, and the second ones meant to
be condemned.
For instance, classically, tyranny is described as having ruthlessness and
disregard for the rights and interests of people as central values, and fear all
around (fear in heart of the tyrant and fear in the heart subjected to its rule) as
one of its key emotions.
And we could identify as well values and emotions and regimes of values and
regimes of emotions for the other types of regimes. In other words, regimes of
emotions, regimes of right and wrong emotions, regimes of positive and
negative emotions are part of the classification and ranking of types of political
regimes and, as such, they are a very significant way to analyze and understand
how political regimes emerge, persist, change, and die.
In their classification of political regimes, Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu and
other Western political philosophers –such as Spinoza to mention another
famous name – have recognized this importance of emotions. For this is largely
in connection with emotions, with their help, that they build their moral views
on political regimes, of political regimes responding to and satisfying or not,
and to what extent, the needs and rights of people.
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It could be that the same exists in the moral and political philosophy of the East,
in Chinese philosophy and others.
But for some reason, in the Western tradition, the centrality of emotions for
analyzing and understanding the nature and evolution of political regimes has
often, in the past and today still, not received the kind of attention and
theorization by political theorists and philosophers that it deserves.
Rationalism and then, in more recent years, positivism and scientism contribute
much to explain this state of affairs.
This is a pity because emotions, the fabric of emotions and the evolution of
emotions experienced by people, individually and collectively, tell us something
valid, something true, so to speak, on the nature and state of political regimes,
of societies and the relations among them.
Interestingly, this is particularly the case for democracy, both in the national
and international contexts.
b) The centrality of emotions in democracy
There are of course many ways that can be used to show the importance of
emotions in democracy. But the centrality of emotions in democratic regimes
starts with its culture of values as culture of rights. Indeed, we can say that the
democratic culture of values as cultures of rights contributes to the centrality
of emotions in three main ways.
. First, democratic core values and the democratic culture of rights they amount
to, have a universal and universalizing dimension. They are meant to be
applicable to all.
In the process, the emotions, the regime of emotions associated with democratic
values and rights spread to all, inform the identity and relations of all actors.
Think about one of the core values of democracy, equality, with its meanings of
equality of being, of equality of access to opportunities, of equality before law.
Among other things, this is a value that largely explains the almost universal
intellectual and emotional appeal of democracy.
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. Second, the central aspects of emotions in democracy concerns the fact that
democratic values, and therefore emotions associated with democratic values,
are positive and therefore inspiring, which makes them easy to identify with,
intellectually and emotionally.
They are positive in the sense that they are geared towards empowering
individuals and society in concrete and emotional terms, in the sense that they
are geared towards making people and societies better, more the agents of their
fate. The centrality, indeed the imperative pursuit of emotions of happiness in
the value and emotional repertoire of democracy, is a case in point.
. But, third, the inspiring appeal of democratic values is also what can turn the
centrality of emotions into negative emotions.
Democratic values create intellectual and emotional expectations that, if not
met, can generate negative values and emotions that can end up shaping the
whole social relations, in the process undermining the very idea and possibility
of democracy. Today, emotions, passions and ideologies of disenchantment and
resentment in Europe, labeled under the name of “populism”, are part of this
story.
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Probably nobody more than Tocqueville has described the centrality of
emotions in connection with values in the democratic regime, how they inform
the whole democratic society, and this in positive as well as in negative terms.
In his book Democracy in America, Tocqueville describes for example the
positive emotions that come with the principle of equality that give the idea and
the feeling that things are possible, that there is no social, normative or
emotional barrier that impede the exercise of agency.
On the negative side, Tocqueville also shows that the value of equality can lead
people to experience negative emotions, especially when it is connected. The
emotions of envy and jealousy, triggered by the dynamics of comparison makes
all the more possible, and can be part of this painful experience.
c) Emotions and democracy, from the national to the international
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Of course, such centrality of emotions in democracy, linked to the universal
characters of democratic values and rights, and their possible translations in
positive and negative emotions, does not unfold only at the national level. It also
shapes the international level as well.
