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Overview of the 1862 StonewallJackson Valley Campaign
T
he campaign conducted
by Maj. Gen. Thomas
"Stonewall" Jackson in
the Shenandoah Valley
in the spring of 1862 is considered one of the most brilliant in
United States, if not world, military
history. Vastly outnumbered, and
at times facing three Union armies, Jackson managed in less
than three months to march his
Army of the Valley hundreds of
miles and fight a series of engagements (including five pitched
battles) in a masterpiece of military art that ultimately created a
grand diversion which tied up
thousands of Union troops threatening Richmond.
Located west of the Blue
Ridge Mountains, the Shenandoah Valley became a major theater
of operations throughout the Civil
War. Principally, its geological
formation (running northeast to
southwest) provided an avenue of
invasion and counter-invasion for
the opposing armies. Additionally,
its fertile soil made it one of the
most important wheat producing
areas of the entire south; literally
the "Breadbasket of the Confederacy" whose crops and other produce fed numerous Confederate
armies in the field.
In the spring of 1862,
however, other events occurred
throughout the South that thrust
the Valley into a more prominent
role. Union war efforts that winter
and spring had led to significant
gains along the Atlantic seaboard
and Mississippi River (including
the capture of New Orleans). In
Virginia, the situation appeared
equally grim, as the western part
of the state had fallen under Union control. This was followed by
the Army of the Potomac's Peninsula campaign, which consisted
of a Union army of 100,000 men
(commanded by Maj. Gen.
George B. McClellan) threatening
Richmond from the southeast.
This plan also called for Gen. Irvin
McDowell, with 30,000 men near
Fredericksburg, to advance on
Richmond from the north.
As McClellan's Peninsula
Campaign began its advance towards Richmond, a Union force of
35,000 men under Gen. Nathaniel
Banks marched into Winchester
in early March. Concerned about
the lack of protection for Washington, D.C., however, President
Lincoln soon ordered troops from
Banks' army in the Valley to the
capitol's defenses. Within a week
more of Banks' forces followed.
These moves drastically reduced
Banks' army from 35,000 to 9,000
men.
Prompted by Gen. Robert
E. Lee, military advisor to Confederate president Jefferson Davis,
to create a strategic diversion in
the Shenandoah Valley, Confederate Gen. Thomas "Stonewall"
Jackson instead unleashed a vigorous offensive that ultimately
paralyzed the Union high command in Washington, kept
McDowell
in
Fredericksburg
(preventing him from joining
McClellan's offensive against
Richmond), and thus wrested the
Continued on page 2
The
Wright stuff
Stonewall Jackson and the 1862
Battle of McDowell, VA
Keven M. Walker is the Chief Executive Officer of the Shenandoah Valley
Battlefields Foundation. Mr. Walker came to
the Foundation from the Antietam National
Battlefield, where he served for 11 years as a
Ranger, a Cultural Resources Specialist and
the Acting Cultural Resources Program Manager.
During that time, Walker served as
a member of the National Park Service’s
national advisory team on cultural resources
and historic preservation and was selected
for the GOAL academy, the NPS’s highly competitive leadership program. Says Edwin C.
Bearss, Chief Historian Emeritus of the National Park Service, “Keven Walker’s work
has been exemplary; ranking him with the
best historic preservation professionals I
have known since I began my career.”
Walker was formerly the Executive
Director of The Walker Foundation for Historic Preservation in Charles Town, West
Virginia. He has appeared on several Maryland Public Television documentaries focusing on the Antietam battlefield as well as
historic homes in Washington County, Maryland. He is the author of “Antietam: A Guide
to the Landscape and Farmsteads,” pub-
lished in 2010.
February Meeting
Monday, February 20
ROTUNDA ROOM, WCBR
6 PM Dinner
7 PM Meeting Begins
initiative away from the entire Federal campaign.
As Stonewall Jackson's
small army of approximately 3,500
men marched north from Mt. Jackson on March 22, Confederate cavalry commanded by Col. Turner
Ashby engaged elements of Union
Gen. James Shields' division on the
southern outskirts of Winchester.
The skirmish on the 22nd, as well
as intelligence gathered from civilians, prompted Ashby to believe
that Union forces were leaving the
Valley and that only a token force
remained. Based on Ashby's information, which later proved false,
Jackson determined to strike.
The 1st Battle of Kernstown
occurred on March 23, 1862 and
resulted in a Union victory. This was
Jackson's only tactical loss during
the campaign. Although he was defeated, Jackson's aggressiveness
caused great alarm in Washington.
Believing Jackson had a large number of men, Lincoln redirected thousands of Union soldiers back to the
Valley. Although this battle was a
tactical loss, Jackson achieved his
objective by diverting the Federals
from Richmond.
Following his defeat at
Kernstown, Jackson retreated up
the Valley to Swift Run Gap, where
he was reinforced by Maj. Gen.