For instance, starting in the 18th century the spread of democracy, of its values
and emotions, of its ethical and political values and emotions, has quickly
extended beyond national borders and become so influential that it has
contributed to the remaking of countries and their relations around the world.
As we know, this has not been an entirely happy story that is it is made of
positive and negative elements. This brings us to the second point of my
presentation, dealing with the geopolitical dimension of democracy, or the
geopolitics of democracy.
II – The Geopolitical Dimension of Democracy
I will be shorter here since this section is more like a bridge, as a way to bring
together geopolitics, democracy, and emotions, which will be the focus of the
third section of the essay. Let us start with clarifying what is meant by
geopolitics.
Geopolitics is a term that was often used in Western Europe, especially in the
late 19th century and early 20th century, but that we do not use much today. This
is in part the case because of the bad reputation the term “geopolitics” has
acquired through its use by German scholars and policy-makers in the years
prior to World War I in the context of the German foreign policy of
Machtpolitik and Weltpolitik (“power politics” and “world politics”.
And yet this term “geopolitics” is useful. It is useful in the sense that, beyond its
German use, it also refers to the inscription of power into the geography of the
world, in the sense that, as such, it refers to at least two considerations: the
projection and translation of a given power into space; and the use of space to
express and develop power –economic, military, political, and even normative
power.
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In this perspective, we can argue that, historically, democracy has been part of
a geopolitical project and enterprise. This is the case for two reasons. The first
reason concerns the fact that democracy is not a pure type of political regime,
so to speak, entirely and fully dedicated to the fulfillment of the democratic
ideals and ideas. Democracy is an hybrid. It is a political and normative hybrid
that constitutes a type of political regimes carrying and projecting, nationally
and internationally, as much democratic values and norms as power and
interests –power and interests that themselves are far from being very
democratic because they are self-serving. In other words the projection of
democratic values is never so democratic that it is void of national interest and
power politic considerations.
This is the case for small democratic powers; and this is all the more the case
for powerful democratic states.
This is to say that, historically, politically and normatively, there is a
fundamental ambiguity, and perhaps contradiction, at the heart of democratic
power and ideals/ideas and their projection, especially when it comes to big
democratic powers.
Here, think about the ambiguous foreign policy and track record of the United
States today. While exporting democratic values, it is also projecting its power
and interests, including the power of its democratic values and norms and its
repertoire of ethical and political emotions and passions, with these
contributing to the expansion of its sphere of influence.
. The second reason accounting for the fact that democracy has a geopolitical
dimension derives from the hybrid dimension of democracy that I just alluded
to. And it concerns the fact that based on what I just said about the ambiguity
of democratic power, the expansion of democratic values in the past two
centuries cannot be seen as an exclusively neutral and positive enterprise for the
world. This expansion of democratic values also expresses geopolitical interests
and has contributed to create a world map in the context of which Western
powers have largely managed to shape the geography of the world to their
image and interest. The strong link existing in the modern era between
capitalism and democracy, with the difficulty of knowing which one of these
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two regimes (capitalism, democracy) is serving the other, is both an illustration
and a demonstration of this state of affairs.
This, arguably, leads us to conclude that the geopolitics of democracy is from
the start and all the way to today, a constant oscillation, never fully settled,
between humanism and predation –and an oscillation inscribed into the
geography of the world. Needless to say, this state of affairs is prone to
undermine the ethical and political claims of being right of the democratic
project.
I go back to this issue in a minute. Indeed, I intend now to expand on the issue
in more specific terms in the third part of my presentation, by focusing on
geopolitics, democracy and emotions.
III – Geopolitics, Democracy and Emotions
So far, we have seen that emotions are part of the method to classify the political
regimes. We have also seen that emotions are a central factor in democracy,
nationally and internationally. In this regard, in addition we have seen that the
geopolitics of democracy at the international level ends up being an oscillation
between humanism and predation. So, against this background, what we have
now to think about is the three following questions:
First: To what extent is the international projection of democracy serving
power and/or serving democracy?