Richard Ewell's division. As part of
the Federal campaign to capture the
Shenandoah Valley in 1862, Federal Gen. John C. Fremont moved to
threaten the Valley from what is
now West Virginia. Leaving Ewell in
the Valley to counter Banks' force,
Jackson then cleverly deceived the
Federals by marching the rest of his
small army to the east, and out of
the Valley towards Richmond. He
then returned his troops to the Valley quickly and secretly by rail to
Staunton, in order to launch an unexpected counter offensive against
Fremont. Jackson surprised the
vanguard of Fremont's army
(commanded by Maj. Gen. Robert
Milroy) on May 8th at the Battle of
McDowell.
Jackson's
victory
forced Milroy’s army to retreat westward.
At this point in the cam-
paign, Jackson now had 17,000
men in his ranks. His next movement was directed northward
against Banks, whose main force
was located at Strasburg. Taking
advantage of the Valley's unique
geography, Jackson side-stepped
Banks by marching the bulk of his
army across the Massanutten
Mountain, a 60 mile range that
splits the Valley lengthwise, and
into the Page (or Luray) Valley.
Jackson's objective was a small
Union outpost at Front Royal, located at the northern end of the
Massanutten. Jackson struck by
surprise on May 23rd and quickly
overwhelmed the Front Royal garrison. Finding Jackson in his rear,
and threatening his line of supply
and retreat, Banks had no choice
but to order a rapid retreat to Winchester, in hopes of making a
stand there. Before Banks could
reach Winchester, however, Jackson with a detachment of infantry,
cavalry, and artillery cut into the
retreating Union column in Middletown on May 24th. The Federals at the head of the line continued north to Winchester, and the
column behind fled west out of the
Valley. Jackson hoped to follow up
his victory and pursue Banks to
Winchester, but some of the Confederate troops began to loot the
wagons they had captured. This
lost momentum allowed the remainder of Banks forces to safely
reach Winchester that night.
To regain his momentum,
Jackson attacked Winchester the
following morning on May 25th.
Jackson's success at the Battle of
Winchester caused Banks to
withdraw towards Harper's Ferry
and continue his flight into Maryland.
Although outnumbered and
facing two Union armies, Jackson
had cleared the Shenandoah Valley of all Federal troops in just over
two weeks. These battles also
completed his primary objective of
diverting Federal forces away from
their main offensive against Richmond. The stunning Confederate
victories at Front Royal and Winchester, and others that followed
throughout the remainder of the
campaign, began to establish
the "legend" of the great
"Stonewall" Jackson.
Reacting to Jackson's
presence along the Potomac
River, Lincoln devised a plan to
destroy the Confederate Army
of the Valley. The President ordered three Union columns to
converge on the Valley and trap
Jackson. "Stonewall" saw the
threats approaching and quickly
withdrew. Jackson marched his
men hard, hoping to escape the
three-pronged Union pincer that
was converging on Strasburg, to
cut off his retreat. Banks pursed
Jackson from the rear while
Fremont threatened from the
west, and Maj. Gen. James
Shields's Union force approached from the east. Jackson's bedraggled men barely
cleared the town on June 1 as
the Union columns converged
behind them. Following his narrow escape Jackson continued
his rapid march southward up
the Valley.
Upon reaching Port Republic, a small hamlet at the
southern end of the Massanutten, Jackson decided to
stand and fight. By controlling
the only bridges that spanned
the South Fork here, Jackson
prevented the Union columns
from uniting, and thus he saw
an opportunity to strike at each
separately. As Fremont was
closer, Jackson's plan was to
attack and overwhelm him first,
and then turn back to defeat
Shields. The Battle of Cross
Keys occurred on June 8th.
The fighting ended with the
darkness which allowed the
Confederates to maintain their
hold on the field and kept the
Union columns from uniting.
Having successfully held
off Fremont, Jackson quickly
turned his attention to Shield's
smaller force at the Battle of
Port Republic on June 9th.
Jackson's plan was to leave
Ewell at Cross Keys to hold
back Fremont, and then concenContinued on page 3
2
trate the rest of his army against
Shields at Port Republic and
quickly crush him with overwhelming numbers. The logistics
of moving most of his men from
Cross Keys to, and then beyond,
Port Republic, however, proved
more difficult than Jackson had
anticipated. The day did not go
according to plan but Jackson
still managed to win his second
battle in two days, successfully
capping his brilliant spring campaign in the Valley. The retreat
of both Fremont and Shields allowed Jackson the freedom to
leave the Valley a week later and
join Gen. Robert E. Lee's besieged army near the Confederate capitol at Richmond.
Battle of Cross Keys
Jackson's Valley Campaign was an absolute success.
In thirty days, Jackson's men
covered 350 miles, defeated
three Union commands in five
battles, caused 5,000 casualties
at a loss of only 2,000 men, and
captured much needed supplies.
More importantly Jackson had
accomplished his main objective
of keeping nearly 60,000 Federal
soldiers occupied in the Valley
rather than advancing on Richmond in conjunction with McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. The
1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign made "Stonewall" Jackson
the most celebrated soldier in
the Confederacy (until he was
eclipsed by General Robert E.
Lee) and greatly lifted the morale
of the Southern home front.