Second: To what extent is the current international projection of democracy
bringing about positive and negative emotions, and passions?
Third: if the current international projection of democracy gives primacy to
power and negative emotions and passions, how to rectify and overcome this
state of affairs to give primacy to democracy and positive emotions and passions?
These three questions are among the key contemporary questions of global
moral and political theory and, more specifically, of democratic global theory.
To answer them we need to touch upon three considerations:
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To begin with, we have to be aware of the fact that at the international level the
commitment of democracy to democracy and its values and emotions of
empathy is very limited; we have to be aware of the fact that the geopolitics of
national interest and self-centered values and emotions prevail.
Moreover, there is the fact that democracy, in part because of its failings and
betrayals of its ideals, internationally and nationally, appears to be less and less
able to generate an identification with its inclusive and universal values, and
therefore more and more inclined to facilitate the development of negative
values and emotions, nationally and internationally.
Finally, we have to think about how to reconnect the international projection
of democracy with a geopolitics of democracy that would be more a projection
of democracy and less a projection of power, and able as such to nurture the
development of positive emotions and passions internationally.
a) The limited commitment of democracy to values and emotions of empathy
Since I just said that a democratic regime is an hybrid, made of power
considerations and democratic concerns, at home and abroad, it is not
surprising that I say that internationally the commitment of democratic powers,
especially big democratic powers, is quite limited. In the end, when these
powers have to choose between the logic of their national interest and the logic
of international responsibility and solidarity, represented by human rights and
expressing values and emotions of empathy, most of the time they prefer the
former to the latter.
This is to say that in the foreign policy of democratic powers the values and
emotions of empathy are at best marginal. Having worked for the United
Nations in the 1990s and the 2000s, I was well-placed to see this in the context
of the humanitarian crises and even genocides of the period, in Rwanda in
particular. Such crises did not trigger much action from democratic leading
countries of the United Nations, like the United States, France and the United
Kingdom.
In Syria, with now more than 200,000 civilians dead after four years of war, the
quasi inaction of the international community is another case in point of the
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limited commitment of democracies to values and emotions of empathy,
responsibility and solidarity beyond borders. And of course we could find
multiple examples of this situation.
b) Democracy and negative emotions
Now, what about democracy and what seems to be the current spread of
negative emotions, nationally and internationally? To be sure, democracy is
usually viewed as being deeply connected, at the national and international
levels, with positive values and emotions. On the other hand, it is not as if
democratic values and emotions could not make room for or even turn into
negative emotions and passions, i.e. emotions and passions that exclude and
denigrate others. This can be the case, and is often the case today.
. At the individual and national/collective levels, as I alluded to earlier, the rise
of populism and ideologies and policies – with the emotions and passions of
rejection of the other that are now part of the national landscape in a number
of European countries, including France and the United States (think about
Donald Trump in the context of the presidential campaign –, so the rise of
populism and ideologies is too a large extent a product of the crisis of political
representation, of the loss of credibility and legitimacy of mainstream elites in
these countries.
But, more broadly, it is also an indication of the failures of democracies, of the
growing gap between the aspirations created by democratic values and the
inability of democratic regimes to fulfill intellectually and emotionally the
aspirations they create.
. But it is also at the international level that democratic values lead to the
production of negative emotions and passions. With the hybrid nature of
democratic power to which we have referred earlier, the fact that power is
prone to prevail over democratic considerations tends to intellectually and
emotionally discredit the foreign policy of democratic powers but also
democratic values themselves, as they appear the captives and the vectors of
power as well.
c) The geopolitics of democracy beyond negative emotions
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Now, if there is some truth in this diagnosis, then the question becomes: how to
overcome this state of affairs and ensure that the geopolitics of democracy goes
beyond the negative emotions and passions that now divide the zones and areas
of conflict?
In order to answer fully this question, we would have to address it in terms of
co-responsibility at the world level –co-responsibility for the currently
democratic and non-democratic regimes, since both have to reform their ways.
But to answer this question by focusing specifically on the democratic side of
the political spectrum, especially when it comes to big democratic powers, we
have, at minimum, to push forward in three directions.
. First, the gap between the reality of the current international system and the
ethics of its democratic values has to be reduced. This entails making
international order, its law, ethics and emotions less the captive of the selfcentered and self-serving philosophies, interests and emotional worldview of
the powerful, including the most powerful democratic countries.
. Second, the democratic values and emotions supporting a more inclusive ethics
of and in the international system have to be enhanced. Among other things,
this entails finding a better formulation and balance between the ethics, politics,
emotions and passions of national sovereignty, on the one hand, and the ethics,
politics and emotions and passions of human rights, on the other.
. Third, democratic values and the emotions associated with them have to be
called upon at the international level in a non-righteous way. They should be
able to help drawing the lines between what is right and what is wrong on the
basis of a sense of reflection and self-awareness mindful of the points of view
and emotions of those at the receiving end of history.
IV – Asia and the Way Forward
I finish this essay with bringing together some of the general issues I addressed
so far and the place of Asia in the international system and its evolution. And
here, in doing so, I want to focus on whether or not there is a chance that in the
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near future the international system and its actors could identify, including
emotionally, with a China eager to serve as a global political power and eager
to alter significantly the international system. This is one of the questions that
one has to think about concerning the geopolitics, democracy and regimes of
emotions of tomorrow.
And here I just wish to limit myself to examining if it will be possible for China
to project internationally values and emotions that could generate identification
of others with them, so that these values and emotions could become a source
of soft power and a basis for the transformation of the international order.
It happens that concerning this issue, I tend to think that it is quite improbable
that China will succeed in generating global intellectual and emotional
identification, and therefore will be able transform substantially the
international system on its terms. And I tend to think that this is the case in part
due to the value and emotional factor.
In this regard, the current predicament of China is somewhat reminiscent of
the one of Japan in the 1980s. At the time you will recall that analysts, in awe
with its post-World War II rapid economic recovery and rise, saw it possible
that Japan would surpass the United States. We all know that this did not
happen. And it did not happen in part because of a value and emotional issue.
The values at the core of Japan’s identity and the modalities and high level of
national integration that accompany them, including with the formulation of
and relation with the “other” beyond borders, insist much on the unique and
different character of the country and its culture. This becomes an obstacle for
other people to identify with them and embrace them, and vice versa. In other
words, the terms of Japanese exceptionalism are too inward looking and
homogeneous to easily permit others to recognize themselves in them, embrace
them and make them theirs, so that it could become a possible value and
emotional basis for a reformed paradigm of international order on Japanese
terms. Regardless of the other factors that also make it improbable for China
to be in the position of shaping the international system in a very significant
fashion, China is in a somehow similar situation. Four types of obstacles,
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especially, stand in the way of the universalization, including the emotional
universalization of Chinese values.
. First, at the most general level, there is always the uphill battle that replacing
an international order and the paradigm of values and emotions that comes
with it, constitutes. This order has truly to be exhausted to render acceptable
the costs of upheaval associated with a deep restructuration of the international
system.
. Second, considering the shaky character of the domestic credibility of the
Chinese regime, one wonders how this regime and its values exported into the
international system could be emotionally so attractive that they would be taken
on board internationally.
. Third, this is all the more the case since the values China stands for at home
are lacking clarity. The deep and rapid transformations the country has gone
through since the late 1970s (to not speak of the previous decades) is not without
having introduced a state of value and emotional fragmentation and confusion,
including with the unsettled mixture of communism, capitalism and
Confucianism. This is an obstacle to an effective intellectual and emotional
projection in the international realm.
. Fourth, a political regime shaped by authoritarian values and emotions is not
well-placed to generate a type of soft power able to contribute to a stable and
credible international identification.
It is on this China note concerning the future of geopolitics, democracy and
emotions, and what we can guess of their implications for the region and the
international system, that I end this essay.
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