SOURCE: https://www.nps.gov/
cebe/learn/historyculture/
overview-of-the-1862-stonewalljackson-valley-campaign.htm
Charlottesville Albemarle
Civil
War
Round
Ta b l e
Launches New Web
Site
The Charlottesville Albemarle Civil War Round Table is
pleased to announce the launch
of its new web site. The site is
hosted by Non Profit Dynamics of
Charleston, South Carolina.
The site includes numerous new capabilities for keeping
Round Table members informed
of current events in the organization, as well as Civil War related
events in the surrounding area.
Round Table members
have access to the entire membership roster, a calendar of
coming events, full descriptions
of the speakers and their topics,
and the ability to register for upcoming lecture dinner reservations. While the site suggests
mailing
dinner
reservation
checks, we will continue to accept payment via cash or check
at the meeting.
Please visit the new site
at your earliest opportunity. The
address is
charlottesvillecwrt.org
Upcoming
Feb. 20 Keven Walker: Stonewall Jackson and the 1862
Battle Of McDowell, VA
ROTUNDA ROOM
Westminster Canterbury
of the Blue Ridge, Pantops
See: charlottesvillecwrt.org
Dinner Menu: Choice of
prime rib, salmon, or crab
cakes
Dinner is optional,
but reservations are required.
Please respond to
Sandy von Thelen
971-8567 (W) or 202-7064 (H)
or make your reservation on the
webpage
The Picket Post
The monthly newsletter of the Charlottesville-Albemarle County Civil War
Round Table.
Officers:
President, Peyton Humphrey
Vice President, Jim Donahue
Treasurer, Sandy von Thelen
After Action Reports, Sandy von Thelen
Program Chairman, Sandy von Thelen
Newsletter Production, Duncan Campbell
Web Page Liaison, Duncan Campbell
Mailing Address:
CWRT
13 Canterbury Road
Charlottesville, VA, 22903
Telephone: (434) 202-7064
The Picket Post | February 2017
3
A Misrepresentation:
Sheridan’s Reaction to
Painting of Himself Riding the Battle Line At Cedar Creek
When Sheridan saw this
now widely publicized painting of
himself riding along the line of
battle to inspire the men at Cedar
Creek and show that he had returned to the army, he reacted
vociferously to its inaccuracies.
“Now just look,” said
Sheridan, “and see how blank ridiculous that man has made me
appear. Here I am represented as
riding down the line with a flag in
my hand and a whole regiment of
cavalry as my escort. Why, blank,
blank, blank, I’m made to appear
like a blank fool. Now the truth is I
rode down the line with ‘Tony’
Forsyth; that was all there was to
it. No flag. No escort.”
Soon after, Sheridan read
an article describing his reaction
to the artwork. His response: “I
wouldn’t have cared so much
about it except that [it] makes me
swear so [much]. People will think
I am in the habit of swearing.
Why, blank, blank, blank, you
know that isn’t so.”
Note that “Tony Forsyth”
was Col. James Forsyth, Sheridan’s
Chief-of-Staff. The ride along the
battle line had been the brainchild
of another staff officer. Major
George “Sandy” Forsyth (no relation to James) had been the one
who suggested that Sheridan
show himself to the men when he returned to the Army at Cedar Creek.
Sheridan’s appearance along
the line of battle rejuvenated the rank
and file of the Army of the Shenandoah. Lt. Col. Moses Granger of the
122nd Ohio, Sixth Army Corps recalled
the scene:
General Sheridan came riding
along the line, just in my rear, as I
was sitting on a stump, he drew rein,
returned our salutes, gave a quick
look at the me, and said, ‘You look all
right, boys! We’ll whip ’em like h–l
before night.’ At this hearty cheers
GENERAL PHILIP SHERIDAN
broke out, and he rode on passing
from the rear to the front of our line
through the right-wing of my regiment, and thence westward followed
ever by cheers.”
Instantly all thought of merely
defeating an attack upon us ended. In
its stead was a conviction that we
were to attack and defeat them that
very afternoon. All were sure that
“Little Phil” would make it impossible
for the enemy to turn our flank, and
easy for us to turn theirs.”
Scott Patchan
SOURCE:
https://
shenandoah1864.wordpress.com/
THE BATTLE OF McDOWELL, VA
A PREVIEW
Some historians consider the
battle of McDowell the beginning of
Jackson’s 1862 Valley Campaign, while
others prefer to include the First Battle
of Kernstown, Stonewall’s only defeat.
The battle of McDowell is studied today
by military historians for several reasons. At the tactical level, it can be argued that the Union forces achieved a
draw. Milroy’s “spoiling attack” sur
prised Jackson, seized the initiative, and
inflicted heavier casualties, but did not
drive the Confederates from their position. At the strategic level, the battle of
McDowell and the resultant withdrawal
of the Union army was an important
victory for the South. The battle
demonstrated Jackson’s strategy of
concentrating his forces against a numerically inferior foe, while denying his
enemies the chance to concentrate
against him. Jackson rode the momentum of his strategic win at McDowell to
victory at Front Royal (May 23) and First
Winchester (May 25).
SOURCE:
https://www.nps.gov/abpp/
shenandoah/svs3-2.html
INCLEMENT WEATHER?
Check the meeting status with
Sandy von Thelen
971-8567 or 202-7064
4